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![Page 1: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Birth control and women's empowerment
Pierre Andre Chiappori
Sonia Oreffice
Conference: The economics of the family
London, September 2006
![Page 2: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
Introduction: Abortion and ‘Female Empowerment’
General view: abortion as ‘empowering’ women
• Common claim in feminist and sociological literatures
• However, not obvious: clearly some women are made better off, but should we expect all women to benefit from the reform?
• In particular:– What about women who want children / exclude abortion? – What impact on the ‘market for marriage’? – What consequences on intrahousehold allocations?
![Page 3: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
Introduction: Abortion and ‘Female Empowerment’
General view: abortion as ‘empowering’ women
• Common claim in feminist and sociological literatures
• However, not obvious: clearly some women are made better off, but should we expect all women to benefit from the reform?
• In particular:– What about women who want children? – What impact on the ‘market for marriage’? – What consequences on intrahousehold allocations?
![Page 4: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
This paper• Marriage as matching (as opposed to bargaining)• Identical men; women differ in their preferences for
children• Abortion as exogenous change in birth control
technology
![Page 5: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
This paper• Marriage as matching (as opposed to bargaining)• Identical men; women differ in their preferences for
children• Abortion as exogenous change in birth control
technology
Conclusions
• Two cases (which side in excess supply?), various regimes• Women in excess supply: all women benefit in general• Crucial conditions: technology available to single as well• Plus: comparative statics• Difference with bargaining: the commitment issue
![Page 6: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
Related work• Akerlof, Yellen and Katz (1996) on out-of-wedlock
child bearing in the United States (‘shotgun marriages’)
– Related issues, different approach– Major differences:
• ‘Change in social norms’• Intrahousehold allocation as exogenous in AYK, whereas
endogeneity crucial here
![Page 7: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
Related work• Akerlof, Yellen and Katz (1996) on out-of-wedlock
child bearing in the United States (‘shotgun marriages’)
– Related issues, different approach– Major differences:
• ‘Change in social norms’• Intrahousehold allocation as exogenous in AYK, whereas
endogeneity crucial here
• Neal (2004): matching model– Similar approach; different emphasis
• ‘Collective’ models of household behavior– Same family– Idea: endogeneize the sharing rule– Examples: Chiappori-Iyigun-Weiss
![Page 8: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
The model• Continuum of men and women; one private commodity →
intrahousehold allocation of consumption an issue; children
• Men all identical; quasi linear utility if married; zero utility of children if single.
• Women: quasi linear utility where u distributed of [0,U], density f; note that utility is transferable.
• Unwanted pregnancies, probability p• Income: men Y, women y without children, z < y with children
UHaH,k aH uH.k
Ua,k a uk
![Page 9: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
The model• Continuum of men and women; one private commodity →
intrahousehold allocation of consumption an issue; children
• Men all identical; quasi linear utility if married; zero utility of children if single.
• Women: quasi linear utility where u distributed of [0,U], density f; note that utility is transferable.
• Unwanted pregnancies, probability p• Income: men Y, women y without children, z < y with children
• Frictionless marriage market (matching model); surplus generated by children
→ equilibria as stable matches
• Mass 1 of women, M of men→ excess supply of women if M < 1
UHaH,k aH uH.k
Ua,k a uk
![Page 10: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
• Single women– If u < y – z = ū : no children– Otherwise: children
Fertility decisions
![Page 11: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
• Single women– If u < y – z = ū : no children– Otherwise: children
• Couples– Efficiency: children if maximizes total surplus
– Hence: children if u >
Fertility decisions
y z uH u ;
![Page 12: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
• Single women– If u < y – z = ū : no children– Otherwise: children
• Couples– Efficiency: children if maximizes total surplus
– Hence: children if u >
• Hence three types of women (depending on preferences): – ‘low’: u < u– ‘intermediate’: u < u < ū– ‘high’: u > ū
Fertility decisions
y z uH u ;
![Page 13: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
• Single women– If u < y – z = ū : no children– Otherwise: children
• Couples– Efficiency: children if maximizes total surplus
– Hence: children if u >
• Hence three types of women (depending on preferences): – ‘low’: u < u never want a child
– ‘intermediate’: u < u < ū want a child only when married
– ‘high’: u > ū always want a child
Fertility decisions
y z uH u ;
![Page 14: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
Basic graph: husband’s maximal utility (as a function of u)
Stable match: excess supply of women
Y + uH
Y + p.uH
uuu
H
LI
![Page 15: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
Basic graph: husband’s maximal utility (as a function of u)
Stable match: excess supply of women
u(M)
Y + uH
Y + p.uH
uuu
Married Singles
Number of males
![Page 16: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
Basic graph: husband’s maximal utility (as a function of u)
Stable match: excess supply of women
u(M)
Y + uH
Y + p.uH
uuu
Married Singles
Number of males
![Page 17: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
Hence: three cases
Y + uH
Y + p.uH
uuu
Small excess supply of women (SESW)
![Page 18: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
Hence: three cases
Y + uH
Y + p.uH
uuu
Intermediate excess supply of women (IESW)
![Page 19: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
Hence: three cases
Y + uH
Y + p.uH
uuu
Large excess supply of women (LESW)
![Page 20: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
Hence three regimes
1. ‘Large’ ESW → marginal woman high type.– Some H women not matched → out-of-wedlock births– No surplus
![Page 21: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
Hence three regimes
1. ‘Large’ ESW → marginal woman high type.– Some H women not matched → out-of-wedlock births– No surplus
2. ‘Intermediate’ ESW → marginal woman intermediate type– Marginal woman: u(M) with
– No out-of-wedlock birth unless unwanted; all married couples have children
– Surplus for all married women, increases with M, max for high type
uM
Uftdt M
![Page 22: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/22.jpg)
Y + uH
Y + p.uH
uuu
Intermediate excess supply of women (IESW)
u(M)
![Page 23: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
Hence three regimes
1. ‘Large’ ESW → marginal woman high type.– Some H women not matched → out-of-wedlock births– No surplus
2. ‘Intermediate’ ESW → marginal woman intermediate type– Marginal woman: u(M) with
– No out-of-wedlock birth unless unwanted; all married couples have children
– Surplus for all married women, increases with M, max for high type
3. ‘Small’ ESW → marginal woman low type– No out-of-wedlock birth unless unwanted; some married couples
don’t have children– Surplus for all married women, independent of M, max for high.
uM
Uftdt M
![Page 24: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/24.jpg)
Y + uH
Y + p.uH
uuu
Small excess supply of women (IESW)
u(M)
![Page 25: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/25.jpg)
Excess Supply of Men
At any stable equilibrium:• All women married, receive all the surplus• ‘High’ and ‘intermediate’ types have
children• ‘Low’ type don’t.
![Page 26: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/26.jpg)
Comparative statics: income
• Women’s welfare non decreasing in y and z. • Assume, for instance, a proportional increase in
y and z. Then: – Less H, more L → fertility decreases– The equilibrium may switch (from LESW to IESW to
SESW) → larger rents for women, smaller for men
→ In a sense, income growth alleviates ESW
![Page 27: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/27.jpg)
uuu
u(M)
![Page 28: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/28.jpg)
uuu
u(M)
![Page 29: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/29.jpg)
Comparative statics: cutting male supply
• Within each regime: – No impact if LESW or SESW– IESW: higher u(M) reduces female surplus
![Page 30: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/30.jpg)
Y + uH
Y + p.uH
Married Singles
u(M)
![Page 31: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/31.jpg)
Y + uH
Y + p.uH
Married Singles
u(M)
![Page 32: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/32.jpg)
Comparative statics: cutting male supply
• Within each regime: – No impact if LESW or SESW– IESW: higher u(M) reduces female surplus
• Change of regime: – All women lose – From IESW to LESW: reduces total fertility,
increases out-of-wedlock fertility.
![Page 33: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/33.jpg)
Y + uH
Y + p.uH
uuu
From IESW to LESW
![Page 34: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/34.jpg)
Single parent benefits
• More high type women → fertility increases
• May change regime to LESW → out-of-wedlock fertility increases
• Welfare: within a constant regime– All women gain– Married women (who do not receive the benefit)
may gain more (per capita) than most singles. – Men lose the same amount.
• If regime changes: more complex
![Page 35: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/35.jpg)
Application: the US over three decades
Major trends:
![Page 36: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/36.jpg)
Application: the US over three decades
Major trends:1. Per capita benefits increase then decrease
![Page 37: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/37.jpg)
Benefits
Source: Moffit JEL 1992
![Page 38: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/38.jpg)
Application: the US over three decades
Major trends:1. Per capita benefits increase then decrease 2. Drop in the ‘supply’ of black, HS drop-out males
![Page 39: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/39.jpg)
Source: U.S. Department of Justice
![Page 40: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/40.jpg)
Source: U.S. Department of Justice
![Page 41: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/41.jpg)
Source: Western-Pettit, ILRR 2000
![Page 42: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/42.jpg)
Source: Neal JHR 2004
![Page 43: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/43.jpg)
Source: Neal JHR 2004
![Page 44: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/44.jpg)
Source: Neal JHR 2004
![Page 45: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/45.jpg)
Hence:
• Benefits: – Inverted U-shape– Note that the impact is not differentiated by race
• Supply of male: – Strong reduction of male supply… – … concentrated on young, black, HS dropouts
![Page 46: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/46.jpg)
Hence:
• Benefits: – Inverted U-shape– Note that the impact is not differentiated by race
• Supply of male: – Strong reduction of male supply… – … concentrated on young, black, HS dropouts
Impact on marriage and fertility?
![Page 47: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/47.jpg)
Source: Neal JHR 2004
![Page 48: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/48.jpg)
Source: Neal JHR 2004
![Page 49: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/49.jpg)
Source: Neal JHR 2004
![Page 50: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/50.jpg)
Source: Neal JHR 2004
![Page 51: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/51.jpg)
Legalizing abortion
• ESM: straightforward• ESW: more interesting
![Page 52: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/52.jpg)
Legalizing abortion
• ESM: straightforward• ESW: more interesting
u(M)
Y + uH
uuu
Y
Y + p.uH
![Page 53: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/53.jpg)
Legalizing abortion
• ESM: straightforward• ESW: more interesting
– Women not wanting kids gain
![Page 54: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/54.jpg)
Legalizing abortion
• ESM: straightforward• ESW: more interesting
– Women not wanting kids gain– If LESW: no impact on married women
• Men’s welfare: cannot increase– If LESW: no difference
![Page 55: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/55.jpg)
uuu
![Page 56: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/56.jpg)
Legalizing abortion
• ESM: straightforward• ESW: more interesting
– Women not wanting kids gain– If LESW: no impact on married women– If S- or I-ESW: all married women gain, including
those who want childrenIntuition: single are better off, and indifference
• Men’s welfare: cannot increase– If LESW: no difference– If IESW: total surplus unchanged, wife’s share
increased
![Page 57: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/57.jpg)
uuu
![Page 58: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/58.jpg)
Legalizing abortion
• ESM: straightforward• ESW: more interesting
– Women not wanting kids gain– If LESW: no impact on married women– If S- or I-ESW: all married women gain, including
those who want childrenIntuition: single are better off, and indifference
• Men’s welfare: cannot increase– If LESW: no difference– If IESW: total surplus unchanged, wife’s share
increased– If SESW: LT lose unwanted births; for all others,
wife’s share increased
![Page 59: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/59.jpg)
uuu
![Page 60: Birth control and women's empowerment Pierre Andre Chiappori Sonia Oreffice Conference: The economics of the family London, September 2006.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/56649e3b5503460f94b2e186/html5/thumbnails/60.jpg)
Legalizing abortion
• ESM: straightforward• ESW: more interesting
– Women not wanting kids gain– If LESW: no impact on married women– If S- or I-ESW: all married women gain, including
those who want childrenIntuition: single are better off, and indifference
• Men’s welfare: cannot increase– If LESW: no difference– If SESW or IESW:
net transfer to the wife!
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‘The Pill’
What if technology reserved to married women?
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‘The Pill’
What if technology reserved to married women?
Y + p.uH
Y + uH
u2 u1 u
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‘The Pill’
What if technology reserved to married women?
Married Married Singles
Y + p.uH
Y + uH
u2 u1 u
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Hence:
• Women with u ≥ u2(M): married, children, lose
• Women with u (M) ≤ u < u2(M): single (instead of married), lose
• Women with u 1(M) ≤ u < u(M): single anyway, no change
• Women with u < u1(M): married (instead of single), gain
Conclusion: most married women lose
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Hence:
• Women with u ≥ u2(M): married, children, lose
• Women with u (M) ≤ u < u2(M): single (instead of married), lose
• Women with u 1(M) ≤ u < u(M): single anyway, no change
• Women with u < u1(M): married (instead of single), gain
Conclusion: most married women lose
The new technology helps married women (who do not use it), but only insofar as it is available to
singles
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Extension 1: costly access
Y-(1-p)c+uH
u - c u
Y + uH
Y + p.uH
Y
Y+pc
Idea: fixed cost c for all
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Extension 1: costly access
• New technology favors all women in general, including those who do not want to use it
(idea: one marginal woman at least uses it)
• However, restrictions to access harm all women in general, including those who do not want to use it and those who can afford it.
• Example: Hyde Amendment (1976)!
• Problem: definition of a ‘market’!
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Extension 2: heterogeneous costs
• Idea; ‘psychological’ costs differ
• Extreme case: zero for some, large for others
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Extension 2: heterogeneous costs
Y-(1-p)c+uH
Y + uH
Y + p.uH
Y
Y+pc
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Extension 2: shotgun marriages
Claim (AYK 96): abortion lead to disappearance of shotgun marriages, which harmed women.
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Extension 3: shotgun marriages
Claim (AYK 96): abortion lead to disappearance of shotgun marriages, which harmed women.
Empirical problems (Neal 2004):
• Why only for poor and minorities?
• Adoptions did not increase.
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Extension 3: shotgun marriages
Claim (AYK 96): abortion lead to disappearance of shotgun marriages, which harmed women.
Empirical problems (Neal 2004):• Why only for poor and minorities?• Adoptions did not increase.
Theoretical problem:
Intrahousehold allocation is not exogenous!
→ ‘female pauperization’ a complex issue…
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Extension 3: shotgun marriages (cont.)
In our model:
• Suppressing shotgun marriage does not harm women…
• … unless it cuts the supply of men.
Empirically: unclear
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Fraction of single men among all employed men (PSID)
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Year
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Fraction of single men among all employed men (PSID)
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Year
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Deviation from the average annual change in the fraction of single men (PSID)
-0.01
-0.008
-0.006
-0.004
-0.002
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
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‘Female empowerment’: empirical test 1 (Oreffice 2004)
Basic idea: labor supply (CFL 1998)– ‘empowerment’: she receives a larger share
of household resources– If leisure normal:
• she should work less• he should work more
– Need to control for wages, education,…– Findings: Prediction confirmed!
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Source: Oreffice 2004
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Source: Oreffice 2004
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‘Female empowerment’: empirical test 2 (Mazzocco, Chiappori 2004)
Divorce in Ireland
Stylized facts: • legalization of divorce, but actual number very small• Strong labor demand, increase in participation
Theory: • Labor demand → potential empowerment of women • Divorce law as triggering renegotiations• Working women: same effect as before• Non working women: need to ‘build up a threat point’
→ increased participation
Tests: confirm the predictions
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Discussion
Heterogeneous males• by income: same• by preferences: supermodular; more complex, similar
predictions
Commitment versus bargaining• Basic insight: ‘market’ conditions matter• One interpretation: commitment (‘prenuptial agreement’)• Alternative polar case: ‘pure’ bargaining.• Differences:
– the existence of an ‘abortion threat’ matters only if credible– therefore: no impact on women unwilling to use abortion.– exclusive availability to married women does not matter
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Conclusions
Very simple model …• Multiple dimensions (income,…)• Frictions• Dynamics (age of marriage; divorce;…)
… but some robust conclusions:• Intrahousehold allocation crucial; equilibrium• Various ‘submarkets’ (empirical translation?)
• General insight: an innovation (technology, but also policy,…) can have a major impact on people not directly affected
→ Cost-benefit analysis!