Case Analysis Embraer

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    Global Strategic Management

    December, 2006

    Case AnalysisEmbraer: The Global Leader in Regional Jets

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    Introduction

    This case analysis examines the major issues and ideas from the HBS case Embraer:

    The Global Leader in Regional Jets1 and identifies the key attributes and characteristics

    of a successful international aircraft company from Brazil. Despite many challenges and

    the fact that Embraer is based in a developing country, Embraer has grown into one of the

    worlds most successful airplane manufacturers. This paper discusses the nature of the

    aircraft industry and competition, the key elements of Embraers strategy, how Embraer

    is adapting to address future market changes. Finally, the paper analyzes the paradox of

    Embraers rise and explores what that may imply about its home country.

    Overview of the Commercial Aircraft Industry

    Porters Five Forces framework2 provides a convenient way to analyze the dynamics

    of the commercial aircraft industry. The figure below shows a high level view of the key

    forces, barriers to entry, supplier power, buyer power, rivalry and the threat of

    substitution. This brief analysis does not take into account the military jet, corporate jet

    and the emerging tiny jet markets that also impact the strategies of aircraft

    manufacturers.

    Barriers to Entry are extremely high with large initial capital investments required along with

    extremely high fixed costs. Additionally, highly skilled workers are required and learning

    curves for workers and companies are long. Because the value chain is highly integrated, that

    is partners and suppliers work very closely with the incumbent manufacturers, a new entrant

    is at a distinct disadvantage. There is a high degree of customer loyalty, coupled with very

    high switching costs for customers.

    Supplier Power is variable. Suppliers with proprietary technology or extremely specialized

    expertise have high power. Suppliers of certain special materials and coatings also have high

    power. Some commodity suppliers of materials and services have relatively low power.

    Buyer Power is extremely high causing severe pricing pressure on aircraft manufacturers.

    The industry often experiences periods of over capacity which puts further downward

    pressure on prices. Customer preference and flying trends may help bolster the power of

    buyers in negotiating with manufacturers who have long development cycles and may have

    inventory which may not meet the current trends and needs of the buyers. On the other hand,

    switching costs for buyers are very high and have a fairly long time horizon.

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    Threat of Substitutes are low with no cost effective alternatives available for commercial jets.

    Industry Rivalry is very high with two major duopolies dominating the industry: Airbus vs.

    Boeing in large jets and Embraer vs. Bombardier in regional jets. Long development lead

    times mean that every new model is critical to the success of the vendor and any misstep

    could spell disaster. Long development lead times mean rivals can plan counter-moves well

    in advance and catch an emerging trend while a competitor may already be committed to a

    certain direction.

    SUPPLIER POWER

    Specialized SuppliersImportance of supplier partnerships

    Impact of inputs on cost or differentiation

    Lack of substitute inputs

    Some Threat of forward integration

    Ample set of technology providers

    BARRIERS

    TO ENTRYVery High Costs of EntryInitial Capital Investment

    High Fixed Costs

    Long Learning curveGovernment support requiredSkilled Engineers/TechnicalBrand LoyaltyCustomer Switching CostsAccess to technology partners(Integrated Value Chain)Incumbent RetaliationProprietary Products

    RIVALRY

    Strong rivalry between playersDuopolies in 2 segments

    (Boeing vs. Airbus Large Jets

    Embraer vs. Bombardier Regional Jets)

    Cyclical Industry

    Intermittent Overcapacity

    High Switching Costs

    Brand identity

    Long Development CycleTimes

    (Rivals can plan counter-moves)

    THREAT OF

    SUBSTITUTESNo compelling or adequate

    substitutes for commercial jets:

    Trains

    Automobiles

    Ships

    Helicopters

    Customer Switching Costs arevery high

    BUYER POWER

    Customers - Bargaining leverage

    Buyer Power is High

    Buyer has transparent information

    Brand identity

    Price sensitivity

    Require Product differentiation

    Buyer concentration vs. industry

    Buyers' incentives(option)

    Diagram of Porter's Five Forces for the Commercial Aircraft Industry

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    Core Elements of Embraers Strategy

    Embraers core strategy can be summarized by the following bullets:

    Interdependence with Brazilian Government

    Focus on Regional Jet MarketFamily Approach to Product Development

    Cultivate relationships and risk share with technology partners and parts suppliers

    Focus on Intelligent Systems, Engineering Project Management

    Risk Partner and Supplier Strategy

    Intelligent Systems

    Interdependence with Brazilian Government

    Embraer was founded by the Brazilian government and the company is a source of

    national pride. In 1994, after privatization, the Brazilian government continued to

    provide subsidies in the form of loans to Embraer to provide capital funds to start new

    initiatives. As quoted by Embraer CEO Botelho, We want to keep on being the

    technological and industrial arm of the Brazilian government, although of course, we

    have to make profits.1

    Embraer recognizes the role its home country plays and the fact

    the United States, home country to its largest customers, is not going to offer the type of

    the support that the Brazilian government will provide.

    Focus on Regional Jet Market

    In the commercial aircraft market, Embraer produces planes exclusively for the

    Regional Jet market. Embraer provides aircraft that are less expensive to produce and

    operate than its main competitor, Bombardier. Airbus and Boeing make larger aircraft

    and do not compete in the regional jet market. In the past few years, Embraer has

    expanded its strategy to also focus on the 70 to 110 seat market as portrayed on their

    website: www.ruleof70to110.com/main/index.html . Embraers campaign points out the

    http://www.ruleof70to110.com/main/index.htmlhttp://www.ruleof70to110.com/main/index.htmlhttp://www.ruleof70to110.com/main/index.html
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    inefficiencies of flying planes that are too large for regional flights or too small to handle

    increasing demand. Their claim is that the 70 to 110 seat plane fills a void for customers.

    Embraer not only provides less expensive planes, they have developed roomier planes

    with innovations such as the double- bubble design8

    that allows more head room and

    larger cabin space for passengers. Another part of Embraers strategy is to use larger

    regional jet aircraft to replace the aging fleet of planes that may be too large to operate on

    the increasing number of short-haul routes. In a sense, Embraer is preparing to compete

    with Airbus and Boeing, but their approach is subtle: create/identify the market, fill a

    void and replace aging aircraft that are going to be retired.

    Product Families

    Embraers method of managing its product lines is based around families of

    aircraft. Rather than developing a single model, Embraer designs it products based on

    platforms than can be scaled to larger or smaller capacities allowing for parts reuse and

    reduction of learning curves for its staff and the staff of its customers. This strategy

    keeps costs low and improves time to market. The platform or family approach to

    product management reduced time to market by two to three years, allowing Embraer

    aircraft to be introduced in less than half the industry standard time that new plane

    projects require6.

    The platform approach to product management works hand in hand with Embraers

    strategic partnership strategy. Embraers strategy can be broken into three parts6:

    Choose Technology Areas aimed at product innovation and fulfilling theneeds/requirements of customers

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    Identification of risk partners for supply of parts and subsystems (technologypackages)

    Cultivation of local subcontractors for engineering services, chemical coatings,milling and other specialized aircraft technologies

    Strategic Partnerships

    For key technology areas, it is not important that Embraer manufacture every key

    technology, but rather the company leverages its core capabilities in systems integration,

    marketing and technical services coordinating the risk partnerships. The risk partners are

    enlisted to supply key components of the aircraft and are required to invest their own

    funds for development, thereby taking on some of the risk of the project. Partners are

    rewarded if the project is successful in supplying primary components and spares for the

    life of the new aircraft line. Most of the risk partners are located outside of Brazil, but

    co-locate engineers in So Jos dos Campos. Local subcontractors are used extensively

    for engineering services, milling, and coatings. Many of the local firms were founded by

    former Embraer employees, resulting in an aircraft industry cluster.

    Intelligent Systems

    Instead of attempting to build an entire aircraft and develop all technologies within

    Brazil, Embraer has chosen to focus on key aircraft technologies while building core

    expertise in aerodynamics, fuselage and systems integration.6 The decision to focus on

    the fuselage was driven partly because this technology could not be easily sourced

    outside of Brazil and thus it provided a good area for Embraer to develop its own

    expertise. This became part of Embraers determination not to outsource the aircraft

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    cockpit nor anything that was not integral to its longer term strategy of concentrating on

    the provision of intelligent systems1. Embraers recognition of the fact that increasing

    its competency in systems integration is more important than the ability to create or

    manufacture all of the technologies in an aircraft, provided it with a realistic approach to

    competing globally.

    Disruptive Innovation?

    Another useful framework for analyzing the commercial aircraft industry and

    Embraers strategy is from the point of view of disruptive technology described by

    Clayton Christensen4. The commercial aircraft industry is dynamic and subject to the

    effects of Porters five forces as described earlier. Vendors in this industry need to be

    cognizant not only of economic factors that impact buyers (airlines) but also of

    passenger preference trends. A keen awareness of passenger trends allows vendors to

    understand market dynamics and sustain or improve their current position. Furthermore,

    an appreciation of the role disruptive innovation may lead manufacturers to discover new

    opportunities and grow future sales.

    As applied to the aircraft industry, Christensens model could be represented as in the

    graph below:

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    From the analysis, Embraer could choose to compete with the Airbus 320 and Boeing

    737 in some sectors. With superior operating margins, Embraer presents a compelling

    case for airlines to consider Embraer aircraft to assemble lighter and more fuel-efficient

    fleets. Based on the previous Porter analysis, the reaction of the incumbent vendors must

    be considered. Although one would expect them to defend their turf, the Airbus 320

    and Boeing 737 are larger aircraft and more expensive to operate. One could argue that

    Embraer has already eaten into some of the market share that would have been been

    attained by Airbus or Boeing by filling the 70 to 110 seat void with lower cost aircraft.

    However, according to Embraer CEO Botelho, entering the 135 seat aircraft market is not

    in the cards for Embraer as this would mean jumping into the big dogs market, a

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    reference to Airbus and Boeing8. Rather, he would prefer to diversify into the defense

    market and expand in the business jet market.

    Alliances and PartnershipsA new strategic direction or logical outgrowth?

    From their founding, Embraer formed strategic relationships with technology

    partners. The first Embraer jet trainer licensed technology from the Italian firm

    Aermacchi for a product to be used by the Brazilian Air Force. Other technology came

    from the Brazilian Aeronautical Technical Centers (CTA) Institute of Research and

    Development (IPD). Embraer learned to incorporate technology from different sources

    while strengthening core competencies in intelligent systems, systems integration and

    project engineering. The use of risk partners not only benefits Embraer from a

    technological point of view, but also from a financial and capital structure point of view.

    Based on Embraers past with the turbulent Brazilian economy of the early 1990s to

    Botelhos restructuring in the middle 1990s, to the WTO dispute, Embraer has always

    faced difficulties with respect to funding projects. In addition to the regional jet market,

    Embraer participates in competition for defense business in Brazil and globally. While

    Botelho would like to expand Brazils share of the defense business, his success has been

    limited.

    The 1999 announcement of a strategic alliance with a group of French aerospace

    companies was a logical outgrowth of Embraers overall strategy of risk partnerships.

    Embraer had already embarked on an effort to work with fewer key suppliers on the ERJ-

    170/190 (only 26 vendors vs. 45 for the ERJ-145)6. The US defense market had proven

    difficult to break into. An alliance could provide extra capital funding, technological

    resources and credible partners to bolster business in this important sector not subject to

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    WTO restrictions. Also, this move was consistent with Embraers core strategy to

    develop Intelligence Systems. In the defense context, this translates to Intelligent

    Defense Systems1.

    The new alliance provides the capability for Embraer to transfer in technological

    know-how for supersonic aircraft, and allows expansion into defense systems for naval

    and ground support1. An alliance is also a good alternative to being acquired which

    would most likely be defeated by government veto. Overall, in terms of diversification in

    product lines, capital funding sources, and acquisition of new technological capabilities,

    the alliance is a good fit and is consistent with Embraers core strategy.

    A Global Leader from an Emerging Economy

    According to Porter, Government cannot create competitive industries; only

    companies can do that.7 In the case of Embraer, the role of government is to act as "a

    catalyst and challenge. Embraer can credit part of its success to government-

    sponsored institutional and technological developments dating back to the 1950s6.

    Embraer implemented much of the IPD technology to its advantage but created its own

    methods of technological innovation and internal learning to carry it forward. Embraer is

    responsible for increasing the size and capabilities of the So Jos dos Campos region

    and creating a local aircraft design cluster for Brazil.

    Even with government help, the appearance of Embraer in a developing country such

    as Brazil appears to be an anomaly. However, in the context of Porters analysis of the

    Competitive Advantage of Nations, some of Brazils lack of endowments actually created

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    the necessity out of which Embraer was born. For example, Brazil has large amounts of

    land through difficult terrain and wide rivers but limited surface transportation

    infrastructure. Aircraft are a natural way to overcome these challenges.

    In applying Porters Diamond Framework to Embraer, we can analyze the success of

    the company and attempt to understand the reasons for this success.

    1. Firm Strategy, Structure and Rivalry

    Embraer has no domestic rivals in the aircraft business. Embraer was founded by the

    government and later was privatized. There is an active aircraft industry in the local

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    suppliers to Embraer in So Jos dos Campos which mirrors the technology cluster

    that the United States has in the area surrounding MIT.

    2. Demand Conditions

    Embraer has very demanding local and global customers. Locally, the Brazilian

    Defense Force and Brazilian Airlines do not automatically choose Embraer. They

    must compete and win on a level playing field. Brazils domestic buyers are just as

    discerning as global buyers.

    3. Related Supporting Industries

    In So Jos dos Campos, Embraer enjoys geographic proximity to upstream and

    downstream industries. This facilitates the exchange of information and promotes a

    continuous exchange of ideas and innovations. These local suppliers are also free to

    compete globally.

    4. Factor Conditions

    Brazil did not inherit any key factors to help them enter the aerospace business. After

    World War II, highly skilled and specialized labor was cultivated. Embraer never had

    easy access to capital or benefited from a strong Brazilian infrastructure. Over time,

    Embraer has developed core competencies and has helped So Jos dos Campos to

    grow, creating specialized factors and conditions helping to foster sustained

    innovation and investment from overseas. These factors are difficult to duplicate and

    have created competitive advantage.

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    Implications for Brazil

    Embraers success demonstrates that with the proper mix of government support,

    strong corporate leadership and sound strategy, Brazilian companies can succeed

    globally. Embraer is a great source of national pride for Brazil and serves as a shining

    example of how a Brazilian company can compete on a global basis. However, the

    company faced adversity and was able to overcome it through strong leadership,

    partnerships with and incentives from the government, along with global risk partnerships

    structured to allow technology and capital to flow into Embraer. By adding value and

    leveraging technologies from other countries, Embraer was able to build its own core

    competencies and achieve global leadership in the regional jet market. Other businesses

    in Brazil are equal candidates for success, specifically satellite and fuel technologies. As

    Porter points out, the government may act as a catalyst, but only companies can create

    sustained competitive industries.

    Managers that recognize the fact that their home nation is integral to their success will

    promote continuous innovation while welcoming the formation of clusters of like

    competitors to create national centers of excellence. These clusters will lead to what

    Porter calls the Diamond of National Advantage which is a self-reinforcing construct

    that is difficult for other nations to imitate. Ultimately, nations that wish to be

    competitive effectively on a global basis need to realize that only companies can achieve

    and sustain competitive advantage and that the capacity of its industry to innovate and

    upgrade is essential. Armed with this knowledge, national policy makers can make

    decisions to foster an environment conducive to supporting industries that will be able to

    take advantage of the lessons described above.

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    References

    1. Embraer: The Global Leader in Regional Jets, Pankaj Ghemawat, Gustavo A.Herrero, Luis Felipe Monteiro, Harvard Business School, 9-701-006, October 20,2000

    2. How Competitive Forces Shape Strategy, Michael E. Porter, HBR Article, March-April 1979.

    3. Designing and Implementing a New Supply Chain Paradigm for AirplaneDevelopment, Yun Yee Ruby Lam, MIT, June 2005,https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/34854

    4. Global Collaboration and ImplementationWorld Aerospace Symposium-2005, TimBowler,www.aviationweek.com/conferences

    5. The Innovators Dilemma, Clayton M. Christensen, Harper Business, 2000, NewYork

    6. Transfer of Technology for Successful Integration into the Global Economy, A casestudy of Embraer in Brazil, Jos E. Cassiolato, Roberto Bernardes and Helena

    Lastres, UNCTAD, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2002,

    http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipcmisc20_en.pdf

    7. The Competitive Advantage of Nations, Michael E. Porter, HBR 90211, 1990

    8. The Little Aircraft Company that Could, Russ Mitchell, Fortune Magazine,November 14, 2005

    9. Airbus vs. Boeing Revisted: international competition in the aircraft market, DouglasA. Irwin, Nina Pavcnik, Journal of International Economics, 28 August 2003,

    http://www.dartmouth.edu/~dirwin/airbus3.pdf

    https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/34854https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/34854http://www.aviationweek.com/conferenceshttp://www.aviationweek.com/conferenceshttp://www.aviationweek.com/conferenceshttp://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipcmisc20_en.pdfhttp://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipcmisc20_en.pdfhttp://www.dartmouth.edu/~dirwin/airbus3.pdfhttp://www.dartmouth.edu/~dirwin/airbus3.pdfhttp://www.dartmouth.edu/~dirwin/airbus3.pdfhttp://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipcmisc20_en.pdfhttp://www.aviationweek.com/conferenceshttps://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/34854