Capability Approach

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Capability approach The capability approach (also referred to as the capa- bilities approach) is an economic theory conceived in the 1980s as an approach to welfare economics. [1] In this approach, Amartya Sen brings together a range of ideas that were hitherto excluded from (or inadequately formu- lated in) traditional approaches to the economics of wel- fare. The core focus of the capability approach is on what individuals are able to do (i.e., capable of). 1 Assessing capability Initially, Sen argued for five components in assessing ca- pability: 1. The importance of real freedoms in the assessment of a person’s advantage 2. Individual differences in the ability to transform re- sources into valuable activities 3. The multi-variate nature of activities giving rise to happiness 4. A balance of materialistic and nonmaterialistic fac- tors in evaluating human welfare 5. Concern for the distribution of opportunities within society Subsequently, and in collaboration particularly with political philosopher Martha Nussbaum, development economist Sudhir Anand and economic theorist James Foster, Sen has helped to make the capabilities approach predominant as a paradigm for policy debate in human development where it inspired the creation of the UN’s Human Development Index (a popular measure of hu- man development, capturing capabilities in health, edu- cation, and income). In addition, the approach has been operationalised with a high income country focus by Paul Anand and colleagues. [2][3] Furthermore, since the cre- ation of the Human Development and Capability Associ- ation in the early 2000s, the approach has been much dis- cussed by political theorists, philosophers, and a range of social scientists, including those with a particular interest in human health. The approach emphasizes functional capabilities (“sub- stantive freedoms”, such as the ability to live to old age, engage in economic transactions, or participate in polit- ical activities); these are construed in terms of the sub- stantive freedoms people have reason to value, instead of utility (happiness, desire-fulfillment or choice) or ac- cess to resources (income, commodities, assets). Poverty is understood as capability-deprivation. It is noteworthy that the emphasis is not only on how humans actually function but also on their having the capability, which is a practical choice, “to achieve outcomes that they value and have reason to value”. [4] Someone could be deprived of such capabilities in many ways, e.g. by ignorance, gov- ernment oppression, lack of financial resources, or false consciousness. This approach to human well-being emphasizes the im- portance of freedom of choice, individual heterogene- ity and the multi-dimensional nature of welfare. In sig- nificant respects, the approach is consistent with the handling of choice within conventional microeconomics consumer theory, although its conceptual foundations en- able it to acknowledge the existence of claims, like rights, which normatively dominate utility-based claims (see Sen (1979)). 2 Key terms 2.1 Functionings In the most basic sense, functionings consist of “beings and doings”. [5] As a result, living may be seen as a set of interrelated functionings. Essentially, functionings are the states and activities constitutive of a person’s be- ing. Examples of functionings can vary from elementary things, such as being healthy, having a good job, and be- ing safe, to more complex states, such as being happy, having self-respect, and being calm. Moreover, Amartya Sen contends that functionings are crucial to an adequate understanding of the capability approach; capability is conceptualized as a reflection of the freedom to achieve valuable functionings. [5] In other words, functionings are the subjects of the capa- bilities referred to in the approach: what we are capable, want to be capable, or should be capable to be and/or do. Therefore, a person’s chosen combination of func- tionings, what they are and do, is part of their overall ca- pability set — the functionings they were able to do. Yet, functionings can also be conceptualized in a way that sig- nifies an individual’s capabilities. Eating, starving, and fasting would all be considered functionings, but the func- tioning of fasting differs significantly from that of starv- ing because fasting, unlike starving, involves a choice and is understood as choosing to starve despite the presence of 1

Transcript of Capability Approach

Page 1: Capability Approach

Capability approach

The capability approach (also referred to as the capa-bilities approach) is an economic theory conceived inthe 1980s as an approach to welfare economics.[1] In thisapproach, Amartya Sen brings together a range of ideasthat were hitherto excluded from (or inadequately formu-lated in) traditional approaches to the economics of wel-fare. The core focus of the capability approach is on whatindividuals are able to do (i.e., capable of).

1 Assessing capability

Initially, Sen argued for five components in assessing ca-pability:

1. The importance of real freedoms in the assessmentof a person’s advantage

2. Individual differences in the ability to transform re-sources into valuable activities

3. The multi-variate nature of activities giving rise tohappiness

4. A balance of materialistic and nonmaterialistic fac-tors in evaluating human welfare

5. Concern for the distribution of opportunities withinsociety

Subsequently, and in collaboration particularly withpolitical philosopher Martha Nussbaum, developmenteconomist Sudhir Anand and economic theorist JamesFoster, Sen has helped to make the capabilities approachpredominant as a paradigm for policy debate in humandevelopment where it inspired the creation of the UN’sHuman Development Index (a popular measure of hu-man development, capturing capabilities in health, edu-cation, and income). In addition, the approach has beenoperationalised with a high income country focus by PaulAnand and colleagues.[2][3] Furthermore, since the cre-ation of the Human Development and Capability Associ-ation in the early 2000s, the approach has been much dis-cussed by political theorists, philosophers, and a range ofsocial scientists, including those with a particular interestin human health.The approach emphasizes functional capabilities (“sub-stantive freedoms”, such as the ability to live to old age,engage in economic transactions, or participate in polit-ical activities); these are construed in terms of the sub-stantive freedoms people have reason to value, instead

of utility (happiness, desire-fulfillment or choice) or ac-cess to resources (income, commodities, assets). Povertyis understood as capability-deprivation. It is noteworthythat the emphasis is not only on how humans actuallyfunction but also on their having the capability, which isa practical choice, “to achieve outcomes that they valueand have reason to value”.[4] Someone could be deprivedof such capabilities in many ways, e.g. by ignorance, gov-ernment oppression, lack of financial resources, or falseconsciousness.This approach to human well-being emphasizes the im-portance of freedom of choice, individual heterogene-ity and the multi-dimensional nature of welfare. In sig-nificant respects, the approach is consistent with thehandling of choice within conventional microeconomicsconsumer theory, although its conceptual foundations en-able it to acknowledge the existence of claims, like rights,which normatively dominate utility-based claims (see Sen(1979)).

2 Key terms

2.1 Functionings

In the most basic sense, functionings consist of “beingsand doings”.[5] As a result, living may be seen as a setof interrelated functionings. Essentially, functionings arethe states and activities constitutive of a person’s be-ing. Examples of functionings can vary from elementarythings, such as being healthy, having a good job, and be-ing safe, to more complex states, such as being happy,having self-respect, and being calm. Moreover, AmartyaSen contends that functionings are crucial to an adequateunderstanding of the capability approach; capability isconceptualized as a reflection of the freedom to achievevaluable functionings.[5]

In other words, functionings are the subjects of the capa-bilities referred to in the approach: what we are capable,want to be capable, or should be capable to be and/ordo. Therefore, a person’s chosen combination of func-tionings, what they are and do, is part of their overall ca-pability set — the functionings they were able to do. Yet,functionings can also be conceptualized in a way that sig-nifies an individual’s capabilities. Eating, starving, andfasting would all be considered functionings, but the func-tioning of fasting differs significantly from that of starv-ing because fasting, unlike starving, involves a choice andis understood as choosing to starve despite the presence of

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other options.[5] Consequently, an understanding of whatconstitutes functionings is inherently tied together with anunderstanding of capabilities, as defined by this approach.

2.2 Capabilities

Capabilities are the alternative combinations of function-ings that are feasible for a person to achieve. Formula-tions of capability have two parts: functionings and op-portunity freedom — the substantive freedom to pursuedifferent functioning combinations.[6] Ultimately, capa-bilities denote a person’s opportunity and ability to gen-erate valuable outcomes, taking into account relevant per-sonal characteristics and external factors. The importantpart of this definition is the “freedom to achieve”, be-cause if freedom had only instrumental value (valuable asa means to achieve an end) and no intrinsic value (valu-able in and of itself) to a person’s well-being, then thevalue of the capability set as a whole would simply bedefined by the value of a person’s actual combination offunctionings.[5] Such a definition would not acknowledgethe entirety of what a person is capable of doing andtheir resulting current state due to the nature of the op-tions available to them. Consequently, the capability setoutlined by this approach is not merely concerned withachievements; rather, freedom of choice, in and of itself,is of direct importance to a person’s quality of life.[5]

For example, the difference between fasting and starving,on person’s well-being, is whether the person is choosingnot to eat.[7] In this example, the functioning is starvingbut the capability to obtain an adequate amount of foodis the key element in evaluating well-being between indi-viduals in the two states. In sum, having a lifestyle is notthe same as choosing it; well-being depends on how thatlifestyle came to be.[5] More formally, while the combi-nation of a person’s functionings represents their actualachievements, their capability set represents their oppor-tunity freedom — their freedom to choose between alter-native combinations of functionings.[7]

An extension of the capabilities approach was publishedin 2013 in Freedom, Responsibility and Economics ofthe Person. This book explores the interconnected con-cepts of person, responsibility and freedom in economics,moral philosophy and politics. It tries to reconcile therationality and morality of individuals. It presents amethodological reflection (phenomenology versus Kan-tian thought) with the aim to re-humanise the person,through actions, and through the values and norms thatlead to corresponding rights and obligations that must beordered. The book extends the capabilities approach ina critical form. In particular, it considers freedom in re-lation to responsibility, that is, the capacity of people toapply moral constraints to themselves. By contrast, Sen’scapability approach considers freedom as a purely func-tional rationality of choice.

2.3 Agency

Amartya Sen defines an agent as someone who acts andbrings about change, whose achievement can be evaluatedin terms of his or her own values and goals.[7] This differsfrom a common use of the term "agent" sometimes usedin economics and game theory to mean a person acting onsomeone else’s behalf.[7] Agency depends on the ability topersonally choose the functionings one values, a choicethat may not correlate with personal well-being. For ex-ample, when a person chooses to engage in fasting, theyare exercising their ability to pursue a goal they value,though such a choice may not positively affect physicalwell-being. Sen explains that a person as an agent neednot be guided by a pursuit of well-being; agency achieve-ment considers a person’s success in terms of their pursuitof the whole of their goals.[5]

For the purposes of the capability approach, agency pri-marily refers to a person’s role as a member of society,with the ability to participate in economic, social, and po-litical actions. Therefore, agency is crucial in assessingone’s capabilities and any economic, social, or politicalbarriers to one’s achieving substantive freedoms. Con-cern for agency stresses that participation, public debate,democratic practice, and empowerment, should be fos-tered alongside well-being.[8]

Alkire and Deneulin pointed out that agency goes to-gether with the expansion of valuable freedoms. That is,in order to be agents of their lives, people need the free-dom to be educated, speak in public without fear, expressthemselves, associate, etc.; conversely, people can estab-lish such an environment by being agents.[6] In summary,the agency aspect is important in assessing what a personcan do in line with his or her conception of the good.[9]

3 Nussbaum’s central capabilities

Nussbaum (2000) frames these basic principles in termsof 10 capabilities, i.e. real opportunities based on per-sonal and social circumstance. She claims that a politicalorder can only be considered as being decent if this ordersecures at least a threshold level of these 10 capabilitiesto all citizens.[10] The capabilities approach has been veryinfluential in development policy where it has shaped theevolution of the human development index (HDI), hasbeen much discussed in philosophy, and is increasinglyinfluential in a range of social sciences.The core capabilities Nussbaum argues should be sup-ported by all democracies are:

1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human lifeof normal length; not dying prematurely, or beforeone’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living.

2. Bodily Health. Being able to have good health, in-cluding reproductive health; to be adequately nour-

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ished; to have adequate shelter.

3. Bodily Integrity. Being able to move freely fromplace to place; to be secure against violent as-sault, including sexual assault and domestic vio-lence; having opportunities for sexual satisfactionand for choice in matters of reproduction.

4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought. Being able to usethe senses, to imagine, think, and reason—and to dothese things in a “truly human” way, a way informedand cultivated by an adequate education, including,but by no means limited to, literacy and basic math-ematical and scientific training. Being able to useimagination and thought in connection with expe-riencing and producing works and events of one’sown choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth.Being able to use one’s mind in ways protected byguarantees of freedom of expression with respect toboth political and artistic speech, and freedom ofreligious exercise. Being able to have pleasurableexperiences and to avoid non-beneficial pain.

5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to thingsand people outside ourselves; to love those who loveand care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general,to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude,and justified anger. Not having one’s emotional de-velopment blighted by fear and anxiety. (Supportingthis capability means supporting forms of human as-sociation that can be shown to be crucial in their de-velopment.)

6. Practical Reason. Being able to form a conceptionof the good and to engage in critical reflection aboutthe planning of one’s life. (This entails protection forthe liberty of conscience and religious observance.)

7. Affiliation.

(a) Being able to live with and toward others, torecognize and show concern for other humans,to engage in various forms of social interac-tion; to be able to imagine the situation of an-other. (Protecting this capability means pro-tecting institutions that constitute and nourishsuch forms of affiliation, and also protectingthe freedom of assembly and political speech.)

(b) Having the social bases of self-respect andnon-humiliation; being able to be treated as adignified being whose worth is equal to thatof others. This entails provisions of non-discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexualorientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, nationalorigin and species.

8. Other Species. Being able to live with concern forand in relation to animals, plants, and the world ofnature.

9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recre-ational activities.

10. Control over one’s Environment.

(a) Political. Being able to participate effectivelyin political choices that govern one’s life; hav-ing the right of political participation, protec-tions of free speech and association.

(b) Material. Being able to hold property (bothland and movable goods), and having propertyrights on an equal basis with others; havingthe right to seek employment on an equal basiswith others; having the freedom from unwar-ranted search and seizure. In work, being ableto work as a human, exercising practical rea-son and entering into meaningful relationshipsof mutual recognition with other workers.

Although Nussbaum did not claim her list as definite andunchanging, she strongly advocated for outlining a list ofcentral human capabilities.[11] However, Sen argues thatan exact list and weights would be too difficult to define.For one, it requires specifying the context of use of ca-pabilities, which could vary. Also, Sen argues that partof the richness of the capabilities approach is its insis-tence on the need for open valuational scrutiny for mak-ing social judgments. He is disinclined to in any way de-value the domain of reasoning in the public sphere. In-stead, Sen argues that the task of weighing various ca-pabilities should be left to the ethical and political con-siderations of each society based on public reasoning.[12]

Along with concerns raised about Nussbaum’s list, Alkireand Black also argue that Nussbaum’s methodology “runscounter to an essential thrust of the capabilities approachwhich has been the attempt to redirect development the-ory away from a reductive focus on a minimally decentlife towards a more holistic account of human well-beingfor all people.”[8]

That said, applications to development are discussed inSen (1999), Nussbaum (2000), and Clark (2002, 2005),and are now numerous to the point where the capabilitiesapproach is widely accepted as a paradigm in develop-ment. The programme of work operationalising the ca-pability approach by Anand and colleagues draws heavilyon Nussbaum’s list as a relatively comprehensive, high-level account of the space in which human well-beingor life quality is experienced. This work argues that thesubitems on Nussbaum’s list are too distinct to be mon-itored by single question and that a dashboard of some40-50 indicators is required to inform the developmentof empirical work.

4 Measurement of capabilities

The measurement of capabilities was, in the early days,thought to be a particular barrier to the implementation

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and use of the approach. However, two particular linesof work, in research and policy have sought to show thatmeaningful indicators of what individuals (and in somecases governments) are able to do can be developed andused to generate a range of insights.In 1990, the UN Human Development report publishedthe first such exercise which focused on health, educa-tion and income which were equally weighted to generatethe Human Development Index. At the same time, andsubsequently, researchers recognizing that these three ar-eas covered only certain elements of life quality havesought to develop more comprehensive measures. A ma-jor project in this area has been the ‘capabilities measure-ment project’ in which Anand has led teams of philoso-phers, economists and social scientists to generate thatgives a full and direct implement of the approach draw-ing particular on the key relations and concepts developedin Sen (1985) but also on work to do with the content ofthe approach. The earliest work in this project developeda set of around 50 capability indicators which were usedto develop a picture of quality of life and deprivation inthe UK. Subsequently, Anand and colleagues have devel-oped datasets for the USA, UK and Italy in which all theelements of Sen’s framework are reflected in data whichpermits all three key equations, for functionings, experi-ence and capabilities, to be estimated.In a series of papers, they have shown that both their pri-mary data and some secondary datasets can be used toshed on the production and distribution of life quality forworking age adults, those in retirement, very young chil-dren, those vulnerable to domestic violence, migrants, ex-cluded traveller communities and the disabled. They usethese applications to argue that the capability frameworkis a particularly good fit for understanding quality of lifeacross the life course and that it provides a relatively uni-versal grammar for understanding the elements of humanwellbeing.

4.1 Women and cultural universals

Nussbaum tries to apply the capability approach tofeminism.[13] While she acknowledges that feminism ismulti-faceted and that making universal claims about fun-damental human principles can be interpreted as imperi-alistic, she nonetheless argues that a universal approachis necessary to battle injustices against women. This taskNussbaum has undertaken illustrates the fine line betweenthe respect and preservation of a culture and the conflict-ing agenda it has in emancipating women from patriarchalstructures.The ten capabilities Nussbaum proposes are to univer-salize fundamental human rights and principles that al-low for the greatest good in all human beings. By iden-tifying the crucial elements of a “good” human life, thisargument tries to neutralize the debate between respect-ing culture and the imperialist nature of applying univer-

sal principles. It prioritizes physical well-being, which iscrucial to leading a good human life. However, furtheranalysis suggests this emphasis can serve as a point ofcontention.Asserting a set of human capabilities is a formative goalfor all cultures and a bold statement by Nussbaum. Inthe ten capabilities Nussbaum proposes, it is importantto draw attention to the overwhelming importance on life(the physical health and well-being). This overwhelmingfocus has been criticized for undervaluing spiritual lifeand well-being. It implies that physical and spiritual lifeare separate entities - reminiscent of the secular treatmentof religion in contemporary Western society.[13]

This is further affirmed when Nussbaum speaks aboutpractical reason as the sixth capability. She states, “thisentails protection of the liberty of conscience”,[13] whichsuggests the practice of spiritual life is separate from thatof physical life. This type of reasoning simplifies thecomplicated nature of religion. Religion for some canbe understood as two isolated entities - church and state.However, for others, religion cannot be understood in iso-lation with their physical lives as they are deeply inter-twined.Further, Nussbaum argues that emancipating women re-quires dismantling culture. She states, “Cultures are notmuseum pieces, to be preserved intact at all costs”.[13]

However, this view of culture neglects the socializationthat allows certain cultures to persistently act against thephysical, psychological and social well-being of women.Chipping away at aspects of a culture that endangerwomen does not eliminate that socialization. Attack-ing the “monolith of tradition and culture” without tack-ling the socialization of cultural values can only treat thesymptoms of a patriarchal culture, which can later return.

4.2 Monetary vs. non-monetary measuresof well-being

Monetary and non-monetary measures of well-beingare ideal when used to complement each other.[3] Un-derstanding the various aspects of economic develop-ment process not only helps address issues of inequal-ity and lags in human development, but also helps topinpoint where countries lag, which once addressed canfurther promote well-being and advancement. As theOrganization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-ment (OECD) (2006) notes:

Well-being has several dimensions ofwhich monetary factors are only one. Theyare nevertheless an important one, since richereconomies are better placed to create andmaintain other well-being-enhancing condi-tions, such as a clean environment, the likeli-hood that the average person will have a right to10 years or more of education, and lead a com-

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4.3 Shift to alternative measures 5

paratively long and healthy life. Well-beingwill also be increased by institutions that en-able citizens to feel that they control their ownlives, and that investment of their time and re-sources will be rewarded. In turn, this will leadto higher incomes in a virtuous circle.[14]

Simon Kuznets, the developer of GNP, cautioned againstusing the measure as an indicator of overall welfare,which speaks to the unintended use of output-based mea-sures as indicators of human welfare.

4.2.1 Critique of output-based measures

The use of GDP and GNP as an approximation of well-being and development have been critiqued widely, be-cause they are often misused as indicators of well-beingand human development when in fact they are only tellingabout the economic capacity of a country or an averageincome level when expressed on a per person basis. Inparticular, feminist economics and environmental eco-nomics offer a number of critiques. Critics in these fieldstypically discuss gender inequalities, insufficient repre-sentation of environmental costs of productions and gen-eral issues of misusing an output-based measure for un-intended purposes. In sum, the conclusion of Capabili-ties Approach is that people do not just value monetaryincome, and that development is linked to various indica-tors of life satisfaction and hence are important in mea-suring well-being. Development policies strive to createan environment for people to live long, healthy creativelives.[3][15][16]

Feminist critiques

Nussbaum highlights some of the problematic assump-tions and conclusions of output-based approaches to de-velopment. First, she notes that GNP and GDP do notconsider special requirements to help the most vulnera-ble, such as women.[17] Specifically, Nussbaum mentionsthat output-based approaches ignore the distribution ofneeds for the varying circumstances of people, for exam-ple a pregnant woman needs more resources than a non-pregnant woman or a single man.[17]

Also, output-based measures ignore unpaid work, whichincludes child rearing and the societal advantages that re-sult from a mother’s work. Marilyn Waring, a politicaleconomist and activist for women’s rights, elaborates onthe example of a mother engaged in child care, domesticcare and producing few goods for the informal market, allof which are usually done simultaneously.[18] These ac-tivities provide economic benefits, but are not valued innational accounting systems; this suggests that the defini-tion of unemployment used in output-based measures isinappropriate.[18] (See the article on Feminist economics,section “Well-being”).Environmental critiques

Another critique by Waring is that the output-based mea-sures ignore negative effects of economic growth[16][18]

and so commodities that lower social welfare, such as nu-clear weapons, and oil extraction which causes spills, areconsidered a good input. The “anti-bads” or the defen-sive expenditures to fight “bads” are not counted as a de-duction in accounting systems (p. 11).[16][18][19] Further-more, natural resources are treated as limitless and nega-tive outputs such as pollution and associated health risks,are not deducted from the measures.[19]

Technical and misinterpretation critiques

When GNP and GDP were developed, their intended usewas not for measuring human well-being; the intendeduse was as an indicator of economic growth, and thatdoes not necessarily translate into human well-being.[14]

Kuznets has often made this point, in his words, “distinc-tions must be kept in mind between quantity and qual-ity of growth, between costs and returns and between theshort and long run. Goals for more growth should specifymore growth of what and for what” (p. 9).[20]

Nussbaum also points out that GNP and GDP omit in-come distribution and the opportunity or ability to turnresources into activities (this critique stems directly fromCapabilities Approach).[17] Kuznets terms this as a prob-lem of “obtaining an unduplicated total of all output”,(p. 15)[21] this suggests that people are only seen as con-sumers and not as potential producers, hence any prod-ucts purchased by an individual are not seen as “beingconsumed in the productive process of turning out othergoods” (p. 15)[21]

These accounting measures also fail to capture all formsof work and only focus on “engagement in work 'for payor profit'", (p. 133)[22] leaving out contributions to a so-ciety and economy, like volunteer work and subsistencefarming. Kuznets provides the example of the processby which farmers devote time and energy to bringing vir-gin land into cultivation.[21] Furthermore, GNP and GDPonly account for monetary exchanges, and place no valueon some important intangibles such as leisure time.[19]

4.3 Shift to alternative measures

Capabilities Approach has been highly influential thus farin human development theories and valuational methodsof capturing capabilities,[2] the theory has led to the cre-ation of the HDI, IHDI and GII and their uses amonginternational organizations such as the United Nationsand others. In 1990 in the Human Development Report(HDR)commissioned by the UNDP set out to create adistribution-sensitive development measure.[23]

This measure was created to rival the more traditionalmetrics of GDP and GNP, which had previously beenused to measure level of development in a given coun-try, but which did not contain provisions for terms ofdistribution.[24] The resulting measure was entitled the

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Human Development Index, created by Mahbub ul Haqin collaboration with Sen and others. The purpose wasto create an indicator of human development, especiallyone that would provide a general assessment and critiqueof global human development to shed light on persistentinequality, poverty and other capability deprivations de-spite high levels of GDP growth.[12]

Currently the HDI continues to be used in the HumanDevelopment Report in addition to many other measures(based on theoretical perspectives of Capabilities) thathave been developed and used by the United Nations.Among these indices are the Gender-related Develop-ment Index (GDI), the Gender Empowerment Measure(GEM), introduced in 1995, and the more recent GenderInequality Index (GII) and the Inequality-adjusted Hu-man Development Index (IHDI), both adopted in 2010.

4.4 Capabilities-based indices

The following are a few of the major indices that werecreated based on the theoretical grounds of CapabilitiesApproach.

4.4.1 Human development index

The Human Development Index takes into considera-tion a number of development and well-being factors thatare not taken into account in the calculation of GDPand GNP. The Human Development Index is calculatedusing the indicators of life expectancy, adult literacy,school enrollment, and logarithmic transformations ofper-capita income.[23] Moreover, it is noted that the HDI“is a weighted average of income adjusted for distribu-tions and purchasing power, life expectancy, literacy andhealth” (p. 16)[25]

The HDI is calculated for individual countries with avalue between 0 and 1 and is “interpreted…as the ulti-mate development that has been attained by that nation”(p. 17).[25] Currently, the 2011 Human Development Re-port also includes the Inequality-adjusted Human Devel-opment Index which accounts for exactly the same thingsthat the HDI considers however the IHDI has all three di-mensions (long and healthy life, knowledge and a decentstandard of living) adjusted for inequalities in the distri-bution of each dimension across the population.[26]

4.4.2 Gender-related development index

The Gender-related Development Index is defined as a“distribution-sensitive measure that accounts for the hu-man development impact of existing gender gaps in thethree components of the HDI” (p. 243).[24] In this way,the GDI accounts for shortcomings in the HDI in termsof gender, because it re-evaluates a country’s score in thethree areas of the HDI based on perceived gender gaps,

and penalizes the score of the country if, indeed, largegender disparities in those areas exist. This index is usedin unison with the HDI and therefore also captures the el-ements of capabilities that the HDI holds. In addition, itconsiders women’s capabilities which has been a focus inmuch of Sen’s and Nussbaum’s work (to list a few: Nuss-baum, 2004a; Nussbaum, 2004b; Sen, 2001; Sen, 1990.)

4.4.3 Gender empowerment measure

The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) is consider-ably more specialized than the GDI. The GEM focusesparticularly on the relative empowerment of women in agiven country.[24] The empowerment of women is mea-sured by evaluating women’s employment in high-rankingeconomic positions, seats in parliament, and share ofhousehold income. Notably this measurement capturesmore of Nussbaum’s 10 Central Capabilities, such as,Senses, Imagination and Thought; Affiliation; and Con-trol Over Ones Environment.

4.4.4 Gender inequality index

In the 2013 Human Development Report the Gender In-equality Index, which was introduced in 2011, continuesto adjust the GDI and the GEM. This composite mea-surement uses three dimensions: reproductive health, em-powerment, and labor force participation.[27] When con-structing the index the following criteria were key: con-ceptual relevance to definitions of human developmentand theory; Non-ambiguity so that the index is easily in-terpreted; Reliability of data that is standardized and col-lected/processed by a trustworthy organization; No re-dundancy found in other indicators; and lastly Power ofdiscrimination, where distribution is well distinguishedamong countries and there is no “bunching” among topand bottom countries (p. 10).[28] This index also capturessome of Nussbaum’s 10 Central Capabilities (Senses,Imagination and Thought; Affiliation; and Control OverOnes Environment).

4.4.5 Other measures

In 1997, the UNDP introduced the Human Poverty In-dex (HPI), which is aimed at measuring poverty in bothindustrialized and developing countries. The HPI is a“nonincome-based” measure of poverty (p. 100) whichfocuses on “human outcomes in terms of choices andopportunities that a person faces” (p. 99).[29] In sup-port of this index, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr—a developmenteconomist and past Director of The Human DevelopmentReport Office—differentiates between income povertyand human poverty. Human poverty can be interpreted asdeprivations to lead a long healthy and creative life witha decent standard of living.[29]

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4.5 Alternative measures of well-being

As noted above, to a great extent, Nussbaum’s CentralHuman Capabilities address issues of equality, politicalfreedom, creativity and the right to the self, as do the var-ious indices that are based on capabilities. It is evidentthat these measures are very subjective, but this fact is inthe essence of defining quality of life according to Nuss-baum and Sen. Nussbaum refers to Sen in saying that,although measures of well-being may be problematic incomparative, quantifiable models due to their subjectivematter, the protection of and commitment to human de-velopment are too important of matters to be left on thesidelines of economic progress. Well-being and quality oflife are too important to be left without intentional focustowards political change,[11]

Measures such as the HDI, GDI, GEM, GII, IHDI and thelike are crucial in targeting issues of well-being and indi-cators of quality of life. Anand, et al. (2009) can be sum-marized as demonstrating that it is possible to measurecapabilities within the conventions applied to standardhousehold survey design, contrary to earlier doubts aboutthe ability to operationalise the capabilities approach.

5 Contrast with other approaches

5.1 Utility-based or subjective approaches

Much of conventional welfare economics today isgrounded in a utilitarian approach according to the classi-cal Benthamite form of utilitarianism, in which the mostdesirable action is the one that best increases peoples’ psy-chological happiness or satisfaction.[6] The "utility" of aperson stands for some measure of his or her pleasureor happiness. Some merits associated with this approachto measuring well-being are that it recognizes the impor-tance of taking account of the results of social arrange-ments in judging them and the need to pay attention tothe well-being of the people involved when judging so-cial arrangements and their results.[7] Amartya Sen, how-ever, argues this view has three main deficiencies: dis-tributional indifference, neglect of rights, freedoms andother non-utility concerns, and adaptation and mentalconditioning.[7]

First off, for some more than others, it may take much lessto bring about happiness, but subjecting them to lesseropportunities for resources and benefits is by no meansfair or just. For example, a paralyzed person generallyrequires more resources to be happy than someone whois not. Thus, distributional indifference refers to ignoringextents of inequalities in what’s needed to obtain happi-ness on an individual level. Secondly, the utilitarian ap-proach attaches no intrinsic value (ethics) to claims ofrights and freedoms, which some people value indepen-dently of their contribution to utility.

Lastly, Amartya Sen makes the argument that theutilitarian view of individual well-being can be easilyswayed by mental conditioning and peoples’ happinessadapting to oppressive situations. The utility calculus canessentially be unfair to those who have come to terms withtheir deprivation as a means for survival, adjusting theirdesires and expectations. The capability approach, on theother hand, doesn't fall victim to these same criticisms be-cause it acknowledges inequalities by focusing on equal-izing people’s capabilities, not happiness, it stresses theintrinsic importance of rights and freedoms when eval-uating well-being, and it avoids overlooking deprivationby focusing on capabilities and opportunities, not state ofmind.

5.2 Resource-based approaches

Another common approach in conventional economics,in economic policy and judging development, has tradi-tionally been to focus on income and resources. Thesesorts of approaches to development focus on increas-ing resources, such as assets, property rights, or basicneeds.[6] However, measuring resources is fundamentallydifferent from measuring functionings, such as the casein which people don't have the capability to use their re-sources in the means they see fit. Arguably, the main dif-ficulty in a resource- or income-based approach to well-being lies in personal heterogeneities, namely the diver-sity of human beings.[7]

Different amounts of income are needed for different in-dividuals to enjoy similar capabilities, such as an individ-ual with severe disabilities whose treatment to ensure thefulfillment of basic capabilities may require dramaticallymore income compared to an able-bodied person. Allsorts of differences, such as differences in age, gender,talents, etc. can make two people have extremely diver-gent opportunities of quality of life, even when equippedwith exactly the same commodities. Additionally, othercontingent circumstances which affect what an individualcan make of a given set of resources include environmen-tal diversities (in geographic sense), variations in socialclimate, differences in relational perspectives, and distri-bution within the family.[7]

The capability approach, however, seeks to consider allsuch circumstances when evaluating people’s actual capa-bilities. Furthermore, there are things people value otherthan increased resources. In some cases, maximizing re-sources may even be objectionable. As was recognized inthe 1990 Human Development Report, the basic objec-tive of development is to create an enabling environmentfor people to live long, healthy, and creative lives. Thisend is often lost in the immediate concern with the ac-cumulation of commodities and financial wealth that areonly a means to expansion of capabilities. Overall, thoughresources and income have a profound effect on what wecan or cannot do, the capability approach recognizes thatthey are not the only things to be considered when judg-

Page 8: Capability Approach

8 7 REFERENCES

ing well-being, switching the focus from a means to agood life to the freedom to achieve actual improvementsin lives, which one has reason to value.

6 See also• Demographic economics

• Economic development

• Ethics of care

• Human Development and Capability Association

• International Association for Feminist Economics

• International development

• Journal of Human Development and Capabilities

• Important publications in development economics

• Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative

• Sustainable development

• UN Human Development Index

• Welfare economics

• Women’s education and development

7 References[1] Sen, Amartya (1985). Commodities and capabilities.

Amsterdam New York New York, N.Y., U.S.A: North-Holland Sole distributors for the U.S.A. and Canada, El-sevier Science Pub. Co. ISBN 9780444877307.

[2] Dowding, Keith; Martin, Van Hees; Anand, Paul; Hunter,Graham; Carter, Ian; Guala, Francesco (2009). “The de-velopment of capability indicators”. Journal of HumanDevelopment and Capabilities (Taylor and Francis) 10 (1):125–152. doi:10.1080/14649880802675366.

[3] Anand, Paul; Santos, Cristina; Smith, Ron (2009), “Themeasurement of capabilities”, in Basu, Kaushik; Kanbur,Ravi, Arguments for a better world: essays in honor ofAmartya Sen 1, Oxford New York: Oxford UniversityPress, pp. 283–310, ISBN 9780199239115

[4] Sen, Amartya (2001). Development as freedom. OxfordNew York: Oxford University Press. p. 291. ISBN9780192893307.

[5] Sen, Amartya (1992). Inequality reexamined. New YorkOxford New York: Russell Sage Foundation ClarendonPress Oxford Univ. Press. ISBN 9780198289289.

[6] Alkire, Sabina (2009), “The human development and ca-pability approach”, in Deneulin, Séverine; Shahani, Lila,An introduction to the human development and capabilityapproach freedom and agency, Sterling, Virginia Ottawa,Ontario: Earthscan International Development ResearchCentre, pp. 22–48, ISBN 9781844078066

[7] Sen, Amartya (2001). Development as freedom. Ox-ford New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN9780192893307.

[8] Alkire, Sabina (2005). “Capability and functionings:definition & justification”. HDCA Introductory BriefingNote (Human Development and Capability Association(HDCA)).

[9] Crocker, David A (1995), “Functioning and capability:the foundations of Sen’s and Nussbaum’s developmentethic”, in Nussbaum, Martha; Glover, Jonathan, Women,culture, and development: a study of human capabilities,Oxford New York: Clarendon Press Oxford UniversityPress, pp. 153–199, ISBN 9780198289647

[10] Nussbaum, Martha (March 2011). Creating CapabilitiesThe Human Development Approach. Belknap Press. pp.30–31. ISBN 9780674050549.

[11] Nussbaum, Martha (2003). “Capabilities as funda-mental entitlements: Sen and social justice”. Femi-nist Economics (Taylor and Francis) 9 (2-3): 33–59.doi:10.1080/1354570022000077926.

[12] Sen, Amartya (2005). “Human rights and capabilities”.Journal of Human Development (Taylor and Francis) 6(2): 151–166. doi:10.1080/14649880500120491. Pdfversion

[13] Nussbaum, Martha (2005), “Women and cultural univer-sals”, in Cudd, Ann E; Andreasen, Robin O, Feminist the-ory: a philosophical anthology, Oxford, UK Malden, MA:Blackwell Pub, pp. 302–324, ISBN 9781405116619

[14] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-ment, OECD, ed. (2006), “Alternative measures of well-being”, Economic policy reforms: going for growth 2006,Paris: OECD, pp. 129–142, doi:10.1787/growth-2006-en, ISBN 9789264035911

[15] Martha Nussbaum (19 May 2011). Creating capabilities(Video). Harvard: YouTube.

[16] Terre Nash (1995). Who’s Counting? Marilyn War-ing on Sex, Lies and Global Economics (Motion picture).Canada: National Film Board of Canada (NFB) and Stu-dio B. See Who’s Counting? Marilyn Waring on Sex, Liesand Global Economics.

[17] Nussbaum, Martha (2004), “Promoting women’s capa-bilities”, in Benería, Lourdes; Bisnath, Savitri, Globaltensions: challenges and opportunities in the world econ-omy, New York: Routledge, pp. 200–214, ISBN9780415934411

[18] Waring, Marilyn (2003). “Counting for something!Recognising women’s contribution to the global econ-omy through alternative accounting systems”. Gen-der & Development, special issue - women reinvent-ing globalisation (Taylor and Francis) 11 (1): 35–43.doi:10.1080/741954251.

[19] Stanton, Elizabeth A (February 2007). The human de-velopment index: a history. Massachusetts: PoliticalEconomy Research Institute - PERI, University of Mas-sachusetts Amherst. Working paper no. 127.

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[20] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-opment, OECD (2001). The well-being of nations:the role of human and social capital. www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/40/33703702.pdf (Paris: Centre for Educa-tional Research and Innovation, Organisation for Eco-nomic Co-operation and Development). p. 9. ISBN9789264185890.

[21] Kuznets, Simon (January 1947). “Measurementof economic growth”. The Journal of EconomicHistory (Cambridge Journals) 7 (s1): 10–34.doi:10.1017/S0022050700065190.

[22] Benería, Lourdes (2003), “Paid and unpaid labor: mean-ings and debates”, in Benería, Lourdes, Gender, devel-opment, and globalization: economics as if all peoplemattered, New York: Routledge, pp. 131–160, ISBN9780415927079

[23] Klasen, Stephan; Schüler, Dana (2011). “Reforming thegender-related development index and the gender empow-erment measure: implementing some specific proposals”.Feminist Economics (Taylor and Francis) 17 (1): 1–30.doi:10.1080/13545701.2010.541860.

[24] Klasen, Stephan (2006). “UNDP’s gender-related mea-sures: some conceptual problems and possible solutions”.Journal of Human Development - special issue, Revis-iting the Gender-related Development Index (GDI) andGender Empowerment Measure (GEM) 7 (2): 243–274.doi:10.1080/14649880600768595.

[25] Schischka, John (9–10 September 2002), “The capabili-ties approach as a metric for economic development: anapplication in Nepal”, Conference proceedings - promot-ing women’s capabilities, examining Nussbaum’s capabili-ties approach, von Hügel Institute, St Edmund’s College,Cambridge: The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerXArchives, CiteSeerX: 10 .1 .1 .197 .7649

[26] United Nations Development Programme, UNDP, ed.(2011). “Statistical annex: technical notes - technical note2: calculating the inequality-adjusted Human Develop-ment Index”. Human development report 2011: sustain-ability and equity: a better future for all. New York Bas-ingstoke: United Nations Palgrave Macmillan. p. 169.ISBN 9780230363311.

[27] United Nations Development Programme, UNDP, ed.(2013). “Chapter 1: The state of human development(progress of nations, equity and human development):Gender and women’s status”. Human development report2013: the rise of the South: human progress in a diverseworld. New York, NY: United Nations Development Pro-gramme. p. 31. ISBN 9789211263404.

[28] Gaye, Amie; Klugman, Jeni; Kovacevic, Milorad; Twigg,Sarah; Zambrano, Eduardo (2010). “3: Introducing thegender inequality index - 3.1: Selection of dimensions andindicators”. In United Nations Development Programme,UNDP. Human development research paper 2010/46 -Measuring key disparities in human development: the gen-der inequality index. New York, NY: United Nations De-velopment Programme. pp. 9–10.

[29] Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko (1999). “What does feminizationof poverty mean? It isn't just lack of income”. Fem-inist Economics (Taylor and Francis) 5 (2): 99–103.doi:10.1080/135457099337996.

8 Further reading

• Alkire, Sabina (2002). Valuing freedoms: Sen’scapability approach and poverty reduction. Ox-ford New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN9780199245796. Hardback.

• Alkire, Sabina (February 2002). “Dimensions ofhuman development”. World Development (El-sevier) 30 (2): 181–205. doi:10.1016/S0305-750X(01)00109-7.

• Alkire, Sabina (2005). “Why the capabil-ity approach?". Journal of Human Develop-ment (Taylor and Francis) 6 (1): 115–135.doi:10.1080/146498805200034275.

• Anand, Paul (May 2005). “Capabilities and health”.Journal of Medical Ethics (BMJ Publishing GroupLtd & Institute of Medical Ethics) 31 (5): 299–303.doi:10.1136/jme.2004.008706.

• Anand, Paul (October 2005). “Introduction”. So-cial Indicators Research (Springer) 74 (1): 1–8.doi:10.1007/s11205-005-6517-0.

• Anand, Paul; Hunter, Graham; Smith, Ron (Octo-ber 2005). “Capabilities and well-being: evidencebased on the Sen–Nussbaum approach to welfare”.Social Indicators Research (Springer) 74 (1): 9–55.doi:10.1007/s11205-005-6518-z.

• Anand, Paul; Dolan, Paul (January 2005).“Introduction: Equity, capabilities and health”. So-cial Science & Medicine - special issue: equity, capa-bilities and health (Elsevier: Science Direct) 60 (2):219–222. doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2004.04.031.

• Anand, Paul (December 2005). “QALYs and ca-pabilities: a comment on Cookson”. Health Eco-nomics: Health Economics Letter (Wiley) 14 (12):1283–1286. doi:10.1002/hec.1002.

• Anand, Paul; van Hees, Martin (April 2006).“Capabilities and achievements: an empiricalstudy”. The Journal of Socio-Economics: spe-cial section - The Socio-Economics of Happiness(Elsevier: Science Direct) 35 (2): 268–284.doi:10.1016/j.socec.2005.11.003.

• Anand, Paul; Santos, Cristina (2007). “Violentcrime, gender inequalities and well-being: mod-els based on a survey of individual capabilitiesand crime rates for England and Wales”. Revued'économie politique (Cairn) 117 (1): 135–160.

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10 8 FURTHER READING

• Anand, Paul (April 2011). “New directions inthe economics of welfare: Special issue cel-ebrating Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen’s 75thbirthday”. Journal of Public Economics (El-sevier: Science Direct) 95 (3-4): 191–192.doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.12.007.

• Ballet, Jérôme; Bazin, Damien; Dubois, Jean-Luc;Mahieu, François-Régis (2014). Freedom, respon-sibility and economics of the person. London NewYork: Routledge. ISBN 9780415596985.

• Clark, David (2002). Visions of development:a study of human values. Cheltenham, UKNorthampton, Massachusetts, USA: Edward Elgar.ISBN 9781840649826.

• Clark, David (2006), “Capability approach (def-inition)", in Clark, David, The Elgar companionto development studies, Cheltenham, Glos, UK:Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 32–44, ISBN9781843764755 Draft pdf version.

• Crocker, David A (November 1992). “Functioningand capability: the foundations of Sen’sand Nussbaum’s development ethic”. Po-litical Theory (Sage) 20 (4): 584–612.doi:10.1177/0090591792020004003.

• Deneulin, Séverine; Shahani, Lila (2009). An in-troduction to the human development and capabil-ity approach freedom and agency. Sterling, VirginiaOttawa, Ontario: Earthscan International Develop-ment Research Centre. ISBN 9781844078066.

• Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko (2003). “The humandevelopment paradigm: operationalizingSen’s ideas on capabilities”. Feminist Eco-nomics (Taylor and Francis) 9 (2-3): 301–317.doi:10.1080/1354570022000077980.

• Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko; Kumar, A. K. Shiva (2009).Handbook of human development: concepts, mea-sures, and policies. New Delhi New York: OxfordUniversity Press. ISBN 9780195692334.

• Kaufman, Alexander (2004). Capabilities equalitybasic issues and problems. New York New York:Routledge. ISBN 9780415499781.

• Kuklys, Wiebke (2005). Amartya Sen’s capabil-ity approach theoretical insights and empirical ap-plications. Berlin New York: Springer. ISBN9783540261988.

• Otto, Hans-Uwe; Schneider, Klaus (2009). Fromemployability towards capability. Luxembourg:Inter-Actions. ISBN 9782959973369.

• Nussbaum, Martha; Sen, Amartya (1993). Thequality of life. Oxford England New York:Clarendon Press Oxford University Press. ISBN9780198287971.

• Nussbaum, Martha; Sen, Amartya (2004), “Non-relative virtues: an Aristotelian approach”, inNussbaum, Martha; Sen, Amartya, The quality oflife, New York: Routledge, pp. 242–269, ISBN9780415934411

• Nussbaum, Martha (2000). Women and human de-velopment: the capabilities approach. CambridgeNew York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN9780521003858.

• Riddle, Christopher A (2014). Disability and jus-tice: The capabilities approach in practice. Lex-ington: Lexington Books / Rowman & Littlefield.ISBN 9780739178027.

• Riddle, Christopher A (2013). “Well-Being and thecapability of health”. Topoi (Springer) 32 (2): 153–160. doi:10.1007/s11245-013-9167-x.

• Riddle, Christopher A (2010). “Indexing, capa-bilities, and disability”. Journal of Social Philoso-phy (Wiley) 41 (4): 527–537. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9833.2010.01514.x.

• Robeyns, Ingrid (2003). “Sen’s capability approachand gender inequality: selecting relevant capabili-ties”. Feminist Economics, special issue on the workof Amartya Sen (Taylor and Francis) 9 (2-3): 61–92.doi:10.1080/1354570022000078024.

• Robeyns, Ingrid (2005). “The capability approach:a theoretical survey”. Journal of Human De-velopment (Taylor and Francis) 6 (1): 93–117.doi:10.1080/146498805200034266.

• Sen, Amartya (September 1979). “Utilitarianismand welfarism”. The Journal of Philosophy (JSTOR)76 (9): 463–489. doi:10.2307/2025934.

• Sen, Amartya (1988), “The concept of develop-ment”, in Srinivasan, T.N.; Chenery, Hollis, Hand-book of development economics 1, Amsterdam NewYork New York, N.Y., U.S.A: North-Holland Soledistributors for the U.S.A. and Canada, Elsevier Sci-ence Pub. Co, pp. 2–23, ISBN 9780444703378

• Sen, Amartya (1989). “Development as capabilityexpansion”. Journal of Development Planning 19(1): 41–58.

• Reprinted in Sen, Amartya (2004), “De-velopment as capability expansion”, inKumar, A. K. Shiva; Fukuda-Parr,Sakiko, Readings in human development:concepts, measures and policies for a de-velopment paradigm, New Delhi NewYork: Oxford University Press, ISBN9780195670523

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• Also reprinted in Sen, Amartya (2012),“Development as capability expansion”,in Saegert, Susan; DeFilippis, James,The community development reader, NewYork: Routledge, ISBN 9780415507769

• Sen, Amartya (2004), “Capability and well-being”,in Nussbaum, Martha; Sen, Amartya, The qualityof life, New York: Routledge, pp. 30–53, ISBN9780415934411

• Sen, Amartya (2010). The idea of justice. London:Penguin. ISBN 9780141037851.

• United Nations Development Programme, UNDP(1990). Human development report 1990. NewYork: Oxford University Press for the U.N.D.P.ISBN 9780195064810.

9 External links• Human Development and Capability Association

• Journal of Human Development

• The Measurement of Human Capabilities

• Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative(OPHI)

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12 10 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

10 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

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