Caleb Writing Sample

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A Pragmatic-Coherentist Approach to External World Skepticism

Caleb Castaneda

Philosophy 341

Professor A n!r

"ecember 1#$ #%1#


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ABSTRACT

In one form or another, the skeptical argument concludes that the data from our senses are insufficient toserve as justification for belief. o!ever, the skeptical argument relies on a conception of justification thatdemands more than is needed" it is presumed that our beliefs do not start out !ith some positive epistemicstatus, and then justification is e#pected to $ield such status. Contrar$ to this vie! of justification, this paperargues that, because the$ are formed !ithin a conte#t !here the$ serve an agent%s needs, beliefs alread$ possess some positive epistemic status before !e seek justification for them. The role of justification is to !eedout incompatible beliefs, not to suppl$ positive epistemic status to propositions. Because the role of

justification is reduced to the role of e#plaining relationships bet!een beliefs that alread$ possess somemeasure of positive epistemic status, a coherentist justificator$ frame!ork can be adopted !ithoutsuccumbing to a vicious form of circular reasoning. It is also argued that such a scheme is still truth&seeking,albeit through an inference that realit$ is under!riting our truth claims. If such an inference !ere to besho!n false, ho!ever, !hat !ould be revealed is that !e care much less about truth than !e thought !e did,and that !e onl$ value truth to the e#tent that it allo!s us to survive and thrive.

&he skeptical arg!ment has resisted sol!tion for millennia' (t remains incredibly

pers!asi e beca!se each of its premisses seems so int!iti ely correct' And yet$ the premisses lead

to a co!nterint!iti e concl!sion) that one cannot rely on her experience as e idence abo!t her

*orld' &his entails a position of complete external-*orld skepticism' &he diffic!lty for anyone

*ho takes !p the challenge of the skeptical arg!ment$ pres!ming she *ishes to a oid s!ch a

de astating concl!sion$ is finding some means of indicating kno*ledge gi en a sit!ation in

*hich *e seem to ha e already conceded that o!r int!itions s!ggest the tr!th of the skeptical

premisses'

+efore beginning$ it might pro e !sef!l to briefly set do*n a placeholder skeptical

arg!ment respecting ,!stification) i

1' ( cannot be ,!stified in belie ing that ( am not massi ely decei ed'

#' (f ( cannot be ,!stified in belie ing that ( am not massi ely decei ed$ then ( cannot

be ,!stified in belie ing the representations of my senses'

( cannot be ,!stified in belie ing the representations of my senses' ii

i Altho!gh the content of this specific form!lation is my o*n$ ( ha e made !se of the template for thearg!ment from ignorance by eith "e.ose) /Sol ing the Skeptical Problem$0 The Philosophical Review $1%4$ no 1 122 ) 1'

ii ( specifically take on ersions of the skeptical arg!ment *hich deal *ith ,!stified belief rather thankno*ledge' ( do this principally beca!se ( *ill be arg!ing that *e ha e a mis!nderstanding of ,!stificationthat has created the problem' 5i en the enormo!s diffic!lties of e en defining kno*ledge$ it seems like


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&he position of this paper is that the first premiss of the skeptical arg!ment fails beca!se it

is hopelessly conf!sed abo!t *hat is meant by ,!stification'ix ( take this position *ithin an

essentially coherentist frame*ork that *ill be s!pplemented by pragmatic considerations' (n

essence$ ( am arg!ing that any form of ,!stification *orth caring abo!t is !naffected by the

skeptical arg!ment' &his is so beca!se$ if ,!stification is !nderstood as simply a coherence

relation bet*een beliefs$ then the belief /( am not massi ely decei ed0 *o!ld be ,!stified so long

as it coheres to all the other beliefs that a person happens to hold' (n brief form$ my thesis is that

the first premiss of the skeptical arg!ment fails !nder any interpretation of ,!stification that

claims that a belief is ,!stified if and only if it is part of a coherent system of beliefs'

S!ch an ans*er is$ of co!rse$ not *itho!t its dra*backs6 ob io!s diffic!lties *ith the

theory remain' (t seems beyond the scope of this paper to *ork o!t e ery problem *ith

coherentist theory' What ( hope can be done in this paper is to sketch o!t the problems *hich any

!sef!l theory of coherentism *ill ha e to address and to sho* that s!ch sol!tions are *ithin the

reso!rces a ailable to coherentists' &his task is made diffic!lt beca!se coherentism faces se eral

rather da!nting ob,ections'

7ne of the most ob io!s ob,ections to the coherentist theory of ,!stification has been the

problem called /the alternati e systems0 ob,ection' iii (f a coherentist makes the claim that beliefs

are ,!stified ,!st if they happen to cohere *ith all the beliefs that a person holds$ then it *o!ld

seem possible that there might be many s!ch systems' (ndeed$ an infinite n!mber of s!ch

possible coherent systems might be tho!ght possible' Speaking abo!t the probability calc!l!s as

the meas!re of coherence$ An!r makes this point s!ccinctly) /7ne co!ld in that case be

taking on too m!ch to attempt to redefine ,!stification and kno*ledge *ithin the same small space' ( *illnote$ ho*e er$ that once ,!stification has been properly defended$ *e seem to be in a m!ch better positionto attempt to reclaim the t!rf of kno*ledge'

iii ( ha e fo!nd the ob,ection in many locations$ for an example$ see http)88***'iep'!tm'ed!8coherent89S: b
http://www.iep.utm.edu/coherent/#SH5bhttp://www.iep.utm.edu/coherent/#SH5b


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,!stified in belie ing anything e'g'$ that s;!irrels r!le the !ni erse $ so long as appropriate

credences are assigned to logically related beliefs e'g'$ that it is not the case that s;!irrels do not

r!le the !ni erse ' &his strikes most of !s as impla!sibly permissi e'0 i

7f co!rse$ A n!r makes this statement *ithin the context of a specific type of coherence

relation$ notably conformance to the probability calc!l!s' +!t it seems that some ersion of his

criticism *ill apply to any form!lation of the idea of coherence' &o see *hy this is so$ is sho!ld

be reali


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coherence' (t is open to the coherentist to s!ggest that the probability calc!l!s itself forms only

part of the idea of coherence$ and that there are other considerations in ol ing coherence$ one of

*hich might be that beliefs m!st be$ not only not incompatible *ith$ b!t in some sense deri e

their s!pport from the rest of the belief system in order to be ,!stified' i +!t *hile this is

!ndo!btedly a fr!itf!l line of in;!iry$ it does not really mitigate the force of the ob,ection' &he

reason for this is that it *o!ld al*ays be open to an indi id!al *ho *as s!fficiently moti ated to

keep the S;!irrel-5ods belief to change his or her other beliefs to make them conform to the

belief that the S;!irrel-5ods r!le the !ni erse' While a mo e s!ch as the coherentist might be

tempted to make might block interpretation 1 $ it really only does so by t!rning interpretation

1 into interpretation # ' +!t either *ay$ the force of the ob,ection is that the coherentist

approach seems to separate tr!th from ,!stification in a *ay that se erely !ndermines the concept

of ,!stification' And the alternati e systems ob,ection$ interpretation # $ arg!ably makes this

point more forcef!lly than does interpretation 1 '

Closely related to this idea is the problem of explaining sense experience *ithin

coherentism'ii

What *e really *ant is to be able to attach o!r belief system to the *orld$ *hich

incl!des the ob,ects of experience' What coherentism *ants to incorporate are beliefs6 b!t it is

not ob io!s that sensory experiences are beliefs at all' At the ery least$ they are not

=onathan an ig$ /Coherentism$0 3$4' do*nloaded from his site at +aylor)https)88bearspace'baylor'ed!8=onathan an ig8***8tex8coherentismc!llison ol!me'pdf an igs!mmaris acco!nting of the coherence relation as being different than the probability calc!l!s'And$ *hile he takes no definite stance himself on the iss!e$ it is to be inferred that he is against the

probability calc!l!s as the meas!re of coherence beca!se he says that it *o!ld in ol e the cost of re,ecting

his incorporation of sense data'i Compare$ for example$ the entry at Stanford>s Encyclopedia) 7lsson$ Erik$ /Coherentist &heories of

Epistemic =!stification0$ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Winter #%1# Edition $ Ed*ard B' altaed' $ forthcoming D. F G http)88plato'stanford'ed!8archi es8*in#%1#8entries8,!step-coherence8Hgt 6' &hisreso!rce gi es many differing *ays of !nderstanding a coherence relation' =onathan an ig$/Coherentism$0 #-4 also specifically resorts to explanations of the coherence relation *hich *o!ld re;!ire

beliefs to deri e s!pport from other beliefs in order to cohere'

ii (n fact$ these t*o ob,ections are so closely related that henceforth ( shall consider them as a singleob,ection$ beca!se they are both predicated on coherentism>s problem *ith the tr!th connection'
https://bearspace.baylor.edu/Jonathan_Kvanvig/www/tex/coherentismcullisonvolume.pdfhttp://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/justep-coherence/&gthttps://bearspace.baylor.edu/Jonathan_Kvanvig/www/tex/coherentismcullisonvolume.pdfhttp://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/justep-coherence/&gt


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propositional' iii +!t if they are not beliefs in the same *ay that other beliefs are$ then it seems

that any *ay of doing coherence *o!ld lea e them !nacco!nted for' And if sense experience

cannot be incorporated$ then it seems that o!r beliefs *ill al*ays be isolated from a partic!larly

important part of the ery *orld that *e *ant to explain by o!r beliefs' &his problem co!ld$ of

co!rse$ be dealt *ith by saying that coherence is a necessary albeit ins!fficient condition of

,!stification$ and that o!r sense experience is incorporated in some other *ay' ix &he problem *ith

doing that is that it renders coherentism impotent in addressing the skeptical problem'

.emember$ the coherentist>s ans*er to the skeptic is that ,!stification is possible beca!se

,!stification ,!st is coherence and it is possible to make a non-skeptical belief cohere to a belief

system' +!t if all the coherentist has done is identify a necessary condition of ,!stification$ he has

not done eno!gh *ork to sho* that ,!stification does obtain for the statement that ( am not

massi ely decei ed' (n essence$ the skeptic *ill be able to respond$ /?es$ that is all *ell and

good$ b!t yo! ha e only sho*n that yo!r belief meets a necessary condition for ,!stification6 yo!

ha e not done f!rther *ork to sho* that ,!stification act!ally obtains$ only that it has met one of

the conditions'0x (t seems$ then$ that the coherentist is faced *ith a se ere diffic!lty) he m!st

maintain that the coherence of a system ,!st is ,!stification in order to defeat the skeptic$ b!t in

so doing he commits himself to a path that at the ery least creates a se ere diffic!lty in

incorporating the data from o!r senses into his belief system'

Iinally$ coherentism faces a sta!nch challenge from the ob,ection that it really seems to be

only a circ!lar form of reasoning' Consider a small belief system *ith only three beliefs' &he

coherentist might be asked *hat reason ,!stifies belief AJ :e might ans*er that belief + ,!stifies

iii an ig explicitly makes the point that sensory data is not propositional' See =onathan an ig$/Coherentism$0 #'

ix ( am indebted to the skepticism class for making this point d!ring in-class comments d!ring my presentation period'

x (bid'$ partic!larly Professor An!r *ho helped me clarify in my mind ,!st *hy$ if coherentism is to be as!itable ans*er to skepticism$ coherence m!st be both a necessary and s!fficient condition for ,!stification'


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Castaneda K

belief A' (n t!rn$ he might be asked abo!t *hat ,!stifies belief +$ and he might respond that

belief C is ,!stifying belief +' +!t *hen asked *hat ,!stifies belief C$ if he *ishes to a oid

circ!larity he better not ans*er that either belief A or belief + ,!stifies belief C' +!t if only

beliefs can ,!stify other beliefs$ it seems that that is precisely the ans*er he m!st gi e' xi

Enlarging the set of beliefs might make the problem of circ!larity far less ob io!s to a less than

diligent obser er$ if only for the reason that a ;!estioner might get lost in the details$ b!t it no

less ass!redly seems to lead to circ!larity'

7f co!rse$ s!ch an ob io!s ob,ection has not gone !nnoticed by coherentists$ *ho ha e

de eloped ario!s *ays of attempting to make coherentismLs circ!larity non- icio!s' Apart from

my o*n proposal that *e can appeal to the !tility of belief for some sort of positi e epistemic

stat!s$ thereby discarding the icio!sness of the circ!larity$ there are se eral other methods

*hereby an indi id!al might claim that the circ!larity problem is not an iss!e' 7ne might

propose$ for instance$ that the entire system of coherent beliefs need to be e al!ated as a *hole

rather than seeking ,!stification for each partic!lar belief' xii &he problem *ith this *ay o!t is the

;!estion is immediately raised) by irt!e of *hat$ then$ is the entire system ,!stifiedJ &his is a

;!estion for *hich no immediate ans*er presents itself' Another$ perhaps more ambitio!s$ *ay

o!t of the problem *o!ld be to s!ggest that it is the nat!re of coherence to tend to*ard tr!th$

th!s coherence gi es !s prima facie ,!stification' &his *o!ld sol e both the circ!larity problem

and the connection-to-tr!th problem$ b!t at the sacrifice of making a claim *hich co!ld be easily

pro en false' &he fact that it is easy to assert f!lly coherent propositions that are seemingly false

perhaps goes a long *ay to*ard explaining *hy this seemingly tantali


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anyone *illing to p!rs!e it'

(t seems$ then$ that at minim!m a *orkable ie* of coherentism *ill ha e to address t*o

ma,or concerns) (t m!st stri e to be tr!th-seeking$ and it m!st find a *ay to a oid the problem of

circ!larity' &hese are tall orders to be s!re' +!t the coherentist has another task) once he has

sho*n that the ob,ections are not ins!rmo!ntable$ he also needs to find a *ay to tell !s ,!st *hat

it means *hen *e say that something coheres$ other*ise the idea *ill not be able to be !sef!lly

applied'

(t is good to be a*are of that f!rther challenge6 other*ise$ the coherentist might think that

his *ork is done if he is able to sho* that there are no ins!rmo!ntable obstacles to the theory'

Ior the p!rposes of this paper$ that task *ill ha e to be left !ndone' ( merely s!ggest it as a

f!rther area of in;!iry' (t seems to me that$ *hile *e may not kno* exactly *hat coherence

consists in$ there m!st be a good ans*er to that ;!estion *hich *e *ill disco er thro!gh f!rther

in;!iry' &his is s!ggested beca!se there seems to be a !ni ersal concept of coherence' While *e

cannot$ perhaps$ define it precisely$ *hen *e !se the term it seems that it is at least !nderstood

that *e are speaking abo!t something' While this is certainly not concl!si e$ the presence of a

!ni ersal concept seems s!ggesti e of the tho!ght that there is something to *hich this concept

refers'

.et!rning to the task at hand$ ( *ant to briefly sketch o!t my proposed sol!tion to the

problems of attaching coherence to tr!th and making the system non-circ!lar' &he task is made

m!ch more diffic!lt if ,!stification is defined in s!ch a *ay as to make it do all the epistemic

*ork' What ( mean by this is that it seems to me that$ *hen *e speak of ,!stified belief$ *e often

expect that all of the acti e epistemic *ork *ill be done by the ,!stification component of

kno*ledge$ *hile belief is tho!ght to be merely passi e' &o ill!strate this point$ *e might

imagine a table of beliefs that has been marked$ /to be belie ed'0 7n the floor$ in a h!ge


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concept!al pile$ is e ery concei able proposition' &he indi id!al picks !p these propositions one

at a time and seeks to find if the proposition is independently ,!stifiable' (f she determines that

the proposition is ,!stified$ then the indi id!al p!ts the proposition on the /to be belie ed0 table6

other*ise$ she ret!rns the proposition to the pile$ to perhaps be re-examined if e idence later

s!rfaces *hich might make it ,!stified' (n this conception$ the sole role of o!r fac!lty of belief is

to passi ely accept e ery proposition *hich ,!stification places on the metaphorical table' While

this imagery no do!bt o ersimplifies the !lgar attit!des abo!t ,!stified belief$ it is my belief that

it only does so slightly' &hat is to say$ *hate er *e officially recogni


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Dnder this ie*$ ,!stification is not ,!stification to belie e anything at all' .ather$ it is

,!stification of beliefs already held. (t can flag a belief as failing to cohere$ as either lacking a

rele antly important connection to any other belief or contradicting another belief$ b!t !ltimately

it does not pro ide the positi e epistemic stat!s alidating o!r decision to belie e the

proposition' (t *orks to make propositions more likely$ not by s!ggesting tr!e propositions$ b!t

rather by flagging beliefs *hich$ gi en the likely tr!th of other beliefs$ are likely to be false' xiii

&ogether$ these t*o ,!stification and belief pro ide !s *ith e erything that *e pre io!sly

*anted of ,!stification) belief pro ides !s *ith the positi e epistemic stat!s for o!r beliefs$ and

,!stification tells the story of ho* these ideas are interrelated'

+!t does this conception ask !s to belie e something odd abo!t beliefJ Dnder this

conception$ the ery act of belie ing pro ides some positi e epistemic stat!s for beliefs' Can this

possibly be correctJ Can the mere act of belief someho* pro ide its o*n positi e epistemic

stat!sJ

(n order to !nderstand ho* belief can pro ide its o*n positi e epistemic stat!s$ it is

necessary to reali


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is an act of tr!st6 the agent gambles that her belief *ill make things go *ell for her' +eliefs *hich

do not promote *ell-being simply cannot earn their keep for ery long' 7r more precisely$ it is

impossible to fare *ell for ery long if the agent has a system *hich is *holly lacking in !tility'

&he agent *ill fare better in direct proportion to the n!mber and significance of her beliefs *hich

tend to promote *ell-being' Either directly or indirectly$ the system of beliefs m!st s!pport the

agent>s *ell-being6 if they do not$ the agent *ill s!ffer' xi

&his explains *hy it is that *e ha e s!ch little control o er o!r beliefs' &ry as *e might$

*e !s!ally find o!rsel es to be !nable to belie e that .ome is located in (daho$ or that =!li!s

Caesar *as a giraffe' (t seems to me that belief is largely a s!bconscio!s process' ( do not *ant to

make the stronger claim that *e can do nothing to infl!ence o!r beliefs' We certainly seem to

ha e the ability to choose *hat to read and *ho to listen to$ and these factors are largely in ol ed

in *hat *e *ill !ltimately belie e' +!t the physical action of s!bscribing to a belief is largely

beyond o!r control' And this makes entire sense from the perspecti e that beliefs are gambles

taken in a game life in *hich *e ha e tremendo!s stakes' We simply find o!r minds !n*illing

to take gambles *hen the stakes are so high' &his propensity of o!r minds to belie e only that

*hich it finds al!able is *hat con eys some sort of positi e epistemic stat!s' (t is the belief>s

!tility$ and not its tr!th$ that gi es it this stat!s'

&he standard$ then$ for a belief to ha e positi e epistemic stat!s is not directly tr!th'

.ather$ *e ha e a sort of proto-*arrant to belie e things beca!se they *ork for !s$ beca!se they

allo* !s to s!r i e and thri e' +!t from this$ it o!ght not be concl!ded that this system is blind

xi ( !se the *ord /directly0 to refer to beliefs that the agent forms on her o*n *hich lead inescapably to *ell- being' +eliefs of this sort might incl!de the belief that one>s is!al data is correctly sho*ing *here the roadends and *here the cliff begins' +!t many of o!r beliefs only indirectly promote *ell-being' Appeal toa!thority is one s!ch case' Nost of *hat *e belie e is belie ed beca!se *e appeal to a!thority' &heindi id!al beliefs may or may not act!ally promote *ell-being$ b!t as a he!ristic more often than notrelying on experts pro es efficacio!s' Dltimately$ *e do this beca!se it *orks for !s as a *hole$ e en if itmay fail !s in indi id!al cases'


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to tr!th' Sooner or later$ an indi id!al *ill form the concept that his *orld ,!st is a certain *ay$

and that if he *ants to be s!ccessf!l$ he does *ell to try to fig!re o!t the *ay that the *orld is'

&his a*areness forms the broad o!tline of o!r concept of tr!th$ *hich is to say that *e tend to

think something tr!e if *e think it conforms to reality as it act!ally is' x (t seems likely that s!ch

a concept$ at least in ag!e form$ is a prere;!isite to the learning of any lang!age' After all$ in

order to !nderstand a lang!age$ one m!st ha e a reference' At minim!m$ the learner m!st

!nderstand that *ords refer to certain things and that the reference point for e ery *ord holds

constant$ s!ch that *hen he ocali


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that positi e epistemic stat!s *hich all animals en,oy *hich permits them to act on their beliefs

simply beca!se those beliefs permit them to s!r i e and thri e'

:ere$ *e begin to see the role of ,!stification as a tr!th-seeking method' Each agent has a

set of beliefs that she s!pposes to be tr!e6 she assigns some positi e tr!th al!e to these beliefs'

+!t e en if *e *ere to grant the premiss that !tility is likely to make something tr!e$ it is also

near certain that at the ery least some !ntr!e beliefs are likely to sneak thro!gh' &his is beca!se$

e en if !tility happens to be correlated *ith tr!th$ there is no reason to think that *hene er one

enco!nters a belief$ that belief is likely to be tr!e' &o claim this *o!ld be to commit a logical

fallacy$ to affirm the conse;!ent) (f A Qtr!thR$ then + Q!tilityR' + Q!tilityR$ therefore A Qtr!thR' E en

if tr!th ine itably leads to !tility$ *e cannot affirm that e ery time *e see !tility$ tr!th m!st be

present' And the sit!ation for the correlation bet*een tr!th and !tility is e en more strained$

beca!se *e cannot e en reasonably claim that there is an ine itable connection s!ch that tr!th

*ill al*ays be efficacio!s' x i At best$ *e *ill be able to arg!e that tr!th tends to*ard !tility'

5i en the fact that$ no matter the correlation bet*een tr!th and !tility$ *e *ill not be able to

pres!me tr!th e ery time *e see !tility$ it is clear that *e *ill need some f!rther tool to *eed o!t

false beliefs' Enter ,!stification'

=!stification starts *here beliefs lea e off' Ior the agent to belie e that she o!ght to

rationally ,!stify her beliefs$ she seems already to ha e formed a partic!lar belief$ namely$ that

/gi en a set of efficacio!s beliefs that promote *ell-being$ most of these beliefs are likely to be

tr!e'0 (t is this belief that the skeptical arg!ment challenges' =!stification does not e en begin

!ntil the indi id!al has this belief$ for if one did not think that tr!th *as the aim of belief$ *hy

x i Ior an example$ see Adam Elga>s piece /7n 7 errating ?o!rself And no*ing (t0$ PhilosophicalStudies $ 1#3) 1$# *herein Elga arg!es that modern science has demonstrated that *e are !s!ally better off*hen *e o erestimate o!r o*n abilities' &his *o!ld be a concrete example of the fact that tr!th is notal*ays efficacio!s'


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*o!ld one s!b,ect one>s beliefs to a system designed to *eed o!t false beliefsJ +y eliminating

those beliefs that do not cohere to the rest of o!r beliefs$ *e thereby grad!ally red!ce the n!mber

of false beliefs in o!r belief system' As ne* beliefs are formed thro!gh life experience$ *e are

able to f!rther refine o!r belief set' &his premiss$ of co!rse$ is likely to be contentio!s' We might

tend to notice ,!st ho* often h!man beliefs are apt to be incorrect' +!t this *o!ld be a mistake$

beca!se it *o!ld o erlook the sheer n!mber of times that h!man belief is apt to be correct'

:!mans are$ indeed$ capable of belie ing the greatest abs!rdities' :o*e er$ e en the most

fancif!l h!man has a set of beliefs that are taken to be !nproblematic) that his shoe is loose

beca!se his shoelace came !ntied$ that *hen he says /apple0 his listener !nderstands *hich fr!it

he *ants$ that *hen he reaches for a glass of *ater on the table$ his hands *ill clasp a solid

ob,ect *hich *ill be filled *ith something that ;!enches his thirst' &he m!ndane nat!re of these

beliefs may ca!se !s to o erlook their sheer ;!antity' (f *e foc!s on the n!mber of times people

tend to belie e abs!rd things$ *hile forgetting the many m!ndane examples *here they get it

right$ *e may tend to !nderestimate ,!st ho* good o!r fac!lties of belief really are'

5ranted$ the process is not perfect' At times$ perhaps$ incoherence may force !s to choose

bet*een t*o beliefs$ and *e may choose incorrectly' We may contin!e to belie e the thing that

does not$ in fact$ correspond to reality *hile abandoning the belief that does correspond to

reality' +!t if o!r beliefs are more likely to be tr!e than not$ and if they are strongly

interconnected$ this sit!ation o!ght not predominate' I!rther$ as ne* beliefs are formed thro!gh

the process of learning$ this o!ght to be self-correcting' 5ranted$ these /if0 statements are highly

conditional) they depend on the idea that tr!th and !tility are highly correlated' +!t that ,!st is

*hat *e mean *hen *e say someone has a belief) *e are making the claim that the indi id!al is

inferring tr!th from the presence of !tility'

At this point$ one might s!spect that *e ha e been g!ilty of begging the ;!estion abo!t


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tr!th against the skeptic' After all$ the precise ;!estion is *hether *e can !se the e idence of o!r

senses to create a pres!mption of tr!th' &he skeptic seems right to point o!t that$ gi en the fact

that this fac!lty is !nder ;!estion$ ( cannot make any claims abo!t ho* often people tend to /get

it right'0 ( bring this !p so that ( may preempti ely correct a potential mis!nderstanding) When (

ha e been saying that the agent /gets it right0$ ( am speaking abo!t tr!th merely as an

appearance' &hat is to say that things appear a certain *ay to the agent6 his belief-forming

process$ combined *ith his ,!stificatory fac!lty$ make it appear to him that he possesses

something *hich passes for tr!th' :e is bo!nd to infer tr!th from this appearance of tr!th$ b!t at

best he can merely make a claim of imp!ted tr!th' "oes this mean that his fac!lty is not tr!th-

seekingJ (t *o!ld seem not' :e might$ after all$ be right' +!t *hat if he is *rongJ (s it really so

important that the agent be right abo!t the tr!th connectionJ

Perhaps the agent gets tr!th all *rong$ and reality does not !nder*rite that *hich passes

for tr!th for him' (n that case$ it seems to me that *hat he really *ants is that appearance of tr!th'

(f his hand reliably clasps aro!nd *hat passes for a solid ob,ect containing *hat seems to be a

thirst-;!enching li;!id e ery time that he reaches for a glass of *ater$ then the agent possesses

something that passes for tr!th' Especially is this the case if the agent>s thirst really is ;!enched$

i'e'$ if he does not proceed to die of thirst' &his belief *hich passes as tr!th for him ser es the

f!nctional role of tr!th' (f$ in the end$ it is not the case that there really is any *ater$ and yet his

thirst is ;!enched all the same$ does tr!th really matterJ (f his thirst really is an inp!t from a

comp!ter program$ an inp!t *hich is ;!enched only *hen he decei es himself into thinking he

has grabbed a glass of *ater$ is it not the case that his belief in the *ater glass is of more import

to him than anything he co!ld concei ably belie e abo!t brains in atsJ (s it not the case$ if the

*orld really is so foreign to !s$ that *hat *e really *ant is the appearance of something that

passes for tr!thJ &hat appearance of something that passes for tr!th is *hat o!r theory of


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coherence gi es !s' (t *orks for !s$ and *e think that reality is !nder*riting the efficacy of *hat

passes for tr!th' (f that is not the case$ then perhaps the real lesson is that *e care m!ch less

abo!t tr!th than *e tho!ght *e did' We think tr!th is highly important6 b!t if the *orld is so

foreign that *e can kno* nothing of it$ perhaps *e imp!te too m!ch importance to tr!th after all'

What if *e are *rong abo!t o!r tr!th claimsJ What if o!r system is largely efficacio!s

and yet mostly or *holly lacking in tr!th contentJ (n its o*n *ay$ this is *hat *e are saying is

possible *hen *e s!ggest that a skeptical scenario might obtain' ( contend t*o things' Iirst$ (

contend that *hat *e really al!e is$ not so m!ch tr!th$ as that stat!s that e okes the feeling of

tr!th in !s$ *hich stat!s *e ha e come to associate *ith o!r *ell-being' Second$ ( contend that

these are not really different pro,ects that *e ha e diffic!lty e en concept!ali "emon'x ii

:o*e er$ the :eroic

E il "emon is importantly different from "escartes> E il "emon' Ior in the :eroic E il "emon

scenario$ thro!gh no fa!lt of the "emon$ the !ni erse is constr!cted in s!ch a *ay that *hen

h!mans belie e the tr!th that state of affairs o er*helmingly tends to*ard h!man misery and

death$ *hereas *hen h!mans belie e things that are not tr!e$ that state of affairs o er*helmingly

tends to*ard h!man flo!rishing and longe ity' &he :eroic E il "emon$ then$ is a fig!re *ho

decei es !s massi ely in order to promote o!r *elfare$ kno*ing as she does that if *e are not

decei ed things *ill not go *ell for !s'

+y my lights$ there does not seem to be any sense in *hich the "emon is act!ally e il in

x ii "escartes !ses the example of the E il "emon in his Iirst Neditations' ( accessed them athttp)88***'*right'ed!8cola8descartes8meditation1'html
http://www.wright.edu/cola/descartes/meditation1.htmlhttp://www.wright.edu/cola/descartes/meditation1.html


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this scenario' 5ranted$ the !ni erse that she inhabits is a pec!liar one$ seeming comparati ely

hostile' +!t she acts to preser e h!man *elfare' :er actions$ tho!gh intentionally meant to

decei e$ are not intended to be to o!r detriment' :er actions o!ght to be regarded as heroic) she

inhabits a hostile *orld$ and yet acts for the benefit of all$ making the best of a diffic!lt sit!ation'

Dnless one is prepared to describe the "emon as e il rather than heroic$ one thereby admits that

o!r preference$ gi en a conflict bet*een the t*o$ is for o!r *elfare o er tr!th'

7ne might ery easily ob,ect to the :eroic E il "emon tho!ght experiment by claiming

that$ *hile it does seem tr!e that$ gi en a conflict bet*een tr!th and *elfare$ h!mans *ill tend to

prefer *elfare$ it might also be s!ggested that these t*o pro,ects are entirely separate T that

!ltimately$ *e *ill choose *elfare o er tr!th$ b!t that an ideal scenario *ill not in ol e any

conflict' (t might then be s!ggested that$ by constr!ing *elfare as in some sense *arrant-

conferring$ ( am impo erishing belief by red!cing its access to tr!th' A better theory$ it might be

claimed$ *o!ld be one that seeks tr!th and *elfare together' &his$ it seems to me$ is really *hat

the tr!th ob,ection is abo!t in its ob,ection to coherence as ,!stification'

&he t*o pro,ects$ ho*e er$ are not so easily separated' &his is the second lesson that the

:eroic E il "emon Scenario hopef!lly imparts to !s' When *e are asked to imagine a *orld

constr!cted in s!ch a *ay that belie ing tr!th is harmf!l *hereas belie ing falsehood is

beneficial$ o!r minds strain to e en imagine s!ch a scenario' We might reasonably *onder ho*

s!ch a *orld co!ld e en exist' We are s!rely right to think that$ e en if s!ch a *orld is possible$

it is beyond my ability to !nderstand' ( do not mean$ of co!rse$ that *e are incapable of forming

e en a concept that s!ch a *orld might exist' &he fact that *e can consider the :eroic E il

"emon scenario means that it is concei able' .ather$ ( mean to s!ggest that$ *hile *e can form

s!ch a concept$ *e ha e diffic!lty imagining the scenario' As o!r minds strain to pict!re the

*orld$ *e are bo!nd to be dra*n back to a *orld *here tr!th is efficacio!s' What might it mean$


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after all$ that kno*ing the tr!th that$ say$ there is a cliff a fe* feet ahead *o!ld someho* ca!se

!s harmJ (t seems to !s that kno*ledge of tr!th helps !s beca!se it pro ides !s *ith information

abo!t *hat state the *orld is in$ enabling !s to respond properly'

What ( am trying to get at is ,!st why it is that *e think tr!th is so important$ *hy it is that

o!r int!itions speak so po*erf!lly against a system *hich does not directly seek tr!th' And it

seems clear that the reason that *e al!e tr!th so highly is beca!se *e ha e imp!ted s!ch

*elfare-promoting al!es to tr!th' &he tho!ght that it might be other*ise$ *hile concept!ally

a ailable to !s$ is not *ithin the scope of o!r int!itions as they ha e act!ally formed' +!t this is

precisely the scenario that the skeptic asks !s to consider'

(t is$ of co!rse$ easy for !s to !nderstand that$ at times$ the tr!th *ill be !npleasant' (t may

e en be the case$ partic!larly *hen *e are po*erless to do anything in response to an !npleasant

tr!th$ that there might be occasions *hen belie ing the tr!th *ill confer no ad antage at all'

I!rther$ it certainly seems possible to imagine a sit!ation in *hich belie ing a falsehood might

confer more ad antage than belie ing the tr!th' +!t *hat does not seem possible is for !s to

imagine that this sort of sit!ation *o!ld be the general r!le$ s!ch that *e abandon the ca!se of

tr!th' S!ch instances *here tr!th does not correspond to or promote *elfare seem anomalo!s to

!s beca!se$ in o!r experience$ in order to properly respond to the *orld$ *e !s!ally need to kno*

*hat state the *orld is in'

&here is a connection$ then$ in o!r minds bet*een o!r *elfare and the appearance of tr!th$

s!ch that *e al*ays seek this appearance of tr!th' 7!r inference is that this appearance of tr!th is

!nder*ritten by reality as it tr!ly is' +!t this is only an inference' (t is *hy *e al!e tr!th6 b!t if

reality *ere sho*n$ as in the :eroic E il "emon scenario$ to not be the force !nder*riting the

efficacy of apparent tr!th$ then it seems that *e al!e this apparent tr!th m!ch more than act!al

tr!th' &r!th does not ha e for !s any !ltimate al!e$ it is simply o!r means to an end6 it is *hat


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*e belie e to be making o!r responses to o!r reality *ork for !s' (f *e belie ed them$ skeptical

scenarios co!ld$ it seems$ o erthro* that pres!mption' +!t if s!ccessf!l$ *hat s!ch skeptical

scenarios cannot do is make !s contin!e to al!e tr!th' A *orld *here a skeptical scenario

obtains is a *orld so foreign that the efficacy of tr!th seems to ha e been t!rned on its heels) *e

no longer al!e it$ or at least *e o!ght no longer al!e it$ for it gi es !s nothing' (f *e so!ght it$

*e *o!ld not be ad antaged in the slightest'

&he tr!th ob,ection to coherentism$ then$ is either tri ial or *rong' (f reality really is

!nder*riting *hat passes for tr!th to !s$ then it is a *rong ob,ection$ for o!r inference is correct)

reality really is !nder*riting *hat passes for tr!th for !s' (f reality really does not !nder*rite

*hat passes for tr!th for !s$ then the ob,ection is tri ially tr!e) *e do not ha e tr!th$ b!t *e no

longer ha e any reason to desire it' +!t this perspecti e can help !s to !nderstand *hy the tr!th

ob,ection to coherentism is so po*erf!l) beca!se *e tend to pres!me that tr!th and *elfare-

promotion are highly correlated$ *e find the idea that a belief system might not be /tr!th-

seeking0 to be ery tro!bling' &he sol!tion lies in realis diffic!lty in incorporating

sense data is like*ise defeated by ass!ming a pragmatic approach to proto-*arrant' .emember$

earlier the problem *as not incorporating sense data' an ig has s!ggested that coherentism

can incorporate sense data *itho!t de ol ing to a form of fo!ndationalism' x iii &he problem *as

that$ in order to gi e ,!stification some means of gi ing *arrant to sense data$ *e had to enlarge

the concept in a *ay that enabled the skeptic to !ndermine the coherentist>s ans*er to the

x iii =onathan an ig$ /Coherentism$0 #'


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skeptic' &he problem *as that *e *ere earlier looking to ,!stification to impart o!r *arrant to

belie e' +y ha ing the !tility of belief confer positi e epistemic stat!s rather than ,!stification$

*e no longer need to ha e ,!stification expand in any s!ch *ay' A proto-*arrant !nder this

scheme is conferred onto the data from o!r senses by the f!nction of o!r belief6 ,!stification does

not need to explain it or pro ide *arrant for it$ merely accommodate beliefs based !pon sense

data in exactly the same *ay as *ith any other belief' 7!r sense data is still afflicted by the

general problem of connecting o!r beliefs to the tr!th$ b!t only to the exact same extent as any

other beliefs' As s!ch$ m!ch of *hat has been said abo!t beliefs in general can be extended to

beliefs based on o!r senses) to the extent that the *orld really is str!ct!red s!ch that the senses

ha e no connection to reality$ to that same extent *e al!e reality less than *e al!e the

efficacio!s data *hich pass as reality for !s'

:o* does this system ans*er o!r int!itionsJ (s it a satisfying ans*erJ (t is to be

ackno*ledged that it is not a f!lly satisfying ans*er' (t seems some*hat !nder*helming$ in that

it appears to be gi ing !s some*hat less than *e *ant' &he fact that the system has only a

ten!o!s tr!th connection is deeply tro!bling to !s' (t might be e en more disconcerting that it

champions this problem as being of little conse;!ence) that it sees h!man *elfare as being

!ltimately of greater al!e than tr!th' (n the end$ tho!gh$ it m!st be remembered that *e co!ld

not hope to find a completely int!iti e sol!tion to the skeptical arg!ment' (f o!r sol!tion gi es !s

some*hat less than *e *ant$ yet eno!gh to engage prod!cti ely *ith the *orld *e enco!nter on

a daily basis$ then perhaps that is all *e need'

Caleb Writing Sample

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