1. Bonrostro vs.   LunaG.R. No. 172346, July 24, 2013

Facts:   Luna, as buyer, entered into a contract to sell with Bliss Development Corporation involving a house. A year after, Luna sold it to Bonrostro. In the agreement, it was stipulated x x x [I]n the event the VENDEE fails to pay the second installment on time, [t]he VENDEE will pay starting May 1, 1993 a 2% interest on the P300,000.00 monthly.  Likewise, in the event the VENDEE fails to pay the amount of P630,000.00 on the stipulated time, this CONTRACT TO SELL shall likewise be deemed cancelled and rescinded and x x x 5% of the total contract price [of] P1,250,000.00 shall be deemed forfeited in favor of the VENDOR.  Unpaid monthly amortization shall likewise be deducted from the initial down payment in favor of the VENDOR. After execution of the contract, Bonrostro took possession of the property. However, except for P200,000.00 downpayment, she failed to pay subsequent amortization. Luna then filed before the RTC a Complaint for Rescission of Contract and Damages. This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of CA affirming with modification the decision of RTC in favor herein respondents.

Issue:  Whether or not delay in the payment of installment is a substantial breach of obligation as to warrant its rescission.

Ruling:   No, in a contract to sell, payment of the price is a positive suspensive condition. Failure of which is not a breach of contract warranting rescission under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, but rather just an event that prevents the supposed seller from being bound to convey title to the supposed buyer. The contract to sell entered by the parties refers to real property on installment basis, in which Art. 1191 cannot apply since they are governed by the Maceda Law. However, there being no breach, Bonrostro is still not excused from being made liable for interest on the installments due from the date of default until fully paid. Tender of payment, a manifestation by the debtor of a desire to comply with or pay an obligation, asserted by Bonrostro for the accrual of interest to be suspended is not a valid defense because for a tender of payment to take effect it must be accompanied by the means of payment and debtor must take immediate step to make a consignation, the deposit of the proper amount with a judicial authority, then interest is suspended from the time of such tender.

2. J PLUS ASIA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. UTILITY ASSURANCE CORPORATION G.R. No. 199650               June 26, 2013

Facts: On the target date as specified in the Construction Agreement, Mabunay accomplished only 31.39% of the construction; hence, petitioner terminated their contract and sent demand letters to Mabunay and respondent surety. But as the demands went unheeded, petitioner filed a Request for Arbitration before the CIAC who rendered its Decision in favor of petitioner. The CA reversed the CIAC’s ruling that Mabunay had incurred delay hat not all requisites in order to consider the obligor or debtor in default were present in this case

Issue: WON, MaBUNAY IS in default?

Held: Yes.

Default or mora on the part of the debtor is the delay in the fulfillment of the prestation by reason of a cause imputable to the former. It is the nonfulfillment of an obligation with respect to time. It is a general rule that one who contracts to complete certain work within a certain time is liable for the damage for not completing it within such time, unless the delay is excused or waived.

In this jurisdiction, the following requisites must be present in order that the debtor may be in default: (1) that the obligation be demandable and already liquidated; (2) that the debtor delays performance; and (3) that the creditor requires the performance judicially or extrajudicially.

3. LIM vs. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 177050               July 01, 2013

Facts: Petitioners obtained several Loans from respondent evidenced by Promissory Notes. The loans were secured by a Mortgage over real properties. Eventually, the petitioners repeated failure to pay the loan amortizations and negotiations, resulted a Restructuring Agreement. The Restructuring Agreement was cancelled by the Bank due to the failure of petitioners to comply with its conditions within a reasonable time. Petitioners filed before the RTC of General Santos City, a Complaint  for Annulment of Foreclosure. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner but the CA reversed.

Issue: Whether or not the cancellation of the Restructuring Agreement extinguished the loan obligation of the petitioner?

Held: No. Article 1186 of the Civil Code, which states that "the condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment," does not apply in this case.

Article 1186 enunciates the doctrine of constructive fulfillment of suspensive conditions, which applies when the following three (3) requisites concur, viz: (1) The condition is suspensive; (2) The

obligor actually prevents the fulfillment of the condition; and (3) He acts voluntarily. Suspensive condition is one the happening of which gives rise to the obligation. It will be irrational for any Bank to provide a suspensive condition in the Promissory Note or the Restructuring Agreement that will allow the debtor-promisor to be freed from the duty to pay the loan without paying it.

4. MANILA BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. ABAN G.R. No. 175666               July 29, 2013

Facts: Sotero took out a life insurance policy from Petitioner designating respondent Aban, as her beneficiary. When Sotero died, respondent filed a claim for the insurance proceeds. Petitioner denied the claim after finding that Sotero was incapable to neither apply nor pay for the insurance; it then filed a civil case for rescission and/or annulment of the policy. The RTC favored ABAN. The CA sustained the trial court holding that petitioner may no longer prove that the subject policy was void ab initio or rescindable by reason of fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation after the lapse of more than two years from its issuance.

Issue: Whether or not the insurance policy issued by the petitioner is rescindable?

Held: No. The ultimate aim of Section 48 of the Insurance Code is to compel insurers to solicit business from or provide insurance coverage only to legitimate and bona fide clients, by requiring them to thoroughly investigate those they insure within two years from effectivity of the policy and while the insured is still alive. If they do not, they will be obligated to honor claims on the policies they issue, regardless of fraud, concealment or misrepresentation. The law assumes that they will do just that and not sit on their laurels, indiscriminately soliciting and accepting insurance business from any Tom, Dick and Harry.

5. Heirs of Servando Franco vs. Sps. Veronica & Danilo Gonzales;  G.R. No. 159709, June 27, 2012.

Facts:           Franco and Medel obtained successive loans from Gonzales as evidence promissory notes. When the borrowers failed to pay the indebtedness, hence, Gonzaes filed a complaint for collection money with the RTC who favoured the respondents. When the respondents moved for execution, it was opposed alleging that the parties had an agreement which was embodied in a receipt whereby Franco paid  P400,000.00 and promised to pay the balance of P375,000.00. Subsequently petitioners   insist that the promissory note that had been already novated when the principal obligation of P500,000.00 had been fixed at P750,000.00, and the maturity date had been extended.

Issue: WON, there was novation of the promissory Note?

Held: No.  There is novation when there is an irreconcilable incompatibility between the old and the new obligations. There is no novation in case of only slight modifications; hence, the old obligation prevails.

The new obligation extinguishes the prior agreement only when the substitution is unequivocally declared, or the old and the new obligations are incompatible on every point. A compromise of a final judgment operates as a novation of the judgment obligation upon compliance with either of these two conditions.

6. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. DEE G.R. No. 182128, February 19, 2014

Facts; Respondent Dee bought on an installment basis a residential lot from respondent PEPI, who in turn assigned its rights to respondent AFP-RSBS. PEPI obtained a  loan from PNB secured by a mortgage over several properties, including Dee’s property. After Dee’s full payment of the purchase price and the execution of a deed of sale, Dee sought from the PNB the delivery of the owner’s duplicate title over the property, to no avail. Thus, she filed with the HLURB a complaint for specific performance by the petitioner, PEPI and AFP-RSBS. The HLURB ruled in favor of Dee.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner be obligated to perform any of the undertaking of respondent PEPI and AFP-RSBS?

Held: The basic principle of relativity of contracts is that contracts can only bind the parties who entered into it, and cannot favor or prejudice a third person, even if he is aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof “Where there is no privity of contract, there is likewise no obligation or liability to speak about.” 

Nevertheless, despite the apparent validity of the mortgage between the petitioner and PEPI, the former is still bound to respect the transactions between respondents PEPI and Dee. The petitioner was well aware that the properties mortgaged by PEPI were also the subject of existing contracts to sell with other buyers. While it may be that the petitioner is protected by Act No. 3135, as

amended, it cannot claim any superior right as against the installment buyers. This is because the contract between the respondents is protected by P.D. No. 957, a social justice measure enacted primarily to protect innocent lot buyers.

7. Ardiente vs. Sps. PastofideG.R. No. 161921; July 17, 2013

Facts:  Ardiente owned a piece of property, which was subsequently sold and conveyed to Pastofide, however, the connection of water supply as well as other utilities remained in the name of Ardiente which  was never questioned, until such time that Pastorfide became delinquent in paying the water bill. The decision being contested in this complaint for damages sprouted from the cutting off of water supply of Pastorfide by the Cagayan de Oro Water District as requested by Ardiente.

Issue: Whether or not Sps Pastofide is entitled to damages?

Ruling:               Yes. The remedy to enforce petitioner's right to ask and even require the Spouses Pastorfide to cause the transfer of the former's account with COWD to the latter's name such right is not to cause the disconnection of the respondent spouses' water supply. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach.

8. PEOPLE vs. JALBONIAN G.R. No. 180281               July 01, 2013

Facts: Appellant was charged for murder. The RTC convicted appellant of murder qualified by treachery relying on the testimony of the lone witness. The CA affirmed appellant’s conviction but modified the RTC’s judgment by ordering appellant to pay the heirs of the victim exemplary damages.

Issue: WON, the heirs are entitled to damages?

Held: Yes. Appellant must pay the heirs of the victim exemplary, moral, and actual damages. The moral damages is awarded "despite the absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victim’s heirs. As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s family." 

Moreover, while actual damages cannot be awarded since there was no evidence of actual expenses incurred for the death of the victim, in lieu thereof, the sum of P25,000.00 may be granted, as it is hereby granted, by way of temperate damages "as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the [victim] suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved."  "This award is adjudicated so that a right which has been violated may be recognized or vindicated, and not for the purpose of indemnification." 

9. BACOLOD vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 206236               July 15, 2013

Facts: The (RTC), convicted the petitioner of arson. The CA affirmed the conviction. However, both the RTC, and, the CA omitted the civil liability to be assessed against the petitioner in favor of the Spouses Cogtas as owners of the burned house.

Issue: Whether or not Actual damages can be recovered?

Held: Yes.

All trial and appellate courts must avoid omitting reliefs that the parties are properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts. Their judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full determination of such rights and obligations would they be true to the judicial office of administering justice and equity for all.

Courts should then be alert and cautious in their rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal cases.

They should prescribe the legal penalties, which is what the Constitution and the law require and expect them to do.

Their prescription of the wrong penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

They should also determine and set the civil liability ex delicto of the accused, in order to do justice to the complaining victims who are always entitled to them.

The Rules of Court mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the civil liability by separate actions has been reserved or waived.

10.PASOS vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATIONG.R. No. 192394               July 3, 2013

Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PNCC. He argued that he is deemed a regular employee of PNCC due to his prolonged employment as a project employee as well as the failure on the part of PNCC to report his termination every time a project is completed. He further contended that his termination without the benefit of an administrative investigation was tantamount to an illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter favored petitioner.

Issue: WON, petitioner is entitled to damages?

Held: No.  Worth reiterating is the rule that moral damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. Likewise, exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.40 Apart from his allegations, petitioner did not present any evidence to prove that his dismissal was attended with bad faith or was done oppressively.