BHARUCH DISTRICT MODEL CHEMICAL DISASTER - Gujarat · BHARUCH DISTRICT MODEL CHEMICAL DISASTER...

GUJARAT STATE INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLANXX

BHARUCH DISTRICT MODEL CHEMICAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

BLOCK NO. 11, 5TH FLOOR, UDYOG BHAVAN,. SECTOR - 11, GANDHINAGAR, GUJARAT (INDIA) - 382 017. TEL: +91.79.2325 9220, 2325 9303, 2325 9246

Report No GSDMA/2012/Module3/R7June 2013

3BHARUCH DISTRICT INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL DMP

CONSULTANT TEAMPRESTELS (Mumbai) led the project under the contract from GSDMA. Mr VN Patel (POST), Dr Ranjit Bannerji (CEO), Nisarg Dave (position),

Others (names) from GSDMA provided overall direction, reviewed deliverables and contributed in improving reports. Mr Sumeet Patil

is the Project Manager from PRESTELS and main coordinating author for the report. Mr Wayne Thomas, Ms Angela Nelson, and Mr John

Scronce from IEM, Inc. (USA) collaboratively led the technical aspects of the project with PRESTELS. Gen (Dr) JR Bhardwaj is the overall

team leader and provided technical and administrative guidance. Mr. KC Gupta (external consultant) is the lead emergency management

expert. Other authors of the report are Mr Surendar Kumar, Mr J Vaghela, Dr VN Rao, Mr A Mhaskar, Dr. G Abraham, Ms Brinda Iyer, Mr

Prakash Patil, and Mr Pranav Patil.

RIGHTS AND PERMISSIONSThe material in this work is property of GSDMA. GSDMA encourages dissemination of its work, but copying and/or transmitting portions or all of this work without permission or without proper citation may be a violation of applicable law. All queries should be addressed to Position Name, GSDMA, Address. Email, Phone Number

This report may be cited as: GSDMA (2013). Gujarat State Chemical Disaster Management Plan. Report No XXXXXX prepared by PRESTELS, June 2013, Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority (GSDMA), Gandhinagar, Gujarat. Available at WEBSITE, viewed on DATE.

Report Designed by : designaren I designaren.com

GUJARAT STATE CHEMICAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

REFERENCE NO: GSDMA/2013/12 10 JUNE 2013

i BHARUCH DISTRICT INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL DMP

LIST OF TABLES..................................................................................................................................................... VILIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................................................VIIABBREVIATIONS.................................................................................................................................................VIIIDEFINITIONS AND GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS ............................................................................................... XEXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................................XVI

1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................11.1 Purpose ................................................................................................................. 11.2 Scope and Objectives ................................................................................................ 11.3 Approach to Preparation of Baruch District CDMP ............................................................... 21.4 Difference and Synergies between CDMP and Offsite Plans ................................................... 21.5 Hierarchy and Relationship of the Plans .......................................................................... 41.6 Coordinating Structures under CAEPPR Rules and DM Acts ..................................................... 41.7 Local Response to Chemical Disasters - Emergency Organisation Structure................................. 51.8 Legal and Policy Framework for Disaster Management Plan ................................................... 6 1.8.1 Legal Authority .............................................................................................. 7 1.8.2 Key Regulatory Bodies ...................................................................................... 71.9 Organization of the Plan ............................................................................................ 8

2. HAZARD ANALYSIS AND VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT ................................................................112.1 HazardIdentification ................................................................................................ 11 2.1.1 An Overview of the Industrial Hazards in Bharuch ................................................... 11 2.1.2 Description of Chemical Hazards ........................................................................ 11 2.1.3 Environmental Consequences ............................................................................ 13 2.1.4 Medical Consequence of Chemical Exposure .......................................................... 13 2.1.5 ClassificationofScaleofDisasters ...................................................................... 14 2.1.6 Levels of Emergency ....................................................................................... 16 2.1.7 Transportation of Hazardous Materials ................................................................. 17 2.1.8 Chemical Emergencies in Aftermath of Natural Disasters ........................................... 18 2.1.9 Domino Effects in Chemical Emergencies .............................................................. 192.2 Vulnerability Assessment ........................................................................................... 19 2.2.1 Distribution and Types of Industries ..................................................................... 19 2.2.2 Worst Case Scenario Assessment ......................................................................... 21

3. PREVENTION AND MITIGATION ..............................................................................................................253.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 253.2 Hierarchy of Concepts for Reducing Risks ....................................................................... 253.3 Considerations in District Emergency Planning ................................................................. 263.4 Disaster Risk Reduction through Land Use Planning ............................................................ 283.5 SignificantRelianceonE-governance ............................................................................ 283.6 Promotion of Prevention Programs in Industry .................................................................. 293.7 Co-ordination between DCG Members ............................................................................ 30

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TABLE OF CONTENT

3.8 Training and Capacity Building .................................................................................... 313.9 Stakeholder Roles and Responsibilities in Prevention and Mitigation ........................................ 31

4. PREPAREDNESS .........................................................................................................................................334.1 DevelopAgencySpecificPreparednessWorkPlan .............................................................. 334.2 Improvement in Chemical Disaster Management Planning .................................................... 33 4.2.1 DDMA and DCG coordination in Planning and Preparedness ......................................... 33 4.2.2 Implement State Level Recommendations for the Synchronization of Onsite and Offsite

Plans ......................................................................................................... 33 4.2.3 Implement Emergency Responder Safety Guidelines ................................................. 34 4.2.4 ImplementGuidelinesforImmediateNotificationofHazardousChemicalsLeaks .............. 34 4.2.5 Formal After-Action Reporting System .................................................................. 35 4.2.6 Development of a GIS-based Database for Planning Information ................................... 354.3 Training, Capacity Building, and Community Preparedness ................................................... 35 4.3.1 Improving the Capability for and Effectiveness of Offsite Mock Drills ............................. 36 4.3.2 Specialized Training on an Integrated and Coordinated Emergency Response ................... 36 4.3.3 Development and Implementation of a Chemical Emergency Community

Awareness and Preparedness Strategy .................................................................. 374.4 Enhance Chemical Disaster Response Capacity ................................................................. 38 4.4.1 HAZMAT Response Capacity Assessment ................................................................ 38 4.4.2 Multi Scenario Chemical Response Capability ......................................................... 40 4.4.3 UnifiedStateLevelFireServices ........................................................................ 40 4.4.4 Incident Response System ................................................................................ 41 4.4.5 QualifiedResponsebyLocalEmergencyResponseTeams............................................ 41 4.4.6 Support from Regional Response Team ................................................................. 42 4.4.7 Support from the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) .......................................... 424.5 Plan for Training, Equipment and Resources for HAZMAT Response ......................................... 42 4.5.1 Background and Basis for Training and Resource Planning ........................................... 42 4.5.2 Gaps in Basic Fire Services in Bharuch .................................................................. 45 4.5.3 Resource Plan for Local Emergency Response Team .................................................. 454.6 Public Private Partnerships (PPP) for Disaster Response ...................................................... 47 4.6.1 Make DPMC Ankleshwar a District Level Asset ......................................................... 47 4.6.2 Mutual Aid Agreements with Other Districts and Dahej Port ........................................ 474.7 Strengthening of the Response Mechanism ...................................................................... 47 4.7.1 Establish Emergency Organization as per Incident Response System .............................. 47 4.7.2 EstablishIncidentIntimationandNotificationProcesses ............................................ 47 4.7.3 Improve Control Room Management .................................................................... 54 4.7.4 Improvements in Communications ...................................................................... 54 4.7.5 Situational Awareness ..................................................................................... 56 4.7.6 Hierarchical HAZMAT Response System ................................................................. 57 4.7.7 Emergency Public Information ........................................................................... 57 4.7.8 Management of Dead ...................................................................................... 57 4.7.9 Mass Care .................................................................................................... 57

iii BHARUCH DISTRICT INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL DMP

4.8 Medical Preparedness for Chemical Emergencies .............................................................. 57 4.8.1 Establish a Public Private Partnership to Augment Medical Resources ............................. 58 4.8.2 EstablishaChemical-SpecificMedicalManagementProcess ........................................ 58 4.8.3 Creation of a Trained Medical First Responder (MFR) ................................................ 58 4.8.4 Formation of a Quick Response Medical Team (QRMT) ............................................... 58 4.8.5 Creation of Stationary and Mobile Decontamination Facilities ..................................... 59 4.8.6 UniformCasualtyProfileandClassificationofCasualties ............................................ 59 4.8.7 IdentificationofPoisonCentres/ToxicologicalLaboratory ......................................... 59 4.8.8 Plan for Onsite Medical Resource Inventory ........................................................... 59 4.8.9 Provision for Mobile Hospital / Mobile Team ........................................................... 59 4.8.10 Stocking for Antidotes and Chemical Casualty Treatment Kits ...................................... 60 4.8.11 Develop Crisis Management Plans at Hospitals ........................................................ 604.9 Stakeholder Roles and Responsibilities in preparedness ....................................................... 61

5. RESPONSE ...................................................................................................................................................635.1 Situation Overview .................................................................................................. 635.2 Planning Assumptions ............................................................................................... 635.3 Emergency Response Organization Structure and Process .................................................... 635.4 Concept of Emergency Operations ................................................................................ 65 5.4.1 Trigger Mechanism ......................................................................................... 67 5.4.2 Set up of the Incident Command Post .................................................................. 67 5.4.3 Assess the Situation ........................................................................................ 68 5.4.4 StaffingandActivitiesofDEOC .......................................................................... 69 5.4.5 Select Protective Action(s) ............................................................................... 69 5.4.6 Control the Hazard ........................................................................................ 69 5.4.7 Provide Short-Term Relief to the Public ................................................................ 705.5 Emergency Medical Response ...................................................................................... 72 5.5.1 Medical Consequence of Chemical Exposure .......................................................... 72 5.5.2 Response Capacity Assessment and Planning During a Response ................................... 73 5.5.3 Response by the Quick Response Medical Team (QRMT) ............................................. 73 5.5.4 Search and Rescue ......................................................................................... 74 5.5.5 Evacuation of Casualties from the Incident Site ...................................................... 75 5.5.6 Activation of Crisis Management at Hospitals ......................................................... 75 5.5.7 Protocol for Medical Management ....................................................................... 75 5.5.8 Rapid Assessment of Health Consequences ............................................................ 76 5.5.9 Plan for Antidotes for Chemical Agent Exposures ..................................................... 76 5.5.10 Requisition of a Pharmaceutical Stockpile (if required) ............................................. 76 5.5.11 Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) ......................................................................... 77 5.5.12 Psychosocial Care .......................................................................................... 77 5.5.13 Public Health Response ................................................................................... 77 5.5.14 Medical Response to Long Term Effects ................................................................ 775.6 RESPONSE TO HAZCHEM TRANSPORTATION EMERGENCIES ..................................................... 77

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TABLE OF CONTENT

5.6.1 Pipeline Transportation ................................................................................... 77 5.6.2 Road Transportation ....................................................................................... 785.7 Summary of Response Actions and Stakeholders responsible ................................................. 795.8 Roles and Responsibilities as per SCG 2008 response Plan .................................................... 81 5.8.1 Fire Services ................................................................................................ 81 5.8.2 Police ........................................................................................................ 81 5.8.3 Department of Health ..................................................................................... 82 5.8.4 District Disaster Management Authority ................................................................ 82 5.8.5 DepartmentofRevenue/ReliefCommissioner/Collector’sOffice ............................... 82 5.8.6 Department of Labour and Employment / Director of Industrial Safety and Health (DISH) ..................................................................... 82 5.8.7 Gujarat Pollution Control Board ......................................................................... 83 5.8.8 Department of Transport .................................................................................. 83 5.8.9 Department of Animal Husbandry ....................................................................... 83 5.8.10 Department of Agriculture ................................................................................ 83 5.8.11 PublicInformationOfficer ................................................................................ 83 5.8.12 Public Works Department ................................................................................. 83 5.8.13 Key Support Functions ..................................................................................... 835.9 Information and Communications ................................................................................. 845.10 Referred and Annexed Documents ................................................................................ 84

6. RECOVERY, RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION ......................................................................856.1 Functions of Recovery .............................................................................................. 85 6.1.1 Infrastructure ............................................................................................... 85 6.1.2 Human-social ............................................................................................... 85 6.1.3 Economic and Livelihood ................................................................................. 86 6.1.4 Environment ................................................................................................ 866.2 Transition from Response to Recovery............................................................................ 866.3 Counselling and Rehabilitation of Victims ....................................................................... 866.4 Immediate Financial Relief to Victims ........................................................................... 866.5 Penalties and compensation ....................................................................................... 866.6 Restoration and Regeneration of Ecosystem .................................................................... 86 6.7 Reconstruction of Damaged Structures and Services .......................................................... 87

7. AUTHORIZATION AND PLAN MAINTENANCE ......................................................................................887.1 Plan Authorization ................................................................................................... 887.2 Authority and Responsibility for the Maintenance of the Plan ............................................... 887.3 Plan Development and Maintenance .............................................................................. 887.4 Record of Acceptance ............................................................................................... 897.5 Record of Changes ................................................................................................... 897.6 Stakeholders and Possessors of the Plan ......................................................................... 90

v BHARUCH DISTRICT INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL DMP

APPENDIX A: HAZARD IDENTIFICATION SUMMARY ..............................................................................91

APPENDIX B: ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF RESPONDERS IN THE NATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR OFFSITE EMERGENCY PLAN BY MOEF .............................................92

APPENDIX C: SITE SAFETY PLAN TEMPLATE ...........................................................................................95

APPENDIX D: PAC SHEET ILLUSTRATION FOR INDUSTRIAL EMERGENCY .......................................107

APPENDIX E: PAC SHEET FOR TRANSPORT EMERGENCY ...................................................................117

APPENDIX F: EXISTING RESPONSE RESOURCES AVAILABLE IN BHARUCH ...................................124

APPENDIX G: GUIDELINES FOR REPORTABLE QUANTITIES OF LEAK TO NOTIFY OFFSITE EMERGENCY ..........................................................................................148

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TABLES

Table 1. Stakeholder Roles in Disaster Management and Response ................................................9Table2.ClassificationandScaleofChemicalDisasters ............................................................ 15Table 3. Summary of Chemicals with Offsite Consequence in Bharuch .......................................... 22Table 4. Stakeholder Roles in Prevention and Mitigation .......................................................... 31Table 5. Bharuch Capability Assessment Results .................................................................... 39Table 6. Gaps in Basic Fire Service Capacity ........................................................................ 44Table 7. Stakeholder Roles in Preparedness ......................................................................... 61Table 8. Stakeholder Roles in HAZMAT Response .................................................................... 80Table 9. Stakeholder Roles in Emergency Medical Management .................................................. 80Table 10. Response protocol for Hazards in road transportation of HAZCHEM ................................... 81Table 11. Record of Acceptance ........................................................................................ 89Table 12. Record of Changes ............................................................................................ 89Table 13. Response Resources Available in MAH Industry in Bharuch (Fire Fighting, PPE, Communication, Vehicles) ................................................................................... 90Table 14. Fire Fighting Resources at Public Fire Stations in Bharuch ............................................132Table 15. Availability of Special Rescue Equipments in Industry in Bharuch ....................................133Table 16. Vendors for Portable DG Sets in Bharuch .................................................................134Table 17. Possible Shelters for Temporary Relief (not insulated adequately for remain safe against chemical leaks) ................................................................................135Table 18. Medical Resources Available in MAH industries in Bharuch ............................................138Table 19. Major Hospitals in Bharuch .................................................................................143Table 20. Minor or Supporting Hospitals and Private Physicians for Support in Bharuch ......................145Table 21. Blood Banks and Medical Test Laboratories in Bharuch ................................................147

vii BHARUCH DISTRICT INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL DMP

FIGURES

Figure 1. Disaster Management Cycle and Focus of Offsite Plan .................................................... 4Figure 2. Bottom-up Approach to the Development of the Disaster Management Plan .......................... 5Figure 3. Coordination of Structures under DM Act 2005 and CAEPPR Rules 1996. ............................... 9Figure 4. Composition of a Local Crisis Group ......................................................................... 10Figure 5. Composition of the Bharuch District Crisis Group ......................................................... 10Figure 6. Location of MAH, Type A and Type B industries in Bharuch .............................................. 20Figure 7. Vulnerability Areas in Bharuch for a Toxic Leak Scenario ................................................ 20Figure 8. Vulnerability Areas in Bharuch for a Flash Fire Scenario ................................................. 21Figure 9. Vulnerability Areas in Bharuch for Vapour Cloud Explosion Scenario ................................... 21Figure 10. Vulnerability Areas in Bharuch for Bleve Scenario ....................................................... 21Figure 11. Assessment of HAZMAT Response Capacity ................................................................ 39Figure 12. Incident Response Team Structure according to the IRS Recommended by the NDMA ............. 51Figure 13. Example of Incident Response Team Structure in Bharuch according to the IRS Recommended by the NDMA ............................................................................ 52Figure 14. Proposed Emergency Response Structure .................................................................. 53Figure 15. Emergency Response Process as per IRS ................................................................... 66

viiiBHARUCH DISTRICT INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL DMP

ABBREVIATIONS

AAAR After Action Report

ABC Airway Breathing and Circulation

ALOHA Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres

ALS Advanced Life Support

APELL Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at Local Level

APR Air Purifying Respirator

BBLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion

BLS Basic Life Support

CCAEPPR Chemical Accident (Emergency Planning Preparedness and Response)

CAIRS Chemical Accident Investigation Reporting System

CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

CECAP Chemical Emergency Community Awareness and Preparedness

CIDM Chemical (Industrial) Disaster Management

CPAP Continuous Positive Air Pressure

DDBMS Database Management System

DC District Collector

DCG District Crisis Group

DDMA District Disaster Management Authority

DEOC District Emergency Operation Centre

DEOR

DISH Directorate of Industrial Safety and Health

DMP Disaster Management Plan

DOH

DOT Department of Transport

DPMC Disaster Prevention and Management Centre

DPO DistrictProjectOfficer

EECC Emergency Control Centre

EMS Emergency Medical Services

EOC Emergency Operation Centre

ERC Emergency Response Centre

ERF Environmental Relief Fund

ERG2012 Emergency Response Guidebook, 2012

GGACL Gujarat Alkalises and Chemicals Limited

GAIL Gas Authority of India Limited (previously known as)

GIDC Gujarat Industrial Disaster Corporation

GIDM Gujarat Institute of Disaster Management

GMB

GNFC Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers and Chemicals Limited

GPCB Gujarat Pollution Control Board

GSDM Gujarat State Disaster Management

GSDMA Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority

HHAZCHEM Hazardous Chemicals

HAZMAT Hazardous Material

HAZWOPER Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response

IIAP Incident Action Plan

IC Incident Commander

ICP Incident Command Post

ICU Intensive Care Unit

ILS Intermediate Life Support

IMO InformationandMediaOfficer

IRS Incident Response System

IRT Incident Response Team

LLCG Local Crisis Groups

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ABBREVIATIONS

LCR Local / LCG Control Room

LEL Lower Explosive Limit

LERT Local Emergency Response Team

LO LiaisonOfficer

LPG LiquefiedPetroleumGas

LS Logistics Section

LSC Logistics Section Chief

MMAH Major Accident Hazard

MARG Mutual Aid Response Group

MARPLOT Mapping Application for Response, Planning, and Local Operational Task

MFR Medical First Responders

MOEF Ministry of Environment and Forests

MSDS Material Safety Data Sheets

MSIHC Manufacturer, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals

NNDMA National Disaster Management Authority

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NHAI National Highway Authority of India

NIDM National Institute of Disaster Management

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NPIC National Poison Information Centre

OOSC Operations Section Chief

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration

PPASS Personal Alert Safety System

PESO Petroleum and Explosives Safety Organization

PID Photo-Ionization Device

PNGRB Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board

PPE Personal Protective Equipment

PPP Public Private Partnership

PS Planning Section

QQRMT Quick Response Medical Teams

RRC Response Commander

RO ResponsibleOfficer

RRT Regional Response Team

SSCBA Self Contained Breathing Apparatus

SDM Sub-Divisional Magistrate

SERT State Emergency Response Team

SEOC State Emergency Operation Centre

SFAC Standing Fire Advisory Council

SO SafetyOfficer

SOP Standard Operating Procedure

SSP Site Safety Plan

TTIH Toxic Inhalation Hazard

TREMCARD Transport Emergency Card

TSDF Treatment Storage and Disposal Facility

UUEL Upper Explosive Limit

UNEP United Nations Environmental Protection Program

USEPA United States Environmental Protection Agency

VVCE Vapour Cloud Explosion

VMI Vendor Managed Inventory

VWEMCL Hazardous Waste Management Facilities

xBHARUCH DISTRICT INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL DMP

DEFINITIONS AND GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS

RELEVANT DEFINITIONS AS PER CAEPPR RULES (996) AND MSIHC RULES (1989)Chemical Accident means an accident involving a fortuitous, sudden or unintended occurrence while handling any hazardous chemical resulting in continuous, intermittent or repeated exposure to death, or injury to, any person or damage to any property but does not include an accident by reason only of war.

Hazardous Chemical means (i) Any chemical which satisfies any of the criteria laid down in Part I of Schedule 1 or is listed in

Part 2 of the said schedule

(ii) Any chemical listed in Column 2 of Schedule 2

(iii) Any chemical listed in Column 2 of Schedule 3.

Industrial Activity includes an operation or process:(i) Carried out in an industrial installation referred to in Schedule 4 involving or likely to involve

one or more hazardous chemicals

(ii) Onsite storage or onsite transport which is associated with that operations or process as the case may be

(iii) Isolated storage

(iv) Pipeline.

Industrial Pocket means any industrial zone earmarked by the Industrial Development Corporation of the State Government or by the State Government.

Isolated Storage means storage of a hazardous chemical other than storage associated with an installation onthesamesitespecifiedinSchedule-4wherethatstorageinvolvesatleastthequantitiesofthatchemicalset out in Schedule-2.

Major Chemical Accident means an incident involving loss of life inside or outside the installation or ten or moreinjuriesinsideand/oronemoreinjuriesoutsideorreleaseoftoxicchemicalsorexplosionorfireorspillage of hazardous chemicals resulting in on site or off site emergencies or damage to equipment leading to stopping of process or adverse effect to the environment.

Major Accident Hazards (MAH) Installations means isolated storage and industrial activity at a site, handling (including transport through carrier or pipeline) of hazardous chemicals equal to or, in excess of the threshold quantitiesspecifiedincolumn3ofSchedules2and3respectively.

Offsite Emergency Plan means the offsite emergency plan prepared under rule 14 of the Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules1989;

Pipeline means a pipe (together with any apparatus and works associated therewith) or system of pipes (together with any apparatus and works associated therewith) for the conveyance of a hazardous chemical other than a flammablegasassetoutincolumn2ofPartIIofschedule1,atapressureoflessthan8barsabsolute.

xi BHARUCH DISTRICT INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL DMP

Site means any location where hazardous chemicals are manufactures or processed, stored, handled, used, disposed of and includes the whole of an area under the control of an occupier and includes pier, jetty or similarstructurewhetherfloatingornot;

Transport means movement of hazardous chemicals by any means over land, water or air.

RELEVANT DEFINITIONS AS PER DM ACT 2005Affected area means an area or part of the country affected by a disaster

Disaster means a catastrophe, mishap, calamity or grave occurrence in any area, arising from natural or manmade causes, or by accident or negligence which results in substantial loss of life or human suffering or damage to, and destruction of, property, or damage to, or degradation of, environment, and is of such a nature or magnitude as to be beyond the coping capacity of the community of the affected area

Disaster management means a continuous and integrated process of planning, organising, coordinating and implementing measures which are necessary or expedient for:

(i) Prevention of danger or threat of any disaster

(ii) Mitigation or reduction of risk of any disaster or its severity or consequences

(iii) Capacity building

(iv) Preparedness to deal with any disaster

(v) Prompt response to any threatening disaster situation or disaster

(vi) Assessing the severity or magnitude of effects of any disaster

(vii) Evacuation, rescue and relief

(viii) Rehabilitation and reconstruction

District Authority means the District Disaster Management Authority constituted under sub-section (1) of section 25.

Local authority includes Panchayati Raj Institutions, municipalities, a district board, cantonment board, town planning authority, Zila Parishad or any other body or authority, by whatever name called, for the time being invested by law, for rendering essential services or, with the control and management of civic services, withinaspecifiedlocalarea.

Preparedness means the state of readiness to deal with a threatening disaster situation or disaster and the effects thereof.

GLOSSARY OF OTHER KEY TERMSAcute exposure: A sudden single exposure

Chronic exposure: A continuous or recurrent exposure over an extended period of time


xiiBHARUCH DISTRICT INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL DMP

Consequence:Resultofspecificevent,withoutconsiderationofexposure.

Criterion: An agreed reference on which a decision or judgement is based.

Danger: A popular expression covering the subjective perception of hazard or risk.

Dose:Quantityofanagentabsorbedoveraspecifiedperiodoftime.

Effect: Immediately or delayed result of an exposure.

Event: The realization of a hazard.

Exposure:Stateofaspecifictargetbeingopenandvulnerabletotheconsequenceofanevent

Frequency: An expression of how often a considered occurrence takes place in a given time.

Hazard: An inherent property of a substance, agent, and source of energy or situation having the potential of causing undesirable consequences and/or effects.

Hazard study:(equivalentterms:hazardsurvey,hazardanalysis,etc.)Identificationofindividualhazardsofa system, determination of the mechanisms by which they could give rise to undesired events, and evaluation of the consequences of these events.

Individual risk:Risktowhichanindividualpersonwithinaspecificpopulationissubjected.

Major hazard:Ahazardhavingthepotentialofcausingamajoraccident;i.e.amajoremission,afireoran explosion which leads to considerable social disruption as the result of serious adverse effects on the following targets:

• Death,severeintoxicationorinjuriesrequiringextendedhospitalizationofnumberofpeopleand/or

• Significantdamagetoproperty,animals,cropsorplants,orsignificantcontaminationofwater,soil or air, with considerable economic impact.

Probability: An expression of the chance that a considered occurrence will take place

Reliability: An expression of the ability of• Numericaldataorassumptionstobeatruerepresentationoftherequiredparameter

• Methodsandprocedurestobeabletogive,forthecircumstancesofthecase,theresultthatisrequired of them

• Equipmentandpeopletoperformthefunctionthatisrequiredofthem.


xiii BHARUCH DISTRICT INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL DMP

Residual risk is the risk still remaining after the implementation of risk management.

Risk is the combination of a stated effect and its probability of occurring.

Risk assessment: The procedure to identify risk by combining the results of a hazard study with the probabilities of the events considered and their effects

Risk management: The whole of actions taken to achieve and maintain the safety of an installation and its operation.

Safety: A situation without risks.

Societal risk:Risktowhichadefinedgroupornumberofpersonswithinaspecificpopulationissubjectedsimultaneously.

Uncertainty: An expression of the doubt about numerical data, an assumption, model used or the result of a method


xivBHARUCH DISTRICT INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL DMP

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Location of MAH, Type A and Type B industries in Bharuch

INTRODUCTIONBharuch is one of the fastest developing, highly industrialized districts in the country with over 11,500 units of small and medium industries from sectors such as chemicals and petrochemicals, engineering, and textiles. The district is sub-divided into eight Talukas: Amod, Bharuch, Jambusar, Jhagadia, Vagra, Valia, Hansot, and Ankleshwar. Each Taluka has a Major Accident Hazard (MAH) unit. Ankleshwar has the maximum concentration of MAH industries with 81 units. The district has the highest preponderance of hazardous chemical industries and is rated in the AA Category making Bharuch a ‘Highly Hazardous’ district in the State SCG Response Plan (2008).The threeprincipal types of hazards associatedwith chemical emergencies arefires, explosions,and toxic releases that affect the population and environment. Hazards can occur onsite as well as during transportation, road transportation posing the highest risk. A detailed vulnerability assessment has been carried out using several parameters including type of chemicals, location, concentration of industries and proximitytohabitation,publicinfrastructureandnaturalresources.ThefigurebelowshowsthelocationofMAH, Type A and Type B units in Bharuch District.

SCOPE OF WORKCurrently, under MSIHC Rules, district offsite plans are prepared and being used as ready reckoner to respond to chemical emergencies. However, the purpose of the Bharuch CDMP is to present a “model” plan that is futuristic and aspires to meet international standards. The need for such a plan is acute given the high growth prospects of Gujarat and need for coordination of emergency response structures under the MSIHC and CAEPPR Rules and the DM and GDM Acts. The GSDMA has appointed a team of international consultants

xv BHARUCH DISTRICT INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL DMP

led by m/s PRESTELS to prepare a model district CDMP based on NDMA guidelines as well as meeting the international norms with an objective of rapid and effective response to chemical emergencies to save lives, environment and property. The CDMP is a plan that will identify what needs to be done and how. However, the action plan to achieve the recommended objectives (how, when, funds, who, etc.) must be prepared by each department assigned the responsibility under this plan. Often, the responsibility is on the group such as SCG and not individual departments or authorities. However, without such detailed action plans, this CDMP cannot be effectively implemented in a time bound manner.

APPROACHThismodel Bharuch district CDMP is based on key recommendations and findings from following reportsdeveloped as a part of preparatory modules under the contract with GSDPA:

Module 11. Capability assessment and gap analysis

2. Vulnerability assessment

3. Antidotes plan

4. Synchronization between onsite and offsite plans

Module 21. Improvement in response mechanism

2. Community sensitization strategy

3. Performance improvement of DISH, PESO and CEI

4. GIS based database system for chemical disaster management

TheapproachwastoprepareastatelevelcomprehensiveCDMPfirst.Thedistrictandthelocalareaplansare then prepared on basis of the state CDMP. The key recommendations for prevention and mitigation, preparedness,responseandrecoverremainthesameinallplans.Thedistrictandlocalplansincludespecificdetailsrelatedtovulnerabilityassessment,industrydirectory,andsomeareaspecificrecommendationsforprevention and mitigation or preparedness that were provided during DCG and LCG meetings.

DIFFERENCE IN OFFSITE PLANS AND THIS CDMPOffsite plans prepared by the DCG are specific for the response to chemical emergencies with somesupporting information to strengthen the preparedness for achieving the desired level of response. In many respects the offsite plan is the ready reckoner in time of chemical emergency and necessarily based on resources available “now”. On the other hand, the CDMP deals with the entire cycle of disaster management: Prevention and Mitigation, Preparedness, Response, Recovery and Rehabilitation with a special focus on capacity building and preparedness to provide effective response. The CDMP also tries to come up with an emergency response organisation that can function under different types and scale of disasters and not only chemical emergencies. Offsite plans are more “response” centric – though we acknowledge that it has some

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

xviBHARUCH DISTRICT INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL DMP

PREV

ENTI

ON & M

ITIGATIONRESPONSE & RECOVERY

REHABILITATION & R

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NPREPAREDNESS

preparednessrelatedinformation–canbeapartofacomprehensiveCDMP.Thefigurebelowdepictsthecycle of disaster management.

Considering the recommendations in this plan seek to build the level of preparedness to international standards, the response plan is also based on the assumption that such a high level of preparedness is possible. Clearly, the CDMP is not, and should not be used as, a ready reckoner or a SOP for emergency response “now”. Instead, the existing Bharuch Offsite Plan should continue to be used until the level of planning and preparedness in Gujarat are commensurate with recommendations and assumptions in this CDMP. Therefore, in addition to offsite plans under MSIHC Rules, this CDMP is a major contribution and step towards taking a comprehensive approach and constituting a futuristic plan for chemical disaster management in Gujarat.

HIERARCHY OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLANSAsdepictedinthefigureabove,theonsiteplanoftheindustryisthemostimportantelementinpreparingadistrict DMP. District DMPs ultimately contribute to the development of state and national level DMPs. The onsite plans identify scenarios which have potential for offsite consequences and thus need the assistance of offsite agencies at the local level. The local (LCG) or district level (DCG) plans for assistance identify scenarios that cannot be managed at either the local or district levels and require assistance from regional or state level agencies.Thestatelevelplanprovidesforassistanceatthedistrictlevelandalsoidentifiesscenarioswhichwill need national and international help. Finally, the national level plan is based on the needs of the state in managing chemical disasters. Each plan has procedures to request higher levels of assistance.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

xvii BHARUCH DISTRICT INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL DMP

LOCAL RESPONSE TO CHEMICAL EMERGENCY - EMERGENCY ORGANISATION STRUCTUREThe response to a chemical disaster is always local with resources segmented from district and state levels. Under MSIHC Rules, the LCG is the lowest level of group available at the industrial cluster level, the DCG is the next level of response. In the case the LCG is not available, the DCG is the lowest level of response. As per the DM Act 2005, the local authorities and Panchayati Raj Institutions can plan for, prepare, and respond to emergencies. Therefore, Taluka or block level administration can prepare for and co-ordinate the response to chemical emergencies, provided Taluka level CDMPs are prepared including management of Chemical Disasters, although such plans are not currently available.

At the State level, agencies such the GSDMA, DISH, GPCB, PESO, CEI, SCG, GIDC etc. are responsible for regulation, planning, and management; and agencies and bodies such as the SDRF SEOC, Fire Services, Emergency Medical Services and Police are entrusted with providing chemical emergency response. Similarly at the district level the DDMA, DCG and LCG are responsible for planning and management and DEOC, Fire services, Emergency medical services and Police are entrusted with chemical emergency response.

Intended coordination in the SCG-DCG-LCG mechanism under the MSIHC rule and the SDMA-DDMA mechanism under the DM Act is automatically achieved at the district level because the district collector is the head of both. It is clear that the SCG, DCG, and LCG are not response agencies themselves but include members that are response agencies. Similarly the GSDMA and DDMA are not response agencies but include member departments that provide a response. However, the NDMA guidelines provide for emergency organizations where different departments, agencies and even private resources (e.g. industries) temporarily align their prioritieswiththeemergencyresponseobjectiveunderaunifiedcommand.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As depicted in the figure above, the onsite plan of the industry is the most important element in preparing a district DMP. District DMPs ultimately contribute to the development of state and national level DMPs. The onsite plans identify scenarios which have potential for offsite

xviiiBHARUCH DISTRICT INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL DMP

This system is called Incident Response System (IRS) and discussed in detail in the text. It is important to recognizethatorganizationundertheIRSandtheexistingstructuresoftheLCGandDCGarenotinconflictalthough there can be differences in terminologies for some positions in the emergency organization. The IRS gives an emergency organization structure called Incident Response Teams (IRTs) that are pre-designated as pertheidentifiedemergencyscenarios.Whilethereisageneralstructure,IRTsarenotprescriptiveaboutwhomustfulfilwhatpositionorrole;instead,thedecisionrestswiththelocalordistrictlevelauthorities.Therefore,theorganizationsandpeoplethataregivenspecificrolesasperexistingLCGandDCGstructurecan be given similar roles or positions in the IRT structure and a coordination between IRTs as per IRS and those as per existing LCG/DCG structures is achieved.

The IRS provides additional advantages of being scalable by including additional and higher levels of response inthesameunifiedcommandstructure,beingflexiblebytransferringcommandandothersectionsofIRStoqualifiedpeopleasscaleandnatureofemergencychanges,andwithaunifiedcommandsothatthereisoneauthorized,andaccountable(technicallyqualified)incidentcommanderandthecommandcanbetransferredup as the scale of emergency increases. The IRS also requires documentation of decisions, actions, and learningsothatnotonlycontinuousimprovementcanbeachievedbutalsoaccountabilityisfixed.

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTBharuch is one of the fastest developing, highly industrialized districts in the country with over 11,500 units of small and medium industries from sectors such as chemicals and petrochemicals, engineering, and textiles. The district is sub-divided into eight Talukas: Amod, Bharuch, Jambusar, Jhagadia, Vagra, Valia, Hansot, and Ankleshwar. Each Taluka has a Major Accident Hazard (MAH) unit. A list of these units along with the associatedhazard identification isprovidedinAppendixA: Directoryofhazard identificationby industry.As per the information provided by DISH there are 81 functional MAH units in Ankleshwar. Bharuch Taluka (district HQ) has seven MAH Units. The road connecting Ankleshwar to the national highway and to Bharuch is congested and has high levels of HAZMAT transported. Panoli is another large GIDC industrial cluster eight km away from Ankleshwar with 19 MAH units. The Jhagadia GIDC cluster is located 30 km East of Ankleshwar and has eight MAH units. Dahej is a port based industrial complex 40 km west of Bharuch and includes six MAH units: IPCL, GACL, Hindalco Industries Ltd, Gujarat Chemical Port Terminal Company Ltd, Sanjana Cryogenic Storages Ltd, and BASF Styrenics. The access road to Dahej is congested and poses a challenge because good medical facilities are available only at Bharuch. Figures below depict the vulnerability of Bharuch district to different hazards.

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xix BHARUCH DISTRICT INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL DMP

Vulnerability Areas in Bharuch for a Toxic Leak Scenario

Vulnerability Areas in Bharuch for Vapour Cloud Eaxplosion Scenario

Vulnerability Areas in Bharuch for a Flash Fire Scenario

Vulnerability Areas in Bharuch for Bleve Explosion Scenario

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

VADUKAVI

AMOD

ASTA

ALVA

SALOL

PADRA

VALAN

PALEJSINOR

UTRAJ

SANGMA

MANPUR

DABHOI

KARJAN

ANDADA

AMBOLI

HANSOT

DAHEWAN

TARSALI

CHOKARI

BHARUCH

GADKHOLNETRANG

BAMANGAM

DHUVARAN

JAMBUSAR

BHIMPURA

DAMAPURA

RAJPIPLA

RAJPARDI

KANKAPURA

KARNAKUVA

TANKARIYA

BORBHATHA

ANKLESVAR

BHANKHETAR

MADHAVPARA

JHADESHWAR

KAYAVAROHAN

BHARUCH

73°0'0"E

73°0'0"E

22°0

'0"N

22°0

'0"N

Bharuch Toxic Dispersion

±

Legend"T Fire Station

G Medical Facilities

^̀ Policestation

nm School

National Highway

Major Road

Railway

Dense Forest

Open Forest

Water Body

Toxic High LOC

Toxic Medium LOC

Toxic Low LOC

Gujarat State

Projection: Transverse Mercator

0 28,000 56,000 84,00014,000Meters

BHARUCH

VADUKAVI

AMOD

ASTA

ALVA

SALOL

PADRA

VALAN

PALEJSINOR

UTRAJ

SANGMA

MANPUR

DABHOI

KARJAN

ANDADA

AMBOLI

HANSOT

DAHEWAN

TARSALI

CHOKARI

BHARUCH

GADKHOLNETRANG

BAMANGAM

DHUVARAN

JAMBUSAR

BHIMPURA

DAMAPURA

RAJPIPLA

RAJPARDI

KANKAPURA

KARNAKUVA

TANKARIYA

BORBHATHA

ANKLESVAR

BHANKHETAR

MADHAVPARA

JHADESHWAR

KAYAVAROHAN

73°0'0"E

73°0'0"E

22°0

'0"N

22°0

'0"N

Bharuch VCE

±



^̀ Policestation

nm School

National Highway

Major Road

Railway

Dense Forest

Open Forest

Water Body

VCE High LOC

VCE Medium LOC

VCE Low LOC

Gujarat State


0 28,000 56,000 84,00014,000Meters

BHARUCH

VADUKAVI

AMOD

ASTA

ALVA

SALOL

PADRA

VALAN

PALEJSINOR

UTRAJ

SANGMA

MANPUR

DABHOI

KARJAN

ANDADA

AMBOLI

HANSOT

DAHEWAN

TARSALI

CHOKARI

BHARUCH

GADKHOLNETRANG

BAMANGAM

DHUVARAN

JAMBUSAR

BHIMPURA

DAMAPURA

RAJPIPLA

RAJPARDI

KANKAPURA

KARNAKUVA

TANKARIYA

BORBHATHA

ANKLESVAR

BHANKHETAR

MADHAVPARA

JHADESHWAR

KAYAVAROHAN

73°0'0"E

73°0'0"E

22°0

'0"N

22°0

'0"N

Bharuch Flashfire

±



^̀ Policestation

nm School

National Highway

Major Road

Railway

Dense Forest

Open Forest

Water Body

Flashfire High LOC

Flashfire Medium LOC

Flashfire Low LOC

Gujarat State


0 28,000 56,000 84,00014,000Meters

BHARUCH

VADUKAVI

AMOD

ASTA

ALVA

SALOL

PADRA

VALAN

PALEJSINOR

UTRAJ

SANGMA

MANPUR

DABHOI

KARJAN

ANDADA

AMBOLI

HANSOT

DAHEWAN

TARSALI

CHOKARI

BHARUCH

GADKHOLNETRANG

BAMANGAM

DHUVARAN

JAMBUSAR

BHIMPURA

DAMAPURA

RAJPIPLA

RAJPARDI

KANKAPURA

KARNAKUVA

TANKARIYA

BORBHATHA

ANKLESVAR

BHANKHETAR

MADHAVPARA

JHADESHWAR

KAYAVAROHAN

73°0'0"E

73°0'0"E

22°0

'0"N

22°0

'0"N

Bharuch BLEVE

±



^̀ Policestation

nm School

National Highway

Major Road

Railway

Dense Forest

Open Forest

Water Body

Bleve High LOC

Bleve Medium LOC

Bleve Low LOC

Gujarat State


0 28,000 56,000 84,00014,000Meters

PREVENTION AND MITIGATION This chapter deals with the prevention and mitigation of the risk posed by hazardous chemical manufacturing, storage, handling, and transportation at the state level. The MOEF is the nodal ministry for chemical disaster management that enacted the MSIHC Rules, 1989 and the CEAPPR Rules, 1996 which are in line with the international best practices that have been adopted through a consultative process under the UNEP’s APELL project.

Several recommendations for prevention and mitigation are most suitable at the state level because they need

xxBHARUCH DISTRICT INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL DMP

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

financial,policyandstatutorysupportforimplementation.Thesemayneedassistancewithimplementationat the district level but such activities will depend on the state level action plan to implement these recommendations.Therefore,thisBharuchdistrictDMPfocusesonlyonafewdistrictspecificmeasures.

A hierarchy of concepts has been developed for reducing the risks of chemical disasters which is an important guide to prioritize the activities required to operationalize this plan. These include:

1. Eliminating or reducing the use of toxics

2. Implementation of risk management programs to minimising opportunities for release to occur and mitigation of any release at source

3. Implementation of land use restrictions

4. Sheltering and evacuation systems supported by public warning systems and public outreach and training on evacuation and sheltering in place

5. A rapid, timely and qualified emergency response capacity to control and reduce the quantity of hazardous chemicals leaked and to reduce the duration of such a leak.

For Prevention and Mitigation, some specific measures/programs have been recommended for BaruchDistrict as follows –

1. Dovetailing of structures under MSIHC Rules, 1898 and the DM Act, 2005.

2. Regular meeting of the DCG

3. Onsite emergency plans for Hazardous Waste Management Facilities

4. Onsite emergency plans for Dahej Port

5. Onsite plans for Type A and Type B Industries

6. Annex District Offsite Emergency Plans

7. Emergency response plans for transport of HAZCHEM

8. Enforcement of MSIHC Rules for Isolated Storages

In addition to the above the following preventive strategies are recommended • Disaster Risk Reduction through Land Use Planning: Prevention by means of separation be-

tween industry and population is most effective. However, this can be achieved only through a proper land use planning. Mechanisms to give permission to projects by taking cognizance of environmental and public health concerns already exist.

• E – Governance -Through the DCG and DDMA, E-governance and information services can be pro-vided that include the availability of hazard and vulnerability profiles at taluka, ward and small area levels, information on compliance by industries, use of web based systems for monitoring of transportation of HAZCHEM and accident investigation and reporting systems.

• Promoting preventive programs in industry - Prevention programs in industry for capacity building can include safety reviews and training for workers and contractors, implementing maintenance management systems, written safety procedures and work aids for employees and contractors and conducting compliance audits

xxi BHARUCH DISTRICT INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL DMP

• Co-ordination between enforcement agencies - As the DCG is a committee of different mem-bers and not an authority with its own staff and resources, coordination between different member agencies is essential for planning and preparedness measures that can lead to effective response capacity. This can be achieved through regular meetings for the planning and review of implementation processes and updating the DMP. It is also recommended to publish a quarterly/yearly magazine on hazardous chemical incidents, accident report findings, new technologies, and other chemical emergency related information

• Training and capacity building - - It is recommended that the DCG in association with the DDMA, conducts training programs for industry personnel, regulatory agency local staff, re-sponse agencies, and general community on various aspects of prevention, mitigation, prepar-edness and response aspects of chemical emergencies

PREPAREDNESS At the district level the key responsibility of planning and monitoring of preparedness is with the DDMA, DCG and LCG, who will be responsible for revision and updating the DDMP, training and capacity building and industry co-ordination.

DEVELOPMENT OF AN AGENCY-DEPARTMENT-SPECIFIC WORK PLAN:Although most recommendations are at the state level, the state level departments are expected to prepare an action plan for implementation of the recommendations in the CDMP at state level. However, the district and local offices will also be required to support this action plan with their target and timeline specific work plan.

IMPROVEMENT IN CHEMICAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLANNING • Synchronisationoftheonsiteandoffsiteplans

• ImplementEmergencyResponderSafetyGuidelines

• Implementguidelinesforimmediateintimationofhazardouschemicalleaks

• UseofChemicalAccidentInvestigationReportingsystem(CAIRS)developedbytheMoEForanalternate system if developed at the state level for formal after action reporting.

• TheuseofGISbasedCAMEOsuiteisalsorecommendedfordevelopingadatabaseforplanningand preparedness in addition to the former.

TRAINING, CAPACITY BUILDING AND COMMUNITY PREPAREDNESS • Regimesforplanningandconductingonsiteandoffsitemockdrills,functionspecificdrills,and

full-scale mock drills.

• Specifictrainingcoursesshouldbedevelopedandconductedforallkeystakeholdersincludingregulatory agencies, emergency response agencies and industry personnel for Integrated and Coordinated Emergency Response.

• ImplementationofChemicalEmergencyCommunityAwarenessandPreparednessStrategy(CE-CAP) to include outreach programs for residents as well as industry covering aspects of risks involved and safety actions such as sheltering in place or evacuation

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xxiiBHARUCH DISTRICT INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL DMP

ENHANCE CHEMICAL DISASTER RESPONSE CAPACITYThe recommendations in this section are based on the underlying fact that public offsite agencies

such as the police, fire, and medical departments who have to provide response in addition to industry have limited qualifications to provide emergency response in case of chemical emer-gencies. The following key recommendations are suggested:

• Governmentorpublicagenciesshouldpreferablyleadchemicalemergencyresponsesbuttheindustry personnel can be integrated in this response structure.

• Chemicalresponsecapabilitybuilds on the basic emergency response capacity especially that of the fire services at local levels. The fire stations in Bharuch need to be strengthened with adequate manpower, equipmentsand finances as per NDMA guidelines on improving fire services. Additionally, it is recommend to create a unified command or department for fire services at the state level. While fire departments in larger municipal corporations such as Ahmedabad and Surat are well-equipped, staffed and trained, other fire departments were identified to be lacking in sufficiently trained man power and equipment as discussed in the gap analysis report and response mechanism report.

• Local emergency response team (LERT) should be formed at local fire departments. The LERT should be well-trained and well-equipped to deal with small scale and frequent local emergen-cies (90% of chemical incidents).The four industrial clusters with the LCG’s to form the LERTs on a priority basis.

• ThestatehasalreadyplannedfiveregionalEmergencyResponseCentres(ERC)andfourminiERCs modelled on the DPMC Ankleshwar in a PPP model. We recommend creation of specialist Regional Response Teams (RRT) at ERCs to augment LERT capacity as required.

• The State Emergency Response Team (SERT) will augment the capacity of RRT to provide quali-fied HAZMAT response for high-risk, high-volume, and thus, less frequent incidents that surpass the capacity of RRTs.

MAKE DPMC ANKLESHWAR A DISTRICT LEVEL ASSETThe DPMC Ankleshwar is managed and supported by the Ankleshwar Industries Association, GIDC Fire Stations, GIDCandGIDCNotifiedArea.Itiswell-equippedwithSCBAsets,firefightingequipment,bothFEAS,foamandwater tenders; PPEs, breathing apparatus, air compressor and variety of monitoring instruments including lox meter and wind velocity and direction meter. The DPMC is already being called in to help the district administration in responding to chemical emergencies so we recommend making the relationship formal by makingDPMCadistrictlevelasset.Thiswillrequiresignificantinvestmentfromdistrictauthoritiesandotherindustries in DPMC similar to the commitment given to DMPC by the industries and authorities in Ankleshwar. It must also be done in agreement with DPMC. In addition to becoming a district level asset, we recommend that DMPCmodel be replicated in other LCGs in Bharuch so that quicker and qualified response can beprovided. DPMC-Ankleshwar can take a lead in establishing these other DPMCs as a district level resource.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

xxiii BHARUCH DISTRICT INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL DMP

PLAN FOR EQUIPMENT, TRAINING, AND RESOURCES FOR HAZMAT RESPONSEThe project recognises that responders at all levels are an important community asset and they form the basis of the community’s response and resiliency to all chemical and industrial disasters. Adequate knowledge and safe operations are imperative resources that need to be provided through training, equipment and supplies. This DMP lists the detailed resources that should be provided to Local Emergency Response Teams (LERTs). The state CDMP includes a more detailed resource plan for Police, Emergency Medical Services, Fire Department, RRT and SERT. For effective response to any emergency including chemical emergencies, thedistrictneedsstrongfireandemergencyresponsecapabilityasperSFACrecommendations.EffectiveHAZMATresponsecapabilitycanonlybebuiltonsuchgeneralbutstrongfireandemergencyresponseservicecapability.Currently,fivefirestationsareoperationalinBharuch,butitneedsanadditional10firestations(fiveinurbanareasandfiveinruralareas)tomeetSFACnorms.Bharuchdistrictcurrentlyhasatotalof14 vehicles such as water tenders, browsers, etc. whereas it needs 41. It has 84 tools and equipment such as hydraulic tools, communication sets, PPE, etc. whereas it needs 496 tools and equipments. It has staff strength of 30 people whereas it requires almost 1000 personnel.

STRENGTHENING OF RESPONSE MECHANISMIncident Response System ItisrecommendedtoestablishanIncidentResponseSystem(IRS)toprovideascalableandflexibleresponsestructure for different types and scales of chemical emergencies managed at different levels. The IRS provides a system for all responsible parties – government authorities, industries, offsite response agencies, NGOs, private business, communities to participate and respond in a coordinated way. The IRS allows for one incident command structure to prioritize and accomplish multiple objectives. While this plan uses the guidelines for incidence response team structure at the local level as per NDMA guidelines on IRS, we make specificrecommendationsmostsuitableforchemicalemergencies.

Establish Incident Intimation and Notification ProcessesSetting up an incident intimation system that can aid rapid response by public agencies without waiting for the incident to potentially become offsite is critical. We have recommended that the industry notify a leakasperaquantitativecriteriaandproactively.WesuggestthatLCRandDEOCbedesignatedasofficialnotificationpointsfortheoccupier,buttheoccupiercanadditionallycallpolice,108,medicaldepartmentand others for faster communication.

Improving control room management and Effective Emergency Communication The control room is a critical asset for effective response. We have recommended strengthening of the DEOC at Bharuch to do the following:

• Abilitytoreceiveanddirectnotificationofemergency

• Adequateequipmenttoensuretheself-sufficiencyofthecontrolroom

• Avoidingconflictingagency-specificcontrolroomsforcoordinatedresponseandbettercommunication

• Establishingproceduresfordeactivationanddemobilizationofthelocalcontrolroom

• Additionally,communicationamongdifferentstakeholdersmustbesignificantlyimprovedsothatwerecommended Bharuch district-wide communication exercise as per the state level communication plan (recommended in state CDMP)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

xxivBHARUCH DISTRICT INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL DMP

Situational Awareness• ItisproposedtousetheCAMEOsoftwaresuitedevelopedbytheUSEPAandNOAAforplanningthe

response.

• TheuseoftheEmergencyResponseGuidebook(2012) isalsorecommendedtoprovidequickandadequateinformationtofirstrespondersandotherswhilemoredetailedmodellingandanalysisisbeingconducted.BasictrainingoffirstrespondersandusersofERG(2012)isnecessaryeventhoughthe guide is organized for easy understanding. First responders will need a hard copy of the same translated in Gujarati.

• Situationalawarenessisnotaonetimebutcontinuousactivity.

Hierarchical HAZMAT Response System A hierarchical Chemical Emergency Response team structure is proposed as follows –

• Level1-TheLocalEmergencyResponseTeamisthespecialHazmatteamattachedtoalocalfiredepartment

• Level2-TheRegionalResponseTeamisapartoftheERCthatspecializesinchemicalemer-gency response

• Level3-TheStateEmergencyResponseTeam(SERT)respondstorareextremelyhazardousinci-dents beyond the capacity of regional response teams

Emergency Public InformationThe community in immediate vicinity of a hazardous chemical unit may face very high levels of hazard within very short time in case of a chemical leak. They should be immediately intimated through a public address system. We recommend that such a system be either in control of the LCR, DEOR or the industry, who is then authorized to warn the communities directly using sirens.

Mass Care and management of deadBharuch district authorities should identify appropriate structures or buildings to be used as emergency shelters following a chemical or industrial incident as well as develop capacities to manage a large number of fatalities through a plan and procedures to locate, activate, mobilize, and provide additional personnel, transportation, last rites, and temporary cold storage facilities for a mass fatality incident.

MEDICAL PREPAREDNESS FOR CHEMICAL EMERGENCIESMedical preparedness is aimed to prepare medical and other authorities to develop capacities of firstresponders and upgrade infrastructure to the extent that they can handle a mass casualty event.

While this DMP includes a plan for an emergency medical response, the Department of Health will prepare a comprehensive district level medical emergency management plan with a focus on preparedness and resource planning to deal with all types of hazards including chemical hazards. Such plans, when developed, will be referred to in this DMP. The measures in this DMP are only a stop gap arrangement and do not undermine the acute need for a comprehensive medical response plan by the Department of Health.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

xxv BHARUCH DISTRICT INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL DMP

The following recommendations have been made • Establish a Public Private Partnership model to augment medical resources, considering that 70%

of medical resources in the country lie within the private sector.

• A chemical-specific medical management process needs to be established for the treatment of exposed/contaminated patients.

• Creation of a trained Medical First Responder (MFR) and Quick Response Medical Team (QRMT).

• Creation of Stationary Decontamination Facilities onsite as well and offsite in hospitals as well as Mobile Decontamination Facilities.

• Uniform Casualty Profiling and Classification of Casualties

• Identification of Poison Centres/Toxicological Laboratory

• Plan for Onsite Medical Resource Inventory

• Stocking for Antidotes and Chemical Casualty Treatment Kit onsite at are MAH units- medical posts as well as ambulances and earmarked health facilities for both the public and private sector.

• Develop Crisis Management Plans at earmarked Hospitals.

RESPONSE The response plan detailed out in this report establishes a concept of operations and assigns specific functional responsibility to departments, agencies, and organizations within Bharuch for chemical and industrial disasters. Chemical disasters can be classified per their scales as: Minor, Moderate, Major and Catastrophic. Verifiable and measurable criteria are developed to define these scales so that available and required resources can be assessed against these scales.

KEY RESPONSE AGENCIES The key agencies required for chemical emergency response have been identified with their roles andresponsibilities. It is important that the roles and responsibilities not be thrust on line departments and agencies but discussed in DCG/DDMA meetings and mutually agreed to. The following are the key agencies:

• District Disaster Management Authority

• The police department

• Fire Services

• DepartmentofRevenue/ReliefCommissioner/Collector’sOffice

• Department of Labour and Employment / Director of Industrial Safety and Health (DISH)

• Gujarat Pollution Control Board

• Department of Transport

• Department of Animal Husbandry

• Department of Agriculture

• PublicInformationOfficer

• Public Works Department

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

xxviBHARUCH DISTRICT INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL DMP

THE RESPONSE MECHANISM – RECOMMENDED PROTOCOLA detailed line of action has been developed, the key steps of which are highlighted below – Step 1 – notification - The trigger mechanism is intimation to DEOC and LCR of the chemical leak/hazard incident.Incaseofserious/heavyleaks,theDISHandGPCBmayhavetobenotifiedtobeincompliancewithMSIHC Rules. The LCR will intimate the local response agencies.

Step 2 - First Response and situation assessment - Ideallythefiredepartmentwillbethefirston-sceneresponse agency, but police, EMRI ambulances, or other public agencies may also reach the site first.Irrespective,theagencywhoreachesfirstshoulddetermineasafelocationfortheIncidentCommandPost(ICP), gather all essential information, and report situation details to the LCR. The LCR will obtain MSDS for the leaked chemical from onsite plans of the industry or other sources to understand potential hazards, control measures, medical treatment, and other details. First responders on site may use ERG 2012 guidebook to determine protective actions and safety precautions.

Step 3 –Assessment for Assistance - The LCR staff, SDM and ICP will decide whether and which members of LCG need to be convened at the LCR to deal with the emergency situation. The LCR and IC will assess the overall situation and determine whether district, regional or state level support is needed and coordinate the same through DEOC

Step 4 – Control and Protective Actions through response agencies - Post intimation of emergency/ incident, the LERT will rush to the scene and assess if response by offsite agencies is required. If yes, protective actions will be determined on basis of situational awareness. If not, the LERT will stay on scene until the onsite personnel can effectively control the leak and LERT will leave after ascertaining that emergency is tackled. If off site measures are required the following hazard control protocol will be followed

1. The district collector (for DCG) or SDM (for LCG) should formally declare a chemical emergency is taking place if indeed this is the case

2. Activation of emergency response teams - LERT, Quick Response Medical Team (QRMT) GVK-EMRI, fire fighters and police officers as per the pre-designated IRT

3. Implement protective actions through –Warning the public, securing the site, establishing and incident command post, ensuring site safety and conducting initial reconnaissance.

4. Conduct site entry and exit

5. Provision of short term relief to public

MEDICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROTOCOLStep 1 - Activation of QRMT - The QRMT is activated immediately on intimation based on impact assessment of the hazard.

Step 2 – Medical Response – TThiswillincludeonscenecare,careintransitandtransfertodefinitivecare.Key functions include Triage, Resuscitation and decontamination.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

xxvii BHARUCH DISTRICT INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL DMP

Step 3 - Search and Rescue - In case of a chemical leak, sheltering in place and/or evaluation needs to be done as per the planning and specifics of the incidents that are unfolding. However, once a chemical incident is in a phase where the first responder can in fact enter an affected area either using personal protective equipments or when the chemical cloud is of low enough concentration, search and rescue of affected population is a key task, search and rescue can be done by the police, medical and/or fire first responders onsite.

Step 4 – Activation of crisis management at hospitals - In case of chemical disasters, the crisis management at a hospital shall be immediately activated by triggering inbuilt mechanisms for prompt emergency medical response.

Step 5 – Requisition of pharmaceutical stockpile - It is assumed that a pharmaceutical stockpile is available in the state as per the antidotes plan provided to the GSDMA. The stockpile is controlled by the SEOC and can be authorized for release by the appropriate authority. The SEOC will coordinate with the DEOC so that stockpile assets can be efficiently received and distributed upon arrival at the siteStep 6- Psychosocial Care - In chemical emergencies, the psychological shocks in addition to actual exposure related complications pose a challenge.

Step 7 - Public health response - During a chemical disaster, the following damages can be incurred and require special attention from the Department of Public Health:

• Contaminatedwatersupply

• Lackoffoodandsafetyoffoodisamajorconcern

• Displacementofcommunityfromtheirnaturalhabitats.

Step 8 – Medical Response to long term effects - In the post-disaster scenario some of the casualties may develop sequels due to chemical injuries. These cases may need regular follow-up, medical care, reconstructive surgery and rehabilitation.

RESPONSE TO HAZCHEM TRANSPORTATION EMERGENCIES The organization structure for response, concept of emergency operations, and roles and responsibility of key stakeholders remains almost the same in case of emergencies involving the transportation of hazardous chemicals. The special considerations while responding to transportation emergencies are:

Pipeline Transportation - In case of pipeline transportation the initial notification may be done by the occupier/owner of the pipeline or by the local community or by the contractor who caused the damage to the pipeline. Therefore, it is important that all pipelines nodes and routes clearly display the emergency contact information in case of any accident with the pipeline. Once the initial notification of an accident is obtained the response operations are similar to other chemical accidents

Road Transportation - In case of an emergency involving a road tanker carrying hazardous chemical, the driver of the tanker is expected to be well-trained to handle emergency situations and have up-to-date contact

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

xxviiiBHARUCH DISTRICT INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL DMP

information.ThenotificationwillbedonebythedriverbycallingDEOC(#1077)andLocalPoliceStation.The consigner and consignee may also make these calls. The tanker must display the emergency information panel and driver should carry the Transport Emergency Card or TREMCARD which has detailed instructions on responseactionsforfire,spillageorleakage.Thedrivershouldtakethefirstprotectionactionsbystoppingtrafficandgeneralcitizensfromapproachingtheaccidentsiteuntilpolicearriveforhelp.Thedrivercantrytostoptheleak(ifany)onlyifheisadequatelytrainedandequippedtodoso.ThepoliceofficeronscenewillmostlikelybethefirstICuntilamorequalifiedresponseteamarrives.Themostimportantactionbythepoliceistocordonoffthesiteoftheaccident,divertandregulatetraffic,andevacuate/shelterinplace citizens in close proximity on a priority basis. The ERG (2012), which has been developed primarily for response to chemical emergencies during road transport, should be followed. It is also important that untrainedandunequippedfirstrespondersshouldnottrytostoptheleakorenterthehotzoneandshouldinsteadwaitforaqualifiedresponse.

RECOVERY The recovery phase of disaster management involves disaster relief, or the provision of immediate shelter, life support and human needs to persons affected by, or responding to, a disaster. The broader disaster recovery involves the coordinated process of supporting affected communities in the reconstruction of the physical infrastructure, restoration of the economy and of the environment, and support for the emotional, social, and physical wellbeing of those affected.

The recovery phase of a disaster is headed by State Relief Commissioner, Revenue department, Gujarat. The main aspects of recovery are grouped into four functions -

• Infrastructure

• Human–Social

• Economic

• Environment

It is important to acknowledge that the four functions of recovery overlap and recovery arrangements must reflect the inter-relationship between each of these functions.

TRANSITION FROM RESPONSE TO RECOVERYAs recovery activities commence within the response phase, the transition to recovery requires detailed planning and a hand over from disaster response operations to disaster recovery operation teams to ensure continuity of disaster operations. The major steps taken during transition include –

1. Preliminary Damage Assessment

2. Identification of the type of public or individual aid and assistance necessary in an emergency declaration

3. Mobilization of essential resources to a temporary location of emergency mass care/Disaster recovery Centres

4. Deployment of community groups to the affected community areas for information dissemination

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

xxix BHARUCH DISTRICT INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL DMP

RECOVERY ACTIONSIn addition to the immediate actions, the following immediate and long term recovery actions are required

• CounsellingandRehabilitationofvictimstoaddresspsychologicalimpact

• ImmediatefinancialrelieftovictimsundertheprovisionofthePublicLiabilityInsuranceAct,1991

• RestorationandRegenerationoftheEco-systemfortheremediationoftheaffectedenvironment

• RepairandReconstructionofDamagedStructuresandServices

• AccidentInvestigation

• PaymentofPenaltyandcompensationorrelieffromtheresponsibleindustry,thePrimeMinister’sRelief Fund, National Calamity Relief Fund and the State Chief Minister’s Calamity/Relief Fund.

PLAN MAINTENANCE AND UPDATINGThe district CDMP should be updated at least once annually, preferably as a result of the annual full-scale mock drills. The plan also needs to be updated post-accident investigations or reviews that identify need for plan improvement or when key contacts of resources change. The report identifies specific instances when the plan should be updated.

This section also includes approval of the plan from district authorities and a table for records of changes in the plan. The plan should be shared with all concerned stakeholders with their undertaking that they would fulfil the responsibilities entrusted under the plan. All revisions and updating of the plan must be made in a participatory manner. We have provided a Person-Action-Communication tool recommended in MoEF’s National offsite guidelines to promote such participatory discussion. We have also recommended regular meeting of DCG members as per CAEPPR Rules. If the DCG members take ownership of this process instead of outsourcing to a consultant or only one or two members of the DCG, specific action plans to improve capability for and actually providing effective response will be achieved in Bharuch.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


INTRODUCTION1

Baruch is a district with the highest preponderance of hazardous chemical industries and is rated in the AA Category making Baruch a ‘Highly Hazardous’ district in the 2008 State SCG Response Plan. Section 2.1.1 provides a narrative summary of chemical hazards in the district. Therefore, the need to prepare for chemical emergencies is acute in Baruch.

While every chemical emergency in an industry does not lead to an offsite emergency, some of these emergencies can affect the larger public and private infrastructure, the population at large and the environment. Safety provisions in industries and other mitigation measure may reduce the probability or frequency and severity of chemical emergencies; however, the risk cannot be zero in most areas. Therefore, it is essential for the communities – the industry, public agencies and departments, and citizens – to always be prepared and in a state of readiness to limit the consequences of any such chemical emergencies.

Baruch has demonstrated leadership in managing chemical emergencies. The offsite plan developed in Baruch was assessed as one of the best in a review of offsite plans by this study’s consultants. Bharuch district also has DPMC Ankleshwar which is identifiedbythestudyteamasasuccessmodeltobe replicated elsewhere in Gujarat. However, the capacityofthedistricttoeffectivelyandefficientlyrespond to chemical emergencies remains limited and concentrated only at the industries. This lack of capability in public agencies is a critical gap because chemical accidents can happen not only at MAH industries which are currently being regulated under MSIHC rules but also in several small factories, homes, laboratories, store houses and others. Even the industry’s capacity can be overwhelmed in case of larger emergencies. As the population density increases and the industries continue to grow the problem of chemical emergency management will become more critical. Therefore, the GSDMA

commissioned a project to achieve international levels of standards in prevention, mitigation, preparedness and response to industrial chemical emergencies. This Model Baruch District Chemical Industrial Disaster Management Plan (Baruch CDMP) is one of the products of this project.

1.1 PURPOSEThepurposeofthisplanistodefinetheactionsandrolesnecessarytoprovideacoordinated,qualified,and quick response for chemical and industrial disasters. This plan provides guidance to Baruch district with a general concept of potential disaster assignments before, during, and following chemical disasters. It also provides for the systematic integration of emergency resources when activated on the basis of the IRS and the response teams will be structured as per the IRT as per the NDMA guidelines.

1.2 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVESThe Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority (GSDMA) has commissioned a project to prepare state chemical and industrial disaster management plan. Specifically, the terms of reference aim:

• ToprepareaModelDisasterManagementPlan for Baruch district in Gujarat

Currently, under MSIHC Rules, district offsite plans are prepared and being used as ready reckoner to respond to chemical emergencies. However, the purpose of Bharuch CDMP is to present a “model” plan that is futuristic and aspires to meet international standards. Need for such a plan is acute given the high growth prospects of Gujarat and need for coordination of emergency response structure under MSIHC and CAEPPR Rules and DM Act and GDM Act. GSDMA appointed a team of international consultants led by m/s PRESTELS to prepare a model district CDMP based on NDMA guidelines as well as meeting the international norms with an objective of rapid and effective

2 BHARUCH DISTRICT INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL DMP

response to chemical emergencies to save lives, environment and property.

The CDMP is a plan that will identify what needs to be done and how. However, the action plan to achieve the recommended objectives (how, when, funds, who, etc.) must be prepared by each department assigned the responsibility under this plan. Often, the responsibility is on the group such as SCG and not individual departments or authorities. However, without such detailed action plans, this CDMP cannot be effectively implemented in a time bound manner.

1.3 APPROACH TO PREPARATION OF BARUCH DISTRICT CDMPThe GSDMA appointed a team of national and international consultants led by M/S PRESTELS to prepare the DMP in a participatory and modular approach. The following reports have been developed as a part of the preparatory modules under the contract with GSDMA and provide the basis for Baruch CDMP:

Module 11. Capability assessment and gap analysis

2. Vulnerability assessment

3. Antidotes plan

4. Synchronization between onsite and offsite plans

Module 25. Improvement in response mechanism

6. Community sensitization strategy

7. Performance improvement of the DISH, PESO and CEI

8. GIS based database system for chemical disaster management

All these interim reports were prepared in participatory manner by inclusion of all key stakeholders and provide much more in-depth information than that summarized in Bharuch

CDMP. The purpose of Bharuch CDMP is not to provide a page heavy report by consolidating all information but to provide a “plan” that will help us identify what must be done to achieve a high level of preparedness and capability. The required information for preparing the reports was collected from secondary data provided by various agencies, one-on-one interviews, group interviews, workshops, and organizational assessments by experts.

The study team also reviewed the 2010 Bharuch Offsite Plan prepared by the DCG through the DISH as well as 2012 offsite plans prepared as per the model offsite guidelines issues by the MOEF. However, the attached DMP is not an attempt to replace the available offsite plan that is based on current realities but a plan to achieve international levels of preparedness considering the existing administrative and legal set up in India. The recommendations here in range from easy short-term solutions to complex longer term strategies. The Bharuch CDMP is based on the similar state level CDMP prepared under this project. The state CDMP includes more comprehensive recommendations whereas theBharuchCDMP includes the specificsof those recommendations at the district level if applicable. The draft of this plan was presented at a Bharuch district workshop of DCG members and their suggestions have been incorporated into the report.

1.4 DIFFERENCE AND SYNERGIES BETWEEN CDMP AND OFFSITE PLANSThe MOEF took the leadership in setting up legal and institutional framework for managing chemical emergencies in industries through the MSIHC Rules (1989) and CEAPPR Rules (1996) for more than two decades following the Bhopal Tragedy. One of the instruments for chemical management is offsite emergency plan by DCG and SCG. It is highly credible that the MOEF has been effective in making such plans based on realities on the ground. However, the DM Act (2005) and GDM Act (2003) were the paradigm shift in management

INTRODUCTION1


of disasters in the country, including chemical disasters.

The DM Act (2005) and GDM Act (2003) envision a “All Hazard” concept to disaster management. These acts also mandated the creation of state and district (and local) disaster management authorities. In some ways, this created a parallel structure to manage chemical emergencies, but in other ways these authorities or the crisis groups under MSIHC are not the response agencies themselves. Therefore, the responsibility for response is still with individual departments. DM Acts also required preparation of a DMP that considers the entire cycle of Prevention and Mitigation, Preparedness, Response, Recovery and Rehabilitation. On the other hand, offsite plans under the MSIHC Rules focus on responses to chemical emergencies and preparedness to provide such responses. The offsite plan thus included information that must be readily available during response to a chemical emergency, but offsite plans do not provide a “plan” to take a comprehensive approach to disaster management. While, nothing in MSIHC Rules stops the offsite from

being developed in to a comprehensive plan for disaster management, the fact is that the newer DM Act use the term DMP to distinguish itself from Offsite Plan. As demonstrated in Figure 1 below, ideally an offsite plan can be an element of a more comprehensive DMP.

The Bharuch CDMP is a “model plan” so that the response and recovery plan here are also based on assumptions that the highest level of preparedness is achieved. Therefore, the response section of this report may not be applicable immediately in Gujarat before meeting the key recommendations in prevention, mitigation and preparedness sections of the report; and thus, cannot replace the existing offsite plan based on current ground realities. Over time, when the capability of the state is built, the response plan and offsite plan under MSIHC will begin to converge. Therefore, while it is critical that Gujarat state continues to prepare offsite plans under MSIHC Rules, preparation of this CDMP is a major contribution and step towards taking a comprehensive approach and constituting a futuristic plan for chemical disaster management.

INTRODUCTION1

PREV

ENTI

ON & M

ITIGATION

RESPONSE & RECOVERYREHABILITATION &

REC

ONST

RUCT

ION

PREPAREDNESS

Figure 1. Disaster Management Cycle and Focus of Offsite Plan


1.5 HIERARCHY AND RELATIONSHIP OF THE PLANSThe MSIHC Rules 1989, CEAPPR Rules 1996, GDM Act 2003, and DM Act 2005 recognize that disaster management is a participatory and bottom-up process. Therefore, all these Acts and Rules can work together to achieve the desired level of planning and preparedness. As depicted in Figure 2, the onsite plan of the industry prepared under MSIHC Rules is the most important and basic element. The DCG offsite plan (and thus District CDMP) is based on the information contained in the onsite plans. The state and national level

plans are based on the information in district plans. For example, the onsite plans identify emergency scenarios which have the potential for offsite consequences and thus need the assistance of offsite agencies at the local level. The local (LCG) or district level (DCG) plans for assistance to industries and identify scenarios that cannot be managed at local or district levels and must be scaled up to regional or state level. The state level plan provides for assistance to the district andalsoidentifiesscenarioswhichneednationalassistance. Each plan has procedures to request higher levels of assistance.

INTRODUCTION1

Figure 2. Bottom-up Approach to the Development of the Disaster Management Plan

1.6 COORDINATING STRUCTURES UNDER CAEPPR RULES AND DM ACTSBaruch has four Local Crisis Groups (LCGs) in four of the industrial clusters in the state: Amod / Jambusar; Ankleshwar; Jhagadia / Valia; and Dahej. Under MSIHC Rules, LCG is established for industrial clusters with MAH factories. The emergencies in these clusters should first be responded to at thelocal (cluster) level. If additional response capacity is required or if the emergency occurs in an area not served by the industrial cluster, then the district is

the lowest level of response available.

The District Collector (DC) of Bharuch is assigned the chairmanship for both the DCG and DDMA under the CAEPPR Rules 1996 and GDM Act 2003 and DM Act 2005. Therefore, he is the appellate district emergency authority at the district level as depicted in Figure 3 below. Because the DC is the head of institutional structures under CAEPPR Rules and DM Acts both, coordination between these two structures is automatically achieved at the district


andLCGlevelsandthereisnoconflictbetweenthesestructures. However, the Incident Response System recommended by the NDMA requires the appointment of an Incident Commander (IC) to manage all response related activities. He is appointed by the DCwhoisdesignatedastheResponsibleOfficer(RO)under the IRS. This new terminology can create someconfusionbecauseMSIHChasdefined“similarsounding” roles for incident controller and district emergency authority. The incident controller is at the unit level and responsible for managing the response activities there whereas the incident

commander manages the entre response operation when the emergency is offsite. The IC can in fact be the incident controller if the RO has appointed him as such. Further the RO and the DEA are both the district collector, but the DC must appoint the IC to manage the response activities under his authority. In spite of these confusing terminologies, it must be noted that the IRS is the most advanced organizationstructurethatisscalable,flexibleandunifiedunderonecommandforeffectiveresponse.More discussion of the IRS is provided later.

INTRODUCTION1

1.7 LOCAL RESPONSE TO CHEMICAL DISASTERS - EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION STRUCTUREAlthough the regional, state and national agencies can provide assistance, the response to a chemical disaster is always local. Under the MSIHC Rules, the LCG is the lowest level of group available at industrial cluster level whereas DCG is the next level of response. Often LCGs are not available in which case the DCG level is the lowest level of response. As per the DM Act 2005, the local authorities and Panchayati Raj Institutions can plan for, prepare, and respond to emergencies. Therefore, even Taluka or block level can be response level provided Taluka level CDMPs are prepared including Management of Chemical Disasters, although such plans are not currently available.

The stakeholders for chemical disaster management have been categorized into agencies responsible for planning and co-ordination and agencies responsible for response. While a majority of the agencies /teams/groups exist, some additional ones are already planned in Gujarat and some new ones are proposed in the state level CDMP. Table 1 is reproduced from the State CDMP and summarizes the roles of these agencies in Disaster Management. The composition of the DCG and LCG in Bharuch is provided in Figure 4 and 5.

As per CAEPPR Rules, the role of DCG is the following:1. Assist in the preparation of the district offsite

emergency plan;

2. Review all the onsite emergency plans prepared by the occupier of major accident

Figure 3. Coordination of Structures under DM Act 2005 and CAEPPR Rules 1996.


hazards installation for the preparation of the district offsite emergency plan;

3. Assist the district administration in the management of chemical accidents at a site lying within the district;

4. Continuously monitor every chemical accident;

5. Ensurecontinuousinformationflowfromthedistrict to the Centre and State Crisis Group regarding accident situation and mitigation efforts;

6. Forward a report of the chemicals accident within fifteen days to the State CrisisGroups; and

7. Conduct at least one full scale mock-drill of a chemical accident at a site each year and forward a report of the strength and the weakness of the plan to the State Crisis Group.

The role of the LCG as per CAEPPR Rules is to:1. Prepare local emergency plan for the

industrial pocket;

2. Ensure dovetailing of the local emergency plan with the district offsite emergency plan;

3. Train personnel involved in chemical accident management;

4. Educate the population, likely to be affected in a chemical accident, about the remedies and existing preparedness in the area;

5. Conduct at least one full scale mock-drill of a chemical accident at a site every six months and forward a report to the District Crisis Group;

6. Respond to all public inquires on the subject.

It is thus clear that LCG is predominantly a planning and preparedness related committee whereas DCG is not only planning and preparedness but also an emergency response management committee. However, neither is the response agencies per se

but includes members that are response agencies. This CDMP has recommended building district capabilities to have a qualified HAZMAT responseat the disposal of the district administration and not relying entirely on the industry. This CDMP also envision organization as per IRS recommended by NDMA. It is expected that any new organization structure, response mechanism and terminology can create confusion especially use and future of existing organization structure.

While the proposed emergency organization as per the IRS is discussed later, we wish to right now address that the existing structures of LCG and DCG are not in conflict with IRS and in fact quite synergistic.For example, DCG in Bharuch as identified firecoordinator and safety coordinators whereas IRS will require safety officer and operations sectionchief(whocanbeafireofficer).Thekeydifferenceis that IRS is not prescriptive about who must play which role but only suggestive so that the local administration can decide for itself which agency or person is best suited for a given role. In fact even industry personnel can be given a role in the IRS as long as they are members of the LCG and DCG. However, the IRS provides additional advantages of being scalable by including additional and higher levels of response in the command structure, flexiblebytransferringcommandandothersectionsof IRS to qualified people as scale and nature ofemergency changes, and with a unified commandso that there is one authorized, and accountable (technically qualified) incident commander andthe command can be transferred up as the scale of emergency increases.

1.8 LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLANThe Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals (MSIHC) Rules, 1989 and the Chemical Accidents (Emergency Planning, Preparedness and Response) (CAEPPR) Rules, 1996 provide a statutory structure for controlling major hazards posed by hazardous chemicals. These rules provide the

INTRODUCTION1


structure for responding to chemical emergencies. The onsite plans prepared by the Major Accident Hazard (MAH) installation as per Rule 13(1) of MSIHC Rules provide vital information for the offsite plan to be prepared under Rule 14(1).

In 2005, the Disaster Management Act (DM Act) was enacted. The Gujarat State Disaster Management Act, 2003 (GDM Act, 2003) was enacted before the national DM Act, 2005. The scope of these acts includes chemical and industrial emergencies as well as manmade disasters. Both these acts are a shift towards an all-hazard emergency management concept compared to the earlier framework that is focused on chemical accidents in industries alone. Theseactsalsoputsignificantresponsibilityonthepublic authorities to plan, prepare and respond to chemical emergencies. As discussed in Section 1.3, the offsite plan required to be prepared as per MSIHC rules can be a part of CDMP prepared as per DM Act 2005 and GDM Act 2003.

The above acts and rules are supported by several technical regulations such as the Gujarat Factories Rules, PNGRB Rules, Dock Safety Rules and others to improve the overall safety performance of the industry. MSIHC rules are also notified under theGujarat Factories Rule, which can potentially give powers to DISH to extend these rules to all factories and not only MAH units.

1.8.1 LEGAL AUTHORITYThis plan derives its authority from the following acts and rules:

Acts:• The Factories Act, 1948, as amended in 1976

and 1987

• The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986

• Disaster Management Act, 2005

• The Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 as amended in 1992

• The National Environment Tribunal Act, 1995

• Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority Act, 2003

• The Explosive Act, 1884

• The Petroleum Act, 1934

• Electricity Act, 2003

• Dock Workers (Safety, Health and Welfare) Act, 1986

Rules:• The Gujarat Factories Rules 1963 under the

Factories Act, 1948 as amended in 1995

• The Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989 as amended in 1994, 2000 and 2004

• The Public Liability Insurance Rules, 1991 as amended in 1992

• The Chemical Accidents (Emergency Planning, Preparedness and Response) Rules, 1996

• Explosive Rules, 2008

• Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989

• Hazardous Wastes (Management, Handling and Trans-boundary Movement) Rules, 2008.

1.8.2 KEY REGULATORY BODIESThe primary responsibility for dealing with chemical emergencies lies with the following:

Government of India: The Ministry of Environment and Forests has been designated as the nodal ministry for chemical accidents.

Government of Gujarat:• Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority

Under DM Act 2005 and GDM Act 2003

• The Department of Labour and Employment via the Directorate of Industrial Safety and Health under MSIHC Rules

• The other regulatory authorities who are given a role in enforcing MSIHC Rules are the Chief Inspector of Dock Safety, appointed under the Dock Workers (Safety Health and

INTRODUCTION1


Welfare) Act, 1986, the Chief Inspector of Mines, appointed under the Mines Act, 1952, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, appointed under Atomic Energy Act, 1972, and the Chief Controller of Explosives (now known as PESO), appointed under the Indian Explosives Act and Rules, 1983.

1.9 ORGANIZATION OF THE PLANChapter one of this plan is the introduction to the

background, need and processes of developing

the Bharuch CDMP. Chapter two describes the

chemical hazards existing in the district with a brief

synopsis of risks and vulnerability. Chapter three

summarizes key recommendations for prevention

and mitigation. Chapter four provides key

recommendations to improve the preparedness to

respond to chemical disasters at the district level.

Chapterfiveistheresponseplanwhichisbasedon

the assumption that the preparedness level as per

chapter four is achieved. Chapter six summarizes

key recommendations and activities for recovery

and rehabilitation post chemical disasters. Chapter

seven discusses the management and maintenance

of this CDMP.

INTRODUCTION1


INTRODUCTION1

STATE DISTRICT

POLICY FORMULATION /REGULATION/ENFORCEMENT

DISHGSDMAGPCB

PNGRBWestern Railways

PESOCEI,DOTGMB

Airport Authority of India

District and regional level representatives of above

organizations

PLANNING / CO-ORDINATION /

CAPACITY BUILDING/TRAINING

DISHGSDMA

State Crisis Group (SCG)GIDCPESO

Dept of TransportationGMB

Airport Authority of IndiaERC

DCGLCG

DDMA

RESPONSE CO-ORDINATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

SEOCERCSDRF

As per IRS: Establish Incident Command Post (ICP) near emergency site.

Primary response from ICP. Establishes communication with DEOC

District Emergency Operations Centre (DEOC )

FIRST/PRIMARY RESPONSE

SDRFSERT

RRT at ERCFire Services

Medical Services (108)Police Dept

LERTattachedtolocalfirestation(qualifiedHAZMATresponse)

Fire, medical and Police, or others as per IRT under command of IC

Quick Response Medical Team (QRMT)

SUPPORT IN RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY AND

REHAB

Department of HealthDept of Industries and Mines

Public Works departmentGPCB

Dept of Animal HusbandryDepartment of Agriculture

Dept of TransportationMinistry of Railways

TrafficPoliceDept of Transportation

Dept of Revenue/ Relief Commissioner / Collector’sofficeasmaincoordinator.

District Level representatives of the State level Agencies

IRT can be formed under IRS even for immediate recovery phase which is an

extension of response

Table 1. Stakeholder Roles in Disaster Management and ResponseLEGEND: Existing Organizations, Planned Organizations in Gujarat, Newly Recommended in this CDMP


Figure 4 - Composition of a Local Crisis Group

SUB-DIVISIONAL MAGISTRATE (SDM)

• Inspector of Factories Member-secretary • Industries in the District/ Member Industrial area/

industrial pocket • Transporters of Hazardous Chemicals (2 Numbers)• FireOfficer• StationHouseOfficer(Police)• BlockDevelopmentOfficer• One Representative of Civil defense• PrimaryHealthOfficer

• Editor of local News paper• Community leader/Sarpanch/ Village Pradhan

nominated by Chair-person• One Representative of Non-Government

Organisation to be nominated by the Chair-person• Two Doctors eminent in the Local area, to be

nominated by the chair-person• Two Social Workers to be nominated by the

Chairperson

INTRODUCTION1

FIRE SERVICE COORDINATOR

Fire Superintendent Bharuch

TRANSPORT COORDINATOR

Asst RTO, Dept of Transport

UTILITIES COORDINATOR

Sudt Engineer (Elec), OandM, GEB

TECHNICAL COORDINATOR -

BHARUCHQualifiedTechnical

Person

TECHNICAL COORDINATOR - ANKLESHWAR

QualifiedTechnicalPerson

ASSOC UTILITIES COORDINATOR

District Agriculture Officer

MEDICAL COORDINATORCDHO Bharuch

EVAC AND REHAB COORDINATORChiefOfficer,Bharuch MC

RESCUE COORDINATORCOMMANDANT SPRF

GROUP I

TECHNICAL COORDINATOR - PANOLI


ASSOCIATE EVAC AND REHAB COORDINATORQualifiedTechnical

Person

SUPPORT FUNCTIONSDEPARTMENT OFFICERS

OF DISTRICT

SECURITY COORDINATOR

Superintendent of Police

PUBLIC WORKS COORDINATOR

Exec Eng, Public Health Eng Dept

COMMUNICATOR COORDINATOR

GM, Dept of telecom

TECHNICAL COORDINATOR - DAHEJ


ASSOCIATE SAFETY COORDINATOR

Representative of PESO

SAFETY COORDINATORRegionalOfficer,GPCB

LIAISON AND PR COORDINATOR

Director, PR and Information Dept

MATERIAL COORDINATOR

District Development Officer

TECHNICAL COORDINATOR -

JHAGADIAQualifiedTechnical

Person

ASSOC MATERIAL COORDINATOR

QualifiedtechnicalPerson

DISTRICT EMERGENCY AUTHORITY / CHAIRMAN OF DCG DISTRICT COLLECTOR

MEMBER SECY, DCG DY DIRECTOR, DISH

Figure 5 -Composition of the Bharuch District Crisis Group


HAZARD ANALYSIS AND VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT2

2.1 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

2.1.1 AN OVERVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL HAZARDS IN BHARUCHThe primary goal of chemical disaster management in Bharuch is to ensure readiness to respond to and recover from the consequences of chemical disasters. A detailed hazard identification andvulnerability assessment is done in Sections 2.2. In this section, we summarize the key hazards in Bharuch District.

Bharuch is one of the fastest developing, highly industrialized districts in the country with over 11,500 units of small and medium industries from sectors such as chemicals and petrochemicals, engineering, and textiles. Investment in the Chemical sector during 1998-07 in Bharuch was approximately INR 14,680 crores generating employment for more than 25,000 people. The district is sub-divided into eight Talukas: Amod, Bharuch, Jambusar, Jhagadia, Vagra, Valia, Hansot, and Ankleshwar. Each Taluka has a Major Accident Hazard (MAH) unit.

Ankleshwar has the maximum concentration of MAH industries. As per the information provided by DISH there are 81 functional MAH units. A list of these unitsalongwiththeassociatedhazardidentificationis provided in Appendix A: Directory of hazard identificationbyindustry.

Bharuch Taluka (district HQ) has seven MAH Units. MAH Units include GNFC and NCPL which are two of the largest fertilizer and petrochemical units in India. GIDC, Ankleshwar is an industrial cluster approximately 15 km south of Bharuch. It is within five km of a densely populated Ankleshwar townposing a serious risk to the population. The road connecting Ankleshwar to the national highway and to Bharuch is congested and has high levels of HAZMAT transported. Consequently, the preparedness in Ankleshwar is also high. The Disaster Management

and Prevention Centre (DPMC) set up under the public private partnership has been identified asone of the best-prepared fire stations in Gujaratequipped to deal with chemical emergencies (althoughitstillneedssignificantstrengthening).Panoli is another large GIDC industrial cluster eight km away from Ankleshwar with 19 MAH units. While alocalfirestationispresent,itdoesnothavethecapacity to respond to chemical emergencies. An LPG bottling plant of HPCL is located in a village called Piludara about eight km from Panoli. LPG tankers and caged trucks carrying empty and filled LPG cylinders have to pass either through alevel crossing near the Panoli Railway Station or the national highway in order to access the unit therefore posing a risk to the railway line.

The Jhagadia GIDC cluster is located 30 km East of Ankleshwar and has eight MAH units.

Dahej is a port based industrial complex 40 km west of Bharuch and includes six MAH units: IPCL, GACL, Hindalco Industries Ltd, Gujarat Chemical Port Terminal Company Ltd, Sanjana Cryogenic Storages Ltd, and BASF Styrenics. The access road to Dahej is congested and poses a challenge because good medical facilities are available only at Bharuch. LPG plants of GAIL and IOCL are located at Rozatankaria, which is about 30 km from Bharuch. Commodities handled by the Dahej port for import include fertilizers, rock phosphate, naphtha, ammonia, coal and coke, propylene, ethylene, copper concentrate, ethanol, profane and coconut oil, while the commodities for export include phosphoric acid and soya beans. Therefore, theDahejportisasignificantlyhazardous.

2.1.2 DESCRIPTION OF CHEMICAL HAZARDSThe three principal types of hazards associated with chemical emergencies are fires, explosions,and toxic releases that affect the population and environment. Additional hazards include chemical


spillage or spill over. Chemical corrosion too can cause damage to property and sometimes life. A district level chemical emergency or disaster can involve one or more of these hazards as described below.

2.1.2.1 FIRE HAZARDFires occur in industry more frequently than explosions and toxic releases. However, the consequences in terms of loss of life are generally lessbecauseafireallowssometimeforpeopletoescape and physical protection against it may be available. Theeffectsofafireonpeopleusuallytake the form of skin burns due to exposure to thermal radiation. The severity of burns depends on the duration of exposure and the intensity of the heat. Heat radiation is inversely proportional to the square of the distance from the source.

There are several properties that measure how readily—that is, how easily—a chemical will catch onfire.Themorevolatileachemicalis,thefasteritevaporates,andthequickeraflammablevapourcloud is formed are factors that contribute to how flammable a chemical is. The flash point is thelowesttemperaturewhereaflammable liquidwillevaporate enough to catch on fire if an ignitionsource is present. The lower the flash point, theeasieritisforafiretostart.Flammabilitylimits,also known as the Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) and the Upper Explosive Limit (UEL), are the concentrationboundariesoftheflammableareaofa vapour cloud. A chemical will burn only if its fuel-air concentration is between the LEL and the UEL. To some extent, these properties are inter-related. Chemicals that are highly volatile and have a low flashpointwillusuallyalsohavealowLEL.

Oncethechemicalcatchesonfire,threethingsneedtobepresenttokeepthefiregoing:fuel(thechemicalvapour), oxygen, and heat. This is often referred to as the fuel triangle. If any one of those components is eliminated,thenthefirewillstopburning.

Like other reactions, a fire can also generate by-products—smoke, soot, ash, and new chemicals formed in the reaction. Some of these reaction by-products can be hazardous themselves. For example, the combustion of polyurethane foam gives off cyanides fumes. In chemical industries, the followingtypesoffirescenariosarepossible:

Jet fires occur when a flammable liquid or gasis ignited after its release from a pressurized, punctured vessel or pipe. The pressure of release generatesalongflame,whichisstableundermostconditions.Typically,jetfireshavealengthlessthan50metersand thus typically stayconfinedonsite.However, if this jet impinges on a neighbouring tank then that tank ruptures under heat stress or BLEVE. Therefore, it is important to control jet fires toavoid domino effects.

Apoolfireoccursonignitionofanaccumulationofliquid as a pool on the ground or on water or another liquid.PoolfirediametersareusuallyconfinedtotheDykeareaofthetankortankfarms.Poolfirescan give rise to BLEVE under certain conditions. Poolfiresinlargetankfarmscanresultinamajordisaster by a cascading / domino effect. The IOC Jaipurfireof2009isanexampleofapoolfire.

Aflashfireoccurswhenacloudofflammablegasand air is ignited. Usually, flash fires or vapourcloud explosion result depending upon the spread of flame post ignition and environmental conditions.In reality it is difficult to predictwhether a flashfireorVCEwillhappen.Inaflashfire,withinafewsecond of ignition the flame spreads both upwindand downwind of the ignition source. The duration of this fire is very short, but it can give rise tosecondaryfiresthatmaytakelongertocontrol.

Fireballs are a rapid turbulent combustion of fuel, usually in the form of a rising and expanding radiantballofflame.Whenajetfireorpoolfireimpinges on a vessel containing pressure-liquefiedgas, the pressure in the vessel rises and the vessel



wall weakens ultimately resulting in catastrophic failure of the vessel. This phenomenon is known as a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE). Although the duration of the heat pulse from a fireball is typically less than 30 seconds,the damage potential is high due to the fireball’smassive surface thermal radiation emissive power. Afireballcanalsobeexpectedtocausesignificantover pressures (blast).

2.1.2.2 EXPLOSION HAZARDExplosions are caused when a mixture of air and fuel gets ignited. Depending upon the characteristics of the explosive vapour, the ignition may also result in aflashfire.TheVapourCloudExplosion(VCE)canbeunconfinedorconfined.Confinedexplosionsoccurwithin some form of containment (e.g. vessels, pipe work), or in less obvious situations (e.g. between buildings),whileunconfinedexplosionscanoccurinopen air.

It is sometimes difficult to make a distinctionbetweenafireandanexplosion.Oftenanexplosionis followed by a fire,with damage and casualtiesbeing caused by both. Probably the greatest danger arisesfromthesuddenmassivereleaseofflammablematerialproducingalargecloudofflammableandpossibly explosive vapour. If this cloud were ignited, the effects would depend on a number of factors including wind speed and the degree of dilution of the cloud with air. It could lead to large number of casualties and damage both onsite and beyond. However, the effects are generally limited to less than 300-400 meters.

2.1.2.3 TOXIC HAZARDSudden releases of toxic vapours have the potential to cause death and severe injuries at a much greater distance. In theory, such a release could produce lethal concentrations at several kilometres from the point of release. In practice, the actual number of casualties depends on the meteorological conditions, density of population in the path of the

cloud, and the effectiveness of the emergency arrangements. Toxic materials can also be carried considerable distances by water. Their release into the public sewerage system, rivers, canals and other water courses, either directly, or through contaminatedwaterusedinfirefighting,canresultin serious threats to public health.

2.1.3 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCESThe possible immediate environmental consequences of a chemical emergency include:

1. The release into the atmosphere of toxic or corrosive gases, aerosols or particulate materials which could ultimately harm the aerial, terrestrial or aquatic environments

2. The release of liquids or solids which could adversely affect land or water courses and the flora and fauna therein

3. Fires or explosions causing damage to buildings or natural environment

4. The effects of environmental impact can be direct or indirect, immediate or delayed, temporary or persistent. The persistent effects are of particular importance, such as damage caused to habitats by fire.

2.1.4 MEDICAL CONSEQUENCE OF CHEMICAL

EXPOSUREHuman exposure to chemical releases can occur through air, food and drink, water or direct dermal contact with the chemical. Epidemiologists need to be aware that apparently inexplicable disease outbreaksmaybethefirstevidenceofatoxicreleaseinto the community. Chemical-induced disorders can manifest themselves in any organ system. Because the body has only a limited repertoire of disease responses, the signs and symptoms may resemble diseases arising from other causes. Unless the disorder is highly specific to the particularagent, epidemiological studies may be necessary to determine whether the occurrence of a disease in a population has increased as a result of chemical



exposure. In general, the adverse responses to toxic exposures may be:

5. Effects that are local or arise at the site of contact with the chemical, such as broncho-constriction from respiratory irritants or irritation of the skin and eyes by irritant gases

6. Effects that are systemic or affect organ systems remote from the site of absorption, such as depression of the central nervous system from the absorption of solvents through the skin, or necrosis of the liver from the inhalation of carbon tetrachloride

7. Effects on mental health arising from real or perceived releases, which depend on the psychological stress associated with an incident.

The timing of the adverse health effects after exposure may vary.

8. Acute effects appear within seconds or minutes, and include eye irritation, broncho-constriction or pulmonary oedema

9. Sub-chronic effects appear within hours or days, and include delayed pulmonary oedema

from phosgene, or renal failure in arsenic poisoning

10. Chronic effects appear weeks to years after exposure. These may be of the greatest concern in an incident, even in the absence of any casualties with acute or sub-chronic effects, and may include cancer and reproductive abnormalities.

2.1.5 CLASSIFICATION OF SCALE OF DISASTERSOne of the ways of classifying chemical disaster is by the consequences according to the provisions of Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals, Rules 1989.Table 2 classifies chemicaldisasters as minor, moderate, major and catastrophic based on the consequence as below as per the 2008 State Response Plan, but made it more comprehensive as per USEPA criteria. These classifications are useful for response capacityassessmentandalsohelpinstandardizingdefinitionofscaleofdisasters.Thisclassificationisdifferentthan NDMA levels of emergency (Levels 0 to 3) discussed in the next section.




Table 2- Classification and Scale of Chemical Disasters as per SCG 2008 Report

Potential for Human Injuries and Fatalities

Low potential for serious human injuries and no potential for human fatalities

Up to 10 human fatalities and 100 injuries requiring medical treatment or observation

Up to 100 potential human fatalities or up to 300 Injuries

More than 100 potential human fatalities and 300+ injuries

Need for Protective Actions

No need for formal evacuation or shelter or other public protective action

Limited evacuation of immediate response control zones of up to 2,000 people and no other public protective action

Requires protective actions of a discrete population managed by ICS for up to 20,000 people

Requires protective actions forasignificantpopulation > 20,000 people, or sensitive receptors, and pre-planning and preparedness programs

Contamination of Environment

Negligible contamination of any environmental media with minimal cleanup costs

Localized, rapidly resolved, non-persistent contamination of environmental media

Spreading and/or persistent contamination of an environmental media that can be readily remediated with existing resources

Widespread and/or persistent contamination of one or more environmental media with long-term remediation or need for outside resources

Need for External Resource Support

Response by facility response team (organic to facility)

Local HAZMAT team response (organic to local jurisdiction)

Community HAZMAT team response from an outside but local jurisdiction

Full reliance on state, intrastate, or national HAZMAT team resources

Advanced Equipment and Lab Support

Basic PPE, materials and tools, limited detection and monitoring, and no lab support

Specialized PPE, some specialized materials, basic tools, and detection and monitoring equipment, and basic lab support

Specialized PPE, materials, and response tools, intermediate detection and monitoring equipment, and lab support

Specialized PPE, materials, tools, and advanced equipment and lab support

SCALES OF CHEMICAL DISASTERSPARAMETERS

MINOR MODERATE MAJOR CATASTROPHIC

table continued on page 16...



table continued from page 16...

Sensitive ReceptorsImpact on 4 or fewer sensitive receptors

Impact on 5 to 10 sensitive receptors

Impact on 11 to 20 sensitive receptors

Impact on more than 20 sensitive receptors

Critical Infrastructure

Impact on 1 or no critical infrastructure locations with no or minor operational disruptions

Impact 1 to 4 critical infrastructure locations with serious operational disruptions

Impacts 4 to 10 critical infrastructure locations with total operational disruptions and degradation of services

Impacts 10 or more critical infrastructure locations, that disables response operations and services

Property and Economic Damages

Less Than $100,000 in property or economic losses

$100,000 to $1,000,000 in property or economic losses

$1,000,000 to $10,000,000 in property or economic losses

More than $10,000,000 in property or economic damages

PublicConfidenceandSocial Stability

No impact on publicconfidencein government or social stability

Minor impact on publicconfidencein government, social stability unchanged

Major impact on public confidenceingovernment and some disruption of social stability

Major impact on publicconfidencein government with widespread disruptions of social stability

SCALES OF CHEMICAL DISASTERSPARAMETERS

MINOR MODERATE MAJOR CATASTROPHIC

2.1.6 LEVELS OF EMERGENCYNDMA guidelines on chemical disasters have defined levels of emergencies, which are usefulin communicating the level of response needed or provided.

• Level – 0: A non-emergency period when mock drills, trainings, exercises and other preparedness activities for effective re-sponse should be done.

• Level – 1: The emergency will spill over to offsite (outside factory) and within the capabilities of the district administration to deal with

• Level – 2: The emergency will require as-sistance and help from the state govern-ment and within their capability

• Level – 3: A National level disaster requir-ing major direct intervention of centre

For communication purpose we recommend adding following levels because NDMA levels ignore onsite emergencies or emergencies that require support from district or local response agencies.

• Level – 0A: An emergency that has only onsite consequences but requires support from local or district response agencies.



2.1.7 TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALSIndustrial installations, especially those handling highly hazardous substances are well-protected simply by the virtue of self-preservation and the ability to better control a hazard that is stationary and confined. However, once the hazardoussubstance leaves the premises of a factory, it also leaves the safety of a well-controlled environment. Consequently, accidents during transportation of hazardous chemicals are more frequent than industrial accidents. Also, depending upon the chemical transported and the population density of the accident area, the consequences can be grave. Pipeline transport is generally safest. Pipelines are well-designed, well-maintained and have several safety features. They are often underground. The main cause for accidents involving pipelines is negligence in digging up the ground which can puncture pipelines.

Rail transport and water way transport are less risky because these methods face lesser uncertainty on exogenous factors such as traffic on their route,accidents of other vehicles on route, densely populated areas en route, and others.

Road transportation of hazardous chemicals poses the highest risk due to the higher probability of accidents. A risk of an accident is present when:

• Vehicles carrying dangerous goods are left to stand unattended;

• The vehicle or container runs loose because it is not properly connected or secured;

• The load starts to move during transport; • Spillage is not quickly washed away from the

vehicles or containers; • Spillage is not properly cleaned;• Incompatible substances mix with each

other (e.g. using same tanker for different chemicals);

• The driver is not properly trained to manger the emergency as per laid down norms;

• The vehicle is not well-maintained (especially for pressured tanks);

• Vehicles not following dedicated routes and times of travel.

The hazards posed by a road tanker are the same as those posed in a factory for given chemical and storage conditions. The difference is the source or location of accidents and thus affected populations. Below are key routes where HAZCHEM transportation is ubiquitous:

• National Highway No 8: This 44 km stretch enters the district at Palej and exits near Pa-noli. On the way, it passes through Bharuch, Ankleshwar and Panoli, which together have more than two-thirds of the total Major Ac-cident Hazard (MAH) units in the District. An-other important feature is that it is on the Ahmedabad – Vapi chemical corridor of the state, which has a concentration of chemi-cal industries. It also caters to the interstate transienttrafficofHAZCHEMandothergoods.From an independent study conducted on be-half of MOEF, it is noted that a chemical car-rier passes the Zadeshwar crossing every two minutes. From this it can be observed that the movement of HAZCHEM transportation and also the potential for accidents involving them in the district is very high.

• Bharuch – Dahej State Highway: Here the approach road is narrow, being wide enough for two heavy vehicles to pass. Being a port complex, Dahej receives high volumes of haz-ardous chemical cargo through ships, which are unloaded through a liquid cargo jetty to receptor tanks at the units. From there they are loaded into tankers and dispatched to end-users. Additionally, Dahej also has large manufacturers of HAZCHEM, which adds to the transportation activity. The volume of HAZCHEM carrier, on this stretch is therefore very high.

• Ankleshwar – Jhagadia State Highway: This road caters to the traffic to and from the


GIDC Jhagadia and also towards adjacent Narmada District. There are two roads that connect the GIDC Jhagadia with the State Highway and another one connecting it with Valia. All three approach roads to the GIDC Jhagadia are in bad shape and become worse during monsoons. Poor road conditions coupledwithheavytrafficcannotonlyleadto disastrous consequences but also delay the deployment of response units when required.

• In addition to the above, attention also needs to be given on the roads within each GIDC (especially Panoli and Jhagadia). While some of the roads within these estates are motorable, others are in bad shape and become worse during monsoons. Movement of heavy vehicles, including those carrying HAZCHEM, within the estate is high. Poor road conditions may not only result in transportation accidents but also increases thetraveltimeforfirstresponderstoreachthe incident site.

• LPG tankers and caged trucks carrying empty andfilledLPGcylinders(forHPCLPiludara)have to pass through a level crossing near the Panoli Railway Station to access the unit or the national highway. As this is the main Delhi-Mumbai railway route, the movement of regular and goods trains is high and sometimes leads to congestion on either side of the crossing. The presence of LPG tankers in such a situation increases the hazard potential of the area.

Following are the major HAZCHEM transported through the District:

• Acids (Acetic, Hydrochloric, Nitric, Sulphuric) and Alkalines

• Carbon disulphide• Ammonia• Methanol• Benzene• Motor spirit

• Chlorine• Naphtha• Diesel• Oleum• Kerosene• Solvents (Xylene, Toluene, Aromax)• LPG/Propane• Technical pesticides

2.1.8 CHEMICAL EMERGENCIES IN AFTERMATH OF NATURAL DISASTERSGujarat has been struck by natural disasters frequently in the recent past. These disasters have impacted industries considerably.

• The Kandla cyclone of 1998 affected oil terminals, jetties, transportation facilities, factories, buildings, warehouses, storage tanks, timber industry and, most important, the salt industry.

• There have been reports of chemical spill in Kandla port in the wake of January 26 earth-quake in 2001.

• Oil products also suffered since the Hindu-stan Petroleum shifted its operations from VizagtoKandlaaftertheeventoffire.

The impact of these natural disasters could trigger a serious chemical accident in Gujarat, particularly in the port-based industries in coastal area that are vulnerable to earthquakes, tsunamis andflooding.Therefore, it is important to consider resilience against natural disasters while locating and designing the new chemical industry. For existing chemicalindustries,aretrofittingofinfrastructuretoremainsafeincaseofearthquakesandfloodingshould be prioritized by the industry. There are two considerations in case of a combination of natural and chemical disasters.

First, the causation of chemical emergency as a result of natural disasters depends on two factors: (a) what is released? Where? and how much?; and (b) under what environmental/climate conditions? Second, extraordinary resource demands and limitations of



responders, equipment, water, and others materials that will be needed to respond to a chemical emergency during a natural hazard event are the biggest concern. Large-scale natural disasters can degrade or destroy the very infrastructure needed to respond to the chemical emergency. Like with any large-scale event, situational awareness allows the control room to set priorities. Lifesaving comes first,andthentheIRSshouldfocusoninterruptingthe dominos or cascading effects to cause additional events (limit the causation), protect property and the environment. In large-scale complex events, we cannot expect the IRS to fix everything all atonce, but the IRS should take the best decisions will be made with resources available. Priorities must be set appropriately, recognising that lives and property will be lost and we can simply minimise any damage.

The IRS structure in case of natural disasters plus chemical emergencies would typically have the collector as the Incident commander. The chief of LERT will head chemical response branch as Operational Section Chief (OSC). Another response teamfor,say,rescueforfloods,willbeheadedbyanother OSC. The IC will coordinate these multiple teams and make executive decisions about setting priorities. It should be noted that the emergency response structure shall always remain IRS, but recognisethatIRSishighlyflexibleandscalable.

2.1.9 DOMINO EFFECTS IN CHEMICAL EMERGENCIESDomino effects in chemical emergencies mean that an accident at one location causes accidents at another location. The simplest way to interrupt the domino effect is to stop the hazard from reaching the neighbouring site. This can be done by ensuring enough spacing between two tanks or units, reducing tank sizes such that vulnerable distances are lower, erecting blast walls, or other such measures. Planning and prevention are important to manage the risk of domino effects. We recommend the following:

• Industrial units who pose risk to neighbouring industrial units because of domino effect should clearly identify and mention the same on their onsite plans.

• Industrial units having tank yards of flammable chemicals should conductworstcase scenarios on the basis of multiple tank failures (if such a scenario is possible).

• Industry units that are at the risk of domino effect from their neighbours should also identify such scenarios on their onsite plan.

• Industry, DISH, DCG should collectively discuss and identify solutions for avoiding and responding to domino effects in a DCG/LCG forum.

• The affected units should be a part of the local mutual aid, conduct joint exercises and mock drills in association with LCG/DCG members, and develop their communication protocols to reduce the potential for and damage from domino effects.

• The LERT should identify clusters where domino effect scenario are possible in their areas of operations and develop tactical plans to respond to such emergencies.

2.2 VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT

2.2.1 DISTRIBUTION AND TYPES OF INDUSTRIESThere are 73 Type A, 165 Type B, and 75 MAH industries in Bharuch. Of these 313 units, all posesomeleveloftoxichazardand248posefire/explosion hazard due to the chemicals stored.

Appendix A lists MAH, Type A and Type B industries in Bharuch, their best known address, latitude and longitude, available chemicals, and possible types of hazard from these chemicals, and indication whether an offsite scenario is possible for the given chemical.

Figure 6 depicts the location of MAH, Type A and Type B industries in Bharuch. Figures 7, 8 and 9 depictthevulnerablezonesfortoxic,flashfireand




Figure 6. Location of MAH, Type A and Type B industries in Bharuch

Figure 7. Vulnerability Areas in Bharuch for a Toxic Leak Scenario

VADUKAVI

AMOD

ASTA

ALVA

SALOL

PADRA

VALAN

PALEJSINOR

UTRAJ

SANGMA

MANPUR

DABHOI

KARJAN

ANDADA

AMBOLI

HANSOT

DAHEWAN

TARSALI

CHOKARI

BHARUCH

GADKHOLNETRANG

BAMANGAM

DHUVARAN

JAMBUSAR

BHIMPURA

DAMAPURA

RAJPIPLA

RAJPARDI

KANKAPURA

KARNAKUVA

TANKARIYA

BORBHATHA

ANKLESVAR

BHANKHETAR

MADHAVPARA

JHADESHWAR

KAYAVAROHAN

BHARUCH

73°0'0"E

73°0'0"E

22°0

'0"N

22°0

'0"N

Bharuch Toxic Dispersion

±



^̀ Policestation

nm School

National Highway

Major Road

Railway

Dense Forest

Open Forest

Water Body

Toxic High LOC

Toxic Medium LOC

Toxic Low LOC

Gujarat State


0 28,000 56,000 84,00014,000Meters Figure 8. Vulnerability Areas in Bharuch for a

Flash Fire Scenario

BHARUCH

VADUKAVI

AMOD

ASTA

ALVA

SALOL

PADRA

VALAN

PALEJSINOR

UTRAJ

SANGMA

MANPUR

DABHOI

KARJAN

ANDADA

AMBOLI

HANSOT

DAHEWAN

TARSALI

CHOKARI

BHARUCH

GADKHOLNETRANG

BAMANGAM

DHUVARAN

JAMBUSAR

BHIMPURA

DAMAPURA

RAJPIPLA

RAJPARDI

KANKAPURA

KARNAKUVA

TANKARIYA

BORBHATHA

ANKLESVAR

BHANKHETAR

MADHAVPARA

JHADESHWAR

KAYAVAROHAN

73°0'0"E

73°0'0"E

22°0

'0"N

22°0

'0"N

Bharuch Flashfire

±



^̀ Policestation

nm School

National Highway

Major Road

Railway

Dense Forest

Open Forest

Water Body

Flashfire High LOC

Flashfire Medium LOC

Flashfire Low LOC

Gujarat State


0 28,000 56,000 84,00014,000Meters


VCE. As expected, Bharuch, Ankleshwar and to some extent Dahej, are the most vulnerable given the concentration of chemical industries there. Please note that a separate vulnerability table and atlas is providedfortheentirestateandthesefiguresareincluded here only for demonstration sake.

2.2.2 WORST CASE SCENARIO ASSESSMENT“AppendixA:DirectoryofHazard IdentificationbyIndustry” lists, by district, the chemical industries in alphabetical order, their type (MAH, A or B), address, latitude-longitude, the chemicals in each industry, maximum unit storage quantity of the chemical, whether chemical has offsite consequence and hence modelled in ALOHA, and type of hazard possible for the chemical.


Figure 9. Vulnerability Areas in Bharuch for Vapour Cloud Explosion Scenario

Figure 10. Vulnerability Areas in Bharuch for Bleve Scenario

BHARUCH

VADUKAVI

AMOD

ASTA

ALVA

SALOL

PADRA

VALAN

PALEJSINOR

UTRAJ

SANGMA

MANPUR

DABHOI

KARJAN

ANDADA

AMBOLI

HANSOT

DAHEWAN

TARSALI

CHOKARI

BHARUCH

GADKHOLNETRANG

BAMANGAM

DHUVARAN

JAMBUSAR

BHIMPURA

DAMAPURA

RAJPIPLA

RAJPARDI

KANKAPURA

KARNAKUVA

TANKARIYA

BORBHATHA

ANKLESVAR

BHANKHETAR

MADHAVPARA

JHADESHWAR

KAYAVAROHAN

73°0'0"E

73°0'0"E

22°0

'0"N

22°0

'0"N

Bharuch VCE

±



^̀ Policestation

nm School

National Highway

Major Road

Railway

Dense Forest

Open Forest

Water Body

VCE High LOC

VCE Medium LOC

VCE Low LOC

Gujarat State


0 28,000 56,000 84,00014,000Meters

BHARUCH

VADUKAVI

AMOD

ASTA

ALVA

SALOL

PADRA

VALAN

PALEJSINOR

UTRAJ

SANGMA

MANPUR

DABHOI

KARJAN

ANDADA

AMBOLI

HANSOT

DAHEWAN

TARSALI

CHOKARI

BHARUCH

GADKHOLNETRANG

BAMANGAM

DHUVARAN

JAMBUSAR

BHIMPURA

DAMAPURA

RAJPIPLA

RAJPARDI

KANKAPURA

KARNAKUVA

TANKARIYA

BORBHATHA

ANKLESVAR

BHANKHETAR

MADHAVPARA

JHADESHWAR

KAYAVAROHAN

73°0'0"E

73°0'0"E

22°0

'0"N

22°0

'0"N

Bharuch BLEVE

±



^̀ Policestation

nm School

National Highway

Major Road

Railway

Dense Forest

Open Forest

Water Body

Bleve High LOC

Bleve Medium LOC

Bleve Low LOC

Gujarat State


0 28,000 56,000 84,00014,000Meters

A separate vulnerability assessment atlas provides a detailed assessment for each chemical for each MAH, Type A and Type B industry for which we have data and where a consequence scenario is possible. For example, for Bharuch district alone there are almost 800 pages of vulnerability tables so that we refer the reader to the vulnerability atlas instead of replicating those pages here. In these tables, we have estimated the vulnerability of populations, forests, water bodies, electrical installations, police stations,firestations,andmedicalfacilities.Basedon this vulnerability assessment, in Table 3 we summarize the chemicals in the district with offsite consequences. Overall, we could identify 71 unique chemicals in Bharuch with offsite consequences.



Table 3. Summary of Chemicals with Offsite Consequence in Bharuch

CHEMICAL NAME TOXIC VCE BLEVE

1,1-DICHLOROETHANE 1

1,3-BUTADIENE 1 1 1

1-OCTENE 1 1 1

2-ETHYL HEXANOL 1

2-ETHYLHEXYL ACRYLATE 1 1

ACETALDEHYDE 1 1 1

ACETIC ACID, GLACIAL 1 1

ACETIC ANHYDRIDE 1 1

ACETONE 1 1 1

ACETONITRILE 1 1 1

ACRYLONITRILE 1 1 1

AMMONIA 1 1

ANILINE 1

BENZENE 1 1 1

BENZYL CHLORIDE 1

BROMINE 1

BUTANE 1 1 1

BUTYL ACETATE 1 1

CARBON BISULFIDE 1 1 1

CHLORINE 1

CHLOROBENZENE 1 1

CHLOROSULFONIC ACID 1

CYCLOHEXANE 1 1 1

DICHLOROMETHANE 1 1 1

DIISOPROPYLAMINE 1 1 1

DIMETHYL SULFATE 1 1

DIMETHYL SULFIDE 1 1 1

DIMETHYLAMINOPROPYLAMINE 1 1

ETHANOL 1 1

ETHANOLAMINE 1 1

ETHYL ACETATE 1 1 1

ETHYL MERCAPTAN 1

ETHYLENE DICHLORIDE 1 1 1

ETHYLENE OXIDE 1 1 1

FORMIC ACID 1

HEXAMETHYLENE DIISOCYANATE 1

HYDRAZINE 1

HYDROGEN CHLORIDE 1

continued on page 23...




ISOAMYL ALCOHOL 1 1

ISOBUTYLENE 1 1 1

ISOPROPANOL 1 1 1

1,1-DICHLOROETHANE 1

1,3-BUTADIENE 1 1 1

1-OCTENE 1 1 1

2-ETHYL HEXANOL 1

2-ETHYLHEXYL ACRYLATE 1 1

ACETALDEHYDE 1 1 1

ACETIC ACID, GLACIAL 1 1

ACETIC ANHYDRIDE 1 1

ACETONE 1 1 1

ACETONITRILE 1 1 1

ACRYLONITRILE 1 1 1

AMMONIA 1 1

ANILINE 1

BENZENE 1 1 1

BENZYL CHLORIDE 1

BROMINE 1

BUTANE 1 1 1

BUTYL ACETATE 1 1

CARBON BISULFIDE 1 1 1

CHLORINE 1

CHLOROBENZENE 1 1

CHLOROSULFONIC ACID 1

CYCLOHEXANE 1 1 1

DICHLOROMETHANE 1 1 1

DIISOPROPYLAMINE 1 1 1

DIMETHYL SULFATE 1 1

DIMETHYL SULFIDE 1 1 1

DIMETHYLAMINOPROPYLAMINE 1 1

ETHANOL 1 1

ETHANOLAMINE 1 1

ETHYL ACETATE 1 1 1

ETHYL MERCAPTAN 1

ETHYLENE DICHLORIDE 1 1 1

ETHYLENE OXIDE 1 1 1

FORMIC ACID 1

...continued from page 22





HEXAMETHYLENE DIISOCYANATE 1

HYDRAZINE 1

HYDROGEN CHLORIDE 1

ISOAMYL ALCOHOL 1 1

ISOBUTYLENE 1 1 1

ISOPROPANOL 1 1 1

METHANOL 1 1

METHYL BENZOATE 1

METHYL CHLORIDE 1 1

METHYL ISOBUTYL KETONE 1 1 1

METHYL METHACRYLATE MONOMER 1 1 1

METHYL TERT-BUTYL ETHER 1 1 1

MONOPROPYLAMINE 1 1 1

MORPHOLINE 1 1

N,N-DIMETHYLANILINE 1 1

N,N-DIMETHYLFORMAMIDE 1 1

N-BUTYL ALCOHOL 1 1

N-HEPTANE 1 1 1

N-HEXANE 1 1 1

OLEUM 1

O-NITROTOLUENE 1

O-XYLENE 1 1

PHOSPHORUS OXYCHLORIDE 1

PROPANE 1 1 1

PROPYL MERCAPTAN 1 1 1

PROPYLENE 1 1 1

PROPYLENE OXIDE 1

STYRENE MONOMER 1 1

SULFUR TRIOXIDE 1

TERT-BUTYLAMINE 1 1 1

THIONYL CHLORIDE 1

TOLUENE 1 1 1

TOLUENE-2,4-DIISOCYANATE 1 1

TOLUIDINE 1 1

TRICHLOROETHYLENE 1

VINYL CHLORIDE 1 1 1



PREVENTION AND MITIGATION3

3.1 INTRODUCTIONThis chapter deals with the prevention and mitigation of the risk posed by hazardous chemical manufacturing, storage, handling, and transportation at the state level. The approach to prevention and mitigation is focused on regulatory and planning strategies. Prevention and mitigation activities are carried out in peace-time or prior to any incident and in a continuous manner.

The history of prevention for industrial accidents is longandgoesbackto1881whenthefirstFactoriesAct was enacted. Legislation has undergone many amendmentsovertimetoreflectthedevelopmentand growth of new technologies, processes, and hazards. However, prior to the Bhopal disaster the focus of chemical safety was on worker’s safety. Since then, there has been a greater focus on the prevention of major chemical accidents to protect communities and the environment by improving safety processes. The MOEF is the nodal ministry for chemical disaster management that enacted the MSIHC Rules, 1989 and the CEAPPR Rules, 1996 which are in line with the international best practices that have been adopted through a consultative process under the UNEP’s APELL project.

Therefore, the current body of legislation on chemical industrial disasters is at par with industrially advanced countries. However, their improvement and implementation has not kept pace with the changes in the chemical industry. There is a need to update the statutes and strengthen the enforcement based on the current hazard scenario in the state.

Several recommendations for prevention and mitigation are most suitable at the state level because they need financial, policy and statutorysupport for implementation. These may need assistance with implementation at the district level but such activities will depend on the state level

action plan to implement these recommendations. Therefore, this Bharuch district DMP focuses only on afewdistrictspecificmeasures.

Some of the key recommendations for prevention and mitigation made in the State CDMP, which will largely be implemented at the local/district level are highlighted below –

• Worst case scenario shall be used as the basis for vulnerability assessment, selection of process technology, and designing of safety systems measures and procedures including emergency responses capabilities by MAH installations

• Onsite plan and safety audit requirement be extended from only MAH to MAH, Type A and Type B industries where for smaller and less hazardous industries the state government may consider easier compliance requirements.

• It is recommended that a land use policy for “no-population buffer zone” be set up for future installations. The land use policy for buffer zone around MAH installations should be based on vulnerability assessment. The consultants recommend that the DCG or DDMA or some other local authority/agency be given a role in approval of new developments in the area on basis of vulnerability assessment.

• Use of third party professionals to strengthen enforcement

Next, we present the hierarchy of concepts in reducing the risks of chemical disasters which is an important guide to prioritize the activities required to operationalize this plan.

3.2 HIERARCHY OF CONCEPTS FOR REDUCING RISKSBelow is a hierarchy of concepts that when implementedcorrectlywillsignificantlyreducethe


risk of a chemical accident by seeking to prioritize those efforts that eliminate risk directly at the source. Used collectively these concepts address risk both from the probability and consequence of incidents. All concepts can be implemented simultaneously or independently but effective risk management would require that the concepts higher in the list be pursued at every opportunity. The following hierarchy can thus provide a guide for the prioritization of activities.

1. Eliminate use of toxics and replace them with a less or non-toxic alternative at each source.

2. Reduce use of toxics through minimizing use and/or storage volumes.

3. Implement risk management programs designed to minimize opportunities for releases to occur, and mitigate any release that does occur at the source with fail (passive) safe systems, and install secondary active mitigation systems (like water curtains),flairs,ventstacks,etc.

4. Implement land-use restrictions to provide minimum safe distances from sources to public and sensitive receptors. This is especially critical for a zone where even a rapidandqualifiedresponsemaynotbeableto save lives (Detailed in the State CDMP).

5. Plan for both or a combination of sheltering in place and evacuation programs where they are complimentary. A “key-hole” sheltering concept is ideal and is such that the population within a plume shelter and adjacent populations are evacuated. Both concepts require public warning systems that initiate the community action immediately and are either automatic or initiated by the releasing facility through a formal system (Detailed in chapters on Preparedness and Response).

6. Maintainarapid,timelyandqualified(well-trained and equipped) emergency response capacity to control and reduce the quantity of hazardous chemicals leaked and to reduce the duration of such a leak. This requires an

extremely effective trigger mechanism for an immediate response (Detailed in chapter on Response).

7. Establish plans, develop public warning systems, and conduct public outreach and training on evacuation and shelter in place. The public needs to be trained on what actions are expected of them based on the warning systems. Without training the public, neither sheltering-in-place nor evacuations will be effective (Detailed in chapters on Preparedness and Response).

3.3 CONSIDERATIONS IN DISTRICT EMERGENCY PLANNING

1. Dovetailing of Structures under MSIHC Rules, 1898 and the DM Act, 2005.a. The collector is a head of the DCG as

per CAEPPR rules as well as the DM Act, 2005 which will achieve synchronization between these two mechanisms. The member secretary of the DCG (Deputy Director, DISH) as well as the DPO can support the collector in discharging his duties. While the DISH is the technical expert in industrial safety, the DPO can support in community outreach, education, planning and coordination, and documentation efforts.

b. The DC will assign roles and responsibilities to the DPO, DISH, and other departments to implement the recommendations in this District DMP.

c. The DC will regularly overview the activities of DCG through regular meetings of DCG.

d. The DC will authorize technical and qualifiedpersonnel(frompublicagenciesor industry) as incident commander (IC) under the incident response system (IRS) and order all response agencies to follow the instructions and order of the IC. IC will be accountable to the DC.



2. Regular Meeting of the DCGa. This recommendation is provided as a

part of the preparedness section, but repeated here to underline the need of regular meetings of the DCG as an effective planning tool where most (if not all) public and private members participate.

b. As per the CAEPPR Rules, the DCG shall meet every forty five days and send areport to the State Crisis Group.

3. Onsite Emergency Plans for Hazardous Waste Management Facilitiesa. With help of the regionalGPCBofficer,

the DCG will seek onsite emergency plan from the hazardous waste TSDF facilities. This plan will identify the vulnerability of offsite population, and provide information on required protective actions and responses in case of emergencies.

b. The vulnerability assessment of Bharuch district will include relevant information from the above plan.

4. Onsite Emergency Plans for Dahej Port a. The DCG will obtain from Dahej Port

authority onsite emergency plan. This plan will deal with impacts of a chemical disaster on land and at sea on both human populations and ecology.

b. The vulnerability assessment of Bharuch district will include relevant information from above plan.

5. Onsite Plans for Type A and Type B Industriesa. While for planning purposes, data forms

and vulnerability analyses using only MAH unitsaresufficient,emergencyresponseplans need accurate and complete information. Onsite plans required under the MSIHC Rules are a mechanism to request such information from the MAH

industry. However, because MSIHC Rules arenotifiedundertheGujaratFactoriesRules, the DISH can request any unit that handles hazardous chemicals to submit an onsite plan.

b. The DCG may request through DISH onsite plans from MAH and Type A and Type B industries in Bharuch as per the provisions of the Gujarat Factories Rules.

6. Annex District Offsite Emergency Plansa. The offsite emergency plans are used

as ready reckoner in case of chemical emergencies. Offsite plans for districts as well as industrial pockets should be prepared by the DCG and LCG (wherever they are available). These plans should be regularly updated.

b. The offsite plans should be annexed to the CDMP.

7. Emergency Response Plans for Transport of HAZCHEM a. The DCG will prepare an emergency

response plan for transportation chemical emergencies in Bharuch. This plan will be based on the assessment of HAZCHEM transportation through Bharuch via road and rail. The plan will also develop a coordinated response strategy with the Department of Transportation, Ministry ofRailways,andTrafficPolicetorespondto transportation emergencies

b. This plan will be annexed to the district DMP.

8. Enforcement of MSIHC Rules for Isolated Storagesa. Isolated storages of hazardous chemicals

are required to prepare onsite plans as per MSIHC Rules and the responsibility to enforce the same is with the GPCB. However, this enforcement is neglected.



b. A state level recommendation has been made that isolated storages be made a responsibility of the DISH instead of the GPCB. In the interim, the DCG can proactively seek onsite plans from the isolated storages with assistance of the GPCB.

3.4 DISASTER RISK REDUCTION THROUGH LAND USE PLANNINGAs per the NDMA recommendations it is necessary to have in place a mandatory mechanism by which the concerned authorities are able to regulate the development of population settlements in the proximity of the installations. A “no-population buffer zone” of 500 meters around the perimeter of the MAH installations is to be set up for future installations.

The consultants wish to further note that the buffer zone should be based on a vulnerability assessment. The time to provide effective response to chemical emergencies is a key determination for buffer zone dimensions.Forexample,evenwithrapidandqualifiedresponse, population within a certain zone cannot be protected.Onotherhand,withoutaqualifiedresponse,a buffer zone of 500 meters may not be adequate. Therefore, the land use planning and permissions for new infrastructure development should consider existing hazards and vulnerability to them.

We would recommend that the DCG or DDMA or some other local authority/agency be given a role in approval of new developments in the area on basis of vulnerability assessment. Additionally the environment department and GPCB may consider chemical vulnerability assessment as a part of chapter on disaster management in the environmental impact assessment report as a key decision factor to permit new industry.

3.5 SIGNIFICANT RELIANCE ON E-GOVERNANCEThe DCG can offer the following e-governance and information services in Bharuch district. A

state level recommendation has been made to develop such e-governance system, but any such system will ultimately be supported with data and information from local levels. We recognize that the district may not have resources to host such an e-governance platform with their own resources, but the following information is recommended to be available at district level:

1. Hazard and vulnerability profile of areas:Based on the state level vulnerability atlas prepared by the GSDMA, a more microscopic area vulnerability atlas can be prepared at Taluka, ward or other small area levels, and be made available to review on a website to the general public. This will aid compliance with the CAEPPR Rules, 1996 that require the local community be informed of any hazards they face. This information should be updated regularly (at least annually).

2. Information on compliance by industry: The DCG website can publish the status of onsite emergency reports, safety audits and safety reports filed by MAH units under the MSIHCRules.

3. Statistics on industrial accidents, offsite emergencies, and chemical emergencies in non-industrial settings can also be maintained on the website

4. GIS- based software should be used for storing disaster management related information, planning, and support during response. We have recommended the CAMEO suite to be adopted for hazard identification, accidentinformation, facility information, disaster scenarios, vulnerability assessment and GIS-based display of threat zones for a given scenario. The DCG must collect the required data for CAMEO and feed it in the database for timely use during emergency. The DCG can conduct trainings on the use of the CAMEO software suite and promote the use of the same by the industry in preparing onsite plans to aid standardization of software used



for offsite consequence analyses.

5. Lack of information and uncertainty of chemicals being transported are major concerns in road transportation emergencies. A web-based system can be developed to log-in information of the vehicle, driver, and chemical being transported by the consignor. The consignee can report receipt of such chemical cargo in the system as well. The system can also print a fresh TREMCARD to be carried in the tanker with all the relevant information including the date of transport. Such a system can effectively deal with the problems of dated/old TREMCARDS, multiple TREMCARDS, and uncertain information about the chemical being transported. Development of such a system is best done at the state level, but the DCG must provide necessary data support.

6. Accident investigation and reporting systems are of immense help in learning and planning for disasters. As per MSIHC rules, offsite emergencies should be reported within 48 hours and a detailed follow-up report should be submitted within 90 days. Such reports should be investigated by the DISH, PESO or GPCB as the case may be and lessons for future reference should be developed. This entire documentation should be available on a web-based system. The MOEF has developed a Chemical Accident Investigation Reporting System (CAIRS) which is available at http://cairs.nic.in/. It is a web-based system where concerned authorities (as mentioned in schedule 5 of the MSHIC Rule, 1989) can register chemical accident information in pre-set formats. Bharuch DCG members may proactively and consistently use CAIRS to reportandfileaccidentinvestigationreports.The CAMEO suite also has a provision to record accident information which is a useful tool that can allow authorities to learn lessons and respond more effectively to future events.

3.6 PROMOTION OF PREVENTION PROGRAMS IN INDUSTRYBharuch has a successful model of public private partnership for industrial chemical disaster management at DPMC – Ankleshwar. The DPMC is not only a response agency but also conducts training, awareness, and outreach programs during peace-time with help from local industrial associations. Considering that Bharuch district has a history of demonstrated capability, we recommend the formation of a program for the prevention and mitigation of chemical emergencies. At the Bharuch workshop of DCG members, it was recommended that a core committee of interested members along with industry representatives be formed to look at the training and knowledge needs of the industry. Some example of possible prevention tools that may be considered in Bharuch District for capacity building of local industry are listed below:

• Conductsafetyreviewsbeforestartup;

• Establish employee participation andprovide access to safety process analyses and management programs;

• Preparewrittensafetyproceduresandworkaids for employees and contractors;

• Conduct safety training for workers andcontractors;

• Conductdailysafetybriefingsforemployeesand contractors;

• Identifybestpracticesanddevelopaplanto implement changes;

• Ensure on going integrity of equipmentand implement maintenance management systems;

• Conductcomplianceaudits;

• Conduct incident investigationsto identifyand address root causes of releases;

• Identify expected equipment life cycle,schedule and budget to replace or upgrade equipment;

• MSDSsheetsand‘Do’sandDon’ts’



• Help in terms of technical and otherresources for emergency response planning and training with local responders, district disaster management authorities, the LCG or DCG, and the public.

Unfortunately, even the recommendations from major accident investigation are implemented half-heartedly. A recent probed by standing parliamentary committee on implementation of MB Lal committee that was constituted in aftermath of IOCLfireinJaipurfoundthatonly56%ofthesafetyrelated recommendations were implemented by oil marketing industries such as IOCL, HPCL and BPCL and even the ministry of petroleum and natural gas was chastised for not enforcing required safety related upgrades in the industry. Therefore, we recommend that the DCG should periodically assess the status of the implementation of recommendations from accident investigations from industry. Members of the DCH such as the DISH have power to get the required changes done from the industry.

3.7 CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN DCG MEMBERSThe DCG is a committee of different members and the following activities can be done in a participatory way under the direction of the DC and with help of DISH and DPO.

• IntheBharuchdistrictworkshop,thelackofregular discussions among DCG members was identifiedasacriticalgapinimplementationandthefirststepindevelopingacoordinatedresponse capacity. Therefore, the DCG members have decided to hold at least one quarterly meeting for the planning and review of implementation processes. Although, we recommend that the frequency be increased to once in 6 weeks to be in compliance with CAPPR Rules that require a meeting every 45 days. The DPO may take a lead role on convening such meetings which should ideally be chaired by the DC. The DCG members may develop their own

criteriaforminimumquorum,identificationof core group members, and procedures to ensure that such meetings indeed happen as discussed. The DPO can request support for such meetings from GSDMA

• Bharuch CDMP (this document) should bereviewed and updated at least once annually in a participatory manner. The annual mock-drill will be the one essential event when updating of CDMP will be essential. The regular DCG meetings can be used to discuss changes in the plan (if any). Also, a core group of members from DCG may be formed to revise and upkeep district CDMP instead of putting the entire responsibility on the Member Secretary of the DCG (DISH) alone.

• DCG can request financial and technicalsupport from the GSDMA to conduct table-top exercises, functional drills and full-scale mock drills. These activities will be carried out continually through the year culminating in a full-scale mock drill at least once a year. The core group of DCG members will be formed to plan for and oversee the implementation of such training and drill activities throughout the year.

• AsrecommendedattheBharuchworkshopof DCG members, the DCG may seek financialandtechnicalhelpfromtheGSDMAto publish a quarterly/yearly magazine on hazardous chemical incidents, accident reportfindings,newtechnologies,andotherchemical emergency related information. Both public authorities and the industry can significantlycontributetothemagazineintermsarticles,data,andfinancialsupport.This magazine will be a valuable resource for regulatory agencies, response agencies, line departments, and the industry alike.

• The Person Action Communication (PAC)sheet is a good tool to establish clarity of roles and co-ordination among the various responders during an emergency. The PAC



sheets for sample scenarios have been provided in Appendix D and Appendix E. The details of PAC analysis are available in the MoEF offsite plan guidelines 2010. The PAC analysis of different emergency scenarios can be one of the agenda items of LCG meets and subsequently these sheets could be annexed to the plan for records. It should be clarified that PAC sheets areprepared by LCG members in discussion and not to be out sourced to an external consultant.

3.8 TRAINING AND CAPACITY BUILDINGThe DCG in association with DDMA can conduct training programs for industry personnel, regulatory agency local staff, response agencies, and general community on various aspects of prevention,

mitigation, preparedness and response aspects of chemical emergencies. Training should cover specific information about chemical hazardprotection zones, relevant onsite emergency plans, and the concept of operations for the district’s DMP.Agency-specificresponsibilitiesshouldalsobereviewed and provided training support. A detailed recommendation to establish training guidelines is made at the State level which can serve as a basis for planning at the district level.

3.9 STAKEHOLDER ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN PREVENTION AND MITIGATIONThe table below summarises the key activities required for prevention and mitigation, and the suggested responsible agencies for them.


Table 4. Stakeholder Roles in Prevention and Mitigation


PREVENTION AND MITIGATION

ACTIVITY

PRIMARY

RESPONSIBILITY

SECONDARY RESPONSIBILITY/

SUPPORT

1Ensuring safe location for chemical

installations

Land use and

development planning

authorities

Secondary approval authorities

including PESO, GPCB and DISH

2Ensuring safety of chemical storage

vessels regulated by PESOPESO DISH

3

Overall chemical safety of the unit

including process safety, PPE, staff

training, etc.

DISH

4

Ensuring no or minimal

environmental impact owing to

operations and possible accidents

at the site

GPCB DISH

5

Ensure that unsafe electrical

conditions do not trigger chemical

accidents

CEI DISH

6

Reducing/Eliminating use of

toxic materials and /or using

alternative non-toxic materials

Industry DISH



PREVENTION AND MITIGATION

ACTIVITY

PRIMARY

RESPONSIBILITY

SECONDARY RESPONSIBILITY/

SUPPORT

7

Risk management programs and

installation of passive and active

mitigation systems

Industry DISH

8

Dovetailing of Structures under

MSIHC Rules, 1898 and the DM Act,

2005.

DC DISH

9Onsite Emergency Plans for MAH

and Type A and Type B industries Industry

LCG, DCG - Member Secretary

(DISH)

10

Onsite emergency plans for

Hazardous Waste Management

Facilities (TSDF)

TSDF facility Regional GPCB

11Onsite Emergency plans for Dahej

Port Dahej Port Authority Regional GPCB, DISH

12Onsite emergency plans for

isolated storage facilities

Isolated storage facility,

Regional GPCBDISH

13 Offsite district emergency plans LCG, DCG DDMA, DC

14Emergency response plans for

transport of HAZCHEM

LCG, DCG, Member

Secretary DCG (DISH)

Department of Transport,

WesternRailways,Traffic

Police

15

Implementing proposed land use

policy on ‘no-population buffer

zone around MAH industries.

Local planning authority,

DCDCG, LCG

16 Implementation of E-Governance State Level DCG DDMA

17Promotion of preventive programs

in industry

DISH, PPP models like

DPMC,

DCG, DDMA, collaboration

between multiple regulatory

agencies

18Coordination between different

enforcement agencies DCG

19 Training and Capacity Building DDMA and DCGGIDM, SPIPA etc. training

institutes

continued from page 31...


PREPAREDNESS4

The following are the recommendations to improve thepreparednessforqualifiedandeffectiveresponseto chemical emergencies by the district authority as pertheresponseplaninchapterfive.Itiscriticalto note that the response plan assumes that the recommended level of preparedness is achieved.

4.1 DEVELOP AGENCY SPECIFIC PREPAREDNESS WORK PLANEach offsite response agency and department assigned a role in the response plan is required to develop a preparedness action plan at the state level. At the district level, the representative officersofconcerneddepartmentshoulddevelopaquarterly and annual work plan on the basis of their respective state level action plans. These work plans should be reviewed at the quarterly meetings of DCG members and progress should be reported to boththerespectiveheadofficesandGSDMA.Thestate level CDMP includes process for preparing such action plans as follows:

• Assign Specific Roles and Responsibilities

• Establish a Core Planning Group within the Organisation

• Make a Preparedness Action Plan

• Develop Emergency Response Protocols

• Prepare a Training Plan

• Flow Down Action Plans (these are the work plans at district of local levels of the organisation)

• Review of the implementation of the ac-tion plan in DCG meetings

• Implementation, Monitoring and Evalua-tion of Action Plan

4.2 IMPROVEMENT IN CHEMICAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLANNING

4.2.1 DDMA AND DCG COORDINATION IN PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS

• DCG and DDMA members should form a core group committee or cell for community outreach and education as per the state level community sensitization strategy. A dedicated resource person(s) may be needed for this activity.

• DCG and DDMA members should form a core group committee to conduct and learn from regular exercises and mock drills as discussed previously.

• DCG and DDMA members should form a core group committee to review, revise and upkeep this DMP as per state level guidelines issued by the SCG and GSDMA from time to time.

• Roles and responsibilities of the DPO and the DISH (Member Secretary, DCG) will be assigned by the DC and both will be provided training and other resources to discharge such responsibilities as required.

• Develop and implement district-level planning assistance to industries to standardize vulnerability assessment methods and assumptions, preparation of onsite plans, annual updates of the same, and help maintain an up-to-date database of industrial units and their chemical storage data in Bharuch.

4.2.2 IMPLEMENT STATE LEVEL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SYNCHRONIZATION OF ONSITE AND OFFSITE PLANSTo strengthen preparation of onsite plans and their synchronization with the district offsite plans or with district DMPs, the following three documents can be issued by DISH to the industry after they are approved in deliberations with the stakeholder:

• OnsitePlanguidelines

• Onsiteplanmodelplan

• Checklist


PREPAREDNESS4

The consultants, under contract with GSDMA, have prepared above three documents. These documents need to be reviewed and adopted by the DISH. The DISH also needs to make conscious and timely efforts to ensure the industries follow these guidelines.

4.2.3 IMPLEMENT EMERGENCY RESPONDER SAFETY GUIDELINESA recommendation has been made at the state level to develop guidelines for responder health and safety standard on lines of Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response Standard (HAZWOPER) developed by the US1. The Bharuch DCG and DDMA willimplementtheseguidelineswheneverofficiallyrequired by the GSDMA and SCG.

4.2.4 IMPLEMENT GUIDELINES FOR IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS LEAKSUnder the MSIHC Rules 1989, the occupier needs to notify the offsite agencies in case the onsite emergency has potential for or poses offsite consequences. However, for an effective response to chemical emergencies that can save lives and properties, time is a critical factor. The time to respond to and effectively control chemical leaks is measured in several minutes, not hours. Therefore, it was identified in State, District and Localworkshops that a critical gap is a trigger mechanism for immediate response.

The recommendation is to develop guidelines to help industries determine when an onsite emergency can potentially become offsite based on risk assessment criteria. Such guidelines and precautionary and not reactionary and thusmay require notificationto offsite agencies even when the emergency does not become offsite eventually. The point is that as theemergency isunfolding, it isoftendifficultto determine whether off site agencies should be notified for help and when, and such decisionsare subjective. This results in valuable loss of time to notify offsite agencies. On other hand

earlynotificationwillenable responseagencies tomobilize teams and keep resources on alert even if in some cases the emergency does not become offsite.

Based on above need for a rapid trigger mechanism, the USEPA has developed criteria to notify chemical leaks on the basis of amount (kg) of chemicals leaked in 40 CFR 302 on the basis of human or animal toxicity, mobility in the atmosphere or environment, persistency or capacity to bio-accumulate in the environment, or presence of any formofsignificantphysicalorenvironmentalhazard(See Appendix G: USEPA standards for reportable quantities). We recommend that DISH and GPCB with support from GSDMA, develop the guidelines for the industry to report chemical leaks on the basis of “quantity leaked” without waiting for the emergency to become offsite. The offsite can be “formally”notifiedatalaterstageifandwhentheemergency becomes offsite to be in compliance with MSIHC Rules.

The focus of reporting and notification hastraditionally been on events that “directly” affect human populations but not on events that affect human health through environmental or ecological damage. Therefore, we recommend that incidents should be reported even when they threaten environment and ecology on basis of USEPA rules as follows:

i. A release of any hazardous chemical or petroleum product (in any amount) to water bodies (lake, rivers, dams, canal, sea, creek, etc.) within the state of Gujarat.

ii. A release of any hazardous chemical or petroleum product, in a quantity of 95 litres or more, to the surface of the land (whether ornotthereisevaporationorfire).

As a state level recommendation, a quantitative criterion is suggested for notification of chemical

1: United States Department of Labour, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response Standard, available online at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9765


PREPAREDNESS4

leaks without waiting for the incident to have offsite potential or actually become offsite. This recommendation was identified in the table-topexercise at the Bharuch workshop to reduce the response time by public authorities to an industrial chemical emergency. If the incident does not become offsite then there are no consequences for the industry or offsite response agencies other than a trip to incident site. However, if it does, the offsite responseagenciesandtheindustrywillbothbenefitfromearlynotificationandthus,aquickerresponse.Whenever these guidelines are issued by the state, the district may seek compliance from industry as well as promote and train on these guidelines.

4.2.5 FORMAL AFTER-ACTION REPORTING SYSTEM

1. The MSIHC Rules require a report of an accident within 48 hours and a follow up report within 90 days. The MSIHC Rules have specified the accident report format. The MOEF has developed a Chemical Accident Investigation Reporting system (CAIRS). Our assessment indicates that CAIRS is not used effectively. For example, only 11 accidents are reported in Gujarat for DISH in the past 10 years. Therefore, the use of CAIRS must be promoted rigorously in Gujarat. However, CAIRS itself needs a few revisions to make it more comprehensive, effective, and user friendly.

2. Whether CAIRS is improved or the GSDMA develops a new state level system that is more comprehensive and user friendly, it is important that accident information and any lessons learned be documented on an accessible platform.

3. The CAMEO suite recommended under this plan has a provision to maintain accident data in addition to CAIRS.

4.2.6 DEVELOPMENT OF A GIS-BASED DATABASE FOR PLANNING INFORMATIONAt the state level, we have recommended the CAMEO suite software developed by the NOAA and USEPA for response planning as well as a decision support system during response in the short term. The study teamhasextensivelystudiedCAMEOsuiteandfindthat some terminologies and functionalities are not supported in Indian statutes and the system is most suitable in US context. However, most elements and functionalityofthesystemarenotcountryspecific.Therefore, CAMEO suite can be effectively used for planning and responding to chemical emergencies even in context of Gujarat (or India for that matter). This system is free and widely used in US. Once Gujarat state develops familiarity with using GIS based software as a decision support and planning system during chemical emergencies, a specialist and commercial software can be developed later.

The CAMEO suite includes: (a) CAMEOfm for chemical related hazard information such as MSDS; (b) ALOHA to model leakage dispersion and estimate threat zones for toxic, fire and explosion scenario; (c)MARPLOT – to integrate ALOHA output on GIS layers to identify vulnerable populations, installations, areasandexportsuchfilestoGoogleEarth;and(d)Databases – various relational databases for chemical industry locations and contact information, accident reporting and investigations, resources available, routes, and other useful information.

While the CAMEO suite is free, it is useful only to the extent that data is entered in the system. The data has to be entered at the LCG and DCG levels. The DC can coordinate the entry of such data with the help of the DCG and DDMA members and the industry. Such data should be shared with state level agencies (GSDMA and SCG Members) so that a comprehensive state level database can be prepared. The DC can alsoengageprofessionalsurveyfirmstocollectsuchdata or the state may provide support for such data collection activities.


PREPAREDNESS4

4.3 TRAINING, CAPACITY BUILDING, AND COMMUNITY PREPAREDNESS

4.3.1 IMPROVING THE CAPABILITY FOR AND EFFECTIVENESS OF OFFSITE MOCK DRILLSMock drills form the backbone of testing the preparedness levels and help us learn lessons to improvethesame.Ourassessmentsfindthatwhilemock drills are conducted as per the MSIHC Rules by industry members and the offsite response agencies, they are not standardized and the feedback or learning from them is not integrated with the offsite plans. Furthermore, smaller exercises and drills need to be conducted regularly leading to a full-scale mock drill so that exercises are a continuous activity and not an isolated annual mock drill. The following regime for mock drills is recommended to be followed at local, district and state levels:

1. A core committee of DCG members should be formed to plan for and review the training, exercise and drill activities. The plan for each year should be annexed to the Bharuch CDMP during annual updating.

2. Onsite mock drills by industry should involve members from the LCG and DCG and be done as per the guidelines issues by the DISH from time to time.

3. Table-top exercises should be conducted to assess response capability and availability of resources and knowledge of procedures in the case of an actual event.

4. Functionaldrillsallowpracticeofaspecificaspect of emergency response. For example, we have recommended communication inter-operability exercises. Similarly functional drills for joint industry-offsite agency response, public information, site security, management of mass casualty, and others can be conducted.

5. The full-scale mock drill may be conducted as follows

a. Conduct at least on full scale mock drill

every year to be in compliance with CAEPPR Rules

b. Invite independent observers to oversee the drill. The GSDMA may develop a panel of pre-approved observers with a fixed tenure and impart orientationtraining to this panel.

c. A special core team should be formed to plan the mock drill scenario. The team should communicate the date but no other detail to other response agencies.

d. News media and general public should be informed of mock drills so that unnecessary panic is avoided.

6. The observations from table-top exercises, functional drills and full scale drills should be documented and key lessons and action items mustbeidentifiedwithsuggestedchangesinCDMP and offsite plans. Following this, the plans should be accordingly revised post discussion between SCG/DCG/LCG members.

4.3.2 SPECIALIZED TRAINING ON AN INTEGRATED AND COORDINATED EMERGENCY RESPONSEThere is a strong need for developing such a specialized training course for emergency planners and responders (both onsite and offsite) regulatory agencies, LCG/DCG members, other professionals inthefieldandindustrialpersonnel.Toassessthetraining needs of the target groups, feedback through group-discussions should be obtained from LCG/DCG members, regulatory bodies, safety professionals from the industry, public response agencies, etc. An electronic database to track responder, SCG/DCG members, and other training credentials should be developed. Private industries should be encouraged to initiate a similar training program for personnel exposed to hazardous substances, health hazards, or safety hazards.

Implementing such a training program will need technical, logistical and funding support from


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the state level. At the state level, we have recommended that the GSDMA may develop training criteria and material on this basis of the OSHA Standard (HAZWOPER2) that includes the following levels of trainings:

1. General site workers initially require 40 hours of instruction, three days of supervised hands-on training, and eight hours of refresher training annually.

2. Workerslimitedtoaspecifictaskorworkerson fully characterized sites with no hazards above acceptable levels require 24 hours of initial training, one day of supervised hands-on training, and eight hours of refresher training annually.

3. Managers and supervisors require the same level of training as the people they supervise, plus eight additional hours of training.

4. Workers who are working at a treatment, storage, or disposal facility that handles hazardous wastes require 24 hours of initial training and eight hours of refresher training annually.

5. First responder awareness level training to demonstrate competency in their assigned duties for 16 hours.

6. First responder operations level training is awareness training plus eight additional hours of training.

7. Hazardous materials technicians require 24 hours training plus additional training to achieve competency in several areas.

8. Hazardous materials specialists require 24 hours training at the technician level, plus additional training to achieve competency in several areas.

9. On scene incident commanders require 24 hours training plus additional training to achieve competency in several areas.

PleaseseeSection4.5foridentifiedtrainingneedsof key response agencies for qualified chemicalemergency response.

4.3.3 DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A CHEMICAL EMERGENCY COMMUNITY AWARENESS AND PREPAREDNESS STRATEGYFrom the analysis of the relevant statutory requirements under key CIDM legislations, it is clear that the responsibility for Chemical Emergency Community Awareness and Preparedness (CECAP) rests with the local public emergency authorities with the active support of state and central governments along with the proactive participation of the industry. Accordingly a state level CECAP strategy is developed.

As per the strategy, community outreach programs should:

• Encourage residents to have a specific chemical disaster plan for themselves, their families, and their businesses.

• Create awareness about the risk involved and safety actions required to be taken—sheltering-in-place or evacuating.

• Develop a sense of participation/involve-ment/partnership of community in deci-sion-making.

• Develop public willingness and readiness to co-operate and take self-protective ac-tions as advised by the DDMA/DCG during real time chemical emergencies.

While it is recommended that the technical, logistic and financial support be provided from the statelevel, district level resources should be developed to implementthestrategy. Specifically, theDCG/DDMA will be required to:

1. Form a committee of members from the DCG, DDMA and industry to develop an action plan as per the state level CECAP and review the plan implementation periodically. The DDMA

2 http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9765


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should have a pre-planned and approved budget, target, and schedule for CECAP activities.

2. Identificationofvulnerablecommunities:Werecommended that the onsite plan identify the vulnerable communities and not only estimate the distance of vulnerable zone so that DCG or LCG can identify vulnerable communities on basis of onsite plans developed by the industry. DCG or LCG can also use MARPLOT or other GIS based platforms to identify such communities and therisks(fire,explosion,toxic)theyface.

3. Workshop based training of Master Trainers: The communities in vulnerable zone need special training to prepare them for the protective action. These communities need information on hazards, chemicals, the risks, expected response, communication protocols, contacts for additional information, compensations, and available resources to help them in emergency. We recommend that each block identify master trainers from the community who can be local leaders, school teachers or others and train them on above topics for their respective communities. These members can train their own neighbourhood or community with active support from the block level trainers. Block level trainers can be trained at district and state level. Such block trainers can be a mix of DISH officials, industry representatives,DPO, and others. The GSDMA may provide support in terms of developing training guides and providing funding for technical support. The local industry can contribute funds to hold the workshops at local levels and make necessary logistics arrangements.

4. General and wider outreach: While communities in vulnerable zones require specific information and training, generalpopulation also needs information on chemical emergencies and their role in them.

These are the typical information, education and communication (IEC) strategies being used in the state. Such mass-communication approach will also serve to reinforce some of the training points for vulnerable communities as well. Developing such general and wider approach consists of three elements.

a. Identify Communication Methods: Select one or more of the channels such as print material (brochures, calendars, news-paper), e-media (web, SMS, emails), radio, TV, and special events.

a. Develop and Produce Education Materials: The materials should include general information on chemical hazards and protective actions general population can take. The materials and should be clear, accurate, consistent, and conveyed in an authoritative manner.

More detailed information is available for reference in a separate CECAP strategy report.

4.4 ENHANCE CHEMICAL DISASTER RESPONSE CAPACITY

4.4.1 HAZMAT RESPONSE CAPACITY ASSESSMENT Under this project, the consultants conducted a thorough capability gap analysis of CIDM at State and district levels. The thrust of the gap analysis was on self-reported assessment of capability on several factors against their international benchmark levels. At the district level, the assessment questionnaire was targeted to 12 types of organizations (Police, GPCB, Fire, Collectorate, etc) and across thirteen capability areas that included the planning, communication, HAZMAT response, the management of dead, and other critical areas. A capacity was considered perfect when the level of 10 out of 10 was reached. The analysis recognized that these self-reports would be biased towards reporting a more positive capability so that the consult teams validatedseveraloftheclaimsthroughfieldvisits


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onasamplebasis.Althoughwefindfewinstancesorhighlevelsofself-ranking,thefieldvisitsclarifiedthat such high ranking itself was based on improper understanding of the roles, responsibilities, and what international capability benchmark really meant. Majority of the respondents honestly selfrankedtheircapabilityandwefindthattheyfall short of the international benchmark. The details of the analysis are available in a separate on Capability Assessment and Gap Analysis. Below

we summarize key findings from our assessmentin Table 5. Overall Bharuch districts self-assessed score is 6.4 out of 10 (moderate capability).

In addition, the team of PRESTELS and IEM consultantsvisitedmunicipalfirestationsandDPMCAnkleshwar, MAH units, and Type A units in the district andassessedtheircapability toprovide“qualifiedHAZMAT response” in a chemical emergency. We summarize our assessment in Figure 11.

CAPABILITY INDICATOR SCORE

Planning 6.9

Control room management 5.9

Communications 6.6

Situational awareness and hazmat response 5.7

Responder safety and health 6.1

Security and protective actions 6.7

Environmental health 5.9

Public health and safety 6.9

Public outreach and education 7.8

Emergency public information 7.3

Emergency medical services 7.3

Management of dead 4.4

Mass care 7

TOTAL 6.5

Table 5. Bharuch Capability Assessment Results

TYPE OF FIRE SERVICEEMERGENCY LEVEL

MINOR - 1 MODERATE - 2 MAJOR - 3 CATASTROPHIC - 4

EXISTING

MAH Units

DPMC Ankleshwar

Municipal Fire BrigadesPROPOSED

Local Emergency response Teams

Regional Response Teams

State Emergency Response Team

LEGEND FOR ASSESSMENT

Complete Capacity to Response

Capacity is Limitedwithseriousdeficienciesthatcanbeaddressedtomajorityextent through rigorous trainings and standardization

None. Investments in equipments, manpower, training, standardization required

Proposed level of capacity for a given team

Figure 11. Assessment of HAZMAT Response Capacity


Therefore, while statutory obligation to respond to chemical emergency rests with the industry, it is also a shared responsibility of the public authorities.

4.4.2 MULTI SCENARIO CHEMICAL RESPONSE CAPABILITYOur discussions with various response agencies and planningunits identified that there isaperceptionthat a chemical emergency can either be fore/explosion or toxic scenario and a different structure or approach is needed as per the scenario unfolding. It is, therefore, essential to recognize that chemical emergency is only that and cannot be / should not be separated out as fire or toxic. A chemical fireis “rarely” only that. The fire by products areoften toxic and of unclear nature. Even a simple burning car may give toxic fumes in case the rubber parts include bromine compounds. Therefore, the response team must approach a chemical fire aspotential toxic event as well. On other hand, several chemicalshavetoxicandflammablehazardrisks.Itis more likely to have one or the other scenario, but the response team has to plan protective actions and response plan assuming that “anything can happen”. The response team also needs to know that firecontrol measures may themselves give rise to toxic by-products. They may have to decide to even aid burning of certain chemicals in the best interest of the environment and exposed population because sometimes fire is actually a beneficial outcome asopposed to the alternative of a toxic leak.

Overall, we clarify that there will be one unifiedteam structure under IRS to respond to chemical emergencies. The IRS is flexible enough toaccommodate different people, skills and resources as per the unfolding scenario. The LERT described next are “multi-hazard” chemical response teams (and not only for toxic).

4.4.3 UNIFIED STATE LEVEL FIRE SERVICESWhile fire departments in larger municipalcorporations such as Ahmedabad and Surat are

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While the LCG-DCG-SCG mechanism is constituted to plan for and coordinate responses to industrial chemical emergencies, the public agencies such as police,fire,andmedicaldepartmentsareresponsiblefor actual responses at the scene. Traditionally, the role of offsite agencies has been supportive where as the industry is made responsible to provide a qualifiedandtechnicalchemicalemergencyresponse.However, this approach ignores that not all industries would have high level of capability to respond to chemical emergencies or that a chemical emergency can exceed the available capability of the industry or that chemical accidents can happen elsewhere than chemical industry alone. In such situations, the responsibility for public protection on the government becomes critical and thus it is essential that a capability for qualified chemical emergencyresponse is developed in the offsite agencies.

Past and recent experience has shown that the government cannot rely solely on private industry and must play a strong role for an effective response. After the Bhopal disaster, internationally the approach was to put responsibility for chemical response on the industry and government played supportive role. However, the experience over time identified thatgovernment or public agencies should preferably lead chemical emergency responses because:

1. The government has the overall responsibility to protect the public health, safety, and the environment compared to the industry which mayhaveconflictofinterestregardingthesetasks;

2. The government response agencies at all levels have the institutional ethics of service to community;

3. The government officials typically have theauthority and the leadership capacity to take decisions/actions in emergency situations; and

4. Chemical emergencies may happen in non-industrial settings where the industry may not have any obligation to provide response.


well-equipped, staffed and trained, other firedepartments were identified to be lacking insufficiently trained man power and equipment asdiscussed in the gap analysis report and response mechanism report. We also find a lack ofstandardization in procedures related to staffing,training, equipment, and response procedures between different fire departments. Also, firebrigades may face jurisdictional limitations when responding to emergencies outside of their jurisdiction. These problems are systemic and serious andstemfromthelackofaunifiedstatelevelfireservice. Therefore, we recommend the creation of aunifiedcommandordepartmentforfireservicesinthestate.Thestatefiredepartmentmayactasaregulatory and resource agency to provide technical guidance, develop training academies and special courses for fire departments, procure equipment,develop standard procedures for operations, and enforcefiresafetyrulesforindustry,commercialandresidential structures. A recent report by Ministry of Home Affairs for State Wise Risk Assessment, Infrastructure and Institutional Assessment for Fire Hazard and Risk Analysis has also recommended that municipalfireandemergencyservicesshouldcomeunder the State Fire and Emergency Services3.

Ideally, each fire station must have capability torespond to chemical emergencies not limited only to fire but also extending to chemical leaks andspills. Also, the capacity to respond to chemical emergency also depends on the basic level of emergency response infrastructure specially for fire services. We have assumed thatGujaratwillhave fire stations as per the SFAC guidelines andspecificationsbasedoninternationalbestpractices.Section 4.5 includes key recommendations for basicoroverallfireservicescapacityonwhichthechemical response capability will be built.

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4.4.4 INCIDENT RESPONSE SYSTEMIn Section 4.7, we describe the emergency response organization structure on basis of incident response system (IRS) recommended by the NDMA, as well as by interpreting the US National Incident Management System (MIMS) within the Indian context. The IRS system allows for a qualified incident commanderto direct the technical aspects of response under direction and authority from the district collector (at district level) or the SDM (at taluka level). The SDM, district collector and chief secretary are given aroleof“responsibleofficer”in IRS. IRSinvolvesthe creation

4.4.5 QUALIFIED RESPONSE BY LOCAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAMSEven after well-equipped, trained, located and adequatenumbersoffire stationsareavailable inBharuch, a specialist team to respond to chemical emergencies will be required. Such a specialist local emergency response team (LERT) should be formedatall localfiredepartments. However,atleast one LERT should be present at LCG and DCG levels. In case a common LERT instead of one per firestationisplanned,thenLERTpersonnelcanbedrawnfrommultiplelocalfiredepartmentsprovidedthey can assemble quickly in time of response. LERT can include local industry personnel, especially in the short term when capability of public agencies to organize such a team is limited. However, it is essential that such private resources are “committed” and involved in planning, practice, and training. The LERT should be well-trained and well-equipped to deal with small scale and frequent local emergencies (90% of chemical incidents).

In Bharuch, the four industrial clusters with LCG will form the LERTs on a priority basis. Other Taluka level fire stations (if available) will eventuallydevelop LERTs at the Taluka level as per the hazard

3 MHA (2012). Fire Hazard and Risk Analysis in the Country for Revamping the Fire Services in the Country. Final Report – State Wise Risk Assessment, Infrastructure and Institutional Assessment of Phase II States. Prepared by RMSI for the Directorate General NDRF and Civil Defence (Fire), Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), New Delhi. November 2012.


present in the Taluka and as per the district plan. The four industrial cluster level LERTs will have more specialist capabilities (training, manpower, equipment and resources) and should support each other and other Taluka level LERTs whenever an incident surpasses local area capacity and has to be responded at the district level. The LERTs should be trainedsufficientlyto:

• Recognize events that may surpass local/dis-trict capacity to respond.

• Rapidlycollectinformationneededtodefinethe situation and organize the appropriate response resources.

• Support local incident command functions as the incident escalates

Section 4.5 includes the composition of LERT, equipments they must have and their training needs.

4.4.6 SUPPORT FROM REGIONAL RESPONSE TEAMThe state CDMP has recommendations to constitute regional response teams (RRT) at the planned emergency response centres (ERC) and four mini ERCs modelled on the DPMC Ankleshwar. These RRTs will be more capable and better equipped and trained than the LERT and will respond to the higher-toxicity, higher-volume chemical release incidents, releases of unknown chemicals, and complex or long duration events that require more resources than local teams are able to support.

RRT will not replace but will augment the LERT. There is no ERC planned as yet in Bharuch but the closest ones to Bharuch will be at Surat and Vadodara. Bharuch district should build adequate local capacity because the closest RRT may take upwards of two hourstoreachBharuchdistrictintraffic.

4.4.7 SUPPORT FROM THE STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM (SERT)A specialist State Emergency Response Team (SERT) for chemical disasters is recommended at the state level and primarily responsible for responding to high-risk,

high-volume, and thus, rare incidents that surpass the capacity of local or regional response teams.

4.5 PLAN FOR TRAINING, EQUIPMENT AND RESOURCES FOR HAZMAT RESPONSEAppendix F lists the response resource available in Bharuch now. These includefirefighting, PPE,and medical assets available in the industry. In public agencies mainly fire station resources andpublic private hospitals are identified. It is clearthat whatever chemical response capability is in Bharuch is with the industry (with exception of DPMC Ankleshwar). However, this CDMP requires that the district capability be in line with international standards which basically means that publicauthoritiesmusthavequalifiedandeffectiveresponse assets under their control and this cannot be achieved by relying entirely on the industry. Industry will continue to remain an important partner but over time the CDMP envisions a more proactive and leadership role for the district authorities. Appendix F is adapted from the Offsite Emergency Plan for Bharuch, 2011. The information is a ready reckoner in case of emergency “now”, but we have already recommended that the existing offsite plan be continued to be in use until the preparedness levels envisioned in this CDMP for effective chemical emergency response are achieved.

4.5.1 BACKGROUND AND BASIS FOR TRAINING AND RESOURCE PLANNINGThis plan is based on three basic rules:

1. All responders to a chemical emergency return home safely.

2. Incident commanders will know what the outcome of an action will be before it is taken (minimize guessing games).

3. All responders will take actions necessary to protect human health, the environment, and stability of the community.

Aside from the high value of human life, responders at all levels are important public investments and assets. They are the resource that form the basis

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of the community’s response and resilience to all chemical and industrial disasters. Their training and dedication make them an extremely valuable asset. Knowledge allows responders to demonstrate respect for the hazards they face and operate safely. Knowledge allows responders to identify hazards and make decisions where the outcome is predicted with a high degree of certainty. The antithesis of knowledgeable decision-making is that taking actions without sufficient knowledgewill have negative consequences and likely cause further harm. Knowledge comes from four sources:

1. Sufficient training.

2. Integrated planning and drills with industry partners.

3. Continuous situational awareness and assessment during an incident.

4. Adequate monitoring equipment and sampling supplies.

This resource plan is written from the perspective of a Hazardous Chemical Emergency Response Team leader and is intended to provide a general level of guidance in identifying the resources needed to support local, regional, and state level response teams and, more importantly, the reasons for acquiring a particular piece of equipment or resource.

The basic premise of this plan is the establishment of a three-tier response system within the State of Gujarat for chemical disasters based on the 90/5/5 principle. The 90/5/5 principle is based on historic observations that 90% of chemical disasters pose relatively low risk to the public. Usually these incidents are comprised of low volume, low hazard chemicals such as fuel, paint, or pesticides/herbicides. A LERT is a basic level entry team that should be able to handle 90% of such events in their jurisdiction. These events, if left unresolved or poorly handled, could escalate into more serious incidents so it is imperative that a prompt response be afforded at the outset. Other local responders

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such as Emergency Medical Services (EMS) personnel and police officers may also be called upon torespond to an incident. While they cannot be expectedtoprovideaspecialistqualifiedchemicalemergencyresponse,theyfillsupportrolesthatareessential to the overall response operation.

The next 5% of disasters involve more significantevents with larger volumes, and/or more complex chemicals or mixtures. These are events that may be resolved with fairly easily implemented response mitigation options (e.g., suit up and shut off a valve). These events would require the support of an RRT. These incidents could evolve into higher level situations if not promptly and properly handled.

The final 5% of events are both operationally andtechnically complex, characterized by large volumes of chemicals, highly toxic substances in uncontrolled circumstances and may involve catastrophic consequences if left unresolved. These incidents include dumping or abandonment of unknown, large volume releases into populated areas or sensitive environments, toxic events with fatalities, or radiation events. Once any significant populationis involved with exposures or contamination, or a significantwaterbodyorenvironmental receptor isinvolved, it is likely that a state or even a national resource will be required. The SERT is comprised of state-level resources that have the ability to work in complex, extremely dangerous situations by using a combination of extensive monitoring/sampling equipment and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).

In general, the higher level teams bring the increased capacity to enter confined spaces, dealwith increasingly higher concentrations of toxic chemicals, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) agents, more complex events, and unknown chemicals in unknown concentrations.

A detailed recommendation for appropriate personnel, training, equipment, and supplies is made to the GSDMA in the state level CDMP. However,


Vehicles EquipmentsType No.

Now

More

Reqd

Type No.

Now

More

Reqd

Type No.

Now

More

Reqd

Water tender 10 6 Hydraulic Rescue

Tools

0 1 Diving Suits (Dry Type) 0 0

Water

Bowser

4 3 Combi-Tools 0 13 Diving Suits (Wet Type) 0 0

Foam

Tenders

0 5 B.A. Sets 15 145 InflatableLighting

Towers

1 11

Advanced

Rescue

Responders

0 1 BA Compressors 0 12 Smoke Exhausters /

PPV

0 5

Sky Lifts /

TTL

0 1 First-Aid Boxes 11 35 Pneumatic lifting bags 2 -1

DCP Tenders 0 8 Thermal Imaging

Cameras

1 0 High Capacity LED

Torches

0 54

Hose Tenders 0 1 Electric Chain Saws

/ Cutters / Hammers

for Concrete

0 5 Rescue Boats 0 0

BA Vans 0 1 Electric Chain Saws /

Cutters/ Hammers for

Wood

2 10 Static Wireless Sets 2 10

Hazmat Vans 0 0 Hydraulic / Manual

Chain Saws / Cutters

for Wood

0 12 Mobile Wireless Sets 12 48

QRT 0 7 Personal Protection

Equipment

29 17 Walky Talky 8 52

Motor Cycle

Mists

0 7 Hand Held Gas

Detector Kits

0 18 Mega Phones 0 12

Fire Boats 0 0 Life Locator

Equipment

0 1

Ambulances 0 0 Portable Pumps 1 36

Education

Vans

0 1 Floating Pumps 0 0

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Table 6. Gaps in Basic Fire Service Capacity

Bharuch district must assess the specific needson the basis of planning, training, and mock drills with local industry partners and local emergency responders. Also, the district must develop an equipment procurement plan that is effectively dovetailed with an adequate level of manpower to use the procured equipment and regular training of such manpower. The state CDMP should be referred to identify manpower, team composition, equipment, and training for the following:

• Policeofficers

• Emergency medical services

• Fire Services

4.5.2 GAPS IN BASIC FIRE SERVICES IN BHARUCHA recent report by Ministry of Home Affairs has conducted survey of fire stations in Gujarat andidentified gaps in infrastructure, equipment,


vehicle, manpower, training and others4. Currently, onlyfiveoftherequired15firestationsisavailableinthe district. In addition to lack of adequate number offirestations,eventheexistingfirestationshavelimitedmanpower.CurrentlyBharuchmunicipalfireservices has only 30 people whereas they need 640 staff strength in urban area and 360 in rural area. Table 6 summarizes the gaps in number of vehicles and equipment. It will be important to build capacity offirefightingandemergencyserviceinBharuchasa precursor to having chemical emergency response capability of international standard.

In addition we have assessed the required quantity of water and/or foam in Bharuch based on the worst case vulnerability scenarios. To estimate water supply needs, we identified themaximum unit storages inthe districts for highly flammable substances thathavepotentialforpoolfires.Wethenestimatedthetotal heat of combustion by multiplying the maximum storagequantitybythecalorificvalueofthefuel.Toneutralise this heat we estimate the quantity of water required by dividing by the latent heat of vaporization ofwater. We assume the efficiency of fire fightingat 25% so that we multiply the estimated quantity of water by four to get total water required. The actual amount of water can be even as high as 15 times if thefirefightingisnotdoneinatechnicallyefficientmanner (angles, where to concentrate water jets, how many water jets at a time, is continuous supply possible, etc.). In case of chemical fires, differenttypes of foam are also immensely useful. We estimated foam requirements as per NFPA guidelines.

We estimate that Bharuch district would require as high as one million cubic meters of water and close to 20,000 cubic meters of foam. The district should identify sources that can provide the required amount of water or make plans to make such water available at short notice. Please refer to the State CDMP for additionalrecommendationsforfireservices.

4.5.3 RESOURCE PLAN FOR LOCAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAMIn chemical emergencies the LERT with help of other responseagencies–fireservices,policedepartmentor EMS – serve three functions:

1. First, they secure the site.

2. Second, they evaluate the situation and initiate public protective action measures or modify pre-planned actions.

3. Third, they establish incident command.

All of these actions take place from a safe distance. No responders enter the site until a Site Safety Plan (SSP) has been completed as a part of an incident action plan, and until the team has all the appropriate PPE and equipment to operate safely in the expected environment. This team can control 90% of typical chemical emergencies. However, the key safety concern for this team is to be able to identify when an event exceeds their capacity and they will need to request assistance from the RRT.

4.5.3.1 TRAININGMinimum training for the eight-member team:

• Incident commander – Technician and Spe-cialist courses with Incident Command Course (40 hour HAZMAT chemistry, 24 hour specialist, 40 hour technician, 24 hour op-erations, eight hour awareness, 16 hour inci-dent command = 152 hours)

• Safety officer – Technician and Specialistcourses with Safety Officer Course (40 hourHAZMAT chemistry, 24 hour specialist, 40 hour technician, 24 hour operations, eight hour awareness,40hourSafetyOfficer=176hours)

• Primary entry (two members) – Techni-cian and Specialist courses (40 hour HAZ-MAT chemistry, 24 hour specialist, 40 hour technician, 24 hour operations, eight hour awareness = 136 hours)

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4MHA (2012). Fire Hazard and Risk Analysis in the Country for Revamping the Fire Services in the Country. Final Report – State Wise Risk Assessment, Infrastructure and Institutional Assessment of Phase II States. Prepared by RMSI for the Directorate General NDRF and Civil Defence (Fire), Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), New Delhi. November 2012.


• Rescue and backup (two members) – Tech-nician courses (40 hour technician, 24 hour operations, eight hour awareness = 72 hours)

• Decontamination and support (two mem-bers) – Operations courses (24 hour opera-tions, eight hour awareness = 32 hours).

4.5.3.2 EQUIPMENTThe equipment needed at the basic level consists of PPE, monitoring equipment, tools, and supplies.

Personal Protective Equipment • LevelDEnsemble–basicfirestructuralPPE

(coat and trousers) or work uniform, a hard hat, chemical work gloves, safety glasses, safety shoes/boots, and a Personal Alert Safety System (PASS) device.

• Level C Ensemble – basic liquid splash and minimum respiratory protection for known chemical hazards which includes: chemi-calspecificprotectivecoverallortwo-piecesuit, chemical gloves, safety glasses, safety boots, and an Air-Purifying Respirator (APR) with appropriate cartridge or Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA).

• Nitrile gloves both outer and inner • Neoprene and butyl rubber outer gloves• Chemical resistant boots and chemical re-

sistant booties• Assortment of cartridges if using APR• Spare bottles if using SCBA.

Monitoring Equipment• Electronic pulse and blood oxygen monitor• Oral digital temperature thermometer• Basic four gas monitor – includes cartridges

for oxygen (O2), carbon monoxide (CO), Lower Explosive Limit (LEL), and a choice of common toxic gases like hydrogen sulphide (H2S), sulphur dioxide (SO2), or chlorine (Cl2). This monitor measures the atmosphere tohelpensurethereissufficientoxygentouse an APR and monitors for the presence of dangerous CO2 levels or explosive concen-

trationsofflammablegas.• Test paper(s) – litmus, peroxide, M-8, M-9,

ammonia, oxidizer, etc.• Photo Ionization Device (PID) – This monitor

allows the direct measurement of airborne gases, vapours, fumes, and dusts that are within the ionization potential of the bulb. It is useful for measuring concentrations of known chemicals, such as identifying soils contaminated with hydrocarbons. It is not very useful for measuring or identifying un-knowns or complex mixtures.

• Geigercounterandradiationfilmbadgedo-simeter–thefilmbadgemustbesenttoalab for dose reading. Use of a low-end digital personal radiation meter for real time read-ings and logbook to record exposures.

Tools• Binoculars• Non-sparking tool set, socket set, drum

wrench, pry bar, screw drivers, hammer(s)• Shovels, picks, brooms • Intrinsically safe radio (no cell phones in hot zone)• Groundingwire and rod (for bonding flam-

mable containers) • Brushes, buckets, garden hose, sprayer for

decontamination.

4.5.3.3 SUPPLIES• Absorbent pads, booms, and loose granular

material (general and petroleum only)• Containers –fivegallonpailswith lids, large

heavy gauge plastic bags, gallon and quart zip-lock bags

• Chemical resistant, packing and duct tape• Engineers tape for marking• Pinflags• Drum marker (paint marker)• Markers, labels, and marking decals• 3-5 litres each of basic decontamination

agents like, soap, tri-sodium phosphate (TSP), calcium hypochlorite solution (HTH), and super tropical bleach (STB).

PREPAREDNESS4


4.5.3.4 VEHICLESBasicvehiclesincludeafireengineorasmallboxvan.

4.5.3.5 REFERENCE MATERIALS (PAPER ONLY)• Field guides, reference books• Unit layout plans (and onsite plan if available)• Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS)• ERG 2012 guidebook.

4.6 PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (PPP) FOR DISASTER RESPONSE

4.6.1 MAKE DPMC ANKLESHWAR A DISTRICT LEVEL ASSETThe DPMC can also serve larger units in addition to mutual aid assistance from other large industries. The DPMC Ankleshwar is managed and supported by the Ankleshwar Industries Association, GIDC Fire Stations,GIDCandGIDCNotifiedArea. It iswell-equippedwith SCBA sets, fire fighting equipment,both FEAS, foam and water tenders; PPEs, breathing apparatus, air compressor and variety of monitoring instruments including lox meter and wind velocity and direction meter. The DPMC helps in industries in the areas of:

• Strengthening of their preventive measures • Emergency and industrial disaster management• Data collection regarding hazardous chemi-

cals and processes, MSDS, antidotes, toxic release, resources etc.

• Conducting safety awareness programmes and training programmes inclusive of indus-trial safety and fire fighting, safe handlingof hazardous chemicals, first aid and com-munity education.

The control room at the DPMC also maintains a list of fireservicesavailableinthearea,hospitals,doctorsand ambulances, technical experts, antidotes and their sources, emergency equipment, etc. While the DPMC is a public private partnership that is expected to serve Ankleshwar GIDC, because of its higher level of preparedness and capability is often

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called to respond to emergencies even in other parts of Bharuch district. We recommend that this expanded role of DPMC Ankleshwar be recognized and it be made a district level asset.

However, thiswill requirea significant investmentfrom district authorities and other industries in DPMC similar to the commitment given to the DPMC by the industries and authorities in Ankleshwar. It must also be done in agreement with the DPMC. In addition to becoming a district level asset, we recommend that the DPMC model be replicated in otherLCGsinBharuchsothatquickerandqualifiedresponse can be provided. The DPMC-Ankleshwar can take a lead in establishing these other DPMCs as a district level resource.

4.6.2 MUTUAL AID AGREEMENTS WITH OTHER DISTRICTS AND DAHEJ PORTOnsite plans for Dahej Port should be prepared and annexed to this DMP. In addition, a mutual aid agreement with the port authorities should be developed to share information and resources during emergencies in the port or other places within the district. Bharuch should also form mutual aid with Surat and Vadodara districts that are adjoining allowing them to support and seek help from Bharuch during chemical emergencies. Also, these two districts will house an ERC that will be a key regional resource which Bharuch may have to rely on. This inter-district mutual aid will specify the particulars of resources, procedures, communication and other activities during an emergency and provide for joint exercises and mock drills.

4.7 STRENGTHENING OF THE RESPONSE MECHANISM

4.7.1 ESTABLISH EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION AS PER INCIDENT RESPONSE SYSTEMAs stated in NDMA guidelines in IRS, the Incident Response System (IRS) is an effective mechanism for reducing the scope for ad-hoc measures in response. It incorporates all the tasks that may be performed


during DM irrespective of their level of complexity. It envisages a composite team with various sections to attend to all the possible response requirements. The IRS identifies and designates officers toperform various duties and get them trained in their respective roles. If an IRS is put in place and stakeholders trained and made aware of their roles, it will greatly help in reducing chaos and confusion during the response phase. Everyone will know what needs to be done, who will do it and who is in command,etc.IRSisaflexiblesystemandallthesections, branches and units need not be activated at the same time. Various sections, branches and units need to be activated only as and when they are required.

The IRS organisation as depicted in Figure 11 functions through Incident Response Teams (IRTs) in the field. In line with the DM Act 2005, theResponsibleOfficer(RO)–thedistrictcollectorwhois also DEA under MSIHC – is overall in charge of the incident response management. However, the RO may delegate responsibilities to the Incident Commander (IC), who can manage the incident through IRTs. Unlike natural disasters, the skill set to respond to chemical emergencies is more technical than administrative and managerial which the DC is expert in. Therefore, as discussed later, werecommendthatatechnicallyqualifiedpersonbe designated as IC for chemical emergency by the RO. The IRTs will be pre-designated at State, District, Sub-Division and Taluka/Block levels. Because chemical emergencies may not provide early warning, the local IRT will respond and contact RO for further support, if required.

The IRS organization has two main components. First, the command staff consists of the Incident Commander (IC), Information and Media Officer(IMO), Safety Officer (SO) and Liaison Officer(LO). They report directly to the IC and may have assistants. The Command Staff may or may not have supporting organisations under them. Second, the General Staff has three components. The Operations

Section (OS) is responsible for directing the required tactical response actions. Expansion of the OS depends on the enormity of the situation. The Planning Section (PS) is responsible for collection, evaluation and display of incident information, maintaining and tracking resources, preparing the Incident Action Plan (IAP) and other necessary incident related documentation. The Logistics Section (LS) is responsible for providing facilities, services, materials, equipment and other resources in support of the incident response.

NDMA IRS guidelines are available at nidm.gov.in/PDF/guidelines/Incident_Response_System.pdf. We refer you to this comprehensive report to understand the precise roles and responsibilities of different IRT members, and Annexure XI in the above link provides suggestion for the departments and agencies that can fill various roles as per the IRS depicted inFigure 11. The information is too comprehensive to just copy in this report so we refer you to the NDMA guidelines for more details. A more detailed structure is provided in Figure 12. However, the key and relevant point for CDMP is that this emergency organization structure as per IRS guideline is for “all hazards” including chemical disasters. The IRS calls for pre-designating IRTs as per the organization in Figure 11 and 12. The organization structure of the DCGandLCGismuchmorespecificasperCAEPPRRules, and hence suitable for chemical emergencies. Therefore, the coordination of the IRS and DCG structure is easily possible by linking the DCG memberswithspecificrolesunderIRS. IRSisalsonot prescriptive and the district administration can assign the “best suited and/or interested” person ordepartmenttoaspecificrole.InthisCDMPweprovidechemicaldisasterspecificrecommendationsand interpretation for IRS.

1. The district collector is both the chairman of DDMAandthe“responsibleofficer”oftheIRSat the district level as per the DM Act, 2005 and DEA under MSIHC Rules. Therefore there isnoconflict in theenvisionedrole forhimunder the two mechanisms.

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2. The DC can choose to be the IC (which may indeed be a right strategy for natural disasters), but for chemical emergencies the ICmusthaveasignificantamountoftraining(see Section 4.5) and need to be present near the incident site. Therefore for chemical emergencies, the RO (the DC) will delegate responsibilities to the Incident Commander (IC) to manage the incident through pre-designatedIRTs.TheICisapersonqualifiedin technical and managerial aspects of managing incidents at the incident site. Until an IC is pre-assigned in Bharuch, the collector willcontinuetofulfiltherole. TheROcanstill head the DEOC while the IC is at the ICP. In case of combination of natural and chemical emergencies or major/catastrophic emergency, the district collector should be the incident commander and the chemical response teams or other disaster response teams will be headed by their respective operations sections chief.

3. Considering that chemical emergencies would oftenhappenwithoutanyearlywarning,firstthe local IRT will respond, and contact/report to RO later (for information or for action, as required) .

4. The IC is located at the incident command post (ICP) which is located outside the hot zone of chemical incidents and directs the response activities.

5. The IC is supported by a pre-designated InformationandMediaOfficer (IMO), SafetyOfficer(SO)andLiaisonOfficer(LO)andanyassistants or deputies. The IMOs main task is information exchange with media and general public. The LO is the focal point of contact for various line departments, representatives of NGOs, PRIs and others participating in the response. The IMO and LO can be located at the DEOC because they are not needed at the incident site. The function of the SO is to ensure the safety of responders and conduct any required situational awareness to assess

and/or anticipate hazardous and unsafe situations. The SO should be based at the ICP along with IC.

6. The Operations Section (OS) is responsible for directing the required tactical actions to meet incident objectives. In case of chemical incidents the IC and the OS Chief (OSC) may both be the same or different persons. For large and complicated emergencies, the IC and OSC may have to be separate functionaries to deal with different aspects of emergency management. The OSC will typically be the head of the emergency HAZMAT response team at the local, district or state level and can be from the industry, fire departmentor any other agency as long as they are trained and sensitized. At the district level, we believe the OSC and IC will be the same persons for chemical emergencies.

7. The Planning Section (PS) is responsible for collection, evaluation and display of incident information, maintaining and tracking resources, preparing the Incident Action Plan (IAP) on the basis of a Site Safety Plan (SSP), and also prepares the demobilization plan.

8. The Logistics Section (LS) is responsible for providing facilities, services, materials, equipment and other resources in support of the incident response. The Section Chief participates in the development and implementation of the IAP, and ensures prompt and smooth procurement and supply ofresourcesasperfinancialrules

9. A single supervisor may be made in-charge of multiple sections and branches within the sections. However, it is important to note thatthefunctionsidentifiedintheIRSremainindependent but just get a common manager

10. Not all sections will need to be activated for all chemical emergencies. For example, for most typical and small emergencies, the LO or LS may not be needed or the OCS and IC can bethesamepersonorsafetyofficercanalsobe the planning section chief, and other such

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arrangements. Overall, redundancy in the proposedplanshouldbesimplifiedandscaleddownwhennotneededtoensureefficiencyof operations and not an organizational quagmire

11. Ideally, the local areas and districts should build the capacity of the staff of public agencies to act as ICs with minimal reliance on the industry to provide such technical leadership. However, considering the limited technical capacity for managing and directing a HAZMAT response in public agencies, the industry response personnel can be made an OSC and the DC or his representative is the IC to ensure accountability and complete cooperation from the industry.

Figure13depictsasimplifiedemergencyresponseprocessonthebasisoftheIRS.Thisfigureattemptsto draw the synergies between the response structures envisioned under MSIHC and DM Acts. The incident controller, site controller, and dotted

shapes for LCG, DCG, and SCG is the mechanism under MSIHC. The ICP will be established as per IRS and the response will be by pre-designated IRT. The incident controller will become the part of ICP. We have depicted LERT, RRT and SERT as primary response agencies. LERT, RRT or SERT head can be the OSC or their head can be the IC as per the plan of the LCG/Taluka. SERT, RRT, LERT can also be considered as ‘groups’ in Figure 12 (bottom cell in left-most column). In the short term, the incident controller from the industry may be the OSC (ifLCGareadoesnothavequalified“public”response capability) and the DC is the IC but over time it is important that the district identifies atechnicallyqualifiedICandnotrelyontheindustryalone. DEOC, SEOC and Local Control Rooms are established in most placed in Gujarat. We have depicted example of police, fire and EMS teamsproviding support to the IC as per his directions. This simplified process can indicate that the IRSis not something drastically different from what is being done under offsite plans.

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Figure 12. Incident Response Team Structure according to the IRS Recommended by the NDMA

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Group (Functional)

(Single ResourceTask Force

/ Strike Team)

Division(Geographical)

ResponseBranch

TransportationBranch

OPERATIONS SECTION PLANNING SECTION LOGISTICS SECTION

INFORMATION & MEDIA OFFICER

SAFETY OFFICER

LIAISON OFFICER

Staging Area

ResouceProvisioning

Unit

GroundSupport

Unit

FacilitiesUnit

CommunicationUnit

MedicalUnit

FoodUnit

Copensation/ Claim Unit

ProcurementUnit

TimeUnit

CostUnit

DEPUTYINCIDENT COMMANDER

RESPONSIBLE OFFICER

ResourceUnit

SituationUnit

DocumentationUnit

DembilizationUnit

ROAD

RAIL

WATER

AIR

ServiceBranch

SupportBranch

FinanceBranch


Figure 13. Example of Incident Response Team Structure in Bharuch according to the IRS Recommended by the NDMA

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ResponseBranch

TransportationBranch

OPERATIONS SECTION(RESPONSE COMMANDEReg. Fire Station Chief,Industry Person etc.)

PLANNING SECTION (DDO) LOGISTICS SECTION (DSO)

INFORMATION & MEDIA OFFICER

SAFETY OFFICER (DISH)

District IRT

LIASON OFFICER (PRO)

Staging Area

ResourceProvisioning

Unit

GroundSupport

Unit

FacilitiesUnit

CommunicationUnit

MedicalUnit

FoodUnit

Compensation/ Claim Unit

ProcurementUnit

TimeUnit

CostUnit

INCIDENT COMMANDER(DC or other qualified person)

RESPONSIBLE OFFICER(District Collector)

ResourceUnit

SituationUnit

DocumentationUnit

DemobilizationUnit

ROAD

RAIL

ServiceBranch

SupportBranch

FinanceBranch

DEOC

Group (LERT,Fire, Police, EMS)


Figure 14. Proposed Emergency Response Structure

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SEOC

Regional ERC

RRT

DEOC

Local Control Room

SCG Members

DCG Members

LCG Members

Site Controller

SERT

LERT

Police, Fire,Medical, 108

Incident Command Post INCIDENT

When LCR is not present,DEOC is the lowest level of response.

Operations Centre & Control Rooms

Internal Communications

Operational Communication

Command & Control Communication

Groups or Commities or Organizations

First Responsers And Supporting Non-Technical Response

Non-Technical Response Team

Specialist Chemical Emrgency Response through ICP


4.7.2 ESTABLISH INCIDENT INTIMATION AND NOTIFICATION PROCESSESCurrently, a system to “notify” district and local authorities exists in case the onsite emergency has the potential to become offsite under MSIHC Rules 1989. However, as discussed in Section 4.2.4, we are recommending a proactive (rather than reactive) approach to notifying possibility of offsite inaverifiableandquantitativemanner.Thissystemwill require industries to report an incident as per the criteria in Section 4.2.4 and not wait for the onsite to have the potential to result in an offsite emergency. This system would be responsible for the following activities:

a. Developan incident reportingandnotifica-tion matrix that pre-designates entities that will be included in the reporting or formal notificationprocess,basedonassigneddis-aster response roles, geographical area of responsibility, and event type.

b. Provideanofficialmandateof theGovern-ment of Gujarat to state/district/local emergency operations centres or control roomstoreceiveandhandlethenotificationanddirectfirstrespondersaccordingly.

c. Receive an initial accident report, and fol-low-up/finalaccidentreportfromresponsi-ble parties regarding any release that meets the following criteria as recommended in Section 4.2.4:i. A release of any hazardous material

or petroleum product (in any amount) to bodies of water within the state of Gujarat.

ii. A release of any hazardous material or petroleum product, in a quantity of 95 Litres or more, to the surface of the land.

iii. A release or threatened release of any hazardous chemical on basis of quantity guidelines recommended in Section 4.2.4

d. Immediately direct the initial notificationsto responding entities at appropriate levels (local, state, and national) based on the es-

tablishedreportingandnotificationmatrix;use appropriate technology to disseminate all available information as rapidly as pos-sible. Notification forwardingshouldbeginat the local level.

e. Immediately activate all pre-planned public alert and warning systems and support emer-gency public information systems by provid-ing pre-planned messages for sheltering or evacuation orders. In case a siren by industry is one of the ways to alert the community in the vicinity of the accident site by the local / district authorities, then state government should establish a process to pre-authorize the industry for use of such siren, as per the terms of pre-authorization. For example, the process should advise on the type of si-ren (standardization across state) and the range of siren for the initial protective ac-tion distances (evaluation or shelter in place or both)

f. A requirement to “formally and automati-cally” notify the district emergency author-ity (Collector) of the offsite emergency as per MSIHC Rules if the emergency becomes offsite during response.

g. A requirement for a formal reporting within 48hoursthatisbasedondebriefingafterre-sponse resources are demobilized and a fol-low up report within 90 days as per existing MSIHC Rules.

4.7.3 IMPROVE CONTROL ROOM MANAGEMENTTimely Intimation and NotificationDevelop a formal process to ensure that all parties responsible for a release of hazardous chemicals immediately intimate local control room or DEOC within 10 minutes of the starting of the leak as per Section 4.2.4 guidelines. The occupier may also contact the police, fire department and EMSdirectly. We are recommending that the LCR and DEOCbeauthorizedtoreceivenotificationofoffsiteon behalf of the collector so that the occupier may nothavetocallthecollectorofficerdirectlyasper

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MSIHC Rules. This process should address:a. A requirement to formally and automatically

notify the district emergency authority (Collector) the likelihood of an impending offsite emergency as per MSIHC Rules. In many cases,theinitial intimationandnotificationof offsite emergencies will be concurrent.

b. Immediate activation of pre-planned public alert and warning systems, implementation of evacuation or sheltering protective actions, and deployment of response agencies in accordance with emergency plans.

c. A requirement for formal reporting within 48 hours that is based on de-briefing afterresponse resources are demobilized and a follow up report within 90 days as per existing MSIHC Rules.

Adequate Equipment to Ensure the Self-Sufficiency of the Control RoomConduct regular assessments of the District Emergency Operations Centre (DEOC) to ensure that backup electrical services and redundant communication systems are present.

Maintain an up-to-date contact directoryThe Department of Revenue publishes contact directory for all state, district and taluka level government functionaries. The MoEF publishes the Red Book containing up-to-date contact information of national and state level functionaries for chemical response. Offsite plans prepared under MSIHC Rules have up-to-date information of even private assets at the district level. However, all such information must be available in easy to search, reliable platform while ensuring that all information is up-to-date.

SEOC and DEOC should develop a system for the monthly checking of all contact information and updating the same. For the sake of reference, Appendix F includes the list of key contacts in the district. The individual district and local area CDMP should have more detailed information. However,

the impulse to use CDMP or even offsite plan as a directory of contact information should be avoided and this critical information should be assigned to SEOC and DEOC staff.

Resolve Conflicting Agency-Specific Control RoomsWhen the DEOC is activated for a chemical emergency, ensure that liaisons or representatives from relevant response agencies and members of the DCG and DDMA report to the DEOC rather than activateanyagency-specificcontrolrooms.Ensurethat the DEOC mainly communicates with the SEOC for any resource or communication outside the district jurisdiction.

Procedures for Deactivation and Demobilization of the DEOC

1. Develop deactivation criteria to include the following situations:a. “State of emergency” is liftedb. Individual branches or units are no longer

requiredc. Coordination of response activities and

resources is no longer requiredd. The incident has been contained and

emergency response personnel have returned to regular duties.

2. Develop deactivation procedures, which should include the following examples:a. The control room director will determine

when to initiate deactivationb. The control room director will notify

sections when they are no longer requiredc. Liaison officer(s) will notify the

appropriate organization of the expected timeline for deactivation

d. Copies will be made of all logs, reports, messages, and any other documents used (and received) in the DEOC by the planning section head (see IRS composition in Response Mechanism Report developed as per NDMA guidelines)

e. All response agencies and other stakeholders should provide input for

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inclusion in an After Action Report (AAR). The AAR should be submitted within 90 days of incident as per MHISC Rules and a copy should also be marked to GSDMA.

3. Develop a general deactivation checklist for DEOC staff to follow.

4.7.4 IMPROVEMENTS IN COMMUNICATIONSFormal Communications PlanDevelop a district level communications interoperability plan that governs internal and external communications during disaster situations on the basis of similar documents prepared at the state level. The district plan should focus on communication protocols, equipment, message content, and other such operational details.

District Wide Communication ExerciseAt least once a year, a functional drill to test the communication capability of Bharuch should be conducted. This drill should validate the interoperability of the DEOC with any local control rooms, control rooms of different response agencies (public and private), neighbouring district DEOCs (in case such a mutual aid agreement with neighbouring districts is made), ERC, and SEOC.

4.7.5 SITUATIONAL AWARENESSAssessment of the Impact of Hazards using CAMEO Suite of Software

• The CAMEO software suite developed by the USEPA and NOAA will be used for plan-ning the response, database management of chemicals,identificationofvulnerablezonesfor population and infrastructural resources, directory of key contacts, route mapping, and as a GIS tool. It is available for free use and the system can be used effectively “for all practical purpose” in the Indian context withoutmuchmodification.AsGujaratstartsusing CAMEO, learns from the experience, and develops its own capability in planning and responding to chemical emergencies us-ing DBMS and GIS, it can use or develop GIS

softwarethatismoreIndiaspecific.• Develop program and associate procedures to

ensure that a GIS-based database management and emergency response system is developed in the state. Recommendations for such a sys-tem are provided as a separate report.

• Develop a training program for basic as well as advanced level of use of CAMEO software for required control room and key response agency staff. Keep track of training and cre-dentials of local staff.

Use of Emergency Response Guidebook• While the CAMEO suite can provide important

information on a developing situation, the Emergency Response Guidebook (2012) can provide quick and adequate information to firstrespondersandotherswhilemoredetailedmodelling and analysis is being conducted. ERG (2012) is available at http://phmsa.dot.gov/staticfiles/PHMSA/DownloadableFiles/Files/HAZMAT/ERG2012.pdf and http://phm-sa.dot.gov/HAZMAT/library/ergand has been provided as an annex to this DMP.

• The ERG (2012) is developed primarily for re-sponse to chemical emergencies during road transport, but can be useful in other situations as well. It is a result of millions of model runs andyearsofrefinementandtheguidebookisregularly updated. Mobile Apps for ERG (2012) is also available for free or at a low price at http://www.androidzoom.com/android_ap-plications/emergency+response+guidebook

• Basic training of first responders and usersof ERG (2012) is necessary even though the guide is organized for easy understanding. First responders will need a hard copy of the same translated in Gujarati.

Live Monitoring for Initiation of Response1. Live monitoring at the peripheral areas

of vulnerable zones evaluated from the application of CAMEO software for toxicity and concentration of the hazardous chemical

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released such that the responders can quickly plan their approach for response. Such monitoring can be done by well-trained members of the LERT, RRT and SERT using on-fieldsamplingequipment.Thelivemonitoringdata can be linked to the DEOC and SEOC to aid decision-making. Live monitoring is different from post-emergency atmospheric sampling and pollution surveillance conducted by the GPCB.

4.7.6 HIERARCHICAL HAZMAT RESPONSE SYSTEM

1. Local first responders should have theknowledge and ability to assess the situation, identify potential hazards, notify disaster management authorities, contain a spill or release, or elevate the response to the next level of capability. We have recommended specialist LERT attachedwith the local firedepartment at LCG and DCG levels

2. The entity responsible for the spill or release may elect to have its own response personnel contain, control, remove or otherwise eliminate the threat if they are so capable. If they are not able to respond immediately, LERT should handle the situation

3. If a local team cannot manage the situation on their own, then RRT or SERT will be requested through SEOC.

4.7.7 EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATIONThe DDMA and DCG should establish formal procedures to issue coordinated emergency public messages. The IRT assigns an Information and MediaOfficerasacommandstaffundertheIC.Animportant element of chemical emergency work with the media is to keep them out of the danger zone so they do not become a part of the problem. This can be achieved by proactively providing the media with video, photographs, and complete information. Considering the media can also be a part of response efforts in getting information to the public, they should be involved in developing district plans

related to public information. Often politicians and other VIPs visit the area for sake of information andgettingfirst-handknowledge. Theyshouldbekept away from the danger zone and be provided with required information, photographs, etc.

4.7.8 MANAGEMENT OF DEADDevelop the capacity of the district to manage a large number of fatalities through plans and procedures to locate, activate, mobilize, and provide additional personnel, transportation, last rites, and temporary cold storage facilities for a mass fatality incident as per guidelines issued by the NDMA.

4.7.9 MASS CAREBharuch district authorities should identify appropriate structures or buildings to be used as emergency shelters following a chemical or industrial incident. Appropriateness of the structure to protect against chemical leaks will be verifiedregularly.Procedureswillbedevelopedtomanage distribution of bulk commodities to support emergency shelter(s), ensure self-sufficiency ofdistrict shelters (e.g. access to water and toilets, etc.), and to communicate effectively with the DEOC. The Logistics Section Chief (LSC) (for example, this rolecanbeplayedbythedistrictsupplyofficer)canbe made responsible for this task.

4.8 MEDICAL PREPAREDNESS FOR CHEMICAL EMERGENCIESMedical preparedness is aimed to prepare medical and other authorities to develop capacities of first responders and upgrade infrastructure to theextent that they can handle a mass casualty event. Emergency medical units should collaborate with stakeholders to develop, implement and maintain a comprehensive strategy to prepare for, respond to, and recover from health emergencies of known and unknown origins. Our assessment of the district hospital in Bharuch finds that the infrastructureto deal with chemical emergencies (burn wards, ventilators, antidotes, trained staff) is grossly inadequate. While this DMP includes a plan for an

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emergency medical response, the Department of Health shall prepare a comprehensive district level medical emergency management plan with a focus on preparedness and resource planning to deal with all types of hazards including chemical hazards. Such plans, when developed, will be referred to in this DMP. The Department of Health can consider a detailed survey of all medical facilities and making the database available to emergency responders to use in their planning and response efforts. The following is only a stop gap arrangement and does not undermine the acute need for a comprehensive medical preparedness and response plan by the Department of Health.

4.8.1 ESTABLISH A PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP TO AUGMENT MEDICAL RESOURCESThe public private partnership models should be developed as a part of the medical preparedness plan as 70% of medical resources in the country lie within the private sector. It includes the following activities to be undertaken:

• Identificationofprivateresources• Classificationof their levelof careand re-

sponse capability• Pre-disaster agreements regarding manage-

ment of mass casualty events• Inclusion of a corporate social responsibility

clause applicable to allotment of land for development of hospitals

• Linkage of other public sector hospitals, railways, ESI and others in defence sector should be part of the planning strategy.

4.8.2 ESTABLISH A CHEMICAL - SPECIFIC MEDICAL MANAGEMENT PROCESSAchemical-specificmedicalmanagementprocessforthe treatment of exposed/contaminated patients requires the description of the impact, inclusive of symptoms, appearance, routes of exposure, potential for secondary contamination, physical properties table, sources and uses and its health effects (organ systems affected by acute exposure,

potential sequel, effects of chronic exposure).

It defines the need of pre-hospital managementorganized by Hot/Warm Zone, Decontamination Zone, and Support Zone (personal protection, decontamination, support, triage, transportation) at the incident site within an ideal time frame. An organized decontamination area and Critical Care Area (specific medical procedures to treatthe exposed patient, patient disposition) should be defined. Evacuation of patients based onincident site and having Patient Information Sheet (the exposure and its potential effects, follow-up instructions) is essential.

Chemicals can be differentiated on the basis of toxic, moderately toxic or least toxic. The management of any chemical at the incident site should be done as per the information given in the Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS). International Chemical Safety Cards are also available for most of the hazardous substances andincludeinformationonfirstaidmeasures.

4.8.3 CREATION OF A TRAINED MEDICAL FIRST RESPONDER (MFR)Trained MFRs should be available at the incident site as well as at the reception area of the hospital to carryout triage, medical decontamination, resuscitation, etc. This needs to match the district’s requirement of related vulnerabilities both individually attributed by chemicals and combined with other natural risks / barriers posed by geographical area. A training program and participation of private industry is key in these efforts.

4.8.4 FORMATION OF A QUICK RESPONSE MEDICAL TEAM (QRMT)A QRMT is a designated group of healthcare professionals who can be assembled quickly to deliver critical care expertise in response to grave clinical deterioration of a victim at a chemical incident site itself, if the site can be safely accessed. QRMTs may consist of any of the

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following staff positions: a) Physician – senior resident or hospitalist; b) Physician’s assistant; c) Critical care unit specialists; d) Clinical nurse specialist and; e) Respiratory therapist. They all need to be trained in managing victims of chemical incidence. The QRMT has several key roles:

• Assessing and stabilizing the victim’s condition through effective resuscitation measures

• Performing incident site medical decontamination

• Organizing information to be communicated to the hospital care settings

• Educating and supporting the ambulance staff while transferring a victim

• If circumstances warrant, assisting with the victim’s transfer to a higher level of care.

4.8.5 CREATION OF STATIONARY AND MOBILE DECONTAMINATION FACILITIESThe medical posts within the factory should have a station decontamination facility for incident site decontamination/primary treatment to safeguard the victim. There should be at least two medical posts perpendicular to each other with appropriate evacuation routes and assembly points to ensure that thewindflow remains in theoppositedirection tothe leak. The DISH may encourage the industry to take appropriate action in this regard.

A Mobile Decontamination Facility should also be planned either through a Mutual Aid Response Group (MARG) or by the District Administration. There should be stationary decontamination units at hospitals to ensure that he hospitals are safe for use.

Under no circumstances shall a person be allowed to enter a medical facility without decontamination. Improper or no decontamination can potentially cripple the medical response capacity so that all local hospitals will be sensitized on the need for decontamination and procedures for the same.

4.8.6 UNIFORM CASUALTY PROFILE AND CLASSIFICATION OF CASUALTIESMedicalofficerswilldevelopaprototypeofcasualtyprofiles and their antidotes, basedon the typeoftoxicants.A uniform profilewill also bemade forsecondary injuries so that the treatment can largely be standardized.

4.8.7 IDENTIFICATION OF POISON CENTRES / TOXICOLOGICAL LABORATORYWe have recommended the establishment of state and regional level poison and toxicological information centres over time. However, the National Poison Information Centre (NPIC) at AIIMS should be available to Bharuch district to seek information. It is important that familiarity with procedures at NPIC, up-to-date contact information, and drills that ensure connectivity with NPIC is maintained.

4.8.8 PLAN FOR ONSITE MEDICAL RESOURCE INVENTORYThe MAH units should develop their own Medical Risk and Resource Inventory. Industry should be counselled to maintain these as a part of their onsite plans required under MSIHC rules. Medical resource inventory should be established based on onsite risk assessment:

1. Ambulances, medical posts, basic life support, trauma support, initial management of burn/toxic care, resuscitation equipment, and ventilators should be made available

2. PPE must be stocked 3. Trained QRTs and stationed medical doctor/

paramedical staff4. Special stocks of antidotes as needed.

4.8.9 PROVISION FOR MOBILE HOSPITAL/MOBILE TEAMThe mobile hospital/medical teams are essential to relieve the pressure from the earmarked hospital, especially in case of combined disaster emergencies. The capacity of a mobile hospital depends on the magnitude of the disaster and the number of

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people to be treated. Such cases are applicable to chemical leaks as secondary disasters as observed in case of the Bhuj Earthquake. The state can support the district develop this capacity with appropriate funding and training.

The district preparedness capabilities should ensure that four triage categories of victims and affected populations should get sufficient vehicles forevacuation to assembly areas, temporary shelters or to designated hospitals. Procedures and systems should be developed so that under no circumstances is it possible for a victim to enter a medical facility (especially a hospital) prior to decontamination.

4.8.10 STOCKING FOR ANTIDOTES AND CHEMICAL CASUALTY TREATMENT KITSA proper chemical casualty treatment kit has a composition of burn care, first aid forABC andadvance support care, trauma care, specialized antidotes, essential medicines, etc. It is essential to develop mitigation reserves at the district level to ensure the availability of the required material at the right time. Under the contract with GSDMA, PRESTELS has prepared “Antidotes Plan” as a separate report. The antidotes plan describes procurement and staffing of antidotes, estimation of requiredquantities,andadministrationforspecificchemicals.

The antidotes required for chemical incidences along with essential medicines are required to be stocked at distant locations to ensure their availability in order to reach the victim in the least possible time. In addition, direct stocking at the responder level ensures their safety and the victim’s safety too. The primary sites for stocking are MAH units- medical posts, ambulances, earmarked health facilities for both the public and private sector.

4.8.11 DEVELOP CRISIS MANAGEMENT PLANS AT HOSPITALSA crisis management plan will be prepared by all earmarked hospitals. The responsibility for preparation and implementation of the plan should lie with the medical superintendent of the hospital. The crisis management plan or hospital disaster management plan should cater for surge capacity, continuous information exchange with other hospitals, temporary makeshift arrangements for mass casualties, etc. The hospital disaster management plan should cater to the development of facilities to conduct a set of minimal tests and follow up to ensure toxicological impact of chemical. A hospital disaster management plan has the following components:

• Specify the roles and responsibilities identi-fied formanagingchemicaldisasters. Thisshall include identificationofahospital in-cident command system, the command nu-cleus, the quick response teams, etc.

• Participate in offsite drills and review hos-pital disaster management plans at regular intervals

• Develop capacities to handle a large number of casualties

• A contingency plan for bed expansion, de-contamination facilities

• Training of medical personnel • Antidote stocking and procurement plans• The contact details of the members of the

command nucleus and quick response teams• Plansfortheavailabilityofasufficientquan-

tity of medical stores i.e., antidotes, antibi-otics, other drugs and life- support system/equipment, oxygen, continuous positive air pressure (CPAP) ventilators, dialysis facili-ties,bloodandIVfluidfortransfusion,etc.

• Procedures for the accurate accounting of morbidity and mortality data

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4.9 STAKEHOLDER ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN PREPAREDNESSThe table below summarises the key activities required for prevention and mitigation and the responsible agencies.

PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITY /

ACTIONS

PRIMARY STAKEHOLDER

/RESPONSIBILITY

SECONDARY

RESPONSIBILITY/

1Development of preparedness work plans

Offsite response agencies – Fire services, LERT,

emergency medical services, Police, etc.

Support

2Overall disaster management planning

LCG, DCG DCG, DDMA

3

Implement State level recommendations for the synchronization of onsite and offsite Plans

LCG, DCG, DISH, Industry DDMA

4Implement emergency responder safety guidelines

DCG, DDMA DDMA

5Implement guidelines for immediate intimation of hazardous chemical leakage

Industry GSDMA, SCG

6Implementing formal after action reporting system

Industry DISH, DCG

7Development and use of GIS based database for planning information

LCG, DCG DISH, DCG

8Improving the Capability for and Effectiveness of Offsite Mock Drills

LCG, DCG, DDMA DC, GSDMA

9 DCG, DDMAAll other agencies with role in

CDMP

10

Developing and conducting Specialized Training Course on an Integrated and Coordinated Emergency Response System

DCG, DDMAIndustry, regulatory agencies ,

Response Agencies

11 Fire ServicesDCG, DDMA, Other offsite

response agencies

12 Development and Implementation of a Chemical Emergency Community Awareness and Preparedness Strategy

Fire Department, LERT, Police, EMS

DCG, DDMA, Other offsite response agencies ,

Table 7. Stakeholder Roles in Preparedness

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Continued on page 61...


PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITY /

ACTIONS

PRIMARY STAKEHOLDER

/RESPONSIBILITY

SECONDARY

RESPONSIBILITY/

13 Enhance district level chemical Disaster Response Capacity through establishment of LERT

DCG, Industry GIDC, DDMA, GSDMA

14 Plan for Training, Equipment and Resources for HAZMAT Response

DC, DDMA, DEOC,DCG Response Agencies

15 Public Private Partnerships (PPP) for Disaster Response- Mutual Aid, Transport of HAZCHEM

Department of Health Offsite Response Agencies

Strengthening of the Response Mechanism through establishment of the Incident response system, incident intimation process, improved control room management , communications, Emergency public information, mass care and management of dead

Private hospitals

Medical Preparedness for Chemical Emergencies- including PPP, formationoftrainedmedicalfirstresponder, QRMT, stationary and mobile decontamination facilities, identificationofpoisoncentres,mobile hospital, antidotes planning and crisis management planning at hospitals


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5.1 SITUATION OVERVIEW1. All the hazardous process industries listed

in the first schedule of the Factories Act,1948 must draw up an onsite emergency plan and detailed disaster control measures in consultation with the Director, Industrial Safety and Health, Gujarat State. The responsibility for the activation of the onsite emergency plan lies with the management. In Bharuch, all MAH units have prepared their onsite emergency plans. Many of these industries in Ankleshwar have developed chemical safety programs based on mutual aid. A number of initiatives in chemical and industrial safety have been taken up by the industries themselves. All factories have shown due diligence in instituting safety management mechanisms in their premises in accordance with the provisions of the Factories Act

2. Bharuch district has prepared and annually updated its Offsite Emergency Plan for chemical and hazardous substances

3. All response agencies such as the police, fire services, and medical services haveparticipated in offsite mock exercises annually. According to MSIHC rules, a full-scale mock drill of each district offsite emergency plan is an annual requirement

4. Technical capability to respond to chemical emergencies is available with chemical industries, especially the larger units such as GNFC and Reliance. Most units have the basic capability to deal with common and small intensity emergencies. Large chemical units have automated and active control measures, adequate response equipment, and well-trained response staff. Chemical industries currently help local authorities in responding to chemical emergencies. In Ankleshwar, industries, GIDC and local NGOs

have established Disaster Prevention and Management Cell to respond to all types of industrial emergencies

5. Technical ability of public response agencies to respond to chemical emergencies in terms of qualifiedmanpower and adequateequipment is negligible except for the DPMC, Ankleshwar. However, even with the DPMC the ability to contain toxic leaks beyond the usual small quantities is limited. The DPMC also requires significant strengthening interms of equipment available and training to providequalifiedHAZMATresponse.

5.2 PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS1. It is assumed that all MAH industries will

revise onsite plans as per the guidelines referred in Section 4.2.2 so that the onsite plans are easily coordinated with offsite plans and provide actionable information for are response in a case of an emergency. Furthermore, we assume that smaller Type A and Type B units have also prepared onsite plans as recommended in Section 2.3 (Point 4). Overall, we assume that the information on chemical units where an incident occurs is completely and accurately available to public response agencies

2. It is the responsibility of agencies and their officials listed under this plan to prepare apreparedness work plan to discharge their assigned roles as per Section 4.1. It is assumed that the preparedness levels of the district and local level response agencies such as the firebrigade,police,medicalcare,andotheragencies have reached the desired levels

3. It is assumed that this Bharuch DMP is annexed by an emergency response plan for isolated storages, Dahej Port, internal roads and highways passing through Bharuch DMP as recommended in Section 4.6.

4. Wherever applicable, mutual aid agreement

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to conduct joint mock drills, share resources and provide coordinated response exists between industries, industries and local authorities, between different public agencies (hospitals, police, railway, fireetc.), local authorities and private resources (e.g., hospitals, antidote vendors, etc.), and between neighbouring districts as per the recommendations in Section 4.6

5. Chemical industries will notify leaks of HAZCHEM as soon as possible as recommended in Section 4.2.4 without waiting for the emergency to have a potential for or an actual offsite consequence. The applicable local/district authorities will immediately initiate the response on such a report by an industry. All emergencies and disasters are local, but local authorities may require regional and state assistance. Local authorities will initiate actions to save lives and protect property. Regional and state disaster assistance, when provided, will support and supplement, not substitute for the response provided by the district

6. Emergency response actions by all response agencies are well-planned, coordinated, and regularly exercised/drilled by local authorities as per Section 4.3.1

7. Respective agencies who have a role in the response have been given proper orientation or sensitization and training as per their roles as recommended in Section 4.3.2. All responders are provided with proper PPE and equipments as per Section 4.2.3. Furthermore, all firstresponders are provided with the Emergency Response Guidebook, 2012 as recommended in Section 4.7.5 so that they can immediately assess the danger and position themselves at a distance deemed as safe

8. It is assumed that a response to chemical emergencies will be provided as per the Incident Response System (IRS) recommended in Section 4.7.1. It is assumed that all local/district authorities have identified, trainedand equipped incident commanders and the

required command and general staff9. SERT, RRT and LERT are formed, well-trained,

and equipped for responding to chemical emergencies as recommended in Section 4.4

10. There is a state level fire departmentestablished as recommended in Section 4.4.3 whichcandirectfirefightingresourcesfromother fire brigades as per the needs of theLERT, RRT or SERT.

11. All LERT, RRT, SERT and fire stations insupporting roles are well-equipped with specialist manpower and equipment resources to deal with chemical emergencies along with regular training at different levels of response functions as recommended in Section 4.5

12. All local, district and state level control rooms are well-staffed and equipped to coordinate responses to chemical emergencies as recommended in Section 4.7.3. A district wide communication plan is implemented and interoperability exercises are regularly conducted as recommended in Section 4.7.4

13. Hazardous substances involved in an incident canbeidentifiedwithinareasonableperiodof time from many sources of information. It is possible to quickly assess the potential damage, identify protective actions and plan the response using the GIS-based decision support database and software, and live monitoring using field equipmentsas recommended in Section 4.2.6 and Section 4.7.5. All other responders (support functions) have a copy of ERG 2012 guidebook as recommended in Section 4.7.5

14. The population most likely to be affected by emergencies are regularly trained on what protective measures may be used, expected response actions, and preparations needed to implement these actions as per Section 4.3.3. It is assumed that most of the citizens who can be potentially affected (including evacuees)willcooperatewith localofficialsand follow recommended protective actions.

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Such measures could include evacuation instructions for relocation to designated reception or shelter areas.

5.3 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE AND PROCESSSection 4.7.1 describes the IRS recommended Emergency Response Structure and System. Figure 10 depicts the emergency response organization as perIRS.Figure12providesasimplifiednotationofthe process of emergency response as per the IRS for

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decision making, communication and response during emergency. This process is common irrespective of the type of hazard orwhere it happens.Thefirstresponder on site may be different, the qualifiedIC may be different, the type of response needed may be different, the members of pre-designated IRT will be different as per emergency type, but the processatalltimeisscalable,flexible,withunifiedcommand, and provides hierarchal response. Figure 15issimplifiedstep-by-stepresponsemechanism.


Figure 15. Emergency Response Process as per IRS

LCR follows the control room procedures

Responsible Officer (SDM), mutual aid personnel, and other members of IRT report to LCR as per plan ICP is established on scene

LERT provides qualified response

Incident Commander (IC) established. Required members of IRT join IC.

First Responder On-SceneOptions

No Action. Repors back “NO ACTION” to DEOC, LCR

Identifies Needs for Response. Request LERT through DEOC Establish temporary IPC. Be Safe

nearest mutual aid, fire, police, medical teams respond, LERT is on high alert or responds if nearby

Communication between LCR and ICP established

If LCR determines the need, DEOC is notified for district / state support

DEOC/SEOC coordinates district/state reponse support, sends RRT and/or SERT as needed

District / State level personnel may take over as IC at the ICP.

Other Response agencies conduct pre-assigned duties

If exceed LERT capacity, LERT notifies DEOC for RRT or SERT

RRT, SERT provide response support if needed

Recovery phase actions

Logistic and Admin support to ICP and DEOC

DEOC or LCR alert designated First Responder TeamsUnit / Accident SitePublic

Other Responders

LCG / Local control room (official LCR. Can be ECC of mutual aid)Actions(1) Alert DC / SDM(2) Alter DEOC(3) DEOC will alert SEOC (if required)

DISH/GPCB only if formal notification is required under MSIHC within 48 hours

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5.4 CONCEPT OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

5.4.1 TRIGGER MECHANISM 1. The occupier/manager of the establishment

responsible for releasing or discharging a hazardous chemical will notify incident the appropriate LCR (if available) and DEOC (whether or not LCR exists, DEOC should be notified)aspertheguidelinesinSection4.2.4.While DEOC will notify DISH if required, the occupier also has a duty to notify an offsite emergency within 48 hours to DISH under the MSIHC Rules. They can additionally report to local control rooms of mutual aid partners, GVK 108,andlocalfireandpolicedepartments,asper the local emergency response plans, but these agencies are not authorized to receive theofficialnotificationofoffsiteemergency;DEOC and LCR of LCG are. a. Gujarat State Control Room is located

on the ground floor of Block No. 2,New Sachivalaya, Gandhinagar. The telephone numbers are 079- 23251900/ 23251902/23251908/ 23251914 and Fax is 079-23251916. SEOC toll free number is 1070.

b. DEOC can be reached by toll free number 1077 by the occupier.

c. It is recommended that there be “one” emergency contact number 108 for general public. 108 can handle a high volume of calls, has a well secured central communication centre, stable computer assisted dispatch, and coordinated police, medical, and firedispatch capability. However, 108 does not have the statutory authority to receivenotificationofoffsiteemergencyfrom the chemical industry. If 108 receives such call, they should forward the same to the DEOC to coordinate qualified response. 108 must trainits responders to recognize chemical emergencies and remain safe and follow

the directions of the IC.d. The trigger mechanism is purposively

redundant with respect to report and alerts to both DEOC and LCR of the LCG even if LCR can report to DEOC.

e. If response by offsite agencies is indeed necessary, then DEOC will notify the district collector and declare offsite emergency under his direction and the IRT will be activated. Because we have recommended that industries proactively notify emergencies as per guidelines in Section 4.2.4, it is possible that some incidents will not need any offsite responseandremainsconfinedtoonsite.DISH and GPCB regional officers arerequiredtobenotifiedbytheoccupierin the case of offsite emergencies within 48 hours, as per MSIHC Rules

2. The occupier should provide the following information to LCR/DEOC:a. Name and telephone number of contact

person.b. Name of the chemical(s) released.c. An indication of whether the substance

is extremely hazardous.d. An estimate of the quantity released into

the environment.e. Estimated time and duration of the

release.f. Whether the release occurred into air,

water, and/or land.g. Any known or anticipated acute or

chronic health risks associated with the emergency, and where necessary, advice regarding medical attention for exposed individuals.

h. Suggested protective actions such as evacuation or sheltering in place.

3. A written accident report should be submitted by the occupier to the Local Crisis Group (LCG), District Crisis Group (DCG) as per MSIHC Rules within 48 hours on basis of debriefingpost emergency. A more detailed follow-up

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report should be submitted within 90 days. DCG should submit such reports to the SCG and GSDMA, the SCG or DCG should report these in CAIRS developed by MOEF or State’s own accident reporting system. The follow-up report must update information included in the initial notice and provide information on actual response actions taken and advice regarding medical attention necessary for citizens exposed.

4. Warning the public in immediate vicinity: leaks of highly toxic chemicals can result in very high concentration in the immediate vicinity of the leak for a few hundred meters within a few minutes. In this zone, no external response is possible to save lives. Therefore, the best strategy is to ensure no residential population or other sensitive receptors in such a zone around the unit. Unfortunately, such buffering is often not available in reality. Therefore, if theonsiteplanoftheindustryhasidentifiedthat community in the immediate vicinity will be affected within a short period time – too short a period of time to inform district/local authorities, properly assess the situation to determine what protective actions are needed, and then inform community as per the instruction of the IC – then there should be provisions for sounding alarms for immediate evacuations. It must be recognized that in this zone there can be fatalities even if an alarm is sounded within a few minutes of a leak depending upon the nature of the leak and chemical properties. Also, the success of the alarm depends on the preparedness of the community through regular training and awareness activities. There are two options as per the discretion of DCG: a. One, the DCG may have installed public

alarms at critical locations throughout the district and sound those alarms through he DEOC or LCR. If possible, the occupier should inform the DEOC/LCR and the DEOC/LCR may sound the alarm

after seeking immediate approval from the RO or as per pre-authorization from the RO as the case may be.

b. Second, the DCG and the RO has assigned the responsibility of sounding the alarm to the industry and industry has installed such alarms. Industry can sound alarms as per direction of the DEOC.

5. Course of Action Following the Trigger (described in more detail in subsequent sections)a. Formal Notification Process is initiated

as per MSIHC Rules if the response by offsite agencies is required.

b. Protective Actions are identified andimplemented based on the scenario unfolding.

c. Emergency Alerts are disseminated to the public.

d. Local emergency response teams are activated.

5.4.2 SET UP OF THE INCIDENT COMMAND POST1. Responding police officers, GVK-EMRI 108,

local medical department and/or firedepartments will receive the report of incident from DEOC officially or from thepublic or the occupier directly.

2. Ideally thefiredepartmentwillbe thefirston-scene response agency, but police, EMS ambulances, or other public agencies may also reach the site first. Irrespective, theagency who reaches first should determinea safe location for the Incident Command Post (ICP), gather all essential information, and report situation details to the DEOC. The DEOC will disseminate this information to SEOC as needed.

3. Thefirstresponderswillimmediatelydetermineprotective action recommendations as per their action plan under the guidance of the IC. The ERG (2012) will be used to determine these actions in case immediate information from other sources is not available.

4. Search and rescue can be attempted only if

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it is safe to enter in the zone and as per the instruction in ERG 2012. First responders should avoid the instinct of rushing in and remain safe.

5.4.3 ASSESS THE SITUATION1. The DEOC will obtain MSDS for the leaked

chemical from onsite plans of the industry or other sources to understand potential hazards, control measures, medical treatment, and other details. CAMEOfm has MSDS information for hundreds of chemicals. The DEOC will also use CAMEO suite (ALOHA, MARPLOT) to the extent that information about the incident is available

2. The LERT will conduct further monitoring and assess the situation whenever they arrive at the ICP.

3. Situational assessments will continue throughout the response through modelling software and live monitoring.

5.4.4 STAFFING AND ACTIVITIES OF DEOC1. DEOC staff will convene members of DCG or

members of IRT (who both may be the same set of people) as per the instruction of the IC, the RO or as per pre-determined plan.

2. All communication channels with responders, technical experts, regulatory bodies, SEOC, other local control rooms if any, and site controller from the unit will be established by DEOC. It is expected that DEOC and other control rooms have fail proof communication systems and up-to-date contact information

3. The DEOC will gather all required onsite plans, offsite plans, action plans, GIS-based CAMEO suite (ALOHA + MARPLOT + CAMEOfm), database of resources available within the district, neighbouring districts, ERC, SERT, private industry, etc.

4. Disaster information managed by the DEOC is coordinated through a Media and Information OfficerlocatedintheDEOC(heiscommandstaff of the IC, but not needed at the ICP). These

representatives collect information, analyse information, and disseminate information to state- and local-level counterparts

5. The DEOC and IC will assess the overall situation and determine whether SEOC should benotifiedforstatelevelsupport.

5.4.5 SELECT PROTECTIVE ACTION(S)1. Post intimation of emergency/ incident, the

LERT will rush to the scene and assess if response by offsite agencies is required in discussion with site controller and/or incident controller. If yes, protective actions will be determined on basis of situational awareness. If not, the LERT will stay on scene until the onsite personnel can effectively control the leak and LERT will leave after ascertaining that emergency is tackled. Next steps assume that offsite response is needed.

2. The DEOC will notify all the response agencies on the salient aspects of the hazard identification, required PPE, and possibleways to control it. This could be on the basis of the MSDS of chemicals, CAMEO chemicals or discussion with experts. Note, this activity may have to be supported by the SEOC in case the information is not available at the DEOC.

3. Use of CAMEO suite software and ERG (2012) will provide estimates of potential damage and help in determining the protective actions to the responders rushing to the site.

4. The DEOC will consult with the IC to determine appropriate protective actions to ensure the health and safety of local citizens as per pre-determined criteria. Protective actions may include evacuation and/or shelter in place orders. Each emergency is different so that the protective actions will also differ. The IC will assess the situation and determine whether evacuation of population is needed, the best possible evacuation route, whether population should self-evacuate to a shelter that is safe against chemical gases, and whether shelter-at-place possible given

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structure of the house. Toxic leak emergencies will provide a small window of several minutes for any evacuation from the hot zone so that organizing public transport, pre-deciding evacuation route, etc. is not practical. On other hand, evacuation may be necessary for large fires to protect public health andsuch evacuation can be planned as per the need of the situation. Shelters works only if the shelter can protect against chemical gas ingress so that most shelters designated for natural disasters may not work for a toxic leak emergency. In our assessment we could not findasingleshelteratdistrictlevelwewouldconsider safe against toxic leak. Protective actions are a critical consideration for the IC and the success depends on planning and preparedness of both the responders and the community. CECAP strategy discussed earlier in this report is key in this respect.

5.4.6 CONTROL THE HAZARD1. Establish an Incident Command Post2. Declare an emergency

a. The district collector (for DCG) or SDM (for LCG) should formally declare a chemical emergency is taking place if indeed this is the case. The DEOC may coordinate this once notified by the occupier. Incase of chemical emergencies, the ICP is establishedfirstandaresponseisinitiatedas per the assessment by the IC. The DC/SDM will be reached as soon as possible for official notification and declarationof offsite emergency. A declaration is useful for confirming that a chemicalemergency has originated, for accessing local, regional or state level resources, and to establish legal authority for all responders to manage the emergency as per the plan. The declaration will also necessitate the occupier to formally

notify regulatory authorities (e.g. DISH) as per MSIHC Rules.

3. Activate emergency response team(s) (through IRS)a. Response to a chemical release will be

immediately and initially conducted by local ordinary responders—medical/GVK-EMRI, fire fighters and police officers—that have been trained to assess a hazardous situation, request appropriate assistance, and coordinate with the DEOC (basic awareness training)

b. Local areas (industrial clusters or districts) will have LERT associated with local fire brigades. The LERT has abasic response capacity for typical fire,explosive and toxic chemical releases in the form of bunker gear, minimum Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), and communication equipment. A LERT has an operational level of training for a HAZMAT response

c. If LERT capacity is not sufficient, RRTand/or the SERT will supplement local response capacity

d. The following triggers would necessitate the activation of an RRT:

i. Presence of a highly toxic chemical;ii. Presence of an highly hazardous

substance in an uncontrolled release situation;

iii. Fires or situations involving unknown hazardous substances;

iv. Presence of a combination of chemicals or compounds that create complex mixtures with unknown public health or environmental consequences; or

v. Large volume release of any hazardous chemical that has or is likely to impact the general public or the environment.

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e. The following triggers would necessitate the deployment of the SERT:

i. Presence of a toxic and hazardous chemical where control of the source will require extended resources beyond the capacity of an RRT;

ii. Release of highly hazardous chemical in an uncontrolled situation where the monitoring equipment or personal protective equipment (PPE) needed for safe operations is not available with the RRT;

iii. Fires or releases involving unknown chemicals where the documentation, monitoring or sampling capabilities are beyond the capacity of the RRT;

iv. Presence of a combination of chemicals or compounds that create complex mixtures with unknown public health or environmental consequences where the documentation, monitoring, or sampling requirements are beyond the capacity of RRT;

v. Large volume release of any hazardous chemical that has or is likely to impact the general public or the environment that are beyond the capacity of a RRT.

4. Implement protective action(s)a. Warn the public as per advice of IC, and

DCG/LCG members. i. The appropriate public warning

messages and the system(s) to deliver the message will be selected based on pre-scripted messages and media

ii. DEOC may establish and manage a phone bank or toll-free hotline to provide emergency information to the public.

b. Secure the sitei. Localpoliceofficersareresponsible

fortrafficmanagement,controloftheimpactedarea,verificationofresponder credentials, and daily security

ii. In the case of a complex, widespread, or long-term chemical disaster, local police departments may request assistance from home guards, civil defence groups, neighbouring districts force, or the state force by coordinating through the DEOC.

5. Ensure site safetya. The IC will ensure that a Site Safety

Plan (SSP) is developed by the planning officer (who can be the IC himself incase of smaller emergencies) with help of site controller/incident controller from the industry, prior to establishing control zones and conducting initial reconnaissance. SSP will be the key component of Incident Action Plan (IAP) that needs to be developed under IRS. SSP can be prepared on the basis of information provided by the industry in their onsite plan as well as any incident specific information. All response teammembers will be briefed on the SSP. A SSP template is provided as Appendix C.

b. Control zones, established by the IC will be communicated to all response team members, Emergency Medical Services (EMS)agencies,andotherfieldpersonnel

c. The DEOC will support the evaluation of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and review the SSP requirements for the initial reconnaissance.

d. All entry team, rescue team, and decontamination team members will undergo initial medical monitoring prior to entering the site.

e. IC will identify an appropriate

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decontamination process for response teammembers,andlocalfirefighters/EMSpersonnel will establish a decontamination station and contamination controls.

f. Additional resources may be requested from the SEOC in the form of licensed medical professionals, trained firefighters,decontaminationequipment,orconsumable decontamination supplies.

6. Conduct initial reconnaissancea. The appropriate response team will

verify PPE requirements, conduct site monitoring to establish levels of concern, and assess community exposure pathways

b. The DEOC will support the modelling of the chemical release scenario (if applicable) to assist the emergency response teams

c. RRT and SERT (state level response) are expected to have onsite modelling capabilities (they list of equipment in Section 4.5 includes laptops). However, SEOC may have to provide specialist modelling support as well

7. Conduct site entry and exita. Once specific response actions are

identified, the relevant response teamwill don the appropriate PPE and execute the required mitigation tasks under the leadership of IC or OSC

b. If multiple entries are required, each entry and exit will be followed by decontamination, medical evaluation, and rotation through primary response stations

c. When the situation is stabilized, the response team will exit the hot zone, undergo decontamination, be assessed by medical personnel, rehabilitated as needed, and participate in a post-response debriefing with incidentcommand staff.

5.4.7 PROVIDE SHORT-TERM RELIEF TO THE PUBLICThe DEOC will logistically support relief efforts and/or deploy specialized personnel to provide medical screening, emergency medical care, documentation of medical treatment, temporary shelter, and basic necessities (i.e. water and food) to citizens that were directly affected by the chemical release. Immediate relief funds can also be released as per existing norms and procedures.

5.5 EMERGENCY MEDICAL RESPONSEEmergency medical units should collaborate with stakeholders to develop, implement and maintain a comprehensive strategy to prepare for, respond to, and recover from health emergencies of known and unknown origins. While this CDMP includes a plan for an emergency medical response, the Department of Health will prepare a comprehensive district level medical emergency management plan with a focus on preparedness and resource planning to deal with all types of hazards including chemical hazards. Such plans, when developed, will be annexed to this CDMP. The following is only a stop gap arrangement and does not undermine the acute need for a comprehensive medical response plan by the Department of Health.

5.5.1 MEDICAL CONSEQUENCE OF CHEMICAL EXPOSUREHuman exposure to chemical releases can occur through air, food and drink, water or direct dermal contact with the chemical. Epidemiologists need to be aware that apparently inexplicable disease outbreaksmaybethefirstevidenceofatoxicreleaseinto the community. Chemical-induced disorders can manifest themselves in any organ system. Because the body has only a limited repertoire of disease responses, the signs and symptoms may resemble diseases arising from other causes. Unless the disorder is highly specific to the particularagent, epidemiological studies may be necessary to determine whether the occurrence of a disease in a population has increased as a result of chemical

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exposure. In general, the adverse responses to toxic exposures may be:

1. Effects that are local or arise at the site of contact with the chemical, such as broncho-constriction from respiratory irritants or irritation of the skin and eyes by irritant gases

2. Effects that are systemic or affect organ systems remote from the site of absorption, such as depression of the central nervous system from the absorption of solvents through the skin, or necrosis of the liver from the inhalation of carbon tetrachloride

3. Effects on mental health arising from real or perceived releases, which depend on the psychological stress associated with an incident.

The timing of the adverse health effects after exposure may vary.

1. Acute effects appear within seconds or minutes, and include eye irritation, broncho-constriction or pulmonary oedema

2. Sub-chronic effects appear within hours or days, and include delayed pulmonary oedema from phosgene, or renal failure in arsenic poisoning

3. Chronic effects appear weeks to years after exposure. These may be of the greatest concern in an incident, even in the absence of any casualties with acute or sub-chronic effects, and may include cancer and reproductive abnormalities.

5.5.2 RESPONSE CAPACITY ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING DURING A RESPONSEThe response capacity of health services should be assessed with particular attention to determine the following: a) availability of first-line and backupemergency medical services (including health personnel and facilities) b) availability of protective equipment c) use of clear diagnostic criteria, standard treatment regimens, and compliance with them d) availability of specific medication(e.g. antidotes) e) availability of facilities for

decontaminating exposed individuals (including health workers) and f) vulnerability of the health facilities to the chemicals.

The Department of Health will assess the deployment needs of resources from the outside, based on preliminary findings (e.g. qualified technicalpersonnel, drugs, logistics, and communications support). The Department of Health will make take decisions on following issues:

• Appropriate triage and case management; • Appropriate care for those evacuated to

temporary shelters; • Collection, identification,andmanagement

of dead victims; and• Advise SCG on the possibility of evacuation

versus shelter in place.

5.5.3 RESPONSE BY THE QUICK RESPONSE MEDICAL TEAM (QRMT)

1. TheQRMTisaself-sufficientunitthatprovidesa staging and triage base for evaluation and management at chemical incident sites prior to transporting a victim to a hospital. QRMTs should be activated immediately with the following activities to be performed:a. Additional QRMT teams should be

activated as soon as the need has been assessed based on the impact analysis of the chemical events

b. Proper communication must be established between DEOCs/ ERCs, designated health care units, district level health care response units and concerned tertiary care health facilities.

c. Rapid diagnostic kits must be available to diagnose the chemical agent and thereby providing proper treatment.

d. Psychosocial support should be given to the well yet worried category of affected community.

e. Specialized ambulances, various medical kits for pre-hospital care and HAZMAT vehicles must be available at the incident

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site so as to provide adequate diagnostic and specialized treatment support for all the contaminated victims.

2. The chemical incident victim requires immediate resuscitation measures at the incident site and evacuation in specialized vehicles. An emergency medical service existstofulfilthebasicprinciplesoffirstaidin contaminated zones, which are to preserve life, prevent further injury, and promote recovery. The following six stages/actions should be followed by medical responders as per their training on the same:a. Early detection of chemical agents and

design of the medical response strategy accordingly

b. Early reporting: the police force at the incident site will make a call to the emergency medical services and provide details to enable a specialized response to be mounted

c. Early response: QRMTs will arrive at the site as quickly as possible, enabling pre-hospital care to begin

d. Good on-scene care: The emergency medical service provides appropriate and timely interventions to treat the victims and incident site decontamination at pre-established medical post itself

e. Care in transit: The emergency medical service loads the patients in to suitable specialized transport vehicles and continues to provide appropriate medical care throughout the journey to reduce mortality and morbidity at the most critical times

f. Transfer todefinitivecare:Thepatient ishanded over to an appropriate care setting, wherein hospital level decontamination and necessary treatment including antidotes etc. will follow.

3. The definition of key concepts of medicalresponse are as follows:

a. Triage: Triage is the process of determining the priority of patients’ treatments based on the severity of their condition. Triage may result in determining the order and priority of emergency treatment, the order and priority of emergency transport, or the transport destination for the patient. Those who have been very close to the leak site and are highly intoxicated and should be given higher priority.

b. Resuscitation: Resuscitation is a series of actions taken to establish normal breathing, heart rate and response in a victim with abnormal vital signs. It uses a systematic approach, based on airway, breathing and circulation to assess and treat the victim, intoxicated by gases.

c. Decontamination: Decontamination is the reduction or removal of chemical agents from body. Decontamination may be accomplished by removal of these agents by physical means or by chemical neutralization or detoxification. Threebasic methods of decontamination exist and are physical removal, chemical deactivation, and biological deactivation of the agent. It is essential to prevent the aggravation of situation of victim due to chemical burden.

5.5.4 SEARCH AND RESCUEIn case of a chemical leak, sheltering in place and/or evaluation needs to be done as per the planning and specifics of the incidents that are unfolding.However, once a chemical incident is in a phase where the first responder can in fact enter anaffected area either using personal protective equipments or when the chemical cloud is of low enough concentration, search and rescue of affected population is a key task. Each local area and district should decide which agency or agencies will conduct the search and rescue. Search and rescue canbedonebythepolice,medicaland/orfirefirst

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responders onsite. However, such activities must happen only as per the direction of the IC. Also, proper coordination between all response agencies tasked with search and rescue is a must and requires thorough joint planning and joint practice at non-emergency times.

5.5.5 EVACUATION OF CASUALTIES FROM THE INCIDENT SITEThe most basic emergency medical services are provided as a transport operation only, simply to take patients from their location to the nearest medical treatment. Generally speaking, the levels of service available will fall into one of three categories; Basic Life Support (BLS), Advanced Life Support (ALS) and an Intermediate Life Support (ILS). Transportation of casualties should occur in ambulancesfittedwithstateofartequipmentandtrained MFRs. The system should work in coherence with the EMS system in the district.

5.5.6 ACTIVATION OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT AT HOSPITALS

1. In case of chemical disasters, the crisis management at a hospital shall be immediately activated by triggering inbuilt mechanisms for prompt emergency medical response. The steps takeninthefirstfewminuteswilldeterminethe effectiveness of disaster mitigation. Quick Reaction Medical Teams (QRMTs) with PPE will reach the accident site immediately along with resuscitation, protection, detection and decontamination equipment and materials. Resuscitation, triage and evacuation work must be done as per SOPs.

2. In hospitals the disaster victims shall be decontaminated and kept in a special, hygienic ward. Initially, based on early symptoms, the type of chemical is assumed, symptomatic treatment initiated and an antidote administered. Blood is then analysed to find out the exact chemical agents and afurther course of treatment is decided. All supportive treatment must be given in the

hospital immediately.3. The hospital casualty room should be well-

equipped with resuscitation equipment such as oxygen cylinders, suction apparatus, airways, laryngoscopes, ventilators, pulse oxymeters, defibrillators, lifesaving drugs, antidotes,auto injectors and dressing material. Medical Treatment includes treatment with antidotes, medicalfirstaidkits, traumacarekits,burncase measures, decontamination Kits and drugs asrequiredbasedonatreatmentprofile.

4. People with life-threatening injuries and illnesses need critical care. Critical care involves close, constant attention by a team of specially-trained health professionals. It usually takes place in an Intensive Care Unit (ICU) or trauma centre. Problems that might need critical care treatment include complications from surgery, accidents, infections and severe breathing problems. Monitors, intravenous (IV) tubes, feeding tubes, catheters, ventilators and other equipment are common in critical care units.

5.5.7 PROTOCOL FOR MEDICAL MANAGEMENTA chemical-specific medical management protocolfor the treatment of exposed patients is assumed to be developed by Department of Health. The protocol will provide information on the following issues:

1. Description (synonyms, appearance, routes of exposure, potential for secondary contamination, physical properties table, sources and uses)

2. Health effects (organ systems affected by acute exposure, potential sequel, effects of chronic exposure)

3. Pre-hospital management organized by hot zone, decontamination zone, and support zone (personal protection, decontamination, support, triage, transportation)

4. Emergency department management organized by decontamination area and critical care area(specificmedicalprocedurestotreatthe

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exposed patient, patient disposition)5. Patient information sheet (the exposure and

its potential effects, follow-up instructions)6. Administrationofspecificantidotesandother

treatmentprofiles.

5.5.8 RAPID ASSESSMENT OF HEALTH CONSEQUENCESA chemical emergency should be first assessedwithin 24 hours following the incident at the latest. A more comprehensive assessment should be carried out later. The Department of Health will contact the nearest designated hospital for chemical emergencies and direct it to carry out the rapid assessment. The rapid assessment consists of:

1. Confirming the existence of a chemicalemergency

2. Determining the source, site, type, size and distribution of the release

3. Identifyingthespecifictypesofchemicalsandtheir reaction by-products

4. Determining the population at risk and the health impact

5. Assessing existing health response capacity.

The Department of Health in collaboration with the GPCB will compile the following information on the basis of the rapid health assessment:

1. Determine the population at risk. Gather information on the proximity and size of residential neighbourhoods, the location and numbers of high-risk populations (e.g. individuals with chronic illnesses, pregnant women, and infants).

2. Evaluate toxicological risks and human exposure pathways. Environmental exposure and body burden assessments are usually not feasible during the acute phase of the accident. These require complex sampling and labour-intensive analytical procedures.

3. Describe morbidity and mortality. For this to be done systematically, it is essential that a working case definition is developed,and consistently applied. During the actual

emergency, it is not feasible to conduct a survey. However, it is important to collect information on whether there has been increased morbidity or mortality caused by the release.

5.5.9 PLAN FOR ANTIDOTES FOR CHEMICAL AGENT EXPOSURESApproximately 10 % of victims would need immediate treatment on the scene itself as soon as the emergency responders arrive. The responders must have antidotes, proper training on administration and protective gear to save these patients. 70 – 80 %of the victims would arrive at hospitals directly, most of them using alternate modes of transport such as taxis or private vehicles.

While not all chemical exposures need antidotes to treat them, some do. It is assumed that antidotes are stocked at the local and regional levels in adequate quantity as per the antidotes plan. It is assumed thathospitalshaveasufficientstockofappropriateantidotes that are immediately available.

5.5.10 REQUISITION OF A PHARMACEUTICAL STOCKPILE (IF REQUIRED)It is assumed that a pharmaceutical stockpile is available in the state as per the antidotes plan provided to the GSDMA. This stockpile is a state resource, it is a large cache of drugs and medical supplies that can be distributed to the site of a possible incident as needed. The plan is to deliver critical medical resources to the site of a state emergency when local public health resources would likely be or have already been overwhelmed by the magnitude of the medical emergency. The stockpile is stored strategically in locations around the state in such a way that the supply will reach the incident site(s) at the earliest possible time, the average acceptable time being 12-24 hours. The stockpile is controlled by the SEOC and can be authorized for release by the appropriate authority.The SEOC will coordinate with the DEOC so that stockpile assets can be efficiently received and

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distributed upon arrival at the site. The state officialswilltransferresponsibilityforthematerialto the appropriate district or local authorities once it arrives at the location. District and local authorities must be prepared to repackage and label bulk medicines and other stockpile material according to established SOPs.

5.5.11 VENDOR MANAGED INVENTORY (VMI)It is assumed that an appropriate VMI program is established in the state. If the incident requires additional pharmaceuticals or medical supplies, follow-up Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) supplies will be shipped to arrive within 24 to 36hours. The follow-up VMI packages can be tailored to provide pharmaceuticals,supplies,and/orproductsspecifictothesuspectedorconfirmedagentorcombinationof agents. The vendors/manufacturers for supplying the drugs concerned are contracted with the state’s Central Medical Store to provide the requested quantities of drugs/supplies at a short notice. These inventories may be transported directly to the location(s) specified in the requestby theCentralMedical store.

5.5.12 PSYCHOSOCIAL CAREIn chemical emergencies, the psychological shocks in addition to actual exposure related complications pose a challenge. The medical teams and hospitals should be trained and prepared to provide psychosocial care to patients during emergency. Even in the recovery and rehabilitation phase, psychological care is an essential component.

5.5.13 PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSEDuring a chemical disaster, the following damages can be incurred and require special attention from the Department of Public Health:

• Contaminated water supply• Lack of food and safety of food is a major

concern• Displacement of community from their natu-

ral habitats.

The Department of Public Health and Engineering will provide a response to ensure public health by preventive approaches as per their departmental action plan to manage the above-mentioned conditions.

5.5.14 MEDICAL RESPONSE TO LONG TERM EFFECTSThe knowledge creation of long-term effects on the exposed population will help in the management and prevention of disease. In the post-disaster scenario some of the casualties will develop sequels due to chemical injuries. These cases may need regular follow-up, medical care, reconstructive surgery and rehabilitation. Close monitoring is required to identify and treat long term health effects like blindness,interstitiallungfibrosis,geneticdisordersandneurologicaldeficiencies,etc.Psychosocialcareis also a key component of long term care.

5.6 RESPONSE TO HAZCHEM TRANSPORTATION EMERGENCIESThe organization structure for response, concept of emergency operations, and roles and responsibility of key stakeholders remains almost the same in case of emergencies involving the transportation of hazardous chemicals. Following are special considerations while responding to transportation emergencies.

5.6.1 PIPELINE TRANSPORTATIONPipelines are usually underground and pose less of a risk than road transportation. The main source of pipeline related accidents are accidental rupturing of pipeline during construction and digging earth. Usually large pipelines are carried through areas with sparse population and have good protection on either side along with control measures such as automatic shut off valves that limit the amount of leak. In case a chemical leak from a pipeline, the following apply:

1. The initial notification may be done by theoccupier/owner of the pipeline or by the local community or by the contractor who caused the damage to the pipeline. Therefore, it is important that all pipelines nodes and routes clearly display the emergency contact

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information in case of any accident with the pipeline

2. Oncetheinitialnotificationofanaccidentisobtained the response operations are similar to those in Section 5.3.

5.6.2 ROAD TRANSPORTATIONAs a part of a separate report on improving response mechanism, PRESTLES has suggested that a highway chemical disaster management plan be developed. This plan will be based on survey of vulnerable population along the route and vulnerability scenario of all chemicals being transported. The following special actions are taken during an emergency involving a road tanker carrying hazardous chemical.

5.6.2.1 TRIGGER MECHANISM1. The driver of the tanker is expected to be

well-trained to handle emergency situations and have up-to-date contact information. He will contact the consignor and consignee of the cargo he is carrying and the local police station (the number should be available with the driver) on a priority basis.

2. The driver will also notify the DEOC (1077). The consignor and consignee may also independently notify DEOC or LCR.

3. The information driver should provide includea. Exact location of the tankerb. Identification of any critical or sensitive

structures nearby (schools, hospitals, etc.)c. Name and telephone number of consignor

and consigneed. Name of the chemical(s) releasede. An indication of whether the substance

is extremely hazardousf. An estimate of the quantity released into

the environmentg. Estimated time and duration of the

release.h. Whether the release occurred into air,

water, and/or landi. Any known or anticipated acute or

chronic health risks associated with the

emergency, and where necessary, advice regarding medical attention for exposed individuals

j. Suggested protective actions such as evacuation or sheltering in place.

4. The subsequent actions will be similar to those in Section 5.6. In case of road emergencies, the policemaybethefirsttoreachthesiteaheadofthefirebrigade.Irrespectiveofwhoarriveson the site first, all first responders shouldhave basic training to identify safe isolation distance and initial protective actions, and identify situations where they must wait for aqualifiedemergencyresponsetocontrolthesituation.

5.6.2.2 INFORMATION AVAILABLE WITH THE DRIVERUnder the Motor Vehicle Act 1988, every motor vehicle carrying hazardous substances should have the following:

1. An emergency information panel with information on: (a) correct technical name of the substances being transported; (b) UN-number, HAZCHEM code, and UN hazard class label; (c) emergency contact telephone; and (d) any specialist advice .

2. The driver of the vehicles should possess the Transport Emergency Card or TREMCARD as per Central Motor Vehicles Rules 132 (2). The TREMCARD carries detailed instructions on responseactionsforfire,spillageorleakage.It also includes instruction to driver on his actions.

5.6.2.3 PROTECTIVE ACTIONS BY THE DRIVER1. As per his training and the hazard posed by

thechemical,he shouldknowto stop trafficand general citizens from approaching the accident site until police arrive for help.

2. The driver of the tanker must be given an appropriate level of protective clothing if he is expected to assist in the response. He needs to protect himself well before attempting to respond. If appropriate PPE is not available,

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then he should move to a safe distance and await response from offsite agencies.

5.6.2.4 ROLES OF THE CONSIGNOR AND CONSIGNEE IN A RESPONSE

1. The consignor must ensure that the driver of the tanker is well-trained, carries a valid license, has a TREMCARD, and the emergency information panel is clearly visible as per the rules on the tanker.

2. The driver should be provided with up-to-date contact information of the police stations and DEOC on the route through Gujarat.

3. The driver should be provided with appropriate protective equipments if he is expected to assist in the response.

4. The driver should be instructed to report at the Department of Transportation check posts at entry points to Gujarat and register themselves.

5. Driver should handover their TREMCARD to responding agencies.

6. Consignor and consignee should coordinate with the DEOC / SEOC to make arrangements for the containment and transfer of content to other vehicles, and other response actions.

7. Consignor and consignee should be encouraged to identify experts en-route to assist in emergency situations and include their contact information on TREMCARD.

8. If both the consignor and consignee are a part of mutual aid group such as the one existing for chlorine transport in Gujarat, they should include contact information of the mutual aid groups on TREMCARDs and train drivers accordingly.

5.6.2.5 INITIAL ACTIONS BY THE POLICE1. Police should immediate notify the fire

brigade, 108, and the DEOC.

2. The most important action by the police is to cordon off the site of the accident, divert and regulatetraffic,andevacuate/shelterinplacecitizens in close proximity on a priority basis.

3. Often the source of ignition is from a passing vehicle and in some cases electrical transmission towers or substations. Depending on the location of the site of an accident and chemical involved, not only traffic butelectricity supply to the area may have to be stopped by the police who may reach the accident spot before other agencies.

5.6.2.6 INITIAL ISOLATION AND PROTECTIVE ACTION DISTANCECordoning off and evaluation decisions are based on the safe distance for isolation and protective actions. The ERG (2012) provides guidance on protective actions such as the effect of chemicals, response information, isolation distance, protection distance, and other useful information for first responderssuch as the police. It is important that the police, medicalandfirefirstrespondershaveacopyoftheERG (2012) (preferably translated in Gujarati) along with adequate training on using the same.

It is also important that untrained and unequipped first responders shouldnot try to stop the leakorenter the hot zone and should instead wait for a qualifiedresponse.

5.7 SUMMARY OF RESPONSE ACTIONS AND STAKEHOLDERS RESPONSIBLEThe tables below summarises the key response activities and the respective primary and support stakeholders responsible for chemical emergency response. In addition, a comprehensive listing of responder responsibilities is listed in Appendix B for ready reference as per the MOEF offsite emergency guidelines, 2010.

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RESPONSE ACTIVITYPRIMARY

RESPONSIBILITYSUPPORT/SECONDARY

RESPONSIBILITY

1Trigger Mechanism - Intimation of

accident/hazardOccupier / manager of the

establishmentDEOC/LCR

2 Establish Incident Command PostFirst Response Agency –

ideally Fire Services, LERTDC

4 Situation Assessment DEOC SEOC

5 StaffingandActivitiesatDEOC LERT, IC DC

6 Selection of Protective Actions DEOC SEOC

7

Control of Hazard – Warn the public Secure the site

Ensure Site Safety through a Site Safety Plan

Control Zones will be established by the IC

Conduct Initial Reconnaissance

IC, LERT

EMS, Fire Services, Police, RRT, SERT,

DC/SDM

8 Provide short term relief to public

Table 9. Stakeholder Roles in Emergency Medical Management

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Table 8. Stakeholder Roles in HAZMAT Response


RESPONSIBILITY

SUPPORT/SECONDARY

RESPONSIBILITY

1Intimation to MFR, 108, Local Medical

DepartmentDEOC, Industry GVK-EMR 108

2 Response by QRMT QRMT Local MFR, DOH

3Response Capacity Assessment and

planning during ResponseDOH

4 Search and Rescue Police /MFR/Fire Services

5Evacuation of Casualties for Incident

SiteMFR, EMS DOH

6Activation of Crisis Management at

hospitalsEarmarked hospitals DOH

7Rapid Assessment of Health

consequencesMedical Staff and Earmarked

hospitalsDOH, GPCB

8 Administration of Antidotes QRMT, MFR DOH, Earmarked hospitals

10Requisition of Pharmaceutical

stockpilesEarmarked Hospital DOH

11Supply of drugs from Vendor Managed

InventoryState Central Medical Store

12 Psychosocial care Earmarked hospitals

13 Public Health Response Department of Public Health


Table 10. Response protocol for Hazards in road transportation of HAZCHEM


RESPONSIBILITY

SUPPORT/SECONDARY

RESPONSIBILITY

1Trigger – Intimation to DEOC, Police,

108, Consignor and ConsigneeDriver Consignor and Consignee

2InitialProtectiveActionsasspecified

in TREMCARDDriver Helper

3 Co-ordination of Consignor and

Consignee with DEOCConsignor and Consignee Mutual Aid Group

4Cordoningoffsite,notificationto

DEOC, Fire Services , EMS and LERTPolice 108

5 Establish incident command post Police Other First Responders

6Isolation and Establishing protective

action distancePolice Other First Responders

7 Control of Hazard LERTPolice, Consignor and Consignee Fire Services, First Responder

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5.8 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES AS PER SCG 2008 RESPONSE PLANThe following roles are responsibilities are suggested as per the SCG 2008 response Plan for Gujaratbutwehavealsorevisedthesesignificantlyas per the model DMP requirements. It is important that the roles and responsibilities not be thrust on line departments and agencies but discussed in DCG/DDMA meetings and mutually agreed to. The specifics of the roles and responsibilitiesmust be listed in the action plan / work plan of the agency of the department. Also, these roles and responsibilities should be read in conjunction with the stakeholders we have identified for keyprevention, mitigation, preparedness and response activities in previous sections. The following should therefore be considered only as a guide.

5.8.1 FIRE SERVICES1. The role of fire brigades during a chemical

accident is to assess the situation, request additional support if local capabilities are inadequate, secure the scene in coordination withpoliceofficers,andsendstatusupdates

to the district control room.2. It isexpectedthatall localfiredepartments

will have developed the capacity to respond to minor and localized chemical leaks and other incidents. Only such trained teams associated with the fire departments will control ahazardous chemical leak. For more serious chemical incidents, regional ERCs or SERTs will provide additional help.

3. An up-to-date database of contact information andresourcesavailablewithGIDCfirebrigadesand private / public industries should be maintained regularly. Such list should be made available to SEOC and DEOC.

5.8.2 POLICE1. The Superintendent of Police (Bharuch

District) will report to the DEOC when required to manage a chemical emergency. He will instruct his staff to the follow instructions given by the IC on the scene for the safety of people and the police themselves.

2. The SP will intimate and coordinate with state headquarters for additional help from



neighbouring districts and reserved forces3. The police forces will help in traffic

management, law and order, evacuation, site security, and make available use of their wireless communications sets if required

4. The SP will lead accident investigation and conserve evidence in case sabotage or terrorism is suspected with help of the IC.

5.8.3 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH1. The District CMO and DHO will provide

necessary and emergency medical experts to the DEOC if required.

2. A database of contact information and key resources (beds, burn units, antidote availability, etc.) will be maintained at the district level for all public hospitals and for private (industry and other) hospitals with whom a mutual aid agreement for sharing resources is made.

3. Health experts will consider the intrinsic toxic potential of the released chemical(s), potential concentration(s), estimated duration of exposure, and public health impacts based on situational details from the DEOC.

4. Health experts will provide advice and guidance for protective actions, public warning, triage, emergency medical transportation.

5. The DEOC will contact the Civil Surgeon/CMO andtheDistrictHealthOfficeranddiscussthedeployment of necessary medical resources including decontamination equipment and supplies, ambulance units, and other specialized assets requested by the incident commander.

6. The DEOC will alert major hospitals near the impacted area and GVK-EMRI 108 ambulance units. These hospitals and ambulance units will follow their crisis management plan.

7. Health experts will collect information on the number of deaths and injuries, the nature of injuries, and likely long-term medical treatment requirements.

8. The health department will assess the medical

needs of the area on the basis of likely long-term consequences and take steps to equip local medical facilities for treating people on a long-term basis and coordinate provision of the same with state level support.

5.8.4 DISTRICT DISASTER MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY

1. DDMA members and SCG members will convene at DEOC as per the need of the IC.

2. The DPO or other staff appointed by the DDMA will be responsible for managing the DEOC. Upon activation for a chemical disaster, this DEOC manager will ensure the activation of all relevant agencies to staff the control room. .

3. The DEOC is responsible for maintaining communication with SEOC and coordinating warning systems to disseminate emergency messages to the public.

4. DEOC will maintain a list of suppliers and vendors that can provide essential chemical disaster response supplies on an urgent basis if needed.

5.8.5 DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE/RELIEF COMMISSIONER/COLLECTOR’S OFFICE

1. The DC will provide immediate relief to all affected citizens.

2. Relief may consist of ex-gratia financialassistance, temporary shelter, water, food, and transportation back to homes when the disaster area is safe.

3. The Relief Commissioner may provide assistance for reconstruction depending upon the nature of damages to the private property and assets.

4. Maintain a list of suppliers and vendors that can provide essential chemical disaster response supplies if needed.

5. Ensure appropriate emergency procurement processes are followed during disaster response operations.

6. Track and document all disaster-related procurements, contracts, rental agreements, labour hours, and equipment hours.



5.8.6 DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT / DIRECTOR OF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY AND HEALTH (DISH)

1. Review onsite emergency plans from MAH installations during the preparedness phase and ensure that information is up-to-date and usable at the time of disaster.

2. Coordinate with the DDMA (DPO or other staff) in maintenance and updating of this DMP.

3. Provide experts to the DEOC during a chemical disaster.

4. Provide inspectors to train, drill, and deploy with the LERT.

5.8.7 GUJARAT POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD1. The GPCB will coordinate with the DEOC

regarding the environmental and health consequences of a chemical release.

2. The GPCB will provide experts to assess resource requirements and determine potential damage.

3. The GPCB will provide laboratory support for the testing of hazardous substances sent from the disaster scene.

4. The GPCB will provide expertise on environmental effects of oil, discharge or releases of hazardous substances, and environmental pollution control techniques

5.8.8 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT1. Implementation of the hazardous materials

transport emergency management plan (highway or road DMP) and provide transport coordination during chemical disasters.

2. Make available experts to the DEOC to provide guidance regarding scene security, trafficmanagement, and safe isolation distances in consultationwiththedistrict-levelofficials.

3. Organize vehicles for and coordinate evacuations.

5.8.9 DEPARTMENT OF ANIMAL HUSBANDRY1. Provide safe facilities for animals in need

of relocation and/or confinement due to achemical disaster.

2. Maintain service for the care and treatment of sick and injured animals that are relocated and reunite owners with impounded animals.

3. Arrange for safe disposal of animal carcass.4. Reunite owners with impounded animals and

coordinate relief to owners who lose cattle in disasters.

5.8.10 DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE1. Take immediate actions to reduce crop damage

and economic losses following a chemical spill.2. Assess agricultural damage following a

chemical disaster and provide expertise for remediation efforts.

3. Coordinate relief efforts.

5.8.11 PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER1. Coordinate the delivery of public warning and

emergency information that relate to chemical disaster situations with the SEOC. Manage media for rumours and spreading panic while ensuring that only relevant, accurate and necessary information is disseminated.

5.8.12 PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT1. Assist with traffic management and debris

removal for mandatory evacuations.2. Inspect public roads and buildings for their

return to normal operations and occupancy 3. Oversee the repair and reconstruction of public

buildings, roads, and other infrastructure if necessary after a chemical disaster

4. Enforce applicable building codes.

5.8.13 KEY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS1. Private businesses and industries within

Gujarat may assist with a wide variety of response, relief, or rehabilitation tasks based on their capabilities. Memorandums of understanding may be enacted with such entities for assistance. Also, they should be included in regular discussion and training on district DMP as well as mock drills and other capacity building exercises



2. Volunteer agencies, such as the Red Cross and local religious organizations, may be available to provide shelter, food, management of donations, and other short-term relief functions. Memorandums of understanding may be enacted with such entities for assistance. Also, they should be included in regular discussions and training on the state DMP as well as mock drills and other capacity building exercises.

3. All external support function agencies that are not in direct control of the DCG or DDMA should be requested to prepare a ’support function action plan’ and these plans should be annexed to the district DMP.

5.9 INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS1. Communication protocol and coordination

procedures employed by the DEOC will be annexed to this DMP. Communication protocol for all responding agencies will be developed and standardized and annexed to this DMP.

5.10 REFERRED AND ANNEXED DOCUMENTS1. In this section, a reference to legal and

administrative requirements or procedures that are applicable to disaster operations (e.g., emergency procurement procedures, mutual

aid agreements, etc.) will be made accessible as and when these documents are available. These documents will not be annexed to the DMP but need to be available at the DEOC for easy reference.

2. In this section, reference has been made to policies and procedures that have been established regarding the use of volunteers and accepting donated goods/services. Examples of documents that may be referenced here include:a. Administration of insurance claimsb. Consumer protectionc. Duplication of benefitsd. Non-discriminatione. Relief assistancef. Recovery of response costs from the

responsible party (i.e., entity that caused the spill or release).

3. Annex Action Plans developed by offsite agencies and state departments to this state DMP as and when available.

4. DMP or response plans for pipelines, ports, hospital, railways should be annexed to this DMP whenever available.

5. The state directory of contact developed by revenue department should be annexed to this DMP


6RECOVERY, RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION

The recovery and reconstruction phase of disaster management involves disaster relief: immediate shelter, life support, and human needs to persons affected by, or responding to, a disaster; the broader disaster recovery; the coordinated process of supporting affected communities in the reconstruction of the physical infrastructure, restoration of the economy and of the environment, and support for the emotional, social, and physical wellbeing of those affected. Section 5.6.6 discusses immediate relief operations as a part of the response plan for chemical emergencies. In this chapter, we focus on longer term recovery and reconstruction efforts needed in case of major or catastrophic chemical disaster. State Relief Commissioner, Revenue department, and the district collector are in charge of such recovery operations.

6.1 FUNCTIONS OF RECOVERYFor the purpose of effective coordination, aspects of recovery are conceptually grouped into four functions. It is important to acknowledge that the four functions of recovery overlap and recovery arrangements must reflect the inter-relationshipbetween each of these functions.

6.1.1 INFRASTRUCTUREInfrastructure, or built environment, recovery includes repair and reconstruction of residential and public buildings, commercial, industrial and rural buildings and structures, government structures, utility structures, systems and services (transport, water, sewage, energy, communications), and other essential services.

6.1.2 HUMAN-SOCIALHuman-social recovery includes personal support and information, physical health and emotional, psycho-logical, spiritual, cultural and social well-being, pub-lic safety and education, temporary accommodation, andfinancialassistancetomeetimmediateindividualneeds and uninsured household loss and damage.

6.1.3 ECONOMIC AND LIVELIHOODEconomic recovery includes renewal and growth of the micro economy (within the affected area) and the macro economy (overall economic activity of the state). Economic recovery includes individual and household entities (e.g. employment, income, insurance claims), private and government business enterprises and industry. It includes assets, produc-tionandflowofgoodsandservices.Itincludesca-pacity for the export of goods and services from the affected region, and securing confidence of over-seas markets. 6.1.4 ENVIRONMENTEnvironment, or natural environment, recovery includes restoration and regeneration of biodiver-sity (species and plants) and ecosystems, natural resources, environmental infrastructure, amenity/aesthetics (e.g. scenic lookouts), culturally sig-nificant sites and heritage structures. It includesmanagement of environmental health, waste, con-tamination and pollution and hazardous materials.

6.2 TRANSITION FROM RESPONSE TO RECOVERYTheafter-stageofresponseisdefinedastheperiodwhen there is no further requirement for the coordination of response activities. As recovery activities being within the response phase, it also signals the transition from response to recovery mode. In this transition the emergency is declared over and the IRT hands over the planning and operations to the relief commissioner or others as appointed by the chief secretary. Careful planning and handover is essential with proper documentation for a successful transition. The major steps taken during transition are as follows:

1. Preliminary Damage Assessment: State should deploy multidisciplinary team to determine the extent of damage to communities.

2. Aids and Assistance: Identification of the type of public or individual assistance nec-essary in an emergency declaration. These


56 RECOVERY, RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION

can be housing, grants, low-interest loans, relocation, unemployment assistance, food commodities, or legal services. Also includes assistance for community such as debris removal, emergency protective measures, roads and bridges, drinking water, buildings and equipment, and other utilities.

3. Mobilization of essential resources: Coordinate and ensure mobilization of essential resources to a temporary location of emergency mass care where impacted survivors of disasters go for limited services and information within 24-96 hours following the disaster.

4. Disaster Recovery Centres: Such temporary lo-cations could be termed as Disaster Recovery centre. Responsibility can be shared by the af-fected district, state and central authorities.

5. Community Groups: Community groups should be deployed in the affected community areas to disseminate information. These will iden-tify and report local unmet human needs and assist survivors.

6. Expenditure: Estimation of cost to be in-curred by the agencies responsible for relief and recovery for the reimbursement.

6.3 COUNSELLING AND REHABILITATION OF VICTIMSThe psychological impact of a chemical disaster manifested as psychosocial trauma including psychological reactions, post-traumatic stress disorder, and other psychological ailments in displaced disaster victims needs to be addressed. Counselling by psychologists and psychiatrists for those suffering from mental trauma is an essential element of medical rehabilitation.

6.4 IMMEDIATE FINANCIAL RELIEF TO VICTIMSUnder the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991, MOEF has published the list of chemicals and threshold qualities beyond which the occupier or owner must take third-party PLI for providing relief to accident victims due to a chemical accident as per the direction of the collector. The Act also provides for an

Environment Relief Fund (ERF) and enables payment of relief over and above the insured amount. The occupier or owner should pay an amount equal to the PLI premium to the ERF and deposit the same with the insurer. At state level GPCB is responsible to ensure compliance with PLI Act and at district level the collector and regional officer of GPCBare responsible. This act provides for immediate access to relief funds so that the compliance with Actshouldbeverifiedandstrengthened.Wehavealready recommended that the maximum liability undertheAct(INRfivecores)shouldbesubstantiallyenhanced.

6.5 PENALTIES AND COMPENSATIONBeyond the immediate relief through provisions of PLI Act, the major compensation for disaster victims comes from the Prime Minister’s Relief Fund and National Calamity Relief Fund. State Government also provides compensation for disaster victims through the Chief Minister’s Calamity/Relief Fund. According to a strict concept of liability, the industries responsible for the accident are liable to pay compensation to victims. Therefore, legal actions can be initiated against the occupier for additional compensation.

6.6 RESTORATION AND REGENERATION OF ECOSYSTEMThe potential for chemical accidents to cause severe environmental damage has been realised on a number of occasions such as at Seveso, Bhopal, Mexico City (LPG disaster), Chernobyl, and Alaska (Exxon Valdez) amongst others. For the remediation of the affected environment, it is essential to assess the environmental impacts, which include identifying of the chemical released, determining the quantitative and qualitative nature of impact, and ascertaining the components of the environment most at risk from chemical accidents. This assessment is dependent on certain factors such as the chemicals involved, pollutant concentrations in the environment, environment media polluted by the accident, topography, and meteorology. After


56 RECOVERY, RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION

assessing the impact, the government can choose the appropriate recovery strategy.

6.7 RECONSTRUCTION OF DAMAGED STRUCTURES AND SERVICESMajor and catastrophic fires and explosions canresult insignificantdamagetostructuresalthoughless in extent compared to earthquakes or tsunamis. Reconstruction offers us a chance to build back better and safer. Reconstruction and restoration of infrastructure shall be achieved at the earliest as per the following guiding principles laid out in the national policy on disaster management.

1. Building back offers opportunity to build bet-ter and safer so that consideration should be given in planning to open spaces, water and sanitation infrastructure, health care fa-cilities, education infrastructure, roads and safety from disasters.

2. Reconstruction plans should be a participa-tory process involving the government, af-fected community, NGOs and the corporate

sector. After the planning process is over, owner driven construction is a preferred op-tionbutaspertheguidelinesandspecifica-tions in the planning.

3. Essential services and intermediate shelters/camps should be established in the shortest possible time. The restoration of normalcy and day-to-day functioning is an important factor for consideration. For permanent re-construction, the relocation option should be considered in case the affected commu-nity was in the highly vulnerable zone ille-gally (e.g. squatters or developments within buffer zone around a company). In case of large chemical facility, the community may be persuaded to shift to a distance further away from the unit. The structure and elec-trical safety audit of all damaged building should be done and they should be repaired accordingly. New construction should ideally be completed within two to three years.


7 AUTHORIZATION AND PLAN MAINTENANCE

7.1 PLAN AUTHORIZATIONThe Chemical and Industrial Disaster Management Plan for Bharuch District supersedes and rescinds all previous versions of the same or similar documents and iseffectivefromthedateofaffixingthesignatureofthe Chairman of the District Crisis Group and Chairman of the DDMA (the District Collector for both).

The plan and recommendations herein are developed in discussion with and in agreement with the stakeholders listed in this plan. This plan is/will be annexed with work plans developed by various response agencies and line departments to meet the objectives and responsibilities listed in this plan.

Continuous review and improvement of this plan is essential to ensure that it is not only updated but also implemented in true spirit. Therefore, this Chemical and Industrial DMP shall be reviewed and updated regularly by the DCG members. Furthermore, the DCG shall meet at least once every quarter to discuss any changes to the plan, review the progress on work plans to meet the objectives of this DMP, and foster discussions among public agencies and industries for improving coordination and sharing knowledge.

I hereby affix our signature to declare that theBharuch District Chemical (Industrial) Disaster Management Plan is authorized on this XX Day of MMM, 2012.

Signatures

7.2 AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THE PLANThe Chairman of the DCG and DDMA appoints XXX as an overall responsible agency / person(s) for the maintenance and upkeep of this plan. The following representatives are appointed for this purpose. [insert a table of names, position and department]. It is the duty of such these appointed representatives to:

1. Possess a Master Copy of the Plan and ensure at all times that it is up-to-date

2. Ensure distribution of the latest plan copy to the SEOC, DEOC, all response agencies and line departments in the district and GSDMA, and obtain documentary evidence of their acceptance and agreement (for example, signature) of the plan document.

3. Keep detailed and up-to-date records of revisions or changes to the plan document and communicate such revisions to all the possessors of the plan.

4. Initiate a revision of the plan whenever it is due.

7.3 PLAN DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE1. The DDMA and GSDMA will maintain, distrib-

ute, and update this DMP but considering the synergies with offsite plan and the role of DCG in chemical emergency management DCGcanalsoprovidesignificanthelp. Offi-cials of stakeholder departments and agen-cies and industry representatives should recommend changes and provide updated information periodically.

2. Head of agencies and line departments at district level will have the ultimate respon-sibility to prepare an action plan and imple-ment the same to ensure that they will be abletofulfiltheassignedrole.

3. The district DMP (this document) will be re-viewed at least once annually by the SCG, DDMA and GSDMA members. The Bharuch


7 AUTHORIZATION AND PLAN MANAGEMENT

district DCG has decided on quarterly group meetings which can be used for planning re-view and update purposes. We recommend a meeting at least once in 45 days to be in com-pliance with CAEPPR Rules. Changes to this plan may be needed even before the annual review:a. When hazard consequences or risk areas

changeb. When the concept of operations for

chemical disasters changec. When departments, agencies, or groups

that perform disaster functions are reor-ganized and can no longer perform the emergency tasks laid out in this plan

d. When alert/warning or communication systems change

e. When additional disaster resources are obtained through acquisition or agree-ment

f. When the anticipated disaster resources are no longer available

g. When a mock drill or actual disaster re-veals significantdeficiencies inexistingplan

h. When state or national planning stand-ards or regulations are revised

7.4 RECORD OF ACCEPTANCEAll the undersigned accept and agree to the following:“This plan document is prepared in discussion with our department/agency/organization. We understand and accept the roles and responsibilities assigned to us for effective implementation of this plan.”

SR.

NO.

DEPARTMENT / AGENCY

/ ORGANIZATION

NAME OF

AUTHORIZED

REPRESENTATIVE

POSITIONSIGNATURE

AND DATE

Table 11. Record of Acceptance

7.5 RECORD OF CHANGESTable 12. Record of Changes

DATEDESCRIPTION OF

CHANGEPAGE OR SECTION

DATE WHEN THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

OF CHANGE FROM POSSESSORS OF THE

PLAN IS OBTAINED


7.6 STAKEHOLDERS AND POSSESSORS OF THE PLAN

The essential authorities and agencies whose participation is vital in any phase of disaster management as per the plan are collectively referred to as the stakeholders and/or possessors of this DMP.

1. GPCBRegionalOffice2. All members of District Crisis Groups3. DPO of DDMA

4. DPMC Ankleshwar and all LERTs (whenever established)

5. DEOC, ERC in Surat and Vadodara (whenever established)

6. Chairman and member secretary of all 4 LCGs in Bharuch

7. SEOC, SCG Member Secretary (via DISH head office),SERT

8. Others as identified by the DCG and DDMAtime to time

7 AUTHORIZATION AND PLAN MANAGEMENT


APPENDIX A: INDUSTRY AND HAZARD IDENTIFICATION SUMMARY

ID UNIQUE ID GIVEN TO EACH UNIT

Name of Unit Name of Unit

Type MAH, Type A or Type B on basis of list provided by DISH

Address Best known address of the unit

Latitude Latitude

Longitude Longitude

Name of Chemical Name of Chemical stored as per DISH data

Substitute ChemicalCorrected Name of the Chemical, alternate name of chemical or substitute

chemical used in ALOHA to model dispersion

Modelled in ALOHA Not modelled if no offsite consequences anticipated

Scenario ModelledList of 5 hazards that the chemical may pose. Tick mark indicates the hazards that can have offsite consequence for the given chemical and unit combination


APPENDIX B: ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF RESPONDERS IN THE NATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR OFFSITE EMERGENCY PLAN BY MOEF

This appendix can be used to link the roles of different authorities, departments, agencies and people with appropriate role as per IRT.

DISTRICT EMERGENCY AUTHORITY (DEA - DISTRICT COLLECTOR)

1. Take overall responsibility for combating the offsite emergency.

2. Ensure the Police and Fire, personnel combat the emergency.

3. Arrange, if necessary, for warning and evac-uating the public, through the Depart¬ment of Police.

4. Communicate with Media to disseminate vital information to public

5. Arrange for dispensing vital information to public using arrangements like mass-sms, pub-lic announcement using pre-recorded tapes

6. Direct the team of Doctors headed by the MedicalOfficer

7. Direct the local chief of State Transport Cor-poration to arrange for transport of victims and evacuation of people trapped within the hazard zone, if necessary.

8. Direct theElectricityBoardofficials to giveuninterrupted power supply.

9. Directtheofficialin-chargetoprovideunin-terrupted water supply as required.

10. If evacuation of population is necessary di-rect theRevenueofficerandtheSupplyof-ficertoprovidesafeshelters,foodandotherlife sustaining requirements for the evacu-ees, if required.

11. Co-ordinate with the media12. Arrange for, release and provide necessary

funds at various stages of disaster mitigation13. Direct railways to stop train, if required

POLICE 1. Communicate and co-ordinate with

i. MAH unit ii. DEAiii. Fire Servicesiv. Transport authoritiesv. Medical Departmentvi. Mediavii. Civil Defence and Home Guards.viii. Local Army establishment as required.

2. Warn and advice the people in the affected area. 3. Regulateanddiverttraffic.4. Arrange for evacuation5. Maintain law and order in the area.6. Ensure protection of life and property of evacuees7. Deal sternly with people exploiting opportun-

ism in wake of a disaster

FIRE SERVICE DEPARTMENT1. Performfirefightingoperationsbydeploying

men and appliances.2. Perform rescue operation in the affected area.3. Communicate and co-ordinate with Police,

Medical Department of necessary information4. Keep knowledge on appropriate response to

different chemical emergency scenarios5. Keep adequate stock and resource informa-

tion on necessary means, material, applianc-es required to deal with particular emergency situations with updated details of suppliers and stockists.

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT1. Arrange for preparing casualties to be sent to

government/private hospitals.2. Set up temporary medical camp and ensure

medical facilities at affected location and neighbourhood


3. Keep knowledge on appropriate response to dif-ferent cases of toxic consumption and injuries

4. Setuptemporarymortuary,identificationofdead bodies and post mortem.

FACTORY INSPECTORATE DEPARTMENT1. Provide necessary direction to MAH unit and

assistance to DEA, Fire Department, and Medical Department among others.

2. Seek help from and involve assistance of Technical Experts of relevant and appropri-ate expertise and specialization.

3. Initiate, facilitate and provide for investiga-tion into the accident.

OCCUPIER OF MAH UNIT1. Possess up-to-date copy of offsite emergency

plan.2. Communicate promptly, any foreseeable dis-

aster, to the DEA, Police, Fire Service and In-spector of Factories in-charge of the District.

3. Communicate changes within the factory thatmayrequireinclusionorsuitablemodifi-cation in the offsite plan to the DEA (Mainte-nanceOfficer)ofthePlan.

TECHNICAL EXPERTS 1. Promptly respond to provide the necessary

technical advice to MAH unit, DEA, Factory Inspectors, Fire Department, Medical Depart-ment among others.

2. Provide on-phone help after properly under-standing and assessing the situation.

3. Make visit to the site in co-ordination with DEA, Factory Inspector(s) to provide for ap-propriate technical assistance.

MUTUAL AID GROUPS1. To quickly mobilize the resources required to

emergency mitigation at the site or wherever required

POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD1. Project likely areas to be polluted.2. Carry out pollution assessment at suspected lo-

cations including soil, river and air assessment.3. Ensure controlling of long-term pollution damage.4. Identify unidentified substances, chemical

releases, if any.

TRANSPORT FLEET OWNERS INCLUDING STATE TRANSPORT

1. Act on the direction of DEA or Police2. Ascertain the extent of transport required with

pick-points, routes and destinations to transport people.

3. Promptly arrange for dispatch of vehicles with sufficientfuelforevacuationpurposes.

4. Arrange vehicles to transport water and other provision to camps set up

MEDIA1. Disseminate vital information to public on direc-

tion of DEA, Police and other Authorities2. Act responsibly in disseminating vital informa-

tion and dispel rumours, if any.

RAILWAYS1. Act as per the direction of DEA to stop incoming

trains, if required2. Arrange for evacuation, if required

TRANSPORTER OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL1. Possess up-to-date copy of offsite emer-

gency plan.2. Communicate promptly, any foreseeable dis-

aster during transportation to the DEA, Po-lice, Fire Service and Inspector of Factories in-charge of the District.

3. Communicate new assignments, newly add-ed routes or other changes that may require inclusionorsuitablemodificationintheoff-site plan to the DEA (Maintenance Officer)of the Plan.

ELECTRICITY BOARD1. Arrange for uninterrupted power supply to the

plant, as required.2. Arrange for lighting; at temporary medical

camps etc.



3. Arrange for switching off power supply on re-quest from District Authorities

4. Take care of electrical equipment within the damaged zone.

TELECOMMUNICATION DEPARTMENT1. Ensure working of communication lines to en-

able effective communication between various responder agencies

AVIATION DEPARTMENT1. Mobilise resources such as helicopters for knock-

ing down vapour clouds etc.

CIVIL DEFENCE 1. Co ordinate with Police authorities.2. Extend help in evacuation.3. Arrange for round the clock security arrange-

ments in the affected and evacuation areas.4. Safeguard the properties and belongings of

evacuees.

HOME GUARDS1. Co ordinate with Police authorities.2. Extend help in evacuation.3. Arrange for round the clock security arrange-

ments in the affected and evacuation areas.4. Safeguard the properties and belongings of

evacuees.

NATIONAL DISASTER RESPONSE FORCE1. Carry out tasks for disaster mitigation as

required

LOCAL GOVERNMENT BODIES1. Mobilise necessary resources in emergency

mitigation2. Provide for community halls, town halls for

evacuees

NGOS1. Act as per the direction of DEA, Police and other

District Authorities2. Aid and assist the district authorities in emer-

gency mitigation.

PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT1. Ensureadequatewatersupplyforfirefighting.2. Arrange for drinking water for evacuated per-

sons at rallying posts, parking yards and evacu-ation centres.

3. Arrange water for cattle.

WATER SUPPLY BOARD1. Arrange for supply of water to evacuees and all

others involved in emergency control operations

CIVIL SUPPLIES DEPARTMENT1. Arrangement to provide food and clothing as

necessary, to the evacuees and all others in-volved in emergency controlling operations.

ANIMAL HUSBANDRY DEPARTMENT1. Arrange for taking care of cattle especially

dairy animals living in affected zone.2. If evacuation of cattle is required, identify the

evacuation area and shelter.3. Transport arrangements for evacuation.4. Fodder, drinking water arrangements for cattle.5. Arrange for veterinary doctor.

AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENT1. Arrange for protection of food grains and stand-

ing crops in the vulnerable zone.2. Give instructions, to farmers, if any.

REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY1. To investigate into the cause of road accident

involving hazardous goods carrier and take nec-essary action

OTHER MEMBERS OF DCG1. Assist and act as per directions of the District

Collector

COASTS GUARDS AND PORT TRUSTS (IN CASE OF EMERGENCY SITUATION IN COASTAL AREAS)

1. Co ordinate with Police authorities.2. Provide necessary help in emergency mitigation



APPENDIX C: SITE SAFETY PLAN TEMPLATE

• The Site Safety Plan below is a critical re-quirement and significantly meets the re-quirement for Incident Action Plan recom-mended by NDMA under IRS.

• This SSP is involved and time consuming to complete. Therefore, it is prudent that this form be made a part of onsite submis-sion by industry with as much information as possible prefilled.

• Even if a prefilled SSP is available, the RC must ensure accuracy of the same. Often

in case of units that do not submit onsite plans, road accidents or even domestic cases involving chemicals will not have pore-filled SSP.

• SSP is an incident specific form so it has to be filled for each incident.

• SSP can be filled in phases as more infor-mation becomes available over time dur-ing an incident.

• SSP should be submitted as a part action taken report.


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or

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t m

ines

□ O

ff-r

oad

vehi

cle

use

□ Cl

ande

stin

e dr

ug la

b□

Wor

king

ove

r or

nea

r w

ater

□ M

ould

□District-specificsafetyreq

uiremen

ts

(a

ttac

h to

SSP

)□

Oth

er (

inse

rt)

□ O

ther

(in

sert

)□

Oth

er (

inse

rt)

Expl

osio

n or

Fir

e Po

tent

ial:

□

Hig

h □

Med

ium

□

Low

□

Unk

now

n


Chem

ical

Pro

duct

s Re

spon

se W

ill U

se o

r St

ore

On

Site

: (

Atta

ch a

Mat

eria

l Saf

ety

Dat

a Sh

eet

[MSD

S] f

or e

ach

item

.)

□ Al

cono

x or

Liq

uino

x

□ Ca

libra

tion

gas

(M

etha

ne)

□

Hyd

roge

n ga

s

□ Is

opro

pyl a

lcoh

ol

□ H

ydro

chlo

ric

acid

(H

Cl)

□ Ca

libra

tion

gas

(Is

obut

ylen

e)

□ H

ouse

hold

ble

ach

(NaO

Cl)

□

Haz

Cat

Kit

□

Nit

ric

acid

(H

NO

3)

□ Ca

libra

tion

gas

(Pe

ntan

e)

□ Su

lfur

ic a

cid

(H2S

O4)

□

Mar

k I K

its

(num

ber?

) __

____

____

____

__

□ So

dium

hyd

roxi

de (

NaO

H)

□ Ca

libra

tion

gas

(4-

gas

mix

ture

)

□ H

exan

e

□ O

ther

(sp

ecif

y) _

____

____

____

____

____

_W

ARN

ING

: E

yew

ash

solu

tion

sha

ll be

rea

dily

ava

ilabl

e on

ALL

pro

ject

s w

here

cor

rosi

ves

(aci

ds o

r ba

ses)

are

use

d.

App

licab

le S

afet

y Pr

ogra

ms

and

Safe

Wor

k Pr

acti

ces

(SW

P). A

ttac

h to

SSP

:□

Dem

olit

ion

and

Dec

onta

min

atio

n□

Tre

nchi

ng a

nd E

xcav

atio

n Sa

fety

□ A

sbes

tos

Prot

ecti

on P

rogr

am□

Hau

lage

and

Ear

th M

ovin

g□

Lea

d Pr

otec

tion

Pro

gram

□ G

ener

al S

afe

Wor

k Pr

acti

ces

□ G

ener

al S

afe

Wor

k Pr

acti

ces

HAZ

WO

PER

□ SafeWorkPracticesforOfficeRespo

nders

□ S

afe

Dri

lling

Pra

ctic

es□

Saf

e D

irec

t Pu

sh (

Geo

Prob

e) P

ract

ices

□ W

orki

ng O

ver

or N

ear

Wat

er□

Use

of

Hea

vy E

quip

men

t□

Spe

cial

Sit

e H

azar

ds (

Fire

arm

s, R

emot

e Si

tes,

Min

es,

airc

raft

, et

c.)

□ S

afe

Elec

tric

al W

ork

Prac

tice

s□

Fal

l Pro

tect

ion

Prac

tice

s□

Por

tabl

e La

dder

Saf

ety

□ D

rum

and

Con

tain

er H

andl

ing

Prac

tice

s□

Fla

mm

able

Haz

ards

and

Igni

tion

Sou

rces

□ S

pill

and

Dis

char

ge C

ontr

ol P

ract

ices

□ H

eat

Stre

ss /

Col

d St

ress

/ P

reve

ntio

n of

Sun

Exp

osur

e□

Bio

haza

rds

□ U

nder

grou

nd S

tora

ge T

ank

Rem

oval

Pra

ctic

es□

Saf

e Li

ftin

g Pr

oced

ures

□ H

ydro

grap

hic

Dat

a Co

llect

ion

□ Permit-Req

uiredCo

nfine

dSpaceEn

tryPractices

□ Non

-Permit-Req

uiredCo

nfine

dSpaceEn

tryPractices

□ R

espi

rato

r Cl

eani

ng P

ract

ices

□ S

afe

Use

Pra

ctic

es f

or U

se o

f Re

spir

ator

s□

Res

pira

tor

Qua

litat

ive

Fit

Test

ing

Proc

edur

es□

Lab

orat

ory

Soil

Test

ing

Safe

Wor

k Pr

acti

ces

Empl

oyee

Tra

inin

g an

d M

edic

al R

equi

rem

ents

:

Basi

c Tr

aini

ng a

nd M

edic

al□

Init

ial 4

0 H

our

Trai

ning

□ 8

-Hou

r Su

perv

isor

Tra

inin

g (o

ne-t

ime)

□ C

urre

nt 8

-Hou

r Re

fres

her

Trai

ning

□ C

urre

nt M

edic

al M

onit

orin

g Cl

eara

nce

(inc

ludi

ng r

espi

rato

r us

e)□

Curr

ent

Firs

t Ai

d Tr

aini

ng

□ C

urre

nt C

PR T

rain

ing

□ C

urre

nt 8

-Hou

r Re

fres

her

Trai

ning

□ C

urre

nt R

espi

rato

r Fi

t-Te

st

Oth

er S

peci

fic

Trai

ning

and

Med

ical

Sur

veill

ance

Req

uire

men

ts□

Conf

ined

Spa

ce T

rain

ing

□ L

evel

A T

rain

ing

□ R

adia

tion

Tra

inin

g□

Indu

strySpe

cific

Spe

cialist______________________________________

□ As

best

os A

war

enes

s Tr

aini

ng□

Oth

er _

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

□

Oth

er _

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____


Mat

eria

ls P

rese

nt o

rSu

spec

ted

at S

ite

Hig

hest

Obs

erve

d Co

ncen

trat

ion

(spe

cify

uni

ts a

nd

sam

ple

med

ium

)

Expo

sure

Lim

it(s

peci

fypp

m o

r m

g/m

3)

IDLH

Lev

el(s

peci

fypp

m o

r m

g/m

3)

Prim

ary

Haz

ards

of

the

Mat

eria

l (exp

losive,fla

mmab

le,

corr

osiv

e, t

oxic

, vo

lati

le,

radi

oact

ive,

bioh

azar

d, o

xidi

zer,

or

othe

r)

Sym

ptom

s an

d Ef

fect

s of

Acu

te

Expo

sure

Phot

oion

izat

ion

Pote

ntia

l (eV

)

PEL

= p

pm,

REL

= p

pmTL

V =

[Ski

n] H

azar

d □

ppm

eV

PEL

= n

/a,

REL

= TL

V =

[Ski

n] H

azar

d □

PEL

=

REL

= TL

V =

[Ski

n] H

azar

d □

PEL

=

REL

= TL

V =

[Ski

n] H

azar

d □

PEL

=

REL

= TL

V =

[Ski

n] H

azar

d □

PEL

=

REL

= TL

V =

[Ski

n] H

azar

d □

PEL

=

REL

= TL

V =

[Ski

n] H

azar

d □

PEL

=

REL

= TL

V =

[Ski

n] H

azar

d □

Spec

ify

Info

rmat

ion

Sour

ces:

NIO

SH P

ocke

t G

uide

to

Haz

ardo

us C

hem

ical

s, S

epte

mbe

r 20

05 a

nd A

mer

ican

Con

fere

nce

of G

over

nmen

tal I

ndus

tria

l Hyg

ieni

sts

(ACG

IH).

“Th

resh

old

Lim

it V

alue

s an

d Bi

olog

ical

Exp

osur

e In

dice

s fo

r 20

09.”

Not

e: In

the

Exp

osur

e Li

mit

col

umn,

incl

ude

Ceili

ng (

C) a

nd S

hort

-Ter

m E

xpos

ure

Lim

its

(STE

L) if

the

y ar

e av

aila

ble.

Als

o, u

se t

he f

ollo

win

g sh

ort

form

s an

d ab

brev

iati

ons

to c

ompl

ete

the

tabl

e ab

ove.

A =

Air

IDLH

= Im

med

iate

ly d

ange

rous

to

life

or h

ealt

h

PEL

= Pe

rmis

sibl

e ex

posu

re li

mit

CARC

= C

arci

noge

nic

m

g/m

3 =

Mill

igra

m p

er c

ubic

met

er

ppm

= P

art

per

mill

ion

eV =

Ele

ctro

n vo

lt

NA

= N

ot a

vaila

ble

REL

= Re

com

men

ded

expo

sure

lim

itU

= U

nkno

wn

NE

= N

one

esta

blis

hed

S =

Soil

TLV

= Th

resh

old

limit

val

ue


Not

e: I

f no

con

ting

ency

leve

l of

prot

ecti

on is

sel

ecte

d, a

ll Re

spon

ders

cov

ered

und

er t

his

plan

mus

t ev

acua

te t

he im

med

iate

sit

e ar

ea if

air

co

ntam

inan

t le

vels

req

uire

upg

radi

ng P

PE.

Fiel

d A

ctiv

itie

s Co

vere

d U

nder

thi

s SS

P:

Task

Des

crip

tion

Leve

l of

Prot

ecti

onD

ate

of A

ctiv

itie

sPr

imar

yCo

ntin

genc

y

1□

A □

B □

C

□ D

□ A

□

B □

C

□ D

2□

A □

B □

C

□ D

□ A

□

B □

C

□ D

3□

A □

B □

C

□ D

□ A

□

B □

C

□ D

4□

A □

B □

C

□ D

□ A

□

B □

C

□ D

5□

A □

B □

C

□ D

□ A

□

B □

C

□ D

Site

Per

sonn

el a

nd R

espo

nsib

iliti

es (

Incl

ude

Resp

onde

rs f

rom

the

Res

pons

ible

Par

ty):

Resp

onde

r N

ame

and

Loca

tion

Task

(s)

Resp

onsi

bilit

ies

IC SSO

OPSOfficer

Entr

y Te

amD

econ

Tea

m

• • • • • •

Not

e:

See

next

pag

e fo

r de

tails

on

leve

ls o

f pr

otec

tion


NO

TE:

Con

ting

ency

leve

l of

prot

ecti

on s

ecti

on s

houl

d be

com

plet

ed o

nly

if t

he u

pgra

ded

leve

l of

prot

ecti

on is

imm

edia

tely

ava

ilabl

e at

the

job

sit

e. I

f no

con

ting

ency

leve

l of

prot

ecti

on is

den

oted

, al

l res

pond

ers

cove

red

unde

r th

is S

SP m

ust

evac

uate

the

imm

edia

te s

ite

area

if a

ir c

onta

min

ant

leve

ls

wou

ld r

equi

re a

n up

grad

e of

PPE

.

Prot

ecti

ve E

quip

men

t: (

Indi

cate

typ

e or

mat

eria

l as

nece

ssar

y fo

r ea

ch t

ask.

)

Task

#Pr

imar

y Le

vel

of P

rote

ctio

n(A

,B,C

,D)

PPE

Com

pone

nt D

escr

ipti

on (

Prim

ary)

Cont

inge

ncy

Leve

l of

Prot

ecti

on(A

, B,

C,

D)

PPE

Com

pone

nt D

escr

ipti

on (

Cont

inge

ncy)

Resp

irat

or t

ype:

Ca

rtri

dge

type

(if

app

licab

le):

CP

C m

ater

ial:

G

love

mat

eria

l(s)

:Bo

ot m

ater

ial:

O

ther

:

Resp

irat

or t

ype:

Ca

rtri

dge

type

(if

app

licab

le):

CP

C m

ater

ial:

G

love

mat

eria

l(s)

:Bo

ot m

ater

ial:

O

ther

:

Resp

irat

or t

ype:

Ca

rtri

dge

type

(if

app

licab

le):

CP

C m

ater

ial:

G

love

mat

eria

l(s)

:Bo

ot m

ater

ial:

O

ther

:

Resp

irat

or t

ype:

Ca

rtri

dge

type

(if

app

licab

le):

CP

C m

ater

ial:

G

love

mat

eria

l(s)

:Bo

ot m

ater

ial:

O

ther

:

Resp

irat

or t

ype:

Ca

rtri

dge

type

(if

app

licab

le):

CP

C m

ater

ial:

G

love

mat

eria

l(s)

:Bo

ot m

ater

ial:

O

ther

:

Resp

irat

or t

ype:

Ca

rtri

dge

type

(if

app

licab

le):

CP

C m

ater

ial:

G

love

mat

eria

l(s)

:Bo

ot m

ater

ial:

O

ther

:

Resp

irat

or t

ype:

Ca

rtri

dge

type

(if

app

licab

le):

CP

C m

ater

ial:

G

love

mat

eria

l(s)

:Bo

ot m

ater

ial:

O

ther

:

Resp

irat

or t

ype:

Ca

rtri

dge

type

(if

app

licab

le):

CP

C m

ater

ial:

G

love

mat

eria

l(s)

:Bo

ot m

ater

ial:

O

ther

:

Resp

irat

or N

otes

:Res

pira

tor

cart

ridg

es m

ay o

nly

be u

sed

for

a m

axim

um t

ime

of 8

hou

rs o

r on

e w

ork

shif

t, w

hich

ever

is

less

, an

d m

ust

be d

isca

rded

at

that

ti

me.

For

job

sit

es w

ith

orga

nic

vapo

urs,

res

pira

tor

cart

ridg

es m

ay b

e us

ed a

s de

scri

bed

in t

his

note

as

long

as

the

conc

entr

atio

n is

les

s th

an 2

00 p

arts

per

million(ppm

),the

boilin

gpo

intisgreatertha

n70°Ce

lsius,and

the

relativehu

midityisle

sstha

n85percent.Ifanyoftheselevelsareexcee

ded,asite-specific

resp

irat

or c

artr

idge

cha

nge-

out

sche

dule

mus

t be

dev

elop

ed a

nd in

clud

ed in

the

SSP

.

Not

es:

All l

evel

s of

pro

tect

ion

mus

t in

clud

e ey

e, h

ead,

and

foo

t pr

otec

tion

.

CPC

= Ch

emic

al p

rote

ctiv

e cl

othi

ngTh

ermolum

inescentDosim

eter(TL

D)Ba

dgesm

ustbe

worndu

ringallfie

ldactivitieson

siteswithradiationha

zards.T

LDsmustbe

wornun

derCP

C.


Mon

itor

ing

Equi

pmen

t: A

ll m

onit

orin

g eq

uipm

ent

on s

ite

mus

t be

cal

ibra

ted

befo

re a

nd a

fter

eac

h us

e an

d re

sult

s re

cord

ed in

the

sit

e lo

gboo

k

Inst

rum

ent

(Che

ck a

ll re

quir

ed)

Task

Inst

rum

ent

Read

ing

Act

ion

Gui

delin

eCo

mm

ents

□ Co

mbu

stib

le g

as in

dica

tor

mod

el:

□ 1

□ 2

□ 3

□ 4

□ 5

0 to

10%

LEL

Mon

itor;evacua

teifcon

fined

spa

ce

10 t

o 25

% LE

LPo

tent

ial e

xplo

sion

haz

ard;

not

ify

SSC

>25%

LEL

Expl

osio

n ha

zard

; in

terr

upt

task

; ev

acua

te

site

; no

tify

SSO

and

DSO

□ O

xyge

n m

eter

mod

el:

□ 1

□ 2

□ 3

□ 4

□ 5

>23.

5% O

xyge

nPotentialfi

rehazard;evacuatesite

23.5

to

19.5

% O

xyge

nO

xyge

n le

vel n

orm

al

<19.

5% O

xyge

nOxygende

ficiency;in

terrup

ttask;evacua

te

site

; no

tify

SSO

and

DSO

□ Ra

diat

ion

surv

ey m

eter

mod

el:

□ 1

□ 2

□ 3

□ 4

□ 5

Nor

mal

bac

kgro

und

Proc

eed

Annu

al e

xpos

ure

not

to e

xcee

d 1,

250

mre

m

per

quar

ter

Back

grou

nd r

eadi

ng m

ust

be t

aken

in a

n ar

ea

know

n to

be

free

of

radi

atio

n so

urce

s.

Two

to t

hree

tim

es

back

grou

ndN

otif

y SS

C

>Thr

ee t

imes

bac

kgro

und

Radi

olog

ical

haz

ard;

inte

rrup

t ta

sk;

evac

uate

si

te;

noti

fy S

SO a

nd D

SO

□ Ph

otoi

oniz

atio

n de

tect

or m

odel

:□

11.7

eV

□ 1

0.6

eV□

10.2

eV

□

9.8

eV□

Oth

er (

spec

ify)

: __

____

____

__

□ 1

□ 2

□ 3

□ 4

□ 5

Any

resp

onse

abo

ve

back

grou

nd t

o 5

ppm

ab

ove

back

grou

nd

Leve

l B is

rec

omm

ende

dLe

vel C

a m

ay b

e ac

cept

able

Th

ese

acti

on le

vels

are

for

unk

now

n ga

ses

or v

apou

rs.

Afte

r th

e co

ntam

inan

ts a

re

iden

tifie

d,actionlevelssho

uldbe

based

on

thespecificcontam

inan

tsin

volved

.>

5 to

500

ppm

abo

ve

back

grou

ndLe

vel B

> 50

0 pp

m a

bove

ba

ckgr

ound

Leve

l A

□ Fl

ame

ioni

zati

on d

etec

tor

mod

el:

□ 1

□ 2

□ 3

□ 4

□ 5

Any

resp

onse

abo

ve

back

grou

nd t

o 5

ppm

ab

ove

back

grou

nd

Leve

l B is

rec

omm

ende

dLe

vel C

a m

ay b

e ac

cept

able

Thes

e ac

tion

leve

ls a

re f

or u

nkno

wn

gase

s or

vap

ours

. Af

ter

the

cont

amin

ants

are

iden

tifie

d,actionlevelssho

uldbe

based

on

thespecificcontam

inan

tsin

volved

.>5

to

500

ppm

abo

ve

back

grou

ndLe

vel B

>500

abo

ve b

ackg

roun

dLe

vel A

□ D

etec

tor

tube

mod

els:

□ 1

□ 2

□ 3

□ 4

□ 5

Spec

ify:

<

1/2

the

PEL

> 1/

2 th

e PE

L

Spec

ify:

The

acti

on le

vel f

or u

pgra

ding

the

leve

l of

prot

ecti

on is

one

-hal

f of

the

con

tam

inan

t’s

PEL.

If

the

PEL

is r

each

ed,

evac

uate

the

sit

e an

d no

tify

the

SSO

and

DSO

.

□ O

ther

(sp

ecif

y):

□ 1

□ 2

□ 3

□ 4

□ 5

Spec

ify:

Sp

ecif

y:

Not

es:

eV=

elec

tron

vol

t

LEL=

Low

er e

xplo

sive

lim

it

m

rem

=Mill

irem

PE

L=Pe

rmis

sibl

e ex

posu

re li

mit

ppm

=Par

t pe

r m

illio

n


Proj

ect-

Spec

ific

Indu

stri

al H

ygie

ne R

equi

rem

ents

Em

erge

ncy

Cont

acts

:

Tel

epho

ne N

o.

Chem

ical

Reg

ulat

ed b

y O

SHA

in U

SA:

Chec

k an

y pr

esen

t on

the

job

sit

e in

any

med

ium

(ai

r, w

ater

, so

il)

□ N

o ch

emic

als

belo

w a

re lo

cate

d on

the

job

sit

e□

Fria

ble

Asbe

stos

□ Si

lica,

cry

stal

line

□ al

pha-

Nap

thyl

amin

e□

Met

hyl c

hlor

omet

hyl e

ther

□ 3,

3’-D

ichl

orob

enzi

dine

(an

d it

s sa

lts)

□ bi

s-Ch

loro

met

hyl e

ther

□ be

ta-N

apth

ylam

ine

□ Be

nzid

ine

□ 4-

Amin

odip

heny

l□

Ethy

lene

imin

e□

beta

-Pro

piol

acto

ne□

2-Ac

etylam

inofl

ourene

□ 4-

Dim

ethy

lam

inoa

zobe

nzen

e□

N-n

itro

som

ethy

lam

ine

□ Vi

nyl c

hlor

ide

□ In

orga

nic

arse

nic

□ Le

ad□

Chro

miu

m (

VI)

□ Ca

dmiu

m□

Benz

ene

□ Co

ke o

ven

emis

sion

s□

1,2-

Dib

rom

o-3-

chlo

ropr

opan

e□

Acry

loni

trile

□ Et

hyle

ne o

xide

□ Fo

rmal

dehy

de□

Met

hyle

nedi

anili

ne□

1,3-

Buta

dien

e□

Met

hyle

ne c

hlor

ide

Med

ical

Mon

itor

ing

Phys

icia

n:

24-

hour

Ano

nym

ous

Haz

ard

Repo

rtin

g Li

ne:

N

atio

nal M

inis

try

of F

ores

try

and

Envi

ronm

ent:

D

istr

ict

Cont

rol R

oom

: P

oiso

n Co

ntro

l:

Fir

e de

part

men

t:

Pol

ice

depa

rtm

ent:

P

erso

nnel

Cal

l-D

own

List

: J

ob T

itle

or

Posi

tion

:

N

ame

Mob

ile P

hone

:DistrictSafetyOfficer:

Inci

dent

Com

man

der:

Officer(SSO

):

Res

pons

ible

Par

ty S

SO:

O

ther

: __

____

____

____

____

____

____

Med

ical

and

Sit

e Em

erge

ncie

s:

T

elep

hone

No.

Sign

al a

sit

e or

med

ical

em

erge

ncy

wit

h th

ree

blas

ts o

f a

loud

hor

n (c

ar h

orn,

fo

g ho

rn,

or s

imila

r de

vice

).

Resp

onde

rs s

houl

d ev

acua

te t

o th

e ra

lly p

oint

s as

des

igna

ted

on t

he s

ite

map

.

Hos

pita

l Nam

e:

Addr

ess:

G

ener

al P

hone

: Em

erge

ncy

Phon

e:

Ambu

lanc

e Ph

one:

H

ospi

tal c

alle

d to

ver

ify

emer

genc

y se

rvic

es a

re o

ffer

ed?

YES

□

NO

□ D

etai

led

Rout

e to

Hos

pita

l: (

see

Page

11

of 1

2 fo

r ro

ute

map

)

Not

e:

This

pag

e m

ust

be p

oste

d on

sit

e.


Site

Map

:


Hos

pita

l Rou

te M

ap:

Note:A

testdriveshou

ldbecond

uctedtoestab

lishagood

rou

tetotheho

spitallo

cation

.Verba

lverification

fromthe

hospitale

mergencyroom

sho

uldalso

be o

btai

ned

to e

nsur

e th

at t

he h

ospi

tal w

ill a

ccep

t ch

emic

ally

con

tam

inat

ed p

atie

nts.


APP

ROVA

L A

ND

SIG

N-O

FF F

ORM

Proj

ect

#: _

____

____

____

____

____

____

_

I hav

e re

ad,

unde

rsto

od,

and

agre

e w

ith

the

info

rmat

ion

set

fort

h in

thi

s P

lan

and

wil

l fo

llow

the

dir

ecti

on o

f th

e O

ffice

r (S

SO)

as w

ell

as p

roce

dure

s

and

guid

elin

es e

stab

lish

ed i

n th

e Sa

fety

Pol

icy

Man

ual.

I u

nder

stan

d th

e tr

aini

ng a

nd m

edic

al r

equi

rem

ents

for

con

duct

ing

fiel

d w

ork

and

have

met

the

se

requ

irem

ents

.

Nam

eCo

mpa

ny /

Age

ncy

/ O

rgan

izat

ion

Sign

atur

eD

ate

I hav

e re

ad,

unde

rsto

od,

and

agre

e w

ith

the

info

rmat

ion

set

fort

h in

thi

s P

lan

and

wil

l co

mpl

y w

ith

and

enfo

rce

this

SSP

, as

wel

l as

pro

cedu

res

and

guid

elin

es e

stab

lish

ed i

n th

e Sa

fety

Pol

icy

Man

ual.

N

ame

Si

te-S

peci

fic P

osit

ion

Si

gnat

ure

D

ate

Inci

dent

Com

man

der

Officer


ILLU

STRA

TIO

N P

URP

OSE

ON

LYEm

erge

ncy

Scen

ario

Des

crip

tion

: 1

0T C

hlor

ine

Bulle

t le

ak a

t N

aam

wal

a Ch

emic

als,

Gra

m,

Dis

tric

t (0

261)

SN

PE

RS

ON

AC

TIO

NC

OM

MU

NIC

AT

ION

PR

IMA

RY

ALT

ER

NA

TE

AC

TR

ES

OU

RC

EW

HO

MH

OW

WH

AT

1In

cide

nt

Cont

rolle

r (R

ahul

Paw

ar)

(Ana

nd S

axen

a)

a. A

tten

d to

leak

age

wit

h m

aint

enan

ce

team

.

a. T

eam

of

trai

ned

wor

kers

, eq

uipm

ent

for

repa

irs,

em

erge

ncy

kit,

lo

cal e

xhau

st,

SCBA

s, s

peci

al

quic

k se

ttin

g ce

men

t.

Site

Co

ntro

ller

INT:

202

, O

: 23

2432

, M

: 98

2324

3534

Chlo

rine

leak

fr

om p

ipe

of

bulk

sto

rage

tank

,flo

w

bein

g st

oppe

d te

mpo

rari

ly b

y us

ing

cem

ent,

tr

ansf

er b

eing

st

arte

d, H

elp

of

Fire

Bri

gade

for

fo

g an

d w

ater

cu

rtai

n ne

eded

, As

sess

ed q

uant

ity

spill

ed a

bout

300

kg

and

tha

t le

ak

may

sta

rt a

gain

if

cem

ent

give

s w

ay.

b. S

tart

tra

nsfe

r ac

tivi

ty.

b. P

erm

anen

t pi

ping

ar

rang

emen

t fo

r tr

ansf

er t

o ot

her

stor

age

vess

el.

c. U

se n

eutr

aliz

ing

med

ium

for

spi

lled

liqui

d, f

og a

nd

wat

er c

urta

in t

o pr

even

t sp

read

.

c. N

eutr

aliz

ing

med

ium

, ga

s sc

rubb

ing

arra

ngem

ent,

w

ater

for

cr

eati

ng f

og a

nd

wat

er c

urta

in.

APPENDIX D: PAC SHEET ILLUSTRATION FOR INDUSTRIAL EMERGENCY


SN

PE

RS

ON

AC

TIO

NC

OM

MU

NIC

AT

ION

PR

IMA

RY

ALT

ER

NA

TE

AC

TR

ES

OU

RC

EW

HO

MH

OW

WH

AT

2

Site

Con

trol

ler

(Kun

jan

Pars

i)

a. A

sses

s co

nseq

uenc

es

of t

he e

mer

genc

y,

the

area

like

ly t

o be

af

fect

ed p

rese

ntly

an

d if

esc

alat

ed -

in

clud

ing

zone

of

isol

atio

n, a

ddit

iona

l he

lp r

equi

red

from

re

spon

ding

age

ncie

s an

d m

utua

l aid

pa

rtne

rs.

a. T

empl

ates

, w

inds

ock,

pl

ant

and

area

m

ap

a. D

istr

ict

Colle

ctor

a. O

: 25

2483

,

R: 2

5421

8,

M

:988

1367

074

b. O

: 24

3454

,

R: 2

3543

4,

M

:932

4834

956

c. O

: 22

3241

,

R: 2

1232

4,

M

:978

6568

899

d. O

: 23

7548

,

R: 2

2484

4,

M

:992

1237

527

e. O

: 26

9874

,

R: 2

6325

4,

M

:976

6303

009

f. O

: 23

4353

,

R: 2

5345

3,

M

:983

4323

453

g. O

: 27

1258

,

R: 2

5451

4,

M

:982

3548

759

a-f.

The

nat

ure

of

emer

genc

y,

cons

eque

nces

, ar

ea li

kely

to

be

affe

cted

pre

sent

ly

and

if e

mer

genc

y is

es

cala

ted,

wha

t he

lp is

re

quir

ed

(Nee

raj

Pate

l)

b. C

oord

inat

e ac

tion

s w

ith

Inci

dent

Co

ntro

ller

for

staf

f, m

ater

ial,

eq

uipm

ent,

exp

erts

ad

vice

and

arr

ange

fo

r he

lp.

b. In

tern

al

tele

phon

eb.

Pol

ice

g.

Nat

ure

of e

mer

genc

y,

area

like

ly t

o be

aff

ecte

d an

d pr

ecau

tion

s to

be

take

n by

pub

lic a

t la

rge

c. I

dent

ify

if a

ll w

orke

rs a

re s

afe

and

arra

nge

for

resc

ue

whe

re n

eces

sary

.

c. T

rans

port

for

in

jure

dc.

Fir

e Br

igad

e

d. A

rran

ge

com

mun

icat

ion

cent

re f

or m

edia

, fa

mili

es.

d. C

omm

unic

atio

n ce

ntre

d. M

edic

al

Officer

e. F

acto

ry

Insp

ecto

r

f. M

utua

l Aid

re

pres

enta

tive

g. M

edia


SN

PE

RS

ON

AC

TIO

NC

OM

MU

NIC

AT

ION

PR

IMA

RY

ALT

ER

NA

TE

AC

TR

ES

OU

RC

EW

HO

MH

OW

WH

AT

3

Dis

tric

t Co

llect

or

Asst

. D

istr

ict

Colle

ctor

(S

hyam

M

itta

l)

a.Con

firmtha

tPo

lice,

Fire

Bri

gade

and

Med

icalOfficerha

ve

rece

ived

info

rmat

ion

and

acti

vate

d th

eir

Plan

. D

irec

t th

em

suit

ably

.

a-d.

Are

a m

ap,

vuln

erab

ility

te

mpl

ates

, te

leph

ones

a. P

olic

e

a. O

: 24

3454

,

R: 2

3543

4,

M

:932

4834

956

b.

O:

2232

41,

R:

212

324,

M:9

7865

6889

9

c. O

: 23

7548

,

R: 2

2484

4,

M

:992

1237

527

d.

O:

2425

87,

R:

284

522,

M:9

8658

4213

5

e. E

lect

rici

ty

boardoffic

ials

f. O

: 26

5489

,

R: 2

5482

4,

M

:988

1568

748

g.

O:

2715

48,

R:

254

621,

M:9

9215

7846

8

h. O

: 26

9387

,

R: 2

4215

4,

M

:992

2458

789

i.

O:

2712

58,

R:

254

514,

M:9

8235

4875

9

j. O

: 26

5398

,

R: 2

7468

2,

M

:936

8754

125

a. In

form

Pol

ice

abou

t na

ture

of

emer

genc

y, p

ersi

stin

g w

ind

dire

ctio

n, a

ffec

ted

area

s,

isol

atio

n ar

ea,

arra

ngem

ent

for

war

ning

and

pre

para

tion

fo

r ev

acua

tion

.

(Asi

m S

heik

h)

b. D

irec

t co

ncer

ned

Revenu

eoffic

ial

for

evac

uati

on,

shel

teri

ng

arra

ngem

ent

whe

reve

r ne

cess

ary.

e. C

omm

unic

atio

n ce

ntre

b. F

ire

Brig

ade

b. In

form

Fir

e Br

igad

e ab

out

natu

re o

f em

erge

ncy,

win

d di

rect

ion,

cas

ualt

ies

in t

he

fact

ory,

res

cue

requ

irem

ent,

m

itig

atio

n re

quir

emen

ts.

c. M

onit

or s

itua

tion

at

fact

ory

cont

inuo

usly

an

d in

the

aff

ecte

d ar

ea a

nd is

sues

di

rect

ions

to

resp

onde

rs

c.Med

icalofficer

c.In

form

med

icalofficer

abou

t na

ture

of

emer

genc

y,

casu

alti

es in

the

fac

tory

, ar

ea li

kely

to

be a

ffec

ted.

Directmed

icalofficerto

aler

t ho

spit

als

in t

he a

rea.

d. R

equi

siti

on f

rom

Au

thor

itie

s an

d Ag

enci

es (

both

G

over

nmen

t an

d Pr

ivat

e) s

uch

as

Tran

spor

tati

on,

Wat

er,

Elec

tric

ity

Prov

ider

s as

ne

cess

ary.

d. S

tate

Tr

ansp

ort

depo

t m

anag

er

d. In

form

Sta

te T

rans

port

dep

ot

man

ager

abo

ut n

atur

e of

em

erge

ncy,

like

ly a

ffec

ted

area

. D

irec

t hi

m t

o ke

ep

buse

s re

ady

wit

h dr

iver

s,

full

wit

h fu

el a

nd a

wai

t in

stru

ctio

ns f

rom

DC/

polic

e.

e.Ar

rang

e M

edia

Cen

tre

to g

ive

info

rmat

ion

to m

edia

, pu

blic

, fa

mili

es.

e. E

lect

rici

ty

boardoffic

ials

e. D

irec

t el

ectr

icit

y bo

ard

offic

ialstoen

surecon

stan

tel

ectr

ic s

uppl

y to

the

are

a.


SN

PE

RS

ON

AC

TIO

NC

OM

MU

NIC

AT

ION

PR

IMA

RY

ALT

ER

NA

TE

AC

TR

ES

OU

RC

EW

HO

MH

OW

WH

AT

3

f. W

ater

sup

ply

offic

er

(M

r. A

run

Iyer

)

f.Directwatersup

plyoffic

er

to e

nsur

e co

ntin

uous

wat

er

supp

ly w

ith

prop

er p

ress

ure.

g.Sup

plyoffic

er

(Rev

enue

Dep

t.)

(Mr.

S.G

.Kul

karn

i)

g.Alertsup

plyoffic

er(revenu

ede

pt.)

and

inst

ruct

him

to

be

read

y to

arr

ange

to

evac

uate

pe

ople

in c

oord

inat

ion

wit

h po

lice

and

to a

rran

ge f

or

prov

idin

g sa

fe s

helt

ers,

foo

d.

h. S

tati

on M

aste

r,

Anan

dnag

ar

h. D

irec

t st

atio

n m

aste

r,

Anan

dnagartostop

the

traffic

on t

he r

ailw

ay li

ne p

assi

ng

thro

ugh

the

area

like

ly t

o be

af

fect

ed.

i. M

edia

i. A

rran

ge f

or in

form

ing

publ

ic

thro

ugh

loca

l cab

le T

V, S

MS,

lo

cal F

M R

adio

, PA

sys

tem

.

j. O

utsi

de D

istr

ict

Auth

orit

ies

(nei

ghbo

urin

g di

stri

cts,

Sta

te

auth

orit

y)

j. R

eque

st f

or a

ll ad

diti

onal

he

lp r

equi

red

to m

itig

ate

the

emer

genc

y

4Fi

re B

riga

de

Chie

f

Dep

uty

Fire

Chi

ef

(Pur

shot

tam

Ag

arw

al)

a. A

rran

ge f

or w

ater

cu

rtai

ns a

nd f

og

arou

nd t

he s

pille

d liq

uid

chlo

rine

in

asso

ciat

ion

wit

h th

e factoryfireteam

.

a. W

ater

, no

zzle

s fo

r fo

g an

d curtain,fire

tend

ers,

SC

BAs.

a. F

ire

Brig

ade

(nei

ghbo

urin

g D

istr

ict)

a. O

: 22

3241

, R:

212

324,

M

:978

6568

899

b. O

: 23

7548

, R:

224

844,

M

:992

1237

527

c. O

: 25

2483

, R:

254

218,

M

:988

1367

074

a.Req

uestforfireten

ders.


SN

PE

RS

ON

AC

TIO

NC

OM

MU

NIC

AT

ION

PR

IMA

RY

ALT

ER

NA

TE

AC

TR

ES

OU

RC

EW

HO

MH

OW

WH

AT

4

(Dha

naja

y Ta

mbe

)

b. R

escu

e th

e af

fect

ed

pers

ons.

Eva

cuat

e th

em a

nd o

ther

ca

sual

ties

and

han

d ov

er t

o m

edic

al

team

.

b. F

ire

tend

er

wit

h ex

tend

ible

la

dder

s, S

CBAs

, st

retc

hers

, ar

rang

emen

t to

low

er t

he

stre

tche

rs f

rom

he

ight

.

b.Med

icalOfficer

b. In

form

loca

tion

of

affe

cted

, re

scue

d pe

rson

s.

c. D

istr

ict

Colle

ctor

c. R

eque

st f

or a

ddit

iona

l as

sist

ance

fro

m

Fire

Bri

gade

of

neig

hbou

ring

cit

ies,

di

stri

cts

if r

equi

red.

5.

Polic

e Su

peri

nten

dent

Dep

uty

Polic

e Su

peri

nten

dent

(S

heel

a Sa

gar)

a. C

ordo

n of

f a

rea,

stop

trafficgoing

tow

ards

aff

ecte

d ar

ea.

a. B

arri

cade

sa.

Com

man

dant

H

ome

Gua

rds

a. O

: 27

4521

,

R: 2

6562

8,

M

:932

6587

418

b. O

: 27

1258

,

R: 2

6587

4,

M

:982

3587

458

c. O

: 27

4485

,

R: 2

6658

2,

M

:992

1587

485

d. O

: 25

2483

,

R: 2

5421

8,

M

:988

1367

074

e. O

: 27

5624

, R:

254

824,

M

:989

0254

781

a. In

form

whe

re t

hey

are

need

ed a

nd a

bout

ac

tion

to

be t

aken

.

(Bhu

pind

er

Sing

h)b.

Arr

ange

for

war

ning

pu

blic

.b.PAsystem

fixed

on a

jee

pb.

Com

man

dant

Ci

vil D

efen

ce

b. In

form

whe

re t

hey

are

need

ed a

nd a

bout

ac

tion

to

be t

aken

.

c. A

rran

ge f

or

pers

onne

l at

vari

ous

spot

s to

mai

ntai

n la

w a

nd o

rder

.

c-e.

Pol

ice

Pers

onne

l,

vehi

cles

c. S

tate

Tra

nspo

rt

Man

ager

c. R

eque

st t

o ar

rang

e bu

ses

to e

vacu

ate

peop

le f

rom

pub

lic

cong

rega

tion

and

hu

tmen

ts.

d. S

end

Polic

e to

pu

blic

con

greg

atio

n to

ask

the

m t

o st

ay

confi

ned.

f. T

elep

hone

d. D

istr

ict

Colle

ctor

d. In

form

gro

und-

stat

us a

nd r

eque

st

for

addi

tion

al

arra

ngem

ents

or

mea

sure

s to

be

take

n.


SN

PE

RS

ON

AC

TIO

NC

OM

MU

NIC

AT

ION

PR

IMA

RY

ALT

ER

NA

TE

AC

TR

ES

OU

RC

EW

HO

MH

OW

WH

AT

5

e. M

ake

arra

ngem

ents

to

eva

cuat

e dw

elle

rs

from

nei

ghbo

urin

g hu

tmen

ts,

whi

ch a

re

likel

y to

be

affe

cted

. H

and

over

cha

rge

of

evac

uees

to

reve

nue

offic

er.

e. N

eigh

bour

ing

Dis

tric

t H

eadq

uart

ers

e. In

form

em

erge

ncy

and

ask

for

addi

tion

al s

taff

an

d re

sour

ces

f. I

nter

act

cont

inuo

usly

w

ith

site

con

trol

ler

and

Dis

tric

t Co

llect

or.

6.

Med

icalOfficer

Asst

. M

edic

al

Officer(Lee

la

Jain

)

a. A

rran

ge f

or

ambu

lanc

es,

doct

ors

and

staf

f.

a. A

mbu

lanc

es,

Doc

tors

, N

ursi

ng

staf

f

Iden

tifie

dho

spitals

and

doct

ors

a. O

: 25

4287

, R:

256

428,

M

:996

0254

713

a. In

form

abo

ut n

atur

e of

em

erge

ncy,

and

as

k th

em t

o be

rea

dy

for

trea

tmen

t. In

form

ab

out

likel

y nu

mbe

r of

cas

ualt

ies

and

ask

them

to

mak

e be

ds

avai

labl

e pr

ompt

ly,

disp

atch

am

bula

nces

an

d pi

ck u

p ca

sual

ties

in

coo

rdin

atio

n w

ith

Polic

e an

d ot

her

auth

orit

ies.

(Sm

riti

Jai

n)

b. A

rran

ge f

or

oxyg

en a

nd o

ther

re

quir

emen

ts

for

emer

genc

y tr

eatm

ent.

b. O

xyge

n Cy

linde

rs

7St

ate

Tran

spor

t M

anag

er

(Pra

bha

Rao)

Asst

. St

ate

Tran

spor

t M

anag

er

(Pun

it

Mal

hotr

a)

a. K

eep

vehi

cles

rea

dy

wit

h dr

iver

s an

d withsufficien

tfu

el.

Asce

rtai

n nu

mbe

r of

bus

es,

pick

poi

nts,

rou

tes

and

dest

inat

ions

fr

om D

istr

ict

Colle

ctor

and

Pol

ice.

D

ispa

tch

vehi

cles

w

ith

nece

ssar

y in

stru

ctio

ns t

o dr

iver

s as

dir

ecte

d by

Pol

ice

/ D

istr

ict

Colle

ctor

for

ev

acua

tion

, or

for

tr

ansp

orta

tion

of

prov

isio

ns.

a. B

uses

, w

ater

ta

nker

s, D

rive

rs.

a. P

olic

e/D

istr

ict

Colle

ctor

a. O

: 24

3454

, R:

235

434,

M

:932

4834

956

/ O

: 25

2483

, R:

254

218,

M

:988

1367

074

b. O

: 25

4872

, R:

274

215,

M

:976

6245

842

a. D

etai

ls o

f re

quir

emen

ts

of b

uses

, pi

ckup

poi

nts,

ro

utes

, de

stin

atio

ns


SN

PE

RS

ON

AC

TIO

NC

OM

MU

NIC

AT

ION

PR

IMA

RY

ALT

ER

NA

TE

AC

TR

ES

OU

RC

EW

HO

MH

OW

WH

AT

7b.

Arr

ange

for

mor

e ve

hicl

es

from

oth

er d

epot

s if

re

quir

ed.

b. T

elep

hone

b. O

ther

dep

ots

for

addi

tion

al

vehi

cles

b. R

equi

rem

ent

for

addi

tion

al v

ehic

les

8.

Fact

ory

Insp

ecto

r in

-cha

rge

of

Dis

tric

t (A

kash

Sa

tput

e)

Dep

uty

Fact

ory

Insp

ecto

r (M

anis

h G

iri)

a. V

isit

sit

e in

coo

rdin

atio

n w

ith

tech

nica

l exp

erts

.a.

Tra

nspo

rt

arra

ngem

ent.

a. E

xper

tsa.

O:

2644

89,

R:

272

548,

M:9

3265

4871

3

b. O

: 25

4687

, R:

269

824,

M

:942

2875

414

a. In

form

abo

ut

emer

genc

y an

d se

ek t

heir

tec

hnic

al

advi

ce.

b. In

vest

igat

e ac

cide

nt in

due

co

urse

.b.

Inve

stig

atio

n fo

rmb.

Mut

ual A

id

Mem

bers

b. D

irec

t to

pro

vide

as

sist

ance

in h

andl

ing

emer

genc

y.

9Te

chni

cal

Expe

rt (

Kam

al

Men

on)

(Tas

lim

Shet

ty),

(P

rita

m K

aur)

a. R

espo

nd w

ith

appr

opri

ate

tech

nica

l adv

ice

to t

he

fact

ory,

Dis

tric

t Co

llect

or,

Polic

e, F

ire

Brig

ade,

med

icalofficer,factory

insp

ecto

r.

a. O

wn

expe

rtis

e,

tech

nica

l re

fere

nce

libra

ry,

inte

rnet

fac

ility

, te

leph

one

a. F

acto

ry

a. O

: 27

1254

, R:

271

486,

M

:988

1574

825

b. O

: 26

9874

, R:

263

254,

M

:976

6303

009

c. O

: 25

2483

, R:

254

218,

M

:988

1367

074

d. O

: 22

3241

, R:

212

324,

M

:978

6568

899

e. O

: 23

7548

, R:

224

844,

M

:992

1237

527

a-e.

Tec

hnic

al a

dvic

e fo

r ha

ndlin

g em

erge

ncy

b. V

isit

sit

e in

coo

rdin

atio

n w

ith

Dis

tric

t Co

llect

or,

Fact

ory

Insp

ecto

r to

pr

ovid

e ne

cess

ary

advi

ce.

b. V

ehic

leb.

Fac

tory

in

spec

tor

10.

Pollu

tion

Co

ntro

l Boa

rd

Mem

ber

(Gir

ija

Gav

asan

e)

Asst

. M

embe

r,

PCB

(Tej

as

Than

kur)

Proj

ect

area

s to

be

affe

cted

an

d m

onit

or c

hlor

ine

conc

entr

atio

n le

vels

at

vari

ous

spot

s

Mon

itor

ing

equi

pmen

t-

--


SN

PE

RS

ON

AC

TIO

NC

OM

MU

NIC

AT

ION

PR

IMA

RY

ALT

ER

NA

TE

AC

TR

ES

OU

RC

EW

HO

MH

OW

WH

AT

11El

ectr

icit

y Bo

ard

(Pra

bhu

D S

ilva)

(Nee

lam

Mun

i)En

sure

uni

nter

rupt

ed e

lect

ric

supp

ly t

o th

e fa

ctor

y an

d at

sh

elte

rs-

--

-

12

Anim

al

Hus

band

ry

(Jee

van

Gan

esh)

(Hel

en

Kejw

al)

Prov

ide

nece

ssar

y ca

re f

or

catt

le o

f th

e da

irie

s,

arra

nge

for

vete

rina

ry

doct

or.

-Ve

teri

nary

do

ctor

O:

3435

43,

L:

3456

54,

M:

9567

5456

79Lo

ok a

fter

the

cat

tle

13Ag

ricu

ltur

e D

epar

tmen

t (A

nish

Jad

hav)

(Man

deep

Ki

shor

)-

--

--

14

Civi

l Def

ence

an

d H

ome

Gua

rds

(Rit

a Ka

poor

)

(Raj

Rai

soni

)

a. C

o-or

dina

te w

ith

Polic

e an

d ar

rang

e to

controltraffic,assistin

evac

uati

on.

Mon

itor

ing

equi

pmen

t-

--

b. A

ssis

t Po

lice

for

secu

rity

of

evac

uate

d pr

oper

ty.

15PW

D/W

ater

Su

pply

(R

esha

mi S

ood)

(Dee

pak

Katt

i)a.

Ens

ure

cont

inuo

us w

ater

su

pply

wit

h ad

equa

te

pres

sure

for

Fir

e Br

igad

e.a.

Wat

er

--

-b.

Arr

ange

dri

nkin

g w

ater

at

shel

ters

.b.

Dri

nkin

g w

ater

c. E

nsur

e w

ater

for

the

ca

ttle

.c.

Wat

er f

or c

attl

e

16

Civi

l Sup

plie

s D

epar

tmen

t (R

ames

h M

ehen

dale

)

(Dili

p Sa

hani

)Ar

rang

e fo

r fo

od,

wat

er a

nd

othe

r ba

sic

amen

itie

s as

ne

cess

ary

for

evac

uees

Food

, w

ater

an

d ot

her

basi

c am

enit

ies

--

-


SN

PE

RS

ON

AC

TIO

NC

OM

MU

NIC

AT

ION

PR

IMA

RY

ALT

ER

NA

TE

AC

TR

ES

OU

RC

EW

HO

MH

OW

WH

AT

17

Mut

ual A

id

Gro

up c

o-or

dina

tor

(Kis

hor

Gup

ta)

(Mee

nal D

ev)

a. A

scer

tain

wha

t eq

uipm

ent,

mat

eria

l,

pers

onal

pro

tect

ive

equi

pmen

t ar

e re

quir

ed

and

arra

nge

to d

eliv

er it

as

fas

t as

pos

sibl

e w

here

th

at m

ay b

e of

use

.

a. E

mer

genc

y re

spon

se

equi

pmen

ts,

PPEs

, SC

BAs,

Tr

aine

d pe

rson

nel,

Am

bula

nces

, Fi

re T

ende

rs.

a. A

ffec

ted

fact

ory

a. O

: 26

5842

,

R: 2

3568

4,

M

:953

5842

456

b. O

: 25

4875

,

R: 2

6524

8,

M

:996

6548

725

c. O

: 22

3241

, R:

212

324,

M

:978

6568

899

d. O

: 23

7548

, R:

224

844,

M

:992

1237

527

a. F

ind

out

wha

t is

nee

ded

(equ

ipm

ent,

mat

eria

l,

PPEs

).

b. R

ende

r te

chni

cal

assi

stan

ce.

b. T

echn

ical

ex

pert

ise.

b. M

embe

rs o

f th

e M

utua

l Ai

d G

roup

.

b. In

form

and

req

uest

to

deliv

er r

esou

rces

to

the

affe

cted

fac

tory

.

c. F

ire

Brig

ade

c,d.

Tec

hnic

al a

ssis

tanc

e fo

r ha

ndlin

g em

erge

ncy,

asc

erta

in

wha

t is

nee

ded

(equ

ipm

ent,

mat

eria

l,

PPEs

).

d.

Med

ical

Officer

18Ra

ilway

Sta

tion

M

aste

r (S

orab

M

ishr

a)

Asst

. St

atio

n M

aste

r (P

reet

i H

ubbe

)

a. S

top

trai

ns p

assi

ng

thro

ugh

the

affe

cted

are

a as

adv

ised

by

Dis

tric

t Co

llect

or.

a, b

) -

Dis

tric

t Co

llect

or

O:

2524

83,

R: 2

5421

8,

M:9

8813

6707

4 G

roun

d st

atus

rep

orti

ng

b. C

oord

inat

e w

ith

Polic

e if

ev

acua

tion

is n

eces

sita

ted.

19

Hea

d of

Loc

al

Gov

ernm

ent

Body

(G

ajan

an

Rath

od)

(See

ma

Mun

im)

Mob

ilise

re

sour

ces

requ

ired

un

der

the

cont

rol

of

the

body

lik

e bu

ses,

sh

elte

rs

(com

mun

ity

halls

, to

wn

hall,

sc

hool

s),

food

an

d w

ater

su

pply

Emer

genc

y Sh

elte

rs,

Food

and

W

ater

sup

ply

Dis

tric

t Co

llect

or

O:

2524

83,

R: 2

5421

8,

M:9

8813

6707

4

Find

out

res

ourc

es,

pers

onne

l hel

p re

quir

ed


SN

PE

RS

ON

AC

TIO

NC

OM

MU

NIC

AT

ION

PR

IMA

RY

ALT

ER

NA

TE

AC

TR

ES

OU

RC

EW

HO

MH

OW

WH

AT

20Te

leco

mm

unic

atio

n D

epar

tmen

t (D

olly

Dan

iels

)(R

ima

Redd

y)En

sure

tha

t co

mm

unic

atio

n lin

esareefficien

tlyworking

--

--

21

NG

O (

Gre

en C

ity

- Jy

oti K

umar

, Sa

ve P

lane

t -

Nit

u Pa

ndey

)

a) A

ssis

t em

erge

ncy

resp

onde

rs.

a, b

) -

--

-

b) H

elp

fam

ilies

of

casu

alti

es,

coun

sel v

icti

ms.

22

Med

ia (

Radi

o An

andn

agar

-

Man

u M

itra

, Ca

ble

Anan

dnag

ar -

La

vish

Jac

ob)

D

isse

min

ate

vita

l inf

orm

atio

n to

pub

lic in

a r

espo

nsib

le

man

ner

-Pu

blic

at

larg

eM

edia

cha

nnel

sPr

ecau

tion

s an

d ac

tion

s to

be

take

n by

pub

lic

Sour

ce:

MoE

F G

uide

line

s fo

r O

ffsi

te E

mer

genc

y Pl

ans,

201

0


APPENDIX E: PAC SHEET FOR TRANSPORT EMERGENCYIL

LUST

RATI

ON

PU

RPO

SE O

NLY

Emer

genc

y Sc

enar

io D

escr

ipti

on:

Nap

htha

15

kl t

anke

r le

ak o

n N

H 0

0 ne

ar S

ome

Road

at

Mile

ston

e 00

km

SN

PE

RS

ON

AC

TIO

NC

OM

MU

NIC

AT

ION

PR

IMA

RY

ALT

ER

NA

TE

AC

TR

ES

OU

RC

EW

HO

MH

OW

WH

AT

1In

cide

nt

Cont

rolle

r (R

ahul

Paw

ar)

(Ana

nd S

axen

a)

a. A

tten

d to

leak

age

wit

h m

aint

enan

ce

team

.

a. T

eam

of

trai

ned

wor

kers

, eq

uipm

ent

for

repa

irs,

em

erge

ncy

kit,

lo

cal e

xhau

st,

SCBA

s, s

peci

al

quic

k se

ttin

g ce

men

t.

Site

Co

ntro

ller

INT:

202

, O

: 23

2432

, M

: 98

2324

3534

Chlo

rine

leak

fr

om p

ipe

of

bulk

sto

rage

tank

,flo

w

bein

g st

oppe

d te

mpo

rari

ly b

y us

ing

cem

ent,

tr

ansf

er b

eing

st

arte

d, H

elp

of

Fire

Bri

gade

for

fo

g an

d w

ater

cu

rtai

n ne

eded

, As

sess

ed

quan

tity

spi

lled

abou

t 30

0 kg

an

d th

at l

eak

may

sta

rt a

gain

if

cem

ent

give

s w

ay.

b. S

tart

tra

nsfe

r ac

tivi

ty.

b. P

erm

anen

t pi

ping

ar

rang

emen

t fo

r tr

ansf

er t

o ot

her

stor

age

vess

el.

c. U

se n

eutr

aliz

ing

med

ium

for

spi

lled

liqui

d, f

og a

nd

wat

er c

urta

in t

o pr

even

t sp

read

.

c. N

eutr

aliz

ing

med

ium

, ga

s sc

rubb

ing

arra

ngem

ent,

w

ater

for

cr

eati

ng f

og a

nd

wat

er c

urta

in.


SN

PE

RS

ON

AC

TIO

NC

OM

MU

NIC

AT

ION

PR

IMA

RY

ALT

ER

NA

TE

AC

TR

ES

OU

RC

EW

HO

MH

OW

WH

AT

1D

rive

r,

(Dee

pak

Nai

k)

Co-d

rive

r (A

rjun

Ya

dav)

a. C

all t

he P

olic

e. R

eque

st

pass

ing

vehi

cles

to

info

rm t

he p

olic

e, if

ph

one

out

of r

ange

.

a. P

hone

a. P

olic

e Co

ntro

l Ro

om

a. O

: 24

3454

, R:

235

434,

M

:932

4834

956

b. O

: 27

4451

, R:

254

624,

M

:982

3658

422

a. T

he t

anke

r ca

rryi

ng h

ighl

y fla

mmab

leNap

htha

has

over

turn

ed,

ther

e is

leak

age

from

the

val

ve a

nd t

here

is

ada

ngeroffirean

dpo

ssible

expl

osio

n. D

etai

ls o

f lo

cati

on.

Traffic

hastobe

stopp

ed.

Repa

irs

need

ed a

nd s

pare

ta

nker

for

tra

nsfe

r of

mat

eria

l re

quir

ed.

Crow

d is

gat

heri

ng

and

need

s qu

ick

cont

rol.

b. S

top

vehi

cles

and

div

ert

traffic

awayfrom

leak

ing

tank

.

b. R

oad

bloc

king

ar

rang

emen

tb.

Empl

oyer

b. T

he d

etai

ls o

f th

e in

cide

nt

and

deta

ils o

f ex

act

loca

tion

.

c. W

arn

peop

le b

y pu

ttin

g up

dis

play

boa

rd s

tati

ng

'Dan

ger'.

c. D

ispl

ay b

oard

of

'Dan

ger'

2Po

lice

Cont

rol

Room

(Po

oja

Mad

hava

n)

Polic

e Co

ntro

l Ro

om

(Sum

an D

ev)

--

a. N

eare

st

Polic

e St

atio

n

a. O

: 24

3454

, R:

235

434,

M

:932

4834

956

b. O

: 25

2483

, R:

254

218,

M

:988

1367

074

c. O

: 22

3241

, R:

212

324,

M

:978

6568

899

d. O

: 23

7548

, R:

224

844,

M

:992

1237

527

e. O

: 23

4353

, R:

253

453,

M

:983

4323

453

a-e.

The

det

ails

of

the

inci

dent

an

d de

tails

of

exac

t lo

cati

on.

b. D

istr

ict

Colle

ctor

c. F

ire

Brig

ade

d. M

edic

al

Officer

e. M

utua

l Ai

d G

roup

co

-or

dina

tor


SN

PE

RS

ON

AC

TIO

NC

OM

MU

NIC

AT

ION

PR

IMA

RY

ALT

ER

NA

TE

AC

TR

ES

OU

RC

EW

HO

MH

OW

WH

AT

4

Lead

er o

f Po

lice

team

at

the

spo

t (V

ipul

D

Souz

a)

(Moh

an

Pate

l)a.Stoptraffic

fromboth

dire

ctio

ns.

a-d.

Sta

ff,

road

bl

ocki

ng

equi

pmen

t,

caut

iona

ry

boar

ds.

Polic

e co

ntro

l ro

om

O:

2434

54,

R: 2

3543

4,

M:9

3248

3495

6

Requ

est

for

rein

forc

emen

ts,

if

need

ed,

Upd

ate

on s

tatu

s at

sit

e.

b) C

ordo

n of

f ar

ea

to e

nsur

e th

at

peop

le a

re a

t sa

fe d

ista

nce.

b) C

ordo

n of

f ar

ea

to e

nsur

e th

at

peop

le a

re a

t sa

fe d

ista

nce.

c) E

nsur

e th

at

ther

e is

no

sour

ce o

f ig

niti

on li

ke a

sm

okin

g bi

di/

ciga

rett

e.

d) E

nsur

e th

at

ther

e is

no

bloc

kage

of

smoo

th a

rriv

al

of e

mer

genc

y re

spon

ders

.


SN

PE

RS

ON

AC

TIO

NC

OM

MU

NIC

AT

ION

PR

IMA

RY

ALT

ER

NA

TE

AC

TR

ES

OU

RC

EW

HO

MH

OW

WH

AT

5D

istr

ict

Colle

ctor

(A

shok

Mit

ra)

Assi

stan

t D

istr

ict

Colle

ctor

(M

eena

l G

ujar

)

Asce

rtai

n ty

pe

of a

ccid

ent

and

poss

ible

co

nseq

uenc

es

-

a. F

ire

Brig

ade

a. O

: 22

3241

, R:

212

324,

M

:978

6568

899

a-c.

Inf

orm

abo

ut t

he i

ncid

ent

etc.

, if

th

ey h

ave

not

rece

ived

it

earl

ier,

m

onit

or p

rogr

ess

of a

ctio

ns t

aken

.

b.Med

icalOfficer

b. O

: 23

7548

, R:

224

844,

M

:992

1237

527

d.

Info

rm

abou

t th

e in

cide

nt

and

loca

tion

, an

d di

rect

him

to

arra

nge

for

a cr

ane

and

a sp

are

tank

er.

Dir

ect h

im fu

rthe

r to

reac

h th

e sp

ot.

c. M

utua

l Aid

Gro

up

c. O

: 25

4687

, R:

269

824,

M

:942

2875

414

d. O

: 27

5424

, R:

256

524,

M

:992

2548

732

e. O

: 24

5248

, R:

265

624,

M

:982

2487

588

e. R

equi

siti

on f

or r

esou

rces

suc

h as

cr

ane,

spa

re t

anke

r w

ith

pum

ping

ar

rang

emen

t, if

req

uire

d

d. R

oad

tran

spor

t Au

thor

ity

f.

Inf

orm

abo

ut in

cide

nt a

nd d

irec

t to

se

ek a

ppro

pria

te t

echn

ical

adv

ice

e. P

rovi

der

of c

rane

, sp

are

tank

er

wit

h pu

mpi

ng

arra

ngem

ent

f. F

acto

ry in

spec

tor

6Fi

re B

riga

de

Chie

f (M

anu

Tand

on)

Dep

uty

in

char

ge-F

ire

Brig

ade

(Shy

am

Mit

tal)

Send

afire

tend

er t

o th

e sp

ot.

Fire

ten

der

--

-


SN

PE

RS

ON

AC

TIO

NC

OM

MU

NIC

AT

ION

PR

IMA

RY

ALT

ER

NA

TE

AC

TR

ES

OU

RC

EW

HO

MH

OW

WH

AT

7M

edic

al

Officer

(Kir

an J

oshi

)

Assi

stan

t M

edic

al

Officer

(Nar

esh

Sach

dev)

Arra

nge

to s

end

an a

mbu

lanc

e fr

om a

sou

rce

near

est

to t

he

spot

.

Ambu

lanc

eH

ospi

tals

(S

anje

evan

i Hos

pita

l)

O:

2452

56,

R: 2

5652

4,

M:9

9215

4587

4

Info

rm a

bout

the

inci

dent

. Re

ques

t th

em t

o be

in s

tate

ofrea

dine

ssifthe

rearefire/

expl

osiv

e ca

sual

ties

.

8

Road

Tr

ansp

ort

Auth

orit

y Ch

ief

(Man

ish

Katg

iri)

Dep

uty

offic

er,RTA

(Pri

tam

H

olgi

)

a. A

rran

ge f

or

reso

urce

s re

quir

ed s

uch

as c

rane

, sp

are

tank

er

wit

h pu

mpi

ng

arra

ngem

ent

a. R

esou

rce

dire

ctor

y

Nea

rest

pro

vide

r of

cra

ne,

spar

e ta

nker

wit

h pu

mpi

ng

arra

ngem

ents

O:

2663

54,

R: 2

5452

1,

M:9

8225

4878

5

Requ

isit

ion

for

cran

e,

spar

e ta

nker

wit

h pu

mpi

ng

arra

ngem

ent.

b. P

roce

ed t

o th

e sp

ot f

or

rend

erin

g as

sist

ance

b. V

ehic

le

c.

Init

iate

ac

cide

nt

inve

stig

atio

n

c.

Acci

dent

in

vest

igat

ion

repo

rt f

orm

at

9

Fact

ory

Insp

ecto

r (M

allik

arju

n Ra

o)

Dep

uty

Fact

ory

Insp

ecto

r (K

rish

na

Pand

it)

a. A

rran

ge f

or

tech

nica

l as

sist

ance

fr

om

tech

nica

l ex

pert

s

a. R

esou

rce

dire

ctor

y

--

-

b. D

irec

t M

utua

l Ai

d G

roup

to

ren

der

assi

stan

ce

b. T

elep

hone


SN

PE

RS

ON

AC

TIO

NC

OM

MU

NIC

AT

ION

PR

IMA

RY

ALT

ER

NA

TE

AC

TR

ES

OU

RC

EW

HO

MH

OW

WH

AT

10

Mut

ual A

id

Gro

up

Co-o

rdin

ator

(A

shok

An

and)

(See

ma

Roy)

a. A

rran

ge f

or

reso

urce

s re

quir

ed s

uch

as c

rane

, sp

are

tank

er

wit

h pu

mpi

ng

arra

ngem

ent

a. A

vaila

ble

reso

urce

sa.

Dis

tric

t

Co

llect

or

a. O

: 25

2483

, R:

254

218,

M

:988

1367

074

b. O

: 24

3454

, R:

235

434,

M

:932

4834

956

c. O

: 22

3241

, R:

212

324,

M

:978

6568

899

d. O

: 27

1254

, R:

265

254,

M

:989

0245

587

a-d.

Inf

orm

and

off

er a

vaila

ble

reso

urce

s

to

mit

igat

e th

e em

erge

ncy

b. P

roce

ed t

o th

e sp

ot w

ith

tech

nica

l ex

pert

s fo

r re

nder

ing

assi

stan

ce

b. V

ehic

les,

Tr

ansp

ort

arra

ngem

ent

b. P

olic

e

c.

Init

iate

ac

cide

nt

inve

stig

atio

n

c.

Acci

dent

in

vest

igat

ion

repo

rt f

orm

at

c. F

ire

B

riga

de

b. D

irec

t M

utua

l Ai

d G

roup

to

ren

der

assi

stan

ce

b. T

elep

hone

d. R

TA

11

Ow

ner

of

vehi

cle

invo

lved

in

abo

ve

acci

dent

(H

arsh

Iran

i)

Man

ager

at

Ow

ner's

fa

cilit

y (G

auta

m

Fira

ngpa

ni)

a. A

rran

ge f

or

reso

urce

s re

quir

ed s

uch

as c

rane

, sp

are

tank

er

wit

h pu

mpi

ng

arra

ngem

ent

a.

Avai

labl

e re

sour

ces

a. D

istr

ict

Co

llect

or

a. O

: 25

2483

, R:

254

218,

M

:988

1367

074

b. O

: 24

3454

, R:

235

434,

M

:932

4834

956

c. O

: 22

3241

, R:

212

324,

M

:978

6568

899

d. O

: 27

1254

, R:

265

254,

M

:989

0245

587

a-d.

Info

rm a

nd o

ffer

ava

ilabl

e re

sour

ces

to

mit

igat

e th

e em

erge

ncy


SN

PE

RS

ON

AC

TIO

NC

OM

MU

NIC

AT

ION

PR

IMA

RY

ALT

ER

NA

TE

AC

TR

ES

OU

RC

EW

HO

MH

OW

WH

AT

11

b. P

roce

ed t

o th

e sp

ot f

or

rend

erin

g as

sist

ance

b.

Vehi

cles

, Tr

ansp

ort

arra

ngem

ent

b. P

olic

ee.

O:

2544

85,

R: 2

7453

2,

M:9

9215

8742

1

e. I

nfor

m a

bout

inci

dent

det

ails

and

se

ek a

ssis

tanc

e

c. F

ire

Bri

gade

d. R

TA

e. N

eigh

bour

ing

owne

rs o

f su

ch

tran

spor

tati

on

com

pani

es

Sour

ce:

MoE

F G

uide

line

s fo

r O

ffsi

te E

mer

genc

y Pl

ans,

201

0


APPENDIX F: EXISTING RESPONSE RESOURCES AVAILABLE IN BHARUCHINFORMATION

BharuchCDMPispreparedwithavisionforainternationallevelofpreparednessforqualifiedandeffectiveresponse. We have recommended specialist teams, manpower, training, equipments and structures to achieve such a high level of response capability in this CDMP. The following is the resource available and listed as per Bharuch Offsite Plan prepared by the DCG in 2011. It is clear that main chemical response resources are available at MAH units as we have already assessed. However, it is not evident that these resources at MAH unitsarestandardizedforinteroperability,regularlytestedandmaintained,andaqualifiedteamistrainedin use of these. Further, the gap of specialist HAZMAT response resources in public agencies is highlighted with this data. However, this data – adopted from Bharuch offsite plan – is useful as a ready reckoner in case of emergencies “now”.


SN

NAME

PHONE

FIRE TENDERS

WATER (M3)

FIRE E SUITS

FIRE P SUITS

WATER HOSES

SCBA

CANI STERMASKS

FULL BODY PVC SUIT

AIRLINE BA

CHEMICAL SPLASH SUIT

EMERGENCYKIT

WATER GEL

M O B I L E PHONES, OTHERS

P A SYSTEM

SIREN (ELECT./HAND/STEAM)

VEHICLES

1Ac

mec

hem

Pvt

. Lt

d.(2

646)

27

2393

-30

--

-1

11

1-

--

1-

Yes

1

2Ac

me

Petr

oche

m P

vt.

Ltd.

(264

6)

2526

62-

100

--

2-

--

--

--

1-

-0

3Am

al P

rodu

cts

Lim

ited

(264

6)

2511

21-

350

--

34

21

23

-1

1;M

esse

nger

s-

Yes

4

4An

grej

i Nit

ro P

rodu

cts

(264

6)

2722

54-

20-

-2

1-

--

--

--

--

0

5Ap

ar In

dust

ries

Lim

ited

(264

3)

2704

42-

2213

-1

553

44

--

--

1-

1 (

1.5

Km

rang

e) a

nd 4

go

ngs

3

6BA

SF S

tyre

nics

Pvt

. Lt

d.(2

641)

25

6021

-32

80-

-10

22

66

--

1-

Hoo

ters

in

All

Bld

gs.

YYe

s1

7Be

ll Ce

ram

ics

Ltd.

(246

1)

2351

51-

2500

1-

-1

--

--

--

10

wir

eles

s se

tsY

-6

8Bi

rla

Cellu

losi

c Lt

d.(2

641)

27

0001

126

695

1-

1350

--

--

-2

Y1,

2 K

m

rang

e12

9Bo

dal C

hem

ical

s Pv

t.

Ltd.

, U

nit

– III

(2

646)

25

1269

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

-0

10Ch

emet

Che

mic

als

Lim

ited

(264

6)

2392

06-

70-

--

1-

-6

--

--

-Ye

s0

11Ch

emie

Org

anic

Ch

emic

als

Pvt.

Ltd

.(2

645)

22

6019

-60

0-

-4

4-

2-

-2

-1

YEl

ect.

be

ll2

Tabl

e 13

. R

esp

onse

Res

ourc

es A

vail

able

in

MA

H I

ndus

try

in B

haru

ch (

Fire

Fig

htin

g, P

PE,

Com

mun

icat

ion,

Veh

icle

s



SN

NAME

PHONE

FIRE TENDERS

WATER (M3)

FIRE E SUITS

FIRE P SUITS

WATER HOSES

SCBA

CANI STERMASKS

FULL BODY PVC SUIT

AIRLINE BA


EMERGENCYKIT

WATER GEL


P A SYSTEM


VEHICLES

12Ch

emin

ova

Indi

a Lt

d.

(For

mul

atio

n D

ivis

ion)

(264

6)

2724

76-

354

-1

103

66

16-

21

1Y

Yes

4

13Ch

emin

ova

Indi

a Lt

d.

(Int

erm

edia

tes

Div

isio

n)(2

646)

27

2536

-48

1-

149

51

638

42

1 se

t of

all

size

s1

-1

(1.

5 Km

ra

nge)

4

14Ch

emin

ova

Indi

a Lt

d.

(Tec

hnic

al D

ivis

ion)

(264

6)

2723

39-

353

1-

364

545

2045

21

4Y

1 (

2 Km

ra

nge)

5

15Cr

ysta

l Che

mie

Pvt

. Lt

d.(2

646)

22

0204

-15

0-

150

m

3-

--

2-

--

-Ye

s1

16Fi

com

Org

anic

s Li

mit

ed(2

646)

22

2168

-40

0-

-50

250

--

--

1.6m

x

1.2m

1 Fa

x-

1 El

ect.

3

17G

as A

utho

rity

of

Indi

a Li

mit

ed(2

641)

23

1015

612

600

-2

180

75

4-

2 LP

G

suit

s5

-1;

Wal

kie

Talk

ieY

29

18G

ujar

at A

lkal

ies

and

Chem

ical

s Li

mit

ed(2

641)

25

6282

-67

00-

32

1410

020

0-

-5

--

Y4

3

19G

ujar

at B

oros

il Li

mit

ed(2

645)

22

0300

-32

0-

-15

--

--

--

Yes

1-

Yes

12

20G

ujar

at C

hem

ical

Por

t Te

rmin

al C

ompa

ny L

td.

(264

1)

2566

043

1500

01

320

010

32

12

--

--

1 ea

ch

infire

stat

ion

and

cont

rol

room

3

21G

ujar

at G

lass

Pvt

. Lt

d.(2

644)

23

3313

-30

0-

1-

--

--

--

-2

-1

Elec

t.5

22G

ujar

at G

uard

ian

Lim

ited

(264

3)

2751

06-

3750

2-

302

3-

-2

2-

4Y

2 (2

Km

ra

nge)

16


...continued from page 126...


SN

NAME

PHONE

FIRE TENDERS

WATER (M3)

FIRE E SUITS

FIRE P SUITS

WATER HOSES

SCBA

CANI STERMASKS

FULL BODY PVC SUIT

AIRLINE BA


EMERGENCYKIT

WATER GEL


P A SYSTEM


VEHICLES

23G

ujar

at

Inse

ctic

ides

Li

mit

ed(

26

46

) 22

0032

-45

0-

-50

68

5030

53

51

-2

(2 K

m

rang

e)9

24G

ujar

at N

arm

ada

Valle

y Fe

rtili

zer

Com

pany

(

26

42

) 24

7001

513

000

12

600

6525

50

+ 2

gas

tig

ht

suit

s

258

2-

20;

2 w

al

ki

e-

talk

ies,

1 v-

sat

Y

Fix

ed

1si

ren

: 5

Km

ran

ge

, 4

sire

ns

: 2

Km

rang

e

39

25G

ujar

at

Pagu

than

En

ergy

Cor

pora

tion

Ltd

.(

26

42

) 28

8501

140

00-

317

58

23

--

--

10-

210

26G

wal

ior

Thio

nyl

(2

64

6)

2217

76-

30-

--

2-

--

31

-1

-Ye

s1

27H

arya

na

Shee

t G

lass

Li

mit

ed(

26

46

) 22

2497

-80

0-

--

--

--

--

Yes

1-

Yes

5

28H

euba

ch C

olou

r Li

mit

ed(

26

46

) 25

0563

-30

0-

-60

310

64

102

--

-1

(1

.5

Km

ra

nge)

8

29H

indu

stan

Pe

trol

eum

Co

rpor

atio

n Lt

d.(

26

46

) 27

4183

-70

00-

142

24

--

--

1-

-5

4

30H

rish

it In

dust

ries

(

26

46

) 25

1488

-20

0-

-7

--

--

--

--

--

0

31H

uber

Ch

emic

als

Indi

a Pv

t. L

td.

(2

64

5)

2260

88-

1100

--

352

-3

21

Firs

t a

id

box

-2

Y1

Elec

t.1

32Im

pro

Inte

rche

m

Pvt.

Lt

d.(

26

46

) 27

2425

-70

-1

2-

--

--

--

--

-0




SN

NAME

PHONE

FIRE TENDERS

WATER (M3)

FIRE E SUITS

FIRE P SUITS

WATER HOSES

SCBA

CANI STERMASKS

FULL BODY PVC SUIT

AIRLINE BA


EMERGENCYKIT

WATER GEL


P A SYSTEM


VEHICLES

33In

dian

O

il Co

rpor

atio

n Li

mit

ed(

26

41

) 23

1161

-28

271

133

1-

--

--

-1;

1w

alki

e ta

lkie

+

base

uni

t-

Fix

ed

2si

ren

s : 1

.5 K

m

ran

ge

, 3

sire

ns

: 0.

5 K

m

rang

e

0

34In

dian

O

il Co

rpor

atio

n Li

mit

ed(

26

42

) 28

8654

-11

100

--

912

-1

--

-3

-Y

2 el

ect

+ 18

ha

nd2

35In

dian

Pe

troc

hem

ical

s Co

rpor

atio

n Lt

d.(

26

41

) 25

6373

624

000

230

100

7550

5030

-5

-

3;

Wal

kie

Talk

ie

for

re

mo

te

area

s

Y2

elec

t,

1 ha

nd15

36H

inda

lco

Indu

stri

es L

td

(Uni

t :

Birl

a Co

pper

) (

26

41

) 25

6004

225

000

26

384

1550

50-

4-

31

YYe

s5

37In

doso

l Dru

gs L

imit

ed(

26

46

) 22

0885

--

1-

-2

--

--

2-

--

-0

38In

dust

rial

So

lven

ts

and

Chem

ical

s Lt

d.(

26

46

) 23

9554

-16

02

--

4-

--

--

--

-Ye

s1

39Io

n Ex

chan

ge In

dia

Ltd.

(2

64

6)

2513

65-

300

--

25

41

1-

1-

1Y

23

40JB

Ch

emic

als

and

Phar

mac

euti

cals

Ltd

.(

26

46

) 25

0011

135

0-

113

31

1-

32

11

-2

9

41Ja

isw

al

Phar

mac

hem

Lt

d (2

646)

-

--

--

--

--

-0

42Ka

bson

s In

dust

ries

Ltd

(2

64

2)

2785

04-

600

--

16-

--

--

--

--

20




SN

NAME

PHONE

FIRE TENDERS

WATER (M3)

FIRE E SUITS

FIRE P SUITS

WATER HOSES

SCBA

CANI STERMASKS

FULL BODY PVC SUIT

AIRLINE BA


EMERGENCYKIT

WATER GEL


P A SYSTEM


VEHICLES

43Ka

nori

a Ch

emic

als

and

Indu

stri

es L

td.

(2

64

6)

2530

12-

450

1-

183

75

4-

12

-Y

Yes

4

44Ko

san

Indu

stri

es L

td

(2

64

6)

2228

79-

200

--

-3

22

42

1-

1-

Yes

2

45KL

J O

rgan

ics

Ltd.

(2

64

5)

2260

46-

200

--

50

m-

--

--

--

--

-0

46La

ffan

s Pe

troc

hem

ical

s Lt

d.(

26

46

) 27

2429

-36

51

-4

22

--

--

--

-2

2

47M

erid

ian

Chem

-Bon

d Li

mit

ed(

26

46

) 22

5131

-80

--

-2

2-

--

--

--

Yes

0

48M

inol

Ac

ids

and

Chem

ical

s Pv

t. L

td.

(2

64

6)

2201

38-

200

--

-1

1-

1-

1-

1-

Yes

2

49M

iran

da

Amsa

w

Pvt.

Lt

d.(

26

46

) 23

9051

-50

-1

6-

--

--

--

1-

Yes

1

50N

arm

ada

Chem

atur

Pe

troc

hem

ical

s Lt

d.(

26

42

) 24

7181

150

00-

220

037

250

100

502

4-

10Y

Fix

ed

2si

ren

s :

5 Km

ra

ng

e,

5 si

rens

:

2 Km

ra

nge

7

51N

atio

nal

Ther

mal

Pow

er

Corp

orat

ion

Ltd.

(2

64

2)

2874

012

1200

00-

212

710

2520

2-

2-

-Y

1 el

ect,

2

hand

9

52N

avje

evan

O C

hem

(2

64

6)

2501

78-

25-

--

32

--

-1

-1

-Ye

s1

53Pa

noli

Inte

rmed

iate

s (I

) Pv

t. L

td.

(2

64

5)

2260

92-

200

--

122

41

3-

1-

1; 1

fax

-Ye

s2

54Pa

noli

Prod

ucts

Pvt

. Lt

d.(

26

46

) 27

2685

-10

0-

--

26

21

11

-1;

1 f

ax-

Yes

1

55Pa

nora

ma

Arom

atic

s Lt

d.(

26

46

) 27

2758

-12

5-

--

3-

5-

-1

-1

-Ye

s2




SN

NAME

PHONE

FIRE TENDERS

WATER (M3)

FIRE E SUITS

FIRE P SUITS

WATER HOSES

SCBA

CANI STERMASKS

FULL BODY PVC SUIT

AIRLINE BA


EMERGENCYKIT

WATER GEL


P A SYSTEM


VEHICLES

56Pe

sticid

es In

dia

Ltd.

(264

6)

2723

99-

--

116

650

525

101

-1

-1

(1.5

Km

ra

nge)

9

57Ra

llis In

dia

Ltd.

(264

6)

2210

75-

400

--

556

206

4-

26

4-

1 el

ect.

(2 K

m

rang

e),

1 ha

nd

oper

ated

3

58Ri

ddhi

Inte

rmed

iate

s and

Ch

emica

ls Pv

t. Lt

d.(2

646)

27

2188

-16

9-

-6

1-

--

--

--

-Ye

s1

59Ri

shiro

op R

ubbe

r (In

tern

atio

nal)

Ltd.

(264

6)

2200

31-

50-

--

23

3-

-1

--

-Ye

s2

60Sa

bari

Arom

atics

Pvt

. Ltd

.(2

646)

25

0253

-50

--

-2

31

-1

--

1-

41

61Sa

nghv

i Org

anics

Pvt

. Ltd

.(2

646)

27

2276

-10

--

-1

1-

1-30

m

in-

1-

--

-0

62Sa

njan

a Cr

yoge

nic S

tora

ges

Ltd.

(264

1)

2510

52-

6000

0-

-19

28

2-

10-

--

Y

1 sir

en

coup

led

with

M

CP a

nd

smok

e de

tect

ion

syste

m

2

63Sa

vala

Che

mica

ls Lt

d.(2

646)

27

2622

-80

0-

132

11

1-

13

-1

2 in

ter

com

sY

Yes

1




SN

NAME

PHONE

FIRE TENDERS

WATER (M3)

FIRE E SUITS

FIRE P SUITS

WATER HOSES

SCBA

CANI STERMASKS

FULL BODY PVC SUIT

AIRLINE BA


EMERGENCYKIT

WATER GEL


P A SYSTEM


VEHICLES

64Sa

vana

Cer

amic

s(2

644)

23

3273

-25

0-

-3

--

--

--

Yes

1 w

ire

less

set

YYe

s3

65Se

arch

Che

m I

ndus

trie

s Lt

d.(

26

45

) 22

6011

111

38-

-17

214

--

1515

3-

1;

hot

line

wit

h he

adof

f

Y3

(5 K

m

rang

e)11

66Sh

ilpa

Chem

ical

s In

dust

ries

(2

64

6)

2513

43-

30-

--

--

--

--

-1

-Ye

s0

67Sh

ivam

In C

orpo

rati

on(

26

46

) 27

2150

--

--

-2

--

--

--

--

-0

68Sh

ree

Ambe

shw

ar

Chem

ical

s(

26

46

) 22

5170

185

--

-3

22

2-

1-

1-

Yes

1

69Sh

ree

Padm

avat

i Ch

emic

als

(2

64

6)

2213

60-

300

--

21

--

--

--

--

Yes

1

70Sh

ree

Sulp

huri

cs

Pvt.

Lt

d.(

26

46

) 22

1335

-25

0-

--

33

53

-1

21;

1 f

ax-

Yes

2

71Sh

rira

m

Alka

li an

d Ch

emic

als

(2

64

5)

2260

301

1200

--

112

73

52

-4

-2

-2

(5 K

m

rang

e)5

72Si

ddhi

Sam

rat

Dye

-Che

m

Pvt.

Ltd

.(

26

46

) 22

4792

-14

--

1-

--

--

--

1-

-2

73Su

n Ch

lori

de P

vt.

Ltd.

(2

64

6)

2723

88-

--

--

22

--

-1

--

--

1

74Tr

ansm

etal

Lim

ited

(2

64

4)

2373

71-

10-

1-

26

32

62

--

-2

bells

1




SN

NAME

PHONE

FIRE TENDERS

WATER (M3)

FIRE E SUITS

FIRE P SUITS

WATER HOSES

SCBA

CANI STERMASKS

FULL BODY PVC SUIT

AIRLINE BA


EMERGENCYKIT

WATER GEL


P A SYSTEM


VEHICLES

75U

nite

d Ph

osph

orou

s Li

mit

ed –

Uni

t 1

(2

64

6)

2512

23-

250

12

189

15

153

21

4; G

ongs

in

all p

lant

sY

1 elec

tric

al

(2

Km

rang

e)

8

76U

nite

d Ph

osph

orou

s Li

mit

ed –

Uni

t 2

(2

64

6)

2505

78-

375

1-

528

--

21-

-1

1-

62

77U

nite

d Ph

osph

orou

s Li

mit

ed –

Uni

t 3

(2

64

6)

2511

89-

100

1-

92

--

10-

--

1-

1 El

ect

1

78Va

rdhm

an A

cryl

ics

Ltd.

(2

64

5)

2260

64-

1186

--

180

35

8-

-1

-1;

8 w

alki

e ta

lkie

sY

Yes

6

79Ve

ntro

n Ch

emic

als

Ltd.

(2

64

6)

2720

50-

--

--

210

--

--

--

--

1

80Vi

deoc

on N

arm

ada

Gla

ss

Ltd.

(2

64

2)

2408

031

1100

1515

175

2-

--

--

5 Kg

4Y

213

81W

anks

ons

Chem

ical

In

dust

ries

Pvt

. Lt

d.(

26

46

) 27

2431

--

--

-2

2-

-2

2-

--

-2

Tabl

e 14

. F

ire

Figh

ting

Res

ourc

es a

t Pu

blic

Fir

e St

atio

ns i

n Bh

aruc

h

SN

NA

ME

PH

ON

EM

AN

PO

WE

RN

UM

BE

R O

F

FIR

E T

EN

DE

RS

AM

BU

LAN

CE

FIR

E S

UIT

SS

CB

A

1An

kles

hwar

GID

C(2

646)

226

101

273

12

4

2An

kles

hwar

Nag

arpa

lika

(264

6) 2

4713

719

1-

-1

3Bh

aruc

h N

agar

palik

a(2

642)

240

008

272

2-

-

4Ja

mbu

sar

Nag

ar P

alik

a(2

641)

221

275

31

1-

-

5Jh

agad

ia G

IDC

(264

5) 2

2610

814

1-

12

6O

NG

C Fi

re S

ervi

ce(2

646)

237

545

105

133

1015

7Pa

noli

GID

C(2

646)

272

872

162

11

2



SN NAME OF THE UNIT EQUIPMENT DETAILS QUANTITYCAPACITY IN MT

1 GNFC, Bharuch

DAMAG AC 265; Tyre mounted, telescopic

hydraulic crane1

100 at 2.7m

radius

Tata P and H; Crawler crane with lattice

boom1 74 at 3.67m

Hydra truck mounted crane 1 25

Groove Industrial Model 1 4

Coles Crane; Kirloskar make, wheel

mounted1 4

Beaver (trailer trolley) 1 20

Swaraj Mazda 2 8

Tractor Trolley 3 3

Fork Lift; Godrej 3 3

2 Asian Paints Fork Lift; Godrej 3 3

3 Hoechst India Ltd. Fork Lift 1 1

4 Gujarat Insecticides Ltd. Fork Lift; Voltas/Godrej 4 1.5 - 3

5 United Phosphorous Fork Lift; Escorts 2 -

6 Pesticides India Ltd. Fork Lift 1 3

7 Cheminova Fork Lift 2 -

8 Heubach Colour Fork Lift 2 -

9 Golden Crane Cranes; Suka 2 20

10 Noble Crane Cranes; Suka 3 20

11 Kamal Crane Cranes; Suka 2 20

12 Search Chem and DCM JCB Crane - -

13 Gujarat Guardian Ltd. Payloaders 3 3

Fork Lift 9 -

14 IPCL HM; Mechanical - 7.5

TIL; Hydraulic - 30

TIL - 12

Escorts - 8

15 GACL Hydra; Mobile - 8

16 Birla Copper TIL Crane; Mobile crane - 40

17

GMDC, Rajpardi

Cranes 1 -

Dumpers 5 -

JCB Crane 2 -

Buldozers 2 -

Plate cutting machine tools 1 set -

18 Welspun Crane - -

Table 15. Availability of Special Rescue Equipments in Industry in Bharuch


SNNAME OF THE VENDOR

LOCATION PHONE NO

1 Excellent Products Plot No. 201/12, Opp. Eva Tex, GIDC Panoli (2646) 227311

2 Gujarat Diesel service Bharuch (2646) 221306

3Dhir Engineers and

Contractors34, GIDC, Narmadanagar, Bharuch (2642) 266823

4 Diesel Pava Corporation5/5 AA Arcade, Near Anupam Chokdi, GIDC

Ankleshwar-

5 Gujarat Diesel service4315/2, Opp. Navbharat Purchasing, GIDC

Ankleshwar(2646) 221306

6 Sadhu Electricals C - 1/4, Patel Super Market, Bharuch -

7 Able Electricals Near Rajnigandha Society, Bholav, Bharuch -

8 Jagdish Diesel Little Heart Chokdi, Ankleshwar (2646) 222655

9Gen Set Sales and

Services

5/14, Ravi Complex, Near GIDC Bus Stop,


Table 16. Vendors for Portable DG Sets in Bharuch


SN

LOC

AT

ION

CA

PAC

ITY

FOO

DM

EDIC

AL

TOIL

ET

SO

FFIC

ER

ES

IDE

NC

E

1N

arm

ada

Vidh

yala

ya,

Nar

mad

anag

ar,

Bhar

uch

2500

No

No

Yes

(264

2) 2

4641

4(2

642)

246

150

2Sp

orts

Com

plex

, N

arm

adan

agar

, Bh

aruc

h20

00N

oN

oYe

s

3Q

ueen

of

Angl

es C

onve

nt S

choo

l, V

adad

la,

Bhar

uch

1000

No

No

Yes

4Am

ity

Scho

ol,

Dah

ej B

ypas

s, L

ink

Road

, Bh

aruc

h10

0N

oN

oYe

s(2

642)

243

635

-

5Sh

rava

n Vi

dhya

laya

, D

ahej

Byp

ass

Road

, Bh

aruc

h50

0N

oN

oYe

s(2

642)

261

525

-

6Ru

ngta

Vid

hyal

aya,

Sta

tion

Roa

d, B

haru

ch10

0N

oN

oYe

s(2

642)

243

466

(264

2) 2

6033

3

7M

unsh

i M

emor

ial

Scho

ol,

D

ahej

By

pass

, Li

nk

Road

,

Bhar

uch

1000

0N

oN

oYe

s(2

642)

266

155

-

8Bh

aruc

h W

elfa

re H

ospi

tal,

Bha

ruch

1000

0N

oYe

sYe

s(2

642)

242

504

(264

2) 2

4188

8

9K

J Po

lyte

chni

c Co

llege

, B

haru

ch50

00N

oN

oYe

s(2

642)

246

402

(264

2) 2

4631

6

10J

P Ar

ts a

nd s

cien

ce C

olle

ge,

Bha

ruch

2000

No

No

Yes

(264

2) 2

6280

2(2

642)

262

902

11M

K C

olle

ge o

f Co

mm

erce

, B

haru

ch20

00N

oN

oYe

s(2

642)

247

930

-

12N

arm

ada

Colle

ge,

Zad

eshw

ar10

00N

oN

oYe

s(2

642)

240

789

-

13Re

lief

Talk

ies

1000

No

No

Yes

(264

2) 2

6298

3-

14Re

lax

Talk

ies

1000

No

No

Yes

(264

2) 2

6033

5-

15Sh

alim

ar T

alki

es10

00N

oN

oYe

s

16Ik

ra Is

lam

ic H

igh

Scho

ol,

Deh

gam

Cho

kdi

1500

No

No

Yes

(264

2) 2

6651

8 24

2212

-

17H

igh

Scho

ol,

Pal

ej10

00N

oN

oYe

s(2

642)

277

048

-

18Sa

rvaj

anik

Hig

h Sc

hool

, N

abip

ur10

00N

oN

oYe

s(2

642)

283

242

-

19La

llubh

ai G

Hig

h Sc

hool

, H

alda

r50

0N

oN

oYe

s(2

642)

288

652

-

20Pr

imar

y Sc

hool

, R

ozat

anka

ria

500

No

No

Yes

--

21M

ahar

aj K

G M

Vid

hyam

andi

r, Z

ades

hwar

1500

No

No

Yes

(264

2) 2

4728

6-

22Sh

ri M

P P

atel

Sch

ool,

Sam

lod

1000

No

No

Yes

2876

32-

23Sa

rvaj

anik

Hig

h Sc

hool

, C

hanc

hvel

1000

No

No

Yes

2302

25-

24Sa

rvaj

anik

Hig

h Sc

hool

, D

ora

1000

No

No

Yes

2366

59-

Tabl

e 17

. P

ossi

ble

Shel

ters

for

Tem

pora

ry R

elie

f (n

ot i

nsul

ated

ade

quat

ely

for

rem

ain

safe

aga

inst

che

mic

al le

aks)



SN

LOC

AT

ION

CA

PAC

ITY

FOO

DM

EDIC

AL

TOIL

ET

SO

FFIC

ER

ES

IDE

NC

E

25R

N P

atel

Vid

hyal

aya,

Sar

bhan

2000

No

No

Yes

2342

48-

-

26G

andh

i Ash

ram

, P

iluda

ra10

00N

oN

oYe

s-

-

27N

ilkan

th M

ahad

ev T

empl

e, Z

ades

hwar

5000

No

No

Yes

--

28H

igh

scho

ol,

Amod

5000

No

No

Yes

--

29Pr

imar

y Sc

hool

and

Hig

h Sc

hool

, Pa

haj

2000

No

No

Yes

--

30Ra

mji

Tem

ple,

Pah

aj20

00N

oN

oYe

s-

-

31M

asji

d Ro

zata

nkar

ia a

nd P

alej

3500

No

No

Yes

--

32G

attu

Vid

hyal

aya,

Ank

lesh

war

1500

No

No

Yes

(264

6) 2

5240

0(2

646)

252

277

33Sp

orts

Com

plex

, A

nkle

shw

ar25

00N

oN

oYe

s(2

646)

251

455

(264

6) 2

5102

2

34M

anav

Man

dir

Com

plex

, A

nkle

shw

ar50

0N

oN

oYe

s(2

646)

253

094

(307

9)

35Li

ons

Scho

ol,

Ank

lesh

war

1000

No

No

Yes

(264

6) 2

2373

5-

36Sa

nska

rdee

p Sc

hool

, A

nkle

shw

ar50

0N

oN

oYe

s(2

646)

252

895

2524

35(2

646)

282

354

37Ch

andr

abal

a M

odi A

cade

my,

Ank

lesh

war

500

No

No

Yes

(264

6) 2

7512

6(2

646)

275

152

38In

dust

rial

Tra

inin

g In

stit

ute,

Ank

lesh

war

2000

No

No

Yes

(264

6) 2

5702

8-

39Ad

arsh

Hig

h Sc

hool

, A

nkle

shw

ar70

0N

oN

oYe

s(2

646)

247

159

(264

6) 2

4764

4

40Ji

nwal

a H

igh

Scho

ol,

Ank

lesh

war

3000

No

No

Yes

(264

6) 2

4719

3(2

646)

244

972

41Ka

daki

a Co

mm

erce

Col

lege

, An

kles

hwar

2000

No

No

Yes

(264

6) 2

4521

5(2

646)

247

128

42Vi

veka

nand

Sch

ool,

Ank

lesh

war

400

No

No

Yes

(264

6) 2

4798

8(2

646)

245

374

43N

atio

nal H

igh

Scho

ol,

Ank

lesh

war

500

No

No

Yes

(264

6) 2

2437

5(2

646)

224

352

44Sc

hool

, K

hara

ch20

0Ye

sN

oYe

s(2

646)

222

094

(264

6) 2

2301

6

45Ba

chel

or H

oste

l, K

hara

ch12

0Ye

sN

oYe

s(2

646)

222

094

(264

6) 2

2301

6

46N

arm

ada

Club

, K

hara

ch15

0Ye

sN

oYe

s(2

646)

222

094

(264

6) 2

2301

6

47Ta

pti C

lub,

Kha

rach

150

No

No

Yes

(264

6) 2

2209

4(2

646)

223

016

48Pr

imar

y Sc

hool

, J

haga

dia

Villa

ge50

0N

oN

oYe

s-

-

49To

ladr

a50

0N

oN

oYe

s-

-




SN

LOC

AT

ION

CA

PAC

ITY

FOO

DM

EDIC

AL

TOIL

ET

SO

FFIC

ER

ES

IDE

NC

E

50Ra

nvad

i50

0N

oN

oYe

s-

-

51Bo

rjai

500

No

No

Yes

--

52D

adhe

da50

0N

oN

oYe

s-

-

53Ra

nded

i50

0N

oN

oYe

s-

-

54U

ntia

500

No

No

Yes

--

55Sa

rdar

pura

500

No

No

Yes

--

56Ka

pals

adi

500

No

No

Yes

--

57Fu

lwad

i50

0N

oN

oYe

s-

-

58Ra

nipu

ra50

0N

oN

oYe

s-

-

59G

uman

pura

500

No

No

Yes

--

60Va

khat

pura

500

No

No

Yes

--

61Se

lod

500

No

No

Yes

--

62N

avag

am50

0N

oN

oYe

s-

-

63Av

adar

500

No

No

Yes

--

64Kh

arac

h50

0N

oN

oYe

s-

-

65H

igh

Scho

ol a

t Ta

lodr

a Vi

llage

1000

No

No

Yes

--

66Pr

imar

y Sc

hool

, D

ahej

100

No

No

Yes

--

67Pr

imar

y Sc

hool

, La

khig

am10

0N

oN

oYe

s-

-

68Pr

imar

y Sc

hool

, Lu

vara

100

No

No

Yes

--

69Pr

imar

y Sc

hool

, Ja

gesh

war

100

No

No

Yes

(264

1) 2

5651

2-

70Pr

imar

y Sc

hool

, Am

beth

a10

0N

oN

oYe

s-

-

71Pr

imar

y Sc

hool

, Su

va10

0N

oN

oYe

s-

-



SN

NAME

PHONE

AMBULANCE

OHC (>=5BED)

FIRST AID BOXES

STRETCHERS

NO. OF DOCTORS

NO. OF NURSES

DETAILS OF

OTHER

FACILITIES/

EQUIPMENT

1Ac

mec

hem

Pvt

. Lt

d.(2

646)

272

393

-N

--

--

-

2Ac

me

Petr

oche

m P

vt.

Ltd.

(264

6) 2

5266

2-

N2

--

--

3Am

al P

rodu

cts

Lim

ited

(264

6) 2

5112

11

N3

1-

-

Oxy

. Cy

l Se

t -

1,

SBS

Sets

- 3

,

Stet

hosc

ope

-

1,Baloo

ntype

respirator-1,Pea

kflo

wm

eter

- 1,

Sel

f ca

re k

it -

1,

Bloo

d pr

es.

mea

suri

ng

equi

pmen

t –

1

4An

grej

i Nit

ro P

rodu

cts

(264

6) 2

7225

4-

N1

--

--

5Ap

ar In

dust

ries

Lim

ited

(264

3) 2

7044

21

Y5

3-

-AC

N a

ntid

ote

kit

and

Med

ical

Oxy

gen

Cylin

ders

6BA

SF S

tyre

nics

Pvt

. Lt

d.(2

641)

256

021

1Y

61

-1

-

7Be

ll Ce

ram

ics

Ltd.

(246

1) 2

3515

1-

N2

1-

-Fi

rst

aid

med

icin

es,

x-ra

y, e

tc.

8Bi

rla

Cellu

losi

c Lt

d.(2

641)

270

001

2Y

--

--

-

9Bo

dal C

hem

ical

s Pv

t. L

td.,

Uni

t –

III(2

646)

251

269

--

--

--

-

10Ch

emet

Che

mic

als

Lim

ited

(264

6) 2

3920

6-

N3

1-

--

11Ch

emie

Org

anic

Che

mic

als

Pvt.

Ltd

.(2

645)

226

019

-N

3-

--

-

12Ch

emin

ova

Indi

a Lt

d.

(For

mul

atio

n

Div

isio

n)(2

646)

272

476

1Y

41

2-

Atro

pine

– 1

0 (i

nj),

2PA

M -

6,

Dia

zeap

am -

5

13Ch

emin

ova

Indi

a Lt

d.

(Int

erm

edia

tes

Div

isio

n)(2

646)

272

536

1Y

41

-2

1 m

edic

al o

xyge

n cy

l. a

nd 1

BA

set

14Ch

emin

ova

Indi

a Lt

d.

(Tec

hnic

al

Div

isio

n)(2

646)

272

339

1N

52

1 pa

rt

tim

e1

Oxy

gen

cyl.

, an

d 2

IV s

tand

s

15Cr

ysta

l Che

mie

Pvt

. Lt

d.(2

646)

220

204

1N

31

--

-

16Fi

com

Org

anic

s Li

mit

ed(2

646)

222

168

1N

51

1 pa

rt

tim

e1

Atro

pine

sul

phat

e (5

0 In

j),

3 PA

M c

hlor

ide

inj.


Tabl

e 18

. M

edic

al R

esou

rces

Ava

ilab

le i

n M

AH i

ndus

trie

s in

Bha

ruch


SN

NAME

PHONE

AMBULANCE

OHC (>=5BED)

FIRST AID BOXES

STRETCHERS

NO. OF DOCTORS

NO. OF NURSES

DETAILS OF

OTHER

FACILITIES/

EQUIPMENT

17G

as A

utho

rity

of

Indi

a Li

mit

ed(2

641)

231

015

1Y

11-

-1

firstaidequ

ipmen

t

18G

ujar

at A

lkal

ies

and

Chem

ical

s Li

mit

ed(2

641)

256

282

1N

181

42

beds

, ox

ygen

cyl

inde

rs,

vent

illat

or

19G

ujar

at B

oros

il Li

mit

ed(2

645)

220

300

1N

52

14

-

20G

ujar

at

Chem

ical

Po

rt

Term

inal

Com

pany

Ltd

.(2

641)

256

604

1N

74

-1

Oxy

gen

cylin

der

and

2 be

ds

21G

ujar

at G

lass

Pvt

. Lt

d.(2

644)

233

313

1N

82

11

O2cylin

der(9kg)-01no.,Artific

ialresuscitators

22G

ujar

at G

uard

ian

Lim

ited

(264

3) 2

7510

61

N9

1-

--

23G

ujar

at In

sect

icid

es L

imit

ed(2

646)

220

032

1N

103

15

-

24G

ujar

at

Nar

mad

a Va

lley

Fert

ilize

r

Com

pany

(264

2) 2

4700

13

Y40

95

at

hosp

ital

1O

xyge

n cy

linde

rs a

nd o

xyge

n ge

nera

ting

mac

hine

avai

labl

e

25G

ujar

at P

agut

han

Ener

gy C

orpo

rati

on

Ltd.

(264

2) 2

8850

11

N12

41

3EC

G,

AED

, O

xyge

n Cy

linde

rs

26G

wal

ior

Thio

nyl

(264

6) 2

2177

6-

N2

--

-D

igen

e, M

ilk o

f M

agne

sia

27H

arya

na S

heet

Gla

ss L

imit

ed(2

646)

222

497

1N

5-

--

-

28H

euba

ch C

olou

r Li

mit

ed(2

646)

250

563

1N

82

13

OxygenCy

linde

rs,pe

akflow

meter

29H

indu

stan

Pet

role

um C

orpo

rati

on L

td.

(264

6) 2

7418

3-

N3

1-

--

30H

rish

it In

dust

ries

(264

6) 2

5148

81

--

--

--

31H

uber

Che

mic

als

Indi

a Pv

t. L

td.

(264

5) 2

2608

81

N2

1-

--

32Im

pro

Inte

rche

m P

vt.

Ltd.

(264

6) 2

7242

5-

N2

--

--

33In

dian

Oil

Corp

orat

ion

Lim

ited

(264

1) 2

3116

1-

N1

1-

--

34In

dian

Oil

Corp

orat

ion

Lim

ited

(264

2) 2

8865

4-

N4

2-

-An

tido

te f

or s

nake

bit

e

35In

dian

Pet

roch

emic

als

Corp

orat

ion

Ltd.

(264

1) 2

5637

32

Ya

t

OH

C5

41

in e

ach

shif

t

Path

olog

y la

b,

x-ra

y,

O2

cylin

ders

, su

ctio

n

mac

hine




SN

NAME

PHONE

AMBULANCE

OHC (>=5BED)

FIRST AID BOXES

STRETCHERS

NO. OF DOCTORS

NO. OF NURSES

DETAILS OF

OTHER

FACILITIES/

EQUIPMENT

36H

inda

lco

Indu

stri

es

Ltd

(Uni

t :

Birl

a

Copp

er)

(264

1) 2

5600

41

Y28

63

5Oxygencylin

der-6,Fu

llfle

dged

labo

ratoryfa

cility

,ECG

M/c

, EN

T Se

t, F

orei

gn b

ody

rem

oval

set

37In

doso

l Dru

gs L

imit

ed(2

646)

220

885

-N

Y-

--

-

38In

dust

rial

Sol

vent

s an

d Ch

emic

als

Ltd.

(264

6) 2

3955

4-

N4

--

--

39Io

n Ex

chan

ge In

dia

Ltd.

(264

6) 2

5136

51

N2

1-

-O

xyge

n Cy

linde

rs

40JB

Che

mic

als

and

Phar

mac

euti

cals

Ltd

.(2

646)

250

011

-N

51

--

-

41Ja

isw

al P

harm

ache

m L

td(2

646)

--

--

--

-

42Ka

bson

s In

dust

ries

Ltd

(264

2) 2

7850

4-

N1

--

--

43Ka

nori

a Ch

emic

als

and

Indu

stri

es L

td.

(264

6) 2

5301

2-

N4

11

-O

xyge

n Cy

linde

rs

44Ko

san

Indu

stri

es L

td(2

646)

222

879

1N

31

--

-

45KL

J O

rgan

ics

Ltd.

(264

5) 2

2604

6-

--

--

--

46La

ffan

s Pe

troc

hem

ical

s Lt

d.(2

646)

272

429

-N

2-

--

-

47M

erid

ian

Chem

-Bon

d Li

mit

ed(2

646)

225

131

-N

1-

--

-

48M

inol

Aci

ds a

nd C

hem

ical

s Pv

t. L

td.

(264

6) 2

2013

8-

N2

1-

--

49M

iran

da A

msa

w P

vt.

Ltd.

(264

6) 2

3905

1-

N1

--

--

50N

arm

ada

Chem

atur

Pe

troc

hem

ical

s

Ltd.

(264

2) 2

4718

11

N3

11

4-

51N

atio

nal

Ther

mal

Po

wer

Co

rpor

atio

n

Ltd.

(264

2) 2

8740

12

Y9

65

7EC

G,

card

iac

mon

itor

, O

2 cy

linde

rs,

suct

ion

mac

hine

, pa

thol

ogy

lab

52N

avje

evan

O C

hem

(264

6) 2

5017

8-

N1

--

--

53Pa

noli

Inte

rmed

iate

s (I

) Pv

t. L

td.

(264

5) 2

2609

2-

N5

1-

--

54Pa

noli

Prod

ucts

Pvt

. Lt

d.(2

646)

272

685

-N

11

--

-

55Pa

nora

ma

Arom

atic

s Lt

d.(2

646)

272

758

-N

1-

--

-




SN

NAME

PHONE

AMBULANCE

OHC (>=5BED)

FIRST AID BOXES

STRETCHERS

NO. OF DOCTORS

NO. OF NURSES

DETAILS OF

OTHER

FACILITIES/

EQUIPMENT

56Pe

stic

ides

Indi

a Lt

d.(2

646)

272

399

1N

82

-4

Atro

pine

(t

ab/i

nj),

ch

arco

al

(tab

),

Pyri

dine

aldo

xim

e m

ethi

otid

e (I

nj),

Der

iphy

lline

(ta

b/in

j)

57Ra

llis

Indi

a Lt

d.(2

646)

221

075

1N

52

1 pa

rt

tim

e

1 pa

rt

tim

e

Atro

pine

(t

ab/i

nj),

ch

arco

al

(tab

),

Pyri

dine

aldo

xim

e m

ethi

otid

e (I

nj),

Der

iphy

lline

(ta

b/in

j)

58Ri

ddhi

In

term

edia

tes

and

Chem

ical

s

Pvt.

Ltd

.(2

646)

272

188

-N

1-

--

-

59Ri

shir

oop

Rubb

er (

Inte

rnat

iona

l) L

td.

(264

6) 2

2003

1-

N3

--

--

60Sa

bari

Aro

mat

ics

Pvt.

Ltd

.(2

646)

250

253

-N

1-

1-

-

61Sa

nghv

i Org

anic

s Pv

t. L

td.

(264

6) 2

7227

6-

N1

--

--

62Sa

njan

a Cr

yoge

nic

Stor

ages

Ltd

.(2

641)

251

052

-N

11

--

-

63Sa

vala

Che

mic

als

Ltd.

(264

6) 2

7262

2-

N4

--

1-

64Sa

vana

Cer

amic

s(2

644)

233

273

1N

3-

--

-

65Se

arch

Che

m In

dust

ries

Ltd

.(2

645)

226

011

1Y

104

--

-

66Sh

ilpa

Chem

ical

s In

dust

ries

(264

6) 2

5134

3-

N4

--

--

67Sh

ivam

In C

orpo

rati

on(2

646)

272

150

-N

--

--

-

68Sh

ree

Ambe

shw

ar C

hem

ical

s(2

646)

225

170

1N

1-

12

-

69Sh

ree

Padm

avat

i Che

mic

als

(264

6) 2

2136

0-

N1

--

--

70Sh

ree

Sulp

huri

cs P

vt.

Ltd.

(264

6) 2

2133

5-

N2

1-

--

71Sh

rira

m A

lkal

i and

Che

mic

als

(264

5) 2

2603

01

N5

41

3An

tido

tes

and

med

ical

equ

ipm

ent

avai

labl

e at

OH

C




SN

NAME

PHONE

AMBULANCE

OHC (>=5BED)

FIRST AID BOXES

STRETCHERS

NO. OF DOCTORS

NO. OF NURSES

DETAILS OF

OTHER

FACILITIES/

EQUIPMENT

72Si

ddhi

Sam

rat

Dye

-Che

m P

vt.

Ltd.

(264

6) 2

2479

2-

N1

--

--

73Su

n Ch

lori

de P

vt.

Ltd.

(264

6) 2

7238

8-

N-

--

--

74Tr

ansm

etal

Lim

ited

(264

4) 2

3737

1-

N7

--

--

75U

nite

d Ph

osph

orou

s Li

mit

ed –

Uni

t 1

(264

6) 2

5122

31

Y15

1-

1At

ropi

ne

: 25

7 no

s.,

PAM

(2

0 m

g):1

no.a

nd

Ambu

bag,

sal

ine,

med

ical

O2

76U

nite

d Ph

osph

orou

s Li

mit

ed –

Uni

t 2

(264

6) 2

5057

81

N9

11

1-

77U

nite

d Ph

osph

orou

s Li

mit

ed –

Uni

t 3

(264

6) 2

5118

9-

N3

11

--

78Va

rdhm

an A

cryl

ics

Ltd.

(264

5) 2

2606

41

N5

2-

1BP

App

arat

us a

nd O

xyge

n cy

linde

r an

d Cy

anid

e

anti

dote

kit

79Ve

ntro

n Ch

emic

als

Ltd.

(264

6) 2

7205

0-

N-

--

--

80Vi

deoc

on N

arm

ada

Gla

ss L

td.

(264

2) 2

4080

31

N4

41

2-

81W

anks

ons

Chem

ical

Indu

stri

es P

vt.

Ltd.

(264

6) 2

7243

1-

N-

--

--



SN

NA

ME

LOC

AT

ION

PH

ON

EB

ED

SB

UR

N

WA

RD

CH

EM

ICA

L P

OIS

ON

TR

EA

TM

EN

T

FAC

ILIT

Y

AM

BU

LAN

CE

1Co

mm

unit

y H

ealt

h Ce

ntre

Amod

(264

1) 2

4501

630

NY

1

2Am

i Sur

gica

l Hos

pita

lSt

atio

n Ro

ad,

Ankl

eshw

ar(2

646)

248

001

9Y

Y-

3An

and

Hos

pita

lSt

atio

n Ro

ad,

Ankl

eshw

ar(2

646)

246

783

25N

N-

4Ja

yabe

n M

odi H

ospi

tal

Valia

Roa

d, G

IDC

Ankl

eshw

ar(2

642)

239

196

60Y

Y2

5N

avje

evan

Hos

pita

lBe

hind

Pan

chay

at B

haw

an,

Stat

ion

Road

, An

kles

hwar

(264

6) 2

4715

715

NN

-

6Pa

tel S

urgi

cal H

ospi

tal

Stat

ion

Road

, An

kles

hwar

(264

6) 2

4653

515

YY

-

7Am

an N

ursi

ng H

ome

Zam

Zam

Com

plex

, 5 B

atti

, Bha

ruch

(264

2) 2

4375

46

NN

-

8Bh

aruc

h H

ospi

tal

Dah

ej b

ypas

s -

Bhar

uch

(264

2) 2

4104

412

5Y

Y4

9C

J Se

th M

emor

ial H

ospi

tal

Shal

imar

Com

plex

- B

haru

ch(2

642)

264

411

18N

Y-

10D

ivya

Jee

van

Sang

h H

ospi

tal

Nr.

Vic

tori

a H

otel

, Bh

aruc

h(2

642)

243

677

22N

N1

11G

ovar

dhan

Hos

pita

lBh

olav

Roa

d, B

haru

ch(2

642)

241

044

35N

Y-

12G

over

nmen

t G

ener

al H

ospi

tal

5 Ba

tti,

Bha

ruch

(264

2) 2

4351

521

0Y

Y7

13Kr

ishn

a H

ospi

tal

5 Ba

tti,

Bha

ruch

(264

2) 2

6473

710

NN

-

14Pa

rth

Surg

ical

Hos

pita

lSh

alim

ar C

ompl

ex -

Bha

ruch

(264

2) 2

6084

410

NY

-

15Se

vash

ram

Hos

pita

l5

Batt

i, B

haru

ch(2

642)

243

493

140

YY

3

16Sh

ah M

emor

ial H

ospi

tal

Ashi

rwad

Com

plex

, 5 B

atti

, Bha

ruch

(264

2) 2

6658

512

NN

-

17Vi

shw

as H

ospi

tal

Fals

uti N

agar

, Bh

aruc

h(2

642)

268

675

18N

Y-

18Za

in C

linic

(D

r. K

han)

5 Ba

tti,

Bha

ruch

(264

2) 2

4369

112

YN

-

19Co

mm

unit

y H

ealt

h Ce

ntre

Jam

busa

r(2

644)

220

088

50N

Y1

20Co

mm

unit

y H

ealt

h Ce

ntre

Jhag

adia

(264

5) 2

2007

830

NY

1

21Se

va R

ural

Hos

pita

lJh

agad

ia(2

645)

220

313

75Y

Y1

Tabl

e 19

. M

ajor

Hos

pita

ls i

n Bh

aruc

h



SN

NA

ME

LOC

AT

ION

PH

ON

EB

ED

SB

UR

N

WA

RD

CH

EM

ICA

L P

OIS

ON

TR

EA

TM

EN

T

FAC

ILIT

Y

AM

BU

LAN

CE

22Co

mm

unit

y H

ealt

h Ce

ntre

Valia

(264

3) 2

7073

330

YY

1

23G

ovar

dhan

Tru

st H

ospi

tal

Valia

(264

6) 2

7058

335

YY

1



SN NAME LOCATION PHONE

OTHER HOSPITALS

1 Brijlal Rungta Hospital Bharuch (2642) 263423

2 Anand Tribhuvan Shah Hospital Bharuch (2642) 263423

3 Narmadanagar Hospital GNFC Township, Bharuch (2642) 247120

4 Govardhan Rugnalaya Hospital Nr. ABC Chokdi (2642) 243603

5 NTPC Hospital Nabipur (2642) 287401

6 Sarbhan Sarvajanik Hospital Sarbhan, Ta. Amod (2641) 236649

7 Samuhik Arogya Kendra Vagra (2641) 225243

8 Sanjivani Hospital Station Road, Ankleshwar (2646) 247984

9 Shreeji Hospital Opp. Brij Nagar, Ankleshwar (2646) 247488

10 Navjeevan Hospital Super Market, Ankleshwar (2646) 247157

11 Anjani Hospital Station Road, Ankleshwar (2646) 246721

12 Modi Clinic Station Road, Ankleshwar (2646) 246459

13 Dave Orthopedic Hospital Station Road, Ankleshwar (2646) 24055

14 Mehta Orthopedic Hospital Station Road, Ankleshwar (2646) -

15 Mamta Children Hospital Station Road, Ankleshwar (2646) 246582

16 Purohit Children Hospital Station Road, Ankleshwar (2646) 246492

17 Monica Skin Clinic Station Road, Ankleshwar (2646) 246177

18 Thadani Eye Hospital Opp. Brij Nagar, Ankleshwar (2646) 247904

19 Drishti Eye Hospital Station Road, Ankleshwar (2646) 248324

20 Kirti ENT Hospital Market Yard, Ankleshwar (2646) 245728

21 Dental Clinic Opp. Rotary Circle, Ankleshwar (2646) 247333 247300

22 Jan Kalyan Hospital Birladham, Kharach (2641) 231891

23 Motala Abbas Mohammed Hospital Kosamba (2629) 231320

24 Arma Hospital Kosamba (2629) 231320

25 Kosamba General Hospital Kosamba (2629) 231320

26 Ann Hospital Nr. Jinwala School, Ankleshwar (2646) 247528

27 Anish Clinic 151, Andada Road, Ankleshwar (2646) 246782

28 Dave Clinic Navjeevan Society, Ankleshwar (2646) 250683

29 Maruti ClinicB-1, Manti Compound, Opp. GIL Colony,


30 Public Health Centre Dahej (2641) 256223

31 Public Health Centre Jolwa (2641) 256795

32 Public Health Centre Atali (2641) -

34 Public Health Centre Kadodara (-) -

35 Public Health Centre Lakhigam (-) -

Table 20. Minor or Supporting Hospitals and Private Physicians for Support in Bharuch



SN NAME LOCATION PHONE

36 Public Health Centre Luvara (-) -

37 Public Health Centre Haldar (2642) 288651

38 Public Health Centre Navaha (2642) 286289

39 Public Health Centre Shukalthirth (2642) 281358

40 Public Health Centre Derol (2642) 282371

41 Public Health Centre Zanor (2642) 287680

42 Public Health Centre Gajera (2644) 233201

PRIVATE PRACTITIONERS

1 Dr. Prabodh H Shah Amod (2641) 245180

2 Dr. N V Seth, IPCL (MBBS) Dahej (2641) 256666

3 Dr. D N Goswamy, (MBBS) Birla Copper, Dahej (2641) 256004-06

4 Dr. M P Vyas, GACL (MBBS) Dahej (2641) 256315 to

5 Dr. D B Vyas, GACL (MBBS) Dahej (2641) 256315 to

6Dr. D A Shah, NCPL (Dip. In Ind.

Hygiene)Bharuch (2642) 247289

7 Dr. Sejwani (Physician) 5 batti, Bharuch (2642) 261238

8 Dr. Gautam Patel (General Surgeon) Falsrutinagar, Bharuch (2642) 260288

9 Dr. Dilip R Shah (Physician) Patel Supermarket, Bharuch (2642) 262866

10 Dr. Yusuf Patel (Physician) Adarsh Shopping Centre, Bharuch (2642) 241682

11 Dr. Aslam Jahan (General Surgeon) Opp. Adarsh Shopping Centre, Bharuch (2642) 262934

12 Dr. H R Munshi (Child Specialist) B/h Narmada Shopping Centre, Bharuch (2642) 268323

13 Dr. H S Saiyed Palej (2642) 277566

14 Dr. Rajesh Chauhan Palej (2642) 277400

15 Dr. Jagdish Desai Palej (2642) 277319

16 Dr. P R Modi B-36, Santkrupa Society, Zadeshwar (2642) 288501

17 Dr. K Parikh (General Practitioner)68, New Colony, Nr. Jain Mandir,


18 Dr. Amit Shah (General Practitioner)Nr. Shopping Centre, Manav Mandir,


19 Dr. M M Mistry (General Practitioner)Joshiya Falia, Nr. Nagar Palika,


20 Dr. D S Golwala (General Practitioner)Joshiya Falia, Nr. Nagar Palika,


21 Dr. C A Shah (General Practitioner) Samdi Falia, Ankleshwar (2646) 247839

22Dr. Amin Surani (General

Practitioner)1 Patel Nagar, Bhavana Falia, Anklehwar (2646) 223117



SN NAME PHONE NO.

Blood Banks

1 Red Cross Blood Bank, Bharuch (2642) 243603

2 Kumarpal Gandhi Blood Bank, Ankleshwar (2646) 244530

Medical Test Laboratories

1 Hiral Laboratories, Ankleshwar (02646) 248182

2 Krishna Clinical Lab, Ankleshwar (02646) 226717

3 Krishna Laboratories, Ankleshwar (2646) 246285 / 246138

4 Mahavir Diagnostics, Ankleshwar (2646) 242522 / 222225

5 Jagdish Laboratories, Ankleshwar (02646) 246582

6 Satyam Lab, Ankleshwar (02646) 253154

7 Alwyn Lab, Bharuch (02642) 262707

8 Ami Lab, Bharuch (2642) 266737 / 232368

9 Bharuch Lab, Bharuch (02642) 261482

10 Jagruti Lab, Bharuch (2642) 268665 / 266955

11 Maijaben Lab, Bharuch (2642) 242808 / 242816

12 Sheth Lab, Bharuch (2642) 263829 / 269520

13 Nanavati X-Ray Clinic, Ankleshwar (02646) 245820

14 Shree Pathological Lab, Ankleshwar (2646) 245497 / 245165

Table 21. Blood Banks and Medical Test Laboratories in Bharuch


APPENDIX G: GUIDELINES FOR REPORTABLE QUANTITIES OF LEAK TO NOTIFY OFFSITE EMERGENCY

One of the stated objectives of the project was to identify a trigger mechanism to achieve quick response that will result in saving of lives and property. We have recommended that a quantitative criteria developed by USEPA (on basis of hazard analysis) be adopted as a “guideline.” We must clarify that Indian legislation do notsupportsuchquantitativecriteriatodecidewhetherornottonotifyoffsite.However,wealsoidentifiedneed of the industry to have some guidance on how to determine the “potential” for an offsite. These guidelines are thus only suggestive. Following these will ensure that industry will err on safe side. We are copying the US legislation verbatim as a reference.

3, Mahendra Industrial Premises. Road No 29. Sion (East), Mumbai - 400 014+91 22 2402 1757 (tel) +91 22 2402 1757 (fax) Pune Branch: 12 Paras Chambers, Pune 411009

2400 Ellis Road, Suite 200Research Triangle Park, NC 27703Phone: (919) 990-8191 or (800) 977-8191Fax: (919) 237-7468

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