Bieler Morton neo Gramscian perspectives in international relations

85Neo-Gramscian perspectives in IR

Situated within a historical materialist problematicof social transformation that deploys many of theinsights of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, acrucial break emerged, in the s, in the work ofRobert Cox from mainstream International Relations(IR) approaches to hegemony. This article provides acomprehensive ‘state-of-the-discipline’ overview ofthis critical theory route to hegemony, world orderand historical change. It does so by outlining thehistorical context within which various diverse butrelated neo-Gramscian perspectives emerged. Atten-tion subsequently turns to highlight how conditions ofcapitalist economic crisis and structural change in thes have been conceptualised, which inform contem-porary debates about globalisation. Significantly, thediscussion is also responsive to the various controver-sies and criticisms that surround the neo-Gramscianperspectives whilst, in conclusion, directions alongwhich future research might proceed are elaborated.Hence providing a thorough survey of this historicalmaterialist critical theory of hegemony and thus formsof social power through which conditions of capitalismare reproduced, mediated and contested.

A critical theory route tohegemony, world order andhistorical change:neo-Gramscian perspectives inInternational Relations

Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton

Capital & Class #8286

Situated within a historical materialist problematic ofsocial transformation and deploying many insightsfrom the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, a crucial

break with mainstream International Relations ()approaches emerged by the s in the work of RobertCox. In contrast to mainstream routes to hegemony in ,which develop a static theory of politics, an abstractahistorical conception of the state and an appeal to universalvalidity (e.g. Keohane and ; Waltz ), debateshifted towards a critical theory of hegemony, world orderand historical change (for the classic critique, see Ashley). Rather than a problem-solving preoccupation withthe maintenance of social power relationships, a criticaltheory of hegemony directs attention to questioning theprevailing order of the world.1 It ‘does not take institutionsand social and power relations for granted but calls theminto question by concerning itself with their origins andwhether they might be in the process of changing’ (Cox: ). Thus, it is specifically critical in the sense ofasking how existing social or world orders have come intobeing, how norms, institutions or practices therefore emerge,and what forces may have the emancipatory potential tochange or transform the prevailing order. As such, a criticaltheory develops a dialectical theory of history concernednot just with the past but with a continual process of historicalchange and with exploring the potential for alternative formsof development (Cox : , -). Cox’s critical theoryof hegemony thus focuses on interaction between particularprocesses, notably springing from the dialectical possibilitiesof change within the sphere of production and theexploitative character of social relations, not as unchangingahistorical essences but as a continuing creation of new forms(Cox : ). The first section of this article outlines theconceptual framework developed by Robert Cox, linking itback to Gramsci’s own work. This includes situating theworld economic crisis of the s within more recent debatesabout globalisation and how this period of ‘structural change’has been conceptualised. Then, attention will turn to whathas been recognised (see Morton ) as similar, but diverse,neo-Gramscian perspectives in International Relations ()that build on Cox’s work and constitute a distinct criticaltheory route to considering hegemony, world order andhistorical change. Finally, various controversies surroundingthe neo-Gramscian perspectives will be traced, before


elaborating in conclusion the directions along which futureresearch might proceed.

A critical theory route to hegemony, world order andhistorical change

Unlike conventional theory, which reduces hegemony toa single dimension of dominance based on the economicand military capabilities of states, a neo-Gramscian perspec-tive developed by Cox broadens the domain of hegemony. Itappears as an expression of broadly based consent, manifestedin the acceptance of ideas and supported by materialresources and institutions, which is initially established bysocial forces occupying a leading role within a state, but isthen projected outwards on a world scale. Within a worldorder a situation of hegemony may prevail ‘based on acoherent conjunction or fit between a configuration of materialpower, the prevalent collective image of world order(including certain norms) and a set of institutions whichadminister the order with a certain semblance of universality’(Cox : ). Hegemony is therefore a form of domi-nance, but it refers more to a consensual order so that‘dominance by a powerful state may be a necessary but nota sufficient condition of hegemony’ (Cox : ). Ifhegemony is understood as an ‘opinion-moulding activity’,rather than brute force or dominance, then considerationhas to turn to how a hegemonic social or world order isbased on values and understandings that permeate the natureof that order (Cox /: ). Hence it has to beconsidered how intersubjective meanings—shared notionsabout social relations—shape reality. ‘“Reality” is not onlythe physical environment of human action but also theinstitutional, moral and ideological context that shapesthoughts and actions’ (Cox : ). The crucial point tomake, then, is that hegemony filters through structures ofsociety, economy, culture, gender, ethnicity, class and ideology.

Hegemony within a historical structure is constituted onthree spheres of activity: the social relations of production,encompassing the totality of social relations in material,institutional and discursive forms that engender particularsocial forces; forms of state, consisting of historicallycontingent state-civil society complexes; and world orders,which not only represent phases of stability and conflict but


also permit scope for thinking about how alternative formsof world order might emerge (Cox : -). These arerepresented schematically (Cox : ):

Figure 1: the dialectical relation of forces

If considered dialectically, in relation to each other, then itbecomes possible to represent the historical process throughthe particular configuration of historical structures. Socialforces, as the main collective actors engendered by the socialrelations of production, operate within and across all spheresof activity. Through the rise of contending social forces,linked to changes in production, there may occur mutuallyreinforcing transformations in forms of state and world order.There is no unilinear relationship between the spheres ofactivity and the point of departure to explain the historicalprocess may equally be that of forms of state or world order(Cox : n.). Within each of the three main spheresit is argued that three further elements reciprocally combineto constitute an historical structure: ideas, understood asintersubjective meanings as well as collective images of worldorder; material capabilities, referring to accumulated resour-ces; and institutions, which are amalgams of the previoustwo elements and are means of stabilising a particular order.These again are represented schematically (Cox : ):

Figure 2: the dialectical moment of hegemony

The aim is to break down over time coherent historicalstructures—consisting of different patterns of social relationsof production, forms of state and world order—that haveexisted within the capitalist mode of production (Cox :

Social

World

orders

Forms of

state

relations of production

Institutions Material

capabilit ies

Ideas


-). In the following, the main characteristics of the threespheres of activity are outlined.

The social relations of productionAccording to Cox (: -), patterns of productionrelations are the starting point for analysing the operationand mechanisms of hegemony. Yet, from the start, this shouldnot be taken as a move that reduces everything to productionin an economistic sense.

Production...is to be understood in the broadest sense. Itis not confined to the production of physical goods usedor consumed. It covers the production and reproductionof knowledge and of the social relations, morals andinstitutions that are prerequisites to the production ofphysical goods (Cox : ).

These patterns are referred to as modes of social relationsof production, which encapsulate configurations of socialforces engaged in the process of production. By discerningdifferent modes of social relations of production it is possibleto consider how changing production relations give rise toparticular social forces that become the bases of power withinand across states and within a specific world order (Cox: ). The objective of outlining different modes of socialrelations of production is to question what promotes theemergence of particular modes and what might explain theway in which modes combine or undergo transformation(Cox : ). It is argued that the reciprocal relationshipbetween production and power is crucial. To examine thisrelationship a framework is developed that focuses on howpower in social relations of production may give rise to certainsocial forces, how these social forces may become the basesof power in forms of state and how this might shape worldorder. This framework revolves around the social ontologyof historical structures. It refers to ‘persistent social practices,made by collective human activity and transformed throughcollective human activity’ (Cox : ). An attempt istherefore made to capture ‘the reciprocal relationship ofstructures and actors’ (Cox a: ; Cox : -; Bielerand Morton a).

Hegemony is thus understood as a form of class rulelinked to social forces, as the core collective actors, engen-dered by the social relations of production (Overbeek ).


For Cox, class is viewed as an historical category andemployed in a heuristic way rather than as a static analyticalcategory (Cox : -, /: ). This means thatclass identity emerges within and through historical processesof economic exploitation. ‘Bring back exploitation as thehallmark of class, and at once class struggle is in the forefront,as it should be’ (Ste. Croix : ). As such, class-consciousness emerges out of particular historical contextsof struggle rather than mechanically deriving from objectivedeterminations that have an automatic place in productionrelations (see Thompson : -; ). Yet the focus onexploitation and resistance to it ensures that social forces arenot simply reduced to material aspects, but also include otherforms of identity involved in struggle such as ethnic, nationalist,religious, gender or sexual forms. In short, ‘“non-class”issues—peace, ecology, and feminism—are not to be set asidebut given a firm and conscious basis in the social realitiesshaped through the production process’ (Cox 1987: 353).

Forms of stateThe conceptual framework, outlined so far, considers hownew modes of social relations of production become estab-lished. Changes in the social relations of production giverise to new configurations of social forces. State power restson these configurations. Therefore, rather than taking thestate as a given or pre-constituted institutional category,consideration is given to the historical construction of variousforms of state and the social context of political struggle.This is accomplished by drawing upon the concept ofhistorical bloc and by widening a theory of the state to includerelations within civil society.

An historical bloc refers to the way in which leading socialforces within a specific national context establish a relationshipover contending social forces. It is more than simply a politicalalliance between social forces represented by classes orfractions of classes. It indicates the integration of a variety ofdifferent class interests that are propagated throughout society‘bringing about not only a unison of economic and politicalaims, but also intellectual and moral unity...on a “universal”plane’ (Gramsci : -). The very nature of an historicalbloc, as Anne Showstack Sassoon (: ) has outlined,necessarily implies the existence of hegemony. Indeed, the‘universal plane’ that Gramsci had in mind was the creationof hegemony by a fundamental social group over subordinate


groups. Hegemony would therefore be established ‘if therelationship between intellectuals and people-nation, betweenthe leaders and the led, the rulers and the ruled, is providedby an organic cohesion ...Only then can there take place anexchange of individual elements between the rulers and ruled,leaders...and led, and can the shared life be realised whichalone is a social force—with the creation of the “historicalbloc”’ (Gramsci : ).

These issues are encompassed within the focus on differentforms of state which, as Cox notes, are principallydistinguished by ‘the characteristics of their historic[al] blocs,i.e. the configurations of social forces upon which state powerultimately rests. A particular configuration of social forcesdefines in practice the limits or parameters of state purposes,and the modus operandi of state action, defines, in otherwords, the raison d’état for a particular state’ (Cox :

). In short, by considering different forms of state, itbecomes possible to analyse the social basis of the state orto conceive of the historical ‘content’ of different states. Thenotion of historical bloc aids this endeavour by directingattention to which social forces may have been crucial inthe formation of an historical bloc or particular state; whatcontradictions may be contained within an historical blocupon which a form of state is founded; and what potentialmight exist for the formation of a rival historical bloc thatmay transform a particular form of state (Cox : n.).In contrast, therefore, to conventional state-centricapproaches in , a wider theory of the state emerges withinthis framework. Instead of underrating state power andexplaining it away, attention is given to social forces andprocesses and how these relate to the development of states(Cox : ) as well as states in alternative conditions ofdevelopment (Bilgin and Morton ). Considering diffe-rent forms of state as the expression of particular historicalblocs and thus relations across state-civil society fulfils thisobjective. Overall, this relationship is referred to as the state-civil society complex that, clearly, owes an intellectual debtto Gramsci.

For Gramsci, the state was not simply understood as aninstitution limited to the ‘government of the functionaries’or the ‘top political leaders and personalities with directgovernmental responsibilities’. The state presents itself in adifferent way beyond the political society of public figuresand top leaders so that ‘the state is the entire complex of


practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling classnot only justifies and maintains its dominance, but managesto win the active consent of those over whom it rules’(Gramsci : , ). This alternative conception ofthe state is inclusive of the realm of civil society. The stateshould be understood, then, not just as the apparatus ofgovernment operating within the ‘public’ sphere (govern-ment, political parties, military) but also as part of the ‘private’sphere of civil society (church, media, education) throughwhich hegemony functions (Gramsci : ). It can there-fore be argued that the state in this conception is understoodas a social relation. The state is not unquestioningly takenas a distinct institutional category, or thing in itself, butconceived as a form of social relations through whichcapitalism and hegemony are expressed. It is this combinationof political and civil society that is referred to as the integralstate through which ruling classes organise intellectual andmoral functions as part of the political and cultural strugglefor hegemony in the effort to establish an ‘ethical’ state(Gramsci : , ).

Furthermore, different social relations of productionengender different fractions of social forces. This means that‘foreign’ capital, for example, is not simply represented asan autonomous force beyond the power of the state but insteadis represented by certain classes or fractions of classes withinthe constitution of the state apparatus. There are contradictoryand heterogeneous relations internal to the state, which areinduced by class antagonisms between nationally- andtransnationally-based capital and labour. The state, then, isthe condensation of a hegemonic relationship between domi-nant classes and class fractions. This occurs when a leadingclass develops a ‘hegemonic project’ or ‘comprehensiveconcept of control’ which transcends particular economic-corporate interests and becomes capable of binding andcohering the diverse aspirations and general interests ofvarious social classes and class fractions (van der Pijl, ,; Overbeek, , ). It is a process that involvesthe ‘most purely political phase’ of class struggle and occurson a ‘“universal” plane’ to result in the forging of anhistorical bloc (Gramsci : ).

Hegemony and world ordersThe construction of an historical bloc cannot exist withouta hegemonic social class and is therefore a national


phenomenon (Cox : , ). This is because the verynature of an historical bloc is bound up with how variousclasses and fractions of classes construct, or contest,hegemony through national political frameworks. Or, putanother way, how such classes ‘nationalise’ themselvesthrough historically specific and peculiar socio-economicand political structures (Gramsci : ; ShowstackSassoon : -). Yet the hegemony of a leading classcan manifest itself as an international phenomenon insofaras it represents the development of a particular form of thesocial relations of production. Once hegemony has beenconsolidated domestically it may expand beyond a particularsocial order to move outward on a world scale and insertitself through the world order (Cox : , Cox :

-). By doing so it can connect social forces acrossdifferent countries. ‘A world hegemony is thus in itsbeginnings an outward expansion of the internal (national)hegemony established by a...social class’ (Cox : ).The outward expansion of particular modes of social relationsof production and the interests of a leading class on a worldscale can also become supported by mechanisms ofinternational organisation. This is what Gramsci (: )referred to as the ‘internal and international organisationalrelations of the state’: i.e. movements, voluntary associationsand organisations, such as the Rotary Club, or the RomanCatholic Church that had an ‘international’ character whilstrooted within the state. Social forces may thus achievehegemony within a national social order as well as throughworld order by ensuring the promotion and expansion of amode of production. Hegemony can therefore operate attwo levels: by constructing an historical bloc and establishingsocial cohesion within a form of state as well as by expandinga mode of production internationally and projectinghegemony through the level of world order. For instance, inGramsci’s time, this was borne by the expansion of Fordistassembly plant production beyond the which would leadto the growing world hegemony and power of ‘Americanismand Fordism’ from the s and s (Gramsci : -

).

Pax Americana and globalisationIn more recent times, it has been one of Cox’s key objectivesto explain additional processes of structural change,particularly the change from the post-World War order to


globalisation. Cox argues that a -led hegemonic worldorder, labelled pax Americana, prevailed until the early s.It was maintained through the Bretton Woods system of fixedexchange rates and institutions like the International Mone-tary Fund () and the World Bank. Moreover, it was basedon the principle of ‘embedded liberalism’, which allowedthe combination of international free trade with the rightfor governments to intervene in their national economy inorder to ensure domestic stability via social security and thepartial redistribution of economic wealth (Ruggie ).The corresponding form of state was the Keynesian welfarestate, characterised by interventionism, a policy of fullemployment via budget deficit spending, the mixed economyand an expansive welfare system (Gill and Law : -

). The underlying social relations of production wereorganised around the Fordist accumulation regime,characterised by mass production and mass consumption,and tripartite corporatism involving government-business-labour coalitions (Cox : -).2 The forms andfunctions of -led hegemony, however, began to alterfollowing the world economic crisis of the s and thecollapse of the Bretton Woods system during a period of‘structural change’ in the world economy in the s. Thisoverall crisis, both of the world economy and of social powerwithin various forms of state, has been explained as the resultof two particular tendencies: the internationalisation ofproduction and the internationalisation of the state that ledthe thrust towards globalisation.

Since the erosion of pax Americana principles of worldorder in the s, there has been an increasing international-isation of production and finance driven, at the apex of anemerging global class structure, by a ‘transnational manager-ial class’ (Cox : ). Taking advantage of differencesbetween countries, there has been an integration of productionprocesses on a transnational scale with TransnationalCorporations (s) promoting the operation of differentelements of a single process in different territorial locations.It is this organisation of production and finance on a trans-national level, which fundamentally distinguishes globali-sation from the period of pax Americana. Following the neo-Gramscian focus on social forces, engendered by productionas the main actors, it is realised that the transnationalrestructuring of capitalism in globalisation has led to theemergence of new social forces of capital and labour. Besides


the transnational managerial class, other elements ofproductive capital (involved in manufacturing and extrac-tion), including small- and medium-sized businesses actingas contractors and suppliers and import-export businesses,as well elements of financial capital (involved in bankinginsurance and finance) have been supportive of this internat-ionalisation of production. Hence there has been a rise inthe structural power of transnational capital supported andpromoted by forms of elite interaction that have forgedcommon perspectives, or an ‘emulative uniformity’, betweenbusiness, state officials and representatives of internationalorganisations favouring the logic of capitalist market relations(Cox : ; Gill and Law : ; Gill a: -

). Significant contradictions are likely to exist betweentransnational social forces of capital and nationally-basedcapital. The latter, engendered by national productionsystems, may oppose an open global economy due to theirreliance on national or regional protectionism against globalcompetition. Parallel to the division between transnationaland national capital, Cox identifies two main lines of divisionwithin the working class. Firstly, workers of s can be inconflict with workers of national companies, shadowing thesplit of capital. Secondly and related to this, there may be arift between established workers in secure employment, oftenwithin the core workforce of s, and non-establishedworkers in temporary and part-time positions at the peri-phery of the labour market (Cox : ). In other words,globalisation in the form of the transnationalisation ofproduction has led to a fractionalisation of capital and labourinto transnational and national social forces alike.

During this period of structural change in the s, then,the social basis across many forms of state altered as thelogic of capitalist market relations created a crisis of authorityin established institutions and modes of governance. Whilstsome have championed such changes as the ‘retreat of thestate’ (Strange ), or the emergence of a ‘borderless world’(Ohmae , ), and others have decried the globalproportions of such changes in production (Hirst and Thom-pson ; Weiss ), it is argued here that the internation-alisation of production has profoundly restructured—but noteroded—the role of the state. The notion of the internation-alisation of the state captures this dynamic by referring to theway transnational processes of consensus formation,underpinned by the internationalisation of production and


the thrust of globalisation, have been transmitted through thepolicy-making channels of governments.3 The network ofcontrol that has maintained the structural power of capitalhas also been supported by an ‘axis of influence’, consistingof institutions such as the World Bank, which have ensuredthe ideological osmosis and dissemination of policies in favourof the perceived exigencies of the global political economy.As a result, those state agencies in close contact with the globaleconomy—offices of presidents and prime ministers, treasuries,central banks—have gained precedence over those agenciesclosest to domestic public policy—ministries of labour andindustry or planning offices (Cox : ). Across the differentforms of state in countries of advanced and peripheralcapitalism, the general depiction is that the state became atransmission belt for neo-liberalism and the logic of capitalistcompetition from global to local spheres (Cox : ).4

From the internationalisation of the state toglobalisation: further developments

Although the thesis of the internationalisation of the statehas received much recent criticism, the work of StephenGill has greatly contributed to understanding this processas part of the changing character of -centred hegemony inthe global political economy, notably in his detailed analysisof the role of the Trilateral Commission (Gill ). Similarto Cox, the global restructuring of production is locatedwithin a context of structural change in the s. It was inthis period that there was a transition from what Gillrecognises as an international historical bloc of social forces,established in the post-World War period, towards a trans-national historical bloc, forging links and a synthesis ofinterests and identities not only beyond national boundariesand classes but also creating the conditions for the hegemonyof transnational capital. Yet Gill departs from Gramsci toassert that an historical bloc ‘may at times have the potentialto become hegemonic’, thereby implying that a historicalbloc can be established without necessarily enjoying hege-monic rule (Gill : ). For example, Gill argues thatthe current transnational historical bloc has a position ofsupremacy but not hegemony. Drawing in principle fromGramsci, it is argued that supremacy prevails, when a situationof hegemony is not apparent and when dominance is exercised


through an historical bloc over fragmented opposition (Gilla: , , ).

This politics of supremacy is organised through two keyprocesses: the new constitutionalism of disciplinary neo-liberalism and the concomitant spread of market civilisation.According to Gill, new constitutionalism involves thenarrowing of the social basis of popular participation withinthe world order of disciplinary neo-liberalism. It involvesthe hollowing out of democracy and the affirmation, in mattersof political economy, of a set of macro-economic policiessuch as market efficiency, discipline and confidence, policycredibility and competitiveness. It is ‘the move towardsconstruction of legal or constitutional devices to remove orinsulate substantially the new economic institutions frompopular scrutiny or democratic accountability’ (Gill ,

: ). Economic and Monetary Union () withinthe European Union () is regarded as a good example ofthis process (Gill ). New constitutionalism results inan attempt to make neo-liberalism the sole model of develop-ment by disseminating the notion of market civilisationbased on an ideology of capitalist progress and exclusionaryor hierarchical patterns of social relations (Gill a: ).Within the global political economy, mechanisms ofsurveillance have supported the market civilisation of newconstitutionalism in something tentatively likened to a global‘panopticon’ of surveillance (Gill b).

The overarching concept of supremacy has also been usedto develop an understanding of the construction of foreignpolicy towards the ‘Third World’ and how challenges weremounted against the in the s through the New Inter-national Economic Order () (Augelli and Murphy ).It is argued that the ideological promotion of Americanliberalism, based on individualism and free trade, assuredAmerican supremacy through the s and was reconstructedin the s. Yet this projection of supremacy did not simplyunfold through domination. Rather than simply equatingsupremacy with dominance, Augelli and Murphy argue thatsupremacy can be maintained through domination orhegemony (Augelli and Murphy : ). As Murphy(: n.) outlines in a separate study of industrialchange and international organisations, supremacy definesthe position of a leading class within an historical bloc andcan be secured by hegemony as well as through domination.Gramsci (: ) himself states, ‘the supremacy of a social


group manifests itself in two ways, as “domination” and as“intellectual and moral leadership”’. Where the former strainof supremacy involves subjugation by force, the latter involvesleading allied groups. Shifts or variations in hegemonytherefore characterise conditions of supremacy, which mayreveal the limits of organising the balance between passiveand active consent relative to force within world order.

A recent important intervention by van der Pijl ()further expands the possibility of using class struggle as ananalytical device for the analysis of confrontations beyondthose concerned with purely material interests. He distin-guishes three areas of capitalist discipline and exploitation:(1) original accumulation and resistance to it, mainly relevantduring the early history of capitalism; (2) the capitalistproduction process, referring to the exploitation of labourin the work place; and (3) the extension of exploitation intothe sphere of social reproduction, submitting education andhealth to capitalist profit criteria and leading to the destructionand exhaustion of the environment. It is the latter form ofcapitalist discipline that has become increasingly relevantduring neo-liberal globalisation. Resistance to it, be it byprogressive social movements and Green Parties, or be it bypopulist, nationalist movements, can be understood as classstruggle as much as the confrontation between employers andemployees at the workplace (van der Pijl : -).

In addition to the neo-Gramscian perspectives discussedso far, there also exists a diverse array of similar perspectivesanalysing hegemony in the global political economy. Thisincludes, among others, an account of the historically specificway in which mass production was institutionalised in the and how this propelled forms of American-centredleadership and world hegemony in the post-World War

period (Rupert a). Extending this analysis, there hasalso been consideration of struggles between social forcesin the over the North American Free Trade Agreement() and globalisation (Rupert b, ). Moreover,there have been analyses of European integration within thecontext of globalisation and the role of transnational classeswithin European governance (van Apeldoorn ; Bieler; Bieler and Morton b; Bieling and Steinhilber; Holman, Overbeek and Ryner ; Ryner ;Shields ); the internationalisation and democratisationof Southern Europe, particularly Spain, within the globalpolitical economy (Holman ); and analysis of


international organisations including the role of gender andwomen’s movements (Lee ; Stienstra ; Whitworth). There has also been a recent return to understandingforms of foreign policy intervention within countries ofperipheral capitalism. This has included analysing thepromotion of polyarchy defined as, ‘a system in which a smallgroup actually rules and mass participation in decision-making is confined to leadership choice in elections carefullymanaged by elites’ (Robinson : ). Polyarchy, or lowintensity democracy, is therefore analysed as an adjunct of hegemony through institutions such as the Agency forInternational Development () and the NationalEndowment for Democracy () in the particular countriesof the Philippines, Chile, Nicaragua, and Haiti and tenta-tively extended with reference to the former Soviet bloc andSouth Africa. Other recent research has similarly focusedon the promotion of ‘democracy’ in Southern Africa (Taylor) as well as the construction and contestation ofhegemony in Mexico (Morton c). Furthermore, aspectsof neo-liberalism and cultural hegemony have been dealtwith in a study of mass communications scholarship in Chile(Davies ). There are clearly a variety of neo-Gramscianperspectives dealing with a diversity of issues linked to theanalysis of hegemony in the global political economy. Thenext section outlines some of the criticisms levelled againstsuch perspectives and, in conclusion, indications are givenof what direction future research might proceed.

Welcome debate: controversies surrounding neo-Gramscian perspectives

In broad outline, neo-Gramscian perspectives have beencriticised as too unfashionably Marxist or, alternatively, toolacking in Marxist rigour. They are seen as unfashionablebecause many retain an essentially historical materialist posi-tion as central to analysis—focusing on the ‘decisive nucleusof economic activity’ (Gramsci, : ). Hence theaccusation that analysis remains caught within modernistassumptions that take as foundational the structures ofhistorical processes determining the realms of the possible(Ashley : ). However, rather than succumbing tothis problem, the fallibility of all knowledge claims isaccepted across neo-Gramscian perspectives. A minimal


foundationalism is therefore evident based on a cautious,contingent and transitory universalism that combinesdialogue between universal values and local definitions withinhistorically specific circumstances (Cox b: ; Cox :

).Elsewhere, other commentators have alternatively decried

the lack of historical materialist rigour within neo-Gramscianperspectives. According to Peter Burnham () the neo-Gramscian treatment of hegemony amounts to a ‘pluralistempiricism’ that fails to recognise the central importance ofthe capital relation and is therefore preoccupied with thearticulation of ideology. By granting equal weight to ideasand material capabilities it is argued that the contradictionsof the capital relation are blurred which results in ‘a slidetowards an idealist account of the determination of economicpolicy’ (Burnham : ). Hence, the categories of stateand market are regarded as opposed forms of socialorganisation that operate separately in external relationshipto one another. This leads to a supposed reification of thestate as a ‘thing’ in itself standing outside the relationshipbetween capital and labour (Burnham ).

In specific response to these criticisms, it was outlinedearlier in this article how the social relations of productionare taken as the starting point for thinking about world orderand the way they engender configurations of social forces.By thus asking what modes of social relations of productionwithin capitalism have been prevalent in particular historicalcircumstances, the state is not treated as an unquestionedcategory. Indeed, rather closer to Burnham’s own positionthan he might admit, the state is treated as an aspect of thesocial relations of production so that questions about theapparent separation of politics and economics or states andmarkets within capitalism are promoted. Although a fullydeveloped theory of the state is not evident, there clearlyexists a set of at least implicit assumptions about the state asa form of social relations through which capitalism and hege-mony are expressed. Moreover, ideas in the form of inter-subjective meanings are accepted as part of the globalpolitical economy itself. Yet, in contrast to Burnham’s claim,they are not regarded as an additional independent variablenext to material properties. Rather, the ‘material structureof ideology’ is the principal emphasis, which demonstratesan awareness of the ideological mediations of the statethrough libraries, schools, architecture, street names and lay-


out (Gramsci : -).5 Only those ideas, which aredisseminated through or rooted in such structures, linked toa particular constellation of social forces engaged in anideological struggle for hegemony are considered to be‘organic ideas’ (Bieler ). In Gramsci’s own words, onlythose ideas can be regarded as ‘organic’ that ‘organise humanmasses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquireconsciousness of their position, struggle, etc.’. These arecontrasted with ideas that are merely ‘arbitrary, rationalistic,or “willed”’, based on extemporary polemics (Gramsci :

-). This indicates an appreciation of the links intellec-tuals may have, or the wider social function they perform, inrelation to the world of production within capitalist societyto offer the basis for a materialist and social class analysis ofintellectuals.6 It is therefore an appreciation of how ideasand intellectual activity can ‘assume the fanatical granitecompactness of . . . “popular beliefs” which assume the sameenergy as “material forces”’ (Gramsci : ).

A different series of criticisms have separately centred onthe thesis of globalisation and the internationalisation ofthe state proposed by neo-Gramscian perspectives. Inparticular, Leo Panitch has argued that an account unfoldswhich is too top down in its expression of power relationsand assumes that globalisation is a process that proceedsfrom the global to the national or the outside-in. The pointthat globalisation is authored by states is thus overlookedby developing the metaphor of a transmission belt from theglobal to the national within the thesis of the international-isation of the state (Panitch , ). It has been addedthat this is a one-way view of internationalisation that respec-tively: overlooks reciprocal interaction between the globaland the local; overlooks mutually reinforcing social relationswithin the global political economy; or ignores class conflictwithin national social formations (Ling ; Baker ;Moran ). The role of the state, following Panitch’s (:

) argument, is still determined by struggles among socialforces located within particular social formations, eventhough social forces may be implicated in transnationalstructures.

In response, it will be recalled from the above discussionthat the point of departure within a neo-Gramscian approachcould equally be changing social relations of productionwithin forms of state or world order (Cox : n.).Indeed, Cox’s focus has been on historical blocs underpinning


particular states and how these are connected through themutual interests of social classes in different countries.Further, following both Gramsci and Cox, the national contextis the only place where an historical bloc can be founded andwhere the task of building new historical blocs, as the basisfor counter-hegemony to change world order, must begin.Gill too, although he tends to take a slightly different tackon the application of notions such as historical bloc andsupremacy, is still interested in analysing attempts toconstitutionalise neo-liberalism at the domestic, regional andglobal levels (Gill a: ). Therefore, there is a focuson transnational networks of production and how nationalgovernments have lost much autonomy in policy-making,but also how states are still an integral part of this process.

Extending these insights (Bieler and Morton ), itmight also be important to recognise that capital is not simplysomething that is footloose, beyond the power of the state,but is represented by classes and fractions of classes withinthe very constitution of the state. The phenomenon now recog-nised as globalisation, represented by the transnationalisationof production, therefore induces the reproduction of capitalwithin different states through a process of internalisationbetween various fractions of classes within states (Poulantzas: -). Seen in this way, globalisation and the relatedemergence of transnational social forces of capital and labourhas not led to a retreat of the state. Instead, there has unfoldeda restructuring of different forms of state through aninternalisation within the state itself of new configurationsof social forces expressed by class struggle between different(national and transnational) fractions of capital and labour.This stress on both internalisation and internationalisationis somewhat different from assuming that various forms ofstate have become simple ‘transmission belts’ from the globalto the national.

Finally, Cox (: -, : ) has made clear thatthe internationalisation of the state and the role of trans-national elites (or a nébuleuse) in forging consensus withinthis process remains to be fully deciphered and needs muchmore study. Indeed, the overall argument concerning theinternationalisation of the state was based on a series of linkedhypotheses suggestive for empirical investigation (Cox /: ). The overall position adopted on the relationshipbetween the global and the national, or between hegemony,supremacy and historical bloc, may differ from one neo-


Gramscian perspective to the next, but it is usually drivenby the purpose and empirical context of the research.

Further criticisms have also focused on how the hegemonyof transnational capital has been over-estimated and howthe possibility for transformation within world order isthereby diminished by neo-Gramscian perspectives(Drainville ). For example, the focus on elite agency inEuropean integration processes by Gill and van Apeldoornwould indirectly reinforce a negative assessment of labour’spotential role in resisting neo-liberalism (Strange ).Analysis, notes André Drainville (: ), ‘must give wayto more active sorties against transnational neo-liberalism,and the analysis of concepts of control must beget originalconcepts of resistance.’ It is therefore important, as PaulCammack () has added, to avoid overstating thecoherence of neo-liberalism and to identify materiallygrounded opportunities for counter-hegemonic action. Alltoo often, a host of questions related to counter-hegemonicforms of resistance are usually left for future research,although the demonstrations during the ‘Carnival AgainstCapitalism’ (London, June ), mobilisations against theWorld Trade Organisation (Seattle, November ), protestsagainst the and World Bank (Washington, April

and Prague, September ), and ‘riots’ during theEuropean Union summit at Nice (December ), as wellas the G-8 meeting at Genoa (July ), all seeminglyfurther expose the imperative of analysing globalisation asa set of highly contested social relations. Overall, while thepoint about a lack of empirical investigation into concreteacts of resistance is correct in many instances, it should notbe exaggerated either. It has to be noted that an analysis ofthe current power configuration of social forces does not byitself strengthen this configuration nor does it exclude aninvestigation of possible resistance. Rather, the analysis ofhegemonic practices can be understood as the absolutelyessential first step towards an investigation into potentialalternative developments; and resistance can only be success-fully mounted if one understands what precisely needs to beresisted. Moreover, several neo-Gramscian attempts dealingwith issues of resistance have now been formulated andprovide fertile avenues for further exploration (see Cox ;Gill , ; Morton ). The primary task of criticalscholarship is to therefore clarify resistance to globalisation(Cox : ).


The final and most recent criticisms arise from the call fora much needed engagement by neo-Gramscian perspectiveswith the writings of Gramsci and thus the complexmethodological, ontological, epistemological and contextualissues that embroiled the Italian thinker (Germain and Kenny). This emphasis was presaged in an earlier argumentwarning that the incorporation of Gramscian insights into and ran ‘the risk of denuding the borrowed concepts ofthe theoretical significance in which they cohere’ (Smith :

). To commit the latter error could reduce scholars to theaccusation of ‘searching for gems’ in the Prison Notebooks inorder to ‘save’ from a pervasive economism (Gareau :

). To be sure, such criticisms and warnings have rightlydrawn attention to the importance of remaining engaged withGramsci’s own writings. Germain and Kenny also rightly callfor greater sensitivity to the problems of meaning andunderstanding in the history of ideas when appropriatingGramsci for contemporary application. In such ways, then,the demand to remain (re)engaged with Gramsci’s thoughtand practice was a necessary one to make and well overdue.Yet the demand to return Gramsci to his historical contextneed not prevent the possibility of appreciating ideas both inand beyond their context. Rather than the seemingly austerehistoricism of Germain and Kenny’s demands, which limitthe relevance of past ideas in the present, it is possible toacknowledge the role played by both past forms of thoughtand previous historical conditions in shaping subsequent ideasand existing social relations (Morton a). This methodpushes one to consider what might be historically relevant aswell as limited in a theoretical and practical translation ofpast ideas in relation to alternative conditions.

Conclusion

To summarise, it has been shown how an alternative criticaltheory route to hegemony improves on mainstream routes.Notably a case was made for a critical theory of hegemonythat directs attention to relations between social interests inthe struggle for consensual leadership rather than concen-trating solely on state dominance. With a particular historicalmaterialist focus and critique of capitalism it was thereforeshown how various neo-Gramscian perspectives provide analternative critical theory route to hegemony.


As a result it was argued that the conceptual frameworkdeveloped by such neo-Gramscian perspectives rethinks preva-lent ontological assumptions in due to a theory of hegemonythat focuses on social forces engendered by changes in thesocial relations of production, forms of state and world order.It was highlighted how this route to hegemony opens upquestions about the social processes that create and transformdifferent forms of state. Attention is thus drawn towards theraison d’état, or the basis of state power, that includes thesocial basis of hegemony or the configuration of social forcesupon which power rests across the terrain of state-civil societyrelations. With an appreciation of how ideas, institutions andmaterial capabilities interact in the construction andcontestation of hegemony it was also possible to pay attentionto issues of intersubjectivity. Therefore a critical theory ofhegemony was developed that was not equated with dominanceand thus went beyond a theory of the state-as-force. Finally,by recognising the different social purpose behind a criticaltheory, committed to historical change, this route to hegemonyposes an epistemological challenge to knowledge claimsassociated with positivist social science.

In a separate section, further developments by diverse,yet related, neo-Gramscian perspectives were outlined.Subsequently, a series of criticisms of the neo-Gramscianperspectives were discussed. Analysis can be pushed intofurther theoretical and empirical areas by addressing someof these criticisms. For example, in terms of further researchdirections, benefit could be gained by directly consideringthe role of organised labour in contesting the latest agendaof neoliberal globalisation (Bieler a and b, Strange).7 It is also important to problematise the tactics andstrategies of resistances to neo-liberalism by giving furtherthought to ‘new’ social movements, such as forms of peasantmobilisation in Latin America like the Movimento (dosTrabalhadores Rurais) Sem Terra (: Movement of LandlessRural Workers) in Brazil and the Ejército Zapatista de LiberaciónNacional (: Zapatista Army of National Liberation) inChiapas, Mexico (Morton ). At a more explicitly theore-tical level, additional work could also be conducted inrevealing Gramsci’s theory of the state and then situating thiswithin a wider discussion of state theory (Bieler and Morton). Overall, though, what matters ‘is the way in whichGramsci’s legacy gets interpreted, transmitted and used sothat it [can] remain an effective tool not only for the critical


analysis of hegemony but also for the development of analternative politics and culture’ (Buttigieg : ).

Notes

* We would like to thank Robert Cox and Kees van der Pijl for theircomments on this article in draft as well as two anonymous refereesof this journal, and Gerard Strange, for their supportive criticisms.Adam David Morton also acknowledges the financial support of anEconomic and Social Research Council () PostdoctoralFellowship (Ref.: ).

1. Although overlaps may exist, the critical impetus bears a less thandirect affiliation with the constellation of social thought known asthe Frankfurt School represented by, among others, the work of MaxHorkheimer, Theodor Adorno or, more recently, Jürgen Habermas(Cox a: ). Hence, Cox may not explicitly understand himselfto be working within the fold of the Frankfurt School (Schecter: ). For a useful discussion of the contradictory strands andinfluences between Frankfurt School critical theory and critical theory see Wyn Jones ().

2. It is worth noting that, whilst the Keynesian welfare state form isreferred to by Cox as the ‘neoliberal state’, this precedent is notfollowed. This is because confusion can result when using his termand distinguishing it from the more conventional understanding ofneo-liberalism related to processes in the late s and s,which he calls ‘hyperliberalism’.

3. At first sight, this understanding of a restructured, but not erodedrole of the state, resembles Cerny’s conceptualisation of the‘competition state’ in globalisation (Cerny a, b). Ratherthan withering away, Cerny argues that ‘states play a crucial role asstabilisers and enforcers of the rules and practices of global society’(Cerny b: ). In contrast to neo-Gramscian perspectives,however, the state is not understood as resting on and beingconstituted by a particular configuration of social forces. Rather,the state is understood as an independent actor intervening in themarket in different ways. As a result, ‘competition state’ analysisfalls into the trap of separating economics from politics and themarket from the state, resulting in an ahistoric analysis of differentsocial forms specific to capitalism (see Burnham ). In contrastto ‘competition state’ analysis, regulation theory places an emphasison how a particular mode of regulation, constituted by the institu-tional ensemble of the state, is related to a specific accumulationregime, i.e. the way production is organised (for an overview of


regulation theory approaches, see Jessop ). The problem here,however, is that ‘theories of regulation are founded on a division ofthe world into a system of states and of multiple sovereignties andan identification of national modes of regulation’ (Dunford :

). As a result, the transnational dimension of globalisation andthe related emergence of new social forces cannot be conceptualised.

4. It is noteworthy that the metaphor of a transmission belt has beenwithdrawn from more recent work (Cox : ).

5. James Scott () has extended this awareness in an interestingway by encompassing a variety of state naming practices, or ‘statesimplifications’, that enhance the legibility of society.

6. One way in which such enquiry has proceeded is through a detailedfocus on the social function of the intellectual within conditions ofsocio-economic modernisation to highlight the mixture of criticalopposition and accommodation that has confronted intellectuals inLatin America, with a specific focus on the Mexican novelist CarlosFuentes (see Morton b).

7. Many of Gramsci’s own insights on the conflict between capital andlabour, arising from political action within new workers’ organisationsknown as ‘Factory Councils’ in Turin during the biennio rosso (-

), might have relevance here and can be found in Gramsci (,

, ).

References

van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan () Transnational Capitalism and theStruggle over European Integration. London: Routledge.

Ashley, Richard K. () ‘The Poverty of Neorealism’, InternationalOrganisation, (): -.

_______ () ‘Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralismand War’, in James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (eds)International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of WorldPolitics. Toronto: Lexington Books.

Augelli, Enrico and Craig Murphy () America’s Quest for Supremacyand the Third World: A Gramscian Analysis. London: Pinter.

Baker, Andrew () ‘Nébuleuse and the “Internationalisation of theState” in the ?’, Review of International Political Economy, ():-.

Bieler, Andreas () Globalisation and Enlargement of the EU: Austrianand Swedish Social Forces in the Struggle over Membership. London:Routledge.


_______ () ‘Questioning Cognitivism and Constructivism in Theory: Reflections on the Material Structure of Ideas’, Politics,(): -.

_______ (a) ‘Labour, Neoliberalism and the Conflict OverEconomic and Monetary Union: A Comparative Analysis of Britishand German Trade Unions’, German Politics, (): -.

_______ (b) ‘Swedish Trade Unions and Economic andMonetary Union: The European Union Membership DebateRevisited? Cooperation and Conflict, (): -

Bieler, Andreas and Adam David Morton (a) ‘The Gordian Knotof Agency-Structure in International Relations: A Neo-GramscianPerspective’, European Journal of International Relations, (): -.

_______ (eds) (b) Social Forces in the Making of the New Europe:The Restructuring of European Social Relations in the Global PoliticalEconomy. London: Palgrave.

_______ () ‘Globalisation, the State and Class Struggle: A“Critical Economy” Engagement with Open Marxism’, BritishJournal of Politics and International Relations, (): -.

Bieling, Hans-Jürgen and Jochen Steinhilber (eds) Die KonfigurationEuropas: Dimension einer kritischen Integrationstheorie. Münster:Westfälisches Dampfboot.

Bilgin, Pinar and Adam David Morton () ‘Historicising Represen-tations of “Failed States”: Beyond the Cold War Annexation of theSocial Sciences?’, Third World Quarterly, (): -.

Burnham, Peter () ‘Neo-Gramscian Hegemony and theInternational Order’, Capital & Class, : -.

_______ () ‘Open Marxism and Vulgar International PoliticalEconomy’, Review of International Political Economy, (): -.

Buttigieg, Joseph A. () ‘The Legacy of Antonio Gramsci’, Boundary, (): -.

Cammack, Paul () ‘Interpreting : Interregionalism and theNew Materialism’, Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, (): -.

Cerny, Philip G. (a) ‘Restructuring the Political Arena:Globalisation and the Paradoxes of the Competition State’, inRandall D. Germain (ed.) Globalisation and its Critics: Perspectivesfrom Political Economy. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

_______ (b) ‘Political Globalisation and the CompetitionState’, in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill (eds.) PoliticalEconomy and the Changing Global Order (second edition). Oxford:Oxford University Press.

Cox, Robert W. () ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: BeyondInternational Relations Theory’, Millennium: Journal of InternationalStudies, (): -.


_______ () ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations:An Essay in Method’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies,(): -.

_______ (/) ‘Realism, Positivism, Historicism’, in RobertW. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_______ () Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces inthe Making of History. New York: Columbia University Press.

_______ () ‘Production, the State and Change in World Order’,in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau (eds) Global Changesand Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the s.Toronto: Lexington Books.

_______ () ‘Global perestroika’, in Ralph Miliband and Leo Panitch(eds) The Socialist Register: New World Order? London: Merlin Press.

_______ (/) ‘Towards a Posthegemonic Conceptualisationof World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun’, inRobert W. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_______ (/) ‘Production and Security’, in Robert W. Coxand Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

_______ () ‘The Forum: Hegemony and Social Change’,Mershon International Studies Review, (): -.

_______ (a) ‘Critical Political Economy’, in Björn Hettne (ed.)International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder.London: Zed Books.

_______ (b) ‘Civilisations: Encounters and Transformations’,Studies in Political Economy, : -.

_______ () ‘Reconsiderations’, in Robert W. Cox (ed.) The NewRealism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order. London:Macmillan.

_______ () ‘Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium:Prospects for an Alternative World Order’, Review of InternationalStudies, (): -.

_______ () ‘The Way Ahead: Towards a New Ontology of WorldOrder’, in Richard Wyn Jones (ed.) Critical Theory and World Politics.Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

_______ () ‘Reflections and Transitions’ in Robert W. Cox withMichael G. Schecter, The Political Economy of a Plural World: CriticalReflections on Power, Morals and Civilisation. London: Routledge.

Davies, Matt () International Political Economy and MassCommunication in Chile: National Intellectuals and TransnationalHegemony. London: Macmillan.


Drainville, André () ‘International Political economy in the Age ofOpen Marxism’, Review of International Political Economy, (): -

.

_______ () ‘Of Social Spaces, Citizenship and the Nature ofPower in the World Economy’, Alternatives, (): -.

Dunford, Michael () ‘Theories of Regulation’, Environment andPlanning D: Society and Space, : -.

Gareau, Frederick H. () ‘A Gramscian Analysis of the SocialSciences’, International Social Science Journal, (): -.

Germain, Randall D. and Michael Kenny () ‘Engaging Gramsci:International Relations Theory and the New Gramscians’, Reviewof International Studies, (): -.

Gill, Stephen () American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_______ () ‘Reflections on Global Order and SociohistoricalTime’, Alternatives, (): -.

_______ () ‘The Emerging World Order and European Change:The Political Economy of European Union’, in Ralph Miliband andLeo Panitch (eds) The Socialist Register: New World Order? London:Merlin Press.

_______ () ‘Epistemology, Ontology and the “Italian School”’,in Stephen Gill (ed.) Gramsci, Historical Materialism andInternational Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_______ (a) ‘Globalisation, Market Civilisation and DisciplinaryNeoliberalism’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, ():-.

_______ (b) ‘The Global Panopticon? The Neoliberal State, EconomicLife and Democratic Surveillance’, Alternatives, (): -.

_______ () ‘Toward a Postmodern Prince? The Battle in Seattleas a Moment in the New Politics of Globalisation’, Millennium:Journal of International Studies, (): -.

______ () ‘Constitutionalising Capital: and DisciplinaryNeoliberalism’, in Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton (eds)Social Forces in the Making of the New Europe: The Restructuring ofEuropean Social Relations in the Global Political Economy. London:Palgrave.

Gill, Stephen and David Law () The Global Political Economy:Perspectives, Problems and Policies. London: Harvester andWheatsheaf.

_______ () ‘Global Hegemony and the Structural Power ofCapital’, International Studies Quarterly, (): -.

Gramsci, Antonio () Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. andtrans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith. London: Lawrenceand Wishart.


_______ () Selections from Political Writings, -, ed.Quintin Hoare, trans. John Matthews. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

_______ () Selections from Political Writings, -, ed. andtrans. Quintin Hoare. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

_______ () Pre-Prison Writings, ed. Richard Bellamy, trans.Virginia Cox. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_______ () Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. andtrans. Derek Boothman. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Hirst, Paul and Graham Thompson () Globalisation in Question:The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance.Cambridge: Polity Press nd edition.

Holman, Otto () Integrating Southern Europe: EC Expansion andthe Transnationalisation of Spain. London: Routledge.

Holman, Otto, Henk Overbeek and Magnus Ryner (ed.) ()‘Neoliberal Hegemony and European Restructuring’, InternationalJournal of Political Economy, (-): Special Issues.

Jessop, Bob (ed) () Regulation Theory and the Crisis of Capitalism, vols. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Keohane, Robert O. () After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord inthe World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

_______ () International Institutions and State Power. Boulder:Westview Press.

Lee, Kelly () ‘A neo-Gramscian Approach to International Organi-sation: An Expanded Analysis of Current Reforms to DevelopmentActivities’, in John Macmillan and Andrew Linklater (eds) Boundariesin Question: New Directions in International Relations. London: Pinter.

Ling, L.H.M () ‘Hegemony and the Internationalising State: APost-colonial Analysis of China’s Integration into AsianCorporatism’, Review of International Political Economy, (): -.

Moran, Jonathan () ‘The Dynamics of Class Politics and NationalEconomies in Globalisation: The Marginalisation of the Unaccep-table’, Capital & Class, : -.

Morton, Adam David () ‘The Sociology of Theorising and Neo-Gramscian Perspectives: The Problems of “School” Formation in’, in Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton (eds) Social Forcesin the Making of the New Europe: The Restructuring of EuropeanSocial Relations in the Global Political Economy. London: Palgrave.

_______ () ‘“La Resurrección del Maíz”: Globalisation,Resistance and the Zapatistas’, Millennium: Journal of InternationalStudies, (): -.

_______ (a) ‘Historicising Gramsci: situating ideas in andbeyond their context’, Review of International Political Economy,(): -.


_______ (b) ‘The Social Function of Carlos Fuentes: A CriticalIntellectual or in the “Shadow of the State”?’, Bulletin of LatinAmerican Research, (), -.

_______ (c) ‘Structural Change and Neoliberalism in Mexico:“Passive Revolution” in the Global Political Economy’, Third WorldQuarterly, (): -.

Murphy, Craig N. () International Organisation and IndustrialChange. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Ohmae, Kenichi () The Borderless World. New York: Fontana._______ () The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional

Economies. New York: Free Press.Overbeek, Henk () Global Capitalism and National Decline: The

Thatcher Decade in Historical Perspective. London: Routledge._______ (ed.) () Restructuring Hegemony in the Global Political

Economy: The Rise of Transnational Neoliberalism in the s. London:Routledge.

_______ () ‘The Forum: Hegemony and Social Change’,Mershon International Studies Review, (): -.

Panitch, Leo () ‘Globalisation and the State’, in Leo Panitch andRalph Miliband (eds) The Socialist Register: Between Globalism andNationalism. London: Merlin Press.

_______ () ‘The New Imperial State’, New Left Review (II),(March-April): -.

van der Pijl, Kees () The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class.London: Verso.

______. () Transnational Classes and International Relations.London: Routledge.

Poulantzas, Nicos () Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, trans.David Fernbach. London: New Left Books.

Robinson, William I. () Promoting Polyarchy: Globalisation, US

Intervention and Hegemony. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Ruggie, John G. () ‘International Regimes, Transactions and

change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order’,International Organisation, (): -.

Rupert, Mark (a) Producing Hegemony: The Politics of MassProduction and American Global Power. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.

______. (b) ‘(Re)Politicising the Global Economy: LiberalCommon Sense and Ideological Struggle in the US NAFTADebate’, Review of International Political Economy, (): -.

______. () Ideologies of Globalisation: Contending Visions of a NewWorld Order. London: Routledge.


Ryner, Magnus () Capitalist Restructuring, Globalisation and theThird Way: Lessons from the Swedish Model. London: Routledge.

Schecter, Michael G. () ‘Critiques of Coxian Theory: Backgroundto a Conversation’, in Robert W. Cox with Michael G. Schecter,The Political Economy of a Plural World: Critical Reflections on Power,Morals and Civilisation. London: Routledge.

Scott, James C. () Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes toImprove the Human Condition Have Failed. New Haven: YaleUniversity Press.

Shields, Stuart () ‘The Charge of the “Right Brigade”:Transnational Social Forces and the Neoliberal Configuration ofPoland’s Transition’, New Political Economy, (): -.

Showstack Sassoon, Anne () Gramsci’s Politics. nd edition.Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Smith, Hazel () ‘Marxism and International Relations Theory’, inA. J. R. Groom and Margot Light (eds) Contemporary InternationalRelations: A Guide to Theory. London: Pinter.

Ste. Croix, G.E.M. de () The Class Struggle in the Ancient GreekWorld from the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquests. London: Duckworth.

Stienstra, Deborah () Women’s Movements and InternationalOrganisations. London: Macmillan.

Strange, Gerard () ‘Globalisation, Regionalism and LabourInterests in the New ’, New Political Economy, (): -.

Strange, Susan () The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power inthe World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Taylor, Ian () Stuck in Middle GEAR: South Africa’s Post-ApartheidForeign Relations. Westport, .: Praeger Publishers.

Thompson, E.P. () The Making of the English Working Class.Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Waltz, Kenneth N. () Theory of International Politics. Reading,Mass.: Addison-Wesley.

Weiss, Linda () The Myth of the Powerless State: Governing theEconomy in a Global Era. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Whitworth, Sandrah () Feminism and International Relations:Towards a Political Economy of Gender in Interstate and Non-Governmental Institutions. London: Macmillan.

Wyn Jones, Richard () Critical Theory and World Politics. Boulder:Lynne Rienner.

Bieler Morton neo Gramscian perspectives in international relations

Documents

Transcript of Bieler Morton neo Gramscian perspectives in international relations