Bill of Rights Sec 3

8/3/2019 Bill of Rights Sec 3

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G.R. No. 81561 January 1

8, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelleevs.ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant .

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for accused-appellant.

BIDIN, J.:p

This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX)convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e)(i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.

The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows:

On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to thebooth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with themfour (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. Theappellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled upthe contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and thename and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland" (Decision, p. 6)

Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. Appellant, however, refused,assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In viewof appellant's representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages werethen placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and ontop of the packages before the box was sealed with masking tape, thus making the box ready for shipment (Decision, p.8).

Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr . Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection . When heopened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom . His curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles

allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside . Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane


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wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves . He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof (tsn, pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).

Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of thesamples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October 6, 1987).

He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of

Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date, i.e ., August 14, 1987. He was interviewed by theChief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in his office. Therefore, JobReyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6,1987).

Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of the NBI agents,opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves . Driedmarijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn, p. 38, October 6, 1987;Emphasis supplied).

The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the package

contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was alsoopened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6,1987).

The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt"acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7, 1987).

Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated address in his passport being theManila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the latter's Chief Security. On August 27, 1987,appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attemptedshipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to theForensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana floweringtops as certified by the forensic chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo , pp. 132-134).

Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the DangerousDrugs Act.

After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.

In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.


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THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THECONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT OBSERVED.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOURPARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION (Appellant's Brief, p. 1; Rollo , p. 55)

1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his

constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III,Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).

Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searchesand seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrestshall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath oraffirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searchedand the persons or things to be seized.

Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court,or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in anyproceeding.

Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the1935 Charter which, worded as follows:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches andseizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge afterexamination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularlydescribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Sec. 1 [3], Article III)

was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment ** to the United States Constitution. As such, theCourt may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts whichare considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.

Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v . Ohio by the US Federal Supreme Court (367 US 643, 81 S.Ct.1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in Stonehill v . Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible anyevidence obtained by virtue of a defective search and seizure warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier

adopted in Moncado v . People's Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the admissibility of evidence was not affected by the


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illegality of its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV) constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is carried over upto the present with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.

In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down theadmissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonablesearches and seizures . (Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299[1975]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon.Achacoso, et al., GR No. 81510, March 14, 1990).

It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were invariably procured bythe State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized government agencies.

On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded wasprimarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention andparticipation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutionalright against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a privateindividual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State?

We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by theConstitution cannot be invoked against the State.

As this Court held in Villanueva v . Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:

1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government , included in which is his residence, hispapers, and other possessions. . . .

. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access except under the circumstancesabove noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of hisdwelling and to respect the privacies of his life . . . . (Cf. Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966] andBoyd v. United States, 116 US 616 [1886]; Emphasis supplied).

In Bur deau v . McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in construing the rightagainst unreasonable searches and seizures declared that:

(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and as shown in previous cases, itsprotection applies to governmental action. Its origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint uponthe activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies; as

against such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolestedoccupation of his dwelling and the possession of his property, subject to the right of seizure by process duly served.


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The above ruling was reiterated in State v . Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking attendant who searched theautomobile to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana instead, without the knowledge and participation of policeauthorities, was declared admissible in prosecution for illegal possession of narcotics.

And again in the 1969 case of Walker v . State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that the search and seizure clauses arerestraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private individuals ( citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).

Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v . US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court there said:

The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a private citizen the owner of a motel in whichappellant stayed overnight and in which he left behind a travel case containing the evidence ***complained of. Thesearch was made on the motel owner's own initiative. Because of it, he became suspicious, called the local police,informed them of the bag's contents, and made it available to the authorities.

The fourth amendment and the case law applying i t do not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a search bya private citizen. Rather, the amendment only proscribes governmental action."

The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressingappellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should notbe admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.

Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the evidencelater on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his conviction.

The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two days. In both instances, the argument standsto fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.

First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an illegalsearch and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, theproprietor of the forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable anda standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to theBureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8; Original Records, pp. 119-122;167-168).

It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of the same to the NBIand later summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he opened the parcel containing the rest of theshipment and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search andseizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.


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Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into awarrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sightis not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search(Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of thearresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202[1927]; Ker v. State of California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]).

In Gandy v . Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where the property was taken into custody of the police at the specific request of the manager and where the search was initially made by the owner there is nounreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional meaning of the term.

That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals findssupport in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection. But protection against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorshipspeech in the Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself posed, as follows:

First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy.Protection against whom? Protection against the state . The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the

individual and the state . Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals . What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphereinaccessible to any power holder . (Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas , Record of the ConstitutionalCommission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis supplied)

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed onlyagainst the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked againstthe State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the testof constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a privateestablishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities,the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the lawenforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to actscommitted by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been modified by the presentphraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of theconstitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence was procured by policeauthorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p. 8, Rollo , p. 62).

The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the government andfundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between individuals. Moreover, it must be


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3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to believe that he was not the owner of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain Michael, a German national, whom appellant met ina pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their 30-minute conversation, Michael requested him to ship thepackages and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the shipment since the German national was about to leave thecountry the next day (October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).

Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as incredulous, self-serving and contrary tohuman experience. It can easily be fabricated. An acquaintance with a complete stranger struck in half an hour couldnot have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose and forappellant to readily accede to comply with the undertaking without first ascertaining its contents. As stated by the trialcourt, "(a) person would not simply entrust contraband and of considerable value at that as the marijuana floweringtops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the other hand,would not simply accept such undertaking to take custody of the packages and ship the same from a complete strangeron his mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo , p. 91). As to why he readily agreed to do the errand, appellant failed toexplain. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-serving evidence which deserveno weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of credible witnesses who testifyon affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]).

Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as per records of the Interpol, he was previouslyconvicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the Federal Republic of Germany on January 1, 1982 and thatthe consignee of the frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also a Swiss national, was likewise convicted for drug abuse andis just about an hour's drive f rom appellant's residence in Zurich, Switzerland (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 66; OriginalRecords, p. 244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo , p. 93).

Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances (Peoplev. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651[1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castaares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As records further show,appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete address or passport number. Furthermore, if

indeed, the German national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in the contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipperthereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownershipover, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise.

Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in rendering the assailed judgment.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged ishereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.


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Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr. and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* Penned by Judge Romeo J. Callejo.

** It reads: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, againstunreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probablecause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and thepersons or things to be seized."

*** Forged checks.

G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995


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SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon Cityalleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedlyvexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive topetitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy ." 1

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney'sfees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefsawardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a taperecording of the confrontation made by petitioner. 2 The transcript reads as follows:

Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) Good Afternoon M'am.

Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na kung paanoka napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.

CHUCHI Kasi, naka duty ako noon.

ESG Tapos iniwan no. ( Sic )

CHUCHI Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon

ESG Ito and ( sic ) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung ( sic ) mag explain ka, kasi hanggang 10:00p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka saStates, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo nakasi hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.

CHUCHI Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.

ESG Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel. Magsumbong kasa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you thinkthat on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na

kita).


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CHUCHI Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.

ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no ( sic ) ko.

ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your own merit alamko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI Kumuha kami ng exam noon.ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo

ESG Kukunin ka kasi ako.

CHUCHI Eh, di sana

ESG Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak . Akala mo ba makukuhaka dito kung hindi ako.

CHUCHI Mag-eexplain ako.

ESG Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano ka puma-rito."Putang-ina " sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.

ESG Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka puwede ka ng hindipumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.

CHUCHI Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.

ESG Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok kunghindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.

CHUCHI Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loo

b.

ESG Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no, nilapastangan mo ako.

CHUCHI Paano kita nilapastanganan?


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ESG Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na.Magsumbong ka. 3

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation wasillegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of RepublicAct 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of privatecommunication, and other purposes. " An information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October6, 1988 is quoted herewith:

INFORMATION

The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act No. 4200,committed as follows:

That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila, Philippines, andwithin the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramireznot being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's conversation with said accused,did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder

secretly record the said conversation and thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said recording to other person.

Contrary to law.

Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.

MARIANO M. CUNETAAsst. City Fiscal

Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the factscharged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial courtgranted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A.4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other thana participant to the communication. 4

From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, whichforthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.

On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:


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[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thusquashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense, therespondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari . 5

Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent Court of Appealsdenied in its Resolution 6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 doesnot apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that theprovision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in thecommunication. 8 In relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be allegedin the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner aguesthat R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently,her act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10

We disagree.

First, legislative intent is determined principally f rom the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear

and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only wherea literal interpretation would be either impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other RelatedViolations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to anyprivate communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other deviceor arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken wordby using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties toany private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes nodistinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or differentfrom those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to makesuch recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appealscorrectly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with anotherwithout the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's conclusion that in enactingR.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations orcommunications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons. Thus:


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xxx xxx xxx

Senator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".

Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy would not appear to bematerial. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not made by all the parties but by some parties andinvolved not criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for example civilcases or special proceedings whereby a recording is made not necessarily by all the parties but perhaps bysome in an effort to show the intent of the parties because the actuation of the parties prior, simultaneouseven subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative of their intention. Suppose there is such arecording, would you say, Your Honor, that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill oroutside?

Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.

Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense but as evidence to beused in Civil Cases or special proceedings?

Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken without theauthorization of all the parties .

Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?

Senator Taada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the observation of onewithout his knowing it and then using it against him . It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike . If the purpose;

Your honor, is to record the intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties should know that theobservations are being recorded.

Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.

Senator Taada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of directors where a taperecording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties know. It is but fair that the people whoseremarks and observations are being made should know that the observations are being recorded.

Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.

Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please be informed thatwhatever you say here may be used against you." That is fairness and that is what we demand. Now, inspite of that warning, he makes damaging statements against his own interest, well, he cannot complain

any more. But if you are going to take a recording of the observations and remarks of a person without


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him knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is being recorded may beused against him, I think it is unfair .

xxx xxx xxx

(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)

Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech , he would be penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is public,but the recording is done secretly.

Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the communicationbetween one person and another person not between a speaker and a public .

xxx xxx xxx

(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)

xxx xxx xxx

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from theCongressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks topenalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does notdistinguish.

Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need notbe specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individualmade a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offenseunder Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:"Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation,as well as its communication to a third person should be professed." 14

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include"private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The wordcommunicate comes from the latin word communicare , meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification,communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing orimparting, as in a conversation , 15 or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are sharedbetween individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures )" 16 These

definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings orthoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and


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private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase"private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and "communication"were interchangeably used by Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:

It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations beingoverheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as well theundeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people have some aspects of their lives they donot wish to expose. Free conversations are often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity,agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to betaken seriously. The right to the privacy of communication , among others, has expressly beenassured by our Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must haverecognized the nature of conversations between individuals and the significance of man'sspiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of thepleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free exchangeof communication between individuals free from every unjustifiable intrusion by whatevermeans. 17

In Gaanan vs . Intermediate Appellate Court , 18 a case which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that

the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization did notviolate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)"enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of theaccused." 20 The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to aviolation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording"of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.

WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us with nodiscretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo JJ., concur.

Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.

Footnotes

G.R. No. 163087 February 20, 2006

SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. and JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO, Petitioners,


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vs.ROGELIO S. SOLUTA, JOSELITO SANTOS, EDNA BERNATE, VICENTA DELOLA, FLORENTINOMATILLA, and GLOWHRAIN-SILAHIS UNION CHAPTER, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.: The present Petition for Review on Certiorari partially assails the Court of Appeals Decision 1 of March 26,2004 holding herein petitioners Silahis International Hotel, Inc. and Jose Marcel Panlilio, along with FloroManiego and Steve Villanueva, civilly l iable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code, for violation of respondents constitutional right against unreasonable search of their office.

Petitioner Jose Marcel Panlilio (Panlilio) was the Vice President for Finance of his co-petitioner SilahisInternational Hotel, Inc. (hotel), while respondents Rogelio Soluta (Soluta), Joselito Santos, Edna Bernate(Edna), Vicenta Delola (Vicenta), and Florentino Matilla (Matilla) were employees of the hotel and officers of the Glowhrain-Silahis Union Chapter, the hotel employees union (the union).

Petitioners version of the antecedents of the case are as follows:

In late 1987, as Coronel Floro Maniego (Maniego), General Manager of the Rapier Enforcement ProfessionalInvestigation and Security Agency, Inc. (REPISA) which the hotel contracted to provide its security force, hadbeen receiving reports that sale and/or use of marijuana, dollar smuggling, and prostitution were going on inthe union office at the hotel and that there existed a theft syndicate, he conducted a surveillance, with theapproval of Panlilio, of suspected members and officers of the union. 2

In the morning of January 11, 1988, Panlilio, his personal secretary Andy Dizon, Maniego, Bulletin reporterNonoy Rosales, and REPISA security guard Steve Villanueva (Villanueva) entered the union office located atthe hotel basement, with the permission of union officer Henry Babay (Babay) who was apprised about thesuspected illegal activities, and searched the premises in the course of which Villanueva found a plastic bagunder a table. When opened, the plastic bag yielded dry leaves of marijuana. 3 Panlilio thereupon orderedManiego to investigate and report the matter to the authorities.

On the other hand, respondents version follows:

On January 10, 1988, Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight at the femalelocker room at the basement of the hotel. At dawn of January 11, 1988, she heard pounding sounds outside,prompting her to open the door of the locker room upon which she saw five men in barong tagalog whom

she failed to recognize but she was sure were not employees of the hotel,4

forcibly opening the door of theunion office. 5 She even saw one of the men hid something behind his back. She then closed the door and


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went back to bed. Soon after she heard the door of the union office opened.

In the morning of January 11, 1988, as union officer Soluta was trying in vain to open the door of the unionoffice, Loida narrated to him what she had witnessed at dawn.

Soluta thus immediately lodged a complaint before the Security Officer. And he fetched a locksmith, Efren

Guevarra, who tried to assist him, Edna, Arnold Ilustrisimo and Ed Bautista open the door. At that instant,men in barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started hitting Soluta and his companions, drawingthem to run to the female locker room, and to thereafter proceed to the Engineering Office where theycalled for police assistance. 6

While awaiting the arrival of the police, Babay and Panlilio, on the latters request, met. At the meeting,Panlilio told Babay that they proceed to the union office where they would settle the mauling incident, towhich Babay replied that the door of the office could not be opened. Panlilio thereupon instructed Villanuevato force open the door, and the latter did. Once inside, Panlilio and his companions began searching theoffice, over the objection of Babay who even asked them if they had a search warrant. 7 A plastic bag wasfound containing marijuana flowering tops.

As a result of the discovery of the presence of marijuana in the union office and after the police conductedan investigation of the incident, a complaint against the 13 union officers, 8 namely: Babay, Isaac Asuncion,

Jr., Soluta, Teodoro Gimpayan, Vicenta, Edna, Arnulfo Ilustrisimo, Irene Velarde, Joselito Santos, Renato Lina,Avelino Meneses, Matilla, and Norman Agtani 9 was filed before the Fiscals Office of Manila, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 179 (The Dangerous Drugs Act).

An Information 10 indicting the union officers was subsequently filed by the Fiscals Office before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.

After trial, Branch 5 of the RTC acquitted the accused. The trial court disposed:

WHEREFORE, with the specimen and/or the marijuana flowering tops allegedly found inside the Union Officeoccupied by the accused not admissible in evidence, coupled by the suspicious circumstance of confiscation, for lack of sufficient evidence, accused Henry Babay, Isaac Asuncion, Jr., Rogelio Soluta,

Teodoro F. Gimpayan, Vicente Delola, Edna Bernate, Arnulfo Ilustrisimo, Irene Velarde, Joselito Santos,Avelino Meneses, Florentino Matilla and Norman Agtani, are ACQUITTED of the charge. The bonds they putup for their provisional liberty are cancelled.

The Branch Clerk is directed to turn over the custody of the seized plastic bag containing flowering tops of marijuana to the NBI Director as Permanent Custodian of the seized Dangerous Drugs.


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and reduced the award of actual damages to individual respondents to P50,000. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, is hereby AFFIRMED with themodification that the first paragraph of the dispositive portion should read:

"1. Plaintiffs Rogelio Soluta, Joselito Santos, Florentino Matilla, Vicenta Delola and Edna Bernate-Dacanay, jointly, the sum of P50,000.00 as actual damages, and the further sum of P1,000.00 each for the sameplaintiffs in the same concept and nature."

The Decision is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED. 15

Hence, the present petition of Panlilio and the hotel, they contending that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FORDAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CIVIL CODE IN THAT:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLICATION OF PEOPLE V. ARUTA (288 SCRA 626[1998]) AND SECTION13, RULE 126 OF THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN THE INSTANT CASE IS LEGALLY FLAWED.

2. PETITIONERS SEARCH OF THE UNION OFFICE IN THE INSTANT CASE WAS ENTIRELY REASONABLEUNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 16

While petitioners concede that the appellate court correctly cited the principles enunciated in People v.Aruta 17 and Section 13, Rule 126 18 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, it gravely erred when it applied Arutato justify petitioners alleged liability under Article 32 of the New Civil Code. They argue that Aruta does notinvolve Article 32 as nowhere in the decision is there any reference to Article 32. 19

Similarly, petitioners argue that being private persons, they are not covered by the standards set forthin Aruta as the constitutional protection against illegal searches and seizures is not meant to be invokedagainst private individuals. 20

Petitioners further argue that the search of the union office was reasonable under thecircumstances, 21 given that the hotel owns the room where the union holds office; the search was notwithout probable cause as it was conducted precisely due to reports received by petitioners that the unionoffice was being used as a venue for illegal activities, particularly the sale and/or use of prohibited


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drugs; 22 and the search was conducted with the consent and in the presence of union officer Babay. 23

The petition fails.

Article 32 of the New Civil Code provides:

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual , who directly or indirectly obstructs,defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of anotherperson shall be liable to the latter for damages:

x x x x

(9) The right to be secure in ones person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonablesearches and seizures ;

x x x x

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated. (Emphasis andunderscoring supplied)

As constitutional rights, like the right to be secure in ones person, house, papers, and effects againstunreasonable search and seizures, occupy a lofty position in every civilized and democratic community andnot infrequently susceptible to abuse, their violation, whether constituting a penal offense or not, must be

guarded against. As the Code Commission noted,

x x x x

(3) Direct and open violations of the Penal Code trampling upon the freedoms named are not so frequent asthose subtle, clever and indirect ways which do not come within the pale of the penal law. It is in thesecunning devices of suppressing or curtailing freedom, which are not criminally punishable, where thegreatest danger to democracy lies. The injured citizen will always have, under the new Civil Code, adequatecivil remedies before the courts because of the independent civil action, even in those instances where theact or omission complained of does not constitute a criminal offense. 24

The Code Commission thus deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but also private individualscivilly liable for violation of rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code. That is why it is not evennecessary that the defendant under this Article should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, itwould defeat its main purpose, which is the effective protection of individual rights. 25 It suffices that there is


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a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff.

In the present case, as priorly stated, petitioners had, by their own claim, already received reports in late1987 of illegal activities allegedly undertaken in the union office and Maniego conducted surveillance of theunion officers. Yet, in the morning of January 11, 1988, petitioners and their companions barged into andsearched the union office without a search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one, andnotwithstanding the objection of Babay.

The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality, it not falling under any of the exceptionalinstances when a warrantless search is allowed by law. Petitioners violation of individual respondentsconstitutional right against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for the award of damages underArticle 32 of the Civil Code.

In MHP Garments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 26 a case for unfair competition, the progression of time betweenthe receipt of the information and the raid of the stores of the therein private respondents premisesshowed that there was sufficient time for the therein petitioners and the raiding party to apply for a judicialwarrant. Yet they did not apply for one. They went on with the raid and seized the goods of the therein

private respondents. Under the circumstances, this court upheld the grant of damages by the trial court tothe therein private respondents for violation of their right against unreasonable search and seizure.

As for petitioners contention that property rights justified the search of the union office, the same does notlie. For respondents, being the lawful occupants of the office, had the right to raise the question of validityof the search and seizure. 27

Neither does petitioners claim that they were allowed by union officer Babay to enter the union office l ie.Babays account of why petitioners and company went to the union office to consider Panlilios suggestionto settle the mauling incident is more credible, as is his claim that he protested the search, and even askedif they were armed with a search warrant.

While it is doctrinal that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which maybe waived expressly or impliedly, a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. There must be clear andconvincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish it to constitute a waiver thereof. 28 There must beproof of the following: (a) that the right exists; (b) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual orconstructive, of the existence of such right; and, (c) that the said person had an actual intention torelinquish the right. In other words, the waiver must be voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made. Theevidence shows otherwise, however.

That a violation of ones constitutional right against illegal search and seizure can be the basis for therecovery of damages under Article 32 in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the New Civil Code, there isno doubt. Since the complaint 29 filed before the trial court was for damages due to malicious prosecution


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and violation of constitutional right against illegal search and seizure, the award by the trial court of actualdamages to respondent union was correctly set aside by the appellate court.

Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Hence, it is not the actor alone who must answer fordamages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injurycaused to the aggrieved party. 30 Such being the case, petitioners, together with Maniego and Villanueva, theones who orchestrated the illegal search, are jointly and severally liable for actual, moral and exemplarydamages to herein individual respondents in accordance with the earlier-quoted pertinent provision of Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

x x x x

(6) Illegal search;

x x x x

(10) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners magnify the citation by the appellate court of Aruta allegedly "to justify [their] liability" underArticle 32 of the Civil Code, which petitioners allege is erroneous as said case did not involve Article 32.

Aruta was, however, cited by the appellate court, not to justify petitioners liability but to rule out thelegality of the search in the union office as the search was not done as an incident of a lawful arrest.

Petitioners cite People v. Marti 31 to support their thesis that the determinants in the validity of theconstitutional right against searches and seizure cannot be invoked against private individuals.

But the ruling of this Court in Marti, a criminal case, bears on the issue of whether "an act of a privateindividual, allegedly in violation of [ones] constitutional rights, [may] be invoked against the State." In otherwords, the issue in that case was whether the evidence obtained by a private person, acting in a privatecapacity without the participation of the State, is admissible.

The issue in the present civil case, however, is whether respondent individual can recover damages forviolation of constitutional rights. As reflected above, Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of theCivil Code, allows so.


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WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing ratiocinations, the petition is DENIED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice

Chairman

ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate Justice

DANTE O. TINGAAsscociate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case wasassigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate JusticeChairman

CERTIFICATIONPursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairmans Attestation, it is herebycertified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case wasassigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice


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G.R. No. 93516 August 12, 1992

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.BASILIO DAMASO @ Bernardo/BERNIE MENDOZA @ KA DADO, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

The accused-appellant, Basilio Damaso, was originally charged in an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with thecrime of subversion, together with Luzviminda Morados y Galang @ Ka Mel, Teresita Calosa y Macabangon @ Ka Tessie,Ricardo Calosa y Perez @ Ka Ric, Marites Calosa y Evangelista @ Ka Tess, Eric Tanciangco y Capira @ Ka Ric and Luz

Tanciangco y Pencial @ Ka Luz (Records, p. 3). Such information was later amended to exclude all the above-enumerated persons except the accused-appellant from the criminal charge. The amended information reads:

That an or about the 19th day of June, 1988, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Basilio DAMASO @ Bernardo/BernieMendoza @ KA DADO, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, have in his possession,custody and control one (1) M14 Rifle bearing Serial No. 1249935 with magazine and Fifty-Seven (57) liveammunition, in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion, filed againstsaid accused in the above-entitled case for Violation of Republic Act 1700, as amended by Executive OrderNo. 276.

Contrary to Third Paragraph of Sec. 1, P.D. 1866. (Records, p. 20)

Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged (Records, p. 37). Trial on the meritsensued. The prosecution rested its case and offered its exhibits for admission. The counsel for accused-appellantinterposed his objections to the admissibility of the prosecution's evidence on grounds of its being hearsay, immaterialor irrelevant and illegal for lack of a search warrant. On these bases, he, thereafter, manifested that he was notpresenting any evidence for the accused (TSN, December 28, 1989, p. 139). On January 17, 1990, the trial courtrendered decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Basilio Damaso alias Bernardo/Bernie Mendoza alias Ka Dado guiltybeyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Presidential Decree Number 1866, and considering that theViolation is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion, pursuant toSection 1, Paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree Number 1866 hereby sentences the accused to suffer thepenalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs of the proceedings.


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The M14 Rifle bearing Serial Number 1249935 and live ammunition and all the articles and/or items seizedon June 19, 1988 in connection with this case and marked and submitted in court as evidence are orderedconfiscated and forfeited in favor of the government, the same to be turned over to the PhilippineConstabulary Command at Lingayen, Pangasinan.

SO ORDERED. ( Rollo , p. 31)

Thus, this present recourse with the following assignment of errors:

A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND AMMUNITIONS IN FURTHERANCE OF, OR INCIDENT TO, OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE CRIME OF SUBVERSION DESPITE THE WOEFULLY INADEQUATEEVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.

B. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED WHEN THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OFSUBVERSION WAS NOT PROVEN BY THE PROSECUTION.

C. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS EVIDENCE THE FIREARMS DOCUMENTS AND ITEMS

LISTED IN EXHIBIT E AFTER THEY WERE DECLARED INADMISSIBLE WITH FINALITY BY ANOTHER BRANCH OF THE SAME COURT AND THE SAID EVIDENCE ARE THE FRUITS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.

D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTIONS TO QUASH FILED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANTBECAUSE THE SEPARATE CHARGE FOR SUBVERSION AGAINST HIM ABSORBED THE CHARGE FOR ILLEGALPOSSESSION OF FIREARMS IN FURTHERANCE OF OR INCIDENT TO, OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE CRIME OFSUBVERSION. (pp. 55-66, Rollo )

The antecedent facts are set forth by the Solicitor General in his Brief, as follows:

On June 18, 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine Constabulary officer connected with the 152nd PCCompany at Lingayen, Pangasinan, and some companions were sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPAmembers in Barangay Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. In said place, the group apprehendedGregorio Flameniano, Berlina Aritumba, Revelina Gamboa and Deogracias Mayaoa. When interrogated, thepersons apprehended revealed that there was an underground safehouse at Gracia Village in Urdaneta,Pangasinan. After coordinating with the Station Commander of Urdaneta, the group proceeded to thehouse in Gracia Village. They found subversive documents, a radio, a 1 x 7 caliber .45 firearm and otheritems (pp. 4, 6-7, tsn, October 23, 1989).

After the raid, the group proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under surveillance the rentedapartment of Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier arrested. They interviewedLuzviminda Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie Aritumba. She stated that she worked with Bernie Mendoza,herein appellant. She guided the group to the house rented by appellant. When they reached the house,


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the group found that it had already been vacated by the occupants. Since Morados was hesitant to givethe new address of Bernie Mendoza, the group looked for the Barangay Captain of the place and requestedhim to point out the new house rented by appellant. The group again required Morados to go with them.When they reached the house, the group saw Luz Tanciangco outside. They told her that they alreadyknew that she was a member of the NPA in the area. At first, she denied it, but when she saw Morados sherequested the group to go inside the house. Upon entering the house, the group, as well as the BarangayCaptain, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled "Ang Bayan," xerox copiers and a computer machine. Theyalso found persons who were companions of Luz Tanciangco (namely, Teresita Calosa, Ricardo Calosa,Maries Calosa, Eric Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados). The group requested the persons in the house toallow them to look around. When Luz Tanciangco opened one of the rooms, they saw books used forsubversive orientation, one M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions, Kenwood radio, artificial beard, maps of the Philippines, Zambales, Mindoro an(d) Laguna and other items. They confiscated the articles andbrought them to their headquarters for final inventory. They likewise brought the persons found in thehouse to the headquarters for investigation. Said persons revealed that appellant was the lessee of thehouse and owned the items confiscated therefrom (pp. 8-12, tsn, ibid ; pp. 2-4, 6, 8-10, 31, tsn, October 31,1989). (p. 5, Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, p. 91, Rollo )

While We encourage and support law enforcement agencies in their drive against lawless elements in our society, Wemust, however, stress that the latter's efforts to this end must be done within the parameters of the law. In the case atbar, not only did We f ind that there are serious flaws in the method used by the law officers in obtaining evidenceagainst the accused-appellant but also that the evidence as presented against him is weak to justify conviction.

We reverse.

The records of this case show that the accused-appellant was singled out as the sole violator of P.D. No. 1866, infurtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion. Yet, there is no substantial and credibleevidence to establish the fact that the appellant is allegedly the same person as the lessee of the house where the M-14 rifle and other subversive items were found or the owner of the said items. The prosecution presented two witnesseswho attested to this fact, thus:

Lieutenant Candito Quijardo

Fiscal

Q How about this Bernie Mendoza, who was the one renting the house?

A He was not around at that time, but according to Luz (Tanciangco ) who mentioned thename Bernie Mendoza (as) the one who was renting the house and at the same time claimingthat it was Bernie Mendoza who owns the said items. (TSN of October 31, 1989, p. 40)

xxx xxx xxx


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Q I am showing you another picture which we request to be marked as Exhibit "K-2," tell us if it has any connection to the house?

A The same house, sir.

Q Now, this person who according to you allegedly occupied the house at Bonuan Gueset, bythe name of Bernie Mendoza, in your capacity as a Military officer, did you find out theidentity?

A I am not the proper (person) to tell the real identity of Bernie de Guzman .

Q Can you tell the Honorable Court the proper person who could tell the true identity of Bernie Mendoza?

A The Intelligence of the Pangasinan PC Command.

Q Can you name these officers?

A Captain Roberto Rosales and his assistant, First Lt. Federico Castro. ( ibid , pp. 54-55)

M/Sqt. Artemio Gomez

Q That underground house, do you know who was the principal occupant of that house?

xxx xxx xxx

A During our conversation with the occupants, they revealed that a certain Ka Bernie is theone occupying the house, Bernie Mendoza alias Basilio Damaso.

. . . (TSN, December 27, 1989, pp. 126-128)

Clearly, the aforequoted testimonies are hearsay because the witnesses testified on matters not on their own personalknowledge. The Solicitor General, however, argues that while the testimonies may be hearsay, the same are admissiblebecause of the failure of counsel for appellant to object thereto.

It is true that the lack of objection to a hearsay testimony results in its being admitted as evidence. But, one should notbe misled into thinking that since these testimonies are admitted as evidence, they now have probative value. Hearsayevidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence. In People vs. Valero , We emphatically declared that:


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The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence, like hearsayevidence or evidence that violates the rule of res inter alios acta , or his failure to ask for the striking out of the same does not give such evidence any probative value. The lack of objection may make anyincompetent evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value.(L-45283-84, March 19, 1982, 112 SCRA 675, emphasis supplied)

It is unfortunate that the prosecution failed to present as witnesses the persons who knew the appellant as thelessee and owner of the M-14 rifle. In this way, the appellant could have exercised his constitutional right toconfront the witnesses and to cross-examine them for their truthfulness. Likewise, the records do not show anyother evidence which could have identified the appellant as the lessee of the house and the owner of thesubversive items. To give probative value to these hearsay statements and convict the appellant on this basisalone would be to render his constitutional rights useless and without meaning.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant is the lessee of the house, the case against him still will notprosper, the reason being that the law enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a valid search and seizureproceedings.

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is enshrined in the Constitution (Article III, Section 2). Thepurpose of the law is to prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasions of thesanctity of the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against suchusurpations when attempted (see Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646). However, such right is not absolute. There areinstances when a warrantless search and seizure becomes valid, namely: (1) search incidental to an arrest; (2) searchof a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view (Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, L-58889, July 31, 1986,143 SCRA 267, 276). None of these exceptions is present in this case.

The Solicitor General argues otherwise. He claims that the group of Lt. Quijardo entered the appellant's house uponinvitation of Luz Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados, helper of the appellant; that when Luz Tanciangco opened one of the rooms, they saw a copier machine, computer, M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions, radio set and more subversive

items; that technically speaking, there was no search as the group was voluntarily shown the articles used insubversion; that besides, a search may be validly conducted without search warrant with the consent of the personsearched in this case, appellant's helper and Luz Tanciangco allowed them to enter and to look around the appellant'shouse; and that since the evidence seized was in plain view of the authorities, the same may be seized without awarrant.

We are not persuaded. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being personal one,cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so inhis or her behalf (De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, 695). In the case at bar, the records show that appellant was not inhis house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter it (TSN,October 31, 1989, p. 10). We Find no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz Morados was indeed the

appellant's helper or if it was true that she was his helper, that the appellant had given her authority to open his house


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in his absence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such an authority. Without this evidence,the authorities' intrusion into the appellant's dwelling cannot be given any color of legality. While the power to searchand seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing theconstitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference tothe basic principles of government (Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235). As a consequence, the searchconducted by the authorities was illegal. It would have been different if the situation here demanded urgency whichcould have prompted the authorities to dispense with a search warrant. But the record is silent on this point. The factthat they came to the house of the appellant at nighttime (Exh. J, p. 7, Records ), does not grant them the license to goinside his house. In Alih v. Castro , We ruled that:

The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not urgent. They knewwhere the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a search warrant before making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the compound would be spirited away, they could havesurrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive measure. There was absolutely no reason at allwhy they should disregard the orderly processes required by the Constitution and instead insist onarbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioner's premises with all the menace of a mili tary invasion. (G.R.No. 69401, June 23, 1987, 151 SCRA 279, 286)

Another factor which illustrates the weakness of the case against the accused-appellant is in the identification of thegun which he was charged to have i llegally possessed. In the amended information ( supra , pp. 1-2), the gun wasdescribed as an M-14 rifle with serial no. 1249935 . Yet, the gun presented at the trial bore a different serial numberthus:

FISCAL

Q Will you kindly restate again the items that you found inside the house?

Lt. Quijardo:

A When she opened the doors of the rooms that we requested for, we immediately sawdifferent kinds of books of which we believed to be used for subversive orientation and the M-14 rifle.

Q In what portion of the house did you find this M-14 rifle which you mentioned?

A In the same room of which the subversive documents were placed.

Q If this firearm would be shown to you would you be able to identify the same?

A Yes, sir.


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Q I am showing to you a rifle bearing a serial number 1249985 which for purposes of identification, may we request your Honor, that this rifle be marked as Exhibit "D."

COURT:

Mark it.

FISCAL:

Q Kindly examine the said firearm and tell the Honorable Court the relation of that firearm tothe firearm which according to you you found inside the room allegedly occupied by oneBernie Mendoza?

A This is the same rifle which was discovered during our raid in the same house. (TSN,October 31, 1989, pp. 36-38, emphasis supplied).

The Solicitor General contends that the discrepancy is merely a typographical error.

We do not think so. This glaring error goes into the substance of the charge. Its correction or lack of i t could spell thedifference between freedom and incarceration of the accused-appellant.

In crimes of illegal possession of firearm as in this case, the prosecution has the burden to prove the existence of thefirearm and that the accused who possessed or owned the firearm does not have the corresponding license for it. Sincethe gun as identified at the trial differs from the gun described in the amended information, the corpus delicti (thesubstance of the crime, the fact that a crime has actually been committed) has not been fully established. Thiscircumstance coupled with dubious claims of appellant's connection to the house (where the gun was found) havetotally emasculated the prosecution's case.

But even as We find for the accused-appellant, We, take exception to the argument raised by the defense that thecrime of subversion absorbs the crime of illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of or incident to or in connectionwith the crime of subversion. It appears that the accused-appellant is facing a separate charge of subversion. Thedefense submits that the trial court should have peremptorily dismissed this case in view of the subversion charge.In People of the Philippines v. Asuncion, et al ., We set forth in no uncertain terms the futility of such argument. Wequote:

If We are to espouse the theory of the respondents that force and violence are the very essence of subversion, then it loses its distinction from rebellion. In People v. Liwanag (G.R. No. 27683, 1976, 73 SCRA473, 480 [1976]), the Court categorically distinguished subversion from rebellion, and held:

Violation of Republic Act No. 1700, or subversion, as it is more commonly called, is a crimedistinct from that of actual rebellion. The crime of rebellion is committed by rising publicly


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and taking up arms against the Government for any of the purposes specified in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code; while the Anti-Subversion Act (Republic Act No. 1700)punishes affiliation or membership in a subversive organization as defined therein. Inrebellion, there must be a public uprising and taking of arms against the Government;whereas, in subversion, mere membership in a subversive association is sufficient and thetaking up of arms by a member of a subversive organization against the Government is but acircumstance which raises the penalty to be imposed upon the offender. (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, in the case of Buscayno v. Military Commission (G.R. 58284, 109 289 (1981]), this Court saidthat subversion, like treason, is a crime against national security, while rebellion is a crime against publicorder. Rising publicly and taking arms against the Government is the very element of the crime onrebellion. On the other hand, R.A. 1700 was enacted to outlaw the Communist Party of the Philippines(CPP) , other similar associations and its successors because their existence and activities constitute aclear, present and grave danger to national security.

The first Whereas clause of R.A. 1700 states that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow theGovernment, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion, and other illegal means . This isa recognition that subversive acts do not only constitute force and violence (contrary to the arguments of private respondents), but may partake of other forms as well. One may in fact be guil ty of subversion byauthoring subversive materials, where force and violence is neither necessary or indispensable.

Private respondents contended that the Court in Misolas v. Panga impliedly ruled that if an accused issimultaneously charged with violation of P.D. 1866 and subversion, the doctrine of absorption of commoncrimes as applied in rebellion would have found application therein. The respondents relied on the opinionof this Court when it said:

. . . in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified offense of illegal possession of firearmsand ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGALPOSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL

POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguez find no application inthis case.

This is however a mere obiter. In the above case, the Court upheld the validity of the charge under the third paragraphof Section 1 of P.D. 1866. The Court opined that the dictum in the Hernandez case is not applicable in that case,considering that the legislature deemed it fit to provide for two distinct offenses: (1) illegal possession of firearmsqualified by subversion (P.D. 1866) and (2) subversion qualified by the taking up of arms against the Government (R.A.1700). The practical result of this may be harsh or it may pose grave difficulty on an accused in instances similar tothose that obtain in the present case, but the wisdom of the legislature in the lawful exercise of its power to enact lawsis something that the Court cannot inquire into . . . (G.R. Nos. 83837-42, April 22, 1992).


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Nonetheless, the evidence in hand is too weak to convict the accused-appellant of the charge of il legal possession of firearm in furtherance of, or incident to or in connection with the crime of subversion, We are therefore, left with nooption, but to acquit the accused on reasonable doubt.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and the appellant is ACQUITTED with costs de oficio .

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-95630 June 18, 1992

SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and MA. LUISA VEROY, petitioners,vs.THE HON. WILLIAM L. LAYAGUE, Presiding Judge, Branch XIV, Regional Trial Court at Davao City; and BRIG.GEN. PANTALEON DUMLAO, Commanding General, PC-Criminal Investigation Service, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This was originally a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court: certiorari , toreview the Order of the respondent Judge dated October 2, 1990 denying herein petitioner's Motion for HospitalConfinement; mandamus, to compel respondent Judge to resolve petitioners' long pending motion for bail; andprohibition, to enjoin further proceedings on the ground that the legal basis therefore is unconstitutional for beingviolative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

The facts of this case are as follows:

Petitioners are husband and wife who owned and formerly resided at No. 13 Isidro St., Skyline Village. CatalunanGrande, Davao City. When petitioner Leopoldo Veroy was promoted to the position of Assistant Administrator of theSocial Security System sometime in June, 1988, he and his family transferred to 130 K-8th St., East Kamias, QuezonCity, where they are presently residing. The care and upkeep of their residence in Davao City was left to two (2)houseboys, Jimmy Favia and Eric Burgos, who had their assigned quarters at a portion of the premises. The Veroyswould occasionally send money to Edna Soguilon for the salary of the said houseboys and other expenses for theupkeep of their house. While the Veroys had the keys to the interior of the house, only the key to the kitchen, where thecircuit breakers were located, was entrusted to Edna Soguilon to give her access in case of an emergency. Hence, since1988, the key to the master's bedroom as well as the keys to the children's rooms were retained by herein Petitionersso that neither Edna Soguilon nor the caretakers could enter the house.

On April 12, 1990, Capt. Reynaldo Obrero of the Talomo Patrol Station, PC/INP, acting upon a directive issued byMetrodiscom Commander Col. Franco Calida, raided the house of herein petitioners in Davao City on information thatthe said residence was being used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yard with the help of


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the caretakers but did not enter the house since the owner was not present and they did not have a search warrant.Petitioner Ma. Luisa was contacted by telephone in her Quezon City residence by Capt. Obrero to ask permission tosearch the house in Davao City as it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center of rebel soldiers.Petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy responded that she is flying to Davao City to witness the search but relented if the searchwould not be conducted in the presence of Major Ernesto Macasaet, an officer of the PC/INP, Davao City and a long timefamily friend of the Veroys. The authority given by Ma. Luisa Veroy was relayed by Capt. Obrero to Major Macasaet whoanswered that Ma. Luisa Veroy has called him twice by telephone on the matter and that the permission was given onthe condition that the search be conducted in his presence.

The following day, Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet met at the house of herein petitioners in Skyline Village to conductthe search pursuant to the authority granted by petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy. The caretakers facilitated their entry intothe yard, and using the key entrusted to Edna Soguilon, they were able to gain entrance into the kitchen. However, alocksmith by the name of George Badiang had to be employed to open the padlock of the door leading to the children'sroom. Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet then entered the children's room and conducted the search. Capt. Obrerorecovered a .45 cal. handgun with a magazine containing seven (7) l ive bullets in a black clutch bag inside an unlockeddrawer. Three (3) half-full jute sacks containing printed materials of RAM-SFP (samples of which were attached asAnnexes "H" and "H-1" of the petition) ( Rollo , pp. 49-55) were also found in the children's room. A search of thechildren's recreation and study area revealed a big travelling bag containing assorted polo shirts, men's brief, two (2)pieces polo barong and short sleeve striped gray polo. sweat shirt, two (2) pairs men's socks, a towel made in U.S.A.,one blanket, a small black bag, Gandhi brand, containing a book entitled "Islamic Revolution Future Path of the Nation",a road map of the Philippines, a telescope, a plastic bag containing assorted medicines and religious pamphlets wasfound in the master's bedroom. Sgt. Leo Justalero was instructed by Capt. Obrero to make an inventory and receipt of the articles seized, in the house (Annex "F" of the Petition, Rollo , p. 48). Said receipt was signed by Eric Burgos, one of the caretakers, and George Badiang, the locksmith, as witnesses. Sgt. Justalero turned over the articles to Sgt. RodolfoUrbano at the police station.

The case was referred for preliminary investigation to Quezon City Assistant Prosecutor Rodolfo Ponferrada who wasdesignated Acting Provincial Prosecutor for Davao City by the Department of Justice through Department Order No. 88dated May 16, 1990. In a resolution dated August 6, 1990, Fiscal Ponferrada recommended the filing of an informationagainst herein petitioners for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitionsin Furtherance of Rebellion) (Annex "L" of the Petition, Rollo , p. 71). Hence, on August 8, 1990. an Information for thesaid offense was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City before the Regional Trial Court, 11th JudicialRegion, Davao City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 20595-90 and entitled"People of the Philippines v. Atty. LeopoldoVeroy and Mrs. Maria Luisa Veroy" (Annex "K" of the Petition, Rollo , p. 70). No bail was recommended by theprosecution.

The aforementioned resolution dated August 6, 1990 of Fiscal Ponferrada was received by the petitioners on August 13,1990. On the same day, the latter filed a Motion for Bail before herein respondent Judge Layague which was denied onAugust 17, 1990 for being premature since at that time, petitioners had not yet been arrested. Despite the fact that thewarrants for their arrest have not yet been served on them, herein petitioners voluntarily surrendered themselves to


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Brig. Gen. Pantaleon Dumlao, PC-CIS Chief, since it was the CIS that initiated the complaint. However, the latter refusedto receive them on the ground that his office has not yet received copies of their warrants of arrest.

In the meantime, on August 15, 1990, herein petitioners were admitted to the St. Luke's Hospital for various ailmentsbrought about or aggravated by the stress and anxiety caused by the filing of the criminal complaint. On August 17,1990, Brig. Gen. Dumlao granted their request that they be allowed to be confined at the hospital and placed underguard thereat.

In an Indorsement dated August 20, 1990, the CIS through Capt. Benjamin de los Santos, made its return to the trialcourt informing the latter of the voluntary surrender of herein petitioners and the fact that they were under hospitalconfinement. Herein Petitioner reiterated their Motion for Bail. In an Order dated August 24, 1990 (Annex "M" of thePetition, Rollo , p. 74), the hearing for the Motion for Ball was set for August 31, 1990 to enable the prosecution topresent evidence it opposition to said motion. The prosecution filed its written opposition (Annex "N" of thePetition, Rollo , p. 75) on August 28, 1990, arguing that the evidence of petitioners' guilt was strong and thereafterpresented its evidence.

On September 21, 1990, respondent Judge required the CIS to produce the bodies of herein petitioners on October 1,1990 for arraignment (Annex "O" of the Petition, Rollo , p. 76). Upon their arraignment, herein Petitioners entered a pleaof not guilty and filed an "Urgent Motion for Hospital Confinement" (Annex "OO" of the Petition Rollo , p. 77) which wasdenied by the court in its Order dated October 2, 1990 (Annex "P" of the Petition, Rollo , p. 80). It likewise ordered theircommitment at the Davao City Rehabilitation Center, Ma-a, Davao City pending trial on the merits. Herein petitionersargued orally a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the prosecution. At the conclusion thereof, the court aquo issued a second order annex "Q" of the Petition, Rollo , p. 83) denying then motion for reconsideration and as to thealternative prayer to reopen the motion for hospital confinement, set the continuance thereof to October 17, 1990. Itwas further ordered that the petition

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