SECRETSCUTT INFOINTION

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BYCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.SOURCESMETHODSEXENPT ION 3B2BNAZI WAR CR IMESDISCLOSCRE ACt

Al E114)00

Subject: Military Figures connected with Report No: WL-737A (PD-304)Rearmament and Conflicting Intrigues re

HA Plan. Data of InfOrmation:As statedthe

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan Date Acquired: As stated

Evaluation: C-3 Date of Report: 19 October 1951

Source: a_ :3 Sub-souroes as stated.

1/TATSUEI Eiichi, Premier YOSH Is "Military Expert".

a. (Sub-source for para. as _122ELLitahlE2; Date of Information: Asof 20 Sep 51; Acquired: 21-Sep51-

TLIStill Eiiehi (gc )Is address is #61 Keido Machi, Seta-*gaya Ku, Tokyo, telephone number 42-2244. He is a former Lt. General,in the Air Branch, graduate of the 27th class at Army Officers School,graduate of the Army War Collere, and severe) times chosen as assistantm3litary attache and then military attache to Great Britain. he wasIn London when the Pacific !far began in 1941, where he had been servingunder thenAmbeasador YOShIDA Shigeru. After his return to Japan, hewas assigned as chief of staff of the East Japan Army as a major general.TATSUEIkushiro

is alci m of fine character, and /a good friend of HLTTOKITa IMOIAJRA Sades as well, with whom he meets frequently,sometimes as often i.e twice a week./ He is prghably the most influentialadvisor on military matters to Prime MinlaterITTOSHIDA Shigarus and hasalso in the past offered assistance and advice to the American FarEast Air Forces, and to G12, GHQ,

b. (Sub-source for para. b: iSGJI )aanobuj Britt of Information: As of28 September. Date acquil s o r.

It is a matter of oommon knowledge that TAISUI Eiichi is on very friendlyterms with Prime Minister IC6iilltildespite IOSHIDA l s aversion to some ofTATSUNI l s military friends such as HATTURIi Therefore, WUXI is Aw-ing the role of IOSHIDA ls military advisor/in afoot. on the issue of m-erriment and is privately siding MIDI. to work out the latter!'limited plan for augmentation of the police reserve as the answer tothat problem. TiTSUMI is aiding the government with advice on thescreening of former regular army field offioere who are to be

thosedaml

and ose "desirable° for the National Police Reserve. Aiding in this effort, presumably with =Di le approval, are the follrsings

3R a.. "armor General of the Arny and farmer MarMinister in the =CRAM Cabinet shoalmart was aloe a Cabinet mamba'.

Clessitleaties

)erA certain KOZUKI (fmq:

:titan 6chit j,t111)11)

+um:mix) F •( dk AL.

SECRET(ZJL-737A)

Former Lt. General of the Army Chief of Staffof the 'I MAM Butai" (=Area eorps undercommand of General 01C3E in he I•hnila area atthe tipe of the surrender) and a classmate ofTATSUNI.

Former Lt. General in the Army, chief of theDemobilisation Bureau, 1iA4TORI l s presentsuperior.

Former Lt. General of the Army, and suc-cessor to TANAKA Shinichi as Chief of Oper-ations and Strategy, GR‘ in 1942 (Japanese G-1our G-3, %.iencral Staff).

Former YajCT General, Arpy, Deputy Chief ofStaff of the Hokkaido Area kw/ at the ti.eof the surrender.

The above group works together harmoniously in aiding TA1SUII toprepare lists and records for YL6HILA..

STSLEI is not a man, however, who elevates or recor.izes his colletuesand subordinates when he has a mission t perform. He is a coma:xlerwho invariably enjoys doinr his work himself, delef; tint very littleauthority, keeping his own cou ...sel, and forming almost no close relation-ships. Usually, cenerals i aides idolize tieir superior: . and are cha_medby Li.eir ability and personality. 'jot so with aides, whowithout exception have always considered him a "cold fish" and did notlike to serve hip . Although is a ve y modest gentlemancf finecharacttr cnd reputat:oh, he seems tp draw a clear-cut line in associ-

witi all his friends: he does not step beyomi that line withthem, and he makes it very difficdt for any to draw any closer thanthat to hiv..

(.-.b-source elicited the following opinions from Tzt'irU4 on 28 Sep 1951.)

V.ZSULI does not oppose hATTaRI Takushiro, but in fact hopes thatEATTOBI will someday be chief of the new Japanese Army, for which posthe feels iu.TTCIII to be eminently qualified, even though he deplores someof HAn.,..al's subordinates such as HaRips. for their indiscretion.d1TiSL.1 .2 has no particular dislike tosMalCURO Hiñeo either, except that

he considers IWAXURO to be more of a pIitoisn than a military man at

et

present, and f that MORO is merely using rearmament as a politicalstepping stone. _DU Akio, who is associated with certain munitions andarms manufectur • plans of economic interests behind the MORO Group,is evehamore unscrupulous &Jerson, and scum of the people he influences,such a#TSUUM0110 Makoto,andWilabiAgigui are far more active thaneven the MOM Group attempting to ruin HILTTORI ls reputation witkthe Japanese governssnt.NI is NOT associated with TOWN;who despises him, despite that may say.

SEW

SECIET( ZJL-737A)

0. (Sub-source flr parr. cjhAIA:KE Yoshitane, elicited fro:: IAISOV,I on5 OctLber; acqUred on 7 October.)

HORIB;.. • former Colonel and Hi,TTORI l a subordinate in the historical17;;77Alton of Um Demobilization Bureau, once asked for an inter-view with TITSUMI. through Lt. General TANIDA Isamu, in January, 1951;however, 17A4SUP4 was mews. of 's -; HATTORIboth to TANIDA and to MORO, refused it because he °didn't want tostir up a hornet's neat of intrigue. Shortly alterwar.:8, 441513•1broke comp2el.:: with TA.:IDA despite the latter's persistent ef;orts tokeep workinr with TLTS...1. Tk..SLiq considers TSUJI Yasa:_obu a finesoldier and rel.tleman, but deplores hie stupii.1 and harmful conOuct,feelin, that it is one of the chief liabilities to UTTORI's waningreputation with the Japa:ese government, particul , rly the policearencies. Because of TSUdI's insecure conduct and rash speeches, thegovernment Considers rearramert tantamount to revival of the Old Jap-anese Army and sees the nirhtmare of a return to Alitariaticcontrol.This is directed unfortunately :et arainst ASLI, who has no concreteplan, but afainst his friend, EATlioEl Takushiro, whose cooperation withthe Police Reserve idea has beeL fine despite the unjust and viciousattacks upon him as an arch-militarist.

2. SHII;OFMRA Seanni ( aFF AE_

Iormer oeneral of the A477, he was 'we:- einister of the ShIlealek Cabinet in1945, ane CAI* to Ue closely acquainted with YOSi.IDA Shigeru at that time.he was in the General SAITO clique, and greatly opposed to Hideki TOJO. Atone period during HATTORI's long tour of duty with the Opem-ional PlansSection of Japanese G-1 (our G-3 General Staff), SHL ..CUIRIL was cidef ofOperations and Strategy. (Jap: nese G-1). Lariely due to his recommendation,despite hATTCHI l e fiel6 grt, de rank at the time, HATTMI w-s made chief ofthe Operational Plans : lection, succeeding ISi'..JARA Kanju, in 1937. HATTORIgreatly respects and trusts General SHIECCURA, and has always continued tomaintain a very close relstionship with hie. HATTORI feels that onlyShL :,VURA, of all of the former general rank officers of the JapaneseArmF, is truly qualified to load the new Japanese Army. HATTORI often callsupon him at present, gives his details of his plans, and aske,for GeneralSHI2-10111HA i s instructions. In short, General SEIMOMURL is former superior,sponsor, and usenseie (teacher) to HLTIVRI. The present Prime Minister,'YOSEIDA, was Foreign Minister when ShIVINAA was Prime Minister in the firstpost-war cabinet. WHOM& enjoys the distinction of being the lastJapanese Minister of Ver. !WHIM hes .Aaintained friendly relations withsmictinuL, and confers with bir . frequently en the rearmament question.However, =NEI, Who is aloe friendly with the general, is a closer advisorof IOBRIDI, and to what extent !Coxing. relies upon 5HIMMON10. cceneel isdubious.

'

(ZJL-737A)

(Sub-source 'or the following: HATTORI. Takushiro; bate of Information: Asof 17 Septater; ate acq ireds 21 September, 1951.)

a. In the fall of 1950, General ShIkUMURA advised HATT.C61.1 confidentiallythat Lt. General TANIDA lama 'as quite bitter in criticizing UTTUR1to himself. TAIIDA appareLtly told SilMOICRA that HATTUILI was tryingto become commander of the entire Japanese Army because of his interestin the National Police Reserve command, and was using :.is. ARAKI's in-fluence with ueneral Willoughby and Willoughby's trust in hi: to thehilt in order to catapult hirself into full power. TAiiIDA decriedHATTORI's monopolistic plans, unfair, bi,:sed and ambitious Choices ofpersonnel, without conferring with anyone else, even the Japanese govern-ment or Prt.e anister YOSHIDA, and he insisted to SHL.011URA. thatHATTORI's plans were extremely ambitious, in fact, that HATTORI was"another A_ISUEs . TAKIDA showed SHLOMIIRA. a list of officers HATTORIhad rejected whom he felt were excellent men. HATTORI defended himselfweU, but realized that some one on his staff at the DemobilizationBureau Historical Records Section planning rearmament and formation ofthe Police :,asr.rve had betrayed him and their secret plans to TA.,IIA.It turned out to be Colonel HOial..A Kazuo, o has later disclosedhATTORI's secrets to DAKURO Hideo and

eth 'iBEs. Torto4ro and :1..oso.

f'

dA

who also oppose HATTORI. i.evertheless, Sn .1:EURA was not convinced byTANIDA of HATTORI's duplicity and ambition, and has continu ,..d to supportHATTORI even to YOSLIUI up to the present tire.

3. pezobilizat'.or, Burea, Chiefs, MIAMI Shuial &a WAWA a. YIIAZAKI StrAchi ( 404 !V I - ).

Former Lt. ueneral of the Army, rraduate of the Army War College, heWas excen Chief of Japanese 04, General Staff, in 1944, soon afterSAITO and YONAI came to power replacing TOJO. He is a "ShlMiuNURA"man, and somewhat favorable to HATTORI, but fearful of HATTORI's am-bitious reputation. When HATTORI returned to his post of chief of theOperational Plans Section of GiN1 General Staff after the fall of TOJO,it ve.a rumored that HaTURI secured the fall of then Major Generel DOIAkio as Chief of G-1 General Staff by causing Da to lose the respectof all his subordinates in 0-1, which brought about XIMAZAKI ls elevationto the post. For this reason, WI hates both HATTORI and MIYAZAKIbitterly to this day.

(6ub-source for the above: as told to TSUJI )asanoba ou28 September; acquired: 3 October 1951.

(Sub-source for the followings HiTTORI Teknahlro; date at informationsas of 17 September; acquired, 21 September 1951.)

The Historical Records Remora &motion at the Deeebilisation Bureau a

rr. t•.3rXr •• •

• •411' °!!. AN!!

4.1

4 (ZJL-7370

the Japanese Crovernment, the only Army function officially retained bythe Ja7emese Government after /945, in close cooperation with GHQ, SOAP,was originally known as the historical Facts SectiRn. Its first chiefwee 131...AKI Shuichi, former G-1 from 194414945. poth HATTORI and}iOIM Raz...o were a- pi mod under NIIAZAKI, as they had been subordinatesof his in G-1, HATTORI as chief of Operational Flans section. WhenEIILZ4U was discharged from his position by result of a strict appli-cation of the Yurpe Ordinance (in early 1947)F (parens are SourceComment), theL he offered to turn the 'oat over to HAT'ICEI. The latterdeclined, however, and recommenied his former operat!_onal plans superior,Major General WILIAM 4empu (or )lotoo). However, it seered thatNAKAYANI. was also excluded tram the post by purge directive, and HATTORIhad to takb over. In spite of the fact that it was evident at the timethat HATTORI had first recommended =MEL, HORIHA Kazuo objected toHOTORIl s elevation at first, claiming that he had his own ideas aboutthat affair. Finally, however, be apparently agreed and appeared will-ing to accept HATTURI t s leadership. MIYAZAKI generally adheres toSHINCRUHA l s direction at present in rearmament and all other activities.

b.frinkYAVA gam (or Nam: gip LA ALL )He is a former senior officer and ir.perior of HATTCRI Takushiro, and anofficer of general rank for whoa HATTORI has the hichest respect. Bewas graduated from Aruy Wbr Collez,e, and has a very inactive record inpost-war activities.