Canal and Water Conveyance Public Safety Best Practices · PDF filePublic Safety Best...

Canal and Water Conveyance Public Safety Best Practices Survey

Subject Area: Management and Customer Relations

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Canal and Water Conveyance Public Safety Best Practices Survey

©2013 Water Research Foundation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

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About the Water Research Foundation The Water Research Foundation is a member-supported, international, 501(c)3 nonprofit organization that sponsors research that enables water utilities, public health agencies, and other professionals to provide safe and affordable drinking water to consumers. The Foundation’s mission is to advance the science of water to improve the quality of life. To achieve this mission, the Foundation sponsors studies on all aspects of drinking water, including resources, treatment, and distribution. Nearly 1,000 water utilities, consulting firms, and manufacturers in North America and abroad contribute subscription payments to support the Foundation’s work. Additional funding comes from collaborative partnerships with other national and international organizations and the U.S. federal government, allowing for resources to be leveraged, expertise to be shared, and broad-based knowledge to be developed and disseminated. From its headquarters in Denver, Colorado, the Foundation’s staff directs and supports the efforts of more than 800 volunteers who serve on the board of trustees and various committees. These volunteers represent many facets of the water industry, and contribute their expertise to select and monitor research studies that benefit the entire drinking water community. Research results are disseminated through a number of channels, including reports, the Website, Webcasts, workshops, and periodicals. The Foundation serves as a cooperative program providing subscribers the opportunity to pool their resources and build upon each others’ expertise. By applying Foundation research findings, subscribers can save substantial costs and stay on the leading edge of drinking water science and technology. Since its inception, the Foundation has supplied the water community with more than $460 million in applied research value. More information about the Foundation and how to become a subscriber is available at www.WaterRF.org.


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Canal and Water Conveyance Public Safety Best Practices Survey Prepared by: Nancy Richardson and William Rettberg, GEI Consultants, Inc., 180 Grand Avenue, Suite 1410, Oakland, CA 94612 Jointly sponsored by: Water Research Foundation 6666 West Quincy Avenue Denver, CO 80235 and Contra Costa Water District 1331 Concord Avenue, P.O. Box H2O Concord, CA 94524 Published by:


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DISCLAIMER

This study was jointly funded by the Water Research Foundation (Foundation) and Contra Costa Water District (CCWD). The Foundation and CCWD assume no responsibility for the

content of the research study reported in this publication or for the opinions or statements of fact expressed in the report. The mention of trade names for commercial products does not represent or imply the approval or endorsement of the Foundation or CCWD. This report is

presented solely for informational purposes.

Copyright ©2013 by Water Research Foundation

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

No part of this publication may be copied, reproduced or otherwise utilized without permission.

ISBN 978-1-60573-184-1

Printed in the U.S.A.


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CONTENTS

TABLES AND FIGURES ............................................................................................................ vii

FOREWORD ................................................................................................................................. ix

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................. xi

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................... xiii

CANAL AND WATER CONVEYANCE PUBLIC SAFETY BEST PRACTICES SURVEY .... 1 Purpose And Objective ....................................................................................................... 1 Background ......................................................................................................................... 2 Existing Guidance ............................................................................................................... 4 Study Methodology ............................................................................................................. 6 Participant Demographics ................................................................................................... 7 Participant Public Waterway Safety Programs ................................................................. 11 Engineering, Administrative, and Operational Controls ....................................... 12 Best Practices ........................................................................................................ 16

Recreational Use of Waterways ............................................................................ 17 Conclusions and Recommendations ................................................................................. 17 Limitations ........................................................................................................................ 19

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 21

APPENDIX A: WATER RESEARCH FOUNDATION INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE .....23

APPENDIX B: SURVEY INSTRUMENT ...................................................................................25


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TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1 Types of Public Access Mitigation and Safety Controls ................................................xv Table 2 Accident Exposure Classifications (Reclamation, 1992) .................................................5 Table 3 Owner/Operators Contacted ............................................................................................6 Table 4 Participant History and Size .............................................................................................7 Table 5 Types of Public Access Mitigation and Safety Controls ................................................12 Figure 1 Types of Conveyances .....................................................................................................8 Figure 2 Service Area Coverage ....................................................................................................9 Figure 3 Locations of Participant Facilities .................................................................................10


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FOREWORD

The Water Research Foundation (Foundation) is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to the development and implementation of scientifically sound research designed to help drinking water utilities respond to regulatory requirements and address high-priority concerns. The Foundation’s research agenda is developed through a process of consultation with Foundation subscribers and other drinking water professionals. The Foundation’s Board of Trustees and other professional volunteers help prioritize and select research projects for funding based upon current and future industry needs, applicability, and past work. The Foundation sponsors research projects through the Focus Area, Emerging Opportunities, and Tailored Collaboration programs, as well as various joint research efforts with organizations such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation.

This publication is a result of a research project fully funded or funded in part by Foundation subscribers. The Foundation’s subscription program provides a cost-effective and collaborative method for funding research in the public interest. The research investment that underpins this report will intrinsically increase in value as the findings are applied in communities throughout the world. Foundation research projects are managed closely from their inception to the final report by the staff and a large cadre of volunteers who willingly contribute their time and expertise. The Foundation provides planning, management, and technical oversight and awards contracts to other institutions such as water utilities, universities, and engineering firms to conduct the research.

A broad spectrum of water supply issues is addressed by the Foundation's research agenda, including resources, treatment and operations, distribution and storage, water quality and analysis, toxicology, economics, and management. The ultimate purpose of the coordinated effort is to assist water suppliers to provide a reliable supply of safe and affordable drinking water to consumers. The true benefits of the Foundation’s research are realized when the results are implemented at the utility level. The Foundation's staff and Board of Trustees are pleased to offer this publication as a contribution toward that end.

Roy L. Wolfe, Ph.D. Robert C. Renner, P.E. Chair, Board of Trustees Executive Director Water Research Foundation Water Research Foundation


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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

GEI Consultants wishes to acknowledge the Water Research Foundation, Contra Costa Water District, and Metropolitan Water District of Southern California for their contributions in the development of this study.

In particular, we wish to acknowledge members of the Water Research Foundation:

Robert Renner, P.E., Executive Director Jennifer Warner, Research Manager Shonnie Cline, Senior Account Manager

Scott Weddle, P.E., District Engineer, Contra Costa Water District helped to sponsor this

study, and Walter Bishop, Walter Bishop Consulting and former General Manager, Contra Costa Water District made technical contributions to this report. In addition, we acknowledge Roy L. Wolfe, Ph.D., Chair, Board of Trustees of the Water Research Foundation, and Assistant General Manager, Metropolitan Water District for hosting the workshop.


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

OBJECTIVE

The objective of undertaking this study (Project #4426) is to survey and report on best practices used by a select group of western water districts, utilities, and hydroelectric companies (owner/operators) to maintain public safety around open water conveyance facilities such as canals, flumes, siphons, and non-dam-related spillways. The researchers define “best practices” as measures that an owner/operator believes are most effective in protecting public safety around these facilities. In discussing public safety, the researchers focused on surveying owner/operator’s methods for eliminating or reducing the potential for “near misses,” inadvertent accidents, or fatalities at conveyance structures that are not intended for public use.

BACKGROUND

Particularly in the western United States, open canals, flumes, and related facilities were designed and constructed years ago in mostly remote, rural areas. Today many of these areas are now part of the urban and suburban landscape. With few exceptions, the closer an unprotected open waterway conveyance is in proximity to people, the higher the incidence of access, and the greater the public safety risk. In any given year, there are fatalities and injuries to both children and adults resulting from unauthorized or accidental entry into manmade water conveyance features.1

It is important to note that owner/operators must develop public safety standards and controls in the absence of specific regulatory laws related to operation of canals, flumes, and other open waterways. Although public safety is generally addressed in guidance issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC [FERC, 1992]) and in a very detailed safety signage publication (FERC, 2001), the agency’s public safety compliance focus at least at the regional level in the west is on the dams and powerhouses, and not on downstream water conveyance facilities. Only the U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) has a set of guidelines and engineering designs for public safety in and around conveyance facilities (Reclamation, 1971, 1978, 1979, and 1992).

1 It should be noted that some hydroelectric owner/operators have Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) mandated recreational areas (reservoirs, campgrounds, etc.) with specific boating/swimming/fishing provisions and accompanying safety guidelines. These FERC “requirements of license” areas were excluded from the study. In addition, the researchers recognize that individuals with intent to harm themselves, even in the presence of a substantial barrier, may succeed through force of will. These scenarios were not addressed, nor were reckless drivers who crashed through guardrails into canals.


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Lacking specific standards and largely relying on interpretation of guidance on a case-by-case basis, most owner/operators face decisions about public access to their open water conveyance systems. These decisions become complex in light of the following considerations:

The long, linear nature of canals and the expense of fencing

Implied public “use” rights when a canal has become a popular walking and biking trail or fishing spot after years of use

Inadvertent creation of an “attractive nuisance” by installing canal egress devices (i.e., escape ladders, safety cables, etc.), thereby “inviting” risky public access

Difficulty in accessing a canal or flume for routine operation and maintenance if barriers are erected

Operation and maintenance costs associated with engineered and operational safety controls

Inspections that focus more on structural concerns than public safety

Consistent application and upkeep of uniform public safety signage

The difficulty locating safety improvements on private property and/or property shared by the owner/operator and a state or federal agency (i.e., U.S. Forest Service)

Addressing risky human behavior for which an owner/operator does not have ultimate control

Vandalism to fencing, gates, signage, and other controls

STUDY METHODOLOGY

The Water Research Foundation (Foundation) solicited interest from 17 owner/operators that maintain canals and other water conveyance structures in Arizona, California, Colorado, Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and Washington to participate in the survey. Prepared by the researchers, the survey covered the characteristics of the owner/operator’s physical facilities, such as the extent and type of conveyance facilities; existing safety programs; and incident rates. The researchers interviewed 10 owner/operator participants.

Almost all participants engaged other members of their organizations in responding to the survey, seeking input from safety, engineering, operations, planning, community relations, and security departments. The researchers compiled and analyzed the results. Five owner/operators peer reviewed this report and participated in a workshop to discuss the study findings.


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RESULTS/CONCLUSIONS

The responses from the survey participants varied, revealing that each owner/operator has a different approach to public safety around canals and water conveyances. Some approaches utilize adaptive management; for example, some owner/operators developed their safety program in response to incidents that have occurred. Other approaches use internally developed programs, Reclamation guidance, or a combination of both.

All survey participants consider the physical features of their facilities and the perceived risk of public safety exposure in the development of their waterway safety program’s controls. These controls can be categorized as follows on Table 1:

Table 1 – Types of Public Access Mitigation and Safety Controls

Engineering Controls Administrative

Controls Operational Controls

Fencing (various types) Signage Patrols (Air/Foot)

Gates (various types) Employee Education Surveillance/Security

Cameras

Escape/Egress Aids (buoys, cables, nets, and ladders)

Public Education Sirens/Alerts

Mutual aid/Interagency agreements

While limited, the data suggests that there are no commonly accepted “standards of practice” let alone “best practices,” and there is a need to further evaluate and discuss the range of options available to address public safety risks. In general, surveyed owner/operators believe that security fencing, followed by patrols were the most effective in safeguarding public safety. Incidentally, participants with safety cultures that model “beyond compliance with existing guidance” favored these two types of controls.

During the workshop, peer reviewers pointed out that it was important that their “brand” (profile in the marketplace to customers and competitors), have safety practices as a key characteristic. The extent and depth of an owner/operator’s overall safety culture and the degree of its permeation within all levels of organization, including budgetary support, from top management through field staff is, in itself a ‘best practice.”

APPLICATIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS

The survey results regarding best practices can be used to provide comparative benchmark data to owner/operators to assess their programs relative to those established by others. It is important that the issue of public safety near open water conveyance structures be elevated in recognition that fatalities and injuries remain a significant issue at unprotected access points and that owner/operators have an obligation to ensure the protection of public safety in and around their manmade infrastructure. Continuing dialogue among owner/operators on the


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efficacy of various controls—engineering, administrative, and operational—is inherently valuable to this effort.

PARTICIPANTS

This Foundation study received assistance from the Contra Costa Water District, which sponsored the study, and the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, which provided the venue for the workshop.

LIMITATIONS

This report presents a summary of information collected from a survey of best practices for public safety around canals and open waterways among a limited number of water districts, utilities, and hydroelectric owner/operators with the survey guided by a common questionnaire. Employee /contractor safety and associated OSHA standards were not addressed in the survey. As survey participants provided information on a voluntary and self-reported basis, it may not be representative of all relevant facts and conditions regarding public safety issues for this group of owner/operators or for owner/operators in general. The report is not intended nor should be construed as a safety evaluation or audit regarding the effectiveness, appropriateness, or adequacy of safety practices of any specific survey participant or the industry as a whole. Finally, it should be noted that it was not the researcher’s intent to develop standards for canal and waterway safety best practices through performance of this study.


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Photo courtesy of Association of Dam Safety Officials, Journal of Dam Safety, Vol. 9, Issue 2, 2011 and Paul G. Schweiger

CANAL AND WATER CONVEYANCE PUBLIC SAFETY BEST PRACTICES SURVEY

PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE

The objective of undertaking this Water Research Foundation (Foundation) study (Project #4426) is to report on best practices used by a select group of western water districts, utilities, and hydroelectric companies (owner/operators) to maintain public safety around open water conveyance features such as canals, flumes, siphons, and non-dam related spillways. The researchers define “best practices” as measures that an owner/operator believes are most effective in providing public safety around these facilities. In discussing public safety, the researchers focused on surveying owner/operator’s methods for prevention or protection of the public from “near misses,” inadvertent accidents, or fatalities at water conveyance structures that are not intended for public use.2

Fatalities or injuries that result from an owner/operator’s lack of controls to protect and safeguard manmade waterway conveyances from the public can pose liability if the hazard is known and there are no public protections in place. The researcher’s objective therefore, was to inventory best safety practices used by the surveyed owner/operators that have proven to be effective in deterring public access and limiting risk and to share those practices with the survey group.

2 The researchers excluded accidents or fatalities that might result from allowable public use. For example,

most hydroelectric utilities have Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) mandated recreational use areas (reservoirs, campgrounds, etc.) with associated boating/swimming/fishing provisions and accompanying safety guidelines. The public is encouraged to use these “requirements of license,” so reservoir drownings, boating/fishing accidents, and campground incidents are considered events for which the licensee likely had adequate safety provisions in place and/or are out of the owner/operator’s reasonable control to prevent. In addition, the researchers recognize that an individual with the intent to self-harm using the drowning potential of a canal even in the presence of a substantial barrier may succeed through force of will. Drivers who crash through guardrail barriers into canals were not the subject of the study, as the owner/operator has no control over driving behavior. Finally, the researchers did not address employee and/or contractor safety and associated OSHA standards in the study.


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BACKGROUND

Particularly in the western United States, open canals, flumes, and related facilities were designed and constructed years ago in mostly remote, rural areas. Today many of these areas are now part of the urban and suburban landscape. With few exceptions, the closer an unprotected open waterway conveyance is in proximity to people, the higher the incidence of access, and public safety risk. In general, the public grossly underestimates the dangers of moving water and lack understanding of the special hazards associated with operation of manmade water conveyance facilities. Such facilities include open canals and ditches, partially covered and uncovered flumes, forebays, afterbays, and non-dam related spillways. While tunnels and siphons are closed conveyances, many include trash racks and debris barriers at their portals that can be human entrapment hazards (although a lack of racking at these structures poses other hazards). Canals with steep, gunite-lined side slopes are virtually impossible to escape while conveying swift and often very cold water without egress aids.

Often, water conveyance facilities become attractive nuisances. Canals are trespassed for swimming, rafting, and “floating,” particularly in the hot summer months. Without barriers to entry, some canal banks are de facto “hike and bikes” e.g., recreational amenities used as walking, jogging, biking, and horseback riding trails. Ungated ground-level or elevated flumes with narrow steel or wooden cat walkways are used for hiking, jogging, mountain biking, and “trick” riding platforms, as well as novelties under which to swim. Unprotected forebays and afterbays can become popular fishing locations. Increasingly, the Internet and social media sites such as YouTube®, and Facebook® have erased much of the “remoteness” of many of these facilities. For example, previously unknown wilderness flumes are now advertised destinations; naturalist organizations such as the Audubon Society in California describe and picture organized hikes on flumes on their website. YouTube® has an assortment of videos involving recreating at canals and flumes, including filmed hikes, mountain biking trips, cross-country running, and even canal jumping in 4x4 trucks.

It is very important to note that owner/operators must develop public safety standards and controls in the absence of specific regulatory laws related to operation of canals, flumes, and other open waterways. Although public safety is generally addressed in guidance issued by FERC (FERC, 1992), and in a very detailed safety signage publication (FERC, 2001), the agency’s public safety compliance focus, at least at the regional level in the west, is on the dams and powerhouses, and less on downstream water conveyance facilities. Only the U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) has a specific set of publically available safety recommendations and engineering designs for public safety in and around conveyance facilities (Reclamation, 1971, 1978, 1979, and 1992).

In the absence of regulatory inducement and largely relying on interpretation of guidance on a case-by-case basis, most owner/operators face decisions about public access to their open


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water conveyance systems. These decisions become complex in light of the following considerations:

The long, linear nature of canals and the expense of fencing

Implied public “use” rights when a canal has become a popular walking and biking trail or fishing spot after years of use

Inadvertent creation of an “attractive nuisance” by installing canal egress devices (i.e., escape ladders, safety cables, etc.), thereby “inviting” public access

Difficulty in accessing a canal or flume for routine operation and maintenance if barriers are erected

Operation and maintenance costs associated with engineered and operational safety controls

Inspections that focus more on structural concerns than public safety

Consistent application and upkeep of uniform public safety signage

The difficulty in locating safety improvements on private property and/or property shared by the owner/operator and a state or federal agency (i.e., U.S. Forest Service)

Adequately addressing unpredictable human behavior for which an owner/operator does not have control

Vandalism to fencing, gates, signage, and other controls

To illustrate the problem of public safety and open water conveyance structures, a notable example involves the federally owned (Reclamation) All-American Canal, operated by the Imperial Irrigation District (IID). The All-American Canal runs for over 80 miles in close proximity to the U.S. California/Mexican border. Before installation of egress aids, the All-American Canal was the location of over 550 drownings (1948 to 2011), mostly illegal immigrants attempting to swim across the canal into the U.S. While the majority of drownings were young men, there were also women and children who perished. In a CBS 60 Minutes segment that aired May 2010, Dr. John Fletemeyer, a research professor at Florida International University’s Laboratory for Coastal Research and a leading authority on drowning, called the All-American Canal the “most dangerous waterway in the United States” (Pelley 2010).

All-American Canal during construction of concrete liner

Source: GEI Consultants, 2012


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Like many open channels and flumes, the water in the All-American Canal is very cold, and moves at a rapid rate, in this case from two to 5 feet per second at the surface and 9 feet per second at the bottom (Fletemeyer, 2009). The danger of these conditions is grossly underestimated by casual sight. The 23-mile segment near the U.S border is a trapezoidal, steep-sided lined concrete section that is very difficult to escape in the absence of egress devices/aids. Following years of public pressure and not without considerable political debate, IID installed both reflective-painted escape ladders every 250 feet and buoy lines at 300-foot intervals along the concrete portion of the canal where crossings were frequently attempted. While construction of a border fence and increased Border Patrol enforcement may have contributed to the decrease in drownings, there has been a marked reduction in deaths in the canal (Simon, 2011).

The All-American Canal’s issues were highly publicized but fatalities in manmade water conveyances generally receive only local attention. For example, since 2011, there have been four childhood deaths in the greater Phoenix, Arizona area caused by drowning in canals. At the time of this report, the most recent fatality was a 2-year old toddler who slipped into the Salt River Project’s Highline canal near Guadalupe in April 2012. This area of the Highline canal is unfenced (Sakal 2012).

EXISTING GUIDANCE

As stated previously, owner/operators have only FERC and Reclamation publications for use in determining the parameters of their safety programs if they want to rely on published documents. Some hydroelectric utilities follow the generalized public safety protocols contained in Guidelines for Public Safety at Hydropower Projects (FERC, March 1992; updated November 2011) and Safety Signage at Hydropower Plants (FERC, October 2001).

For hydroelectric owner/operators, FERC offers relatively loose directives:

“Project owners are responsible for providing any appropriate safety devices and other safety measures at their projects, even if not specifically required by the Regional Engineers. However, the staff of the Division of Dam Safety and Inspections (D2SI), in cooperation with project owners, are expected to assess the overall need for safety devices or other safety measures at all projects in order to develop the most effective solution to identified safety problems. Other safety measures may include preventing recreational activities in hazardous areas. Project owners are expected to expeditiously install and properly maintain any safety measures they determine are needed or are required by the Regional Engineer…each project is unique and will necessarily require judgments and solutions that should be made in the field.”

Canals, intake areas, natural channels, and catwalks are among the features considered hazardous by FERC at hydroelectric projects: “As a general rule, all projects will require some type of safety devices, warning systems, or other measures. The amount of protection necessary


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increases as public exposure to the hazards increases. For example, one canal may require only a warning sign, while another may require safety nets, escape ladders, several warning signs, and the need to be enclosed with a chain link fence” (FERC, March 1992; updated November 2011).

FERC, with considerable input from the Hydro Public Safety Issues Group (HPSIG), the Midwest Hydro Users Group Public Safety Committee (HUG), and others produced Safety Signage at Hydropower Plants (FERC, 2001). This publication is a comprehensive document on signage that applies not just to dams, reservoirs, and recreational areas of a hydroelectric project, but includes the downstream facilities such as canals, flumes, wasteways, and off-channel spillways. According to FERC, “safety signage should address not only activities or actions that are prohibited, but should also guide and encourage viewers to make safe activity choices” (FERC, 2001). The document draws from numerous agencies (USACE, FHWA, ANSI, OSHA, etc.) and covers signage in detail, including recommendations ranging from font choice, size, color, and typography to sign shape and panel configuration details from the International Standards Organization (ISO).

Reclamation also recognizes that it is not always practical to standardize safety features on any given structure but confirms, “One of the most important considerations is the number of people which will be exposed to the hazard through operations, recreation, or living nearby” (Reclamation, 1978). Accordingly, Reclamation classifies canals using the following hazard ranking system “Accident Exposure Classifications” shown on Table 2, below (Reclamation, 1992).

Table 2 –Accident Exposure Classifications (Reclamation, 1992)

Class A Those canals adjacent to schools and recreational areas such as playgrounds, subject to frequent visits by children, and those canals nearby or adjacent to urban areas or highways which (sic) are subject to frequent visits by the public.

Class B Those canals nearby or adjacent to farms or highways which (sic) could be subject to visits by children or public seeking recreation, such as swimming.

Class C Those canals far removed from any dwelling which (sic) are subject to infrequent visits by operating personnel or public, such as an occasional sportsman.

Class D Those canals that would be a hazard to domestic animals

Class E Those canals that would be an extreme hazard to big game animals

In reviewing historic records of fatalities within its system, Reclamation states, “Almost all of the drownings occurred in the urban and rural populated areas (Class A and B exposure). Conversely, drownings in canals and laterals located in isolated areas with only occasional exposure to persons do not represent a problem” (Reclamation 1978).


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Many western irrigation districts and some water agencies have Reclamation ownership and therefore, a legacy of canal and flume protection measures in place. As the owner of thousands of miles of water conveyance structures, the “Bureau of Reclamation is acutely aware of the safety hazards associated with open waterways, and incorporates protective features into the design of new facilities and modifies existing irrigation features for the protection of the public” (Warren 1978). Reclamation provides detailed specifications for public protection of each class of canal and siphons in several publications (Reclamation 1971, 1978, 1979, and 1992). For example, Reclamation specifies that for Class A and B hazard classifications, “Safety fencing in conjunction with nets or cables shall be 6-foot minimum height security fence with three strands of barbed wire vertically above it” (Reclamation 1992). Reclamation has developed similar specifications and applicability standards for handrails, escape ladders, safety nets, and cables. Interestingly, Reclamation bases fencing specifications on the class categorization noted above in Table 2; physical characteristics and hazards of the conveyance itself, such as velocity, type, slope parameters, etc. drive design guidance for egress aids only.

STUDY METHODOLOGY

The Foundation invited 17 owner/operators in Arizona, California, Colorado, Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and Washington to participate in a telephone survey of best practices. Appendix A is the invitation. Table 3 lists the invitees.

Table 3 – Owner/Operators Invited to Participate (*Peer Reviewers)

Owner/Operator Headquarters Type of Operation

Avista WA Power/hydroelectric

Central Arizona Project* AZ Water and Irrigation

Central Utah Water Conservancy District UT Water Agency

City of Scottsdale, Arizona AZ Water Utility

Coachella Valley Water District* CA Water and Irrigation

Contra Costa Water District* CA Water Agency

Denver Water CO Water Agency

Imperial Irrigation District CA Water/Irrigation

Jordan Valley Water District UT Water District

Metropolitan Water District of Southern California*

CA Water District/Hydroelectric

Nebraska Public Power District NE Power/Hydroelectric

PacifiCorp OR Power/Hydroelectric

Salt River Project AZ Power/Hydroelectric/Water Utility

Southern California Edison CA Power/Hydroelectric

Truckee Meadows Water Authority* NV Water Agency/Hydroelectric

Tucson Water AZ Water Utility

Turlock Irrigation District CA Water and Irrigation District


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Appendix B is the survey sent by the Foundation in advance to the participants. The survey covered the characteristics of the owner/operator’s physical facilities, such as the extent and type of conveyance facilities; existing safety programs; engineering, operations, and administrative controls; and incident rates.

The researchers surveyed 10 owner/operators. Telephone interviews generally lasted between 30 and 60 minutes. Almost all participants engaged other departments within their organization to respond to the survey, seeking input from safety, security, engineering, operations, community liaison, and planning departments. Five survey participants were selected to peer review this report. A workshop was held among the peer reviewers, researchers, and the Foundation to discuss findings and the direction the canal and waterway public safety effort could take going forward.

PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS

Table 4 lists survey participants with respect to year founded, customer base, and revenues. Among the study group, five participants operate hydroelectric projects (among other power production) and the others are water utilities/districts and irrigation providers. Participants operate facilities in Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington.

*Southern California Edison’s responses focused solely on the Borel Canal

The survey accounted for the sum of participants’ canals and flumes, which range in size

from approximately one mile to over 300 miles in length, for a collective total of 840 miles of canals and over 50 miles of flumes. Data was collected on siphons, wasteways, non-dam related spillways, and tunnels as well; all participants have some or all of the features. Figure 1 shows the type and extent of conveyance facilities.

Table 4 - Participant History and Size

Participant Date Founded

Customers thousands

Revenuethousands

Avista 1889 481 1,300,000

Central Arizona Project 1971 5400 211,000

Coachella Valley Water District 1918 260 209,000

Contra Costa Water District 1936 500 92,803

Denver Water 1918 1300 290,000

Metropolitan Water District of Southern California

1928 19000 1,200,000

Nebraska Public Power District 1970 1000 950,000

PacifiCorp 1984 1700 2,000,000

Southern California Edison* 1886 14000 10,577,000

Truckee Meadows Water Authority 2001 95 72,000


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Figure 2 illustrates the study participants’ total square miles of coverage. PacifiCorp has the largest area, and much of the power producer’s facilities are located in remote areas of Oregon, Washington, and Idaho. Conversely, although much smaller, Contra Costa Water District, Truckee Meadows Water Authority (Reno), and Denver Water have greater urban coverage.

Figure 1 – Types of Conveyances


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Figure 2 – Service Area Coverage (in square miles)

Based on the owner/operators’ founding dates, the surrounding land use at the time of their facilities’ construction was almost exclusively rural. Rural areas are those with sparse population (farmland and open ranges or national forest). Suburban areas include small and mid-size ranches and lower density housing subdivisions and commercial establishments. Urban areas are a mix of commercial and residential development in 1-acre increments or less.


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In the last several decades, most study participants have found that the buffer zone between their infrastructure and the public has markedly decreased. PacifiCorp and Southern California Edison are exceptions, as their conveyances remain located in rural areas.3 In contrast, Avista, the Central Arizona Project, Contra Costa Water District, Denver Water, and Truckee Meadows Water Authority have had to address the challenge of urbanization around their water infrastructure. The location of participants’ facilities with respect to urban/suburban development is shown on Figure 3.

Over the past 10 years, all study participants except Denver Water have experienced fatalities associated with operation of their canals and waterways. The causes have varied and deaths have involved children and adults, although Coachella Valley Water District has not had any childhood fatalities. In all cases, bodies were recovered some distance from where they entered the conveyance making it challenging to pinpoint and correct breach points. For most study participants, known near “misses” average 2 to 3 per year.

3 The data for Southern California Edison pertains only to the Borel Canal.

Figure 3 – Locations of Participant Facilities


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PARTICIPANT PUBLIC WATERWAY SAFETY PROGRAMS

The extent of the participants’ public waterway safety programs varied from “nothing formal/no specific plan” to detailed programs and procedures. Some participants have maintained safety controls constructed or recommended by Reclamation at the time of canal construction, which include both fencing and egress aids. The Central Arizona Project, Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, Coachella Water District, and the Contra Costa Water District have a legacy of Reclamation-designed engineering, administrative, and operational controls that have been in place since the facilities’ construction. A few hydroelectric owners (Avista and Nevada Public Power) use the Public Safety Plans4 under their FERC license to integrate open waterway safety measures beyond those required at the hydropower plant/dam/reservoir. Data regarding budgets for waterway public safety was collected from owner/operators in the survey, but the funding metrics were too diverse to make meaningful comparisons.

In almost all cases, survey participant’s safety programs have evolved over a period of years. With few exceptions, programs have been developed in response to recognized risk5 as opposed to a triggering incident, although Avista specifically started its safety program in response to a fatality at one of its facilities in the 1970s. The survey data and the workshop results indicate that the most robust safety programs among study participants include a high level of all risk management controls – engineering, administrative, and operational. These safety programs receive the highest level of management attention, encompass employee and public safety in equal measure, and include an appropriate level of budgeting within the organization.

The researchers asked study participants to list responsible personnel titles and departments within their organizations that have responsibility for canal and waterway safety. The following are highlights of responses.

Truckee Meadows Water Authority: Coordinator of Safety and Security, Engineering and Operations Safety Committee

Central Arizona Project: Department of Risk Management; Engineering Services; Maintenance; Environmental, Safety & Health (11 personnel); Protective Services (7 personnel); Communications & External Affairs; and Canal Maintenance staff

4 From Safety Signage at Hydropower Projects: “FERC requires that a Public Safety Plan be developed by the owner of any project where public safety measures are necessary. The plan includes a list of each safety device at the project and a schematic drawing showing the location of each device. Such safety devices include fences, signs, boat barriers, buoys, log booms, audible devices, night illuminations, and warning lights. The plan is kept current by the project owner and reviewed by Commission staff during each operation inspection for accuracy and adequacy.” 5 Security and vulnerability assessments undertaken post 9/11 prompted some owner/operators to re-examine their system’s vulnerability to public access and the potential risk of sabotage, and to update their safety and security measures accordingly.


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Avista: Manager of Hydro Safety and Security and Emergency Action Plan (EAP) Coordinator

Coachella Valley Water District: Both the Director of Communications and Legislation (2 of 7 devoted to classroom education) and the Director of Trades (2 of 9 are fully dedicated to the canal) report to the General Manager-Chief Engineer

Contra Costa Water District: General Manager with various departments involved: Engineering, Operations, Public Information, and Watershed and Lands

PacifiCorp: Manager of Compliance and Regional Manager; various departments involved: Compliance, Operations, and Legal

Engineering, Administrative, and Operational Controls

The researchers categorized owner/operator responses to restrict or control public access as engineering controls, administrative controls, and operational controls. Table 5 below illustrates these controls.

Table 5 – Types of Public Access Mitigation and Safety Controls

Engineering Controls Administrative

Controls Operational Controls

Fencing (various types) Signage Patrols (Air/Foot)

Gates (various types) Employee Education Surveillance/Security

Cameras

Escape/Egress Aids (buoys, cables, nets, and ladders)

Public Education Sirens/Alerts

Mutual aid/Interagency agreements

Engineering Controls

Engineering controls fall into two categories: access restriction and egress aids. Fencing and gates are the most common methods of access restriction. Egress aids facilitate escape once a person has entered the water and include items such as buoys, cables, and escape ladders.

Fencing

Most study participants used fencing to control access along urbanized areas of their open waterways. Fencing was categorized as:

Boundary and/or Right of Way (R.O.W. [generally 3 to 5 strand barbed wire])

Liner (if lined canal)

Chain link

Wire mesh

Security-barbed wire


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The Central Arizona Project has secured all 300-plus miles of canal with fencing that includes chain link topped with security barbed wire. Wire mesh is used in areas adjacent to the canal along operation and maintenance roads. In urban areas, where there is a known entry point, the Central Arizona Project has used hard metal panel fencing with good effect. Contra Costa Water District uses a combination of security fencing and liner fence (5 ft.) in urban areas and similarly, Coachella Valley Water District has provided security fencing for approximately 50 miles of its canal that runs through urban areas. The rural portions are unfenced. Metropolitan Water District uses security fencing along the entire length of the Colorado River Aqueduct (even though it is in a sparsely populated area) and barbed wire along the San Diego Canal. PacifiCorp and Nebraska Public Power District do not fence their canals except at the locations of structures. Denver Water’s canals are part of the urban landscape as recreational features and are not fenced.

All study participants use a combination of chain link/barbed wire and locked gates around their operating equipment and in locations where there is a heightened risk to public safety (i.e., Truckee Meadows Water Authority at flumes). All members of the study group protect tunnels and siphon entrances with chain/link security fencing and use trash racks at tunnel portals.

Only a few respondents provide fencing and barbed wire at bridge crossings. The Central Arizona Project has gates at both ends of bridge crossings with signage. Coachella Valley Water District fences bridge crossings in urban sections of the canal in accordance with Reclamation specifications. Contra Costa Water District provides additional fencing around the liner fence at bridge crossings and other facilities including check structures in all urban areas.

Gates

Generally, there are two types of gates. One prevents vehicle entrance and the other foot or bike traffic. Vehicle gates are usually ranch type gates with padlocks. Other gates include locked and key-controlled six-foot chain link fences at entry points. All participants use one or both to control access.

Egress/Escape Devices

These devices are designed for self-rescue or to buy time for aided rescue and include in-canal/waterway ladders, buoys, grab cables, and safety netting. More than half the study group made use of these devices, especially in lined canals. Of the study participants that used egress devices, half follow Reclamation specifications on spacing of ladders, grab cables, and buoy systems.

Administrative Controls

Warning and informational signage is a common administrative control. In addition to fixed signage, warnings can be audible devices (verbal announcements or sirens),


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lights/illumination, beacons, and strobe lights. Public education is also an administrative control and can encompass mascots; regular briefings to schools and assemblies; distribution of fliers; public service announcements (using radio, television, websites, and prescreening trailers at movie theaters); and booths at town and county fairs.

Signage

Signage is used by all study group participants, but it is not viewed as a stand-alone deterrent. Survey participants reported that the public and owner/operator’s employees tend to ignore or “no longer see” signs over time. Signage messages range from No swimming/boating/fishing signs to those that warn the public of the specific potential dangers of the waterway (swift current, cold water, underwater suction). Others just use the simple Stay Out/Stay Alive. The study participants viewed No Trespassing signs as ineffective if the public does not perceive a credible threat of punishment and particularly if the sign is in a remote area or is located on a passable gate, fence, or tree trunk. For unsupervised children, signage regardless of type may have no effect at all.

An overall lack of consistency in signage is an issue as study participants strive to stay current with bilingual and multi-bilingual demographics; shifts in the psychology of effective signage messaging/fonts/graphics; federal, state, and local guidance differences; and replacement programs that have to account for acquisitions, vandalism, theft, and changes in public access. Spacing used by the participants varies widely from every 50 feet to every .25-mile based on location of the waterway with respect to public access, as does location: some are painted on the canal concrete edges, hung on fencing, or are freestanding markers.

Public Education

Five of the study participants have public education programs, with varying degrees of emphasis. All programs focus primarily on educating school-aged children about the dangers of the canals and how to keep themselves safe. Some programs include mascots (“Blue - the Canal K9,” “Dippy Duck,” etc.). The overall message of these public education efforts, as stated by the Central Arizona Project is “Keep Out of the Canal.”

The Central Arizona Project has had a well-developed public outreach program for years; the presence of the Salt River Project’s unfenced conveyances in the same metropolitan area has been the only challenge in an otherwise successful program. Coachella Valley Water District has two full time employees who visit approximately 17,000 elementary students each school year to talk about the dangers of the Coachella Canal and the need to obey the no trespassing/no swimming signs. Avista has made 70 to 80 presentations on water safety annually for the past 15 years. Nebraska Public Power District issues a brochure and maintains a website bulletin advising of the restrictions against swimming and boating in canals. Contra Costa Water District has a long-established public education program aimed at school-aged children from


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kindergarten through grade 8 that includes distribution of flyers to 26 local schools and presentations at annual spring assemblies.

Employee Education

The researchers did not collect data on educating employees about public safety. However, several owner/operators that participated in the workshop indicated that ideally, management conveys a comprehensive safety message from top to bottom, emphasizing that all employees are responsible for ensuring a safety-first culture. Training programs for water operators and others responsible for routine inspections of all water infrastructures should address public safety.

Mutual Aid/Interagency Agreements

Mutual aid/interagency agreements are both administrative and operational controls. For example, the Contra Costa Water District has a cooperative agreement with the East Bay Regional Parks Department (EBRPD) for Contra Costa Water District’s canal paths within the Park’s jurisdiction. The control of public safety is “shared” to some extent in that EBRPD has a responsibility for educating the public about canal dangers and participates in upkeep of recreational aesthetics. Similarly, Denver Water entered into cooperative agreements with multiple local recreational agencies to develop its canals as common recreational amenities. During the workshop, participants agreed that partnerships with local law enforcement and first responders are critical in controlling public access.

Operational Controls

Operational controls are often used as adjuncts to engineering controls and include security/surveillance cameras and either in-house and/or contract patrol services. In general, all owner/operators conduct routine inspections to observe structural deficiencies. Some use water operators or roving patrols to discourage public trespassing and misuse and an in a few cases, complete patrols using helicopter surveillance. In addition to patrols, a number of owner/operators began using surveillance cameras facilities after completing vulnerability assessments post 9/11. Sirens and strobes are generally used as emergency warnings as opposed to security devices.

Patrols

Apart from regular operations and maintenance inspections which all participants conduct on a daily or weekly basis (some via helicopter for remote locations), a few of the participants utilized some form of regular patrols to assess safety breaches along open waterways. The Central Arizona Project uses patrol agents on a daily basis to cite trespassers or to spot any damage to its fencing. Metropolitan Water District uses daily security patrols and contracted security on weekends as well as regular aircraft patrols along the rural Colorado River Aqueduct. While not deputized, Contra Costa Water District uses canal patrol officers with citing authority, and its park and recreation partner, EBRPD has patrols and cooperative agreements with local


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law enforcement. Lacking security patrols, some survey participants have arranged with local law enforcement agencies to cite for trespassing and other violations in more rural locations.

Security Cameras

A few participants use security cameras and closed circuit TVs as operational controls but these are generally located around facility operating equipment (pump stations, check structures, gates, spillways, etc.) and not specifically dedicated to stretches of open waterway. Of the surveillance cameras used, most were installed as part of vulnerability security assessments conducted post 9/11.

Sirens/Strobes

A few owner/operators make use of sirens and/or verbal warning systems in the event of an operational change that increases downstream flow in a canal or in an off-channel spillway. Avista utilizes a sophisticated annunciation system that has been effective in alerting the public to hazardous situations in recreation areas.

Best Practices

Study participants cited fencing, specifically chain link security fencing, as the most effective measure to maintain public safety around open waterways. Daily patrols were cited as the next best practice as these can be used to see reoccurring public risk areas and locations of access as well as vandalism. Public education followed as the third most effective practice. Particularly for Coachella Valley Water District, a consistent and thorough education program regarding the dangers of the canal reduced and in some cases, eliminated student trespassing at several schools adjacent to the Coachella Canal.

The drawback to fencing is the cost of installation and maintenance. Vandalism is an issue for all participants. Both the Central Arizona Project and Metropolitan Water District are able to spot vandalism on a daily basis through their patrols and equip personnel with the tools to make minor repairs or to flag the location of the breach for follow up. Coachella Valley Water District has taken to painting portions of its chain link fencing with bright blue paint as an identifier in the event that sections are stolen.

There was some feedback on the issue of creating an attractive nuisance in the installation of fencing and especially, escape aids. Some participants have had internal debates about installing egress devices, as they perceive that the public might find ladders, buoys, and grab as invitations for unintended use.

For most participants, increased fencing and signage were cited as public safety-related improvements they planned and budgeted, specifically upgrading fencing in specific areas to be more restrictive and/or adding fencing where it does not exist, and improving, increasing, and standardizing signage.


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Recreational Use of Waterways

A decision point for owner/operators with open waterway conveyances in urban and semi-rural/suburban areas is whether to allow access for recreation or to restrict it. A position somewhere in between appears to invite the most risk as it leaves open the potential for public misuse. Surveyed owner/operators recognize the inherent risk in unprotected waterways that pass through heavily urbanized or suburban areas and provide accordingly for risk mitigation. In semi-rural areas, the rationale for owner/operators’ public safety choices is often based on population density; yet public safety risks via transient recreational use of unprotected infrastructure remain.

The additional function of a canal as a recreational feature drives decision-making with respect to signage, fencing, and egress aid choices and can involve partnerships with local agencies. Denver Water’s High Line Canal for example, was a joint effort of seven agencies working together to create a public recreation attraction. Denver Water is responsible for running water through the canal and for completing general maintenance of the canal; local agency partners maintain the canal trail. Contra Costa Water District works with EBRPD in managing the network of concrete-lined walkways adjacent to the Contra Costa Canal. The EBRPD assists Contra Costa Water District with public education programs, maintenance of fencing and egress aids, and routine patrols.

All of Denver Water’s canals are open to recreational access and remain without fencing in an urban setting. Contra Costa Water District on the other hand, has installed a 5-ft liner fence, and in some areas, uses security barbed wire fencing at locations of conveyance hazards. Truckee Meadows Water Authority faced the decision of canal access for public recreational use at the request of the City of Reno, Nevada. After some debate, they decided against using waterways for hiking and biking. Various communities have requested that the Central Arizona Project someday contemplate development of an urban bike trail; at this point, all portions of the Central Arizona Project’s canal are fenced with security-grade or better fencing.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The most robust public safety programs among study participants include a high level of all risk management controls – engineering, administrative, and operational and receive the highest level of management attention and budgetary support within the organization. Safety begins at the top and encompasses both employee and public safety in equal measure with a resulting safety culture that permeates the entire organization.

It is important that the issue of public safety near open water conveyance structures be elevated in recognition that fatalities and injuries remain a significant issue at unprotected access points and owner/operators have a legal, if not moral obligation, to protect the public from the dangers of their manmade water conveyance structures.


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In the absence of an established, national framework with enforceable regulatory requirements, owner/operators must develop programs on their own. Dialogue regarding best practices among a wider group of owner/operators can provide benchmark data for program assessment and evaluation. As Ron Ashkenas states in the Harvard Business Review, “One of the characteristics of great companies is that they actively learn from others. But (sic) to be successful at doing this requires more than just identifying and borrowing best practices; it also requires adaptation to your culture and full adoption by your leadership. Without paying attention to these two steps, it is unlikely that best practices will actually be put into practice” (Ashkenas 2010).

Based on the survey data and the workshop, suggested further areas of discussion include:

Metrics to determine choices/priorities for engineering, administrative, and operational controls as best practices. While engineering controls, supplemented by administrative and operational controls were cited by workshop participants as being the preferred approach, factors such as efficacy and amount of resources--both human and monetary--for operation and maintenance are significant considerations.

Profile and characteristics of a best-in-class management commitment to public safety. Workshop participants agreed that an organization with “best-in-class” practices makes no distinction between public safety and employee safety. The degree to which safety consciousness permeates an organization, from top management to field staff, is very important and becomes an integral part of an owner/operator’s “brand” (public profile). Breaches in employee or public safety practices damage an owner/operator’s reputation.

Processes that owner/operators can use to continuously assess public safety threats and liabilities. One workshop participant suggested that improved education of customers regarding waterway safety increases awareness and reporting of safety problems. Employee incentives were cited as another way to keep safety consciousness at the forefront; workshop participants agreed that over time, safety signs and procedures run the risk of being ignored so refresher training is critical.

Role of risk management in developing best practices and public safety budgets. All study participants have policies and procedures for incident reports, although the definition of “near misses” as a recordable event varies. The processes by which incidents translate into operational changes also varies by owner/operator as data tracking mechanisms might lack feedback loops while for other


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owner/operators, data is used to develop projects for inclusion in Capital Improvement Programs.

The need/desire for greater regulatory requirements/guidelines regarding public safety around canals, flumes, and other water infrastructure. While FERC does have enforcement authority through its Dam Safety program, public safety around canals and flumes downstream of a hydroelectric project are not included in the 5-year Independent Part12D Dam Safety inspection process. In the absence of federal or state regulatory requirements, owner/operators are the decision-makers for what constitutes public safety around waterway infrastructure. At some point, there needs to be further discussion concerning state and/or local ordinances that specify a set of best management practices (BMPs) to protect the public.

LIMITATIONS

This report presents a summary of information collected from a survey of practices for public safety around canals and open waterways among a limited number of water districts, utilities, and hydroelectric owner/operators with the survey guided by a common questionnaire. Employee /contractor safety and associated OSHA standards were not addressed in the survey. As survey participants provided information on a voluntary and self-reported basis, it may not be representative of all relevant facts and conditions regarding public safety issues for this group of owner/operators or for owner/operators in general. The report is not intended nor should be construed as a safety evaluation or audit regarding the effectiveness, appropriateness, or adequacy of safety practices of any specific survey participant or the industry as a whole. Finally, it was not the researcher’s intent to develop standards for canal and waterway safety best practices through performance of this study.


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REFERENCES

Aisenbrey, A.J., Jr., R.B. Hayes, H.J. Warren, D. L Winsett, and R. B Young 1978. “Design of Small Canal Structures.” Chapter 9, Safety. U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Denver, Colorado.

Ashkenas, Ron. 2010. http://blogs.hbr.org/ashkenas/2010/11/why-best-practices-are-hard-to.html (accessed August 10, 2012).

Simon, Darren 2011. “AACLOP Human Safety Measures Buoy Testing Final Report,” Correspondence, San Diego County Water Authority to Val Tenney, Chair, All American Canal Lining Project Coordinating Committee, McArthur, CA, July 19, 2011.

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 2001. “Safety Signage at Hydropower Projects,” Division of Dam Safety and Inspections, Office of Energy Projects, Washington, DC, October 2001.

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 1992. “Guidelines for Public Safety at Hydropower Projects,” Division of Dam Safety and Inspections, Office of Energy Projects, Washington, DC, March 1992 with Appendix 6 updated November 29, 2011.

Fletemeyer, Dr. John R. 2009. “Professional Review and Evaluation of Current and Proposed Human Safety Measures for the All-American Canal with some Additional Recommendations,” Prepared for the San Diego County Water Authority, Dr. John R. Fletemeyer, Research Professor/Laboratory for Coastal Research, Florida.

Latham, Howard S. and James W. Verzuh 1971. “Reducing Hazards to People and Animals on Reclamation Canals, Open and Closed Conduit Systems Program,” Rec ERC 71-36. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, September 1971.

Pelley, Scott. 2010. “The All-American Canal.” CBS 60 Minutes http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=6453537n&tag=api (accessed August 10, 2012).

Sakal, Mike 2012. "Long an Issue in Arizona, Canal Safety Back in Forefront after Recent Drownings.” http://www.eastvalleytribune.com/local/the_valley/article_63aad3d4-85c2-11e1-8f8e-001a4bcf887a.html (accessed August 10, 2012).

San Diego County Water Authority 2009. “All-American Canal Lining Project (AALCP) Human Safety Measures (Action),” Memorandum from San Diego County Water Authority to Imported Water Committee, February 26, 2009.

U.S. Department of the Interior 1992. “Safety Design Standards, General Design Standards,” Chapter 3, U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Engineering and Research Center, Denver, Colorado, August 1992.

Warren, H.J. 1978, “Design of Small Canal Structures,” Chapter 9 – Safety, U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Denver, Colorado.


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APPENDIX A

WATER RESEARCH FOUNDATION INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE


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Dear Name of General Manager/Contact: The Water Research Foundation (WaterRF), under the sponsorship of Contra Costa Water District, is undertaking a study among a select group of western water utilities to assess best practices regarding public safety around water conveyance features, particularly canals, flumes, siphons, bridge crossings, and non-dam-related spillways. As you may be aware, for many water purveyors and hydroelectric generators, open canals, flumes, and related facilities were designed and constructed years ago in areas that were once rural, but are now part of the urban and suburban landscape. In any given year, there are fatalities and injuries to both children and adults resulting from unauthorized or accidental entry into these features. Our goal for this study is to produce a report that will identify, evaluate, and recommend waterway safety best practices among western water agencies and serve as a platform for a larger and on-going dialogue about this issue. WaterRF is interested in having (name of agency) participate in this study. The study results will be peer-reviewed and available to participants. We anticipate completing interviews with study participants by the end of March and producing a draft report at the end of April 2012. Please identify an individual who is knowledgeable of (name of agency’s) waterway safety practices and who would be willing to spend approximately 30 minutes answering questions over the telephone with GEI Consultants, our research contractor on this study. I will forward that individual’s name, telephone number, and email to Nancy Richardson at GEI Consultants, who will follow up by sending a questionnaire in advance and scheduling a convenient time to conduct the interview. Thank you for your cooperation and participation. Please email me the contact information at [email protected] and feel free to call me at 303-734-3422 if you have any questions or concerns. Very truly yours, Jennifer I. Warner, Research Manager Water Research Foundation cc: William Rettberg Nancy Richardson


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APPENDIX B

SURVEY


Waterways Best Practices Questions

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Overview of Participant

1 Year established

2 Total revenue/customer base

3 Operating budget

4 Coverage area

5 Types of water conveyance system facilities

a. Hydro generation

i. If so, extent of FERC-mandated recreational area

b. Canals Number/overall length

c. Flumes Number/overall length

d. Tunnels

e. Spillways (operational/not dam-related)

6 Location of facilities

a. Percentage in urban areas:

b. Percentage in semi-developed rural-urbanizing areas:

c. Percentage in remote areas:

7 Canals and open flumes: size of features, i.e. flow capacity, depth, and velocity?

Waterway Safety Program

1 Does Participant have a public waterway safety program? If so, how long has the program been in place?

2 What prompted the waterway safety program to begin?

3 When the program was established, how did the agency assess which system components were included and what improvements were necessary?

4 Who administers the waterway safety program (highest-level person)?

5 What are the characteristics of the responsible organization (i.e., which department, number of staff devoted to the program)?



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6 What is the annual budget for public waterway safety? What percentage does this represent of Participant’s overall operation and maintenance program budget?

7 Discuss the following waterway safety program elements as applicable:

a. Fencing

i. Boundary and/or R.O.W.

ii. Liner (if lined canal)

iii. Chain Link

iv. Wire mesh

v. Security-Barbed wire

b. Tunnel and/or siphon entrances protection

c. Egress (ladders, buoys, other self-rescue)

d. Public education

e. Signage

f. Patrols

g. Security cameras

h. Gates –types and locking systems

i. Inspections (periodic to assess condition of safety measures and/or to recommend additional measures)

j. Bridge crossings

8 Of the measures listed above, which are the most effective and why?

9 Describe, if any, drawbacks to the safety measures that have been implemented, i.e., maintenance issues, creation of attractive nuisances, etc.

10 What public safety-related improvements, if any, are planned for the future?

11 Does Participant have canal access and maintenance roads or trails that are public use, i.e. designated or undersigned?

a. If designated, does Participant provide trail operation and maintenance or is there a separate recreation agency involved?

b. If undesignated, how does Participant deal with the visiting public: hikers, bikers, horses, and/or motor bikes/snow machines?

c. Does Participant permit public access to canal operating equipment including spill gates, diversions, or clean out ramps?



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12 Incident rate (public/not employees) over the past 10 years associated with Participant’s water conveyance system:

a. Number of fatalities

b. Number of injuries/accidents

c. Number of "near misses"

13 How does Participant handle incidents, “near-misses,” claims, and losses?


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