Busineess ETHICS

8/8/2019 Busineess ETHICS

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APPLIED ETHICS

applied ethics is, in the words of Brenda Almond, co-founder of the Society for

Applied Philosophy, "the philosophical examination, from a moral standpoint, of

particular issues in private and public life that are matters of moral judgment". It is

thus a term used to describe attempts to use philosophical methods to identify the

morally correct course of action in various fields of human life. Bioethics, for

example, is concerned with identifying the correct approach to matters such as

euthanasia, or the allocation of scarce health resources, or the use of human

embryos in research. Environmental ethics is concerned with questions such as the

duties of humans towards landscapes or species. Business ethics concerns

questions such as the limits on managers in the pursuit of profit, or the duty of

'whistleblowers' to the general public as opposed to their employers. As such, it is a

study which is supposed to involve practitioners as much as professional

philosophers.[1]

Applied ethics is distinguished from normative ethics, which concerns what people

should believe to be right and wrong, and from meta-ethics, which concerns the

nature of moral statements.

An emerging typology for applied ethics (Porter, 2006) uses six domains to help

improve organizations and social issues at the national and global level:

Decision ethics, or ethical theories and ethical decision processes

Professional ethics, or ethics to improve professionalism

Clinical ethics, or ethics to improve our basic health ne eds

Business ethics, or individual based morals to improve ethics in an organization

Organizational ethics, or ethics among organizations

Social ethics, or ethics among nations and as one global unit


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Benefits - 1. Consequentialism is grounded in actual effect. So, moral action

always improves life on earth (in some manner). Acting morally can improve your

lot in life. So, there is an incentive to act morally even if you do not believe in an

afterlife. 2. Consequentialist theories are often attentive to the particulars of the

situation. 3. These theories will allow for exceptions to the rule when warranted by

the outcome. 4. Utilitarianism follows the cause and effect reasoning in science. Itcan be proven wrong or right by referring to empirical evidence, instead of a

theoretical ideal. 5. All sentient beings understand pain and pleasure. Thus many

have claimed that utilitarianism is transcultural. 6. On a related note, utilitarianism

avoids the charge of speciesism in ethical the ory by using a moral foundation that

is shared by other species, thus requiring their consideration.

Problems - 1. Consequences are difficult to predict. Your actions may have good

intentions and a high probability of causing good results. But, if somethin g

happens and the consequences are actually bad, then your action was morally

wrong. Also, as the situation involves more people and alternatives, it becomes

more difficult to determine which action would produce the best consequences.How can we ever know that we actually chose the best alternative. There is no

opportunity for comparison of actual cases, just similar ones. 2. "Does the end

always justify the means?" A consequentialist theory would justify many actions

that we normally would consider wrong, if it turned out that the consequences were

good. 3. This theory undermines trust in others and intimate relationships since we

can never be sure that the consequences might not justify a betrayal of trust and in

many of these theories, each individual is treated the same regardless of one's

relationship. So, for example, ones duty to prevent pain to a stray cat would be

equal to ones duty to prevent pain to ones own cat.

Utilitarianism

Summarily, Jeremy Bentham states that people are driven by their interests and their fears, but their

interests take precedence over their fears, and their interests are carried out in accordance with how

people view the consequences that might be involved with their interests. "Happiness" on this account

is defined as the maximization of pleasure and the minimization of pain.

Historically, hedonistic utilitarianism is the paradigmatic example of a consequentialist moral theory.

This form of utilitarianism holds that what matters is the aggregate happiness; the happiness of

everyone and not the happiness of any particular person.John Stuart Mill, in his exposition of

hedonistic utilitarianism, proposed a hierarchy of pleasures, meaning that the pursuit of certain kinds

of pleasure is more highly valued than the pursuit of other pleasures.[6]

However, some contemporary

utilitarians, such as Peter Singerare concerned to maximize the satisfaction of preferences, hence


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"preference utilitarianism". Other contemporary forms of utilitarianism mirror the forms of

consequentialism outlined below.

]Ethical egoism and altruism

Ethical egoism can be understood as a consequentialist theory according to which the consequences

for the individual agent are taken to matter more than any other result. Thus, egoism will prescribe

actions that may be beneficial, detrimental, or neutral to the welfare of others. Some, like Henry

Sidgwick, argue that a certain degree of egoism promotes the general welfare of society for two

reasons: because individuals know how to please themselves best, and because if everyone were an

austere altruist then general welfare would inevitably decrease.[7]

Ethical altruism can be seen as a consequentialist ethic which prescribes that an individual take

actions that have the best consequences for everyone except for himself.[8]

This was advocated

byAuguste Comte, who coined the term "altruism," and whose ethics can be summed up in the

phrase: Live for others.[9]

Teleological ethics

Teleological ethics (Greek telos, end; logos, science) is an ethical theory that holds that the ends

or consequences of an act determine whether an act is good or evil. Teleological theories are often

discussed in opposition to deontological ethical theories, which hold that acts themselves

are inherentlygood or evil, regardless of the consequences of acts.

Teleological theories differ on the nature of the end that actions ought to

promote. Eudaemonist theories (Greek eudaimonia, "happiness") hold that ethics consists in some

function or activity appropriate to man as a human being, and thus tend to emphasize the cultivation

of virtue or excellence in the agent as the end of all action. These could be the classical virtues

courage, temperance,justice, and wisdomthat promoted the Greek ideal of man as the "rational

animal", or the theological virtuesfaith, hope, and lovethat distinguished the Christian ideal of man

as a being created in the image of God.

Utilitarian-type theories hold that the end consists in an experience or feeling produced by the

action. Hedonism, for example, teaches that this feeling is pleasureeither one's own, as in egoism

(the 17th-century English philosopherThomas Hobbes), or everyone's, as in universalistic hedonism,

orutilitarianism (the 19th-century English philosophers Jeremy Bentham,John Stuart Mill, and Henry

Sidgwick), with its formula of the "greatest pleasure of the greatest number."


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Other utilitarian-type views include the claims that the end of action is survival and growth, as

in evolutionary ethics (the 19th-century English philosopherHerbert Spencer); the experience of

power, as in despotism (the 16th-century Italian political philosopherNiccol Machiavelli and the 19th-

century German Friedrich Nietzsche); satisfaction and adjustment, as in pragmatism (20th-century

American philosophersRalph Barton Perry and John Dewey); and freedom, as in existentialism (the20th-century French philosopherJean-Paul Sartre).

The chief problem foreudaemonist theories is to show that leading a life of virtue will also be attended

by happinessby the winning of the goods regarded as the chief end of action. ThatJob should suffer

and Socrates and Jesus die while the wicked prosper, then seems unjust. Eudaemonists generally

reply that the universe is moral and that, in Socrates' words, No evil can happen to a good man,

either in life or after death, or, in Jesus' words, But he who endures to the end will be saved.

Utilitarian theories, on the other hand, must answer the charge that ends do not justify the means. The

problem arises in these theories because they tend to separate the achieved ends from the action by

which these ends were produced. One implication of utilitarianism is that one's intention in performing

an act may include all of its foreseen consequences. The goodness of the intention then reflects the

balance of the good and evil of these consequences, with no limits imposed upon it by the nature of

the act itselfeven if it be, say, the breaking of a promise or the execution of an innocent man.

Utilitarianism, in answering this charge, must show either that what is apparently immoral is not really

so or that, if it really is so, then closer examination of the consequences will bring this fact to light.

Ideal utilitarianism (G.E. Moore and Hastings Rashdall) tries to meet the difficulty by advocating a

plurality of ends and including among them the attainment of virtue itself, which, as John Stuart

Mill affirmed, "may be felt a good in itself, and desired as such with as great intensity as any other

good."

this describes an ethical theory which judges the rightness of an action in terms of

an external goal or purpose. So, according to a teleological theory, consequences

always play some part, be it small or large, in the determination of what one should

or should not do. Not all teleological theories are consequentialist. John Rawls'

theory of justice is teleological, but not consequentialist because it claims that

consequences are only part of what must be considered when determining what

policy is morally just. (Rawls)

Benefits- 1. There is room in some theories for good intentions, even if the action

didnt active the desired end. 2. Active attempt to connect morality with the real

world. 3. By allowing for the consideration of consequences, teleological the ories

can adapt to different circumstances and situations. (Also see utilitarianism)

Problems - Depends on the theory. See utilitarianism for an example.


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DEONTOLOGICAL - This type of theory claims that there are features within

the actions themselves which determine whether or not they are right. These

features define the extent to which the actions conform with recognized moral

duties. For example, driving while drunk violates the duty to above all do noharm. The duties derive from various sources, such as religion, biology,

psychology, metaphysics, culture, language, etc. Depending on the deontological

theory, these duties may be absolute (no exceptions), prima facie (can only be

overridden by a more important duty), or conditional (only hold under specified

circumstances).

Deontological theories do not consider consequences to be important when

determining whether or not an action is ethical. It doesnt matter if the d runk driver

made it home safely. Driving drunk was still wrong because the intention to drive

drunk was wrong (or to drink alcohol when one knows one needs to drive).

Immanuel Kant's ethical theory is deontological. He claims that actions are only

morally right when they are done out of duty. He sees moral duties as unchanging

laws for human conduct. He believes that morality is derived from the ability to

think rationally, which enables beings to be free. If one is not free, then one cannot

be held responsible. Thus only free individuals are moral agents and all free

individuals are capable of acting out of reason. Kants moral theory is largely

focused on protecting and promoting the free action of rational beings. Three

formulations of his categorical imp erative are derived from this moral

foundation:(Kant)

y Always act out of duty, in accordance with a good will (I.e. One does the

right thing because one recognizes that it is the right thing to do, not because

it pleases you to do it or will promote good c onsequences.). (pp. 25-26.)

y Always act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a

Universal Law of Nature (i.e. Are you willing to allow any other rational

being to act on the same reasoning you used to justify your action?) (p. 49.)

y Act as to treat the capacity for rationality, whether in thine own person or in

that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only. (i.e.

Never treat a rational being as a mere means to an end.) (p. 62.)

Benefits - 1. Right and wrong actions are easily determined by considering one'sduties. In some cases, these are explicitly spelled out (i.e. religion). However, the

use of judgement is usually necessary to determine which duties apply and how. 2.

Unlike utilitarianism, the end does not justify the means. Deontological theories

provide a sound basis for inalienable rights and inherent value. 3. Since duties do

not change, there is a greater sense of security/predictability in the accepted

behavior of others. Right and wrong dont vary with the consequences, although

there may be a various according to circumstances (i.e. in the case of conflicting


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duties). 4. Good motives are valued, even if the outcome wasnt what you

expected..

Problems - 1. There is no agreement on a single standard for morality. 2. Ignoring

consequences can cause pain and suffering. 3. The imposition of a specific moral

belief system on others has been a cause of significant harm throughout history.Some deontological theories are not equipped to respect diverse beliefs. H owever

there are some deontological theories that incorporate respect for the beliefs of

others. There are even some religious -based theories which, while espousing one

true way also respect diverse beliefs amongst individuals (i.e. Buddhist ethics).

Virtue ethics

Both teleological and deontological ethical theories are called deontic or action-based

theories of morality because they focus entirely upon the actions which a person performs.

Those theories focus on the question, "Which action should I choose?" Virtue ethics,

however, take a very different perspective.

theories place less emphasis on which rules people should follow and instead focus on

helping people develop good character traits, such as kindness and generosity. These

character traits will, in turn, allow a person to make the correct decisions later on in life.

Virtue theorists also emphasize the need for people to learn how to break bad habits of

character, like greed or anger. These are called vices and stand in the way of becoming a

good person.

Recently virtue ethics has not been a very common topic for study, but it date s back to the

ancient Greek thinkers and is thus the oldest type of ethical theory in Western philosophy.

Plato discussed four key virtues: wisdom, courage, temperance and justice. The first

systematic description of virtue ethics was written down by Arist otle in his famous

work Nichomachean Ethics. According to Aristotle, when people acquire good habits of

character, they are better able to regulate their emotions and their reason. This, in turn,

helps us reach morally correct decisions when we are faced w ith difficult choices.

One reason why virtue ethics can be popular and why they make an important contribution

to our understanding of morality is that they emphasize the central role played by motivesin moral questions. To act from virtue is to act from some particular motivation; thus to say

that certain virtues are necessary for correct moral decisions is to say that correct moral

decisions require correct motives.

Neither teleological nor deontological moral theories require motives to play a role in o ur

evaluation of moral decisions but encouraging correct motivations is very often a key

component of the moral education of young people. We are taught that we


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should desire certain outcomes and that we should want to accomplish certain goals by our

actions.

Another reason why virtue theories are so attractive is that the other moral theories share

in common the difficulty in dealing with complicated moral calculations over what actions to

take or which moral duties to emphasize. Virtue theories promise that once we aresuccessful in creating the sort of person we want to be, arriving at the correct moral

decisions will come naturally.

Key questions which virtue ethical systems ask include:

What sort of person do I want to be?

What virtues are characteristic of the person I want to be?

What actions will cultivate the virtues I want to possess?

What actions will be characteristic of the sort of person I want to be?

Problems With Virtue Ethics

The reality of virtue ethics isnt as neat and simple as some might imagine. Although many

common moral decisions may indeed come more easily to a person of the right moral

character, the fact of the matter is that many moral dilemmas require a great deal of careful

reasoning and thinking simply having the right character cannot be enough to even make

the right decision likely, much less assured. The fact that rule based and duty based ethical

systems are complicated and difficult to employ does not make a person of good character

more likely to make the right choices.

Another problem with virtue-based ethical systems is the question of what the right sort

of character is which a person should have. Many, if not most, virtue theorists have treated

the answer to this question as self-evident, but it is anything but. One persons virtue may

be another persons vice and a vice in one set of circumstances may be a virtue in another.

Some advocates of virtue ethics suggest that we determine the right virtues by asking a

virtuous person, but that is just an exercise in question begging. Others might suggest asking

a happy person, but that assumes that happiness and virtue always coincide by no means

an obvious truth.

Perhaps a key to understanding virtue theories of ethics is to regard them as ways to

approach moral psychology but not moral epistemology. What this means is that virtue


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theories should not be contrasted with theories about how to make moral choices, like the

teleological theory of John Stuart Mill or the deontological theory of Immanuel Kant.

Instead, virtue theories of ethics should be treated as ways to understand how we become

moral creatures, how we develop the means by which we make moral decisions, and the

process by which moral attitudes develop. More importantly, virtue theories may be able toteach us how morals themselves should be taught, particularly in the earliest years when

the more complicated decision-making processes are not yet possible.

Deontology and Ethics: WhatisDeontology, Deontological Ethics?

Deontological moral systems are characterized by a focus upon adherence to independent

moral rules or duties. To make the correct moral choices, we have to understand what our

moral duties are and what correct rules exist to regulate those duties. When we follow our

duty, we are behaving morally. When we fail to follow our duty, we are behaving immorally.Typically in any deontological system, our duties, rules, and obligations are determined by

God. Being moral is thus a matter of obeying God.

Deontological moral systems typically stress the reasons why certain actions are performed.

Simply following the correct moral rules is often not sufficient; instead, we have to have the

correct motivations. This might allow a person to not be considered immoral even though

they have broken a moral rule, but only so long as they were motivated to adhere to some

correct moral duty.

Nevertheless, a correct motivation alone is never a justification for an action in a

deontological moral system and cannot be used as a basis for describing an acti on as

morally correct. It is also not enough to simply believe that something is the correct duty to

follow. Duties and obligations must be determined objectively and absolutely, not

subjectively. There is no room in deontological systems of subjective fee lings; on the

contrary, most adherents condemn subjectivism and relativism in all their forms.

Perhaps the most significant thing to understand about deontological moral systems is that

their moral principles are completely separated from any consequences which following

those principles might have. Thus, if you have a moral duty not to lie, then lying is always

wrong even if that results in harm to others. For example, you would be acting immorally

if you lied to Nazis about where Jews were hiding.

The word deontology comes from the Greek roots deon, which means duty, and logos, which

means science. Thus, deontology is the "science of duty." Key questions which deontological

ethical systems ask include:


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What is my moral duty?

What are my moral obligations?

How do I weigh one moral duty against another?

Problems With Deontological Ethics

A common criticism of deontological moral systems is that they provide no clear way to

resolve conflicts between moral duties. a deontological moral system should incl ude both a

moral duty not to lie and one to keep others from harm, for example, but in the abovesituation how is a person to choose between those two moral duties? A popular response to

this is to simply choose the "lesser of two evils," but that means re lying on which of the two

has the least evil consequences and, therefore, the moral choice is being made on a

consequentialist rather than a deontological basis.

Some critics argue that deontological moral systems are, in fact, consequentialist moral

systems in disguise. According to this argument, duties and obligations which set forth in

deontological systems are actually those actions which have been demonstrated over long

periods of time to have the best consequences. Eventually, they become enshrined i n

custom and law and people stop giving them or their consequences much thought theyare simply assumed to be correct. Deontological ethics are thus ethics where the reasons for

particular duties have been forgotten, even if things have completely change d.

A second criticism is that deontological moral systems do not readily allow for grey areas

where the morality of an action is questionable. They are, rather, systems which are based

upon absolutes absolute principles and absolute conclusions. In real life, however, moral

questions more often involve grey areas than absolute black & white choices. We typically

have conflicting duties, interests, and issues that make things difficult.

Another common criticism of deontological ethical theories is the ques tion of just which

duties qualify as those which we should all follow, regardless of the consequences. Duties

which might have been valid in the 18th century are not necessarily valid now, but who is to

say which ones should be abandoned and which are stil l valid? And if any are to be

abandoned, how can we say that they really were moral duties back in the 18th century?

If these were duties created by God, how can they possibly stop being duties today? Many

attempts to develop deontological systems focus on explaining how and why certain duties


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are valid at any time or at all times and how we can know that. Religious believers are often

in the difficult position of trying to explain what believers of the past treated certain duties

as objective, absolute ethical requirements created by God but today they aren't today

we have different absolute, objective ethical requirements created by God. These are all

reasons why irreligious atheists rarely subscribe to deontological ethical systems, though it

can't be denied that they can at times have ethical insights to offer.

The fallacies of egoism are: 1) egoistic moralism (or moralistic egoism), the sense that it is a

moral duty to pursue one's own interests ( Ayn Rand sounds like this, and many earlier

moralists, including Kant, posit a category of "duties to self," such as Jefferson properly

denies above); and 2) egoistic [moral] aestheticism, the sense that no moral duty exists to

restrain the actual pursuit of one's own interests (sounds like Nietzsche but is notRand).

Egoistic aestheticism eliminates all moral duties to others, leaving only prudent or

"enlightened" self-interest to govern relations with them. An egoistic aestheticism which is

not a moralaestheticism would simply mean that goods for the self are worthy of pursuit;

and that is not a moral fallacy. Egoistic moralism and egoistic aestheticism can actually be

combined, which would make it a duty to pursue self -interest whatever the cost to others.

Moral duty does arise where goods for others, which may or may not overlap goods for the

self, are concerned. Moral duty consists of respect forthe autonomy of others , which

means allowing the free exercise of the innocent, competent will of others inreg ardto

theirown interests.

"Allowing the free exercise" means the use of neither fraud (deception) nor force (coercive

threat of violence or actual violence) against the will of other persons in the disposing of

their interests.

"Innocent" means that the other is not actually committing or effecting a wrong, whether or

not they intendwrong (although they actually are morally innocent if they do not intent

wrong and are not negligent). The intentional or negligent commission of a wrong entails

loss of some rights of autonomy and self-interest both in order to prevent the active

commission of the wrong and in order to extract retribution (through the loss of goods,

proportional to the wrong) as just punishment for wrongs committed.

"Competent" means mentally able to rationally evaluate and pursue one's own self-interest.

Incompetent persons do not lose rights of self -interest and only lose rights of autonomy in

so far as their self-interest can be better evaluated and pursued, in their behalf, by others.


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"Their own interests" are self-defined in the areas or matters where, according to the types

of interests considered below, we have rights of possession, use, and exchange.

It has become common to say that people have rights whereverthey have interests, but this

principle does not allow for "compossibility," the possibility that the rights can all be

exercised at the same time, since many interests overlap and conflict. Such "rights" mustnecessarily be abridged, a dangerous characteristic, since any rights ca n then be abridged

for any expedient reason. Ifnot allinterests are protected by rights, however, then rights

can be moral and legal claims that cannotbe abridged.

This formulation of the nature of moral duty is functionally similar to Immanuel

Kant's version of the moral law as requiring one to act always to treat others as ends also

and never as means only. Since treating others as means is to use them to further one's own

self-interest (or some other inte rest), and this can be done in many completely innocent

ways, the crucial question is what treating someone as an "end also" amounts to. An "end"

clearly stops the action of the will, so that the will does not continue to some further good.That makes the "end" a good-in-itself. While we may value others as goods-in-themselves,

we usually do make use of them for ulterior ends; and the only way to reconcile their

function as both end and means is if they are willing to pursue some ulterior end in our

behalf. Thus, Kant's formulation calls on us to respect the autonomy and dignity of persons,

allowing them the freedom to help or not to help us in the pursuit of goods. If they are not

willing to help us, then we cannotuse them as means to our self-interested ends. That

complements the version of moral duty given above. There we leave people alone to pursue

their self-interest, while with Kant we do not force them to pursue ours.

I should note, however, that this interpretation of Kant is not consistent with Kan t's own

view of the moral law; for Kant actually states the rule as "Act so that you treat humanity,

whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means

only" [Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals , Lew White Beck translation, Library of the

Liberal Arts, 1959, p.47]. Thus, one should treat oneself as an end also as well as means.

Since it doesn't make any sense that one could violate one's own will, Kant needed to have

in mind more than just autonomy as the content of the self as an end. Since that is the area

where Kant's theory seems indefinite, leading to endless interpretations over the years

(including rejection by Schopenhauer as indeterminately vague), and would in any case

involve duties to self, which don't exist, I do think that partof Kant's moral law can be

amputated without real loss, and that it is appropriate to do so. Respecting the autonomy ofothers is a simpler, more definite, and more defensible princ iple than whatever it would

mean to respect oneself, as well as another, as an end in itself. [ note]

Leonard Nelson, although essential to the treatment of ethics here, with his theories of ideal

ethics and of moralism, stuck too closely to Kant's first version of the moral law (to act so

that the maxim of one's action can be universalized without contradiction), which is

moralistic, and produced a moralistic formulation of the moral law himself. Thus, he calls


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the moral law "the principle of abstraction from the numerical determination of persons"

[System of Ethics, Yale, 1956, p. 113] and says:

If we suppose that all interests affected by our acti on are those of a single person, if we

suppose, in other words, that the interests of the person affected by our action are ours as

well, we would favor the preponderating interest regardless of whether it is our own or thatof the other person. [ ibid. p. 114]

This makes Nelson's theory actually teleological, for right action is then to bring about the

"preponderating interest" among all those affected by an action, though, dealing with actual

affected interests, this is not quite as absurd as teleological theories that simply require that

the "greatest good" be effected in every situation, which is actually beyond the scope of

human cognition or action. Nelson's theory, nevertheless, is moralistic both because every

action then becomes a moral issue, where the "preponderating interest" must be

calculated, and because it can make some non-moral interest of others into the

consideration which determines moral action, for there is nothing to prevent t he"preponderating interest" from being a non-moral interest. Nor can the "preponderating

interest" even bedeterminedin a theory of value where most goods, the goods of ideal

ethics, are not absolute and will often not, and could not, be agreed upon by di fferent

persons. Only where a moral issue is already involved will there be a "preponderating

interest" that is absolute, determinable, and preemptive over non -moral and personal

goods; and such a moral issue, as above, will always involve the respect for the innocent,

competent will of others with respect to their own interests.

It is a shame that Nelson errs when it comes to the content of the moral law, but this

provides an important lesson how mistakes can be made even in the context of a theory

that is sound and fruitful. Similar problems occur with Nelson's view of Socratic

Method and non-intuitive immediate knowledge.

A reconcilation of teleological and deontological ethical theories is possible when we note

that some ends are not to be attainedbut simply, as already attained, to be respected. That

will occur withpersons as ends-in-themselves. A Utilitarian or other teleological theory that

allows persons to be used, simply as means for some ulterior end, overlooks the status of

persons as ends already. It has always been possible to argue for a teleological theory by

saying that individual rights, etc. are among the appropriate ends that teleological ethics

would be pursuing. One need merely add that they are not among "appropriate" ends but

are absolute ends which absolutely restrict morally acceptable action. Since persons as ends

are not purposes to be realized through action but are features of the moral universe that

absolutely restrict action, it is more straightforward and revealing to see morality in

deontological rather than teleological terms. Now, however, these can be translatedinto

one another, and teleological theories that allow for expe diency rather than morality can be

revealed as relativizing, not morality in some abstract sense, but the moral worth of

aperson as an absolute end-in-itself and good-in-itself.


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Goods for the self are interests of person, property, and contract. These tra nslate

into rights. "Interests of person" are the possession and control by a person of their own

body, labor, and other attributes of their personal status (e.g. reputation, civil rights, etc.).

"Interests of property" are the possession and control by a person of tangible and intangible

assets, distinct and separable from the person, the ownership of which is recognized in

custom and law, usually giving the owners powers of exclusive possession, use, and

exchange. Interests of person and property impose duties of respect to refrain from the use

of fraud and force against the person and property of others. "Interests of contract" are the

agreements and promises through which interests of person and property a re usually

managed and altered, and so respect for person and property also becomes respect for

contract.

Interests of person and property in general forbid wrongs of commission, i.e. fraudulent or

violent damaging acts against persons and property, by others. Moral duty also forbids

wrongs ofomission -- or posits duties of commission (or duties to act) -- requiring positive

actions for the sake of another because of contract (see below) or where fundamental

interests, such as life and limb, are endangered. The distiction between duties of omission

and commission is ancient, as Thomas Jefferson noted in 1813, in a letter to John Adams,

about rabbinical law:

From the law of Moses were deduced six hundred and thirteen precepts, which were

divided into two classes, affirmative and negative, two hundred and fourty -eight in the

former, and three hundred and sixty-five in the latter.

The duties of omission (the negative ones) thus constitute 60% of the total. This may

indicate their more fundamental and straightforward nature, as the Ten Commandments

themselves mostly begin with "Don't" ( L'in Hebrew). The duty to act in the cases of

commission involves the judgment that the other person is in some respect physically

unable or mentally incompetent to help themselves. The pursuit of goods for others

is altruism.

The fallacy of altruism, or altruistic moralism (or moralistic altruism), is the sense that there

is a general duty, or that morality as such requires us always, to act in the interest of others.

On the other hand, an "altruistic moral aestheticism" [or, simply, "altruistic aestheticism"] is

not a moral fallacy; for this only means that a person may act for the good of others if this

seems good, which is unobjectionable as long as the action respects the autonomy of

others, i.e. is not against their innocent and competent will. The asymmetry between

egoistic and altruistic moral aestheticism, that one is a fallacy and the other isn't, is due to

the circumstance that morality limits the pursuit of self-interest and posits respect for

others. The removal of moral constraint in aestheticism thus would be motivated for the

self, which can then gain through wrong, but would not be motivated for others , who were

protected from wrongful loss.


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Altruistic moralism is often a tempting doctrine because the rule for the specification of

non-contractual duties of commission appears to be complex. There will be such a duty on a

person only where:

The other is unable to help themselves,

the other is in dangerof serious and irreversible harm,

there is no one else present who has a more defined contractualobligation to help the

other (e.g. lifeguard, parent, physician, policeman, etc.) and who is able to do so, and

a person is able to act competentlyto prevent that harm withoutcomparably endangering

either themselves personally or the interests of those who are contractually dependent

upon the agent for support (e.g. children or other family, etc.). [This will be

simplified below.]

A person who does more than is required by these conditions, i.e. who acts even at the cost

of endangering themselves or damaging their own interests of comparable magn itude to

those originally endangered, acts with supererogation , i.e. beyond the requirements of

moral duty. Altruistic moralism denies supererogation. Since non -contractual duties of

commission involve judgments ofincompetence or physical disability, altruistic moralism

impliespaternalism, i.e. the judgment that the agent knows better the interests of others,

and how to pursue them, than they do themselves. Paternalism and altruistic moralism thus

will lead to basic violations of moral duty as the actual innocent and competent

autonomous will of others may be abridged by force. That is a general problem

with anyform of altruism, that the self-defining character of what is good is transferred

from the other to the altruistic agent, always raising the danger that another may bejudged incompetentsimply because their judgment about what is good for them may differ

from the agent's.

Entrepreneur Vs Manager

When you compare managers and entrepreneurs you need to first look at the definitions of

both titles. A manager is someone who directs a team and an entrepreneur is someone who

organizes, manages, and assumes the risks of a business or enterprise. With the se

definitions you can surmise that an entrepreneur can be a manager but a manager can not

be an entrepreneur. The reasons for this are plentiful, but it basically comes down to the


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type of person you are. If you like to control all aspects of a situation then you are generally

a manager, but if you are someone who works through problems with people then you are

more likely an entrepreneur.

A manager is someone who is what is known as a micromanager. They like to control all

aspects of their workplace. Each person is given their assigned tasks and a manager will look

over your shoulder until you finish it. They do not like to give up control enough to find out

if you could do it on your own because they think if you make a mistake that it will come

down on them. Unfortunately, with this attitude the people who work for a manager are

less likely to grow in their career and will either stagnate or leave the company or position

quickly. This will help to perpetuate the feelings of the manager that no one can m easure of

to him in their skill levels. This type of demeanor works well when you have a person that

needs to be consistently supervised. Someone who can't take a task and see if through on

their own, they need to have it explained to them step by step.

An entrepreneur is generally considered a leader versus a manager. They will give people

tasks and a deadline and generally leave them alone until it is completed. They will trust

people to get the job done without having to constantly look over their shoul der. When they

hire someone they believe that they have hired someone who is qualified to handle the

tasks before them, so they don't think they should have to ask for status reports on an

hourly basis....

Busineess ETHICS

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