Briefing Regional implications of Iraqi Kurdistan's quest for … · 2018. 7. 23. · contested by...

BriefingDecember 2016

EPRS | European Parliamentary Research ServiceAuthor: Eric Pichon, Maps: Eulalia ClarosMembers' Research Service

ENPE 595.836

Regional implications of IraqiKurdistan's quest for independence

SUMMARY

Strengthened by its victories over ISIL/Da'esh, the government of the autonomousregion of Kurdistan in Iraq has announced that it plans to organise a referendum onindependence. The deadline is still unclear, as political divisions have led the regionto an institutional stalemate. Negotiations with the federal Iraqi government willfocus on the territorial scope of the referendum. The Kurdish leaders want to includethe 'disputed areas', in particular Kirkuk, in the poll. However, Iraq is not keen to becut off from this oil-rich region, which is already at the heart of a dispute on thesharing of oil revenues. The status of Mosul after it is recaptured from ISIL/Da'esh isalso under discussion.

Even if the referendum were to take place and the 'yes' side won, it is not certain thata Kurdish state would emerge. Such a state would be weakened by internal divisionsand poor economic conditions. In addition, Syria, Turkey and Iran, neighbouringcountries that have complex relations with Iraqi Kurdistan, are worried that anindependent Kurdish state would encourage their own Kurdish populations to seekgreater autonomy. Yet, the perspective of a Greater Kurdistan is remote, since theregional Kurdish landscape is dominated by the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) andits affiliates, which do not share Iraqi Kurdish leaders' ideology or strategic alliances.

As for the EU and the great world powers, although they consider Iraqi Kurdistan tobe a reliable ally in the fight against ISIL/Da'esh (again recently in the battle for Mosul),they do not want to openly back the fragmentation of the Middle-East.

Masoud Barzani,president of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

In this briefing: Background and issue Territories and oil disputed with

Baghdad Political stalemate Iraqi Kurdistan's relations with its

neighbours International positions an independent

Iraqi Kurdistan Implications for the EU Further reading

EPRS Iraqi Kurdistan's quest for independence

Members' Research Service Page 2 of 8

Background and issueThe Kurds are the Middle East's fourth-largest ethnic group. They are mostly SunniMuslim,1 but have a strong cultural identity and traditions that are distinct from SunniArabs. Their aspiration for a state of their own has not been realised because it has neverserved the geopolitical interests of the great powers, and also because of politicaldivisions among the Kurds themselves. Kurds live mostly in mountainous areas, asisolated communities;2 political parties often have a local area of influence and vie tokeep or extend it, but none enjoys support in all Kurdish areas. After the First World War,Kurdish-inhabited areas were split between several countries (see Map 1). Nowadays,most of the 30 million Kurds live in the border areas of Iraq (5.5 million Kurds, of a totalof 32.6 million Iraqis), Turkey (14.7 million Kurds, of a total of 81.6 million inhabitants),Iran (8.1 million Kurds of a total of 80.8 million inhabitants) and Syria (1.7 million Kurds,of a total of 18 million inhabitants).3 In the four countries, Kurds have been subject tovarious levels of discrimination, triggering in turn rebellion and repression.

Map 1 – Proposed 'Greater Kurdistan'; Iraq: Kurdistan Region and disputed territories

Sources: ETH, 2014; USIP, 2011; Institut kurde de Paris & University of Columbia, 1998 (through Vox.com).

In Iraq, in the aftermath of Saddam Hussein's toppling, the United States directlyinfluenced the Iraqi Constitution of 2005. The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI, capital city:Erbil) was given considerable autonomy, as a reward for its role in helping to oust SaddamHussein. KRI is the only recognised 'region' in Iraq with its own government, parliament(see Figure 1), judicial powers and security forces. It has a draft constitution that has notyet been ratified by a popular vote. Despite KRI's broad autonomy, the federalgovernment retains exclusive powers, in particular in foreign policy and the distributionof oil revenues. Iraqi Kurdish leaders wish to unravel the ties with Iraq, and considerautonomy as a first step towards independence. Since 2014, the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional

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Government ('the KRG') has been declaring that it is actively preparing a referendum onindependence. In September 2016, Masoud Barzani, KRG president, implied it could takeplace within less than one year.4 However, several obstacles still have to be removedbefore this can be achieved.

Territories and oil resources disputed with BaghdadBarzani says discussions with the Iraqi government on the referendum are already takingplace. Baghdad has little legal basis to challenge Kurdistan's right to hold a referendum;the Iraqi Constitution's Preamble states that Iraq is a 'free union of people, land andsovereignty'. However, the geographical scope of the consultation is a contentious issue,because the KRG wants to include the inhabitants of the disputed territories in the poll.

Iraqi provinces neighbouring the Kurdistan Region are still disputed between Iraq'sfederal and Kurdish governments (see Map 2). Many Kurds live in these territories, butArabs and Turkmen also make up a large proportion of the population. The absence of acensus since 1957 and several waves of population resettlement ('arabisation' and'kurdification') mean that the exact share of the population is unclear. The inhabitants ofthe disputed territories should have been consulted on whether they wish to be part ofthe Kurdistan Region or to be administered by a different entity. According to Article 140of the Iraqi Constitution, this consultation on the status of the disputed territories shouldhave occurred no later than 2007, but it has never been carried out. Almost all of thedisputed territories are now de facto under Kurdish rule, since Kurdish troops, the'peshmerga' – which are also divided along the lines of the Kurdistan Democratic Party /Patriotic Union of Kurdistan political rivalry (political parties: see Figure 1) – retook themfrom ISIL/Da'esh. The KRG intends to consult the populationon the status of the disputed territories by its own means, inlieu of the central government. Two referendums (or a two-question referendum) are likely to take place in thedisputed territories: if a majority of the inhabitants endedup voting to join Kurdistan, they would be entitled to takepart in the referendum on Kurdistan independence. InKirkuk, one of the major disputed territories, this scenario iscontested by non-Kurdish parties, in particular Turkmen,who consider Kirkuk to be their historic capital, and areafraid they will be sidelined or discriminated against by aKurdish power. In June 2016, Baghdad proposed analternative referendum on the autonomy of Kirkuk withinIraq, based on a share of powers between Kurds, Turkmenand Arabs.

Iraq indeed has no intention of abandoning the region ofKirkuk, for it holds one of the biggest oilfields in the country,representing 10 % of Iraq's oil reserves. Iraqi Kurds alreadycontrol some of Kirkuk's wells and pipelines and in 2014brokered an oil deal with Turkey, bypassing the Iraqigovernment. The KRG and the federal government arearguing over the distribution of oil revenues.5 In the run-upto the battle of Mosul, a 50/50 sharing of Kirkuk oil revenueswas agreed, allegedly brokered by the USA.

The battle for Mosul

On 17 October 2016, Iraqi forcesand the international coalitionlaunched a military operation torecapture Iraq's second-largest cityfrom ISIL/Da'esh. Iraqi Kurdishforces are involved in the assault.Before providing this help, Erbilnegotiated a better arrangementon oil revenues. According toBarzani, talks on the battle forMosul also addressed the futurestatus of Mosul, where the KRGseeks to gain greater influence.(The Mosul area is not presentlyconsidered to be a 'disputed terri-tory' but is claimed by both Kurdishand Shia militias). Kurdishpeshmerga agreed with the Iraqigovernment not to enter the city ofMosul, but Barzani allegedly saidthey would refuse to retreat fromthe areas around the city they haveretaken from ISIL/Da'esh.

http://cabinet.gov.krd/a/d.aspx?s=040000&l=12&a=51812http://www.france24.com/en/f24-interview/20160909-peshmerga-iraqi-forces-agree-mosul-battle-plan-kurdish-leader-tells-france-24http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/f4a2f800-826d-45da-8866-443d35ddc107/%E2%80%98Kurds-broke-taboo-in-Iraq--discussed-independence-with-Baghdad%E2%80%99http://www.basnews.com/index.php/en/news/kurdistan/281479https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iraq_2005?lang=enhttp://www.usip.org/publications/iraqs-disputed-territorieshttps://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/iq350a.pdfhttp://time.com/3182347/kurds-sunni-arabs-iraq-isis-erbil/https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iraq_2005?lang=enhttp://iswresearch.blogspot.be/2016/10/iraq-control-of-terrain-map-october-7.htmlhttp://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28738975http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/25052016http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37656019http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/d34941b8-c06f-46fe-a634-43b36ea72472/Turkmen--Arabs-reject-Kirkuk-inclusion-in-Kurdistan-referendumhttp://unpo.org/downloads/1300.pdfhttp://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkmen-iraq-between-rock-and-hard-place-1460749597http://www.france24.com/en/f24-interview/20160909-peshmerga-iraqi-forces-agree-mosul-battle-plan-kurdish-leader-tells-france-24http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/kirkuk-kurdistan-iraq.htmlhttp://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/09/mosul-liberation-iraq-civil-war-214256http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/kirkuk-kurdistan-iraq.htmlhttp://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/09/mosul-liberation-iraq-civil-war-214256http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/kirkuk-kurdistan-iraq.htmlhttp://carnegieendowment.org/2016/05/19/mosul-after-islamic-state-kurdistan-region-s-strategy-pub-63615http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37907801http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/08/kirkuk-kurdistan-region-oil-economy-iraq-government.htmlhttp://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-and-iraqs-kurds-agree-50-year-energy-deal-112046143http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/11/arab-kurd-tensions-simmer-shadow-mosul-campaign-161122055709252.htmlhttp://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-usa-mosul-exclusive-idUSKCN12314Z



Oil revenues represent more than 90 % of the Iraqi central and Kurdish regional budgets.The KRG estimates it holds 45 billion barrels of oil reserves; but, according to theInternational Energy Agency, these reserves would amount to no more than 4 billionbarrels if the disputed territories were not included in the calculation. KRI's economyalready faces uncertain revenues and is under pressure from ISIL/Da'esh attacks – theautonomous region hosts more than 1.5 million Syrian refugees and displaced Iraqis.6Without Kirkuk, the economic viability of an independent Kurdistan would be at stake.

Political stalemate in the Kurdistan Region of IraqInternal political strife in the Kurdistan Region is currently hindering the setting-up of areferendum. The Kurdish Electoral Commission declared itself ready to organise thepractical aspects of a poll in all parts of the region. However, the independencereferendum cannot be held without a sound political consensus: the wording of thequestion needs to be approved by the Kurdistan Parliament in Iraq (KPI).

Figure 1– Kurdistan Region of Iraq: main political parties; regional parliament and governmentMain political parties

The main political parties in the Kurdistan Parliament are:

- the KDP, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (Partiya Demokrat a Kurdistanê), led by Masoud Barzani. Itdraws its main support from Dohuk and the region's capital Erbil; it has fought for independence since1946; it favours a free-market economy.

- the PUK, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (Yekîtiya Nîştimanî ya Kurdistanê), led by Jalal Talabani. It isa splinter (1975) from the KDP, based mainly in the area of Suleymanyia; it has a leftist political stanceand is a member party of Socialist International. The KDP and PUK are long-standing rivals, and madedivergent strategic alliances before uniting against Saddam Hussein in 2002.

- Gorran, the Movement for Change (Bzutinewey Gorran), led by Neshirvan Mustafa. Formed in 2009 byformer PUK members to challenge the power-sharing arrangement between PUK and the KDP. Its mainsupport base is in Suleymanyia and Kirkuk.

- Political Islam is also represented in the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament but is still in the minority.Proponents have a conservative stance on social issues, and fight for a less secular and lesspresidentialist political system.

The Kurdistan Parliament in Iraq

Picture by Zirguezi (CC0 public domain, 2014)

The Kurdistan Parliament in Iraq is elected every four years bypopular vote (last election: 2013)

KDP Seats: 38

Gorran 24

PUK 18

Islamic Union 10

IslamicBrotherhood

6

Other 4

(R) Reserved for minorities(Turkmen, Assyrian,Armenian)

11

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)The KRG is a coalition government, where the main parliamentary parties are represented. KDP and the PUK used toshare ministerial and high official positions; but since 2013, when Gorran won more votes than the PUK in theParliamentary elections, power-sharing arrangements have been difficult. A government could not be formed until June2014, when Barzani's nephew (KDP) was appointed prime minister, Talabani's son (PUK) nominated deputy primeminister, and Gorran given ministerial portfolios.Main sources: Rubin Center, 2013, Kurdistan Regional Government, 2016.

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Most Iraqi Kurdish parties publicly support independence, but the Parliament has beenin recess for more than one year. The reasons for the deadlock lie in the current positionof Masoud Barzani, the president of the Kurdistan Region. A presidential election shouldhave taken place in 2015,7 but could not be held because of the fight against ISIL/Da'esh.Barzani then stayed in power, although the opposition refused to approve the extensionof his mandate, unless more power was given to the parliament. The unrest extended togovernmental level. In October 2015, ministers from Gorran, the main opposition party(political parties: see Figure 1), were ousted and the Parliament's speaker (YoussefMuhammad, Gorran) was barred from entering Erbil. Opposition parties are insisting onprior reactivation of the parliament before planning a referendum. For opponents, theurge for a referendum is merely a means to restore Barzani's contested legitimacy, evenif the latter pledged to step down once independence has been achieved. There is noclear legal basis for resolving the issue, as the Kurdistan Region has only a draftconstitution and no constitutional court. Negotiations to break the political deadlockhave not succeeded so far.8 The current stalemate reveals how the Kurdistan Region inIraq is politically divided, with the risk Kurdish parties fall back on their respectivestrongholds (see Map 2). Experts fear this might add to regional instability.

Iraqi Kurdistan's relations with its neighboursKurdish geopolitics are quite a complex matter. The fight against ISIL/Da'esh and the civilwar in Syria, which have blurred the borders and destabilised central governments, havecontributed to the empowerment of the Kurdish movements, armed by the anti-ISIL/Da'esh coalition. They have also aggravated factional conflicts: the KurdistanDemocratic Party (KDP), Iraq's main Kurdish party, and Turkey's Kurdistan Workers' Party(PKK) are vying for supremacy over 'Greater Kurdistan'.

TurkeyRenewed violence between the PKK and the Turkishgovernment puts the KRG's kinship solidarity at oddswith its strategic alliance. Turkey's Kurds do not enjoythe same autonomy as their Iraqi fellows, although inthe 2000s, reforms progressively lifted the ban on theuse of the Kurdish language. By contrast, IraqiKurdistan and Turkey have developed close economicties: Turkey is the main supplier of goods to theKurdistan Region of Iraq, and buys oil directly from theKRG, outraging both the Iraqi government and the PKK.Despite this relationship, Turkey, which also wants toplacate the Iraqi Turkmen community, is officially for aunity government in Iraq.

The Kurds of Iraq and Turkey have fought togetheragainst ISIL/Da'esh, but Barzani has kept a firm stanceagainst the PKK, notably because the latter has gainedinfluence in Iraq and supremacy in Syria's Kurdistan.

SyriaIn Syria, successive regimes resettled Syrian Kurds on a massive scale in other parts of thecountry, or deprived them of their Syrian nationality. Since the beginning of the civil war,Kurdish forces defending the northern territories against ISIL/Da'esh have been able toset up de facto autonomous Kurdish provinces, under the name 'Rojava' or 'West' (see

The PKK the Kurdistan Workers' Party(Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan), wasfounded in 1978. It has a Marxist stanceand has been involved in several wavesof guerilla war against Turkey since1984, the latest ongoing since July2015. Its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, in jailsince 1999, recently renewed a call forpeace talks. The PKK is listed as aterrorist organisation by Turkey, the EUand the USA. The legal Turkish KurdishParty HDP (founded in 2013) distancesitself from armed violence but isaccused by the government of linkswith the PKK. The PKK has bases inMount Qandil and Mount Sinjar in Iraq.(see Map 2).

http://ekurd.net/parties-barzani-referendum-2016-06-26http://ekurd.net/crisis-over-kurdistan-presidency-favors-barzani-2015-08-27http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=61286http://www.voanews.com/content/political-stalemate-in-kurdistan-adds-to-regional-instability/2931613.htmlhttp://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/12/us-iraq-kurds-idUSKCN0S60HX20151012http://www.nrttv.com/En/Details.aspx?Jimare=10565http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/02/kurdish-referendum-barzani-political-survival-iraq-160204111835869.htmlhttp://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/03/turkey-iraq-syria-kurds-massoud-barzani-interview.htmlhttp://www.iconnectblog.com/2015/11/a-constitutional-crisis-in-a-land-without-a-constitution-presidential-terms-and-iraqi-kurdistan/http://www.iconnectblog.com/2015/11/a-constitutional-crisis-in-a-land-without-a-constitution-presidential-terms-and-iraqi-kurdistan/https://ekurd.net/barzani-crisis-iraqi-kurdistan-2016-10-07http://www.usip.org/publications/2015/10/21/rare-stability-risk-in-iraq-s-kurdish-region-and-elsewhere-middle-easthttps://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/schrodingers-kurds-transnational-kurdish-geopolitics-age-shifting-bordershttps://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/arming-iraq-s-kurds-fighting-inviting-conflicthttp://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2015/03/20153884927156246.htmlhttp://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/06/magazine-dreams-kurdistan-150625093200072.htmlhttp://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflict-tracker/p32137http://www.pkkonline.com/en/http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/210920162http://cabinet.gov.krd/a/d.aspx?s=040000&l=12&a=54994http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/kurdistan-turkey.htmhttp://blog.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/2016/07/20/turkey-s-pkk-conflict-the-rising-toll/http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/turkey-and-the-krg-signs-of-booming-economic-ties-infographichttp://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/turkey-and-the-krg-signs-of-booming-economic-ties-infographichttps://emam.revues.org/1035http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/jailed-pkk-leader-calls-negotiation-first-statement-almost-two-years-496070383http://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Kurdistan-Oil-Exports-Revenue-Hits-US328M-In-September.htmlhttp://www.mfa.gov.tr/pkk.en.mfahttp://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/terrorist-list/http://www.voanews.com/a/iraq-seeks-arbitration-in-dispute-with-turkey-over-kurdish-oil-sale/1923074.htmlhttp://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/8cfac8e0-3dcd-431d-a587-45e4b5cf0d62/KRG-to-PKK--stop-sabotaging-pipelinehttp://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htmhttp://www.middleeasteye.net/news/analysis-inter-kurdish-tensions-point-toward-hdp-pkk-divide-173002852http://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2016/06/03/turkey-only-state-willing-to-protect-turkmen-rights-says-iraqi-turkmen-front-mphttp://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-turkey-kurds-idUSKBN0F51RU20140630http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/11/turkish-pm-opposition-hdp-funding-terror-161106125444256.htmlhttp://uk.businessinsider.com/kurds-are-divided-2015-7?r=US&IR=Thttp://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/gte_wp_12.pdfhttp://minorityrights.org/minorities/kurds-5/http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/67515/1/Rojavaat4.pdf



Map 2). A power-sharing deal was agreed in 2012 between the Kurdistan National Council– a shallow coalition of other Syrian Kurdish parties backed by Iraqi Kurdistan – and thePYD (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, Syria's Kurdish Democratic Union Party), but was neverapplied; the PYD and affiliated armed forces have taken control of most Syrian Kurdishareas (see Map 2). The PYD is accused by both the KRG and Turkey of being an affiliate ofthe PKK and between March and June 2016, Iraqi Kurdistan temporarily closed its bordersto Syrian peshmerga. It is unlikely that Syrian Kurds would join forces with Iraqi Kurdistanto claim independence; like the KRG in Iraq, Syrian Kurds are rather trying to enforce theirpositions within Syria for a post-ISIL/Da'esh era, as their involvement in the battle forRaqqa shows.

Map 2 – Control of terrain by Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria, as of August 2016;location of oil and gas fields

Sources: Institute for the Study of War, 2016 (for Iraq); The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2016 (for Syria);US Energy Information Administration, through Vox.com, 2015 (for oil and gas).

IranIran does not support Kurdish independence, but is influential enough to help improverelations between the KRG and the Iraqi government, in order to contain its own Kurdishinsurgency and prevent Saudi Arabia from gaining influence. Iran's Kurds do not benefitfrom specific political rights or representation and are also discriminated against asSunnis. To fight against ISIL/Da'esh, Iranian Kurdish factions joined forces and becamemilitarily empowered. They have now turned their arms on the Iranian regime, which isbrutally repressing them. Iranian Kurdish fighters from the PJAK (Partiya Jiyana Azad aKurdistanê, Kurdistan Free Life Party, considered an affiliate of PKK) are based in IraqiKurdistan (see Map 2), but their cause is not supported by the KRG. Iraqi Kurdish leadersare not willing to offend the Shia regime in Teheran, all the more since the two entitiesare currently discussing an oil pipeline from Iraqi Kurdistan to Iran.

http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/25/syria-s-kurds-must-seek-regional-cooperation/dwgl?reloadFlag=1http://www.limesonline.com/cartaceo/i-curdi-di-siria-fabbricano-lindipendenza?prv=truehttp://www.limesonline.com/cartaceo/i-curdi-di-siria-fabbricano-lindipendenza?prv=truehttps://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote32-Barfi.pdfhttp://warontherocks.com/2016/09/turkeys-kurdish-red-line-in-syria-and-the-fight-against-isil/http://warontherocks.com/2016/09/turkeys-kurdish-red-line-in-syria-and-the-fight-against-isil/http://ekurd.net/iraq-syria-kurdistan-border-reopens-2016-06-08http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-uncovered/u-s-backed-assault-syria-s-raqqa-what-you-need-n679036http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-uncovered/u-s-backed-assault-syria-s-raqqa-what-you-need-n679036http://iswresearch.blogspot.be/search/label/Iraqhttps://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Maps/Syria Conflict/PYDexpansionNorthernSyria-HiRes.pdfhttp://www.vox.com/a/maps-explain-the-middle-easthttps://epthinktank.eu/2016/05/10/iraq-iran-relations-following-the-nuclear-deal/http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2016/04/160420105055207.htmlhttp://www.unpo.org/downloads/321.pdfhttp://www.mei.edu/content/article/iran%E2%80%99s-uneasy-relationship-its-sunni-minoritieshttp://www.mei.edu/content/article/iran%E2%80%99s-uneasy-relationship-its-sunni-minoritieshttps://www.stratfor.com/analysis/iranian-kurds-return-armshttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/pjak.htmhttp://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/16082016http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/iraq-kurds-iran-eye-oil-deal-160621072705742.html



International positions on an independent Iraqi KurdistanIn the current context, the international community is reluctant to back the creation of anew state in the region. Iraqi Kurdistan's claim is reinforced by the fact that it has provena more reliable ally of the Coalition against ISIL/Da'esh than the Iraqi army. Fragmentationof the Middle East might add to instability and would not guarantee the respect ofminority rights however: the KRG is considered a model of religious tolerance, but isaccused of discrimination by non-Kurdish minorities. Regional autonomy within theexisting borders remains the preferred option for the main international players.

United StatesThe US government is officially opposed to Kurdish independence and favours Iraq'sunity. Nevertheless, it has long been a supporter of the Kurdish cause. The KRG has anoffice in Washington 'which acts as an embassy of sorts' and has direct diplomaticrelations with the White House: in May 2015, for instance, Masoud Barzani and KRGleaders visited President Barack Obama in Washington. In the framework of the fightagainst ISIL/Da'esh, Kurdish troops have benefited from a US 'train and equip'programme. The political stalemate is a cause of concern for US officials.

RussiaAlthough Moscow has more apparent links with Syrian Kurds, Russia also delivers armsto Iraqi Kurds to support their fight against ISIL/Da'esh. Some experts see it as acompetition with the USA and Turkey in the area. Despite its strategic alliances with theKurds, Russia firmly supports the territorial integrity of the countries in the region.

IsraelMoving against the tide, Israel's prime minister said in an interview in June 2014 that IraqiKurds deserved an independent state, a call taken up in 2016 by his justice minister. Israeland the Iraqi Kurds have had relations since the mid-1960s, first linked by their oppositionto the Iraqi state, now by their common need to contain the advance of ISIL/Da'esh. Thereare also economic considerations: Israel imports a large part of its oil from the Kurdistanregion of Iraq (19 million barrels between May and mid-August 2015 corresponding to77 % of Israeli needs). Revenues from these sales in turn finance the peshmerga. TheKRG's links with Israel however complicate its quest for support from other countries inthe region.

Implications for the EUThe KRG, which has an office in Brussels, is considered to bean important interlocutor for the EU regional strategy in Iraqand Syria, in particular for the delivery of EU aid to refugeesand for the fight against ISIL/Da'esh. EU representatives haveexpressed concerns that the political stalemate could 'distractfrom the critical issue of defeating Da'esh'. At the same time,the EU remains committed to Iraq's unity. For these reasons,the EU sometimes acts as a mediator between Erbil andBaghdad. In 2014, the EU Council approved the delivery ofweapons to the Kurdish troops by some Member states 'withthe consent of the Iraqi national authorities'.

The European Parliament hasraised concerns about Iraqiminorities, including the Kurds, onseveral occasions. Parliament hasalso encouraged cooperation withthe Kurdish forces in the fightagainst ISIL/Da'esh. In July 2014Parliament 'took note' of theannouncement of a referendumfor independence, and called forrespect for non-Kurdishpopulations in the process.

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/551330/EPRS_BRI(2015)551330_EN.pdfhttp://tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/religion-geopolitics/commentaries/opinion/kurdistan-spotlight-beacon-tolerant-pluralismhttp://www.voanews.com/a/minorities-in-iraq-kurdistan-push-for-greater-political-voice/2910051.htmlhttp://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdfhttp://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdfhttp://new.krg.us/relations/http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/08/kurds-lobbie-congress.htmlhttps://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/05/05/readout-president-and-vice-presidents-meeting-iraqi-kurdistan-region-prehttps://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/05/05/readout-president-and-vice-presidents-meeting-iraqi-kurdistan-region-prehttp://m.state.gov/md246199.htmhttp://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/231120155http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/05/russia-syria-iraq-kurds-quest-autonomy.htmlhttp://rbth.com/defence/2016/03/18/russia-delivers-first-weapons-supplies-to-iraqi-kurds_576809http://rbth.com/defence/2016/03/18/russia-delivers-first-weapons-supplies-to-iraqi-kurds_576809http://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-pursues-ties-with-kurds-to-keep-foothold-in-region-1461239887https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ifri_rnv_85_eng_the_kurds_a_channel_of_russian_influence_in_the_middle_east_delanoe_june_2015_0.pdfhttp://tass.com/politics/857770https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/29/israel-prime-minister-kurdish-independencehttp://www.timesofisrael.com/shaked-calls-for-an-independent-kurdistan/http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/03/18/israel-and-the-kurds-love-by-proxy/https://www.ft.com/content/150f00cc-472c-11e5-af2f-4d6e0e5eda22http://dfr.gov.krd/p/p.aspx?p=210&l=12&r=364http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/search/search.do?searchTab=y&snippet=true&:country_s=Iraq&:parliamentaryTerm=8th+term+2014+-+2019&lang=en&dismax=yhttp://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9105-2016-INIT/en/pdfhttp://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/search/search.do?searchTab=y&snippet=true&:country_s=Iraq&:parliamentaryTerm=8th+term+2014+-+2019&lang=en&dismax=yhttp://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P8-TA-2015-0071https://www.ft.com/content/150f00cc-472c-11e5-af2f-4d6e0e5eda22http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P8-TA-2014-0011http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/144311.pdfhttp://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/iraq/press_corner/all_news/news/2015/02112015_01_en.htmhttp://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert_37_Kurds.pdfhttp://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert_37_Kurds.pdf



Further readingGunes, C. and Lowe, R. The Impact of the Syrian War on Kurdish Politics Across the MiddleEast, Chatham House, London, 2015.

Hassan, K., Kurdistan's Politicized Society Confronts a Sultanistic System, Carnegie MiddleEast Center, Washington DC, 2015.

Jahn, E., 'On the way to two, three, or four Kurdistans?', International Politics: PoliticalIssues under Debate, Vol. 1., Springer, Berlin, 2015, pp. 139-154.

Romano, D. and Gurses, M. (ed.), Conflict, democratization, and the Kurds in the MiddleEast: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2014.

Voller, Y., The Kurdish liberation movement in Iraq: from insurgency to statehood,Routledge, London, 2014.

Endnotes1 With the exception of Yazidi, and Shia Failis and Shabaks.2 Kurds do not speak a common language: some speak only the language of their home country, and there are several

Kurdish dialects (mainly Sorani, written largely in a Perso-Arabic script, and Kurmanji, written largely in Latin script).3 Council on Foreign Relations estimates, based on CIA World Factbook 2014.4 In previous declarations, he had hoped it would take place before the end of 2016, 'if Allah so wishes'.5 The Iraqi constitution states that Iraq's oil revenues shall be distributed 'in a fair manner in proportion to the

population'. According to this rule, the KRG is entitled to 17 % of the country's oil revenues, provided Kurdish oil isexported through the Iraqi state organisation. But since 2014, the federal government has not given the KRG its share,while the KRG has failed to provide Baghdad with the agreed amount of oil.

6 'In early 2015, the total number of refugees and IDPs [Internally Displaced Persons] added up to 1.5 million in KRI[Kurdistan Region of Iraq].' in The Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Assessing the Economic and Social Impact of the Syrian Conflictand Isis, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, 2015).

7 Masoud Barzani was elected by the Parliament in 2005; in 2009, he was re-elected for four years by a direct vote. In2013, a controversial law voted by the Kurdish Parliament extended his mandate until 20 August 2015.

8 The situation has stalled, because Barzani's party, the KDP (for the main political parties see Figure 1), does not havean absolute majority in Parliament, and the opposition is too divided to challenge Barzani or propose an alternativecandidate. Tensions have at times escalated into fighting between supporters of each side. Several rounds ofnegotiations on the Parliament's reactivation and the selection of a successor to Barzani until elections take placehave failed (as of 20 November 2016).

Disclaimer and CopyrightThe content of this document is the sole responsibility of the author and any opinions expressed therein donot necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament. It is addressed to the Membersand staff of the EP for their parliamentary work. Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposesare authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and the European Parliament is given prior notice andsent a copy.

© European Union, 2016.

Photo credits: © European Union 2011 PE-EP (EP Committee on Foreign Affairs Discussion with President ofthe Autonomous Kurdish Government in Iraq, 2009)

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