October 2006 1

Cyber Security Research Plans for aSecure Aircraft Data Network (SADN)

NITRD HCSS, Aviation Software Systems: Design for Certification

Kevin HarnettVince Rakauskas

DOT/Volpe Center Infrastructure Protection and Operations Division

October 2006 2

Briefing Agenda

• Background

• Aircraft Data Network (ADN) Cyber Security Issues

• ADN-Related Program/Systems Assessment

• Gap Analysis

• Recommendations

October 2006 3

Task 1: Baseline SADN Cyber Security Research Requirement

• Discussions with the FAA, AC/avionics manufacturers and others

• Document candidate SADN R&D technology research areas (focus on B787 and A380/350)

• Understand current Boeing 787 and Airbus 380 ADN cyber security issues

• Provide “lessons learned” to apply to cyber security requirements for the Next Generation Aircraft

Task 2: Leverage Related SADN Program

• Investigate direction of related ADN initiatives (e.g. FAA’s SSDS and the AEEC’s SEC groups)

• Leverage cyber security requirements for potential SADN R&D “partnerships”

Volpe Center Task (from NASA Glenn Research Center - GRC)

Interviews conducted with: NASA FAA (AVS, AIR-120, ATO,

ARD) Joint Planning and

Development Office (JPDO) U.S. Air Force/ESC DoD Technical Support

Working Group (TSWG) DHS ARINC/AEEC Aircraft manufacturers

(Boeing) Avionics manufacturers

(Honeywell) Airlines (United) Sensis Corporation

October 2006 4

AircraftControl

CabinServices

PsgrDevices

IFEADN

External802.11

Broadband

CrewDevices

Internal802.11 Internal

802.11

Vulnerabilities

Airlines will use Broadband Internet connectivity to support passenger services then use existing

bandwidth to support operations.

Revenue from passenger services provides funding for

increased infrastructure costs

Newvulnerabilities

are added

ADN Cyber Security Issues

Technology Advances enable new, cost-effective

connectivity between on-board Networks and Airline Ground

Networks

VHF/HFSATCOM

October 2006 5

External802.11

Broadband

AircraftControl

CabinServices

PsgrDevices

IFEADN

CrewDevices

Internal802.11 Internal

802.11

VHF/HFSATCOM

Mission-critical systems are potentially

susceptible to attack

ADN Cyber Security Issues

October 2006 6

• These cyber security vulnerabilities are not only new but have not been anticipated.

• Since it has not been a concern in the past, the existing Code of Federal Regulations does not specifically address cyber security vulnerabilities

• Consequently, there are no existing Policies, Certification Criteria or Procedures that provide assurances that cyber security vulnerabilities will not cause unsafe flight conditions

• Cyber security vulnerabilities in the ADN will be irrevocably bound to the safety of flight.

• Unmitigated, these vulnerabilities will have a definite negative effect on the safety of flight.

ADN Cyber Security Issues

October 2006 7

One Potential Solution

October 2006 8

Key ADN-Related Program/Systems

FAA• AIR-120 SDSS Program (Network Security and Safety Aircraft LAN Study) • Automated Airborne Flight Alert System (AAFAS)• AVS Boeing 787 Security Issue Papers (domain separation and EDS)• Airborne Internet (A.I.)

Industry• ARINC/AEEC) Subcommittees (particularly ADN and SEC)• ATA E-Biz's Digital Security Working Group (DSWG) and Certipath• Eurocae's WG-72 (Aeronautical System Security) Working Group

DoD• United States Air Force Airborne Network (AN) Project • USAF Multi-sensor Command and Control Aircraft (MC2A)• Coast Guard C-130J• DoD Global Information Grid (JPDO)• Technical Support Working Group (TSWG)

October 2006 9

Other ADN-Related Program/Systems

FAA• GCNSS Network-enabled Operations (NEO) Airspace Security Demo• ISS R&D Program Planning Team (PPT)

NASA• Mobile Communications Network Architecture (MCNA)• ADS-B Security Project• Aircraft Centric Data and Information Communications Systems Security

• Assessment report• Policy report

Industry• Transatlantic Secure Collaboration Program-TSCP • Wireless Communications Consortium

DoD• TWIC (& HPSD-12) - logical access smart cards• DHS's Computer Security Information Assurance (CSIA) R&D Working Group

October 2006 10

JPDO NGATS Integrated Plan, Dec 2005

• NGATS vision is to “harmonize and integrate” the Civilian and Military ATC systems

• System-wide safety and security monitoring allows analysis of failure, threat, and vulnerability trends in real-time, based on data gathered throughout the system

• NGATS allow more creative sharing of airspace capacity for civil, LEA, DoD, and commercial users through access to operational information 

Next Generation Air Transportation System

JPDO NGATS goals can not be possible without “secure and safe Aircraft Data Network (ADN) and applications…”

October 2006 11

DoDDHSTSA

FAA/NASA

NGATS

Aviation Industry

UndiscoveredInterdependencies

Partner & Leverage

Gap Analysis

Potential Gaps

Potential Overlaps

October 2006 12

Leverage DoD GIG Activities° Leverage USAF GIG activities to develop a Airborne Network

(AN) to support NGATS and the AN Information Assurance (IA) Program

° DoD/USAF have legacy (Joint-STARS, AWACS,) and new “Next-Generation Weapon Systems” (e.g. USAF MC2A, CG C-130J) with IP-based Airborne platforms with security concerns

° Opportunities for DoD /DHS and FAA to partner on “joint” SADN requirements for Secure and Net-centric ADNs 

SADN could impact and support several overlapping FAA A/G Demonstration Projects (NEO, SWIM, AAFAS, and AI)

Recommend Government Oversight and Participation on three key ADN Security Working Groups

° AEEC SEC ° ATA DSWG° EUROCAE WG-72

ADN-Related Program/SystemsConclusions

October 2006 13

• There are many activities underway but the ultimate technical solutions remain to be determined

• Determining solutions that will be viable for all stakeholders will be a challenge

• Additional Research and Development will need to be funded which must include the full range of stakeholder issues

• Lack of direction, oversight and coordination among the ADN-related FAA, DoD, and DHS and Aviation Industry Security Work

• Several redundant efforts and overlaps (but the greater consequence is the potential for gaps, conflicting results and undiscovered interdependencies)

• Non-government (commercial) projects driven by cost likely to overlook elements of security needed by the Federal Government

• Much potential for gain through a managed approach

Gap Analysis – Conclusions

October 2006 14

SADN Policy

SADN Certification Criteria

Net-centric Security Architecture/Services

PKI/Key Management

Air to Ground Communications

Perimeter and Boundary Defense

Identification & Authentication

EFB and Other Laptop Computers

Auditing, IDS and Incident Response

Malware

EDS of FLS and Maintenance Procedures

Policy

Certification

Infrastructure

Security

Mechanisms

Maintenance

Monitor, Deter, Detect, Respond

Research & Development topicsSecurity Concept

Research & Development TopicsRecommendation

October 2006 15

Key R&D Topics

SADN Policy

SADN Certification Criteria

Auditing, IDS and Incident Response

October 2006 16

Our Progress

Seek Opportunities For Collaboration

US Air Force Airborne Network (AN) IA Project

UK / US Workshop On Aeronautical Telecommunications Networks (ATN) Security

Boeing 787 Security Assessment

Technical Support Working Group (TSWG)

October 2006 17

Our R&D Recommendationsfor You

Gain An Awareness Of Others Activities

Understand The Goals Of The Stakeholders

Seek Collaborative Opportunities For SADN R&D Projects

Keep The Goals Of NGATS In Mind

October 2006 18

Our R&D Recommendationsfor You

Security is

“Built In”

Not

“Bolted On”

October 2006 19

Contacts

• Kevin Harnett, Volpe Center Cyber Security Program Manger– Email: harnett@volpe.dot.gov– Phone: 617-699-7086

• Vince Rakauskas, Security Engineer– Email: rakauskas@comcast.net– Phone: 508-339-0280

October 2006 20

Acronyms

AAFAS Automated Airborne Flight Alert System ADN Aircraft Data NetworkARP Aerospace Recommended PracticeAEEC Airlines Electronic Engineering CommitteeAI Airborne InternetARD FAA Chief Technology Officer (R&D)ATA Air Transport AssociationC-130J Coast Guard C-130J HelicopterCC Common CriteriaCONOPs Concept of OperationsCSIA Computer Security Information AssuranceDSWG Digital Security Working Group DSWGEDS Electronic Distribution of SoftwareEFB Electronic Flight BagFLS Field Loadable Software GIG-BE Global Information Grid - Bandwidth ExpansionHSPD-12 Homeland Security Presidential Directive - 12IDS Intrusion Detection SystemIFE In-Flight Entertainment

October 2006 21

Acronyms

IPS Intrusion Protection SystemISS Information System SecurityJPDO Joint Planning and Development OfficeMC2A Multi-sensor Command and Control Aircraft MCNA Mobile Communications Network ArchitectureNEO Network Enabled OperationsNGATS Next Generation Air Transportation SystemPKI Public Key InfrastructurePO Program OfficePPT Program Planning TeamRTCA Radio Technical Commission for Aviation SADN Secure Aircraft Data NetworkSCAP Security Certification and Authorization PackageSDSS Software and Digital Systems System ST&E Security Test and EvaluationSWIM System Wide Information ManagementTSCP Transatlantic Secure Collaboration ProgramTSWG Technical Support Working GroupTWIC Transportation Worker Identification Credential