Consti 2 Outline (Bill of Rights Sec 1-4)

University of Cebu College of Law (Constitutional Law 2 Course Outline 2)

Instructor: Atty. Ria Lidia G. Espina

III. Bill of Rights

A. Definition/scope

1. Civil rights - Those rights that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in a wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of government. They include the rights to property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc.. They are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.

2. Political rights - They refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, e.g., the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right to petition and, in general the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government

Simon vs. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994Doctrine: Civil rights are those rights that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in a wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of government; political rights refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government.

FACTS: On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending the resolution of the vendors/squatters complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR.

On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning CHR's jurisdiction and supplemental motion to dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990 stating that Commissioners' authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case were not civil and political rights, but their privilege to engage in business".

On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying petitioners' motion and supplemental motion to dismiss. And petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied also in an Order, dated April 25, 1991.

The Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, praying for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. Petitioner also prayed to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Ferno, et.al vs. Quimpo, et.al".

ISSUE: W/N the issuance of an "order to desist" is within the extent of the authority and power of the CRH.

HELD: No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority and power of the CHR. Article XIII, Section 18(1), provides the power and functions of the CHR to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any part, all forms of human rights violation, involving civil and political rights".

The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an adjudicative power that it does not possess. The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue an restraining order or writ of injunction, for it were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued by the Judge in any court in which the action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC.

The writ prayed for the petition is granted. The CHR is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580.

B. Due process of law“A law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon

inquiry and renders judgment only after trial” [Darmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton 518],

“Responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice” [Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association v. City of Manila, 20 SCRA 849].

“The embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play” [Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, pp 32-33 ].

1. Who are protected

Smith, Bell & Company (Ltd.) vs. Joaquin Natividad, Collector of Customs of the port of Cebu, 40 Phil 163Doctrine: Universal in application to all persons, without regards to any difference in race, color or nationality. Artificial persons are covered by the protection but only insofar as their property is concerned.

Facts: This is a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by the petitioner to compel Natividad to issue a certificate of Philippine registry in favor of the former for its motor vessel Bato of more than fifteen tons gross, built in the Philippine Islands in 1916.

Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippine Islands whose majority stockholders are British subjects. The Bato was brought to Cebu in the present year for the purpose of transporting plaintiff's merchandise between ports in the Islands. Application was made at Cebu, the home port of the vessel, to the Collector of Customs for a certificate of Philippine registry. The Collector refused to issue the certificate on the grounds that all the stockholders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd. were not citizens either of the United States or of the Philippine Islands. The instant action is the result.

Counsel argues that Act No. 2761 denies to Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., the equal protection of the laws because it, in effect, prohibits the corporation from owning vessels, and because classification of corporations based on the citizenship of one or more of their stockholders is capricious, and that Act No. 2761 deprives the corporation of its property without due process of law because by the passage of the law company was automatically deprived of every beneficial attribute of ownership in the Bato and left with the naked title to a boat it could not use .

Issue: W/N the Government of the Philippine Islands, through its Legislature, can deny the registry of vessel in its coastwise trade to corporations having alien stockholders

HELD: YES. Act No. 2761 provides:Investigation into character of vessel. — No application for a certificate of Philippine register shall be approved until the collector of customs is satisfied from an inspection of the vessel that it is engaged or destined to be engaged in legitimate trade and that it is of domestic ownership as such ownership is defined in section eleven hundred and seventy-two of this Code.Certificate of Philippine register. — Upon registration of a vessel of domestic ownership, and of more than fifteen tons gross, a certificate of Philippine register shall be issued for it. If the vessel is of domestic ownership and of fifteen tons gross or less, the taking of the certificate of Philippine register shall be optional with the owner.

While Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., a corporation having alien stockholders, is entitled to the protection afforded by the due-process of law and equal protection of the laws clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights, nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature, in denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell &. Co. Ltd., the right to register vessels in the Philippines coastwise trade, does not belong to that vicious species of class legislation which must always be condemned, but does fall within authorized exceptions, notably, within the purview of the police power, and so does not offend against the constitutional provision.

Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong, 86 SCRA 275Doctrine: The guarantee extends to aliens and includes the means of livelihood

FACTS: This case involves an ordinance prohibiting aliens from being employed or engage or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00. Private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition to stop the enforcement of such ordinance as well as to declare the same null and void. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, hence this case.

ISSUE: W/N said Ordinance violates due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.

HELD: Yes. The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor who may withhold or refuse it at his will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The

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shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

2. Meaning of life, liberty or property

Life includes the right of an individual to his body in its completeness, free from dismemberment, and extends to the use of God-given faculties which make life enjoyable [Justice Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law, pp. 320321]. See: Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200.

Liberty includes “the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude, x x x (It) includes the right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways x x x” [Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660]

Property is anything that can come under the right of ownership and be the subject of contract. It represents more than the things a person owns; it includes the right to secure, use and dispose of them [Torraco v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197]. i)

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) vs. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., 50 SCRA 189Doctrine: The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security “against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general principles”

FACTS: Petitioners herein alleged that they informed the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills of their decision to have a mass demonstration at Malacañang, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. The company respondent pleaded to exclude the employees in the first shift to join the mass demonstration; however the petitioners still included them. As a result, the company respondent filed a case thru the city prosecutor and charged the demonstrating employees of violation of the CBA. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondent company, and the petitioners failed to file a timely motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: WON the case dismissal as a consequence of a procedural fault violates due process.

HELD: Yes. The decision of the CIR to dismiss the petition based on technicality (being 2 days late) was rendered null and void. (The constitutional rights have dominance over procedural rules.) And, the company was directed to reinstate the eight officers with full backpay from date of separation minus the one day's pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from other sources during their separation from service. (The removal from employment of the officers were deemed too harsh a punishment for their actions)

Nunez vs. Averia, 57 SCRA 726Doctrine: Public office is not property; but one unlawfully ousted from it may institute an action to recover the same, flowing from the de jure officer’s right to office. It is nevertheless a protected right.

Facts: Petitioner CONSTANTINO A. NUÑEZ, is the protestant in Election Case No. TM-470 of respondent court contesting the November 8, 1971 election results in certain precincts for the mayoralty of Tarnate, Cavite on the ground of fraud, irregularities and corrupt practices. Original protestee was the proclaimed mayor-elect Edgardo Morales, who was ambushed and killed on February 15, 1974 in a barrio of Tarnate and hence was succeeded by then vice-mayor Rodolfo de Leon (respondent) who as the incumbent mayor is now substituted in this action as party respondent. Respondent court had in its questioned order of January 31, 1974 granted protestee's motion for dismissal of the election protest on the ground "that this court has lost its jurisdiction to decide this case for the reason that the same has become moot and academic," citing the President's authority under General Order No. 3 and Article XVII, section 9 of the 1973 Constitution to remove from office all incumbent government officials and employees, whether elective or appointive. Upon receipt of respondent's comment the Court resolved to consider petitioner's petition for review on certiorari as a special civil action and the case submitted for decision for prompt disposition thereof.

Issue: W/N public office is a property right protected by the Constitution.

Held: No, public office is not considered a property; but to the extent that security of tenure cannot be compromised without due process, it is in a

limited sense analogous to property. ACCORDINGLY, respondent court's dismissal order of January 31, 1974 is hereby set aside and respondent court is directed to immediately continue with the trial and determination of the election protest before it on the merits.

Crespo v. Provincial Board, 160 SCRA 66Doctrine: An order of suspension, without opportunity for hearing, violates property rights

FACTS: Gregorio T. Crespo was elected Municipal Mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, in the local elections of 1967. On January 25, 97, an administrative complaint was filed against him by private respondent Pedro T. Wycoco for harassment, abuse of authority and oppression. As required, petitioner filed a written explanation as to why he should not be dealt with administratively, with the Provincial Board of Nueve Ecija, in accordance with Section 5, Republic Act No. 5185. However, on February 15, 1971, without notifying Crespo or his counsel, the board proceeded with the hearing and allowed private respondent Pedro Wycoco to present evidence, and thereafter, the board issued Resolution No. 51 ordering a preventive suspension against petitioner mayor Crespo. This was assailed by petitioner arbitrary, high-handed, atrocious, shocking and grossly violative of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5185 which requires a hearing and investigation, and grossly violated the due process.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner mayor was deprived with due process.

HELD: Yes, the order of preventive suspension was issued without giving the petitioner a chance to be heard. To controvert the claim of petitioner that he was not fully notified of the scheduled hearing, respondent Provincial Board, in its Memorandum, contends that "Atty. Bernardo M. Abesamis, counsel for the petitioner mayor made known by a request in writing, sent to the Secretary of the Provincial Board his desire to be given opportunity to argue the explanation of the said petitioner mayor at the usual time of the respondent Board's meeting, but unfortunately, inspire of the time allowed for the counsel for the petitioner mayor to appear as requested by him, he failed to appeal." The contention of the Provincial Board cannot stand alone in the absence of proof or evidence to support it. The assailed order was issued mainly on the basis of the evidence presented ex parte by respondent Wycoco, and nothing therein can be gathered that the written explanation submitted by petitioner was taken into account.

Republic vs. Rosemore Mining and Development Corporation, G.R. 149927, March 30, 2004Doctrine: A mining license that contravenes a mandatory provision of law under which it is granted is void. Being a mere privilege, a license does not vest absolute rights in the holder. Thus, without offending the due process and the non-impairment clauses of the Constitution, it can be revoked by the State in the public interest

Facts: Petitioner Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation after having been granted permission to prospect for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan, succeeded in discovering marble deposits of high quality and in commercial quantities in Mount Mabio which forms part of the Biak-na-Bato mountain range.

The petitioner then applied with the Bureau of Mines, now Mines and Geosciences Bureau, for the issuance of the corresponding license to exploit said marble deposits.

License No. 33 was issued by the Bureau of Mines in favor of the herein petitioners. Shortly thereafter, Respondent Ernesto Maceda cancelled the petitioner’s license stating that their license had illegally been issued, because it violated Section 69 of PD 463; and that there was no more public interest served by the continued existence or renewal of the license. The latter reason was confirmed by the language of Proclamation No. 84. According to this law, public interest would be served by reverting the parcel of land that was excluded by Proclamation No. 2204 to the former status of that land as part of the Biak-na-Bato national park.

Issue: Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 84 is valid.

Held: Yes. We cannot sustain the argument that Proclamation No. 84 is a bill of attainder; that is, a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial.” Its declaration that QLP No. 33 is a patent nullity is certainly not a declaration of guilt. Neither is the cancellation of the license a punishment within the purview of the constitutional proscription against bills of attainder.

Too, there is no merit in the argument that the proclamation is an ex post facto law. It is settled that an ex post facto law is limited in its

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scope only to matters criminal in nature. Proclamation 84, which merely restored the area excluded from the Biak-na-Bato national park by canceling respondents’ license, is clearly not penal in character.

Also at the time President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 84 on March 9, 1987, she was still validly exercising legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution of 1986. Section 1 of Article II of Proclamation No. 3, which promulgated the Provisional Constitution, granted her legislative power until a legislature is elected and convened under a new Constitution. The grant of such power is also explicitly recognized and provided for in Section 6 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.

Pedro vs. Provincial Board of Rizal, 53 Phil 123Doctrine: Mere privileges, such as the license to operate a cockpit, are not property rights and are revocable at will

FACTS: Petitioner Gregorio Pedro assails the validity of Ordinance No. 36,

series 1928 which was approved by the temporary councilors appointed by the provincial governor of Rizal, Eligio Naval.

Petitioner contends that the ordinance should be declared null and void on the following grounds:1. It impairs his acquired rights; 2. It was enacted on account of prejudice considering that the

ordinance is purposely enacted for a special purpose, namely, to prevent, at any cost, the opening, maintenance, and exploitation of the cockpit of the said petitioner-appellant; and

3. It provides for special committee composed of persons who are not members of the council. Hence, they are not accorded with the power to act like the other Councilors.

Pedro further asserts that having obtained the proper permit in order for him to maintain, exploit and open to the public the cockpit in question, and having paid the license for the same, he was able to fulfill all the requirements provided by Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928. Hence, Pedro sticks firm to his belief that he already acquired a right which cannot be taken away from him by Ordinance No. 36.

ISSUE: Whether or not a license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit falls under the property rights which a person may not be deprived without due process of law.

HELD: No; a license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit does NOT fall under the property rights which a person may not be deprived without due process of law.

The Court held that a license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is a mere privilege which may be revoked when the public interests so require. The special committee composed of persons who are not members of the council are NOT performing a legislative act. The work entrusted to them by the municipal council is only informational. Further, the ordinance, which was approved by a municipal council duly constituted, that suspends the effects of another which had been enacted to favor the grantee of a cockpit license, is valid and legal.

G.R. No. 157036 June 9, 2004 (431 SCRA 534)FRANCISCO CHAVEZ VS. HON. ALBERTO ROMULO AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, PNP CHIEF HERMOGENES EBDANEDoctrine: The license to carry a firearm is neither a property nor a property right. Neither does it create a vested right. A permit to carry a firearm outside one’s residence may be revoked at any time. Even if it were a property right, it cannot be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of police power

FACTS: This case is about the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence in order to deter the rising crime rates. Petitioner questions the ban as a violation of his right to property. Chavez is a gun- owner who filed a petition for prohibition and in-

junction seeking to enjoin the implementation of the “ Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carying of Firearms Outside of Residence” issued by PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane, Jr. In January 2003, Pres. Arroyo delivered a speech before the members of the PNP stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crime incidents. She directed PNP Chief Ebdane to suspend the issuance of permits to carry firearms outside of resi-dence (PTCFOR). Thus, Chief Ebdane issued the assailed Guidelines. Chavez contends that such guidelines was a derogation of his consti-tutional right to life and to protect life as he, being a law-abiding li-censed gun-owner is the only class subject to the implementation while leaving the law-breakers (kidnappers, MILF, hold-uppers, rob-bers etc.) untouched. Petitioner also averred that ownership and car-rying of firearms are constitutionally protected property rights which

cannot be taken away without due process of law.

ISSUES:1. WON the citizens’ right to bear arms is a constitutional right2. WON the revocation of the PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed Guide-

lines is a violation of right to property3. WON the issuance of said Guidelines is a valid exercise of Police

power

HELD: 1. SC ruled that nowhere fond in our Constitution is the provision on

bearing arms as a constitutional right. The right to bear arms, then, is a mere statutory privilege unlike in the American Constitution which was the law invoked by petitioner. Right to bear arms is a mere statutory creation as was observed by the laws passed to regulate the use, acquisition, transfer, importation of firearms; it cannot be consid-ered an inalienable or absolute right.

2. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to en-joy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. A li-cense is merely a privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the granting authority and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property right nor does it create a vested right. Such license may be revoked anytime when the authority deems it fit to do so, and such revocation does not deprive the holder of any property, or immunity.

3. The test to determine the validity of police measure , thus: The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from

those of a particular class, require the exercise of the police power; and

The means employed are reasonably necessary for the ac-complishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the so-ciety. Owing to the proliferation of crimes, particularly those committed by NPA, which tends to disturb the peace of the com-munity, Pres. Arroyo deemed it best to impose a nationwide gun ban. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the issuance of guide-lines is the interest of the public in general. Such means of revo-cation is, thus, a valid exercise of police power.

Petition is hereby dismissed.

Libanan v. Sandiganbayan, 233 SCRA 163Doctrine: The mandatory suspension from office of a public official pending criminal prosecution for violation of RA 3019 cannot amount to deprivation of property without due process of law

Canlas vs. Napico Homeowners, G.R. No. 182795, June 5, 2008

Facts: Petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in the Brgy. Manggahan, Pasig City. Their dwellings have either been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment. Petitioners claim that respondents hold fraudulent and spurious titles. Thus, the petition for writ of amparo. The rule on writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extra legal killings or disappearances.

Issue: WON the writ of amparo is a correct remedy for the petitioners.

Ruling: No. The writ of amparo does not cover the cause of the petitioners. The threatened demolition of a dwelling by a virtue of a final judgment of the court is not included among the enumeration of rights covered by the writ. Also, the factual and legal basis for petitioners’ claim to the land in question is not alleged at all in the petition

Luque vs. Villegas, G.R. No. L-22545, November 28, 1969

Facts: Petitioners (who are passengers from Cavite and Batangas who ride on buses to and from their province and Manila) and some public service operators of buses and jeeps assail the validity of Ordinance 4986and Administrative Order 1.

Ordinance 4986 states that PUB and PUJs shall be allowed to enter Manila only from 6:30am to 8:30pm every day except Sundays and holidays.

Petitioners contend that since they possess a valid CPC, they have already acquired a vested right to operate.

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Administrative Order 1 issued by Commissioner of Public Service states that all jeeps authorized to operate from Manila to any point in Luzon, beyond the perimeter of Greater Manila, shall carry the words "For Provincial Operation".

Issue: W/N Ordinance 4986 destroys vested rights to operate in Manila

Held: NO! A vested right is some right or interest in the property which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. As far as the State is concerned, a CPC constitutes neither a franchise nor a contract, confers no property right, and is a mere license or privilege.

The holder does not acquire a property right in the route covered, nor does it confer upon the holder any proprietary right/interest/franchise in the public highways.

Neither do bus passengers have a vested right to be transported directly to Manila. The alleged right is dependent upon the manner public services are allowed to operate within a given area. It is no argument that the passengers enjoyed the privilege of having been continuously transported even before outbreak of war. Times have changed and vehicles have increased. Traffic congestion has moved from worse to critical. Hence, there is a need to regulate the operation of public services.

3. Aspects of due process

a. Substantive due process - This serves as a restriction on government's law- and rulemaking powers

The requisites are:1. The interests of the public, in general, as distinguished from

those of a particular class, require the intervention of the State.2. The means employed are reasonably necessary for the

accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive on individuals

US vs. Toribio, 15 Phil 85 FACTS: Appellant in the case at bar was charged for the violation of sections 30 & 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle. Evidence sustained in the trial court found that appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao described in the information, without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality where it was slaughtered. Appellant contends that he applied for a permit to slaughter the animal but was not give none because the carabao was not found to be “unfit for agricultural work” which resulted to appellant to slaughter said carabao in a place other than the municipal slaughterhouse. Appellant then assails the validity of a provision under Act No. 1147 which states that only carabaos unfit for agricultural work can be slaughtered.

ISSUE: W/N Act No. 1147 is constitutional.

HELD: Yes. The provision of the statute in question being a proper exercise of police power is not a violation of the terms of Section 5 of the Philippine Bill; a provision which itself is adopted from the Constitution of US; and is found in substance in the Consititution of most if not all of the States of the Union.

Churchill vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil 580FACTS: Plaintiffs put up a billboard on private land in Rizal Province "quite a distance from the road and strongly built". Someresidents (German and British Consuls) find it offensive. Act # 2339 allows the defendent, the Collector of InternalRevenue, to collect taxes from such property and to remove it when it is offensive to sight. Court of first Instanceprohibited the defendant to collect or remove the billboard

ISSUE: 1. W/N the courts may restrain by injunction the collection of taxes 2. Is Act # 2339 unconstitutional because it deprives property without

due process of law in allowing CIR to remove it if it is offensive

HELD: 1. An injunction is an extraordinary remedy and not to be used if there is

an adequate remedy provided by law; here there is an adequate remedy, therefore court may not do so.

2. Unsightly advertisements which are offensive to the sight are not dissociated from the general welfare of the public, therefore can be regulated by police power, and act is constitutional.

Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660Doctrine: “Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases

FACTS: Petitioner Rubi and other Mangyanes were recommended by the Provincial Governor of Mindoro to take their habitation on an unoccupied land of Tigbao on Naujan Lake to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they run. The Mangyanes had to stay there for a reason of cultivation under certain plans. Over 300 Mangyanes were confined on a 800 hectares whereas the land is under the resolution of the Provincial Board. Then Dabalos, one of the Mangyanes, was taken by the provincial sheriff and imprisoned him at Calapan solely because he escaped from the reservation. Habeas Corpus was made on behalf of Rubi and the Mangyans for an application that alleged the virtue of the resolution of the provincial board creating the reservation whereas they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. The validity of Sec.2145 of the Administrative Code was challenged.

ISSUE: WON Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprives a person of his liberty of abode.

HELD: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes. One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines.

Binay vs. Domingo, G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991Facts: Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which extends P500 burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross family income does not exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken out of the unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the program. However, the Commission on Audit disapproved said resolution and the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof for the following reasons: (1) the resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, general welfare, safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2) government funds must be disbursed for public purposes only; and, (3) it violates the equal protection clause since it will only benefit a few individuals.

Issues:1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the general welfare clause2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause

1. Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause.

2. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare, social justice as well as human dignity and respect for human rights." The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.

3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment.

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Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers

Agcaoili vs. Felipe, 149 SCRA 341

Lupangco vs. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 848Facts: On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy.

No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days immediately preceding every examination day including examination day.

Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission

On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.

Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution

In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional

Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the Court of Appeals

Issue: Whether or not the PRC resolution violates substantive due process

Held: Yes. Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfilment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote their personal growth

Balacuit vs. Court of First Instance, 163 SCRA 182FACTS: This involves a Petition for Review questioning the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No.640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969, penalizing any person, group of persons, entity or corporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests or other performances to require children between 7 and 12years of age to pay full payment for tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the said ticket. Petitioners who are managers of theaters, affected by the ordinance, filed a Complaint before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City docketed as Special Civil No. 237 on June 30,1969, praying that the subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, void and unenforceable. The Court rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of Butuan constitutional and valid.

ISSUE: Whether Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan is valid and constitutional and was the Ordinance a valid exercise of police power

HELD: NO. Ordinance No. 640 is declared unconstitutional. The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.

BANAT vs. Comelec, 595 SCRA 477Facts: The case is a Special Civil action filed by BANAT (Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency) party-list, a duly accredited multi-sectoral organization, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9363 and enjoining the COMELEC and from implementing the statute. R.A. 9363 is a consolidation of Senate bill and House bill passed by the Senate and signed by the President.

Issue: W/N R.A. 9363 constitutional?

Ruling: The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.Topic related discussion:

STATUTES – It is settled that every statute is presumed to be constitutional. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law. Those who petition the Court to declare a law unconstitutional must show that there is a cleared and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful, speculative or argumentative one; otherwise, the petition must fail.

TITLE OF BILLS – The constitutional requirement that “every bill” passed by the Congress shall embrace shall embrace o0nly one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof” has always been given a practical rather than technical construction. The requirement is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the general purpose which he statute seeks to achieve. A title which declares a statue to be an act amends a specified code is sufficient and the precise nature of the amendatory ct need not be further stated.

People vs. Siton, 600 SCRA 476FACTS: Siton et al. were charged with vagrancy pursuant to Art. 202(2) of theRPC.1 They filed separate motions to quash on the ground that Art. 202(2) is unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad. The MTC denied the motions and declared that the law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the State’s police power and justified by the maxim“salus populi est suprema lex.” The MTC also noted that in the affidavit of the arresting officer it was stated that there was a prior surveillance conducted on Siton et al. in an area reported to be frequented by vagrants and prostitutes who solicited sexual favors. Siton et al. thus filed an original petition for certiorari and prohibition with the RTC, directly challenging the constitutionality of Art. 202(2). Siton et al.’s position:(1) The definition is vague. The definition results in an arbitrary identification of violators (the definition includes persons who are otherwise performing ordinary peaceful acts) (3) Art. 202(2) violated the equal protection clause because it discriminates against the poor and unemployed The OSG argued that the over breadth and vagueness doctrines apply only to free speech cases. It also asserted that Art. 202(2) must be presumed valid and constitutional. Siton et al. failed to overcome this presumption. The trial court declared Art. 202 (2) as unconstitutional for being vague and for violating the equal protection clause. Citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, it held that the “void for vagueness” doctrine is equally applicable in testing the validity of penal statutes.3 The court also held that the application of Art. 202(2), crafted in the 1930s, to our situation at present runs afoul of the equal protection clause as it offers no

reasonable classification. Since the definition of vagrancy under the provision offers no reasonable indicators to differentiate those who have no visible means of support by force of circumstance and those who choose to loiter about and bum around, who are the proper subjects of vagrancy legislation, it cannot pass a judicial scrutiny of its constitutionality.

ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 202(2) is unconstitutional.

OSG’s position:(1) Every law is presumed valid and all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality(2) The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines have special application to free-speech cases only and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes (3) Siton et al. failed to overcome the presumed validity of the statute(4) The State may regulate individual conduct for the promotion of public welfare in the exercise of its police power

Siton et al.’s position :(1) Art. 202(2) on its face violates the due process and the equal protection clauses (2) The due process vagueness standard, as distinguished from the free speech vagueness doctrine, is adequate to declare Art. 202(2) unconstitutional and void on its face(3) The presumption of constitutionality was adequately overthrown

HELD: CONSTITUTIONAL. The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties is legislative in nature and inherent in the sovereign power of the state as an aspect of police power. Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. The power is plenary and its scope is vast andpervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public

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health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare. As a police power measure, Art.202(2) must be viewed in a constitutional light

White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila, 576 SCRA 416Facts: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law and ordinance entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-time Admission, Short-time Admission Rates, and Wash-up Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila.” On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9 and prayed that the Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional. On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation and Sta. Mesa Tourist Development Corporation filed a motion to intervene, which was granted by the RTC. MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff which was also granted by the RTC. On January 14, 1993, the RTC issued a TRO directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance. On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. The City then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court referred the same to the Court of Appeals. The City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Local government code and the Revised Manila charter. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.

Issue: Whether the Ordinance is constitutional.

Held: No, it is not constitutional. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and the like. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends does not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricts the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification.

b. Procedural due process – This serves as a restriction on actions of judicial and quasijudicial agencies of government

Requisites: (Judicial Due Process) – IJHJ1. I – Impartial and Competent Court clothed with judicial power to

hear and determine the matter before it2. J – Jurisdiction lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant

and/or property3. H – Hearing (defendant must be given opportunity to be heard)

Cases in which notice and hearing may be dispensed without violating due process:1. Abatement of nuisance per se2. Preventive suspension of a civil servant facing admin

charges3.Cancellation of passport of a person sought for commission

of crime4. Statutory presumptions

4. J – Judgment rendered upon lawful hearing

G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998Imelda Romualdez-Marcos vs. SandiganbayanDoctrine: when the Court cross-examined the accused and witnesses, it acted with over-zealousness, assuming the role of both magistrate and advocate, and thus denied the accused due process of law

Rivera vs. Civil Service Commission, 240 SCRA 43Doctrine: A public officer who decided the case should not be the same person to decide it on appeal because he cannot be an impartial judge

FACTS: Petitioner was the manager of Corporate Banking Unit of LBP and was charged with dishonesty, receiving for personal use of fee, gift or other valuable thing in the course of official duties, committing acts punishable under the Anti-Graft Laws, and pursuit of private business vocation or profession without permission required by CSC. Rivera allegedly told Perez that he would facilitate the processing, approval and release of his loan if he would be given 10% commission. Rivera was further charged having served and acted, without prior authority required by CSC, as the personal consultant of Lao and consultant in various companies where Lao had

investments. LBP held Rivers guilty of grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service in accepting employment from a client of the bank. The penalty of forced resignation, without separation benefits and gratuities, was thereupon imposed on Rivera.

Issue: Whether the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in composing the capital penalty of dismissal on the basis of unsubstantiated finding and conclusions (violation of substantive due process)

Ruling: Yes. Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should have behooved Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit herself totally from any participation in resolving Rivera’s appeal to CSC to give full meaning and consequence to a fundamental aspect of due process. CSC resolution is SET ASIDE and the case is remanded to CSC for the resolution, sans the participation of CSC Commissioner Gaminde, as she was the Board Chairman of MSPB whose ruling is thus appealed

People vs. Medenilla, G.R. No. 131638-39, March 26, 2001Doctrine: even as the transcript of stenographic notes showed that the trial court intensively questioned the witnesses (approximately 43% of the questions asked of prosecution witnesses and the accused were propounded by the judge), the Supreme Court held that the questioning was necessary. Judges have as much interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious presentation of evidence, and have the duty to ask questions that would elicit the facts on the issues involved, clarify ambiguous remarks by witnesses, and address the points overlooked by counsel.Facts: On 16 April 1996, Loreto Medenilla y Doria was caught for illegal possession and unlawfully selling 5.08g of shabu (Criminal Case 3618-D), was in unlawful possession of 4 transparent plastic bags of shabu weighing 200.45g (Criminal Case 3619-D) in Mandaluyong City. Versions of facts leading to the arrest are conflicting; the prosecution alleging buy-bust operations, while defense claim illegal arrest, search and seizure. Arraigned on 25 June 1996, Medenilla pleaded not guilty. The judge therein, for the purpose of clarification, propounded a question upon a witness during the trial. On 26 November 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig (Branch 262) found Medenilla, in Criminal Cases 3618-D and 3619-D, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 15 and 16 of RA 6425, as amended (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).

Issue: Whether judges are allowed to asked clarificatory questions.

Held: YES. A single noted instance of questioning cannot justify a claim that the trial judge was biased. The Court have exhaustively examined the transcript of stenographic notes and determined that the trial judge was more than equitable in presiding over the hearings of this case. Moreover, a judge is not prohibited from propounding clarificatory questions on a witness if the purpose of which is to arrive at a proper and just determination of the case. “The trial judge must be accorded a reasonable leeway in putting such questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts to make the record speak the truth. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths which tend to destroy the theory of one party.”

G.R. No. 144464, November 22, 2001Cruz vs. Civil Service Commission, The Court rejected petitioners' contention that they were denied due process ostensibly because the Civil Service Commission acted as investigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge. The CSC is mandated to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by it or instituted before it directly or on appeal. Neither can it be denied that petitioners were formally charged after a prima facie case for dishonesty was found to exist. They were properly informed of the charges. They submitted an answer and were given the opportunity to defend themselves

FACTS: On September 9, 1994 it was discovered by the Civil Service Commission that Paitim, Municipal Treasurer of Bulacan took the non-professional examination for Cruz after the latter had previously failed in the said examination three times.

The CSC found after a fact finding investigation that a prima facie case exists against youfor DISHONESTY, GRAVE MISCONDUCT and CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BESTINTEREST OF THE SERVICE.

The petitioners filed their Answer to the charge entering a general denial of the material averments of the "Formal Charge." They also declared that they were electing a formal investigation on the matter. The petitioners subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that if the investigation will continue, they will be deprived of their right to due

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process because the Civil Service Commission was the complainant, the Prosecutor and the Judge, all at the same time. On November 16, 1995, Dulce J. Cochon issued an "Investigation Report and Recommendation" finding the Petitioners guilty of "Dishonesty" and ordering their dismissal from the government service.

Petitioners maintain that the CSC did not have original jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative case. Allegedly, in accordance with Section 47(1), Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title 1,Book V, Administrative Code of 1987, the CSC is vested with appellate jurisdiction only in all administrative cases where the penalty imposed is removal or dismissal from the office and where the complaint was filed by a private citizen against the government employee.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners’ right to due process was violated when the CSC acted as investigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge all at the same time.

HELD: NO. The fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC itself does not mean that it could not be an impartial judge. As an administrative body, its decision was based on substantial findings. Factual findings of administrative bodies, being considered experts in their field, are binding on the Supreme Court. The records clearly disclose that the petitioners were duly investigated by the CSC. After a careful examination of the records, the Commission finds respondents guilty as charged. The photograph pasted over the name Gilda Cruz in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP) during the July 30, 1989 Career Service Examination is not that of Cruz but of Paitim. Also, the signature over the name of Gilda Cruz in the said document is totally different from the signature of Gilda Cruz.

G.R. No. 76761, January 9, 1989Assistant Executive Secretary vs. Court of Appeals, Facts: On April 15, 1948, Jesus Larrabaster applied with the National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA) for a home lot at the Marbel Settlement District, Cotabato. Larrabaster’s application was granted on July 10, 1950 with a Home Lot Number 336 (later known as 335) with an area of 1,500 square meters.

Larrabaster then leased the lot to private respondent Basilio Mendoza and tolerated Jorge Geller to squat on the portion thereof. On November 25, 1952, the Land Settlement and Development Corporation (LASEDECO) took over the functions of NLSA.

On June 29, 1956, Larrabaster and his wife assigned their rights and interests over the Disputed Property to Jose Pena. Pena allowed Mendoza and Geller to stay on the lot. On September 1956, a supplementary Deed of Sale was executed by the same parties defining the boundaries of the disputed property.

On June 18, 1954, R.A No. 1160 transferred the custody and administration of the MarbelTownsite to the National Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA). Pena requested NARRA to approve the transfer of rights that the parties indicated but the latter did not approve such request in view of Proclamation Number 336, series of 1956, returning to the Bureau of Lands the disposition of lands which remained unallocated by the LASEDECO at the time of its abolition.

The Bureau of Lands did not act on Pena’s request either, prompting him to bring up the matter to the Board of Liquidators (BOL). Pena must have realized that the Disputed Property contained an area bigger than 1,500 sq. meters, he request to BOL that the area be adjusted from 1,500 to 3,616.93 sq. meters to conform to its actual area. Pena moved for reconsideration stressing that the land should be entitled to him, but BOL again denied the request under its Resolution No. 439, series of 1967. Pena then appealed to the Office of the President. The Office of the President asked the BOL to conduct investigation on the disputed property. BOL then recommended that Pena be awarded the Lot. No. 108 instead of the whole former Lot Number 355. Pena alleged that the lot transferred to him contains 3,616.93 and not 1,500 sq. meters. Upon Pena’s motion for reconsideration, the same office modified its decision awarding to Pena of the original Lot Number 355 is hereby maintained.

On August 1, 1969, private respondent Basilio Mendoza addressed a letter of protest to the BOL, to which the latter responded by advising Mendoza to direct its protest to the Office of the President.

Mendoza did so and on September 28, 1971, said office rendered its letter-decision, affirming its previous decision of May 13, 1969, having found no cogent reason to depart therefrom. In the meantime, on January 17, 1970, and while the protest with the office of the president was still pending, Mendoza resorted to Civil Case Number 98 for certiorari before then the Court of First Instance of Cotabato against petitioner- public officials and Pena. On June 23m 1978, Mendoza followed up with a Supplementary Petition to annul the administrative decision of September 20, 1971 denying his protest. On May 10, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision in Civil Case no. 98, dismissing Mendoza’s petition for Certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not private petitioner Basilio Mendoza was denied with the due process of law

Ruling: Although there was a procedural defect because there was an absence of notice and opportunity to be present in administrative proceedings, the defect was cured when Mendoza was allowed to file his letter-protest with the Office of the President.The foregoing observations do not justify the conclusion arrived at.

After the Office of the President had rendered its decision on May 13, 1969, Mendoza filed a letter-protest on August 1, 1971 with the BOL. The latter office directed him to file his protest with the Office of the President, which he did.

On September 28, 1972, Mendoza’s request for consideration was denied by the said Office. So that, even assuming that there was an absence of notice and opportunity to be present in the administrative proceedings prior to the rendition of the February 10, 1969 and May 19, 1969 decisions by the Office of the President, such procedural defect was cured when Mendoza elevated his letter-protest to the Office of the President, which subjected the controversy to appellate review but eventually denied reconsideration.

Having been given a chance to be heard with respect to his protest there is a sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process.

Bautista vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157219, May 28, 2004Doctrine: Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process.

Facts: On August 12, 1999, petitioners Natividad E. Bautista, Clemente E. Bautista and Socorro L. Angeles filed a complaint against respondent Manila Papermills, International, Inc. for quieting of title. This complaint was later amended to implead respondents Adelfa Properties, Inc. and the spouses Rodolfo and Nelly Javellana. fter several delays spanning more than two years, the case was finally set for trial. However, on May 2, 2002, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Postponement to cancel the hearing on the ground that Atty. Michael Macaraeg, the lawyer assigned to the case was in the United States attending to an important matter. The trial court denied petitioners motion for postponement and considered them as having waived the presentation of their evidence.

Issue: Whether or not there is a violation to due process.

Ruling: No, due process is not violated. Petitioners’ contention that they were denied due process is not well- taken. Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee. Mariveles Shipyard vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144134, November 11, 2003

Chua vs. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 33Doctrine: Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for recon-sideration.

Facts: From 1970 up to 1981, Roberto Chua lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A. Vallejo and they begot two sons. On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City.

On 2 July 1992, Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a petition for the guardianship and administration over the persons and properties of the two minors.

Petitioner Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua, representing to be the surviving spouse of Roberto Chua, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue. Petitioner alleged that at the time of the decedent’s death, Davao City was his residence, hence, the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is the proper forum. In support of her allegation, petitioner presented the following documents: (1) photocopy of the marriage contract; (2) Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of Davao City; (3) Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that he was married and was born in Cotabato City; (4) Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as married; and, (5) Passport of the decedent specifying that he was married and his residence was Davao City.

Vallejo contends that movant/oppositor Antonietta Chua is not the surviving spouse of the late Roberto L. Chua but a pretender to the estate of

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the latter since the deceased never contracted marriage with any woman until he died.

The trial court ruled that petitioner has no personality to file the motion not having proven his status as a wife of the decedent. The Order was appealed to the CA, but it decided in favor of herein respondents. The petioner elevated the case to the Supreme Court that the Court of Appeals erred in not nullifying the orders precipitately issued ex- parte by the public respondent Regional Trial Court in the intestate proceeding without prior hearing or notice to herein petitioner thereby depriving Antonietta Garcia Vda de Chua of the due process and opportunity to be heard.

Issue: Whether or not the Petitioner was denied of the due process?

Held: The petitioner was not denied of the due process . Due process was designed to afford opportunity to be heard, not that an actual hearing should always and indispensably be held. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. Here, even granting that the petitioner was not notified of the orders of the trial court inclusive, nonetheless, she was duly heard in her motions to recall letters of administration and to declare the proceedings of the court as a "mistrial," which motions were denied in the Order dated 22 November 1993. A motion for the reconsideration of this order of denial was also duly heard by the trial court but was denied in its Order of 13 December 1993.

Suntay vs. People, 101 Phil 833Facts: On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of 16 years, filed a verified complaint against Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City, alleging that on or about 21 June 21954, the accused took Alicia Nubla from St. Paul's College in Quezon City with lewd design and took her to somewhere near the University of the Philippines (UP) compound in Diliman and was then able to have carnal knowledge of her. On 15 December 1954, after an investigation, an Assistant City Attorney recommended to the City Attorney of Quezon City that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. On 23 December 1954 attorney for the complainant addressed a letter to the City Attorney of Quezon City wherein he took exception to the recommendation of the Assistant City Attorney referred to and urged that a complaint for seduction be filed against Suntay. On 10 January 1955, Suntay applied for and was granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs (5981 [A39184]). On 20 January 1955, Suntay left the Philippines for San Francisco, California, where he is at present enrolled in school. On 31 January 1955, Alicia Nubla subscribed and swore to a complaint charging Suntay with seduction which was filed, in the Court of First Instance (CFI) Quezon City, after preliminary investigation had been conducted (Criminal case Q-1596). On 9 February 1955 the private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue an order "directing such government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of having the accused brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law." On 10 February 1955 the Court granted the motion. On 7 March 1955 the Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United States instructing him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued to Suntay and to compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charges against him. However, this order was not implemented or carried out in view of the commencement of this proceedings in order that the issues raised may be judicially resolved. On 5 July 1955, Suntay’s counsel wrote to the Secretary requesting that the action taken by him be reconsidered, and filed in the criminal case a motion praying that the Court reconsider its order of 10 February 1955. On 7 July 1955, the Secretary denied counsel's request and on 15 July 1955 the Court denied the motion for reconsideration. Suntay filed the petition for a writ of certiorari.

Issue: Whether Suntay should be accorded notice and hearing before his passport may be cancelled.

Held: Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing may be dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious because of the absence of such hearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply with the due process of law clause of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the said clause. Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the

Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion (Section 25, EO 1, S. 1946, 42 OG 1400) to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Suntay’s suddenly leaving the country in such a convenient time, can reasonably be interpreted to mean as a deliberate attempt on his part to flee from justice, and, therefore, he cannot now be heard to complain if the strong arm of the law should join together to bring him back to justice.

Co vs. Barbers, 290 SCRA 717

Due Process in Extradition Proceedings

G.R. NO. 139465, January 8, 2000SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V. JUDGE LANTIONParties of the case:Petitioners: Secretary of JusticeRespondents: Hon. Ralph C. Lantion, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 25, and Mark B. Jimenez

Facts: On January 13, 1977, then President Marcos issued PD No. 1069 “Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons who has committed crimes in a Foreign Country.” The decree is founded on the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution.

On November 13, 1977, then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Philippines, signed in Manila the “Extradition treaty between the Philippines and the United States of America (RP-US Extradition Treaty).

On November 13, 1944, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing as request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. Mr. Jimenez committed five (5) violations against the provisions of the United States Code (USC). When the panel of attorneys began with the technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition documents, they found out that the official English translation of some documents was not attached. The respondent requested for a copy of the official extradition request as well as the documents and papers submitted therein. The petitioner denied the request as it alleges that such information is confidential in nature and it is premature to provide such document as the process is not a preliminary investigation but a mere evaluation. Thus, the constitutional rights of the accused are not yet available.

On August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with the RTC of National Capital Judicial Region a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of NBI, for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish him the extradition documents, to give access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose the extradition request.) The lower court granted the petition in favor of Jimenez.

Issue: Whether or not private respondent was deprived by due process of law.

Held: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish respondent the copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.

Ratio Decidendi: We have ruled repeatedly that this Courts equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as “justice outside legality,” may be availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements. The constitutional issue at bar does not even call for “justice outside legality,” since private respondent due process rights, although not guaranteed by a statute or treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees.

In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land. The basic principles of administrative law instruct us “the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one side

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or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of. The essence of procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced. In the absence of law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extradite.

Government of US vs. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002FACTS: Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty,# the United States

Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Gov-ernment Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authen-ticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and docu-ments, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.

Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Ma-nila, Branch 25.# The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition re-quest and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence.

The Court held that private respondent was bereft of the right to no-tice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition pro-cess.

Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition

In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the is-suance of an order for his “immediate arrest” pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.

Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed be-fore it an “Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,”# which prayed that petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. The RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reserva-tions on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the ac-cused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a war-rant of arrest.

In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.

The Court directed the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash.# After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Ji-menez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.

ISSUE: Whether or not being an elected member of the House of Representatives is compelling enough for the Court to grant his request for provisional release on bail.

HELD: After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for

bail. Since the applicants have a history of absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b) there exist special, humanit-arian or compelling circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special circum-stance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.

In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection.

The Constitution guarantees: ‘x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.’ This simply means that all persons simil-arly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and respons-ibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public of-ficers has never been an excuse to free a person validly [from] prison. The duties imposed by the ‘mandate of the people’ are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest

in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Con-gress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members.

A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.

A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or other-wise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities im-posed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The func-tions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and re-stricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.

Government of Hongkong vs. Olalia, G.R. 153675, April 19, 2007Doctrine: Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character.

FACTS: Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.

On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The RTC issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.

Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing the case, it was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail and this was granted by respondent judge.

Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.

HELD: No. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.

Tanada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446Facts: President Ferdinand Marcos issued various presidential decrees, letters of instruction, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders. The petitioners, Tañada et al, wanted the respondents, Tuvera et al, to publish these presidential directives.

The petitioners sought mandamus as publication is essential to the right of the people to information on matters of public concern and to the principle that the laws to be enforceable must be published.

The respondents contend that the publication of the laws including presidential directives is not necessary for their effectivity especially since the laws themselves set their own effective dates.

Issue: Whether or not the publication of presidential directives is necessary

Held: Yes, publication is a necessary requirement of due process. cazgo/ 03.06.16 / 9

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/sep2002/148571.htm%20%5C%20_edn6%20%5C%20






Before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court hereby orders the respondents to public in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all. Its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. The mere mention of the number, title or supposed date of effectivity does not satisfy the publication requirement.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets.

Tropical Homes vs. NHA, 152 SCRA 540Doctrine: Appeal is not a natural right nor is it part of due process; generally, it may be allowed or denied by the legislature in its discretion. But where the Constitution gives a person the right to appeal, e.g., in the cases coming under the minimum appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court [Sec. 5(2), Art. VIII], denial of the right to appeal constitutes a there is a statutory grant of the right to appeal, denial of that remedy also constitutes a denial of due process.

CONSOLIDATED CASES January 28, 2003G.R. No. 148468, G.R. No. 148769, G.R. No. 149116Serapio vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468, January 28, 2003Doctrine: The Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman’s discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman’s findings are essentially factual in nature, and the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.

FACTS: Edward Serapio was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal Counsel of Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. This foundation was established to help provide educational opportunities for the poor and underprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and students. Donations came pouring in from various institutions, organizations and that of Chavit Singson. However, on the latter part of 2000, Chavit accused then President Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in the illegal number game jueteng as protector, beneficiary and recipient. The Ombudsman took the necessary steps and find probable cause, thus the case of plunder before the Sandiganbayan.

The accused, herein petitioner took all legal remedy to bail but consequently due to numerous petitions and motion to quash, the same was suspended and counter petitioned. Petitioner also prayed for issuance of habeas corpus.

ISSUE:1. WON petitioner should be arraigned first before hearing his petition

for bail;2. WON petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended information

during pendency of his petition to bail; and3. WON petitioner should instead be released through a writ of habeas

corpus.

HELD:A. Although he was already arraigned, no plea has yet been entered

thereby rendering the case moot. Nonetheless, the court takes cognizance and held that arraignment is not a prerequisite to conduct hearing on petition for bail.

B. The court finds no inconsistency between an application of an accused for bail and his filing of motion to quash. Bail, is a security given to release a person in custody of the law. A motion to quash on the other hand is a mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint filed against him for insufficiency of its facts in posits law. This tow has objectives not necessarily antithetical to each other.

C. In exceptional cases, habeas corpus may be granted by the court even when the person is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender. However, in the case at bar, there is no showing of any basis for the issuance of the writ. The general rule is that the writ does not apply when the person alleged to be restraint of his liberty is in custody of an officer under process issued by competent court; more so, petitioner is under detention pursuant to a valid arrest order.

The petition was partly GRANTED on motion to quash. The petition for habeas corpus and bail was DISMISSED.

Go vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 138Doctrine: But where there is a statutory grant of the right to preliminary investigation, denial of the same is an infringement of the due process clause

Facts: Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost had a collision with another vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the other vehicle, and drove off. An eyewitness of the incident was able to take down petitioner’s plate number and reported the same to the police, who subsequently ordered a manhunt for petitioner. 6 days after the shooting, petitioner presented himself in the police station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, the police detained him. Subsequently a criminal charge was brought against him. Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner in his petition for certiorari assails such procedure and actions undertaken and files for a preliminary investigation.

Issues: (1) Whether or Not warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful. (2) Whether or Not petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation.

Held: Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. Ramos, wherein the Court upheld the warrantless arrest as valid effected 1 to 14 days from actual commission of the offenses, which however constituted “continuing crimes,” i.e. subversion, membership in an outlawed organization, etc. There was no lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113. This is because the arresting officers were not actually there during the incident, thus they had no personal knowledge and their information regarding petitioner were derived from other sources. Further, Section 7, Rule 112, does not apply.

Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the police station, he neither expressed surrender nor any statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime. When a complaint was filed to the prosecutor, preliminary investigation should have been scheduled to determine probable cause. Prosecutor made a substantive error, petitioner is entitled to preliminary investigation, necessarily in a criminal charge, where the same is required appear thereat. Petition granted, prosecutor is ordered to conduct preliminary investigation, trial for the criminal case is suspended pending result from preliminary investigation, petitioner is ordered released upon posting a bail bond.

c. Due process in administrative proceedings

Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil 635 (1940)FACTS: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.

ISSUE: W/N NLU was deprived with due process.

HELD: The CIR is free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements, but this not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:REQUISITES: (Administrative Due Process) – HEDSPIK

1. H – Right to a HEARING, which includes the right to present one’s cause and submit evidence in support thereof

2. E – Tribunal must consider the EVIDENCE presented3. D – DECISION must have something to SUPPORT itself4. S – Evidence must be SUBSTANTIAL5. P – Decision must be rendered on the evidence PRESENTED at

the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected

6. I – Tribunal, body, or any of its judges must act on its or his own INDEPENDENT consideration of the facts and law of the controversy

7. K – Decision is rendered in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can KNOW the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered

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The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth.

d. Due process in school proceedings

Guzman vs. National University, 142 SCRA 699FACTS: In 1984, Diosdado Guzman and two others complained that the National University (NU) barred them from enrolling in the said university. NU argued that their failure to enroll was due to the students’ fault. It was alleged that Guzman et al spearheaded illegal mass actions within the university premises; that such mass actions were violative of school policies; that due to their mass actions, Guzman et al incurred bad grades; that Guzman et al hated NU anyway so why should they be allowed to enroll; that it is in the best interest of both parties for the students not to be enrolled.

ISSUE: W/N Guzman et al were deprived of due process.

HELD: Yes. Guzman et al were deprived of due process . In the first place, NU never showed which school policies or duly published rules did Guzman et al violate upon which they may be expelled from. NU failed to show that it conducted any sort of proceedings (not necessarily a trial type one) to determine Guzman et al’s liability or alleged participation in the said mass actions.

Under the Education Act of 1982, Guzman et al, as students, have the right among others “to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation, except in case of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations.” Guzman et al were being denied this right, or being disciplined, without due process, in violation of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools which provides that “no penalty shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as defined in the Manual and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted.”

Therefore, in effect, NU, by barring the enrollment of Guzman et al imposed sanction upon the students without due investigation – such act is illegal.

The Supreme Court also emphasized the minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are:1. That the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;2. That they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired;3. That they shall be informed of the evidence against them;4. That they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; 5. That the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

Gonzales vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 125735, August 26, 1999Doctrine: There was a violation of administrative due process where the teacher was dismissed by the university without having been given full opportunity to confront the “witnesses” against her

FACTS: Lorlene Gonzales, petitioner, has been a schoolteacher in the Elementary Department of private respondent Ateneo de Davao University since 1974. Fr. Oscar Millar, S.J., Ateneo Grade School Headmaster, sent a letter dated 11 April 1991 informing petitioner of the complaints of two (2) parents for alleged use of corporal punishment on her students. Petitioner claimed that she was not informed of the identity of the parents who allegedly complained of the corporal punishment she purportedly inflicted in school-year 1990-1991. She likewise claimed that she was not confronted about it by private respondent Ateneo in 1991 and that it was only two (2) years after the complaints were made that she discovered, through her students and their parents, that ATENEO was soliciting complainants to lodge written complaints against her. On 31 March 1993 she wrote a letter to Fr. Oscar Millar, S.J., demanding that she be formally informed of the complaint and be duly investigated.

On 9 June 1993 petitioner was informed of the composition of an investigative committee organized by Fr. Oscar Millar, S.J., to look into the

alleged use of corporal punishment by petitioner in disciplining her students. She was duly furnished with the rules of procedure, informed of the schedule of the hearings, and given copies of the affidavits executed by the students who testified against her. Petitioner refused to take part in the investigation unless the rules of procedure laid down by the Committee be revised, contending that the same were violative of her right to due process. Petitioner specifically objected to the provision which stated: “x x x 3) Counsel for Ms. Lorlene Gonzales shall not directly participate in the investigation but will merely advise Ms. Gonzales x x x”

The Committee did not revise the rules. Respondent claims that the rules of procedure to be applied were substantially the same rules that were used in the investigation of a former Ateneo employee and therefore we are under legal advice not to change these rules. Over the objection of petitioner the Committee commenced with its investigation without petitioners participation. On 10 November 1993 private respondent served a Notice of Termination on petitioner pursuant to the findings and recommendation of the said Committee. Thereafter, petitioner received a letter from the president of Ateneo demanding her voluntary resignation a week from receipt of the letter, otherwise, she would be considered resigned from the service.

On 29 November 1993 petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal. The Executive Labor Arbiter found her dismissal illegal for lack of factual basis. In the decision, it was explained that although petitioner was afforded procedural due process respondent institution failed to establish substantial evidence as to the guilt of the complainant of the offense charged. Both parties appealed to the NLRC which on 25 March 1996 reversed the decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter by declaring petitioners dismissal valid and legal. Petitioner now seeks the reversal of the NLRC decision.

ISSUE: Was the petitioner, Ms. Gonzales, afforded due process

HELD: NO. The Court notes that the NLRC ignored the important issue raised by the petitioner, which is primarily the absence of due process. Upon being notified of her termination, Ms. Gonzales had the right to demand compliance with the basic requirements of due process. Compliance entails the twin requirements of procedural and substantial due process. Ample opportunity must be afforded the employee to defend herself either personally and/or with assistance of a representative; to know the nature of her offense; and, to cross examine and confront face to face the witnesses against her. Likewise, due process requires that the decision must be based on established facts and on a sound legal foundation.

It is precisely to demand compliance with these requirements that petitioner at the very onset of the investigation demanded the revision of the rules laid down by the Investigative Committee. The refusal of the Committee to accede to this demand resulted in her failure to confront and cross-examine her accusers. Ateneo failed to prove by substantial evidence that petitioner had inflicted corporal punishment on her students. In Ang Tibay v. CIR, the Court set the measure of evidence to be presented in an administrative investigation when it said, substantial evidence is more than mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The evidence of private respondent did not measure up to this standard. It relied solely on the witnesses affidavits with questionable veracity. Petitioner adequately proved, by means of affidavits, letters of petition and manifesto made by her students and co-teachers, that she was a competent and dedicated teacher having spent seventeen (17) years of her life in the service of the very institution which is now seeking her dismissal.

The NLRC decision was reversed and set aside, and the decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter was reinstated, affirmed and adopted.

C. Equal Protection of the Laws

People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil 12Doctrine: The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the law prohibiting members of non-Christian tribes from drinking foreign liquor, on the ground that their low degree of culture and unfamiliarity with the drink rendered them more susceptible to its effects.

Facts: On or about January 25, 1937, in the City of Baguio, the above-named accused, Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and illegally receive, acquire, and have in his possession and under his control or custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which

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the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639.

Issue: Whether or not Act No. 1639 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws, violates the due process and improper exercise of the police power of the State.

Ruling: Act No. 1639 is valid and unconstitutional. The Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture is not an argument against the equality of its application. The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." When the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain practice by certain class of persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer. The private interests of such members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation.

Mirasol vs. DPWH, G.R. No. 158793, June 08, 2006Doctrine: The Supreme Court held that there is a real and substantial distinction between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal — real and substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways.Facts: On January 10, 2001, petitioners filed before the trial court a Petition for Declaratory Judgment with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction to nullity of the following administrative issuances for being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act 2000, entitled "Limited Access Highway Act" enacted in 1957: (a) DPWH Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1968; (b) DPWH Department Order No. 74, Series of 1993; and (c) Art. II, Sec. 3 (a) of the Revised Rules on Limited Access Facilities promulgated in 199[8] by the DPWH thru the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB).

Issue: Whether or not Administrative Order No. 1 introduces an unreasonable classification by singling-out motorcycles from other motorized modes of transport and violates the right to travel.

Ruling: No. Petitioners are not being deprived of their right to use the limited access facility. They are merely being required, just like the rest of the public, to adhere to the rules on how to use the facility. AO 1 does not infringe upon petitioners’ right to travel but merely bars motorcycles, bicycles, tricycles, pedicabs, and any non-motorized vehicles as the mode of traveling along limited access highways. There exists real and substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. A classification based on practical convenience and common knowledge is not unconstitutional simply because it may lack purely theoretical or scientific uniformity.

Philippine Association of Service Exporters vs. Drilon 163 SCRA 386Doctrine: Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risks to which their class was exposedFacts: The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. The measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females," that it 'does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills," and that it is violative of the right to travel. It was likewise held to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.

In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law." In addition, it was contended that Department Order No. 1 was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It was claimed to be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced.

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondent Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,

invokes the police power of the Philippine State.

Issue: Whether or not deployment ban for female domestic helpers is valid under our Constitution.

Held: Yes. It is a valid exercise of police power. The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.

"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.”

It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will." It is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.

Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies vs. POEA, 243 SCRA 666Doctrine: there was found substantial distinctions between land-based and sea-based Filipino overseas workers, because of dissimilarities in work environment, safety, danger to life and limb, and accessibility to social, civil and spiritual activities

Ichong vs. Hernandez, supraDoctrine: The Court upheld the validity of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law despite the objection that it violated the equal protection clause, because there exist real and actual, positive, and fundamental differences between an alien and a national

Almonte vs. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286Facts: Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce all documents relating to Personal Service Funds yr. 1988 and all evidence for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988. The subpoena ducestecum was issued in connection with the investigation of funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB which were legally disbursed. Almonte and Perez denied the anomalous activities that circulate around the EIIB office. They moved to quash the subpoena ducestecum. They claim privilege of an agency of the Government.

Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena ducestecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished several government offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman.

Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved to quash the subpoena and the subpoena ducestecum. In his Order dated June 15, 1990, 6 respondent Ombudsman granted the motion to quash the subpoena in view of the fact that there were no affidavits filed against petitioners. But he denied their motion to quash the subpoena ducestecum. He ruled that petitioners were not being forced to produce evidence against themselves, since the subpoena ducestecumwas directed to the Chief Accountant, petitioner NerioRogado. In addition the Ombudsman ordered the Chief of the Records a Section of the EIIB, petitioner Elisa Rivera, to produce before the investigator "all documents relating to Personnel Service Funds, for the year 1988, and all documents, salary vouchers for the whole plantilla of the EIIB for 1988, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof."

Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman investigation on the basis of an anonymous letter does not violate the equal protection clause.

Ruling: The court dismissed the petition. It was held that the fact that the Ombudsman may start an investigation on the basis of an

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anonymous letter does not violate the equal protection clause. Petitioners complain that "in all forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via their verified complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed," while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation.

In the first place, there can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form and in a manner," the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the people which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them.

People vs. Jalosjos, G.R. No. 132875-76, February 3, 2000Doctrine: The SC ruled that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable basis for valid classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class

FACTS: Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

Issue: Whether respondent should be given since he is a public official

Ruling: The Constitution guarantees: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws." This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue favouritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality not prejudice shall be displayed. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals. Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane tothe purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-appellant's claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any other right or interest, including the police power of the State. WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.

G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000International School Alliance of Educators vs. Quisumbing, Doctrine: There was no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by “foreign hires" and “local hires” as to justify the disparity in salaries paid to these teachers

FACTS: International School (IS) pays its teachers who are hired from abroad, or foreign-hires, a higher salary than its local-hires, whether the latter are Filipino or not (most are Filipino, but some are American). It justifies this under the ‘dislocation factor’ – that foreigners must be given a higher salary both to attract them to teach here, and to compensate them for the “significant economic disadvantages” involved in coming here. The Teacher’s Union cries discrimination.

ISSUE: Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local- hires.

HELD: Discrimination exists. Equal pay for equal work is a principal long honored in this jurisdiction, as it rests on fundamental norms of justice1. Art. XIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution (Social Justice and Human Rights) exhorts Congress to give the highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right od all people to human dignity, reduce

social, economic, and political inequalitites.” The Constitution also provides that labor is entitled to “humane conditions of work.”. These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace, but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees. Lastly, the Constitution directs the State to promote “equality of employment opportunities for all,” “…regardless of sex, race, or creed.” It would be an affront to both the spirit and the letter of these provisions if the State closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.2. International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law include principles of equity, i.e., fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and numerous other international Conventions all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.

Abakada Guro vs. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008Facts: Petitioners question the Attrition Act of 2005 and contend that by establishing a system of rewards and incentives when they exceed their revenue targets, the law (1) transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters; (2) violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection as it limits the scope of the law to the BIR and BOC; (3) unduly delegates to the President the power to fix revenue targets without sufficient standards; and (4) violates the doctrine of separation of powers by creating a Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the law’s implementing rules.

Issue: W/N R.A No. 9335 is constitutional

Held: YES. R.A. No. 9335 is constitutional, except for Section 12 of the law, which creates a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to review the law’s IRR.

That RA No. 9335 will turn BIR and BOC employees and officials into “bounty hunters and mercenaries” is purely speculative as the law establishes safeguards by imposing liabilities on officers and employees who are guilty of negligence, abuses, malfeasance, etc. Neither is the equal protection clause violated since the law recognizes a valid classification as only the BIR and BOC have the common distinct primary function of revenue generation. There are sufficient policies and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets as the revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and the BOC.However, the creation of a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee for reviewing the IRR formulated by agencies of the executive branch (DOF, DBM, NEDA, etc.) is unconstitutional since it violates the doctrine of separation of powers since Congress arrogated judicial power upon itself.

Nicolas vs. Romulo, 578 SCRA 438**This case is consolidated with Salonga vs Daniel Smith & BAYAN vs Gloria Arroyo

FACTS: On the 1st of November 2005, Daniel Smith committed the crime of rape against Nicole. He was convicted of the said crime and was ordered by the court to suffer imprisonment. Smith was a US serviceman convicted of a crime against our penal laws and the crime was committed within the country’s jurisdiction. But pursuant to the VFA, a treaty between the US and Philippines, the US embassy was granted custody over Smith. Nicole, together with the other petitioners appealed before the SC assailing the validity of the VFA. Their contention is that the VFA was not ratified by the US senate in the same way our senate ratified the VFA.

ISSUE: Is the VFA void and unconstitutional & whether or not it is self-executing.

HELD: The VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely because the VFA is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to produce Smith before the court during the trial.

The VFA is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the US Congress that executive agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be immediately implemented. The SC noted that the VFA is not like other treaties that need implementing legislation such as the Vienna Convention. As regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or assistance has been given under it and this can only be done

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through implementing legislation. The VFA itself is another form of implementation of its provisions.

Ormoc Sugar Co. vs. Treasurer of Ormoc City, 22 SCRA 603

Facts: On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries." Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March 20, 1964 for P7, 087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5, 000, or a total of P12, 087.50.

On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, with service of a copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI, Constitution).

Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city's power to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations. After pre-trial and submission of the case on memoranda, the Court of First Instance, on August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant chartered city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter.

Issues: (1) Whether or Not the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause under Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution.(2) Whether or not it was violative of the rule of uniformity of taxation under the Bill of Rights, Sec. 22[1], Art. VI, Constitution.

Held: In Felwa vs. Salas, We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.

A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily collected (Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan). 6 At the time of collection, the ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness, the same being then presumed constitutional until declared otherwise.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, the challenged ordinance is declared unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to refund the P12,087.50 plaintiff-appellant paid under protest. No costs. So ordered.

D. Arrest, Searches and Seizures

Sony Music vs. Judge Espanol, G.R. No. 156804, March 14, 2005Doctrine: The absent the element of personal knowledge by the applicant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of the search warrant may be justified, the warrant is deemed not based on probable cause and is a nullity, the issuance being, in legal contemplation, arbitrary.

Facts: In 2000, Sony Music Entertainment (Phils.), Inc. sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent Lavin as they complained:

a. that Solid Laguna Corporation, together with its officers were engaged in the replication, reproduction and distribution of Sony videograms without license and authority from the Video Regulatory Board (violation of P.D. 1987); b. that Solid Laguna was manufacturing, selling, and distributing various titles of CDs in violation of Sony Music’s copyrights (and a violation of RA 8293). Agent Lavin, in applying for a search warrant, stated before Judge Dolores Español that an unnamed person provided them information as to the presence of pirated CDs in the premises of Solid Laguna; c. that Lavin and other witnesses were accompanied by unnamed persons to enter the premise and conduct further investigation.

The judge then issued two corresponding search warrants; one for probable violation of PD 1987 and the other for probable violation of RA 8293.

The search warrants were subsequently enforced and items were seized from Solid Laguna on the strength of the two warrants.

Solid Laguna thereafter presented a certification that they are actually authorized to manufacture and sell CDs by the VRB at the same time it asked the court to quash the search warrants and return the items seized. Judge Español then quashed the search warrant issued for probable violation of PD 1987.

Judge Español later quashed the other warrant because of the fact that the items seized as a result of the two warrants were commingled hence they cannot be examined properly. Judge Español also ruled that the issuance of the warrant stemmed from the intimation made by petitioners that Solid Laguna was not authorized to manufacture and sell CDs but in fact they were authorized by the VRB. This being, the warrants are of no force and effect because of the lack of probable cause.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Español is correct

HELD: Yes. The issuance of the search warrant in question did not meet the requirements of probable cause. Judge Español did not accordingly err in quashing the same, let alone gravely abuse her discretion. It is also within her authority to quash the said warrants based on her findings which were found to be valid by the Supreme Court. Further, it cannot be overemphasized that not one of the applicants of the warrants testified seeing the pirated discs being manufactured at Solid Laguna’s premises, they merely relied on unnamed persons which is at best are hearsays.

The Supreme Court also noted that the lack of supporting evidence and documents in applying for the search warrants on this infringement case does not mean that the master tapes of the alleged copies being pirated should have been produced. It is true that the Supreme Court, in 20thCentury Fox Case, underscored the necessity, in determining the existence of probable cause in copyright infringement cases, of presenting the master tapes of the copyrighted work.

But, as emphatically clarified in Columbia Pictures vs CA “such auxiliary procedure, however, does not rule out the use of testimonial or documentary evidence, depositions, admissions or other classes of evidence xxx especially where the production in court of object evidence would result in delay, inconvenience or expenses out of proportion to its evidentiary value.

What the Supreme Court is saying is that any evidence presented in lieu of the master tapes, if not readily available, in similar application proceedings must be reliable, and, if testimonial, it must, at the very least, be based on the witness’ personal knowledge.

People vs. Marti, G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991Doctrine: The Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. It’s a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint is imposed.

"Package of marijuana to be sent abroad" Andre Marti and his wife Shirley wanted to send packages to their

friend in Switzerland and contracted the services of Manila Packing and Export Forwarders.

When asked by the forwarder if they could examine and inspect the packages, Marti refused, assuring that the packages simply contained books and cigars.

However, the proprietor opened the boxes for final inspection as part of their SOP. Upon opening, they suspected that the contents were illegal drugs.

The proprietor reported the incident to NBI which confirmed that the suspected content were marijuana.

In the presence of the NBI agents, the boxes were opened and found dried marijuana leaves inside.

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After Marti was traced by NBI, he was charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Marti assailed the admissibility of the drugs as evidence against him, which, according to him, is obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication.

ISSUE: W/N an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State? NO.

HELD: When a private individual violates another person’s right to

privacy, the evidence obtained therefrom is admissible; however the violator could be held civilly liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code.

The Court ruled that in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties granted by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government. Its protection is directed only to governmental action.This right do not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a search by a private citizen.

In this case, the evidence was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention of State authorities. Therefore, there is no reason why it should not be admitted to prosecute him. The Court pointed out that: a) It was the proprietor who made a reasonable search of the packages in compliance with SOP AND b) the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected into a warrantless search and seizure. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.

G.R. No. 113271, October 16, 1997Waterous Drug Corporation vs. NLRC, Doctrine: The Supreme Court ruled that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. (In this case, petitioner’s officer opened an envelope addressed to the respondent and found therein a check evidencing overprice in the purchase of medicine; the check was then deemed admissible in evidence.) – PRIVATE PERSON

Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp.YSP Inc., a supplier of medicine, sold to Waterous, thru Catolico, 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, previews P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that the price per bottle is P320.00. Verification was made to YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy and it was found that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced.YSP, Inc. Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the difference represents refund of jack-up price of ten bottles of Vorentablets per sales invoice, which was paid to Ms. Catolico.

Said check was sent in an envelope addressed to Catolico.Catolico denied receiving the same. However, Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. confirmed that she saw an open envelope with a check amounting P640 payable to Catolico.Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty.

NLRC dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants.

The petitioners contended that in the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Issue: Whether or not the check is admissible as evidence

Ruling: Yes. The court finds no reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.

Requisites for a valid warrant

1. Probable cause

Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp, G.R. NO. 140946, September 13, 2004

Corro vs. Lising, 137 SCRA 541, July 15, 1985

Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800, December 26, 1984

Webb vs. De Leon, G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995

2. Determination by the judge

People vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126005, January 21, 1999

Salazar vs. Achacoso, 183 SCRA 145

People vs. Bolasa, G.R. NO. 125754, December 22, 1999

Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board 9 SCRA 27 (1963)

Morano vs. Vivo 20 SCRA 562

Mr. Averongonzado Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 112708-09, March 29, 1996

3. Personal examination

Soliven vs. Makasiar, G.R. No. 8287, November 14, 1988

Kho vs. Makalinta, G.R. No. 94902-06, April 21, 1999

Alvarez vs. Court of Appeals, 64 Phil 33 (1922)

People vs. Mamaril, G.R. NO. 147607, January 22, 2004

Lim vs. Felix, G.R. No. 94054-57, February 19, 1991

Cruz vs. Judge Areolo, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1642, March 06, 2002

Okabe vs. Judge Gutierrez, G.R. No. 150185, May 27, 2004

4. Particularity of description

Bache and Co. vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 (1971)

People vs. Tee, G.R. Nos. 140546-47, January 20, 2003

People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil 169 (1925)

Pangandaman vs. Casar, 159 SCRA 599 (1988)

Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp, supra.

Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, supra.

Frank Uy vs. BIR, G.R. No. 129651, October 20, 2000

Allowable warrantless searches

Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest

People vs. Estella, G.R. No. 138539-40, January 21, 2003People vs. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007People vs. Kalubiran, 196 SCRA 645People vs. Aruta, G.R. No. 120915, April 13, 1998People vs. Malmstedt, 196 SCRA 401People vs. Chua Ho San, G.R. No. 128222People vs. Hindoy, G.R. No. 128277, November 16, 1998Espano vs. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 558

Seizure of evidence in plain view

People vs. Musa, 217 SCRA 597People vs. Figueroa, 248 SCRA 679Caballes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002People vs. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007People vs. Salanguit, G.R. No. 133254-55, April 19, 2001

Search of vessels and aircraft

Roldan vs. Arca, 65 SCRA 336People vs. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402

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People vs. Saycon, 236 SCRA 325

Search of a moving vehicleValmonte vs. De Villa, 178 SCRA 211Cabales vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002People vs. Libnao, G.R. No 136860, January 20, 2003People vs. Vinecario, G.R. No. 141137, January 20, 2004

Customs search

Stop and frisk

Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89139, August 2, 1990People vs. Solayao, G.R. No. 119220, September 20, 1996Malacat vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123595, December 12, 1997Manalili vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113447, October 7, 1997People vs. Sy Chua, G.R. Nos. 136066-67, February 4, 2003

Exigent and emergency circumstances

People vs. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 Guanzon vs. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623

Searches of passenger at airports

People vs. Gatward, 267 SCRA 785People vs. Susan Canton, G.R. No. 148825, December 27, 2002

WaiverPeople vs. Omaweng, 213 SCRA 462People vs. Correa, 285 SCRA 679People vs. Barros, 231 SCRA 557Lui vs. Matillano, G.R. No. 141176, May 27, 2004People vs. Damaso, 212 SCRA 457Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs, 68 SCRA 320People vs. Asis, G.R. No. 142531, October 15, 2002

Allowable warrantless arrest

Umil vs. Ramos 187 SCRA 311People vs. Sucro 195 SCRA 388People vs. Recepcion, G.R. No. 141943, November 13, 2002People vs. Rodrigueza, 205 SCRA 791People vs. Molina, G.R. No. 133917, February 19, 2001People vs. Sy Chua, G.R. No. 136066-67, February 4, 2003

People vs. del Rosario, G.R. No. 127755, April 14, 1999Go vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 138People vs. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121917, March 12, 1997People vs. Abriol. G.R. No. 123137, October 17, 2001

Exclusionary ruleDemaisip vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 373People vs. Diaz, G.R. No. 110829, April 18, 1997

E. Privacy of Communications and Correspondence

Gaanan vs. IAC, 145 SCRA 113 (1986)Ramirez vs. CA, G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995Salcedo-Ortanez v. CA, 235 SCRA 111 (1994)Alejano v. Cabuay, G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005In Re Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987)People vs. Albofera, 152 SCRA 123 (1987)Zulueta v. Court of Apeals, 253 SCRA 699 (1996)Waterhouse Drug Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113271. October 16, 1997

F. Freedom of Expression, Assembly and Petition

1. Scope

Dichotomy between print and broadcast media

Chavez vs. Secretary Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008

2. Aspects

Freedom from censorship or prior restraint

Burgos vs. Chief of Staff 133 SCRA 800UNIDO vs. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 17, April 3, 1981Osmena v. COMELEC, 288 SCRA 447, March 31, 1998National Press Club vs. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 1 (1992)Adiong vs. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712 (1992)ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133486, January 28, 2000Social Weather Station vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001Sanidad vs. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 529Mutuc vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-32717, November 26, 1970

Movie Censorship

Gonzales vs. Katigbak, 137 SCRA 717

Lagunzad vs. Sotto Vda. De Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476

FACTS: Lagunzad and de Gonzales entered into a licensing agreement for the former wasfilming “The Moises Padilla Story.” Manuel Lagunzad was a newspaperman and,through his MML Productions, began the production of the movie. The movie wasbased on the book of Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr. entitled- “The Long Dank Night inNegros.”

Although the emphasis of the movie was on the public life of Moises Padilla, there were portions which dealt with his private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes, of his mother, Maria Soto Vda. de Gonzales, private respondent herein, and of one "Auring" as his girlfriend.

The movie was scheduled for a premiere showing on October 16, 1961. Thirteendays prior to it, Moises’ half -sister, Mrs. Nelly Amante, objected to the movie as itexploited Moises’ life and demanded in writing for certain changes, corrections and deletions in the movie.

Petitioner contended that the episodes in the life of Moises Padilla depicted in the movie were matters of public knowledge and was a public figure; that private respondent has no property right over those incidents; that the Licensing Agreement was without valid cause or consideration and that he signed the same only because of the coercion and threat employed upon him. As a counterclaim, petitioner sought for the nullification of the Licensing Agreement as it constitutes an infringement on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favour of the private respondent.

Issue: Whether or not the Licensing agreement infringes his right to freedom of speech and the press.

HELD: No. From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. It would be too much to insist that at all time and under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for recognition.

The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing-of-interests test." The principle requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation."

In the case at bar, the interests’ observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and the right of -freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking into account the interplay of those interests, we hold that under the particular circumstances presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern.

Ayer Productions vs. Judge Capulong 160 SCRA 861Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 529Viva Productions vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123881, March 13, 1997MTRCB vs. ABS-CBN, G.R. No. 155282, January 17, 2005

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Freedom from subsequent punishment

2. Content-based and content-neutral regulations

Chavez vs. Secretary Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008Newsounds Broadcasting Network vs. Dy, G.R. No. 170270, April 2, 2009Soriano vs. Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009

3. Test of valid governmental interference

a. Clear and present danger ruleb. Dangerous tendency rulec. Balancing of interest test

People vs. Perez, 45 Phil 599 (1923)Cabansag vs. Fernandez, 102 Phil 152Gonzales vs. COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835Eastern Broadcasting Corp. vs. Dans, Jr., 137 SCRA 628

4. Unprotected speech

Article 353, Revised Penal CodeLedesma vs. Court of AppealsFlor vs. People, G.R. No. 139987, March 31, 2005U.S. vs. Kottinger, 45 Phil 352Miller vs. California, 37 L. Ed. 2Nd 419, 431 (1973)Fernando vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159751, December 6, 2006

5. Assembly and Petition

B.P. Blg. 880 (Public Assembly Act of 1985)

J.B.L. Reyes vs. Bagatsing, G.R. No. L-65366, October 25, 1983Dela Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 126183, March 25, 1999Ruiz vs. Gordon, 126 SCRA 233Bayan vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 169838, April 23, 2006Malabanan vs. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359

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Consti 2 Outline (Bill of Rights Sec 1-4)

Documents

Transcript of Consti 2 Outline (Bill of Rights Sec 1-4)