Battle of the Classics

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http://jcs.sagepub.com/content/3/1/67The online version of this article can be found at:

DOI: 10.1177/1468795X03003001695

2003 3: 67Journal of Classical SociologyMathieu Deflem

Battle of the ClassicsThe Sociology of the Sociology of Money : Simmel and the Contemporary

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The Sociology of the Sociology of Money

Simmel and the Contemporary Battle of the Classics

MATHIEU DEFLEM University of South Carolina

ABSTRACT I offer a discussion of Simmels Philosophy of Money in comparison

with the analyses of money in the writings of Marx, Weber and Durkheim. Based

on this analysis, I argue that Simmels ambiguous status as a classic can be

accounted for by some of the characteristics of his approach as well as the

historical (non-)reception of his work. Simmels relative neglect in sociology for

the better part of the century as well as his recent revival with the rise of the new

cultural studies and the postmodern paradigm shift hint at an important interde-pendence between the history and systematics of sociological theory. The theme

of money has not managed to be accepted as an undisputed topic of sociological

reflection because of its non-independent status in most social theories (apart

from Simmels) as well as the factual resistance to totalizing accounts (like

Simmels) in the history of sociology. Recent transformations in social theory,

however, indicate that money may, and to some extent already has, become a

more autonomous topic of inquiry. In conclusion, I argue that Simmels work

does lend itself to be taken up in postmodern perspectives and that the socio-

logical study of money can likewise be appropriated by the new cultural studies.However, these new perspectives will have to come to terms with the modernist

resistance of Simmel and the other sociological classics remaining influence in

contemporary sociological theory.

KEYWORDS Durkheim, Marx, modernity, money, Simmel, sociological theory,

Weber

I know that I shall die without intellectual heirs, and that is as it should be.My legacy will be, as it were, in cash, distributed to many heirs, each

transforming his part into use conformed to hisnature: a use which will

reveal no longer its indebtedness to its heritage.

(Georg Simmel)

Journal of Classical SociologyCopyright 2003 SAGE Publications London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi Vol 3(1): 6796 [1468795X(200303)3:1;6796;031695]

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This paper takes as a point of departure Georg Simmels study of money in his

famous book The Philosophy of Money (1900, 1989, 1990). Against the back-

ground of this work, I will examine how the theme of money was reflected upon

in the social theories of Karl Marx, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. This

comparative investigation will serve to uncover some of the underlying theoreticalassumptions that account for the similarities and differences in the particular

perspectives of these classics. While Simmels work has regularly been evaluated in

comparison to any one of the sociological classics (e.g. Beilharz, 1996; Deutsch-

mann, 1996; Faught, 1985), it has not been assessed in terms of its (dis)associa-

tions with the classics as a unity. On the basis of an analysis of the money theme,

therefore, this paper will position and discuss Simmel as a classic among the

classics.

While not pretending to offer an in-depth investigation of the manyintricacies involved with comparing Simmel with Weber, Marx and Durkheim, this

paper will serve to elucidate the status and reception of Simmels work as one of

the building-blocks in the founding of sociology. Based on the insight that such

an endeavor has implications for the formation as well as reception of sociological

theory (Alexander, 1987), I will orient my discussion not only to an examination

of the sociological study of money proper, but also to the social context of

Simmels writings, to consider how his work has been received and evaluated in

sociology. This paper, then, will advance some theoretical ideas on the sociology

of money as well as present a chapter in the sociology of sociology.I develop my arguments as follows. First, I briefly review the main theses

of Simmels work on money and relate it to his broader intellectual and socio-

logical project. Then, I discuss themes of a sociology of money in the writings of

Marx, Weber and Durkheim, and evaluate their work in comparison to Simmels.

Finally, I suggest how the reception of Simmels work and some of its assumptions

have affected, and may continue to shape, the sociological study of money.

Simmel on Sociology, Money, Individual andSociety

The work of Georg Simmel is most commonly analyzed in terms of its innovative

contribution to the study of society, that is, as a distinct mode of sociological

thinking. In Simmels substantive discussions of society, which have not been

ignored, his work on the social significance of money has generally not received

the attention that his other studies of modernity have come to enjoy. To use-fully present Simmels analysis of money, I will discuss the basic themes of his

theoretical perspective, present a brief description of the various elements in his

sociology of money, and relate these back to his general sociological

outlook.

JOURNAL OF CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGY VOL 3(1)68



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A Picture of Simmels Sociology

Central to Simmels social theory are his conceptions of formal sociology and

notion of sociation, which are situated in a more encompassing distinction

between general, formal and philosophical sociology (Simmel, 1964, 1971: 140;see also Frisby, 1985, 1992: 541; Levine, 1971; Wolff, 1964: xxviixl). Simmel

conceives of sociology in the first place as a method, a point of view from which to

take a picture of its field of study. The three divisions of general, formal and

philosophical sociology demarcate different viewpoints of sociological photogra-

phy. General sociology investigates the whole of historical life inasmuch as it is

societally formed. Historical developments can be perceived from different per-

spectives, each of which represents a particular frame of analysis or category of

thought in order to lay bare the objective, individual (subjective) and/or social

point of view. The social viewpoint is evidently central to sociology, although the

link with the other perspectives is for Simmel essential. In this respect, he devotes

most attention to the relationships and differences between individual and social

life, especially as they extend the historical narratives on particular groups

(Simmel, 1964: 2639). Formal sociology is concerned with the study of societal

forms that result out of the sum of interaction among living humans. These forms

of life must be distinct from their content, Simmel argues, since groups with

different substantive content (referring to the relatively variable what of social

life) may exhibit similar, even identical, forms, while the form of groups (referringto the relatively stable how of social action) can differ though their contents are

the same. The content of social life refers to the drives, interests, purposes,

inclination, and psychic states around which individuals come together in inter-

actions that take on certain forms (Simmel, 1964: 402). Typical for Simmels

study of formal sociology, for example, are his discussions of sociability, super-

ordination and subordination, competition and other associational forms as

informing social life through any historical concreteness of the specific manifesta-

tions of such principles (e.g. Simmel, 1964: 4057 on sociability). Philosophical

sociology, finally, deals with the epistemology of the special social sciences

(engaged in the study of any one particular manifestation of social life) and the

metaphysics of their specific topics of investigation. As such, philosophical soci-

ology is the science of social science. In Simmels work, philosophical sociology is,

as Wolff (1964: xl) has argued, not of central concern apart from its programmatic

announcement to develop an epistemology of sociology and its indirect treatment

through a study of intellectual history, for example on individualism in social

thought from the 18th to the 19th century (Simmel, 1964: 5884).

Formal sociology is Simmels favored domain, because he considers it toprovide the most distinct sociological response to the critique of historians that

the study of society would inevitably be bound to the various concrete, distinct

and always diverse historical forms of social life. The field of formal sociology is

closely linked to Simmels conception of individual and society, and the form/

DEFLEM THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF MONEY 69



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content distinction in individualsocial relationships. With the study of social

formations, Simmel wants to overcome the problems associated with methodo-

logical individualism, stressing the primacy of the individual, and holism or

sociologism, emphasizing the social. According to Simmel, neither one, society or

individual, is thinkable without the other. Central to the field of sociology are

precisely those social formations that overcome the individual/social dualism:

individuals engage with one another and thereby constitute the social. Society is

not just the sum total of individual acts, but refers to individuals interconnected

through social interaction.

Sociation (Vergesellschaftung) is a crucial concept in Simmels formal

sociology. Sociation constitutes the process that ties the parts to the whole,

individuals to one another and society. Sociation is the form (realized in

innumerably different ways) in which individuals grow together into a unity andwithin which their interests are realized. And it is on the basis of their interests . . .

that individuals form such unities (Simmel, 1971: 24). Most famous in respect of

Simmels notion of sociation is his perspective that conflict, rather than implying

any disconnectness, implies an association between the parties involved (e.g.

Simmel, 1964: 1629). The inherent mutual implication of society and individual

suggests Simmels dialectical approach and its manifestations across social and

cultural forms (see Coser, 1977: 1836). In his analysis of the picture frame, for

instance, Simmel likens the simultaneous wholeness of a work of art and it beinga unified whole with its surroundings to the general difficulty of life that the

elements of totalities [groups] nevertheless lay claim to being autonomous

totalities [individuals] themselves (1994: 17). In the many concrete instances of

social life, also, sociation functions as a binding principle even and especially when

groups are relatively confined, as is in the case with the secret society (Simmel,

1964: 34576). Writes Simmel, sociation offers each of [the members of a secret

society] psychological support against the temptation of disclosure. Sociation

counterbalances the isolating and individualizing effect of the secret (1964:

355).

Social interaction, then, can be studied from the twofold perspective of

content and form, with the latter as the dominant theme in Simmels work.

Separated from the content of action, the forms of social life follow a logic of their

own. Behind every social formation there are forces at work that should be

isolated from the content of their manifestation their analysis points to the value

of abstract or pure sociology. As a logical consequence of these premises, Simmel

studied all kinds of social phenomena, for no matter how much they differ, behind

and within them forms of social life operate in society as a whole. The wide varietyof topics discussed by Simmel (fashion, law, space, women, poverty, secrecy, the

city, art, money) is justified by his premise that the study of any one particular

topic of sociological reflection inevitably implies its relatedness to other manifesta-

tions of social life. Any sociology of particularities is at once a total sociology.




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Snapshots of The Philosophy of Money

Simmel published his Philosophy of Moneyoriginally in 1900, and republished it in

1907, when the book was expanded to some 700 pages (Simmel, 19012

[reprinted in Simmel, 1989: 71923], 1989). Divided over two parts, threechapters each, Simmel relates money to just about every imaginable social

phenomenon and, indeed, argues for the inextricable links between money, the

individual and, ultimately, modern society in its totality. It is this characteristic of

total relationalism that is so clearly obvious in Simmels work on money (Turner,

1986).

The first part of Simmels book is analytical, and aims at studying the being

(Wesen) of money out of the preconditions of social life. Most fundamentally,

Simmel proposes a study of money that transcends a purely economic approach.

The point, Simmel argues, is to go beyond moneys place in the market by linking

it to culture and society in order to understand the deeper valuations and currents

of psychological, yes, even metaphysical presuppositions (1989: 13). First, he

analyzes the relationship of money to value (Wert), arguing that, while value has

an objective side to it (the value transgressing the boundaries of social and

individual realizations), it is through money that subjective values (that people

attach to particular objects) become objectified. Values can be differently attached

to one and the same object, and they are closely connected to objective value

(since they build up subjective values), but only in money can any subjective valuefind full objective expression or manifestation. The desired object while located

at a distance from the individual can be captured through a monetary exchange

relation. The value is determined by the desire that people have to obtain an

object, not the use-value of the object. Trade is, according to Simmel, essential to

the constitution of moneys value, for trade allows objects to become exchange-

able with a value that can be expressed in monetary terms.

Money represents the objectified articulation (verselbstandigte Ausdruck)

of exchange relationships, because, separated from all other goods, it is the

transformer of objects into commodities. Money in modern society becomes

more and more functional: it establishes relationships, and ties people to one

another by the flow of goods and services. The price of a product in this exchange,

Simmel contends, is the measure of exchangeability that exists between it and the

totality of other products (1989: 123). Money represents the relatedness and

heterogeneity of objects: money expresses the general element contained in all

exchangeable objects, . . . it is incapable of expressing the individual element in

them (1964: 3901). Importantly, the substance of money itself no longer plays

a role in its function in exchange. Where once money had substance-value (e.g.gold and silver coins), it has become a pure symbol to determine qualities

quantitatively. Money is an instrument entering into nearly all of peoples social

interactions. Never a purpose in itself (an sich), money has sheer infinite capacities

of applicability in exchange relations. At the same time, however, money can




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become a purpose for itself (fur sich), precisely because of its unlimited potentials

as a means: quantities of money become significant qualities. Economic con-

sciousness, the need to acquire, and monetary greed increase fundamentally in

significance not only in the market but in most every sphere of social life, a process

Simmel describes as the commodification of interactions or the general reduction

of quality to quantity.

The second, synthetic part of The Philosophy of Money Simmel directs at

unfolding the workings of money for the world, that is, the world of the

individual, culture and society. This leads Simmel to analyze money in relation to

individual liberty. He argues that money frees the person because the obligation

to use money (Geldverpflichtung) is only related to the product of labor or to the

buyer/seller on the market, but never to the whole person. Simmel expresses this

well in an analysis of superordination and subordination, where he writes: Moneyhas carried to its extreme the separation . . . between man as a personality and man

as the instrument of a special performance or significance (1964: 293). Through

the formation of ties among innumerable individuals, money secures personal

liberty. In such relationships, money allows for the movement of property, and

property itself becomes an act, an engagement in interactions. Freedom, then,

refers intimately to property, the possession of goods or money, allowing for the

establishment of ever more relations: The meditating concept for this correlation

between money on the one hand, and the enlargement of circles [of socialinteraction], as well as the differentiation of individuals on the other, is often

private property as such (1989: 473). Money can overcome the physical and

social distance between individuals, Simmel argues, because of its capacity to be

absolutely transferable, confined with a process of individualization. At the same

time, however, persons in society are valued more exclusively in terms of money.

People can be measured in an objective and absolute way according to the

monetary value that entering a relationship with them represents. As such, money

exerts its influence in a variety of social domains: legal rights transform into

monetary claims, and labor relations become useful only inasmuch as they in-

volve monetary gains (wages).

Finally, Simmel debates how money also determines culture and the whole

rhythm of life. Modern life becomes an intellectual endeavor excluding emotional

considerations in favor of calculability. The culture of things replaces the culture

of persons, and the creativity of mind is subject to a process of reification

(Vergegenstandlichung) in terms of calculable matter. A process of rational intellec-

tualization goes hand in hand with moneys capacity of transforming objects into

interchangeable commodities, both principles finding their most extreme realiza-tion in the metropolis, the seat of the money economy, [where] in rational

relations man is reckoned with like a number (1964: 411). The emergence of

romantic ideals and strong emotions, Simmel maintains, is but a reaction against

this monetarization of culture: money and intellect are exchangeable, people and




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culture can be bought. Through money, all can be bought, all is related, all is in

constant motion the world is in total flux.

Money and the Photography of SocietyIn the Preface to The Philosophy of MoneySimmel states that his study of money is

meant as an example of the broader intent of his sociological enterprise to study

through every singularity of life, the totality of its meaning (1989: 12). As Poggi

(1993) argues, money is for Simmel the central structure and symbol in the

historical formation of modern society. As such, Simmels analysis of money is

exemplary for his sociological approach. Indeed, the main themes of Simmels

sociological perspective can be retrieved in the book (see Frisby, 1990b: 513;

Turner, 1986).The most outstanding characteristic of Simmels sociology in his discus-

sion on money is the relatedness (Wechselwirkung) of money to other social

phenomena. As Bryan Turner (1986: 95) remarks, in Simmels work any item of

culture can be the starting point for sociological research into the nature of the

totality. . . . Nothing is trivial because everything is related (1986: 95). This

relationalism is typified by his examination of money as a social institution that can

only be understood within the total social framework within which it is imbedded.

Money points to the interdependencies of social life, the way in which all events,

things and individuals are related. Money has no intrinsic meaning but derives itssignificance from its relatedness to money-vested objects and the money-needy

subjects that want to acquire these objects.

Money is also an important medium in the creation of social ties between

people. Society is not just a collection of individuals, and neither one can be

conceived without the other. Through money, relationships between people are

established. At the same time, however, these relations are reified into impersonal

costbenefit alliances that are able to transgress social and physical boundaries.

The intellectualization process accompanying the expansion of the money econ-

omy involves a disintegration of substance into impersonal ties. A general

tendency to calculability and quantitative control, leading social interactions to

become dictated more by the money people have or represent, appears unavoid-

able to Simmel, particularly with moneys tendency to become an end in itself. Yet

personal freedom is preserved, can even be enhanced, on the basis of property to

be used in relations of calculable exchange. Referring to popular German expres-

sions for money, Simmel uses the notions of coal (Kohle) and dough (Knete) to

clarify the freedom-enhancing qualities of money (see Frerichs, 2001). The poor

by necessity have to use whatever little money they have as coal, burning throughit as they spend it for specific purposes. The rich, however, have the opportunity

to reshape the purpose of money, as if it is malleable like dough, and can spend,

save or invest money to accumulate wealth. To Simmel, also, money has eman-

cipatory effects because it frees the individual from membership restricted to any




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one collectivity to a web of group affiliations with a plurality of individuals across

social categories and groups. Money in this way creates freedom (as lack of

constraint), albeit a freedom that dialectically implies a relative absence of en-

joyment, of sense, of quality. Writes Simmel, money produces both a previously

unknown impersonality in all economic ownership and an equally enhancedindependence and autonomy of the personality (1991: 18). Money alienates and

separates but it also creates bonds among the members of the network where it

circulates.

Finally, while Simmels differentiation between general, formal and philo-

sophical sociology was not explicitly developed until after the publication of The

Philosophy of Money, both formal and philosophical components can be discerned

in this work. Most clearly, in seeking to go beyond the presuppositions of

monetary economics, Simmel presents a chapter in philosophical sociology. Heseeks to uncover the ontology of moneys role in society through an inquiry into

the nature of reality suggested by social phenomena (Wolff, 1964: xxxiv). This

philosophical aspiration is at the same time imbedded in the formalism of

Simmels sociology. The central concept of sociation in his formal sociology is not

present in The Philosophy of Money, but other characteristics of the formal approach

underscore his analysis. For example, the form/content separation, which Simmel

sees more and more manifested in modern times, is exemplified by moneys

evolution from a substance-value (in gold or silver) to a purely functional device

(paper money). Money thus manages to reify all that social life including theeconomy but also culture entails as content, transforming qualitative worth into

quantifiable functionality. Through the formal qualities of its operation, money

enables exchange at a distance and an extreme abstractness that fragments people

into formal properties, each of which carries a price-tag.

The Sociological Trinity on Money: Elements ofDeification

The analysis of Simmels study on money in this paper is intended to position and

discuss his work in relation to the other sociological classics. I therefore separately

review the treatment of money in the works of Marx, Weber and Durkheim, to

indicate those elements in the work of these classics that offer useful points for a

comparison with Simmels discussion of money. Although the sociological trinity

did not study money as an independent topic of inquiry, there are distinct

elements of a monetary theory that can nonetheless be deduced from their

respective writings.

Marx: Money and the Contradictions of Capitalism

In at least three of his writings, Marx paid specific attention to the functions of

money in society (see also Arnon, 1984; de Brunhoff, 1976; Ingham, 1998;




10/31

Lavoie, 1986; Morris, 1967). First, in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts

of 1844, Marx (1978) devotes a chapter to The Power of Money in Bourgeois

Society. He argues that money represents the abstract relationships of private

property that have become detached from human relations of exchange. Money is

the epitome of mans alienation: That which is for me through the medium of

money that for which I can pay (i.e. which money can buy) that am I, the

possessor of the money (1978: 103). Money is the ultimate good, since it can

buy all other goods, but it transforms the real powers of man and nature into alien

abstractions reified in relations of exchange. In On the Jewish Question, the

alienating force of money Marx attributes particularly to the (Jewish) culture of

materialism: Money is the jealous god of Israel, beside which no other god may

exist (1978: 50).

The humanistic approach to alienation is further elaborated by Marx in hiscrucial work Grundrisse (1973), though here a more strictly economic analysis of

capitalisms internal contradictions is also presented. Money is considered in

connection to capitallabor relations, and the focus is more exclusively on wages

and the formation of capital rather than on money as such. The accumulation of

the means of production and the transformation of money into capital cause it to

become an independent force that determines the mode of production. In this

broader process, Marx argues, money becomes increasingly detached from the

social relations that paradoxically have initially given rise to the formation of thoserelationships. This element Marx particularly identifies in relation to wage-labor:

The capitalist, it seems, therefore, buys their [the workers] labour with money.

They sell him their labour for money (1978: 204). Thus money reflects and

reifies social relations, and these relations become external to, and independent

from, the people that engage in them.

Marxs speculations on the capitalist economy become fully matured in his

work Capital (1978: 294442). Stripped of the Hegelian language that still

dominated his early works, Marx now develops a detailed economic analysis and

argues that the value of money is determined by the forces of production and not

by the market conditions of supply and demand. In the chapter on Commodities

and Money (1978: 30229), specifically, Marx argues that to become a com-

modity, a good must be transferable into any other one, and money is the medium

that enables this transfer of commodities. The next chapter discusses the impor-

tance of the transformation of money into capital through the transformation of

money into commodities and back into money. The change from money to

capital, however, does not occur in money itself. Instead, in order for money to be

converted into capital, a special commodity must exist whose consumption is anembodiment of labor and a creation of value this, Marx contends, can only be

labor-power. This labor-theory of value is based on Marxs critique of commodity

fetishism as the unquestioned belief that goods possess value as an inherent

property. Marx writes,




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. . . to find an analogy, we must have resource to the mist-enveloped

regions of the religious world. In that world the productions of the human

brain appear as independent beings endowed with life, and entering into

relation both with one another and the human race. So it is in the world of

commodities with the products of mens hands. This I call the Fetishismwhich attaches itself to the products of labour, so soon as they are

produced as commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from the

production of commodities.

(1978: 321)

Unmasking this fetishism, Marxs historical materialism unveiled that a com-

modity has exchange-value only because it stands in a particular relation to human

labour and production.Congruent with Marxs theory of value, money is intimately tied up with

labor and a concept of value based on labor and, therefore, labor products. To

Marx, money is itself a commodity but one that in abstract form also represents

the value of other commodities. As such, money is not just a medium of exchange,

but also a means of domination. For as a universal measure for value (and the

labor it entails), money symbolizes the capitalist mode of production and its social

relations of exploitation. It is on the basis of this labor-theory of value that Marx

goes on to construct his theories of labor power, the creation of surplus value, and

the expropriation of the worker. The specific but relatively limited role Marxattributes to money in his explanation of the contradictions of capitalism is clear:

the division of labor, the accumulation of capital, the opposition between

bourgeoisie and proletariat, and the inherently contradictory mode of capitalist

production are the central elements that account for industrialized society. The

study of money to Marx only makes sense as part of a more encompassing analysis

of capitalism.

Weber: Money and the Rationalization of SocietyMax Webers treatment of the role of money in society forms part of his

sociological discussions on the rationalization processes in industrial society. In

The Protestant Ethic, Weber argues that the ethic of Protestantism has as its

summum bonumthe earning of more and more money, combined with the strict

avoidance of all spontaneous enjoyment of life (1976: 53). The acquisition of

wealth is an end in itself, and the Protestant is preoccupied by the making

of money, albeit in an ascetic way. It is this methodical attitude that Weber holds

responsible for the formal-rational conduct to life that he considers so importantin the development of capitalism. The irrational accumulation of wealth (irra-

tional, because money is denied its very reason for existence, namely exchange)

accelerates the rationalization of the capitalist money economy. The ethics of

Protestantism thus contributed to the rise of capitalism by its amazingly good, we




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may even say a pharisaically good, conscience in the acquisition of money, so long

as it took place legally (1976: 176).

Weber also discusses the role of the money economy throughout his later

works, particularly in the posthumous collection Economy and Society (1954,

1958a, 1958b, 1958c, 1962). Basically, he outlines the characteristics of ration-alized, modern society in several social domains, and the money economy is

thereby seen as one of the driving forces. In the paper Religious Rejections of the

World and Their Direction, for instance, Weber elaborates on the theme of The

Protestant Ethic, and argues that the calculable method of life, characteristic of the

rational economy of capitalism, finds in money the most abstract and imper-

sonal element that exists in human life (1958c: 331). Elsewhere, Weber (1954,

1962) similarly argues for the social significance of money in creating the

possibility of rational calculability, the possibility of assigning money values to allgoods and services, which creates impersonal relations of exchange between the

participants in the market because money is the accepted means of exchange. The

money economy is also seen to determine the structure of bureaucracies, in that it

is necessary to provide the income to maintain them (based on a system of

taxation) since they cannot be derived from private profits (1958b: 2049).

Webers definition of class, finally, essentially refers to the possession of goods and

the opportunities for (monetary) income (1958a: 1813). But, of course, while

Weber in his work emphasizes the role of the money economy in the development

of nearly all facets of modernity, he also pays considerable attention to cultural,religious, political, technological and legal processes of rationalization in the

formation of modern society. The elective affinity (Wahlverwantschaft) between

these factors is precisely one of his most fundamental methodological claims, so

that he treats money always in relation to other social forces.

Durkheim: Money and the Morality of the Social Order

Of all the classics, Durkheim is probably the one who least addressed the issue of

money in his sociological work. In attempting to reconstruct a Durkheimian

monetary theory, it is to be noted that Durkheims doctoral dissertation on the

social division of labor (1984) includes but very minimal discussions of the money

economy. Instead, the emphasis in his study is on modern societys capacity to

maintain solidarity in light of growing trends of individualization. He outlines an

evolutionary model from mechanical to organic solidarity, whereby the nature of

solidarity is seen to shift from one between identical, substitutable elements to one

between distinct, functionally specialized parts. The latter refers primarily to the

division of labor between workers, but also includes social relations establishedthrough monetary exchange. But Durkheim does not discuss economic forces as

such, instead placing premium on the social regulations, collective beliefs and

sentiments that underlie these processes they are in the final analysis responsible

for a societys cohesion (or lack thereof as a result of anomie).




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Additionally, in Suicide, Durkheim (1951) employs a similar argument to

account for the rise in suicide-rates whenever there is a positive or negative, but

always abrupt, transition in economic life, and because of the chronic state of

anomie in the world of trade and industry. Economic crises lead to a sudden

weakening of social regulations, which brings about a disruption of the sociallimits set to mans desires. Such desires can include the need to acquire more and

more money, and the economic crises may refer to monetary losses or gains.

Durkheim specifically mentions prices of the most necessary foods and the fact

that world expositions bring more money into the country and are thought to

increase public prosperity (pp. 2445). The lack of regulations in the economic

world, responsible for suicide as a regular factor, consists in the freeing of

industrial relations from all constraints on (monetary) needs. However, Durkheim

conceives of the morality of the social order that can and should guide economicforces as the crucial theme of sociological reflection, not the economy or money as

such.

Simmel versus the Trinity: A Stranger among theClassics?

It is apparent that Marx, Weber and Durkheim did not pay as much exclusive

attention to money as an autonomous domain of sociological inquiry as Simmeldid, although none of them entirely denied the significance of money in their

respective analyses. Simmels approach to money diverges from each of the other

classics in ways that can be explained with reference to their respective general

theoretical perspectives. On the one hand, of course, Marxs influence on Simmel,

Durkheim and Weber may indicate a centrality of the influence of historical

materialism or at least an elective affinity among the classics in their development

of sociological theory from the second half of the 19th century onwards. On the

other hand, the concentration on the money theme in Simmels work also licenses

a thematically more delineated approach that can identify the theoretical concerns

that distinguish his work from that of the other classics.

The Age of Sociology

Since Parsons (1937) as well as some of his critics (e.g. Giddens, 1971), the

history of sociological thought has firmly been established in the major trans-

formations of society in the 19th century (Collins, 1994; Holton, 1996). Building

on the centrality of social change, the classics thereby also converged theirthinking, or at least transformed their thought in substantial respects. The

transformation from or rift between the younger and older Marx is well docu-

mented. In Durkheim, the anti-voluntaristic orientation of the early period of

social realism was refashioned in his later work on religion. And Webers




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influences from German idealism and romanticism place meaning and inter-

pretation completely at the center of his methodology.

In the work of Simmel, similar themes and transformations are at work

(see Coser, 1977; Frisby, 1987: 4234; Levine, 1997; Scaff, 1988: 37). Among

Simmels most important initial intellectual influences are German Volkerpsycholo-gie, particularly the notion that social totality historically antecedes the individual,

but also the idea that there is an evolutionary trend toward the development of

individuality. The emphasis on individuality in Simmels writings until the late

1880s leads Simmel himself to refer to his work as psychological contributions.

Thereafter, however, he explicitly proclaimed sociological objectives, with a

peculiar interest in philosophically grounding the sociological project. Particularly

in the last decade of the 19th century, Simmel was heavily involved in sociological

work and his contribution to establish sociology as an independent science.During this period, he wrote most of his explicitly sociological work and was

among the first to teach a course in sociology. However, although this task was

accomplished a decade later in an institutional sense (as sociology had become a

discipline with its own journals and institutionalization in the academic world),

Simmels programmatic formulations of a new science of society had not pro-

duced the results to which he aspired. Disillusioned, he turned to philosophical,

metaphysical matters. As I will discuss in more detail later, his turn away from

sociology in the stricter sense of the term was never complete, but this was mostly

because of efforts on the part of his students (especially Albion Smalls successfulendeavors to bring Simmels work to the attention of American sociologists [see

Levine, 1997: 1813]).

These shifts in Simmels work are especially significant in the context of

The Philosophy of Money. For it is in this work that he shifts from a sociological

analysis of social forms to an emphasis on moral autonomy, individuality, existen-

tial responsibility and personal experience (Holton, 1996: 457; Levine, 1997:

183). Intimately part of this orientation towards a philosophy of culture is the

notion, which figures so prominently in The Philosophy of Money, that a major

evolutionary trend in modern society is the development of increasing individ-

uality. As Levine (1997) has shown, for the notion of an increasing individual

subjectivity Simmel found intellectual support in the work of Nietzsche and, more

broadly, Hegels perspective of self-consciousness. More broadly, the general

evolutionary orientation was of course no stranger to sociological theorizing of

the latter half of the 19th century, finding expression, most clearly, in the works

of Durkheim and, especially, Spencer (which had initially stimulated Simmel to

sociological investigations). The centrality of individuality comes to the fore-

ground most clearly in The Philosophy of Money, with its emphasis on money as auniversal impersonal measure of value that also enables new and expanded

subjective experiences. In other words, Simmel maintains that as much as it is true

that there are de-personalization trends in modernity, it also and still allows for

individuals to react creatively and make ones own world in the money economy,




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for the metropolitan individual is not simply a passive victim of consumerism

(Holton, 1996: 46). Let us now consider how the centrality of the money theme

in Simmels work relates more specifically to the other sociological classics.

Simmel and Marx

In the Preface to his study on money, Simmel claims that he wants to adjust

historical materialism by looking at economic processes as the result of deeper

presuppositions, while preserving the explanatory model of the influence of

economic life upon culture (1989: 13). Simmels relation to Marx in the study

of money thus comprises both similarities and differences in approach (see

Deutschmann, 1996; Frankel, 1977: 1727; Turner, 1986: 1004). Indeed, on

the one hand, some of the themes in Marxs work reappear in some form inSimmels study. First, there is the evolutionary sketch of money from simple barter

to the more complex and more complete existence of money as paper money. In

addition, both Simmel and Marx use religious analogies to denote the impersonal

nature of money (the Holy Grail, money as fetish), and this theme of impersonal-

ization through money is apparent in the writings of both authors. Although

Marxs Grundrissewere not yet discovered during Simmels life, he unwittingly

reconstructed some of the classical Marxist themes of objectification and aliena-

tion (Turner, 1986: 1013). Money is seen by both Simmel and Marx as the

purest form of reification; it is the technically most perfected medium of moderneconomic exchange that transforms all quality into quantity, alienates people from

their true existence, and fragments their personalities into formal properties.

On the other hand, Simmels approach is in several respects antagonistic to

Marxs throughout The Philosophy of Money. The main difference in their respec-

tive approaches is that Marx holds the capitalist mode of production responsible

for the contradictions of modern, industrialized society, while for Simmel it is the

money economy as such that is the cause of the impersonalization of social

relations. Marxs theory is primarily concerned with the capitalist sphere of

production and the relation between money, labor and capital, while Simmel

concentrates on the distribution and circulation of goods, which are held to

constitute a value-creating sphere of exchange. Seeking to move deeper than

historical materialism to reach at the psychological and metaphysical meanings of

the concrete historical manifestations of economic forms, Simmels Philosophy of

Money is a fundamental critique of Marxs political economy. While in Marxs

work, too, money has different functions (as a measure of value, a medium of

exchange and a means of accumulating wealth), it was always of central concern to

Marx that money embodied abstract labour and that the value of money wasdetermined by the conditions of production (Turner, 1986: 109). Opposing

most critically this economicization of money, Simmel locates money resolutely in

the broad realm of human experience. In Simmel, money is only loosely tied to its

material basis and instead represents a sociological phenomenon, a form of human




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interaction. Therefore, also, exchange is for him a crucial form of sociation,

whereas the economy is only one special form of exchange (see Frisby, 1985:

5960). Whereas Marxs theory of value is based on the productive relations of

the human subject with nature through labor, Simmel presents a relativist theory

of value that posits that the value of things rests on a subjective judgment, onvaluation. Therefore, those goods that are difficult to obtain for the individual

who wants them within certain limits of feasibility will be the most valuable

(Sassatelli, 2000).

The differences between Simmels formal-philosophical sociology, in

search of the universals of humanity, and Marxs concrete economic-historical

analysis, aimed at the general laws of capitalism, are manifested in their respective

value theories. Also, as far as the problematic sides of money are concerned

(reification, fragmentation), Marxs analysis is, in however paradoxical a way, moreoptimistic, since capitalism, he argues, will one day undermine itself. Simmels

analysis instead points to the role of money as a world of its own, driven by the

nature of human life, which cannot just be overthrown. Conversely, along with

the growth of money as a pure symbol, Simmel defines freedom in relation to the

possession of money as providing the means to engage in social interactions. For

Marx, this potential of increased freedom and individualization is of course far

more problematic: the freedom of some can only be maintained by the unfreedom

of many others. Underlying these differences in approach, Simmels discontent

with socialist ideology can be discerned. To Simmel, socialism cannot eradicate alldistinctions between people, at least not without destroying their freedom (see

Simmel, 1964: 738).

Simmel and Weber

The relationship between Simmel and Weber is a peculiar one. They were close

friends, but the intellectual influences between them are not very clear and have

been a topic of considerable scholarly debate (see Abel, 1970: 11214; Faught,

1985; Leger, 1986; Levine, 1972, Lichtblau, 1991; Nedelmann, 1988; Scaff,

1987, 1988; Turner, 1986: 10410; C. Turner, 1989). On the one hand, there

are affinities between Simmels and Webers work. They generally share a meth-

odological concern for the role of understanding (Verstehen), and the accompany-

ing concepts of sociation and social interaction. Also, Simmels identification of

the form of social action may have inspired Webers development of ideal-types

(although the former has metaphysical status, while the latter is a methodological

device). As members of the intellectual life of Berlin, they both had first-hand

access to the achievements of modern, metropolitan culture. Although for theProtestant Weber this primarily meant an inquiry into subjective and objective

culture, while the Jewish Simmel was more attracted to the new aesthetics of

modernity, they both expressed a fatalistic theme in their sociology and identified

the cold-hearted objectification of culture.




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The impersonal nature of money in exchange relations identified by

Simmel corresponds closely to Webers notion of bureaucratization in terms of

purposive rationality (Zweckrationalitat). Both Simmel and Weber concentrate on

the role of money in modern society as enabling an increasing quantification of

relations and fragmentation of the human person into functional partitions.Money is seen to transform personal bonds into calculable instrumental ties.

Simmels Philosophy of Moneymay well have been a direct source of inspiration for

Webers analysis of modern bureaucratization. (Weber read the book after a

period of illness around 1902.) Webers analyses of the methodical conduct of life,

the rational calculation and intellectualization, the dominance of bureaucratic

control, and the growing process of secularization into the iron cage of modernity

presuppose a rational money system, and similar themes are discussed in Simmels

study on money.Weber in his writings hardly ever referred to Simmels work and, when he

did, he was quite critical about some of Simmels intentions. Weber wrote a

critique of Simmels sociological approach, including his analysis of money, but,

probably because Simmel had difficulties acquiring a full professorship, he never

finished the paper (Weber, 1972). Still, the unfinished manuscript does indicate

some of the differences in their perspectives. Weber argues that, while Simmel has

advanced some important theoretical ideas and made subtle empirical observa-

tions, there are numerous unacceptable aspects in his methodology. Most criti-

cally, Weber refutes Simmels methodological approach and his notion ofinteraction. He criticizes Simmels interpretive method for proceeding largely on

the basis of analogy, which to the specialist is devoid of any sense. With respect to

Simmels notion of interaction, Weber argues that it is so vague and broad that it

is not possible to conceive of an influence of one person by another that would be

purely one-sided, i.e., not containing a certain element of interaction

(1972: 163).

In some of Webers other works, more of his disagreements with Simmels

approach are revealed. Thematically most interesting is that Weber in The

Protestant Ethicspecifically criticizes Simmels Philosophy of Money. While he calls it

a brilliant analysis, he also maintains that Simmel does not sufficiently distinguish

between the money economy in general and capitalism in particular, to the

detriment of his concrete analysis (1976: 193, 185). Weber in his work indeed

paid attention to the structural conditions of the capitalist money economy,

whereas Simmel developed a phenomenology of money as a medium of the

human experience of reality as such. Weber sought to look beyond the formalism

of social action, and wanted to unveil its psycho-cultural dimension (why people

act), while Simmel argued to go beyond substantivism in order to understandsocial interactions in terms of the forms they have (how people act).

From a methodological viewpoint, Weber maintains in Economy and

Societythat his work departs from Simmels method (in Soziologieand Philosophie

des Geldes) in drawing a sharp distinction between subjectively intended and




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objectively valid meanings; two different things which Simmel not only fails to

distinguish but often deliberately treats as belonging together (Weber, cited in

Frisby, 1990b: 14). As Levine (1997: 1789) clarifies, Simmel developed an

explicit interest in Verstehenonly after 1900. This may have been due to, or at least

it harmonizes with, the fact that Simmel for strategic reasons did not wish to beexplicit about his opposition to Wilhelm Diltheys hermeneutics. For in contrast

to the Diltheyan Verstehen method that conceived of society as singular mean-

ingful events, Simmel in his work seeks to construct general propositions that can

account for manifold historical events (Dahme, 1990: 1419). This methodo-

logical conflict was meaningful in a professional sense because Dilthey hindered

Simmels career opportunities at Berlin.

Once Simmel had clarified his methodology more explicitly, it was influen-

tial for Webers approach but mostly as a negative model (see Frisby, 1987:4257; Lichtblau, 1991; Scaff, 1988: 1317; Turner, 1986: 1045). In particular,

Weber sought to depart from Simmels methodology in formulating a cognitive

rational interpretation of motives, rather than a psychological theory of conscious-

ness. For Simmel it was indisputable that all social events . . . are rooted in souls,

that sociation is a psychological phenomenon (cited in Nedelmann, 1988: 20).

Against this psychologism, Webers method of understanding of action has to be

restricted to the subjective intentions of human agents, and is clearly distinguished

from, if also related to, causal explanations (in the sense of causal pluralism and

Wahlverwantschaft) of the social structures in which actions are imbedded (seeGerth and Mills, 1958: 5561). Echoing the famous connection Weber draws

between understanding and explanation, he criticizes Simmel for not clearly

distinguishing the interpretation of motives of actors and the socio-historical

context of meaning.

Simmel and Durkheim

Durkheim was quite well acquainted with Simmels work and published two

review articles on books by Simmel, including a review of The Philosophy of Money

(Durkheim, 19001, 19023). Durkheim also discussed Simmels sociological

theory at some length in two other papers (Durkheim, 1964, 1982; see also Abel,

1970: 10812; Bentley, 1926; Frisby, 1990a: xviixviii; Maffesoli, 1988; Mes-

trovic, 1991: 5474; Naegele, 1958; Thompson, 1982; Wolff, 1958). As far as

Simmels general sociological theory is concerned, Durkheim strongly disagrees

with Simmels a-historical formalism. According to Durkheim, form only applies

to social morphology (an approach that he rejected, particularly in Suicide), and

the separation of form and content rests on nothing but Simmels idiosyncraticarbitrary judgment. Durkheim asserts that the special social sciences, concerned

with the processes or variable contents of human existence, are just as much

sociological as is the study of the external forms of the collectivity. The forms and

substance of relationships are social facts, that is, for both it holds that one cannot




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but feel present the hand of society, which organises them and whose stamp they

plainly bear (1982: 191). Contrary to Simmels view of society as being essen-

tially involved with the sociation of individuals, Durkheim emphasizes that society

is a moral milieu that serves a function of integration, referring to the (formal)

attachment of people to society, but that also exhibits a particular regulatoryforce, referring to (substantive) moral codes and rules.

Simmels conception of the relationship between society and individual is

markedly different from Durkheims. Of course, as analysts of thefin de si`ecle, they

share the ideas of a force sui generis (Simmels metaphysics versus Durkheims

collective conscience) and a historical account of a process into modernity that is

characterized by a general impersonalization and functional compartmentalization

of social relations. But Durkheims identification of social facts exerting their

influence over individuals and having a life of their own regardless of individualmanifestations cannot be easily reconciled with Simmels notion of sociation and

stress on individual differences in social interactions.

Durkheims specific objections to Simmels Philosophy of Money fit well

within this general critique. Durkheim (19001) argues that Simmels book (as

the title indicates) presents a social philosophy and is not sociology sensu stricto,

for he discusses just about every conceivable fact and thought related to money,

especially in the second synthetic part, and the facts he there presents are often

imprecise and unwarranted. Too many diverse questions are dealt with, Durkheim

argues, and, lacking any analysis, Simmel fails to see that the force of money doesnot derive from any of its presumed intrinsic values. What is far more important to

Durkheim is the presence or absence of the regulation to which [money] is

submitted, and the nature of that regulation (19001: 145). Unlike Simmels

identification of alienation and the fragmentation of personality into functional

parts as a result of the essence of money, Durkheim held that the division of labor

is not pathological as such, but only when it lacks a developed system of solidary

organizations and the necessary regulations concerning how these organizations

should come together. In sum, Durkheim cannot agree with Simmels abstract

approach: money cannot have such a profound moral influence solely on the

grounds of its formal characteristics. What matters to Durkheim is the moral

regulation through which money is controlled, not money as such.

Simmel and the Prospects of a Sociology ofMoney

This analysis of Simmel in relation to the other classics has revealed some of the

underlying distinctions between these different perspectives in classical theory.However, this confrontation by itself does not suffice to evaluate Simmel as a

sociological classic and assess the influence of his work for the sociological study of

money. Sociological theory-building is the result not only of conceptual argu-

mentation and debate, but just as much of the actual reception of a body of




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knowledge in the sociological community (Alexander, 1987; Lamont, 1987). Any

judgment of sociological theories necessarily implies, and should take into

account, a clarification of the historical dimension in theory formation.

Simmels (Lack of) Influence in Sociology

The influence of Simmels work in sociology is marked by an ambivalence that

seems to have haunted him throughout his life (see Coser, 1958, 1977: 1949;

Frisby, 1990a: xvxxv; Gerth and Mills, 1958: 21). While Simmel had good

connections with Berlins cultural and intellectual elite at the turn of the 20th

century, he was excluded for a long time from influential university positions. He

remained a lecturer (Privatdozent) and honorary professor at the University of

Berlin, and had to move to Strasbourg to become full professor only in 1914. Theslow progression in Simmels career was likely the result of anti-Semitic senti-

ments, but his eclectic theories also caused him to remain somewhat of an outsider

in the scholarly environment. Still, during his lifetime Simmels work received

quite some attention, as can for instance be seen from the large number of, mostly

positive, reviews of The Philosophy of Money(e.g. Altmann, 1903; Duprat, 1900;

Mead, 1901; Meyer, 1901).

The ambivalent reception of Simmels work during his lifetime also

conditioned his early influence in the United States (Frisby, 1992: 15562;

Levine, 1991; Levine et al., 1976; Wolff, 1964: xxivxxv). Early issues of TheAmerican Journal of Sociologycontained some 15 papers by Simmel and generally

paid a lot of attention to the German scholar. (Several Chicago sociologists had

studied in Germany.) In the later development of American sociology, however,

Simmels work seems to have been largely ignored. George Herbert Mead (1901)

wrote a (very positive) review of Simmels Philosophy of Money in an economic

journal, but to the present day Simmels influence in economics is really non-

existent. Other American sociologists (Park, Burgess, Spykman) published on

Simmel, and offered translations of his work to the American readership, but with

only moderate success. When Parsons (1937) published his first systematic social

theory, referring abundantly to European sociologists, Simmel was excluded apart

from some scant references. (Parsons drafted a chapter on Simmel and Tonnies

but did not include it in his book; see Parsons, 1998.) With the subsequent rise of

functionalism, little attention was paid to Simmels sociology (Saiedi, 1987).

Simmels work was marginalized as a result of the rise of Parsonian functionalism,

and the post-functionalist attack on Parsons did little to revive it (Alexander,

1987: 3446). As late as 1976, a review paper could be published on the influence

of Simmels work for substantive areas in American sociological research, without,quite rightly, mentioning the theme of money (Levine et al., 1976).

Apart from unfavorable historical conditions, there are also theoretical

causes for Simmels poor reception. There are good reasons to say that any social

theory, however complex, simplifies reality by ordering modern civilization




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according to an encompassing explanatory model. As my review of the money

theme in the work of Marx, Weber and Durkheim has shown, their studies took

into account money as an element of sociological inquiry only within a more

encompassing perspective aimed at unfolding the central, in this way unifying,

theme of analyzing (and criticizing) modern industrialized societies. Marx focusedon money within a more encompassing study of the capitalist mode of produc-

tion; Weber discussed the money economy in relation to the broader trends of

societal rationalization; and Durkheim concentrated on the moral regulatory

structures in which money is socially imbedded. Capitalism, rationalization and

social morality are the respective keywords, providing unity to the traditions of

sociological theory and diversity to theoretical sociology. Such a clear-cut

approach is not what characterizes Simmels sociology of everything, which is

resistant to being pinned down into one or the other determining category ofsociological thought. It is for these reasons that Simmel has often been called a

talented essayist with a striking love of details (see Levine, 1997: 173; Dahme,

1990: 17). Also, unlike the other classics of sociology, Simmel did not hold

industrialism to be the central turning point in the evolution to modern society.

Rather, he considered the money economy in general, without it being specifically

tied to capitalism or the division of labor in industrialism, as decisive for the Great

Transformation into modernity (Lawrence, 1980: 1823). He offered a unique

characterization of modernity, and provided new basic tools for its sociological

study (separation of form and content, relationalism, the possibility of socialorder). Still, his disinclination to specialize and his refusal to argue for one clear-

cut driving force in the evolution to modernity have led his work not to be

indisputably classified as classic (see Frisby, 1992: 4563).

Past, Present and Future of the Sociology of Money

Over the past decades, Simmels social theory has witnessed a notable revival,

especially with the advent of the new cultural studies and the discussions on

modernity and postmodernity (see, e.g., Backhaus, 1998; Blegvad, 1989; Dahme,

1990; Featherstone, 1991; Gross, 2001; Scaff, 1988; C. Turner, 1989; Weinstein

and Weinstein, 1990, 1993). The sociology of money, too, has been the subject of

renewed sociological interest (e.g. Baker and Jimerson, 1992; Condominas, 1989;

Ingham, 1998; Singh, 2000; Zelizer, 1994). Of course, the money theme has

never been totally absent from sociology. Noteworthy are Parsons and Smelsers

functional analysis of money as a generalized medium of interaction (Parsons and

Smelser, 1956; Smelser, 1963), Luhmanns autopoietic notion of money (1985),

Habermass thesis of the monetary colonization of the lifeworld (1981), andGiddens discussions of money and trust in his structuration theory of modernity

(1990, 1991). However, none of these renowned authors base their theories on

Simmel. Habermas, for instance, develops his concept of money out of a critical

reappraisal of Parsons, and he quotes Simmel only three times in his analysis of




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theories of modernity (1985: 170, 298, 371). To Habermas (1983, 1996),

Simmels philosophy of the subject (Lebensphilosophie) is unacceptable from the

standpoint of post-metaphysical communication-theory. Likewise, Giddens,

though claiming that The Philosophy of Money is the most far-reaching and

sophisticated account of the connections between money and modernity (1991:22), only briefly discusses Simmels notions of trust and space (1990: 18;

1991: 229).

In addition to the analysis of money in the works of these contemporary

classics, money has recently gained a more accepted status as a topic of socio-

logical inquiry (see, e.g., Dodd, 1994; Doyle, 1992; Ganmann, 1988; Ingham,

1994, 1996; Smelt, 1980; Zelizer, 1989). Some scholars have even begun to

develop sociological analyses of money in contemporary society explicitly on the

basis of Simmels ground-breaking work (e.g. Deutschman, 2000; Ritzer, 2001;Sassatelli, 2000). Christoph Deutschman (2000), most clearly, has developed an

alternative to a functionalist sociology of money by arguing that Simmels

conceptualization of money as an absolute means allows for a useful perspective

of moneys role in modern society in relation to broader currents of individualiza-

tion and modernization.

Apart from the historical fact that sociologists have mostly neglected

money (Ingham, 1998; Pixley, 1999), two tensions continue to trouble the

reception of the sociological study of money. First, sociologies of money cannot

find a way in to economic studies, where monetary theories are largely developedon the basis of discussions of Keynes, Smith, Ricardo or Marx. This lack of multi-

disciplinary collaboration is regrettable since economics is after all essentially

concerned with the study of money. Moreover, because any sociology of money

should clarify the specific sociological contribution, debate with economic mone-

tary theories seems indispensable. And, second, the historical neglect of money in

sociology indicative is the fact that Simmels Philosophy of Moneywas translated

into English nearly 80 years after the German original cannot be overcome

overnight. Regardless of whether or not money is theoretically considered a

suitable topic for sociological investigation, sociologys history de facto constrains

moneys receptiveness into the field. The vagueness and internal inconsistencies

that mark most contemporary sociological studies of money, not surprisingly

therefore, all too clearly confirm that there is no systematic sociology of money

(Zelizer, 1991: 1304).

Simmel and the Quest for Sociological Theory

An assessment of Simmels sociological theory also includes considerations onrelevant aspects in the history of theory formation. The factual resistance against

Simmels sociology and the study of money as a theme of its own will also

condition an evaluation of the merits of his work. From this perspective, the

recent revival of Simmel in postmodern theories deserves attention, minimally




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because Simmel handed down the interconnected particularities of his writings

and because they have inspired the current debate on postmodernity. This issue

calls for a more profound investigation than I can offer here, but the discussion of

Simmels study of money and the confrontation with the other classics offer

important elements for a useful assessment of Simmel today.

Apart from the obvious fact that the neglect of Simmels sociology has

always been more relative than absolute, it should be noted that the contemporary

(re)appraisal of his work is not the exclusive property of postmodern theories.

Simmels discussion of small-group interaction has gained an established place in

symbolic interactionism and, to a lesser extent, in social psychology. Moreover,

the inspiration of Simmels work on culture is regularly manifested in cultural

sociology, which is surely not the exclusive domain of postmodern theorizing.

Additionally, in attempting to construct a synthesis in theoretical sociology,Simmels sociology has also been related to the work of social theorists with a

more accepted status (see, e.g., Levine, 1991, 2000 on Simmel and Parsons).

Most remarkable is the fact that over the last decade Simmels work has

been revived because of its appropriation in postmodern theories. David Frisby

has offered insightful material to systematically assess Simmels relation to post-

modernity (Frisby, 1985, 1990c, 1992: 6479, 15574). Frisby describes Sim-

mels work as characterized by essentially modernist aspirations. Simmels

conception of modernity is closely akin to Baudelaires formulation of the modernas the mode of experiencing the new as transitory. This is demonstrated by

Simmels emphasis on the fluidity of forms of action and the interrelatedness of all

manifestations of modern culture.

Paradoxically, however, Simmels analysis of modernity has been a major

source of inspiration for theories of the postmodern. Frisby (1992: 16974)

discusses Simmels notion of pure exchange, his emphasis on culture, and the

primacy of the aesthetic experience as decisive in this regard. I would add that

Simmels relationalist approach and his manifold studies of the dyad, the triad, the

nobility, the metropolis, silence, secrecy, the stranger, landscapes, sociability, and

so forth, may well fit with the postmodern claim for order out of chaos. His

discussions of the interrelatedness of the fragments of modernity, particularly his

The Philosophy of Money, in which he makes excursions into just about every

conceivable topic connected to money, ironically fit well with the postmodernist

contention that the only thing left to discuss is everything. Yet it makes sense to

argue, as Sassatelli does, that Simmels insistence on relationalism and sociation, in

his The Philosophy of Money as well as across the rest of his oeuvre, should be

conceived as the most perilous interdisciplinary pursuit within modern episteme(2000: 209). To what extent the postmodern appropriation of Simmels work can

indeed be upheld, particularly given the fact that it had modernist aspirations,

how it will come to terms with the persisting influence of the other classics in

sociology, and to what extent it may be the case that Simmels sociology will be




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judged not by its original intentions but by the meaning ascribed to it today are

the central questions theorists will have to address.

ConclusionI have evaluated Simmels study of money in confrontation with the other

sociological classics to indicate the markedly ambivalent place of his writings in the

history of sociological thought. Although there may be limitations to this

discussion of the selected classics, my examination revealed that a striking element

in Simmels writings, as compared to Marx, Weber and Durkheim, is his refusal to

locate any underlying pivotal force in the course to modernity. The totality of

formally interrelated parts is modernity, not its explanation through reference to

the capitalist economy (Marx), the mutual influence of culture and economy(Weber), or the changing nature of morality in light of industrialism (Durkheim).

Therefore, Simmel can study money as such, while for Marx, Weber and

Durkheim it would make little sense if a monetary theory is not part of, and

clarified in relation to, a more broadly explanatory theory of society. In light of

these methodological considerations, and given the recent reception of Simmels

work in postmodern theories, there are reasons to argue that Simmel today is a

postmodern theorist, precisely to the extent in which he is recognized as such by

contemporary commentators. This historical condition at once poses serioustheoretical challenges to both sides of the modernpostmodern spectrum. In light

of my review of Simmels theory in relation to the other classics of sociology, some

indications can be given on the directions this debate could take. On the one

hand, the present postmodern appraisal of Simmels work calls for Simmelian

sociologists of a different persuasion to clarify the modernist core of Simmels

work how to reconcile such a position with Simmels great indeterminacy and

sheer enumeration (Durkheim, 19023: 649), the diffidence and even indif-

ference (Frisby, 1987: 423), the emphasis on aesthetics (see Bohringer, 1984;

Hubner-Funk, 1984), and his leveling down of society to culture; and how to

account for, offer counterweight to, the postmodernist appropriation of his

sociology. This may prove a difficult endeavor, given Simmels preoccupation to

lay bare the non-causal sense of societys totality through an analysis of its

multiplicities, his preoccupation with the forms of social life, and, above all (in

light of todays plurality of lifeworlds), his metaphysical contentions, which, by his

own premises, are not just hypothetical statements, but appeal to the presupposi-

tions of knowledge as such (Voraussetzungen des Erkennens uberhaupt, Simmel,

1989: 9).However, postmodern interpretations of Simmel will have to come to

terms with the remaining persistence of the other sociological classics as well as

with (the interpretations of) Simmels notion of modernity. With regard to the

study of money, this especially calls for a clarification of Simmels analysis vis-a-vis




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the study of money from a materialist (Marx), multi-causal (Weber) and socio-

logistic (Durkheim) perspective. Whatever the shortcomings of the perspectives of

these theorists may be, each of them, and unlike Simmels, has provided a

yardstick by which the empirical facts of social life can be systematically ordered

with an encompassing but differentiating social theory. With their flight into

aesthetic prose and pose, postmodern theories, however, essentially refuse to

aspire any longer to this conception of theoretical access to the world. It is the

tragedy of their fate that they are nevertheless confronted with their modernist

counterparts and the extent to which the latter rely on the classics as con-

temporaries. Postmodern sociologist thereby will have to address the criticism that

they obscure rather than clarify complex societies and prevent an insightful

sociological understanding, for instance of the money theme. Ironically, then,

given the postmodern appropriation of Simmel, the first sociologist of modernitymay well become the first to be judged by an evaluation of its most relentless

critics.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Eve Darian-Smith, Donald Levine, Gary Marx, Leonard Pinto and anonymous reviewers

for helpful comments on a previous draft.

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