British Commandos Special Series No 1

7/30/2019 British Commandos Special Series No 1

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U635nc, A . ERIE NO. 1 AUGUST 9,1942

BRITISH COMMANDOSAur~--. CF D U. 2L0. 1 R

PREPARED BYMILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICEWAR DEPARTMENT


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Military Intelligence Service Special SeriesWlar Departiment No. 1Washington, August 9, 1942 MID 461Notice1. The publications of the Special Series are for the purpose of pro-viding officers with reasonably confirmed information from official andother reliable sources.2. Nondivisional units are being supplied with copies on a basis similarto the approved distribution for divisional commands, as follows:

Inf L)iv Cav Div Arnmd DivDiv Hq______- 8 Div Hq_________ 4 Div Hq--_______ 11Rcn Tr--____--- 1 ()rd Co-_____-_- 1 Rcn Bn --_______ 1Sig Co -___----- 1 Sig Tr_________ 1 Engr Bn______ 1Engr Bn_____- 1 Iten Sq________1 NMed Bn--______ 1AMed n________- 1 gr S1gr qaint Bn--_____ 1QM 1n _. - I lMed Sq _____ 1 Sup Bn- _. 1Hq Inf Regi I QW1 Sq------- 1 Div Tn Hq ___. 1

each --__----- 3 Hq ('av Brig 2 Armd Regt, 4Inf Bn 1 eachi_ 9 each__ 4 each --------- 8Hq Div Arty____ 1 Cav ltegt 4 each_ 16 FA Bn, 1 each__ 3FA Bn, 1 each__ 4 Hq Div Arty___ 1 Inf Regt__----- 4

FA Bn, 1 each__ 330 34 32

Distribution to air units is being made by the A-2 of Army Air Forces.3. Each command should circulate available copies among its officers.Reproduction within the military service is permitted provided'(1) thesource is stated, (2) the classification is not changed, and (3) the in-formation is safeguarded. Attention is invited to p)aragraph 10a, AR380-5, which is quoted in part as follows: "A document * * * will beclassified and * * * marked restricted when information containedtherein is for official use only, or when its disclosure should be * *denied the general public."4. Suggestions for future bulletins are invited. Any correspondencerelating to Special Series may be addressed directly to the Evaluationand Dissemination Branch, Military Intelligence Service, War Depart-ment, Washington, D. C.

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TABLE OF CONTENTSPara-

Chap ter I BACKGROUND OF THE COM-MANDOS --------- 1-10 1SECTION I ORIGIN AND ORGANIZATION _______-___- 1-7 3Introduction ------ --------------- 1 3

Organization------- ------------- 2 5Principles of Leadership and Discipline_- 3 6Procurement of Personnel--------- 4 7Administration ---------------------- 5 9Training Principles ------------------- 6 11Arms and Equipment ---------------- 7 13

SECTION II INDEPENDENT (COMMANDO) COMPANIES INAUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND __----- 8-10 17

General ---------------------------- 8 17Tables of Organization and Weapons -- 9 18Standard Equipment ..............- 10 22Chapter 2 COMMANDO TRAINING ---------. 11-23 25

SECTION I SPECIAL AND COMBINED TRAINING_-___ 11-15 27General _--.------------------- 11I 27Special Training- ------------ - 12 28Instructor Training Courses----------- 13 33Comments by a U. S. Observer -------- 14 37Combined Training ------------------ 15 39

SECTION II MOUNTAIN TRAINING _____-_.__________ 16-21 45General ---------------------------- 16 45Food ------------------------------ 17 47Clothing ---- ------------- 18 48Footgear ---------- - --------------- 19 49Packs----. ----------------------- 20 51Mountain Tents and Bedding --------- 21 52

SECTION III COMMANDO RATIONS---------------- 22-23 53General---------------------------- 22 53Typical Ration ------------ - -- 23 53Chapter 3 COMMANDO OPERATIONS - 24-40 55SECTION I VAAGSO (NORWAY) RAID -- ____--- _----- 24-27 57General- .---------- -------- 24 57

III


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Para-graphs Page

Report of Naval and Military Comn-lallnders W ho Carried O(lt the VaagsoRaid .. .-------- ---- 25 59

Appendices ----------------- ------ 26 88Notes for Lessons by Boarding PartyConmlander ----- -.--------- 27 96

SECTION II BRITISH TASK FORCE, SPITSBERIEN OPER-ATION__--_- ----------------------- 28 40 99

Strategic Value- .....-------------- 28 99Special Trainillng---- ------------- 29 100Composition of Force -------------. 30 100Unity of Command --------. ---. . .-- 31 101Voyage ---- ----------------------- 32 102Landing and Operations ----------- -- 33 103Major Demolitions -------------------- 34 105Evacuation of Norwegian Settlemnents___ 35 106Signal Operations- -.------------- 36 107Secrecy ---------------------------- 37 108Appendix A-Composition of Task Force_ 38 108Appendix B--Diary of Newspaper Man

with Task Force ---------.--- 39 110Lessons of the Spitsbergen Operation --- 40 114Chapter 4 BRITISH LESSONS FROM COM-MANDO OPERATIONS ---------- 41-58 117

Value of Raids -------------- ------- 41 119Choice of Target --------------------- 42 120Choice of Landing Places ---------- - 43 121Reconnaissance .44 121Size of Raiding Force ------------- 45 122Sea Transport ----------------------- 46 122Selection of Dates; Tide Factors------- 47 124Timing ---------------------------- 48 125Naval Plan ----------------------- 49 126Air Plan ------------------- - 50 126Land-Force Plan -------------------- 51 128Training and Rehearsals ------ ------ 52 130Security- ------------------ 53 132Clothing and Equipment ----------- 54 133Recognition at Night -. - ---- 55 134Action after Landing -------- ------ 56 135Return -.--------------- --- 57 137Publicity ----- ---------------- 58 138

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Chapter 1

BACKGROUND OF THECOMMANDOS

ParagraphsSection I ORIGIN AND ORGANIZATION . . 1-7

Section II INDEPENDENT (COMMANDO) COM-PANIES IN AUSTRALIA AND NEWZEALAND . . . . . . . 8-10


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SECTION IOrigin and Organization1. Introduction.-Since the decisive outcome of thecampaigns in France and the Low Countries left theBritish Army considerably inferior to the GermanArmy in strength and mat6riel, the British had nochoice but to avoid full-scale fighting until new powercould be marshalled. Accordingly, shortly after thewithdrawal from Dunkirk in June 1940, the Im-perial General Staff organized a Special ServiceBrigade under the control of the Director of Com-bined Operations, Admiral of the Fleet Sir RogerKeyes, who had learned the technique of coastalraids in the First World War. The Brigade wascomposed of raiding parties and task forces-rovinghit-and-run fighters-and soon came to be knownas "commandos" after a Dutch word, derived fromthe Portuguese, that had come into familiar use inthe Boer War as a term describing any niilitarybody as well as a raiding party. Under Sir Rogerthe commandos carried out several "pin-prick"raids on the French coast and a larger raid on theLofoten Islands in Norway, in which they developedtheir peculiar tactics.

By the fall of 1941 the commandos were reor-ganized and placed under the direct control of Cap-tain Lord Louis Mountbatten, who, as Chief of Com-bined Operations, has been given the ranks of vice-

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admiral in the Royal Navy, lieutenant-general in theArmy, and air marshal in the Royal Air Force, inorder that the three services may have equal recogni-tion in planning and carrying out combined opera-tions. Under his leadership the conmmandos carriedout the raid on Vaagso, Norway, in December 1941.Actually the reorganization of the commandosconsists chiefly of a reorientation of aims rather thana change in organization and administrative meth-ods. The Brigade of commandos remains, for ex-ample, under the control of Combined Operations,which operates under the Ministry of Defence, anoffice held by the Prime Minister. However, theBrigade does not in fact train or function normallyas such; the separate commandos are stationed invarious places and are trained separately. The com-bined training of the commandos with naval andair units continues essentially as first planned; andnow that Great Britain has regained the offensivepower which she temporarily lost in the Battle ofFrance and has otherwise increased her war-makingpotentialities, it is expected that the scope and num-ber of commando operations will increase consid-erably.The primary mission of the commandos is to carryout raids, and for that purpose they are speciallyand rigorously trained. Raiding parties may varyin size from a small reconnaissance group to a com-plete commando troop or even a larger force, andevery raid will aim to destroy enemy installationsand to obtain information. The secondary missions

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are: (1) to act as an elite or shock-assault brigadeto seize and hold a bridgehead for covering a land-ing in force, and (2) to provide specially trainedcovering forces for any operation. In the Far Eastthe scope of the commandos' operations will furtherinclude their use in support of guerrilla warfare infriendly and hostile areas. They will frequently becalled upon "to show the flag"-to undertake an in-vasion primarily to encourage the resistance of smallor conquered countries.Commandos, therefore, will play an increasinglyimportant role, and the available material on theirhistory, organization, and experience has been di-gested in this bulletin for the purpose of providinga guide to the offensive possibilities of such units.An account of the British raid on Spitsbergen hasbeen included because this operation, though notcarried out by commando troops proper, had manyof the characteristics of commando raids.2. Organization.-The commandos adhere closelyto the guerrilla system, in which small bands join to-gether to form larger but easily manageable units.The basic organization is a "troop" of 62 enlistedmen, commanded by a captain and divided into twosections under lieutenants, a section being the usualcomplement for one landing craft. Sections are com-posed of subsections (squads) commanded by ser-geants. The next higher organization is the com-mando proper, which consists of six troops. Thecommando proper is led by a lieutenant-colonel, whomakes a point of knowing every man in his organiza-

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tion and tries to develop among them a feeling ofpersonal attachment and miutual confidence. In addi-tion to the six troops, there is in each commando aheadquarters of 7 officers and 77 enlisted men organ-ized in Administrative, Intelligence, Signal, andTransport sections; also, there are attached 1 sur-geon and 7 men from the Royal Army Medical Corpsand 2 armorers from the Royal Army OrdnanceCorps. The brigade of commandos is under the di-rect command of a brigadier.3. Principles of Leadership and Discipline.-" Leadership " rather than" command " holds togetherthe commando unit. Leadership is absolute. Nohigher command can intervene between the memberand his immediate chieftain.

This extreme type of organization obviously couldnot be adopted in units formed under Regular Armyauspices. However, Army traditions and conventionshave been blended with the principles of guerrillafighting to adapt them to the character of the Britishsoldier. For commando service, regular troops of ahigh order of intelligence and daring have been se-lected, and have been physically conditioned and spe-cially trained to deal swift and telling blows. As themodified plan now works out, commando officers areallowed to form their own units. They also have theprivilege of sending any man back to his unit with-out explanation or right of appeal. On the samebasis, enlisted men are given the right to return totheir Army organization at any time, after giving

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notice and without stating their reasons. Experiencehas justified these innovations, for it has seldom beennecessary to introduce any punishment other than awarning of dismissal.4. Procurement of Personnel.-The significant factabout the commandos is that all personnel are volun-teers. The first recruits were called by a circularletter sent from the War Office to the commandinggenerals of the five commands (armies). They wereasked to call for volunteers "for special service"the nature of which was not indicated. The letterstated, however, that the men would not be askedto parachute unless they specifically volunteered forit, and promised that every volunteer would be inter-viewed privately by an officer. Thus a man had theopportunity to withdraw his application, if hewished, after getting some idea of the service thatwould be expected of him.In general, the stated requirements for service inthe commandos were:

a. Youth and physical fitness;b. Intelligence, self-reliance, and an independent frame ofmind;c. Ability to swim;d. Immunity to seasickness.Items c and d were found particularly essential inactual commando operations; and in addition to the

above requirements, every volunteer had to be afully:trained soldier. With the exception of trained-staff officers, personnel of all arms were eligible, but7


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this latitude proved to be too broad and was cor-riected after it was found that too high a proportionof skilled technicians were serving as infantrymenin the commandos. In fact, so many outstandingmen volunteered that some resistance to the com-mando idea developed among unit commanders ofthe Army. 'As a result, it became necessary to ob-tain commando personnel from training centers.At present the commandos contain men from everyregiment in the British Army, from Canadian regi-ments, and from the Royal Marines. In a typicalcommando 50 to 90 different regiments may be rep-resented. Officers and men are allowed to retaintheir regimental insignia, for these have been foundto be a particularly strong incentive for each manto excel in his duties as a representative of his regi-ment. All personnel are seasoned and experiencedsoldiers, and a very high percentage have had com-bat experience in either Norway or France or inboth. To lead the commandos the commanding gen-erals were also asked to select officers who were notabove the rank of lieutenant-colonel and who wereunder 40 years of age. These officers were also re-quired to possess tactical ability and sound militaryjudgment, a high order of leadership, and dash. Thefinal selections from the army commanders' listswere made in the War Office.The commando leaders selected their troop leadersfrom lists of officer volunteers at various army head-quarters. In turn each troop leader picked his twojunior officers. Then each set of 3 troop officers

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went through the list of volunteers until 62 noncom-missioned officers and enlisted men were interviewedand accepted. This procedure took time, but whenit was completed every officer had the satisfactionof knowing that his men were personally selected.From those eliminated the commando leader madetip a list of the more likely men who would be suit-able for replacements, although, as the plan ma-tured, a depot unit was formed to train additionalvolunteers as a commando reserve.A very large proportion of noncommissioned offi-cers is included in each troop, not only to facilitatetactical employment in very small parties but tooffer reasonable prospects of promotion to the su-perior men who have been flocking into the com-mando ranks.Since officers are detailed to the commandos, andnot permanently assigned, they receive normal con-sideration for promotion in their Army units. Manyofficers have preferred to remain with the comman-dos rather than to accept a higher rank, if this meantreturning to their old units.5. Administration.-It was decided that the com-mandos should receive no quarters or rations from theArmy. Instead each man draws an allowance of6s/8d (about $1.40 a day, with double the amount forofficers) with which to provide himself with lodging,food, transportation to and from his troop head-quarters, and the upkeep of a suit of civilian clothes.(The civilian suit is required, for example, for se-

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crecy in "trickling" troops into a home-port areaprior to embarking for a lraid.)As for housing, each comlmando is assigned to aseaside town in which to organize and carly on train-ing with naval units. On arrival at their "hometown" newly assigned commando members disperseto find themselves lodgings. A recreation ground orlocal hall is used as a rendezvous where the men canjoin with members of the naval unit for recreationor training.A suitable house is used as a supply depot and asa headquarters for a small administrative staff inorder to relieve the commando leader of routinepaper work concerning such things as pay, records,and equipment. This administrative staff is not de-signed to go on raids, and the administrative officeris usually a rather elderly major.The system of individual maintenance allowancesis merely the application of the normal practice ofhandling civilian labor in the Army, and the com-mando leaders are unanimous in its praise. Afterabout 4 or 5 months' experience, they reported at aWar Office conference that this system did morethan anything else to teach the men self-relianceand to instill the "commando spirit." It consider-ably reduces administrative overhead and leavesevery officer and enlisted man free to devote hiswhole time to training. He has none of the guardand other camp or garrison duties which normallycut into combat training. The system is immensely

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popular with the men, and it adds weight to thethreat of dismissal for any breach of discipline.The discipline and morale of the commandos isexceptionally high, as would be expected of a groupof select volunteers. An excellent spirit of fellow-ship prevails between officers and enlisted men, andis evident in all the training and exercises. Officersparticipate in athletics with the men, and two half-days a week are set aside for rugby, soccer, cross-country runs, boxing, etc. All are required to takepart in one form of sport or another. The factthat commanders may immediately return a man tohis unit for breach of discipline or for ineptitudehas an important effect in maintaining the high dis-ciplinary level. The varied and realistic nature ofthe training undertaken is likewise an aid to morale.Current-events talks are given weekly by all troopcommanders, and outside speakers (naval officers,civilians, professors, etc.) give weekly lectures onthe larger aspects of the war. Frequent week-endsare granted from Friday p. m. to Monday a. m.,and a liberal leave-policy obtains in order to preventthe men from going stale.6. Training Principles.-Training of commandopersonnel is designed to develop individual fightinginitiative, and is based entirely on offensive princi-ples. The training program seeks the development,to the very highest possible degree, of stamina andendurance under any operating conditions and in alltypes of climate. It aims to perfect all individuals


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in every basic military requirement, as well as inthe special work likely to be encountered in opera-tions, namely: wall climbing, skiing, obstacle run-ning, demolition, street fighting, both night and dayshooting, solution of tactical problems, surmountingbarbed wire, handling grenades and torpedoes, etc.Every man is expected to achieve some particularqualification, as motorcyclist, driver, boat operator,engineer, etc. The training succeeds in developingat one and the same time confidence, initiative, andingenuity in the individual and perfect teamwork inthe group. Commando leaders are given a free handand a reasonable cash allowance to organize theirown training program. Particular stress is placedon swimming and boating, although other exercisesare also practiced in order to develop rugged physi-cal condition. Stalking and the use of cover andconcealment are stressed, but greater emphasis isplaced on night problems, for the success of mostraiding operations depends on an ability to worksilently, with precision, in darkness.The idea that no type of operation is unusual is in-culcated in the men. At a moment's notice theyshould be able to ride bicycles or motorcycles; driveautomobiles and trucks of unfamiliar types; ridehorses and camels; and travel in aircraft, ships, andboats of any sort, all depending on the nature of theoperation, the availability of means of transport, andthe terrain in the various theaters of war. Com-mandos are sometimes carried as air-borne troopsand receive special training for air-borne operations.

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In the beginning, training in combination withnaval units consisted of practice in handling miscel-laneous watercraft, which were placed in charge ofyoung volunteer Naval Reserve officers, with yachts-men and fishermen as their crews. Now, however,the commandos have regularly manned ships withwhich to train and to sail in combined operations.The introduction of cooperative training with navalunits, soon after the commandos were formed, wasconsidered an essential element of the whole plan,for the "seaworthiness" of the commandos givesthem their mobility. Thorough amphibious trainingenables these units to avoid obvious, sandy beachesand to strike unexpectedly on rocky coves or ruggedheadlands, making the most of the element of sur-prise.

The commando brigade is prepared to accept cas-uialties in the training program rather than suffer the50 percent or higher battle casualties that wouldsurely result were the personnel inexperienced orunprepared for the realities of the battlefield. Alltraining, therefore, is conducted with the utmost real-ism. Wide latitude is accorded commanders in theselection of methods, and thus the development ofinitiative and ingenuity in the solution of battle prob-lems is encouraged. A similar latitude is accordedtroop commanders.7. Arms and Equipment.-In choosing the kinds ofarms and equipment suitable for commandos, thedetermining factor was the type of operations inwhich they would engage. In the summer of 1940

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the Germans were in positions along the coast lineof Europe, from Narvik in northern Norway toBiarritz in southwestern France. Any part of thiscoast was within reasonable striking distance fromthe British Isles. In view of the Royal Navy'ssuperiority at sea, the raiding opportunities forcommando units seemed unlimited. The task wasessentially one for an amphibious force-a sort ofsuper-marines-who would fight only with equip-ment which could be carried on their backs from aboat to a beach. They would also need the guer-rilla's traditional mobility on any terrain, whichmeant that vehicles larger than bicycles, and perhapsthan a handcart, were not practicable. Any bettermeans of transport would have to be captured atthe scene of operations.

Consequently, regulation requirements for thenumber and allocation of weapons are not prescribed,but in every case distribution is made according tothe tactical requirements of the particular missionto be performed. Every man who joins the com-mandos brings his own rifle or pistol, and he is alsoprovided with a fighting knife, which is used by thecommandos with particular effectiveness. Eachcommando headquarters has a separate store of extraweapons so that extreme flexibility in armament isassured. A typical store contains: Bren guns;Thompson submachine guns; caliber .50 antitankrifles; 2-inch and 3-inch mortars with a supply ofboth smoke and high-explosive shells; defensive(fragmentation) Mills hand grenades; offensive

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(plastic body, concussion type) hand grenades;smoke pots; Very pistols; "knuckle dusters" (brassknuckles); "Limpets" (magnetic, acid, high-ex-plosive mines), one type suitable for use againstships and another for use against tanks; and demoli-tions of all types. Each troop is equipped withBren guns, Thompson submachine guns, an antitankrifle, and a 2-inch mortar; normally each subsectionis allocated one Bren gun and a submachine gun,the allocation of the antitank rifle and the mortarbeing left to the discretion of the troop commander.The clothing and equipment furnished commandosincludes a variety of types. Normal clothing is"battle dress," a two-piece woolen garment, stoutshoes, and leggings. In colder weather a sleevelessbutton-up leather jacket which reaches the hips isworn over or under battle dress; a two-piece denimdungaree is also provided for wear over battle dressin damp or rainy weather. The men are furtherequipped with cliff-climbing and with hauling mate-rials, such as rubber-soled shoes and toggle-and-eyeropes. A wool undervest and a heavy-ribbed woolcardigan with long sleeves and turtle neck are alsoavailable for cold-weather wear. Overcoats arenever worn in training or in operations, even insevere weather. All clothing is designed and wornsolely with a view to comfort and utility under ac-tual operating conditions. No leather belts are worneither by officers or enlisted men; a fabric waist-belt is provided. In addition to his weapons, theindividual soldier generally receives such items as

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these: Tommy (individual) cooker; lensatic corn-pass; field rations; skis and poles; individual waistlife-belt ("Mae West"); Primus stove; 1-gallonthermal food-container; gas cape; wristlets. Troopsare equipped with two-man rubber boats; plywood(sectionalized) canoes; collapsible canvas canoes:bamboo and canvas stretchers; 2-inch scaling ropes;1-inch-mlesh heavy wire in rolls for crossing entan-glements; and toggle ropes. Transportation equip-ment for each commando includes Hillman pick-up1,500-pound trucks, motorcycles, and one 3-ton truck.Communication equipment for each troop includes anumber of portable radio sets, voice-and-key type,weighing 36 pounds with a voice range of 5 miles;semaphore flags; blinker guns; Very pistols andflares.

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SECTION IIIndependent (Commando) CompaniesInAustralia and New Zealand8. General.-The Australian and New ZealandArmies have several units which are the equivalentof commandos but are designated as independentcompanies, organized on a platoon instead of atroop basis. The total strength of each company is267 officers and enlisted men. The primary purposeof the independent companies is to educate remoteand undefended communities to cooperate in strik-ing back at any enemy that might land on Australia,New Zealand, and other nearby islands of the Brit-ish Empire. These companies will also be used inthe warfare of the southwest Pacific for manningnew bases and for reconnoitering. Eventually theywill also operate against the enemy in his own aswell as in friendly territory.In general, the same high standards are requiredfor personnel in the independent units as are de-manded of the British commando members.Trained soldiers, single and without dependents, be-tween 20 and 40 years of age, are selected. Theymust be of good physique and health and have cour-age, determination, intelligence, and individuality;and they must be amenable to strict discipline.

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Other requiiements are unassailable loyalty andreliability.As in Great Britain, the independent companiesreceive special training at an infantry training cen-ter that was organized for this purpose. The basiccourse of instruction takes 6 weeks, but this is fol-lowed by combined training with units of the RoyalAustralian Navy and the Royal Australian AirForce in places suitable for arnmphibious air opera-tions.9. Tables of Organization and Weapons.-The fol-lowing tables show the organization of the inde-pendent company, and its weapons:

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British Commandos Special Series No 1

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