Breakdown in the Andes

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Breakdown in the AndesAuthor(s): Michael ShifterSource: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 2004), pp. 126-138Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20034072

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Breakdown in the AndesMichael Shifter

FIRE ON THE MOUNTAINTWICE in recentmonths, the historically troubledbut chronically neglectednations fthe "southernrescent"ftheAndes-Peru, Ecuador,and Bolivia-have made internationalheadlines. First, inApril, an angry

mob set on themayor of Ilave, a small city in Peru's impoverished highlands, and lynched him for corruption.Two months later, the same fatebefell themayor of a town in the Bolivian high plains: he was publiclylynched and his body set on fire, also for alleged misuse of public funds.

With adrug-fueled armed conflict raging inColombia and apoliticalcrisisplaguing il-richVenezuela, evelopmentsn thesouthernndesfallunder the radar fmost U. S. policymakers and outside observers.Therecentautos-da-fe, however, should serve as remindersof the region's urbulent past andwarnings of a possible return to violence and instabilityin thenear future.Washington has responded to theprospect of renewedturbulencewith amix of indifference and fatalism: indifferencebecausePeru, Ecuador, and Bolivia are considered largelyunimportant toU.S.interests;fatalism because all toomany view them ashopeless anyway.

And indeed, there ismuch toworry about in all three cases-broken nations,with imminent political crises and other significant problems in need of urgent attention.They are all still struggling tobecomecoherent,well-functioning states.The social, ethnic, andgeographic divides thatpredate their founding continue towiden, and recentchangeshave created a profound and unsustainable gulf between the politicalsphereand the restof society.

MICHAEL SHIFTER isVice President forPolicy at the Inter-AmericanDialogue andAdjunct Professor of Latin American Studies atGeorgetownUniversity's School of Foreign Service.[126]


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Breakdown in theAndesThe clearest sign of political instabilityis thedesperationofthe region'sleaders.In the past fiveyears,public outrage-stemming from some combinationof unacceptableorruption,alteringconomicreforms, nddeepening ocialdistress, nd inflamedy opposition emagogues-has

unseated apresident ineachof the threenations.Today, thepolitical survival f Peru'slejandro oledo,Ecuador's ucioGutierrez, ndBolivia'sCarlosMesa is similarly indoubt.All three lackany prior experience inelected office, andpublicmistrust of political leadersand institutionshasmadegoverning xceedinglyifficult.oledoandGutierrez,nparticular,took officewith considerable opularityand stronganticorruptionplatforms.Their approvalhas since sunk to single digits inpublic opinionpolls, and now, dogged by corruption charges themselves, they appearuncertain about how to go forward.Their destroyed credibility offers abiting commentary on the region'sbleak political landscape.

Other developments in theAndes, however, offer ameasure ofhope for progress toward more open and democratic politics. Thetremors in the region have ledpreviously excluded groups,with newfound access to information and technology, to press for a real role innational politics. Especially inBolivia and Ecuador, indigenous populations are increasingly isible and politicallymobilized. Theirheightenedexpectations nddemands-entirely legitimate nd longoverdue-carry profounddemocratizing otential.

But this promise will be frustrated unless political leaders in thesenationsarepreparedoreform ossilizednstitutions,ncludingoliticalparties and justice systems-*and unlessWashington supports suchefforts, elping ommitted eformersndworkinginconcert ith otheroutsideactors.Otherwise,potentially ositivetrends ill putunmanageable strainson brittle governance structures.Should they erupt, thesocial volcanoes in Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia will spreaddislocation,lawlessness,and insecurity in a continent alreadyon edge.

THE REAL LIFE OF ALEJANDRO TOLEDOPERUVIANShave long pondered a question posed byMario VargasLlosa inhis 1969 novel Conversation in theCathedral:"When, precisely,did Peru mess up?"Even before lastApril's lynching in Ilave dramaticallyrevealedhecountry's olatility, crisishadbeensimmering

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for some time. Yet only when; ? it exploded into such brutalitydid Peru's political class take note.raanta,,AtXulSC


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Breakdown in theAndesbroadresonancenda reflectionf Peru'sncreasinglyluid olitics-thefirstcracks n thetraditional ominance f anarrow, rivileged lite.Toledo'selection followedmore thanadecadeof rulebyAlbertoFujimori,anotherpoliticalneophytewhose surprise lection in1990coincided ith theimplosionf Peru'smainpoliticalparties.Fujimori,now a fugitiveinJapan,presidedovera highly corrupt,autocraticregimethatdid significantdamage topolitical institutionsanddisillusionedmost Peruvians.Many believed-unrealistically, t nowseems-that Toledowould begin toaddress hecentral nstitutionalproblemsat the heartof Peruvianpolitics.The lostopportunity fToledo's "transitionovernment" as led to a renewedrepudiationof Peru's political class, of which Toledo, hanging on to office by athread, snow consideredapart. (Fujimori, eanwhile,remains hequintessentialntipolitician, ith considerableappeal o thecynicalelectorate; espitehis fugitivestatus,hispersistentpopularityhas led to talkof a possible comeback.)Toledo facesstiffchallenges nmultiplefronts. ot onlyhaveremnantsf theregimeledbyFujimoriandVladimiroMontesinos,Fujimori'sow-imprisonedntelligencehief,

Absent seriouseffortsat reconciliationandreform,upheaval isbound tocontinue inone formor another.taken veryopportunity osubvert oledo'sstrugglingdministration,utToledohasalsofaceda tough ppositionledby former opulistPresident lanGarcia,who heads theAmericanPopularRevolutionaryAlliance (APRA),erhaps thecountry's nlystrongpoliticalparty.Garciawill be a seriouscontenderto succeedToledo in 2oo6, despite the ruinouslegacyof his firstpresidency.Further omplicatinghesituation, hebrothers ntauro andOllantaHumala have organized amilitaristicnationalistmovement thatseekstocapitalize nPeru's thnicdivisions.Although incipient, hisfar-from-democraticovementcouldpresentagrave threat fpublicdisillusionment ith "politics susual" ontinuestobuild.Peru's ocagrowershave alsobecomemore assertive verthepasttwo years. Embraced by theHumala brothers and encouraged by the

success f theirbetter-organizedounterpartsnneighboring olivia,they have appliedpressureon Toledo to soften theU.S.-backederadicationolicyandprovide ore social ompensationndalternativeFOREIGN AFFAIRS September!October2004 [129]


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MichaelShifteremploymentpportunities.heircontinued ctivism ill furthertrainPeru'sragile olitical nstitutionsnd couldspark ider socialunrest.

Unlike Bolivia and Ecuador, Peru has not seen the emergence ofindigenousoliticalmovementsandparties, ven though ts indigenouspopulation is, in absolute terms, the largest in South America. Andgiven how discredited politics has become in Peru, it is unlikely thatindigenous groups will transform into aviable political force in thenearfuture. Such amobilization, however, would be salutary for Peru'sdemocratization. he indigenouspopulationhas long sufferedexclusion and profound injustice. In its analysis of human rights abusesandpolitical iolence rom 980 o2000,Peru's ruthandReconciliationCommission found that three-quarters of the 69,ooo victims wereof indigenousdescent,most of themfromPeru'spoorestregions.Itattributedmore than half of the killings to the virulentMaoist ShiningPath insurgency, which took advantage of pent-up rage and anineffective tate tounleash itsviolence.

Shining Path no longer poses a strategic threat, but its ability toreinvent itself and cause problems again should not be dismissed. Asthe Ilave incident showed, the basic problem that allowed the riseof the insurgency in the firstplace-a governmentwithout authorityremains unsolved. Absent serious efforts to build an effective stateand reconcile the country, such upheaval isbound to continue in oneform or another.Paradoxically, Peru's economic performance has been relativelysound in recent years, much stronger than the regional average.Respectable growth rates (projected at 4.5 percent annually through2007) and the nascent Camisea gas project provide some ballast in aprecarious situation. Still, the political mishandling of some privatizations (such as those inArequipa in 2002) and the still inequitabledistribution of economic gains have hardly endeared neoliberalism toPeruvians.Moreover, the depth of public dissatisfaction in the face ofa reasonably sound economic outlook serves only to highlight justhow dire Peru's political crisis has become. Recent violent protestsby teachers' unions (inAyacucho, the birthplace of Shining Path)reinforcethispoint.And unfortunately, ith supportforToledoeroding-and growing doubts about his ability to finish his termbadly needed reforms seemmore elusive than ever.

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AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOSJust saying "no":

Protesting thedestructionofcocafarms,El Chapare,BoliviaAlthough Ecuador isnot amajor producer of coca likePeru, Bolivia,andColombia, the drug trade still has the potential to sow instabilitythere.The country is amajor transit route for both drugs and precursor

chemicals sed in theirproduction, nd this tradehas contributed osoaring crime rates.Ecuadorians are also apprehensive about spilloverfromtheColombianconflicton thecountry's orthernborder: rugfueledviolenceanduncontrolledrefugee lows.They tend to see theU.S.-backed Plan Colombia, an antidrug security aid package, asdragging them deeper and deeper into anasty situation. As a result,even the relationshipbetween the Ecuadorian and Colombianarmed forces-which looked promising at the start of the Gutierrezgovernment-has grown tenseandmistrustful.The United States impinges on Ecuadorian politics inother importantways. In 1999, afterWashington withdrew itsmilitary installation



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Breakdown in theAndesfrom Panama, it set up severalbases fromwhich to carryout counterdrug operations. The only one in South America is located in theEcuadorian coastal town of Manta. The U.S. presence has arousedconsiderable suspicion, especially since the start of U.S. militaryoperations in Iraq inMarch 2003.Many Ecuadorians suspect that theterms of theManta agreement are unfavorable, since it was signed

when former President JamilMahuad was at his weakest.It was also underMahuad that Ecuador adopted theU.S. dollar as

itscurrency,becoming theonly country inSouthAmerica tohave doneso.Although themeasure at first stabilized the economy, analysts nowemphasize the downsides of dollarization, especially itsnegative effectonEcuador's ompetitiveness.ormany Ecuadorians,heseproblemsare closely linked to efforts at liberalization and privatization.Mostrecently, proposed foreign investment in oil and gas caused a furor,indicating deepeningdissatisfactionith neoliberalmeasures.Theprotests setoff by the startof trade talksbetween theUnited States andAndean countries inMay isyet another sign of growing antiglobalization zeal among disaffected groups. And Gutierrez, already undersiege, can hardly afford to face additional challenges to his nile.

FROM RESENTMENT TO RESISTANCEBOLIVIA'S OLATILITYas dramatically isplayed lastOctober,when the elected government of Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada collapsed ndersustained ressurerom ndigenous roups, ocagrowers,and labor associations. The opposition was broadlymotivated by thegovernment's inability to attend to acute social distress. But whatspecifically triggered unrest was the proposed sale of natural gas toforeign interests. (The fact that the gas would be routed throughChile, which many Bolivians blame for their lack of access to the sea,was especially controversial.) Roughly 6o Bolivians died in violentclashes between armedprotestersand securityforces-gruesomeevidence of the inabilityof political institutions and leaders tomanagethe extreme tensions in South America's poorest country.

Bolivia's divisions along ethnic lines, mirroring geography, areparticularly ronounced. he oil- andindustry-richowlands egion,centered inSanta Cruz, has embracedmarket-oriented reforms,while

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Michael Shifterthe indigenousmajorityconcentrated n thehighlandshas rejectedneoliberalism n favorof state-leddevelopment. InMay, Bolivia'sentrant in theMiss Universe contest clumsily evoked this divisionwhen she said, "I'm from the other side of the country, andwe are tallandwe arewhite people andwe know English." Some analystswarnthat the prevalence of such attitudes and the divisions they reflectcould simply split the country apart.Like those inPeru and Ecuador, theparty system inBolivia is ina stateof crisis.With many small parties vying for influence, governingcoalitions such as the one forged under the Sanchez de Lozada gov

ernment are hard to sustain.The energizedindigenous sector-the voice of which,though nlyrecently oticed, asbeengrowingoverdecades-furthercomplicateshesituation.The indigenous opulation onstitutesmajority inBolivia, and its engagementinpolitical life is amajor democratic advance.Butit is also an added stresson Bolivia's outdated

Insteadof coalescingintofunctioningstates,they are at risk ofbreaking apart.

political institutions, specially hen combinedwith the protestsofBolivia's ell-organizedcocagrowers, hose livelihoods avesufferedconsiderably as a resultof eradication efforts carriedout by theBoliviangovernment ndpushedrelentlesslyyWashington.

These opposition forces have come together in the figure of EvoMorales, a leader inCongress who heads theMovement TowardSocialism MAS).oralesenjoys trong acking, specially mongcocagrowers nd indigenous roups,andembodies hegrowingresentmenttoward and defiance of Bolivia's established order. He was barelyedgedout forpresidentby SanchezdeLozada inthe2002elections

Morales' success was in part the unintended consequence of criticalcomments by theU.S. ambassador-and will likelybe a contender inthe next election aswell.

Despite his electoral success,Washington has deniedMorales avisato visit theUnited States because of his controversial stance on thedrug question.Whether or not this decision iswise, it at leastmakessense in terms of U.S. policy goals. Less understandable wasWashington's treatmentof Sanchez de Lozada when his government startedto collapse lastyear.He had vigorously pursued the economic reforms

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Breakdown in theAndesandantidrugpolicies long advocated yU.S. advisers, et in 2002,when he requested $150million indevelopment assistance tohead off afiscal crisis thatwas sure to exacerbateunrest, the Bush administrationrebuffed him, providing ameager $lo million. Sanchez deLozada, ofcourse, was prescient: without the aid, he was unable to survive inoffice. If Bolivia's experience is any indication of howWashingtontreats its "models" and "success stories," some Latin Americans havequipped, theywould prefer to decline such a status.

Carlos Mesa, Sanchez de Lozada's vice president, took over inOctober 2003 and has exceeded expectations simply by survivingpolitically in the face of enormous pressure. He has shown somecommunicationskills andpolitical deftness-especially regardingBolivia's long-standing aspiration to regain access to the sea.But he oweshis survival in largepart to thewidespread belief that his premature departure from officewould do much damage to theprospects of Boliviandemocracy.Morales has seemed to agree,but a strong indigenous forceheaded by Felipe Quispe has been much less pliant, and thatgroup andothers could pose seriousproblems forMesa in the near future.

Mesa gained some political breathing space on July 18 from theapproval of a national referendum on Bolivia's oil and gas industries.The referendum clearly presages an expanded role for the state andhigher taxes on multinational corporations, but itswording wasambiguous enough tobe acceptable toboth foreign corporate interestsandmore moderate nationalist domestic sectors.Still, evenwith Mesa'spolitical acumen,thecountry's ocialrestiveness-the "gaswar"of2003 built on the "waterwars" of 1999-2000 inCochabamba-willnot subside any time soon.

FORGOTTEN NEIGHBORSALTHOUGH the three cases have clear differences, there is a commonelement to thepolitical crises of Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia: with discredited ndbankruptarties, neffectualeadership,orruptnstitutions,and societies buffeted by unrelieved poverty and the fallout fromthe drug trade, each is experiencing ameasure of disintegration.Instead of coalescing into coherent, functioning states, they are atrisk of breaking apart.

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MichaelShifterTo be sure, the social and economic problems afflicting these nations

are acute, but the current crisis is at root a political one, and progresswill not comewithout serious eform. he countries'nstitutions re illequipped o dealwith suchdevelopments s increased ressure rommarginalized groups. Socialmovements areunable to channel demandsin anorderly, oherentfashion.Politicalpartieshave lost credibilityor are simplyabsent.Government agenciesare largely nresponsiveand rarely oordinate mong themselves. rust inpolitical nstitutionsis historically ow.The relentlessdenigration f "politics"-thoughfashionable nd perhaps ustified-onlyworsens the problem,doingnothing tohelp attract reform-minded leaders to government or to reinvigoratealcified nstitutions.nd theelection fpoliticalneophytes,these countries are learning, does not provide any easy solutions.

Under these circumstances, even positive steps toward strongerdemocracy have had adestabilizing effect. Peru, Ecuador, and Boliviahave allmade noteworthy efforts to decentralize authority, but in theabsence f effective ational nstitutionsndleadership,hesereformshave tended to accentuate fragmentation rather than improve governance.Indigenouspoliticalmovementspresenttheirown problemsforweak institutions and national leaders: however legitimate theirdemands, they usually cannot be met.

To some degree, the prospects forgreater cohesion and democraticstability in the countries of the southern crescent depend on whathappens in other Latin American countries, especially Colombiaand Venezuela. Ecuador is particularly sensitive to violence in

Colombia-as antidrug and anti-insurgent activities intensifyalong their porous border-but a deterioration of the Colombiansituationwould create tension in Peru and Bolivia aswell. Venezuela'sPresident Hugo Chavez, meanwhile, fancies himself amajor playeron the regional stage.Although there is little sign that Latin Americans in general see him as an attractive rolemodel, he has inspiredfigures such asMorales inBolivia and the Humala brothers inPeruand delved into explosive regional politics by openly siding withBolivia in its long-standing border controversy with Chile. In addition, regional powers Argentina, Brazil, Chile, andMexico havea keen interest in Bolivian gas, aswell as a strong role in shapingthe region's broader political and economic context.



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Breakdown in theAndesThe United States also has a critical role to play, especially givenits already deep involvement in Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia. In light

of currentpriorities in thewar on terrorismand in Iraq, it isunrealisticto expect major U.S. initiatives aimed at the southernAndes any timesoon.And given the rigidity andmyopia of someU.S. policies in thepast, it is important tokeep inmind thatU.S. policies themselves cancause problems. Itwould be amistake, however, forWashington tolet these situations fester.Even without making the troubled region apriority, ashingtoncancontributeignificantlyotheregion'sffortsto pursue amore stable course.Most significant, of course, is the issue of drugs. To date, U.S.policy- aimedat eradicating ocaproductionand interdicting tstransit-has been disappointing atbest. In its2004National Drug Strategy, heOfficeofNationalDrugControlPolicy ONDCP)ontendedhat,afteragenerationof effort, itssupply-controlactivities arefinallyyieldingresultsand countering the "balloon effect": the tendency for drug production,when it is suppressed in one place, to pop up in another.TheONDCPeportsthatprogress ineradicatingcoca inColombia "hasnot been

offset in traditionalgrowing areas inPeru.Nor have regularincreases incultivation inBolivia come close to offsetting the drop inColombia."Despite theseclaims, there isno evidence of a change in theavailabilityorprice of cocaine in theUnited States. Nor have the rampant criminalityand corruptionthataccompany thedrug trade shown any signof abating.U.S. drug policy currently operates as a "hub and spoke" system,with Washington dealing with each individual country separately.This approach is flawed. Instead, theUnited States should instituteagenuinelymultilateral strategy,with multilateral cooperation on allkeytasks.Washington can build on the impressivemultilateral evaluationmechanism developed by theOrganization ofAmerican States and ontheAndean drug summits held under theGeorge H.W. Bush administration.Of course, as long asdemand persists, the logic of themarketwill prevail over any attempt at eradication. But amore cooperativeapproachwould bewelcomed byAndean governments, make thedrugwar more acceptable toAndean populations, and lead to progresstoward alleviating the problem.The United States is also the region'sprincipal trading partner, andtradebenefits and preferences are a crucial component of any effort to

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MichaelShifterassist the region economically and socially.The Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act-first passed in 1991 and extendedand upgraded n2002-gives Peru,Ecuador,Bolivia, andColombiapreferencesorcertain xports. t iscurrentlycheduled oend in2006.

Washington can now show itscommitment to embattled Andean governments y reaching ilateral radeagreements. .S. negotiators reworking on such agreements with Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia (withBolivia as an observer at the talks); given these countries' politicalfragility, ashington shouldbe as flexibleas possible in negotiatingsuchagreements. griculturalubsidies n theUnited States,however,will likely continue to represent amajor barrier toAndean cooperation.Washington shouldalsomarshal nternationalupport o undertakemore ambitious evelopment fforts n the region.LatinAmericahassufferedadramatic reduction in aid in recentyears, especially comparedtootherregions hathavebecomegreater oreign olicypriorities. heMillenniumChallengeAccount created y theBush administrationillnot benefit much of Latin America, particularly the troublednations ofthesouthern ndes (with hepossible xceptionfBolivia). ccordingly,a program focused specifically on the region, such as the $2.5 billionsocial investment fund for Latin America proposed by Representative

Robert Menendez (D-NJ.), isneeded to signalWashington's engagement with the region.Given the turbulence there and the potentialbenefits of such aid, the costwould be low.At aminimum, theUnitedStates should try to mobilize more resources for the Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank and forWorld Bank projects inLatin America.Of course, underlying contemporarymanifestations of instability inPeru, Ecuador, and Bolivia-drugs and violence, batfles over oil andeconomic reform, heightened demands by previously excluded actorsare the fissures that have haunted these countries since their founding.In his 1934book Fire on theAndes, the American journalistCarletonBeals wrote of Peru, "theuncut umbilical cord of South America's future," hat its"duality ... isstill the secretof political turmoil and nationalfrustration.Until this duality is reconciled,Peru can know no enduringpeace, can achieve no realaffirmation of itsnational life."Seventy yearslater,this duality has not been reconciled inPeru or itsneighbors-andpolitical turmoil and national frustrationhave persisted as a result.0

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