BANDUNG AND THE ORIGINS OF THIRD WORLD SOVEREIGNTY
Transcript of BANDUNG AND THE ORIGINS OF THIRD WORLD SOVEREIGNTY
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BANDUNG AND THE ORIGINS OF THIRD WORLD SOVEREIGNTY
Antony Anghie
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Introduction
It is surely tempting to treat the Bandung Conference, the historical meeting of Asian and
African states in 1955, as formulating a third world vision of sovereignty in much the same
way as Westphalia articulated an idea of sovereignty that dominated thereafter in relations
among Western states. This chapter sketches out the significance of Bandung and the concept
of sovereignty that emerged from the conference. First, the chapter studies the Bandung
version of sovereignty in terms of earlier efforts of non-European states to adapt to
international law and establish themselves within that system. This version of sovereignty,
which relied on the idea of Panchsheel or the “Five Principles of Coexistence,” was devised
to protect the interests of third world states in the external realm in relation to international
affairs. It was shaped by concerns about colonialism, self-determination, and development.
Next, the chapter assesses the impact of the Bandung moment on contemporary debates and
discussions relating to sovereignty and what might be termed the third world concept of
sovereignty. While the Bandung version of sovereignty can be seen as a crucial element of
the anti-colonial campaign of the Bandung states, it also needs to be understood as adopting a
particular idea of the nation-state. In this respect, the focus is on the impact of the Bandung
version of sovereignty in the internal sphere—that is, the internal political system of third
world states. The legacy of Bandung is the creation of a series of tensions—most generally
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between external and internal sovereignty—that continue to characterize the politics of
developing states.
The Background
The origins of Bandung can be traced to African and Asian countries’ fear that they were left
out of the major deliberations at San Francisco leading to the creation of the United Nations,
and that this inaugural omission could signal their ongoing exclusion from any major role in
the management of international affairs, and this despite decolonization and the emergence of
a new global order. Many of the attendees at Bandung were not part of the United Nations.
Of the fifty states at the San Francisco conference, only twelve were from the Afro-Asian
region.1 India was present, although still a British colony. Asian and African states were
concerned that the Great Powers would dominate the system via the Security Council, and
that they would also decide many of the most crucial international questions outside the
Security Council. As Prime Minister of Sri Lanka Sir John Kotelawala asserted, in the case of
the major issues of the time (such as conflicts in Korea and Southeast Asia), “negotiations for
settlement had to be carried on outside the framework of the United Nations.”2 Tension
among the Great Powers was the source of the greatest international instability, and yet, as a
result of the veto system in the Security Council, the United Nations was severely limited in
its ability to address this fundamental issue. Nehru argued that if the United Nations proved
ineffectual, Asian states might create an Asian Federation “for their own protection against
outside aggression.”3
This chapter is dedicated to the memory of my first teacher of development politics, Herb Feith-extraordinary teacher and champion of the Third World. 1 Godfrey Jansen, Nonalignment and the Afro-Asian states, (Praeger, 1966), p. 41. 2 See Amitav Acharya, `Norm Subsidiarity and Regional Orders: Sovereignty, Regionalism and Rule Making in the Third World' (2011) 55 International Studies Quarterly, 1, p. 109. 3 Jansen, p. 42.
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Kotelawala was to play a major role in suggesting the need for an “Asian Conference”
and in boldly declaring that Ceylon “has important a part as any to play in the conduct of
Asian affairs.”4 He followed up by hosting the Colombo Conference, held in April 1954 amid
significant world events that confirmed the need for Asian countries to unite and formulate a
common strategy. The Geneva Conference on Indochina began two days prior to the opening
of the Colombo Conference, and Dien Bien Phu fell two days after it ended. Participants in
the Geneva deliberations felt the need to keep the participants at the Colombo Conference
apprised of developments, as they realized that peace in Southeast Asia would have better
prospects for success with the support of the Asian countries gathered at Colombo. Whatever
the divisions and tensions between the Asian states in Colombo—regarding alliances and
communism, to name but two challenges—the value of meeting and discussing common
conerns with other Asian states survived, and it was unanimously agreed that Indonesia
should host a Conference of Asian and African states. Auspiciously, perhaps, the India-China
agreement that embodied the principles of Panchsheel was announced while the conference
was in session.5
Sovereignty, Civilization, and Panchsheel
By the end of the nineteenth century, international law, authored by the West, had established
the doctrine that only “civilized states” were sovereign. All states that failed to meet the
criteria of civilization lacked proper sovereignty; as a consequence, virtually all the states of
Africa and Asia, including China and Japan, were regarded as not fully sovereign and thus
incapable of participating on completely equal terms in the international system and in the
making of international law. Non-European states developed different strategies to be
4 Jansen, p. 144. 5 Ibid. at p. 147.
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accepted as sovereign, civilized members of the community of nations, and these efforts are
now well documented.
Japan made extensive internal reforms to modernize along Western lines, and fought
various wars in Asia while claiming to strictly observe the laws of war—an assertion not
always shared by the victims of these conflicts.6 China, burdened and humiliated by unequal
treaties, sought to establish itself by participating in various international conferences and in
the activities of the League of Nations.7 The King of Siam employed prominent European
and American lawyers to advise him on modernizing the Thai legal system and negotiating
the termination of unequal treaties. The Latin American states, which had acquired
sovereignty much earlier, argued that they were civilized and attempted to establish a
different “standard of civilization.” Whatever the private reservations they felt about the
validity and appropriateness of the Western norms, these nations were forced to comply in
order to establish that they were civilized. Few of these states really challenged the West in
this regard, but rather sought to reconfigure their own political institutions in order to win the
ultimate prize of sovereignty. Within this historical trajectory, Bandung, in its Final
Communiqué, sought to outline a third world vision of sovereignty that was devised to
protect the interests of both the Asian and African countries and, more generally, assert their
ambition to play a role in the management of international affairs.
This vision of sovereignty and international relations was largely based on the concept
of Panchsheel, or the Five Principles of Coexistence. These principles are (1) mutual respect
for sovereignty and territorial integrity; (2) nonaggression; (3) noninterference in internal
affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful co-existence.8
6 Masaharu Yanagihara, ‘Japan’, in Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 475-500; Ibid. Kinji Akashi, ‘Japan-Europe’, p. 724-744. 7 Ibid. Shin Kawashima, ‘China’, p. 451-475; Ibid. Chi-Huang Tang, `China-Europe’, p. 701-724. 8 Jansen p. 127; See also, George McTurnan Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955, (Cornell University Press: 1956), p.8.
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Nehru first referred to these principles as Panchsheel in September 1954, purportedly
after a meeting with Indonesian Premier Ali Sastroamidjojo, who had visited India to
persuade Nehru to participate in the conference that would become Bandung. Sastroamidjojo
had mentioned the Sukarno’s five principles, Pantja Sila, which are the foundation of the
Indonesian states: “nationalism, humanism, freedom, social justice and faith in God.”9 Nehru
responded by propounding his own version of Panchsheel, which took on a different, more
historical, and even spiritual character—not by virtue of the content of the principles, but
because the very idea of five founding principles echoed the Five Precepts (Panca-sila, from
the Sanskrit, meaning five principles) that represent the minimum moral obligation of a lay
Buddhist.10 Nehru himself appeared to take different positions about the lineage of
Panchsheel, claiming at one time that there was nothing original in the principles themselves,
and later, that the principles are “as old as our thought and culture.”11 Reference is also made
to the famous rock edicts of Asoka.12
In more legal terms, Panchsheel was the basis of relations between China and India
with regard to Tibet. These principles acquired a more elevated and profound character when
they were presented in a joint statement by Nehru and Zhou Enlai on June 28, 1954, and
asserted to be fundamental: “If these principles are applied not only between various
countries but also in international relations generally, they would form a solid foundation for
peace and security and the fears and apprehensions that exist today would give place to a
feeling of confidence.”13 The five principles became the basis of the agreement between India
and China, meant to alleviate tensions caused by border disputes between the two countries.
However, the origins of these principles are not especially auspicious, given that war between
9 Jansen, p. 128. 10 See e.g., Walpola Rahula, What the Buddha Taught, (Sri Lanka: Buddhist Cultural Centre, 2006). 11 Jansen, p. 129. 12 For an account of Panchsheel and its ongoing significance, see External Publicity Division, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, ‘Panchsheel’, (2004), available at http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/191_panchsheel.pdf. 13 Jansen, p. 128.
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China and India broke out in 1962, and that many Indian commentators regarded the five
principles as a “tactic aimed at relaxing vigilance in the opponent by lulling him into a sense
of false security.”14 Nevertheless, the Panchsheel has been foundational for the Non-Aligned
Movement, and was reiterated at the 1961 Belgrade Conference.
The five principles correspond to some of the most established doctrines of classic
international law as found in the UN Charter. The ideas of noninterference and mutual
respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity correspond with principles found in Article
2(4) of the Charter, which prohibits the use of force against the territorial sovereignty of a
state; Article 2(7), which prohibits interference by the United Nations in matters within the
domestic jurisdiction of a state; and Article 2(1), which holds that all sovereign states are
equal.
However, the representatives at Bandung were not especially concerned about the
originality or derivation of the principles they were asserting. Their emphasis on sovereignty
and nonintervention is understandable given that Asian and African countries were just
emerging from the humiliations of colonialism. Further, they believed these principles could
be used to articulate a new vision of international relations and reform international law, now
that they could participate in numbers within the international system as equal and sovereign
states. The states attending the Conference felt strongly that they were in a unique position to
contribute to international peace and security because they were not (at least officially)
involved in the Cold War that had so powerfully dominated international relations. These
nations believed they could relieve Cold War tensions by enabling and encouraging China to
enter the international arena. Further, the Bandung states thought they could facilitate the
ongoing process of decolonization, a project that was far from complete, given the ongoing
struggles of the people in Southeast Asia and Africa.
14 Ibid.
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Given Panchsheel’s heavy emphasis on noninterference, it may seem anomalous that
the Final Communiqué also included a section on human rights and self-determination that,
among other things, “affirmed full support for the fundamental principles of Human Rights”
and took note of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is clear, however, that this
support was based on the Bandung states’ view that human rights could be used (1) to
advance the cause of self-determination and (2) to protect colonized peoples from the
colonial violence. The Bandung states viewed self-determination, the acquisition of
sovereignty, as “a pre-requisite of the full enjoyment of all fundamental Human Rights.”15
Further, it used human rights to condemn South African apartheid. It is interesting to note
that Charles Malik, one of the drafters of the Universal Declaration, was present at the
Conference even though he did not play a prominent role.
Sovereignty, Colonialism, and the Nation-State
President Sukarno succinctly stated Bandung’s greatest achievement in his opening speech. It
was the first meeting of African-Asian states in history, and it confronted those newly
sovereign states with the question of what they stood for, both individually and collectively.
Sukarno declaimed: “We were suddenly confronted with the necessity of giving content and
meaning to our independence when it was finally attained and secured…Not material content
and meaning only, but also ethical and moral content.”16
Racism, poverty, and colonialism were the major themes of the Conference.17
Sukarno warned that colonialism could take many different forms:
15 See Communique-Part C.1; for further discussion of this approach to human rights see generally, Roland Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010). 16 See note 8 above, Kahin, p. 41. 17 Ibid. at p. 12.
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I beg of you, do not think of colonialism only in the classic form which we of
Indonesia, and our brothers in different parts of Asia and Africa, knew. Colonialism
has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control, intellectual control, actual
physical control by a small but alien community within a nation. It is a skillful and
determined enemy, and it appears in many guises. It does not give up its loot easily.
Wherever, whenever and however it appears, colonialism is an evil thing, and one
which must be eradicated from the earth.
He warns not only of the dangers of neo-colonialism—that is, colonialism in the economic
rather than purely political realm—but also, foreshadowing Fanon, hints that elites within the
new nation could be agents of this force. Sukarno’s concerns were well founded, for even as
the United Nations was promoting the cause of decolonization, real power was shifting to the
Security Council—and, more broadly, in the sphere of economic relations that were so
crucial to the third world—to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.18 The
newly independent states were hardly represented in these organizations. The United Nations
preserved and created its own inequalities.
It is understandable that Bandung discussed and reinforced norms of nonintervention
and noninterference. The Bandung states were highly sensitive to the problem of outright
aggression, but also indirect pressure affecting the states.19 As Acharya argues, furthermore,
these “standard norms”—which are found in the UN Charter, as mentioned earlier—acquire a
different significance in the particular context of the concerns of the Bandung states, which
were concerned about Western economic and political pressures, the instruments of neo-
colonialism, and communist infiltration. It is notable that the Final Communiqué calls for
18 For the broad argument that the UN essentially attempted to preserve the Empire, see Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: the End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 19 Acharya, p. 411–412.
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“abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries,” a principle on which
few comment but that is radical in its implications, given that the exertion of pressure is an
essential tool of classic diplomacy. This idea that international law should prohibit “pressure”
or “coercion” emerges again in the context of the sustained but unsuccessful attempts of the
developing countries to include this in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Questions about the meaning of colonialism and the character of sovereignty emerged
in a number of different contexts. Most immediately, Bandung took place at a time of
increasing anti-colonial resistance; the British and French empires were far from willing to
relinquish their imperial power, notwithstanding the emergence of countries such as Burma,
India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The French had made their intent clear by their ongoing
fighting in Indochina, overcome only by the determination of the Viet-minh. The British
continued to battle nationalist movements in various countries, such as Kenya, with a
ferocity, the startling character of which is now made rendered vivid by recent research and
litigation in the English courts.20 Disputes relating to race and self-determination were
ongoing in Palestine, West Irian, and French North Africa. The Bandung states affirmed the
right of self-determination of the peoples of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.21 The issue of
colonialism, however, emerged in a more unexpected and ambiguous form, when Kotelawala
raised the question of “communist colonialism” referring to “those satellite states under
communist domination in Central and Eastern Europe.”22 Sir John, referring to states such as
Albania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania, demanded, “And if we are united in our
opposition to colonialism, should it not be our duty openly to declare our opposition to Soviet
20 Nkidi Mutua & others v. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office [2012] EWHC 2678 (QB) No. HQ09X02666; See generally, Caroline Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005). 21 Kahin, p. 17. 22 James Austin Copland Mackie, in Didier Millet (eds.), ‘Bandung 1955: Non-Alignment and Afro-Asian Solidarity’, (2005).
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colonialism as much as to Western imperialism?”23 The Conference was thrown into
disorder. Much debate exists as to whether in raising this issue Kotelawala, who was pro-
Western in many of his views even if ardently anti-colonial, was acting as an agent for the
Western powers, who were very concerned about Bandung and what it could represent. This
view, however underestimates his strong personality and staunchly ant-communist views.
The issues of sovereignty and self-determination raised a number of unexpected and
unresolved questions and problems. For example, while the Bandung rendition of sovereignty
was crucial to the external relations of third world states, it was equally important, in
retrospect, for the internal political arrangements and identity of those states. Commenting on
the earlier Asian Relations Conference in Delhi in 1947, Itty Abraham argues that the
following findings emerge:
The first is the absolute acceptance of the nation-state mold by all the delegates
present at the Asian Relations Conference. The Asian political entities soon to be free
were uniformly represented as states composed as national majorities joined by ethnic
or cultural minorities. …Communities marked by difference from these national
majorities were being recast as aliens and outsiders, notwithstanding their long
residence in these countries.24
Bandung did little to question this trend. Indeed, it seemed to reinforce it. Participants
at Bandung upheld not only the Western model of sovereignty, but, more specifically, a
particular idea of the nation-state, as reflected by their deliberations and approaches to crucial
questions of population and territory.
23 Mackie, p. 87. 24 Itty Abraham, How India Became Territorial: Foreign Policy, Diaspora, Geopolitics, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), p. 69.
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At Bandung, the question of population and the “alliance” of populations was
important to states such as Indonesia and Thailand, which were extremely uneasy about the
presence of ethnic Chinese, many of whom had lived for many generations within their
borders but who were feared for possessing divided loyalties. Under the laws of China, which
adhered to the principle of jus sanguinis as a basis of nationality, these peoples had Chinese
nationality. Indonesia was threatened by the potential spread of communism through these
populations, as a result of which it negotiated agreements with China. Zhou Enlai agreed that
ethnic Chinese could become citizens of Indonesia, and he urged these people to obey the
laws of the countries in which they were located.25 This initiative, and other reassurances that
Zhou provided, did not completely resolve the issue, but they offered some comfort to
Thailand and Cambodia, and suggested some degree of cooperation and the success of China
and Zhou Enlai in their diplomacy at Bandung. However, this episode also demonstrates the
great uncertainty Southeast Asian states experienced as they set about the task of creating
nation-states, understood to be relatively homogenous populations that were completely loyal
to the new postindependence state.
Scholars such as Clifford Geertz have analyzed the nationalist challenges confronting
these states.26 The problem was how the “new state” could present itself as an entity that
credibly represented the interests and protected the identities of the many different ethnic
communities it now sought to govern. Even more problematically, the Western nation-state
model of the sovereign state did not always correspond with indigenous visions of
sovereignty that had prevailed in Asia for long periods of time. As Thongchai Winichakul
argues, the Thai polity of the nineteenth century had a somewhat different idea of
sovereignty, territory, and people than those held by European powers that relied on their 25 Mackie, p. 84-85; See also, Itty Abraham, ‘Bandung and State Formation in Post-colonial Asia’ in Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya (eds.), Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order, (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008) pp. 48-68, 58-64. 26 See generally, Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, (New York: Basic Books, 1973) vol. 5019.
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own versions of these concepts for the crucial purposes of international negotiation and treaty
making. As Winichakul points out, when discussing negotiations between the British and
Thailand in the mid-nineteenth century: “It is evident that Siam did not lack the terminology
and concepts for dealing with the British proposals for boundaries. But considering these
definitions closely, we can see that none of them meant exactly the boundary that the British
had in mind.”27 It is not difficult to imagine how the complex misunderstandings that led to
the ongoing dispute on the Temple of Preah Vihear/Pra Viharn may have arisen.28 Asian
societies had distinctive and highly developed traditions of governance and rule prior to the
arrival of the European powers. However the embrace and adoption of the Western concept
of the nation-state that was a prerequisite for becoming a sovereign state, a goal they all
yearned to achieve, inevitably demanded a transformation of these indigenous traditions, and
not all new states were successful in making these changes without experiencing ongoing
ethnic tensions and, in some cases, long and devastating civil wars. An understanding of the
legal efforts to address these challenges involves a study not only of the doctrine of self-
determination and international law, but constitution making—an issue that inevitably
involved, for most Asian and African states, a detailed analysis of how to manage potential
racial tensions legally.29 In more extreme cases, the effect of colonialism was not to transform
existing political entities but create entirely new ones, as in the case of Indonesia.
Many of these tensions emerged in debates about the scope and application of the
doctrine of self-determination. The complexities of the issue emerged most directly in the
case of West Irian, which was a topic at Bandung. The Conference expressed its support for
27 Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), p. 75. 28 Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) [1962] ICJ Rep 6; Request for the Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), [2013] ICJ Rep 151, p.281; Simon Chesterman, ‘The International Court of Justice in Asia: Interpreting the Temple of Preah Vihear Case’, (2015) 5 Asian Journal of International Law, 1, p.1-6. 29 See eg., William Crawley, ‘A Political Legacy of the British Empire: Power and the Parliamentary System in Post-Colonial India and Sri Lanka’, (2013) 44 Asian Affairs, 2, p. 309-311.
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Indonesia’s position against the Netherlands in the dispute over West Irian.30 It was only over
a period of time, however, that the character and the extent of those complexities unfolded.
As Mackie points out, for Indonesia, the West Irian issue was “one of the most important
items on the Bandung agenda”31 and one of the principal reasons why Indonesia had sought
to host the Conference. Indonesia claimed that West Irian was part of the state of Indonesia,
as it had been part of the Dutch East Indies, of which Indonesia was the successor state.32 The
Dutch, for strategic and other reasons, claimed that people of West Irian were of a different
ethnicity and therefore not part of Indonesia. The Dutch and Indonesia had entered into an
agreement in 1949 that dealt with this issue, but the wording was vague enough for the Dutch
to retain possession of West Irian. The Dutch then claimed to be intent on fulfilling the
requirements of Article 73 of the United Nations, and guiding the people of West Irian
toward self-determination and independence. It is hard not to see the Dutch position as
calculated opportunism that had the potential for causing great instability.33 And the
argument that ethnicity should be the basis of statehood surely would have resulted in the
destruction of almost every postcolonial Asian and African state—not least Indonesia itself,
which comprises so many different ethnicities.
This dispute, as with so many in the region, originated with the activities of the Dutch
East India Company, which, in 1660, concluded a treaty with Tidore, a small island in the
Moluccas. Under the terms of the treaty, the “Papuans, or all of their islands” were
characterized as belonging to the king of Tidore.34 The Dutch made no real attempt to control
West New Guinea—whatever the ostensible rights they acquired through treaties with
Tidore—until the twentieth century, or very close to Indonesian independence. However, it is
30 See Communique, E.2. 31 Mackie, p. 86. 32 Ibid. 33 See generally, Kalana Senaratne, ‘Internal Self-Determination: A Critical Third World Perspective’, (2013) 3 Asian Journal of International Law, 2, p. 331-332. 34 Arend Lijphart, The Trauma of Decolonization: the Dutch and West New Guinea, vol. 17 (Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 23.
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very uncertain as to whether these treaties could have provided any sort of title, given, as a
Dutch administrator reported, that the population of West Papua had “never heard of
Tidore.”35
A large range of arguments canvassed questions such as whether Papua was “Malay”
or “Australian” in terms of its flora and fauna, and whether the population of Papua was
racially separate from the people of Indonesia. Inevitably, while distinctions could be made in
the abstract, the Dutch themselves had treated “Indonesians” and “Papuans” as part of the
Dutch Empire in the East Indies, and it seemed merely strategic to make these distinctions
precisely when the Indonesians were claiming independence and succession to Dutch
territories in the region. The agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia providing for
the transfer of power to the new state of Indonesia left the status of West Irian unresolved—
or, rather, the subject of dispute between the two parties. Indonesia claimed it had received
sovereignty over West Irian, whereas the Netherlands claimed that its status was unresolved.
The Dutch claimed that the “people” of West Irian were entitled to “self-determination.”36
The West Irian issue was among the most sensitive discussed at Bandung. Indonesia
had been careful not to explicitly include it in the agenda, confident that other states would do
so as part of a broader discussion of the central theme of colonialism.37 Prior to Bandung, the
United Nations had refused to support Indonesia’s call for a reopening of negotiations with
the Netherlands regarding the future of West Irian. Eventually, the Conference asserted that it
“supported the position of Indonesia in the case of West-Irian” and “expressed the earnest
hope that the United Nations would assist the parties concerned in finding a peaceful solution
to the dispute.”38
35 Lijphart, p. 24. 36 See generally the range of arguments are provided by Lijphart, p. 22-35. 37 See Roeslan Abdulgani, Bandung Spirit: Moving on the Tide of History, (Prapantja, 1964), p. 110. 38 Quoted in Abdulgani, p. 113.
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This was hardly the end of the matter. The status of West Irian remained unresolved,
and the New York Agreement of 1962 created a system by which Indonesia took on the role
of “full administrative responsibility” over West Irian until such time as a referendum could
be held in 1969.39 The choice presented on this occasion was limited, as the question was
whether the people wished Indonesia’s status to be transformed from “administrator” to
“sovereign.”
Indonesia argued that the people of West Iran were too “primitive” to exercise the
right of self-determination in a conventional way;40 the conditions were such that self-
determination in the Irian context required consulting the appropriate elders. Many African
states were disturbed by this argument, which echoed classic colonial sentiment regarding
primitiveness and the backward nature of the population, which GA Resolution 1514 had
sought to eliminate. Several African states, such as Sierra Leone, questioned Indonesia’s
position that the backwardness of the people and the difficulty of the terrain justified a
procedure that was more about consultation than self-determination.41 Some African states
accused Indonesia of behaving like a colonial power and betraying the sacred principles of
Bandung.42 This episode illustrates the challenge that continues to confront many developing
countries: creating coherent and stable nation-states in the aftermath of independence. The
theme of colonialism, a central preoccupation of the Bandung states, is now taken up by
minorities and ethnic groups that regard themselves as victims of “internal colonialism,” the
violence committed by the post-colonial state.43 The communities within those states now
assert their “right to self-determination.”
39 The Dutch had proposed a plebiscite supervised by the UN after a period of UN administration; See, Michla Pomerance, ‘Methods of Self-Determination and the Argument of “Primitiveness”’, (1974) 12 Canadian Yearbook of Int’l Law, 38, p. 47. 40 Pomerance, p. 51-52; see in particular p. 55 “In West Iran there exists, as is generally known, one of the most primitive and undeveloped communities in the world…” 41 Pomerance, p. 60. 42 Pomerance, at footnote 115. 43 See e.g., Mohammad Shahabuddin, ‘Liberal Self-determination, Postcolonial Statehood, and Minorities: The Chittagong Hill Tribes in Context’, (2013) 1 Jahangirnagar University Journal of Law, p.77-96.
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Bandung and the Development State
The Bandung states were inevitably concerned with development issues, but the economic
dimensions of the conference are often overlooked.44 However, economic cooperation was
the first issue in the Final Communiqué, which began with the assertion: “The Asian African
Conference recognized the urgency of promoting economic development in the Asia-African
region.”45
The Communiqué mentioned the “general desire for economic cooperation among the
participating countries on the basis of mutual interest and respect for national sovereignty.” It
was very much outward looking, emphasizing that the proposals for cooperation among
Bandung states “do not preclude either the desirability or the need for co-operation outside
the region, including the investment of foreign capital.”46 Technical assistance was requested;
the World Bank was asked to allocate a greater part of its resources to Asian and African
countries, and the Conference recommended “the early establishment of the Special United
Nations Fund for Economic Development” and “the International Finance Corporation which
should in its activities the undertaking of equity investment.”47
All this suggests that the conference attendees believed that, as in the political sphere,
the developing countries’ needs and concerns were not properly reflected in the activities of
the existing international economic institutions. However, it also demonstrates that the
conference was eager to engage in international commerce. The theme of Permanent
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, which was to be such a prominent part of the third
44 For a good overview of this dimension of Bandung, see Helen E.S. Nesadurai, ‘Bandung and State Formation in Post-colonial Asia’, in Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya (eds.), Bandung Revisited: the Legacy of the 1955 Asian African Conference for International Order, (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), p. 68-105. 45 Communique, Art 1. 46 Communique A., Art 1. 47 Comunique, Art 3.
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world attempt to reform the international economic system from the 1960s onward, was not
mentioned at Bandung. This is true despite the fact that early resolutions focusing on that
topic had already been passed,48 and that many of the states at Bandung were soon to be
embroiled in conflicts over nationalization: for example, Indonesia nationalized parts of the
Dutch oil industry in 1963.
The need to stabilize commodity trade was a crucial aspect of the Bandung Economic
Program. Point 5 of the Communiqué focused on this issue, calling for collective action
among members directed at stabilizing commodity prices “through bilateral and multilateral
arrangements” and for the adoption of a unified approach on this issue in international
forums, including the United Nations Permanent Advisory Commission on International
Commodity Trade. The Conference also called for the diversification of the export trade of
the Asian and African countries through the processing of their raw materials prior to export,
where possible. The view that commodity price stability was crucial to the economic well-
being of developing countries, for example, was a central part of the UNCTAD initiative,
which would serve as the impetus for the New International Economic Order.
All these recommendations suggest that the Bandung states, while having different
affiliations, shared several common goals. All were intent on achieving “development” and,
far from being internally oriented, regarded participation in the international economic
system as a key aspect of their program. They were far from “inward looking,” seeking
instead to engage with the international economic system.
The Bandung states adopted a moderate49 and, as in the case of the Bandung vision of
sovereignty, fairly orthodox stance. They sought to participate on more equal terms within
the existing system, rather than to transform it completely. At this stage, development policy
had not become a fierce subject of controversy, and the Bandung states, while alarmed at the
48 General Assembly Res. 626, Right to exploit freely natural wealth and resources, 7th Session, (1952). 49 Nesadurai, p. 72.
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polarization resulting from the Cold War, believed the existing system could be suitably
adjusted. However, it is most evident that the Bandung states saw no contradiction or
difficulty in articulating a vision of sovereignty that powerfully asserted the importance of
noninterference, even while seeking to further global trade and investment. Further, if we
consider the issue of sovereignty and development together, we might see the beginnings of
what might be termed “developmental sovereignty” that was primarily focused on achieving
development and attempting to use the cause of development as a substitute for nationalism.
Conclusion
The term “Eastphalia,” coined by the South Korean scholar Kim Sung Won, describes a
model of sovereignty that is evident in the practice of East Asian states. It emphasizes
noninterference in internal affairs.50 Eastphalian sovereignty resembles the Bandung model in
important respects. It is somewhat anomalous that Eastphalian sovereignty is asserted so
forcefully even when human rights has assumed such global significance, and when
European, African, and Latin American states have (albeit in different ways) subscribed to
regional arrangements that impinge significantly on their sovereignty. It is clear that the
Eastphalian model does not preclude engagement with international economic affairs. While
very unwilling to compromise what they regard as their political sovereignty—as suggested
by ongoing territorial and maritime disputes in that region, and the reluctance of the
Association of South East Asian Nations to cede sovereignty to the a regional authority—
East Asian states have been most willing to participate in international economic relations
and indeed, are seen as the model for developing states to pursue.
50 See generally, Kim Sung Won, David Fidler and Sumit Ganguly, ‘Eastphalia Rising? Asian Influence and the Fate of Human Security’ (2009) 26 World Policy Journal, 53; Tom Ginsburg, ‘Eastphalia as the Perfection of Westphalia’, (2010) 17 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 27, p. 147.
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The East Asian model of development combines a strong state with an outward-
oriented, market-friendly economic policy. We see this dual model of sovereignty tentatively
evident even in Bandung. This model is based on the idea that a clear distinction can be made
between political and economic sovereignty. China, Japan, and the states of ASEAN are
extremely sensitive to any possible encroachment of political sovereignty, which is associated
with territorial and maritime boundaries. This is suggested by the ongoing and apparently
intractable disputes among the East Asian and Southeast Asian states regarding maritime
boundaries in the South China Sea and disputes about the ownership of various islands. At
the same time, these states have inaugurated the East Asian model of development, which
involves entering into bilateral investment treaties, free trade agreements, and the whole
panoply of international instruments that further the globalized trade and investment
strategies that these countries have embraced.
In the Nicaragua Case, the International Court of Justice affirmed the prohibition
against intervention in resounding language, as the rule “forbids all States or groups of States
to intervene, directly or indirectly, in internal or external affairs of other states.”51 The
Bandung model of sovereignty continues to animate many developing countries and shapes
their response to human rights issues and debates about humanitarian intervention. Further,
Panchsheel continues to be invoked and celebrated as a doctrine that helps ensure a stable and
peaceful world order.52 The sixtieth anniversary of the “Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence” was celebrated by the Chinese Government in 2014 with much pomp and
circumstance.53 Further, China and Myanmar state that these basic principles govern their
51 Case Concering Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Around Nicaragua, (Nicaragua v. United States) [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, para. 205. 52 For an account of how the five principles affected deliberations in the United Nations, and subsequent instruments such as General Assembly Resolution No. 2625, the “Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning the Friendly Relations and Co-operation of States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,” see Miguel de Serpa Soares, ‘Keynote Speech at the International Colloquium on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and the Development of International Law’, (2014) 13 Chinese Journal of International Law, 3, p. 481-484. 53 See Ankit Panda, “Reflecting on China’s Five Principles, 60 Years Later”, The Diplomat, (June 26, 2014).
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foreign policies, and the Chinese government asserts that the principles are “diametrically
opposed to power politics” and “transcend social systems and ideologies.”54 Human rights
continue to be a component of the modern version of the five principles, which seems to be
hold, understandably, that it is the function of the state to protect human rights while also
suggesting that no external authority can intervene in the state’s activities in that sphere—
unless, of course, the state has consented to such intervention. The Five Principles have thus
resulted in powerful vision of sovereignty that extends beyond classic Westphalian
sovereignty in its absolutism. In his classis work on Westphalian sovereignty, Leo Gross
argues that it is mediated by the doctrine that sovereign states are under an obligation to
protect minorities. No such allowance is made in the Five Principles. Indeed, many
developing countries most fear the threat from within from minorities developing their own
nationalist aspirations and claims to self-determination. The West Irian question at Bandung
presaged a complex and as yet unresolved problem.
The question also arises as to how Panchsheel resolves disputes that arise from a
conflict over the extent of territorial or maritime sovereignty. Doctrines of nonintervention
were not only formulated against the West. Old conflicts between various precolonial entities
continued through the medium of the nation-state; rivalries between the old Kingdoms of the
Thais and Khmers now emerge in battles between the nation-states of Cambodia and
Thailand. In this sense the precolonial past endured, with ancient battles being replaced
through new political entities. When these rival states claim historical title to territory or
waters, the competing claims of sovereignty are the source of the conflict. A question arises
over whether the modern language of international law can comprehend and address these
54 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18053.shtml (last visited May 31, 2015); for an important collection of essays commemorating the sixtieth anniversary which reflect on the development and ongoing importance of these principles, see the 2014 publication of the Chinese Journal of International Law.
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conflicts, which originate in a time that precedes the advent of European colonialism.55 At
least in Southeast Asia, these questions prove to be extremely difficult. The great
achievements of Bandung must be celebrated, for the Bandung states could only act within
the constraints and demands of their time.56 But in examining the origins of third world
sovereignty, we might already detect the possibility that among the most lasting inheritances
of Bandung is a series of tensions that the postcolonial state still struggles to resolve. There is
a tension generated by the presence of minorities in virtually all postcolonial states. The
postcolonial state must also assert its political sovereignty even while striving to achieve
development, a project that inevitably involves a loss of control over many of the most
important aspects of economic sovereignty.57 The complex interactions between sovereignty,
colonialism, and development thus continue to unfold.
56 For a superb meditation on the legacies of Bandung and how we should understand them, see Adil Khan, “Ghostly Visitations”, in this volume. 57 For a powerful analysis of these themes, seen from the perspective of environmental sustainability, See Prasenjit Duara, The Crisis of Global Modernity: Asian Traditions and a Sustainable Future, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).