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Durkheims Lost Argument (18951955):Critical Moves on Method and Truth

Stphane Baciocchi and Jean-Louis Fabiani

Introduction

Durkheims course of twenty lectures on pragmatism, given at the Sorbonneduring the academic year 1913 to 1914, has been regularly reassessed, par-ticularly since an apparently complete English translation (1983).1Far frombeing marginal in Durkheims work, as claimed by Steven Lukes (1973),the lectures seem central for understanding Durkheims epistemology andmethodology. This was initially set out in his two doctoral theses themain one on the division of labour (1893) then substantially reworked in

later writings, particularlyLes Formes lmentaires (1912). Unfortunately,we know the lectures only from a posthumous reconstruction by thefaith-ful Durkheimian and sympathiser with Marxism, the philosopher ArmandCuvillier, who published Pragmatisme et sociologie in 1955, drawing ontwo anonymous sets of student notes that later disappeared. It is thusdifficult to know the scope and effect of Cuvilliers own rewriting of thesenotes. Moreover, he made his reconstruction forty-two years after the ac-tual presentation by Durkheim at the Sorbonne.2The sociological contextin France was by this time entirely different. The most prominent sociolo-

gists, such as Jean Stoetzel, were outspoken anti-Durkheimians in theirdemand for an empirical knowledge clearly severed from any philosophicalfoundation. The Durkheimians who tried to pursue the founders endeav-our in the interwar period were dead. The very first reviews of Cuvilliersedition3indicate that Durkheimianism seemed to belong to the intellectualpast, at least since the death of Marcel Mauss in 1950.

A third set of student notes on the lectures was recently discovered byone of us, as an extension of our joint project (Durkheim 2003). The dis-covery allows a reassessment of Pragmatisme et sociologie and a better

understanding of Cuvilliers handling of his material. Without claiming torevolutionize the interpretation of Durkheims complex relationship withpragmatism and without necessarily disagreeing with the most recent schol-arly work on the issue, we would like to shed some new light on the proper

Durkheimian Studies,Volume 18, 2012: 1940, @ Durkheim Pressdoi:10.3167/ds.2012.180103 ISSN 1362-024X


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location of these lectures in Durkheims whole theoretical construction. Wehave deplored for a long while the lack of a sociological analysis applied

to sociological works. Sociological texts are usually read as sacred texts,which remain unaffected by their conditions of production and circulation.Durkheims lectures are not a text, but a posthumous reconstruction fromhighly situatedaccounts (namely, those of the auditors). So it is all themore productive to put them back in their specific context, and to questionDurkheims goals together with their reception by the Parisian philosophi-cal audience of the time.

A question, to begin with, is how Durkheim moved on to discussingpragmatism. Here, we will try to contribute to a fresh sociology of texts

(McKenzie 1986; Mulsow 2009), by analysing the lectures as a work in prog-ress. An institutional fact, which has gone unnoticed, is that Durkheimslectures inaugurated the first official chair of Sociology in France,4so thatthey should be seen as a point of departure for a new development of thediscipline and for its theoretical grounding.

The course on pragmatism and sociology must be reapproached as awork in context. In the first decade of the new century, pragmatism becamea burning issue, not only as an American import (Gross 1997; Shook 2009;Schultenover 2009; Chevalier 2010; Pudal 2011), but as a transnational

philosophical revolution and social movement. Durkheim had to situatehimself in relation to pragmatism as a hot issue of the day and to give anaccount of his own intense reading of William James (cf. Stedman Jones2003; 2004), from the Principles of Psychology (1890) to the Varieties ofReligious Experience (1902; French translation, 1906). Our main findingundoubtedly concerns the notes of the courses opening, inaugural lecture,missing in Cuvilliers edition. These enable us to move from recontextual-ization to more theoretical considerations in the section on A Lost Argu-ment: The Question of Method to ask about the main theoretical point

that Durkheim wants to make in his lectures. Far from being a claim fora national-rationalism, as Bruno Latour recently popularizes it throughParisian intellectual circles,5Durkheims lectures on pragmatism can beread as a foundational discourse for a discipline that aims at playing thecentral role in the new general system of sciences. As against other disci-plines such as psychology, sociology allows the coexistence of a definiteviewpoint on reality and the possibility of making general or universalstatements. Durkheim accordingly develops, in a clear-cut polemical way,a sociology of philosophy.

In the third and last part of our paper on the opposition betweenmythological and scientific truths we briefly conclude that it is a tool forunderstanding tacit beliefs that underlie Cuvilliers editorial reconstitu-tion of Pragmatisme et sociologie.We advocate a new critical edition in


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which, as a first attempt, we experiment with an edition of DurkheimsInaugural Lecture: Pragmatism and Sociology, 1913.

Contexts Matter

We will start from the retrieved notes, so poorly described in the current cat-alogue of manuscripts held by the Sorbonne (Py 1989) that they were hardlyrecognizable. We suggest a new and more comprehensive description:

Ms Sorbonne 364 Fond Ren Le Senne, Pragmatisme et sociologie. Notestaken at mile Durkheims lecture course on Pragmatism and Sociology (anon-

ymous, Sorbonne, Winter 1913 = Spring 1914, 108 f.).

The notes are among others on Les 10 premires leons du Cours de Ha-melin sur Descartes, La morale de Descartes, La philosophie pratiquede Kant and La thorie de laction morale daprs Frd. Rauh. This givessome precise indications about the anonymous note-takers intellectual lo-cation and interests. It also points, in some ways, to an aspect of the overallcontext in which pragmatism was intensely discussed in relation with themoral. Here, the relevant interlocutors would be Durkheim, Octave Hame-

lin and Frdric Rauh (see Horner 1997). And one can observe that Frenchcontemporary philosophers who are either missing in Cuvilliers edition(along with Rauh and G. Milhaud) or seldom cited (such as M. Blondel, .Boutroux, O. Hamelin, . Le Roy, H. Poincar, C. Renouvier and T. Ribot)appear to have been widely read by Durkheims auditors or at least bystudents and alumni of the cole Normale who borrowed Jamess booksduring the academic year 1913 to 1914.6

Durkheims Inaugural Lecture in Sociology

Another aspect of the context is the institutional fact that Durkheimscourse on pragmatism and sociology inaugurated the first chair, in Frenchuniversities, officially designated as a chair in sociology. He had arrivedearlier on at the Sorbonne with a post in the science of education and hisopening lecture of 4 December 1902 had been given under the character-istic title, Pdagogie et Sociologie (Durkheim 1903b). A decade later, thechange of appointment marked an important step towards the institution-

alization of sociology and its autonomy from philosophy, still considered,in the French educational system at the time, as the crowning discipline(Fabiani 1988). This move was to be stopped by the First World War and aB.A. in Sociology was introduced only in 1958.


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Durkheim inaugurated his chair after the very successful and highlycontroversial publication of his new book, Les Formes lmentaires. Forthe first time in his rather contentious life with fellow philosophers, hewas recognized as a full member of his community, although his work was

the most elaborate attempt so far to give an epistemological foundation tothe new science of sociology. The book appeared in a dual context. Partof the background was an extensive debate on science and religion thatassociated many segments of French intellectual life. Contrary to the com-mon picture of a fully secularized French philosophy, the issue of religionremained uppermost in the minds of philosophers (Jones 1998; Fabiani2010). Academic philosophers faced the growing issue of what they calledthe new mysticism and crisis of the reason in the lay public, partly trig-gered by many writers hostile to the development of the New Sorbonne. In

this respect, William Jamess interest in psychology, psychopathology, psy-chical research and mysticism was totally opposite to the French academicsearch for purely rational grounds of philosophy, while his vision of a uni-fied philosophy very much diverged from the French quest for stable disci-plinary boundaries. As we are reminded by Francesca Bordogna (2008: 5),

Figure 1. Durkheim ex cathedra


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scholars have long noted that James did not stick to emerging disciplinarydivides. She aptly describes how James never ceased to blur the bound-

aries separating disciplines and also, which is even more important, thedistinction between professional philosophy and popular philosophy. Heused to complain about the Ph.D. octopus. In contrast, Durkheim advo-cated professionalism in philosophy and sociology and complained aboutamateur sociology as well as the various brands of fashionable mysticismmushrooming in France at the turn of the century. It is worth noting that allthe academic philosophers except Bergson shared the same commitmentto rationalism, particularly the founders of the Revue de mtaphysique etde morale,otherwise rather hostile to the development of sociology (Souli

2009).What also matters is how, according to Marcel Mauss, the lecture courseon pragmatism was the philosophical crowning of Durkheims entire work.Yet what does this mean? For a full understanding of the importance giventhe lectures by Durkheims nephew, it is necessary to turn to the rathercomplex relationship that the sociologist developed with his first discipline,philosophy. Durkheims early writings, along with his aim to reform thephilosophical curriculum, stirred up turmoil among the philosophical com-munity. It is dangerous to have Monsieur Durkheim as an ally, the editors

of the newRevue de mtaphysique et de moralewrote in 1895, just afterhe had published a harsh criticism of the Agrgation de philosophie in theRevue philosophique,while the majority of philosophers saw theRgles dela mthode sociologique both as theoretically insufficient and imperialist.In fact, Durkheim had to fight simultaneously on two fronts. The first wasthe legitimization of a new science, sociology (as already mentioned, thelectures were an important device in this process). The second was thepreservation of his full membership in the philosophical community. Hislectures must be understood by taking into account Durkheims dual goal.

Philosophy is still, for him, the discipline within which judgements ondisciplinary boundaries are made. Nor, in his view, did he ever give up onphilosophy as the most advanced form of theoretical knowledge. He alwaysrefused depiction as an anti-philosopher and did not want his sociologyto be considered a weaker form of theorizing. Obviously, it was a verycomplex and somewhat contradictory endeavour. This may explain whyDurkheim removed, from the article he drafted as the introduction toLesFormes lmentaires,7the entire final section in which he defined sociologyas a form ofAufhebungfor philosophy, and wrote:

on nous a parfois suspect davoir une hostilit systmatique pour la philo-sophie en gnral, ou, tout au moins, dune sympathie plus ou moins exclu-sive pour un empirisme troit, dans lequel on ne voyait, avec quelque raisondailleurs, quune moindre philosophie. Ctait nous prter une attitude bienpeu sociologique. Car le sociologue doit poser comme un axiome que les ques-


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tions qui ont tenu une place dans lhistoire ne sauraient jamais tre primes;elles peuvent bien se transformer, non prir. Il est donc inadmissible que lesproblmes mtaphysiques, mme les plus audacieux, qui ont agit les philoso-phes, puissent jamais tomber dans loubli. Mais il est galement certain quilssont appels se renouveler. Or prcisment, nous croyons que la sociologie,plus que toute autre science, peut contribuer ce renouvellement. (Durkheim1909d: 755756)8

Each word counts in this excerpt. Metaphysical problems are de factoeter-nal. Sociology should not be a lesser philosophy. Sociology has a philo-sophical mission: to renew the conditions of true philosophical thinking.Of course, this is only made possible by a theoretical coup de force that

has no real grounding. If philosophy can be defined as the consciousnessof science, its position is more and more questioned by the growing divi-sion of intellectual labour (a theme already present in Durkheims thesispublished in 1893). Sociology is still a relatively small discipline that canbe mastered easily and that in the meantime is a science of totality. Theparadox can be put this way. Small is total, which seems to be the central,taken for granted, point in Durkheims sociological imperialism, and maybe the blind spot of his whole intellectual endeavour.

Two main explanations have been given of the sections removal from

the eventual, published version of Les Formes lmentaires.According toSteven Lukes (1973: 408409), Durkheim did not want to give too muchpower to philosophy. In the rather different view of Jean-Louis Fabiani(1993), Durkheim wanted to hide the sociological imperialism that deter-mined the conditions of survival for philosophy. In fact, leaving aside theOld Catholic philosopher Jules Lachelier and his scorn for the gods of thecrossroads, the philosophical community engaged in detail and at lengthwith Durkheims last book.9This provides some clues about Durkheimsstrategy: philosophers had to be convinced by the sociologists theoretical

grandeur and his philosophical abilities. But we now also have textual evi-dence that the deleted section was used as the framework of Durkheimsinaugural lecture on pragmatism and sociology.10

The French Topicality of Pragmatism

Interest in pragmatism, as an issue of the day, reached a peak in France be-tween 1906 and 1912. This is shown by Romain Pudal (2005, 2007, 2011),

but was already apparent from the monumental bibliography of John Shookand team (1998). The bibliography is useful yet questionable in so far asit is centred on the main texts of American and British pragmatism, withsome attention paid to Italian writings. It tends to overlook the output andreception of most of the French authors linked with pragmatism. If Shook


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is compared with the Literaturlist given by a German scholar of Frenchpragmatism (Simon 1918), it is noticeable that twenty names are missing.

These are especially authors who did not refer to American pragmatism,but contributed to the debate generated by the work of Maurice Blondel,Henri Poincar and Henri Bergson.

Shooks bibliography raises another problem, a methodological one. Thechoice of leading national journals of philosophy creates a documentaryboundary and distorts the view. This leaves out the general press and news-papers, where controversies on pragmatism were far from absent, but alsoleaves out journals in other disciplinary fields, such as psychology, so-ciology and theology. Moreover, Shook deals only with printed material,

ignoring the vast array of oral teaching that does not necessarily lead topublications. An examination of the titles of courses taught in French andSwiss universities at the time shows the frequency of courses devoted topragmatism. Examples from 1912 include the following: Institut Catholi-que de Paris, abb Srol (collaborator of theRevue de philosophie), Prag-matisme et christianisme; Universit de Clermont-Ferrand, M. Joyau, Delobjet des sciences et de la mtaphysique, de la classification des sciences,des sciences occultes, du positivisme et du pragmatisme; Universit deDijon, M. Abel Rey, tudes sur la philosophie des sciences: Le pragma-

tisme.11

Nor is Shook aware of the texts, surviving as manuscripts, sentin answer to two important competitions organized in 1911 and 1913 bythe Institut Catholique de Paris and the Acadmie des sciences morales etpolitiques. These were on two themes that give a good idea of the philo-sophical topicality of pragmatism: De la valeur du pragmatisme commedoctrine religieuse, and Le Pragmatisme. Origine, formes principales, etvaleur de cette philosophie.12Nevertheless, Shooks bibliography remainsthe best analytical tool so far, and we must draw on this admirable work toreconstruct the attention space (Collins 1998) to pragmatism in France in

the first years of the twentieth century.A network-based analysis of the French philosophical field constructedfrom the bibliographical entries in Shooks work shows the existence ofthree factions. The central cluster is organized round Xavier Lon (editor oftheRevue de mtaphysique et de morale), the Alcan publishing house andMaurice Blondels main correspondents. It includes the Republican philo-sophical establishment (. Boutroux, A. Lalande, . Durkheim, D. Parodi,D. Roustan, R. Berthelot, etc.). What is less obvious is the fact that it islinked to other groups, particularly to a second network that associates

the Protestant world, the Bergsonians, Jamess early correspondents andThodule RibotsRevue philosophique,and that is connected to the centralcluster through the Renouvieran philosopher Lionel Dauriac. The third net-work comprises the Catholic world, organized round theRevue de philoso-phieand the Institut Catholique de Paris, and with links to publishers such


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as Flammarion and Rivire. Many neo-Thomist priests belonged to thisgroup, which is connected to the central cluster through Maurice Blondel.

It is also possible to identify different phases in the construction ofpragmatism as a philosophical object in France. The first moment (1898to 1906) is centred on William Jamess initial network of correspondents(T. Flournoy, F. Abauzit, H. Bergson), and has a strong Jamesian flavour(Bergson [1911] 2011). The second moment (1906 to 1910) is polarized,and clear-cut factions can be identified around religious oppositions. TheCatholic counter-offensive condemning Modernism in the EncyclicalPas-cendiof 1907 generates a confessional dividing line, and pragmatism tendsto appear as a legitimate object in the world of Republican secularized

philosophy, while philosophy teachers connected with modernism suchas abb mile Baudin or douard Le Roy reinforced their centrality asbrokers. It is worth noting that Durkheim did not publicly take part in thevery hot, conflictual moment around 1907 and 1908. He failed to show upat the Socit franaise de philosophie, when the meaning of pragmatismwas discussed (7 May 1908).13Nor did he attend the famous InternationalCongress of Philosophy at Heidelberg in September the same year.

What was named, sometimes vaguely, le pragmatisme, was thus farfrom being limited to an Anglo-American import. Maurice Blondel, the

Catholic philosopher, coined the term himself in France, without referenceto Charles S. Peirce or to James. In any case, ninety-four articles on thetopic were published in theRevue philosophiqueduring this period. Fewerappear in the Revue de mtaphysique et de morale,but it has to be keptin mind that the journal was explicitly devoted to the promotion of a newrationalism, and pragmatism seemed clearly anti-rationalist. This view washeld not only by Durkheim but by a majority of French scholars. Thereseems to have been a real craze for pragmatism for a few brief years. Overa hundred books on it were published between 1907 and 1913 (twenty in

1907 and 1908, twenty-two in 1909, twenty-six in 1910, twenty-eight in1911, nineteen in 1912 and 1913), while the International Congress at Hei-delberg in 1908 was nicknamed the congress of pragmatism. Pragmatismwas often described as a mood or a fashion, rather than as a real philo-sophical victory over the established conceptual systems. Jamess deathand the First World War put an end to this unusual philosophical fashion,defined by Dominique Parodi as a major intellectual trend in the prewarperiod. The pragmatist wave was most of the time linked with the crisis ofrationalism in French society. Durkheim was not the only one to notice that

pragmatism had found its warmest supporters among neo-religious groupsand, in France, anti-republican ideologists. The bankruptcy of science andthe decline of republican rationalism were commonplace topics, encoun-tered every day in social life. This undoubtedly helps us to understand theharshness of Durkheims tone. He wanted to protect the still fragile suc-


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cesses of the New Sorbonne. But it would be far too simplistic to equateDurkheims standpoint with a mere protective reaction. In a review of 1910

of Schinzs Anti-pragmatism, he was severe in his criticism of its purelyideological concerns (Durkheim 2003: 69) and acknowledged the meritsof pragmatism when it dealt with human practice. On the other hand,while he was actively promoting his new book14 which in 1908 he hadthought of entitlingLes Formes lmentaires de la pense et de la pratiquereligieuse15 he was called on to explain his relation with pragmatism. InFebruary 1913, at the Socit franaise de philosophie, he had to make astatement saying: Entre le pragmatisme et moi, il y a labme qui sparele rationalisme de lempirisme mystique. Toute confusion est impossible

(Durkheim 1913b: 82).In fact, Durkheim was highly strategic in regard to pragmatism (Joas1984), particularly in its topicality in France. Since it was essentially aforeign philosophy known through translation, he could dismiss it with-out being considered an anti-philosopher. Bergson excepted (and he wasmarginal in the system), most French academics were reluctant to granthospitality to a form of thought and social movement that was itself sodismissive of established professional philosophy. It is paradoxical thatDurkheim, who was seen by some contemporaries as developing a social

pragmatism in religious studies (for example, Hbert 1909: 136137; Co-chin 1913: 81), was indeed much more positive than others. This was tothe extent that pragmatism helped with grasping the importance of humanpractice, a domain of thought necessary to understand religion and widelyused as a strategic tool in the last part ofLes Formes lmentaires.In a way,pragmatism was necessary to support and secure Durkheims conceptual-ization and he was not shy in borrowing large chunks of its definition ofpractice. So his relationship with pragmatism could illustrate his own viewof philosophy: useful for thinking about some elements of society, but un-

Figure 2. French translations of William James


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able to build up a whole conception of society. In the lectures, Durkheimreturned to the vision developed in the suppressed section of his draft in-

troduction toLes Formes lmentaires.Philosophy was to become a kind ofauxiliary science for sociology and, more than that, sociology could revealthe fruitful points in a philosophy otherwise misguided and false. BrunoLatour is wrong when he portrays Durkheim as a poor besieged rational-ist. He had a very complex strategy that allowed his nephew to see in thelectures the outstanding achievement of a scientific career.

A Lost Argument: The Question of Method

There is a real continuity between Durkheims last book and the lectureson pragmatism. This has been already remarked (Stedman Jones 2003),but reintroducing into the discussion the missing first lecture gives morestrength to the statement. The inaugural lecture starts where Les Formeslmentairesends. From the beginning, the process of writing the bookwas closely linked to readings of texts devoted to pragmatism. The initialdraft (Pickering 1984: 79) was presented at the Sorbonne as a cours pub-licduring the academic year 1906 to 1907 and entitled La Religion. Les

Origines (Durkheim 1907f). For the first time in Paris, and long before hisofficial chair in sociology, the poster mentioned Cours de Sociologie.16During these crucial years for Durkheim, the discussion of pragmatismwas at its hottest in Parisian intellectual circles. The French version ofThe Varieties of Religious Experiencecame out in 1906. In a report of thesame year, he supported the translators request for an official subscrip-tion by emphasizing the important debates round this well-known work(Durkheim 2003: 112), and in the following year he reviewed the new edi-tion itself (Durkheim 1907g[2]). While writing upLes Formes lmentaires,

Durkheim read a range of books more or less directly discussing Jamesspsychology and pragmatism, for example, D. Draghicesco,Le Problme dela conscience. tude psycho-sociologique (1907), abb Hbert, Le Divin.Expriences et hypothses. tudes psychologiques(1907), A. Schinz,Anti-pragmatisme, examen des droits respectifs de laristocratie intellectuelle etde la dmocratie sociale (1909), J.M. Baldwin, Psychologie et sociologie.LIndividu et la socit(1910), R. Berthelot, Un Romantisme utilitaire, tudesur le mouvement pragmatiste(1911) (see his reports of these in Durkheim2003). Pragmatism was much more than a general context (Jones 2002).

It constituted a powerful, influential background in the development ofDurkheims religious sociology.The retrieved inaugural lecture does not in fact introduce a specialized

course on pragmatism, designed to fight against an increasingly populartendency in French philosophy. Instead, it puts pragmatism to work as a


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way to set up and legitimize sociology vis--vis philosophy and psychol-ogy, in a highly strategic approach that strengthens Durkheims usual dis-

course on the merits and limits of the competing disciplines. Pragmatismas a doctrine allows for social sciences full recognition of the category ofpractice and, as already stated in Les Formes lmentaires,brings someuseful tools for the actual study of collective practices. On the one hand,it has a nice ability to identify varieties and changes of experience, but, onthe other, it fails to explain stability and regularities. Varieties are mean-ingless if they are not integrated into a frame that accounts for them, andDurkheims notion of concomitant variations the backbone of his earlytheory remains the best example of this point of view.

The retrieved notes make possible a partial reinterpretation of Durkheimslectures. Cuvilliers edition can be compared with the new set of notes andnew questions can be raised. An essential point is that the only basis forthe text consists of written accounts that are all anonymous so far. Cuvilli-ers text is an account of accounts, based on two anonymous manuscriptsthat disappeared. Cuvillier mentioned the Vrin philosophy bookshop (placede la Sorbonne, Paris, the usual meeting point of young philosophy teach-ers exiled in remote provinces) as the channel of supply of the two setsof notes he used for his own account of accounts, and added that be-

ing a comrade of the cole Normale had helped him to find them. Thiswas in the 1950s, and it is not absurd to suppose that those friends wereleftist philosophers close to the Communist Party. While the new profes-sional sociology rejected Durkheim as a relic of the past, still immersedin philosophy, some young Marxist intellectuals could see in Durkheim agenuinely progressive form of thought. It is known that in the post-Second-World-War era, the French Communist Party attracted a fair number ofyoung talented philosophers, including Ren Maublanc, who turned out tobeone of the most dedicated Marxist admirers of Durkheimianism. He was

also one of the pupils of Durkheims who attended the lectures on pragma-tism (Gouarn 2011). Published in the middle of the Cold War, but beforethe Krushchev report on Stalinism and the events of 1956 in Budapest,Pragmatisme et sociologiecan be seen as a tribute to a leftist definition ofintellectual activity.

Our reinterpretation is only tentative and must be considered as a workin progress. It should not be taken as the last word on the issue. We stillneed to look for more evidence and for other sets of notes along with theone we have already located. Meanwhile, the comparison between Cuvil-

liers text and the retrieved set of notes sheds new light on Durkheimsactual purpose in his lectures.First of all, our note-taker was present at the beginning of Durkheims

introductory lecture. This makes a significant difference, since what Cuvil-lier presents as the introduction is in fact an account of the last part of the


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preliminaries. His editions starting point is thus misleading and unfor-tunately emphasizes the national rationalist post hoc way of picturing

Durkheim. Our writer arrived on time, unlike Cuvilliers. His account al-lows us to reframe the course as a whole. What is at stake in Durkheims in-troduction is the question of method, something that is obviously a leadingtheme of his work. But the method of the lectures is significantly differentfrom the method defined in The Rules.In 1895, he developed an epistemol-ogy of combat. In making his way, he had to establish clear boundariesbetween sociology and two competing disciplines that were both muchmore advanced institutionally and epistemologically. But on reaching thehighest point in his career, he could devote himself to an even more ambi-

tious task, to assert the centrality of sociology in the system of sciences,a centrality based on the unity of method. This method was based on aproblmatiqueof what would today be called the construction of the socialobject, posited as social fact, against discourses based on generalities (Ba-ciocchi and Mergy 2003; Fabiani 2003). There is a strong epistemologicallink between the method and the centrality of sociology.

If the layout ofPragmatisme et sociologieis compared with the layoutof the retrieved notes, it is easy to see that the notes are more syntheticand more sensitive to the major theoretical articulations. Indeed, it can be

said that the note taker is in many ways more theoretically oriented thanCuvillier. In his editions reconstruction of the course, he misidentified thelecture on method, which he believed missing from the two sets of noteshe was drawing on, as a lecture to which he gave the title: Pragmatism andReligion. The anonymous note-taker provides a more apposite title: Thevarieties of religious experience. Method (Ms 364, VIII. f.1). This mistakeled Cuvillier to underestimate the centrality of method in Durkheims lec-tures. Choosing religion as an object of investigation is in itself a questionof method (Ms 364, I.f.4). This has to do with the dimension of religion as

a matrix vis--vis every social object, particularly knowledge and science.These are forms ofAufhebungof religion (just as sociology is in a sense theAufhebungof philosophy).

But if religion is so central for method, it is also because theory andpractice are intimately linked in it. Religion provides the best example ofthe importance of practice in symbolic activities: every symbol has to beperformed to exist as a symbol. In this respect, pragmatism is very usefulfor Durkheim, since the relation between theory and practice is hardly de-ducible from his first theoretical ideas (the epistemology working up to Sui-

cide,to put it bluntly). He needed pragmatism because it provided a highlysuggestive way of assessing the importance of practice. However, the pureprimacy of practice is in turn a defeat of reason. Durkheims strategic useof pragmatism is very clever, but has its shortcomings. The theme of ef-fervescence the other name of practice in action led to innumerable


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interpretations of Durkheim as an irrationalist. Les Formes lmentairesremained trapped in a contradiction, which stems from the books am-

bivalent use of pragmatism. First put to work as a device to establish theimportance of practice in religious life, and then in social life as a whole,it was rejected as triggering irrationalism and the collapse of social stablerealities (sociology being viewed as the science of institutions). Durkheimwas tricky in his use of pragmatism, but maybe a little bit too tricky. Thevery notion of practice was the worm in the bud. Besides, as we are re-minded by Mauss (1904) in his very first review of Jamess Varieties,it isnecessary to disentangle the notions of practice and experience from thepragmatist line on the acquisition of knowledge, namely knowledge by ac-

quaintance. This was mysterious, close to Jamess mild form of mysticism.It was also elitist, close to the model of the knowing man as the Christianreligious virtuoso, a character definitely unpalatable for any Durkheimianand, more generally, for any Republican French philosopher of the time.So let us now try to define more precisely how pragmatism is present inDurkheims book.

Although pragmatism is never mentioned in Les Formes lmentaires,William James turns up four times in the books conclusion, which hasa pride of place. He is one of the few contemporary philosophers quoted,

along with Boutroux, Hamelin and Lvy-Bruhl. But he is not presented asa philosopher. Durkheim is highly tactical in this respect. Jamess nameappears only in the footnotes, not in the main text itself. In this, he is firsta recent apologist of the faith (Durkheim 1912a: 596, 597), then a quasi-anonymous scientific contributor when the argument develops the notionsof concept crystallization (618) and of the spatial dimension of sensations(628: on a pu soutenir,avec de bonnes raisons, our emphasis). Durkheimmarks here a fairly clear distinction between the author of The Principlesof Psychology(1890) and, as in the first references, the author of The Va-

rieties of Religious Experience/LExprience religieuse(1902/1906). Withsuch a distinction, he enrols James, so to speak. The concept of religiousexperience is necessary in order to understand the social reality of religion,which is never an illusion. But refusing the illusory dimension of religiousfeelings and actions does not mean endorsing the believers point of view.Religious experience is real and always specific, yet cannot be equatedwith the scientific one, even though there is not an abyss between them(Durkheim 1912a: 596). Durkheim uses Jamess ideas against scientistswho aim to study religion as a purely negative object (an illusion, a mere

fancy). But in the meantime he turns James against himself, when he refersto his theory of conceptualization to distinguish between the impressionsfelt by the faithful and the concept of religion, which has to be linked tothe notion of society. There is a very clever move by Durkheim here. Heestablishes a refreshed version of his theory of society by enrolling the evi-


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dence of religious experience, but still does not accept its confusion withscientific experience.

In his 1904 review, Mauss focussed on the notion of experience, but hadnot noticed one of the conclusions drawn by James and made famous byDurkheim a decade later, namely, the uplifting, dynamogenic power ofreligious life and feelings. So the next step is to characterize these feelings.To what psychological order do they belong? Their resultant outcome is inany case what Kant called a sthenic affection, an excitement of the cheer-ful, expansive, dynamogenic order which, like any tonic, freshens ourvital powers (James [1902] 1985: 39798).

When, some years later, Durkheim reviewed the very loose French trans-

lation of the Varieties a translation that suppresses the reference to Kantssthenic affections he conceded to James the conclusion according towhich faith is dynamogenic. This is the source of religions practical truth(sa vrit pratique), as well as what explains its remarkable permanence anduniversality (Durkheim 1907g [2]: 118; Merlli 2010). Although the termdynamogenic is never used inLes Formes lmentaires,it is everywherean underlying idea in the book.17This can be linked with Durkheims pre-sentation at the Socit Franaise de Philosophie which appears as a realcoming out when he comes up with a notion of the dynamogenic while

repudiating any association with a mystical empiricism (empirisme mys-tique). But it can also be linked with Durkheim and Mausss own review ofLes Formes lmentaires,which reassesses and respecifies the Durkheimiandefinition of religion: Bien quelle ait un rle spculatif jouer, sa fonctionprincipale est dynamognique (Mauss and Durkheim 1913: 98).

There is no such thing as a pragmatist turn in Durkheims later work18,but a very interesting exploitation of acknowledging the primacy of prac-tice in religious life, as the title of the book implies and the importanceof the efficacy of rites clearly shows. The third part of the book is a key to

understanding its earlier claims about adhesion to beliefs (Rawls 2004).The many references to the non-illusory dimension of religion, perceivedthrough the efficacyand dynamogenic dimension of ritual performances,owe much to Durkheims close reading of Anglo-American pragmatism.

The method set out in the retrieved lecture allowed Durkheim to makethis clear-cut separation between sociology on the one hand and psychol-ogy and philosophy on the other. Only the former used definite descriptionsas the way to construct social objects for scientific inquiry. The latter werestill dependent on generalities to develop their discourse. This explains

why Durkheim launched a kind of French-American Methodenstreit.Heagreed with James on the object of method, on looking for a way of estab-lishing the truth, but strongly disagreed with him over the logic of inquiry:sociology is epistemologically central, since based on definite descriptionsof historical, definite domains of social life.


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In the lectures on pragmatism, Durkheim radicalized the imperativestated in The Rules.Instead of just insisting that the sociologist had to treat

social facts as things, he now advocated a grasp of facts as close as possible(une saisie des faits aussi prs que possible,Ms 364, I.f.1). In other meth-odological texts, he stressed the need for sociology to develop a genuineviewpoint, freed from philosophical generalities that go on generating mostof the concepts in the social sciences. In his inaugural lecture, however, hehas a new way of associating the necessary specialization of the sociologicalviewpoint with a sui generisgrasp of things, which is no longer producedby a priori categories, defined as an affair of philosophical preconceptions(prjugs philosophiques,Ms 364, I.f.1). Preexisting philosophical theories

provide no help to the sociologist, and this is as true for determinism as formechanicism. Durkheim here opposes the promise of a radical sociologyto the limits of pragmatism, still dependent on philosophical preconcep-tions. There is thus a transfer of radicalism, so to speak, from pragmatismto Durkheimian sociology. Durkheim is accordingly highly original in hiscritique of pragmatism: it fails as a theory because it does not succeed inbecoming a radical empiricism.But his legacy is in some ways enigmatic. Ifsociology does not get hold of things in themselves through pragmatismsmystical empiricism as he defines the method used in Jamess Varieties

how does it get close to and grasp the social thing? To a large extent, theissue is left in epistemological indetermination.

Mythological Truth and Scientific Truth

This leads on to our final point. In order to establish the centrality of so-ciology, Durkheim fell back on one of his first conceptual pairs the me-chanical and organic developed round the concern with solidarity in his

dissertation on the division of labour. Truth is embedded in social relations(Stedman Jones 2004). Mythological truth is definitely on the mechanicalside. It is consensual, based on exegesis and permanently available to bereactivated, as in a sociological definition of philosophy (Fabiani 1997) thatcorresponds roughly with the Durkheimian definition ofphilosophia peren-nis. It stands in structural opposition to scientific truth. This is organic,individualistic (thus dissensual) and based on the sociological analysis offacts (texts becoming facts in this respect). Sociology is clearly a science foran age of a complex division of labour. The centrality of sociology prevents

scientific truth from being individualistic in a negative sense, as in thenumerous pathologies of the division of labour that are also pathologies ofmodern individualism.

Understanding Durkheims lectures was not helped by Cuvilliers docu-mentary method of interpretation. Born in 1887, he got the agrgation de


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philosophiein 1919 (the first postwar class) and spent all his career as aphilosophy teacher in secondary schools. He was, we might say, a kind

of armchair Durkheimian, whose greatest achievement was a philosophytextbook for French Lyces that remained in print from 1927 to 1973, arecord. His aim was to capture his masters voice and he was proud towrite that, at times, Durkheims parole was distinctly recognizable. Cuvil-lier was certainly a zealous rewriter. But he did not realize that the courseon pragmatism was a work in progress, a step to going further in buildingthe science of sociology and not a philosophical will, a status it got onlyby accident. Moreover, Cuvilliers reconstruction strengthened the idea ofa direct clash between pragmatism and sociology. James was less a target

than a tool, and the faithful editor totally missed the point.He was also proud of having picked out the overlaps between the twosets of notes:

Ce nest, nous le rptons, quune reconstitutionque nous nous sommes ef-forc de faire aussi fidle que possible travers cette double srie de notes. Cel-les-ci nous ont souvent permis les recoupements les plus srs de lune lautreversion, et nous sommes convaincu que dans certains passages au moins, letexte, identique ou presque dans les deux versions nous apporte vraimentlcho de la parole de Durkheim. (Cuvillier 1955: 89)

Cuvillier stood on the mechanical side of exegesis. He fused together thetwo sets of notes and checked their overlap, cohesion and consistency onmore or less implicit Durkheimian grounds. He had a rather nave ideaof faithfulness to the letter of lectures that were not dictated and in whichDurkheim, although never extemporizing, could come back to some pointsto stress the main lines of his argument. Actually, Cuvillier did not fullyconsider the oral performance as such, and virtually erased the mediationof the anonymous auditors notes.

The devoted editor was looking for a lost textual authenticity ratherthan historicity. We have proceeded differently. Skimming across originalsources, looking for discrepancies and contrasts, we have attempted to ren-der the auditors notes as a unique and sociologically situated account. As aconsequence, we have kept explicit the chain of operations through whichwe have elaborated it. From the transcription to the translation, everyoneshould be in a position to construct their own judgement on fresh documen-tary evidence, and, as we hope, contribute to a renewed discussion.

Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this paper was given at an international conference,mile Durkheim: Sociology and Ethnology, held at the University of Ber-


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lin on 18 June, 2010. We would like to thank William Pickering, WillieWatts Miller, Susan Stedman Jones, Carole Gayet-Viaud, Anne Rawls, Ste-

ven Lukes and Thomas Rooney for their insightful comments.

Notes

1. A comprehensive list would include: Allcock 1982; 1983, Nijhoff 1983, Joas1984; 1993, Murphy 1985, Gross 1997, Rawls 1997, Stedman Jones 2003; 2004,Karsenti 2004, Clavier 2005, Shimizu 2007, Prus 2009, Schmaus 2010.

2. It is very unlikely that Cuvillier attended the lectures on pragmatism. He wasa leftist Catholic when he entered the cole Normale Suprieure and got his

agrgation dephilosophie.He made contacts with Marc Sangniers le Sillon,not far from modernist circles interested in pragmatism. Later, he became asocial democrat, edited the works of Proudhon and published a very successfulmiddle of the road text-book of philosophy that was to be in use for almostforty years.

3. See Anon., Bibliographie,Revue universitaire,64: 279280 (1955); Luis Bu-ceta, Noticias de libros,Revista de Estudios Politicos,97: 221222 (1958); An-dr Henry, Analyses et comptes-rendus,tudes philosophiques,10: 741742(1955); G. Leger Bulletin dhistoire de la philosophie moderne, Revue dessciences philosophiques et thologiques,40 (4): 708709 (1956); Jean-Claude

Margolin, Analyses et comptes rendus,Revue philosophique de la France et deltranger,83 (148): 536537 (1958); Jean Raes, Comptes rendus,Revue Phi-losophique de Louvain,54 (43): 508 (1956); C.A. V[iano], Nuovi Libri,Rivistadi Filosofia,48 (2): 225226 (1957); David Victoroff, Du caractre social de lavrit. propos dun livre rcent,Revue de Synthse,35: 247248 (1955) andAnalyses et comptes rendus,Journal de psychologie normale et pathologique,40: 217218 (1956). See also Gaudemar 1969.

4. Although a Cours libre de sociologie was taught at the Sorbonne by RenWorms, no chair had been created under this title. The Council of the Facultdes Lettres de Paris, meeting on 14 June 1913, and examining a proposal from

Durkheim himself, recommended that the chair of Science of Education bearthe title of Sociology and Science of Education, which would better fit whatwas taught and give more breadth to applications in the future. The UniversityCouncil examined and accepted the recommendation on 30 June, on RectorLiards request to Durkheim not to downgrade the Science of Education in thetitle of the chair, as it represented until then its total content. On 12 July, a de-cree was passed appointing Durkheim as Professeur de Science de lducationet de sociologie, as from 1 November 1913. Archives nationales (Paris) AJ16/4751, Conseil de la Facult des Lettres, sance du 14 juin 1913, f.226 andAJ16/2589, Conseil de lUniversit, sance du 30 juin 1913, f.242243.

5. See Pourquoi Marianne na plus de lait,Le Monde,23 septembre 2003 andBruno Latour, interview with Jean-Marc Lvy-Leblond, Il ne faut plus quunescience soit ouverte ou ferme,Rue Descartes,41 (3), 2003: 70.

6. Cf. Ms Sorbonne 364, Part. III f.2 (Milhaud), Part. V f.2 (Hamelin andRenouvier) and Part. VIII f. 5 (Rauh and Poincar) and Bibliothque de lENS


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(Paris) Register entitled cole Normale Suprieure Bibliothque, lves,19131914 1917, octobre 1913 dcembre 1917 and Anciens lves, register

1912 [-1916]. 7. See his letter of 24 July 1908 to Xavier Lon, editor of theRevue de mtaphy-sique et de morale,in which the article appeared the following year. The letterrefers to his new book asLes Formes lmentaires de la pense et de la pratiquereligieuse(Durkheim 1975, vol. 2: 467). But the article instead announces it as

Les Formes lmentaires de la pense et de la vie religieuse(Durkheim 1909d:733, n. 1).

8. Cf. Durkheim 1910, a little-known article on the New Sorbonne. 9. Stphane Baciocchi, Origine de la religion / religion des primitifs. La premire

rception desFormes lmentaires de la vie religieuse,19121917, paper given

at Les Formes lmentaires de la vie religieuse de Durkheim, cent ans aprs(19122012), international conference at the University of Bordeaux, 1113June, 2012.

10. Cf. Ms Sorbonne 364, Part. I f.2 / Durkheim, Sociologie religieuse et thoriede la connaissance (1909d: 756758) and f.3 / 1909d: 755 and 756757).

11. Anon., Les cours de philosophie dans les universits des pays de langue fran-aise,Revue de philosophie(Paris), 21, juilletdcembre 1912, p. 592593.

12. Archives des lInstitut Catholique de Paris E15, Prix Hugues (apologtique); lInstitut Acadmie des sciences morales Prix du Budget,Le Figaro,58(203), dimanche 21 juillet 1912, p.3e; Sances et travaux de lASMP. Compte

rendu, 73, 1913, p.72; Archives de lASMP Carton 191, Le pragmatisme.Origine, formes principales, signification et valeur de cette philosophie,1912,typescript, 106 pp.;Le Pragmatisme anglo-amricain. Ses origines, ses formes

principales, sa signification et sa valeur,1912, [Gorgias, 473, B], ms, 357 f.;Le Pragmatisme. Origines, formes principales, signification et valeur de cettephilosophie,1912, La vrit est fille du temps, typescript, 122 f.

13. Dominique Parodi, Andr Lalande, Ren Berthelot, Clestin Bougl, douardLe Roy, Lucien Laberthonnire, Georges Sorel, Jacques Hadamard, lie Halvy,Lon Brunschvicg, Jules Tannery, Maurice Blondel, La signification du prag-matisme, Bulletin de la Socit franaise de philosophie,8 (7), juillet 1908,

sance du 7 mai 1908, p. 240296. Apart from these speakers, people regis-tered as attending the collective discussion were: G. Beauvalon, V. Delbos, M.Drouin, C. Dunan, B. Jacob, L. Lvy-Bruhl, F. Ogereau, F. Rauh, G. Rodier,

J. Tannery, L. Weber and Winter.14. Cf. Jones and Vogt 1984; Pickering and Watts Miller 2004.15. MS Sorbonne 361 f.132r. Cf. Durkheim 1975, vol. 2: 467.16. Lettre dEmile Durkheim Mon cher ami Henri Hubert, Paris, [mai 1906],

edited by Philippe Besnard, Revue franaise de sociologie, 28 (3): 529530(1987).

17. Cf. Durkheim 1912a: 73, 295304, 311, 317, 442, 451452, 583, 592, 595, 597,634 and 637. See also Watts Miller 2005.

18. Deweys case should be examined at length. His work became part of theAn-ne sociologiques attention field as early as 1904, when it mentioned twopapers by him, (Dewey, Interpretation of Savage Mind, The Psychological Re-view9 (3) 1902 and The Evolutionary Method As Applied To Morality. II Its


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Significance for Conduct,Philosophical Review11, 1902). This is particularlyinteresting, since it shows two things. One is that theAnne sociologiques edi-

tors were highly interested in what was going on in philosophy and anthropol-ogy in the United States. The second is that Durkheim and Dewey tended tomove in close intellectual spaces: they both read the same accounts of primi-tive life, with a strong emphasis on Australian ethnographic data (Spencerand Gillen, Grey and Horn). Of course, they give quite different answers to thepuzzling questions raised by discovery of the savage mind, but they draw onthe same texts and thus to some extent develop a common cognitive space. Itwould be unsafe to go further towards a rapprochement, but it is worth keep-ing in mind this intellectual parallelism and the Western turn of Durkheim-ian sociology in the first decade of the twentieth century. Nor was the move

peculiar to Durkheim. Boutroux, one of the most prominent institutional phi-losophers in France, made a trip to the United States in 1912 and was accord-ingly nicknamed French philosophys travelling salesman (commis-voyageur).Bergson, through his British connections and through James, had also devel-oped contacts in America. The United States tended to become a country ofacademic production and a new market for ideas. Durkheim was aware ofthat. His student audience was already significantly international and he wasdeeply interested in the translation of his books into English. The First WorldWar accelerated the process. Durkheim died in 1917, and his involvement withthe U.S.A. is far less known than Bergsons. He had been commissioned to edit

a book on the organization of higher education in Paris for prospective U.S.students, and Poincars eulogy of Durkheim mentioned the fact as an elementof praise. In the meantime, Dewey had taken a strong and early interest inLes

Formes lmentaires.We have evidence that he read the book in French andkept notes on it (Southern Illinois University Carbondale / Center for DeweyStudies, John Dewey papers, Box 52: Manuscripts and Lecture Notes, 19011976, Folder 5, 9ff.). As far as these notes indicate, Dewey was mainly inter-ested in Durkheims method: how to identify the simplest forms of religion andhow to distinguish a sociological from a biological study. Deweys notes showa fair understanding of Durkheims rather complex reasoning, which he tries

to analyse into successive phases, and this at least reveals the common field ofattention we mentioned earlier.

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Leon inaugurale : Pragmatisme et Sociologie

Inaugural Lecture: Pragmatism and Sociology, 1913

mile Durkheimedited and translated by Stphane Baciocchi,

Jean-Louis Fabiani and Willie Watts Miller

Conventions relatives la transcription

La prise en note du cours de Durkheim a t fidlement retranscrite etrvise depuis le manuscrit conserv la Bibliothque Victor Cousin dela Sorbonne1. Nous indiquons par des chevrons la pagination originale dece manuscrit ( pour partie I folio 1 ). Les mots ou seg-ments de phrase souligns dans loriginal ont t rendus par des italiques,

les titres par du gras. Nos hsitations sur la transcription sont signalespar un point dinterrogation et places entre crochets [ ? sensitif] . Demme, les quelques mots ou segments illisibles sont indiqus entre cro-chets ( [illis.] ).

Figure 1. Durkheim at the Sorbonne

Durkheimian Studies,Volume 18, 2012: 4158, @ Durkheim Pressdoi:10.3167/ds.2012.180104 ISSN 1362-024X


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mile Durkheim

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Bien que gnralement triviales, les nombreuses abrviations prsentesdans loriginal tmoignent dune pratique et dune situation dcrites par un

des auditeurs de ce cours : il sagissait de noter la hte ce qui se pr-sentait loral comme le courant de la pense si serre du Professeur2.En outre, ces abrviations constituent, pour qui naurait pas renonc iden-tifier le scripteur anonyme de cette prise de notes, une prcieuse marque ousignature graphologique. Aussi ont-elles t conserves et dveloppes entrecrochets ( 1 [un] , doct [doctrine] ). Nous avons aussi conserv lesratures (mots barrs) ainsi que les ajouts et corrections que nous signalonspar des lignes verticales (mcanistique ). Dans loriginal, ces ajouts et lgrescorrections sont dune autre plume, plus fine, et attestent dune relecture des

notes, sans doute hors de lamphithtre. Nous navons pu dterminer silsagissait dune autre main, mais ne le croyons pas. En effet, certains ajouts,corrections ou rectifications supposent de connatre assez exactement cequi a t not lors de la premire prise de notes dans lamphithtre.

Lannotation en notes de fin est de notre initiative. Elle vise pour lessen-tiel souligner le paralllisme entre cette leon inaugurale et la troisimepartie de larticle Sociologie religieuse et thorie de la connaissance publi par Durkheim en 1909. Cest seulement partir de la seconde moi-ti du folio 5, alors que la leon touche sa fin, que la comparaison du

manuscrit avec ldition propose par Armand Cuvillier de ce mme cours,restitu daprs deux autres jeux de notes dauditeurs, devient possible.Nous avons alors systmatiquement plac en note, et comme en regard, laversion tablie par Cuvillier.

Translation

The aim is to make the French transcription of the notes the basis of a

relatively flowing and readable English version. This involves a number ofchanges in punctuation, the formation of sentences and the organizationof paragraphs, but preserves the use of emphases and capitals. Words thatare uncertain are followed with a question mark in square brackets [?] andwords that are illegible are indicated by an ellipsis and question mark insquare brackets [?].

Notes

1. Ms Sorbonne 368 Fonds Ren Le Senne, Pragmatisme et Sociologie , notesprises lors du cours magistral dmile Durkheim, professeur titulaire de lachaire de Sociologie, s.n., hiver 1913 printemps 1914, 108 f. (13,7 x 21,1 cm).

2. IMEC Abbaye dArdenne, fond Marcel Mauss. Lettre de Constantin Sude-teanu (1885-1960) Marcel Mauss, Cluj, 1927, f.1v.


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Pragmatisme et Sociologie

INcessit de lexist.[ence] indpend[an]t.[e]de la Soc.[iologie]

1[un] probl.[me] proprement philosoph[ique] en sociologue Quelleest laffinit entre S[ociologie] et Ph[ilosophie] ? Comme la philosophieest sociologie est ne chez les philosophes, elle est reste trop longt[em]psphilosoph[ique] (Comte Spencer)1; aussi nuisible lune qu lautre.

Car lune a p[ou]r but datteindre les faits sociaux d[an]s leur natureintime, et ne peut avoir que de lloignement p[ou]r les vues lointaines, va-gues et confuses. Ex[emple] = que n[ou]s apprend de nouveau sur les faitssociaux la loi du passage entre de lhom[ogne] lhtrogne2. Les chosesvues dune telle hauteur sont brumeuses ; oppos.opposition la doct[rine] de

Tarde, aux clefs qui ouvrent toutes les serrures3.Une telle mthode est la fois nuisible la sociologie et la philosophie,car la philosophie senrichit par lapport des sciences particulires.

La sociologie doit classer les faits, et atteignedre les faits daussi prsque possible, il faut que elle atteigne [se] spcialise de +[plus] en +[plus], quelle sloigne de t[ou]tes les ries philosophiques, elle ne doitm[me] pas tre plutt dterministe mcanistique . Il faut que le sociologue ou-blie les prjugs philosophiques ; m[me] les quest[ions] philoso[phiques]

se prsentent lui s[ou]sdes aspects nouveaux, et apportent des lments desolution n[ouveau]xp[ou]r les probl.[mes] proprement philosophiques.Ainsi la Sociologie p[ou]r servir la Philos.[ophie] na qu rester elle

m[me] ; en se dvelopp[an]t, elle se muera en Philosophie4.Car.[actre] spcial de la spcula[tion] philosoph[ique] = vue hypoth-

tique sur des portions + [plus] ou [moins] vagues grandes du rel.Il y a 1 [une] ph.[ilosophie] math.[matique], phys.[ique], biol.[ogique]

etc. Cependant < I. f.2 > toutes ces spcul.[ations] ne s[on]t pasphil.[osophiques] au m[me] degr ; ph.[ilosophie] physique + [plus]

phil.[osophique] que phil.[osophie] math[matique] et biol.[ogique]+ [plus] que physique Cest que ce caractre hypothtique nexclue[sic] pas une cert[aine] rigueur scientifique. Il faut donc que ces vuessynth[tiques]portent sur des objets dtermins. Comment concilier ces2 [deux] ncessits contraires ? Un seul moyen, il faut que cet objet soit


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assez central pour quil puisse offrir 1 [une] vue densemble sans perdrede sa dtermination.

P[ou]r certa[ines] phil.[osophies] il y a un seul objet central (Spinoza)5

.Mais il semble quil ny ait pas 1 [une] telle unit du rel ; pluralit desvues centrales possibles. Mais il y a une hirarchie entre les points [devue]. + [Plus] lobj.[et] sera central, plus la vue sera philosophique.

Comte avait vu cette hirarchie (math.[matique] cont.[enue] d[an]sphys.[ique] [,] phys.[ique] d[an]s biologie). Aussi les sciences super.[ieures]c.[est] d.[ire] trait[an]t dobjets + [plus] complexes nous offrent desvues + [plus] philosophiques.

Il en est une qui semble n[ou]s offrir 1 [une] vue b[eau]c[ou]p + [plus]

centrale que les autres, cest la conscience humaine, qui nest que reprsenta-tion. Tout lunivers semble sy trouver en raccourci. La conscience embrassed[an]s 1 [une] cert.[aine] mesure la totalit des autres phnomnes 6.

La Psychologie

Dirons[-]nous que la psych.[ologie] est la science la + [plus] philo-sophique ?

Il est invitable que la psych.[ologie] delle m[me] arrive toucher desquest.[ions] phil[osophiques], m[ai]s elle est loin du 1er[premier] rang. Eneffet la conscience indivi.[duelle] nexprime pas la totalit du monde, ellenexprime que notre monde individuel, parcelle infime. Personne de nousne possde lintgralit de la morale, de la science, du droit, de la langue,de la technique. Non seulement lunivers indiv.[iduel] est tronqu, m[ai]sil est modifi. Chacun de n[ou]s a son p[oin]t de vue sur son universspcial7.

Par consqu[en]tla consc.[ience] indiv.[iduelle] ne peut pas n[ou]s of-

frir 1 [un] p[poin]t de vue abs.[olument] central. Aussi la psych.[ologie]est-elle oblige de faire abstract.[ion] de n[o]tr[e] personnalit, de nosindividualits ; elle ntudie < I. f.3 > [pas] le dtail, mais les formes les+ gnrales de la facult de : penser, sentir, smouvoir etc.

Or, en face de ces pouvoirs tout formels qu il ne reste + [plus] queq[uel]q[ue]-chose de trs aride. Car le contenu, cest le rel au milieu du-quel n[ou]s vivons. Et par consq[uen]t, la philos.[ophie] ensemble de for-mes vides, est elle m[me] formelle. Toute la vie sest retire .

Cest ce qui fait le succs des de laphil.[osophie] de Fechner, de Nietzs-

che, enfin du pragmatisme : lutte contre les formes scolastiques . Mais ledanger cest que par opposit[ion] ces formes, on les brise, et alors il nereste que des vues pratiques, car si sches quelles soient, ces formes ontexist pend[an]t des sicles8.

Cest p[ou]r cela quici on les examinera, et on les discutera.


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Sociologie

Il y a 1 [un] autre p[oin]t de vue central ; ensemble des reprsentationsdes hommes ; la f[oi]s p[oin]t de vue central et non formel ; n[ou]s lestrouvons en elles-m[me]s, cur de la ralit ; une civilisation a existe9.Q[uel]q[ue] ch[ose] qui dure par dessus les gnrations successives, il nya que la socit : il ny a quelle qui en permett[an]t la contin.[uit] deleffort cre la civilisation.

Aussi le p[oin]t de vue dtude de la civilisation est 1 [un] p[oin]t devue central, et dun autre ct cest 1 [une] chose minemment sociale, parconsq[uen]tlobjet de la sociologie.

lens.[emble] des consc[iences]

p[oin]t de vue vraiment centralLe rgne social [ ? indivi.[duelles]reprsente]

rgne biologique

Les formes elles-m[mes] dont on parlait plus haut, est-on sr quellessoient purement psychologiques ?

Jusquici les formes suprieures motives / intellectuelles nont pu treexpliques psychologiquement.

Sans doute trouve ton une explica[tion] local[e]empiriste. M[ai]s cest uneexplica[tion] phil[osophique] qui suppose 1 [une] rie [thorie] philosophique, non psycholo-gique. Cest lexpl.[ication] dialectique < I. f.4 > qui fait en ralit va-nouir en ralit la chose quil faut expliquer.

Les autres doctrines les posent m[ai]s ne les expliquent pas. On faitde la raison, de lentendement q[uel]q[ue] chose qui se pose. Alors la porteest ouverte t[ou]tesles expl[ications] qui chappent la science et la pen-se distincte.

Nous entrevoyons comment la sociologie peut tudier ces formes en

leur laissant leur spcificit . On voit par l comment la sociol.[ologie] peuttre amene poser des probl.[mes] philo[sophiques] et des probl.[mes]n[ou]v[eau]x.

Mais cest surtout d[an]s ltude des religions que la soc.[iologie] peutservir la philosophie.

La Sociol.[ogie] au dbut est alle aux formes les + [plus] visibles, auxchoses les + [plus] naturelles, aux m[ou]v[emen]ts qui se traduisentdans lespace. Cest pourquoi elle est alle dabord aux pratiques . Orcela noffre pas 1 [un] p[oin]t de vue central comme les p[ro]b[l]m[es

moraux. Ltude des pratiques ne n[ou]s ramenait pas la quest.[ion] dela connaissance.Il en est autrement de la religion , car n[ou]s trouvons l des penses,

des croyances, des mythes (aspect [ ?sensi]tif / aspect esthetique), des arts.N[ou]s trouvons l une masse touffue de reprs.[entations] organises.



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Jusqu hier la religion contenait tout ce qui tait la vie dun peuple,artist[ique], intell[ectuelle], moral[e].

Donc la religion n[ou]s prsente 1 [un] p[oin]t de vue minemmentcentral ; cest une question de mthode .On a souvent dit que les sciences s[on]t la base de la phil[osophie], et

que la phil.[osophie] tait une rflexion sur les sciences. Cest incont[esta]blem[ai]s il ne faut pas oublier que les sciences ne se dveloppent quen separticularis[an]t. Il faudr[ai]t trouver 1 [un] point de vue idal, encore trouver do lon puisse saisir les sciences , [illis.] do quen [ ? soient]les religions .

Dautre part, lhomme scientifif[ique] est 1 [un] homme singul[ier],

tronqu, et en particulier spar des exigences pratiques, < I. f.5 > delaction, cest une rgle de mthode. Aussi q[uan]d on tudie la pense dece p[oin]t de vue, elle devient une sorte dentit.

Tandis que d[an]s la Relig[ion], la pense est intim[emen]tunie lac-tion 10. Lact.[ion] intel[ectuelle] et lact.[ion] y sont intim[emen]tli[e]s lune lautre. L n[ou]s pouvons tudier la Pense, vivante.

Ces recherches permett[en]tm[me] daborder 1 [une] thorie b[eau]c[ou]p+ [plus] centrale, la rie [thorie] de la vrit .

Pourquoi sera-t-il quest[ion] du Pragmatisme [?]11

Le Pragmatisme est la rie [thorie] de la vrit, la plus rcente, et pres-que la seule qui existe. Car la +part [plupart] du temps on se borne laposer la vrit .

Le Pragm[atisme] lui a entrepris de faire 1[une] rie [thorie] de la v-rit. Sa rencontre avec la sociologie et si contraires, si divergentes quellessoient, expriment 1 [un] tat desprit commun. Vie et action12.

Gravit de la cause en jeu dans le dbat soulev par le Pragm[atisme].Le Pragm[atisme] livre la Raison un assaut furieux. N[ou]s fait sentir

+ [plus] quaucun autre la ncessit de renouveler le Rationalisme, de lemodifier13.

danger pour n[otre]culture base [de] rationalisme danger pour notre tradition philosophiqueExposition du PragmatismeExamen du Pragmatisme

< I. f.6 >Danger pour la tradition philosophique.

La tradition philosophique est essentiel.[lement] rationaliste. Sans douteon peut distinguer rat.[ionalistes] et empiristes mais prendre les chosesde + [plus] haut et sur[tou]tsi on compare rat.[ionalisme] et emp.[irisme]pris ensemble opposs au pragm.[atisme] ; on saperoit que ce sont 2[deux] espces dun m[me] genre ; (De part et dautre rat.[ionalisme] et


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emp.[irisme] on a 1 [un] culte p[ou]r la vrit, on affirme la ncessit decert.[ains] jugements qui lient lesprit.

les uns d[an]s la nature des choses les autres [d[an]s la nature] de la pense14 Soit Kant, d[an]s lesprit Soit Hamelin d[an]s lesprit et d[an]s les choses

[illis.] combin d[an]s lidalisme radical, on est prs de lempirisme(car il ny a p[a]s 1 [un] ideal.[iste] qui soit solipsiste).

Le Pragm[atiste], lui, nie la force obligatoire des jugements logiques.Lui, rclame, la libert de lesprit vis vis de la vrit15.

1 [Une] seule except[ion] import[an]te

au ration.[alisme] d[an]s lhistoire,cest la sophistique. Rapprochem[en]t reconnu, avou par les pragma-tistes eux mmes (Schiller se traite de Protagoren, reprend la ques[ion]de Prot[gora]s et de Platon)16. Assurm[en]t il ny a rien qui cond amnelePragm[atisme]. Cest la sophistique qui a fait avancer le Socratisme. LePragm.[atisme] aujourdhui peut servir rveiller le dogmatisme empruntaprs la secousse du Kantisme17.

Notes

1. Durkheim poursuit ici sa critique des sociologies spculatives qui ont prcd,dans lvolution des connaissances, la sociologie scientifique quil entendfonder. Pour Durkheim, la sociologie dAuguste Comte est sans lendemainimmdiat dans la mesure o, comme celle dHerbert Spencer, elle ne par-vient pas sextraire des gnralits philosophiques . Pourtant, luvre deComte, et un moindre degr celle de Spencer, ont selon Durkheim un vri-table caractre propdeutique . Dailleurs, quelques rserves quappellela doctrine de Comte, un sentiment trs vif de ce quest la ralit sociale y est

partout prsent. Il nest pas de meilleure initiation ltude de la sociologie remarque-t-il (Durkheim 1915a : 42, 43 ; 1975: 112, 113).

2. Durkheim fait ici allusion la loi de von Baer, biologiste allemand (1792-1876), pour lequel au cours du dveloppement de luf, les caractres gn-raux apparaissent avant les caractres particuliers, qui se dveloppent dans unsecond temps, lorganisation dun animal scartant de plus en plus de celledes autres animaux au cours du processus. On passe ainsi de lhomogne lhtrogne. Cest sur cette loi de von Baer que Spencer appuie sa thorie dela diffrenciation et dveloppe son point de vue volutionniste. La remarquedoit donc tre lue comme une critique de la sociologie spencerienne, prsente

rgulirement dans luvre de Durkheim depuis le cours de philosophie duLyce de Sens profess en 1883-1884.

3. Cf. Le mot [ la clef qui ouvre toutes les serrures ] est de M. Tarde (Lois delimitation,p.V), qui le place sous lautorit dun philosophe qui parat treTaine. Mais quel quen soit lauteur, il nous parat bien peu scientifique. Nous


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ne croyons pas quil y ait de science o une clef de ce genre existe. Les serruresdoivent tre ouvertes, disons mme forces, les unes aprs les autres et labo-

rieusement (Durkheim 1903c : 472, n. 1 ; 1975: 129, n.6). 4. Cf. [] cette science [la sociologie] est destine, croyons-nous, fournir la philosophie les bases qui lui sont indispensables et qui lui manquent pr-sentement. On peut mme dire que la rflexion sociologique est appele seprolonger delle-mme et par son progrs naturel sous la forme de rflexionphilosophique ; et tout permet de prsumer que, aborde par ce biais, lesproblmes que traite le philosophe prsenteront plus dun aspect inattendu (Durkheim 1909d : 758 [phrase de conclusion]).

5. La critique de Spinoza est galement prsente dans le Cours de philosophiefait au Lyce de Sens et minutieusement pris en note par lun des lves de

Durkheim, Andr Lalande : Une autre cole, lcole idaliste,propose la m-thode dductive ou a priori.Il faut chercher, dit-elle, lide la plus gnrale,lide premire do dpendent toutes les autres, et de mme que des dfini-tions quil fait accepter en commenant, le mathmaticien dduit tout le reste,en faisant voir que tout est contenu dans la dfinition primordiale, de mmede cette ide premire le philosophe doit tirer toutes les autres, qui y sontcontenues. - Spinozaa donn lexemple le plus frappant de cette mthode. Sonouvrage est crit avec tout lappareil mathmatique : dfinitions, thormes,corollaires, etc. [] Cette mthode a un grave dfaut. Cest de mettre lexp-rience absolument en dehors de la mthode philosophique. Dans les sciences,

il faut expliquer des faits donns, non inventer une srie dides se droulantet se dduisant les unes des autres sans sinquiter si elles cadrent avec la ra-lit (Cours de philosophie fait au Lyce de Sens,Partie 1 : Objet et mthodede la philosophie (suite) ; cf. Durkheim 2004 : 38).

6. Cf. Tout le monde accorde aujourdhui que la philosophie, si elle ne prendpas son point dappui dans les sciences positives, ne peut tre quune formede la littrature. Mais dun autre ct, mesure que le travail scientifique sedivise et se spcialise davantage, il devient de plus en plus vident que, sile philosophe ne peut procder son uvre de synthse qu condition depossder lencyclopdie du savoir humain, la tche est impossible. Dans ces

conditions, il ne reste la philosophie quune ressource : trouver une sciencequi, tout en tant assez restreinte pour pouvoir tre possde par un seul etmme esprit, occupe cependant, par rapport lensemble des choses, une si-tuation assez centrale pour pouvoir fournir la base dune spculation unitaireet, par consquent, philosophique. Or les sciences de lesprit sont les seules satisfaire cette condition. Comme le monde nexiste pour nous quautantquil est reprsent, ltude du sujet enveloppe, en un sens, celle de lobjet ; ilne semble donc pas impossible que, en se plaant au point de vue de lesprit,on puisse arriver embrasser lunivers dans son ensemble sans quil soit, pourcela, ncessaire dacqurir une culture encyclopdique, dsormais irralisa-ble (Durkheim 1909d : 756).

7. Durkheim tait beaucoup plus nuanc dans son cours du Lyce de Sens, des-tin des lves de lenseignement secondaire. Il rfutait en effet lobjectionselon laquelle lobservation [psychologique] manque donc de gnralit, nade vrit que dans le particulier.Cette mthode rduirait la psychologie ntre


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quune collection de monographies individuelles. [] On peut facilement r-futer ces objections. [] On rpondra quon ntudiera dans chaque homme

particulier, que ce qui est commun tous les hommes,de mme que, dans untriangle donn, un mathmaticien ne considre que les proprits communes tous les triangles. En outre, nous comparerons les rsultats obtenussur nous ceux obtenus sur dautres, de faon ne laisser absolument dans nos obser-vations que les caractres communs. Nous ne nous contenterons mme pasdtudier ceux qui vivent autour de nous, sous lempire des mmes circonstan-ces : nous observons les documents que lhistoire nous a laisss sur les grandshommes des temps passs (Cours de philosophie, op. cit., Partie 2 : Objetet mthode de la psychologie ; cf. Durkheim 2004 : 56). Entre 1884 et 1913,Durkheim est pass du statut de professeur de philosophie celui de fondateur

de science, et il peut tre plus radical. 8. Cf. [] on nous a parfois suspect dune hostilit systmatique pour la phi-losophie en gnral, ou, tout au moins, dune sympathie plus ou moins exclu-sive pour un empirisme troit, dans lequel on ne voyait, avec quelque raisondailleurs, quune moindre philosophie. Ctait nous prter une attitude bienpeu sociologique. Car le sociologue doit poser comme un axiome que les ques-tions qui ont tenu une place dans lhistoire ne sauraient jamais tre primes ;elles peuvent bien se transformer, non prir. Il est donc inadmissible que lesproblmes mtaphysiques, mme les plus audacieux, quont agits les philo-sophes puissent jamais tomber dans loubli (Durkheim 1909d : 755756).

9. Cf. Cest dans la civilisation dune poque, cest--dire dans lensemble formpar sa religion, sa science, sa langue, sa morale, etc., que se trouve ralis lesystme intgral des reprsentations humaines au moment considr. Or lacivilisation est une chose minemment sociale (Durkheim 1909d :756757).

10. Cf. La religion nest exclusivement ni une philosophie obligatoire ni une dis-cipline pratique : elle est lune et lautre la fois. La pense et laction y sonttroitement unies, au point dtre insparables (Durkheim 1899a[ii] : 22).

11. Ici commence ldition du cours propose par Armand Cuvillier (Durkheim1955).

12. Cf. Quelles sont les raisons qui mont amen choisir le sujet de ce cours ?

Pourquoi lai-je intitul Pragmatisme et Sociologie? Cest dabord lactualitdu Pragmatisme, qui est peu prs la seule thorie de la vrit actuellementexistante. Cest ensuite quil y a dans le Pragmatisme un sens de la vieet delactionqui lui est commun avec la Sociologie : les deux tendances sont fillesdune mme poque.

Et pourtant, pour les conclusions du Pragmatisme, je nai quloignement.Il y a donc intrt marquer les positions respectives des deux doctrines (Durkheim 1955 : 27).

13. Cf. Le problme soulev par le Pragmatisme est en effet fort grave. Nous as-sistons de nos jours un assaut contre la Raison, une vritable lutte mainarme (Durkheim 1955 : 27).

14. Cf. Certes, on distingue gnralement dans la tradition philosophique deuxcourants : le courant rationaliste et le courant empiriste. Mais il est facile devoir quEmpirisme et Rationalisme ne sont au fond que deux manires diff-rentes daffirmer la raison. De part et dautre, en effet, on maintient un culte


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que le Pragmatisme tend dtruire : le culte de la vrit ; on admet quil existedesjugements ncessaires.La diffrence est dans lexplication quon donne de

cette ncessit : lEmpirisme la fonde dans la nature des choses, le Rationalismedans la raison elle-mme, dans la nature de la pense. Mais des deux cts, onreconnat le caractre ncessaire, obligatoire de certaines vrits, et les diffren-ces sont secondaires ct de ce point fondamental (Durkheim 1955 : 28).

15. Cf. Or cest prcisment cette force obligatoire des jugements logiques, cettencessit des jugements de vrit, que nie le Pragmatisme. Il affirme que les-prit demeure libre en face du vrai (Durkheim 1955 : 28).

16. Cf. Par l, le Pragmatisme se rapproche de lexception unique laquelleil a t fait allusion, savoir de la Sophistique, qui niait elle aussi toute v-rit. Ce rapprochement nest pas arbitraire : il est avou par les pragmatistes

eux-mmes. Cest ainsi que F. C. S. Schiller se proclame protagoren et rap-pelle laxiome : Lhomme est la mesure de toutes choses (Durkheim 1955 :2829).

17. Cf. Noublions pas cependant que la Sophistique a jou un rle utile danslhistoire des doctrines philosophiques : cest elle, en somme, qui a suscitSocrate. De la mme faon, le Pragmatisme peut servir aujourdhui tirer lapense philosophique de ce nouveau sommeil dogmatique o elle tend sendormir depuis la secousse que lui avait imprime la critique de Kant.Son avantage est, comme il a t dit, de mettre en lumire les faiblesses

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