Towards a Systematic Analysis of Automated Election in the Philippines
AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM
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Transcript of AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM
Automated National and Local Elections
May 10, 2010
AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM
For the first time in history, the Philippines will be having an Automated Elections Systems (AES) for its national and local elections. R.A. 8436 , An Act Authorizing the COMELEC to use an
AES in the May 11, 1998 National and Local Elections and in Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises, etc. (Dec. 1997)R. A. 9369 , Amending RA 8436 (Jan 2007)
R.A. 9369
Covers both Automated and Manual ElectionsCovers voting, counting, consolidating, canvassing, and
electronic transmissionAES -system using appropriate technology which has
been demonstrated in the voting, counting, consolidating, canvassing and transmission of electoral results and other electoral processes.a. Direct Recording Election (DRE); andb. Optical Media Recording (OMR).
R.A. 9369
Benefits:a. There will be less human intervention in the voting,
counting, canvassing and proclamation of winning candidates;
b. The election results will be process more objectively; and
c. Faster election results.
AES Standards and Features Under RA 9369
Most suitable technologyPaper Based or Direct Recording Electronic Ballots are either paper or electronic ballotOne BEI member – Technology capableElection Returns, printed (30 cops) and electronic formCertificate of Canvass, printed and electronic formElectronic Transmission of ResultsContinuity/Back-up Plan
Statistics:
• 16 Regions• 80 Provinces• 120 Cities • 1514 Municipalities• 42,025 Barangays• 342,075 Established Precincts• 50,086,054 registered voters
nationwide as of Sept, 2009
Zambales Voters Profile (01/03/10)
• 13 municipalities + 1 City• Total No. of Brgys > 247• Total No. of polling centers > 227• Total No. of voters > 435,556• Total No. of established precincts > 2,949• Total No. of Clustered Precincts > 595
CITY/MUNICIPALITY
NO. OF ESTAB PRCNT
NO. OF CLUSTERED PRCNT
NO. OF VOTING CENTERS
NO. OF REGISTERED VOTERS( as of 01.10.10)
OLONGAPO CITY 17 855 143 22 1 112,593
BOTOLAN 31 206 47 23 4 31,173
CABANGAN 22 102 25 17 13 13,428
CANDELARIA 16 103 25 15 10 18,353
CASTILLEJOS 14 165 33 16 7 25,483
IBA 14 184 36 10 5 28,477
MASINLOC 13 177 34 14 6 26,360
PALAUIG 19 136 35 20 8 21,633
SAN ANTONIO 14 113 24 11 11 17,957
SAN FELIPE 11 91 19 8 14 12,796
SAN MARCELINO 18 144 32 13 9 20,343
SAN NARCISO 17 108 26 14 12 16,545
STA. CRUZ 25 183 45 26 3 31,237
SUBIC 16 382 71 18 2 59,178
STATISTICS
• 80, 136 Clustered Precincts (estimate)
• 37, 884 Polling Centers (estimate)
• 82, 200 PCOS Machines• 80, 136 PCOS Machines for
distribution to clustered precincts.
• Testing •and
•Sealing •of
•PCOS
test
ing
& s
eal
ing
pro
cedu
res
at l
ea
st th
ree
da
ys b
efo
re e
lect
ion
da
yPublic shall accomplish test ballotsBallots shall be manually countedand election returns accomplishedSame set of ballotsthat was manually counted shall be fed into the counting machine
test
ing
& s
eal
ing
pro
cedu
res
at l
ea
st th
ree
da
ys b
efo
re e
lect
ion
da
yManual countshall be compared withthe print-out of the election returnsIf public is satisfiedthat the manual count is the same as the automated count, the print-out and manually prepared election returns shall be signed-off by the witnesses
test
ing
& s
eal
ing
pro
cedu
res
at l
ea
st th
ree
da
ys b
efo
re e
lect
ion
da
y
Machines shall be sealed withoutany connection to transmission linksPublic shall be allowed to secure the polling places where the counting machines are installedThe only time that the counting machines shall be openedis on election day in the presence of watchers
Clustered PrecinctsNot more than 7 Precincts in a cluster
Not more than 1,000 voters
986
bo
ard
of e
lect
ion
insp
ecto
rs• One (1) BEI for every clustered precinct
• Three regular members–Chairman
– Delivers ballot to voter
–Poll Clerk–Third Member
• Support Staff–Depends on number of precincts clustered–To assist Poll Clerk and Third Member in
managing– List of Voters with Voting Records – Book of Voters
bo
ard
of e
lect
ion
insp
ecto
rsNo. of Precincts
ClusteredNo. of Support
StaffTotal no. of personnel (BEI + Support Staff)
0 none 32 none 33 1 44 2 5
5 to 7 3 6
votin
g• Voting period
–7:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.• Unless there are voters waiting for their turn to
vote or within the school premises– Poll Clerk lists down names voters queuing
– Poll Clerk calls voter to cast ballot
– Voter who fails to appear after being called twice shall not longer be allowed to vote
–Precinct set up• At least 10 voters can cast ballot at any one time
votin
g• Before voting starts
–Show that ballot box is empty• Transparent plastic
–Turn on and initialize PCOS
–Print “Zero Report” • To show that there
is no entry/vote in machine’s memory
1
Paraan ng Pagboto(Voting Process)
Magpakilala sa Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) sa presinto kung saan kayo nakarehistro. Matapos mapatunayan ang inyong pagkakilanlan, bibigyan kayo ng balota na may mga pangalan na ng mga kandidato.
est
ablis
hin
g id
en
tity
of v
ote
r• LIST OF VOTERS WITH VOTING RECORDS
–Photograph
est
ablis
hin
g id
en
tity
of v
ote
r
est
ablis
hin
g id
en
tity
of v
ote
r• If identity cannot be established through
photograph–Compare signatures
• Use Book of Voters– Contains applications for registration
» Includes specimen signature of voter
–Other methods to challenge identity
off
icia
l bal
lots
• Pre-printed names of candidates
• 300 candidates can be accommodated– 150 names per side
of ballot
Paraan ng Pagboto (Voting Process)
2Gamit ang marker, itiman o i-shade ng buo ang bilog na nasa tabi ng pangalan ng inyong mga napiling kandidato.
Off
icia
l Bal
lots
• Ovals opposite names of candidate
• Shade oval opposite name of chosen candidate
Tamang Paraan ng Pag-shade sa balota. (Correct way of shading a ballot)
|
COkay!
pco
s (pre
cin
ct c
ou
nt o
pti
cal s
can
)• One unit per clustered precinct• Voter personally feeds ballot into machine• Ballot can be fed at any orientation• Ballot scanned both sides simultaneously
CAN FAKE BALLOTS BE FED INTO THE PCOS?
• No. The ballots contain several security features thateliminate fraud. Ballots flagged by the machine asinvalidwillbereturnedandwillnotbecounted.
Note: As per COMELEC we won’t utilize the BallotDiversionSlot andtheballot boxwon’thavedifferentcompartments.
WHAT ARE THE SECURITY FEATURES OF THE BALLOT?
• PositionIdentifiers/Markers: Onallsidesoftheballotarepositionidentifiers,whoseintersectionpointswouldindicatetheplacementofanoval.Thisallowsthesystemtoaccuratelylocatethepositionofamark,andevaluateitaccordingly.
• BarCode. Eachballothasauniquebarcode. Thismakessurethateachballot is countedonly once, andat the canvassing level, canidentify thedetails of theballot (theprecinct it wascastedin, themachinethatevaluatedtheballot,etc.
• UVInk: EachballotisalsomarkedwithaUVink,whichisnotreadilyapparent oncasual scrutiny. Thismarkisvisibletothespecial lensand light of the AutomatedCountingMachine, whichverifies firstthepresenceoftheUVinkbeforecastingavote.
WHAT SHALL VOTERS USE TO MARK THEIR BALLOTS?
• COMELEC / SMARTMATIC-TIMwouldbeprovidingspecial ballotmarkers to each precinct, which will be used for the votingprocess. The Automated Counting Machine can accommodatepencil marks, but for reasons of securingtheprocess (as pencilmarkscanbeerasedandreplaced),blackmarkerswillbeused.
NOTE:Pencilmarksareeditable,andthereforenotrecommended.Inan extreme case where marks are maliciously edited after theballotshavebeencasted,countedandtransmitted,andanaudittakesplace, thiscouldleadtoalotofsuspicionandconfusionintheprocess.
pco
s (p
reci
nct
co
un
t op
tica
l sca
n)
Ballots go in here …
… and get dropped into the ballot box thru
this chute …
pco
s (p
reci
nct
co
un
t op
tica
l sca
n)
… and there they are. :)
cou
nti
ng
• At close of polls– Perform close
function• To prevent
additional ballots from being inserted
– After close function, PCOS automatically• Starts counting
process• Prints election
returns after completion of automated count
– Eight (8) copies
can
vass
ing
/co
nso
lidat
ion
• Electronically transmitted results–Used as basis for canvassing/consolidation and
proclamation of winning candidates for• City/municipal officials• Provincial officials• Members, House of Representatives• Senators and Party-list
–Congress will also receive electronically transmitted results• Constitution authorized the Congress to promulgate
rules for canvassing of results for President and Vice-President
cou
nti
ng
• Insert transmission cable–After printing first eight (8) copies of ER
• To eliminate doubts that the PCOS can be manipulated remotely
• Perform electronic transmission function• Print additional twenty-two (22) copies of ER
– Automatically performed by PCOS after completion of transmission
HOW WILL THE ELECTION RETURNS BE TRANSMITTED?
• TheBEIthenconnectstheTransmissiondevicetothePCOSviatheEthernetport.TheAutomatedCountingMachines isonly “connected” onceattheendofthevotingday,andthendisconnectedaftertransmission.
• Thetransmissionprocesstakeslessthan2minutes/designation.
• Asinthemanualprocess,theresultsfromtheprecinctswillbetransmittedtotheMunicipalCanvassingServer/Station.
• The municipal canvassing server canvasses all the results fromthe precinctsunder its jurisdiction. Onceall theresultsarecanvassed, theMBOC(MunicipalBoard of Canvassers) can generate and print out the Municipal Certificate ofCanvassaswellastheStatementofVotes.Thisprocessisrepeated,transmittingthe results and printing the necessary reports in the Provincial and NationalCanvassingStations.
HOW SURE ARE WE THAT RESULTS CANNOT BE INTERCEPTED AND ALTERED DURING TRANSMISSION?
• PriortotransmittingtheElectionReturns,thePCOSdigitallysignsthefilesusingtheSHA256algorithmandencryptsthemusingtheAES128algorithm.
• This encryptionlevel is as good, if not better than mostonlinebanking transactions, which are “connected” 24 hours a day,sevendaysaweek.
• Bycontrast, theAutomatedCountingMachinesisconnectedonlyattheendofthevotingday,onlyfortheshortperiodneededtosend the information. This makes therisk of “hacking”virtuallyimpossible.
Municipal/City Board of
Canvassers
Provincial Board of
Canvassers
National Board of Canvassers
Congress COMELEC
PrecinctElection Returns
Mun./City COC
SOVP
Prov. COC
SOVM/C
Physical transport
Physical transport
Physical transport
Manual System of Canvassing
Municipal/City Board of
Canvassers
Provincial Board of
Canvassers
National Board of Canvassers
Congress COMELEC
Precinct
Physical transport
Physical transport
Physical transport
Electronic Transmission
ComelecCentral Back-up Server
Advance Results/
Monitoring
Server for Dominant Majority/ Minority
Parties, Citizens Arm, KBP
Advance Results
Secured Public
Website
Election Returns
Mun./City COC
SOVP
Prov. COC
SOVM/C
secu
rity
• Security measures under a manual election system still applicable
• Strengthen security through automation–Password–PIN–Digital signatures–Encryption
secu
rity
(12
8-bit
en
cryp
tio
n)
2• 2 = 4• 2 = 8• 2 = 16• 2 = 32• 2 = 64• 2 = 128• 2 = 256
128
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
• 2 = 512• 2 = 1024• 2 = 2048• 2 = 4096• 2 = 8192• 2 = 16,384• 2 = 32,768
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
• 2 = 65,536• 2 = 131,072• 2 = 262,144• 2 = 524,288• 2 = 1,048,576• 2 = 2,097,152• 2 = 4,194,304
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
• 2 = 137,438,953,472• 2 = 274,877,906,944• 2 = 549,755,813,888• 2 = over One Trillion combinations• 2128= 340 undecillion, 282 decillion, 366 nonillion,
920 octillion, 938 septillion, 463 sextillion, 463 quintillion, 374 quadrillion, 607 trillion, 431 billion, 768 million, 211 thousand and 456
37
38
39
40
secu
rity
(12
8-bit
en
cryp
tio
n)
340,282,366,920,938,463,463,374,607,431,768,211,456
• 128-bit encryption–Same security system used by banks
• Random Encryption–Temperature of machine–Voltage–Unique machine identity–User identity
• No single/master decryption code
secu
rity
• Time needed to decrypt one precinct result will be same amount of time needed to decrypt next precinct result
• Transmission takes at most 2 minutes• Copies for distribution
–30 copies of election returns at the precinct level–30 copies of certificate of canvass at municipal
level–14 copies of certificate of canvass at provincial
level
secu
rity
• Audit Log– Activities– Time– Date
secu
rity
IS THERE ANY ASSURANCE THAT THE HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE THAT THE AES WILL USE ARE SAFE AND SECURE?
• Yes.• Security andsystemintegrityare overriding
concerns before, during, and after theelections.
A. PRE-ELECTIONS• Source-CodeAudits–Thesystemwillundergothenecessarysource-codeaudits
(by an Independent International Source Code Auditor, political parties andinterestedparties)asprescribedbylaw.
• Testing – Before the Automated Counting Machines are deployed for theelections, the technology will be tested and certified by the DOST and willundergo2-3FieldTeststofine-tunethesystem,andaMockElectiontosimulatetheactualconditionsintheelections.
• Pre-SealingEvent–ThreedaysbeforetheElections,alltheAutomatedCountingMachines will have been deployed to all the voting centers throughout thecountry.DuringthePre-SealingEvent, theBEIs, witnessedbytheWatchersandrepresentativesof thepolitical parties involved, will test the systemandmakesurethatthetechnologywillfunctionasexpected.
B. DURING • Accessing the System– The BEIs access the administrative menu of the systemby
positioningtheSecurityKeyonthecontactpointfirmly.TheBEIwouldthenbeshownanewpageintheTouchScreenpanel---theAdministrativeMenu.
– Openingof theElections–ToopentheElections, theBEI wouldpress theSTARTbutton on the touch screen. The systemwould then prompt the BEIs for twopasswords succcession. Upon opening, the systemwould automatically print theZEROVOTEDOCUMENT.
– ZEROVOTEDOCUMENT- ThisreportisbasicallyanERshowingzerovotesforeachcandidate ineachcontest. This is the automatedversionof publicly inverting theballot box in themanual process, showing that the box has not been previouslystuffedwithvotes.ThereportwouldthenbesignedbytheBEIsandthewatchers.
• The Automated Counting Machines captures an image of each of the ballot cast.Furthermore,thatsameimagewouldbeappendedwithahuman-readablereportofhowtheAutomatedCountingMachines interpretedthemarks. Incasesof recounts,wecanreviewtheballotimages,andseeataglancehowthemarkswereevaluated.
WHAT HAPPENS IF A VOTER SELECTS LESS CANDIDATES THAN EXPECTED?
• It’s called an under-Vote. Under-votes are validvotes, and will be interpreted by the systemaccordingly. For example, for a contest where thevoter can select a maximum of 12 candidates,choosing a number of candidates less than theexpected12isstillvalidandwillbecounted.
WHAT HAPPENS IF A VOTER SELECT MORE CANDIDATES THAN EXPECTED?
• It’s called an over-vote. The systemwill not acceptover-votingforanycontest.Shouldtherebeaninstanceof over-vote for a particular contest (for example,voting for 2candidates in thePresident contest), thatcontest will not be counted. However, the othercontestswouldstillbeevaluatedandcounted,providedthatthosecontestswerenotover-votedin.
IN CASE OF MASSIVE BLACKOUTS ON MAY 10, COULD IT LEAD TO FAILURE OF ELECTIONS?
• NO. TheDepartmentof EnergycanandshouldprioritizeMay10,2010 NationalElections.
• Therearealwaysportablegeneratorsprovidedbythepollwatchers,politicalparties,amongothersduringelections.
• Comelec'sserviceprovider,Smartmatic-TIM, is requiredtohave12hourback-upbatteries. Sparesarealsoavailableatstrategiclocationsfromitstechnicalsupportstaff.
• The machines are essentially laptops which require lowpowerconsumptionand whichcaneasilybeconnectedtoa variety of power sources including rechargeablebatteries,invertersandportablegenerators.
• Rechargeablebatteriesarereadilyavailable incommercialretailstoresnationwide.
• TELCOs have, as standard practice, 2 standby powergeneratorsetsintheirstations/facilities.
• SO MANY ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF POWER. POWERFAILUREWILLNEVERLEADTOELECTIONFAILURE.
THERE MIGHT NOT BE ENOUGH TIME TO ACCOMMODATE ALL VOTERS. COULD THIS LEAD TO MASSIVE DISENFRANCHISEMENT?
• NO. AES process is actually shorter. No ballot serialnumbers to log and perforate. No going throughseveral pages of candidate list. Candidates are listedalphabetically,easytochoose.
Illiteratesdon’thavetowriteanything– they just shadeovals.
JUST HOW LONG DOES IT TAKE TO CAST A BALLOT? HOW MANY BALLOTS CAN THE PCOS PROCESS IN 11 HOURS?
• Based on informal Comelec time-and-motion study, it takes anaverageof 8secondsforacompleteballotcastingcycle.
• Evenif wedoublethisnumberanduse15secondsasanestimateforasingleballottobecast;
• 15secondsperballotcast =Fourballotscastperminute;
• At50%machineutilization, this is reducedtotwoballotscast perminute;
• Twoballotscastperminute = 120ballotscastperhour;
• 120ballotscastperhourfor11hours = 1,320ballotscastfortheentireElectionDay; and
• Assuming 100% voter turnout, the PCOS machine can cast onElectionDayis1,320ballots
WHERE WILL COMELEC/SMARTMATIC-TIM FIND THE 50,000 IT TECHNICIANS IT NEEDS FOR ELECTION DAY?
• The ICT industry associations have volunteered to join efforts to assistCOMELECinthedeploymentofITtechniciansnationwide.
• InstituteofElectronicsCommunicationsEngineersof thePhilippines(IECEP)the Philippine Electronics and Telecommunications Federation (PETEF), thePhilippineComputerSociety(PCS), theInformationSystemsSecuritySocietyof thePhilippines(ISSSP), theChief InformationOfficersForum(CIOForum)fromallgovernmentITdepartments,andothers.
• Likewise, PPCRV, NAMFREL, CER, schools, universitiesarealsobeingtappedto assist by providing their graduating students in the IT, science andengineeringfield.
• THERE IS NOSHORTAGE OF FILIPINOSWHO WOULD LIKE TO BE PART OFHISTORY. THERE WILL BE ENOUGH ITTECHNICIANS ON THE GROUND TOENSURESUCCESSOFTHE AUTOMATEDPOLLS.
WHAT IF THERE IS NO SIGNAL TO TRANSMIT THE RESULTS?
• COMELECenbanchadcreatedaTechnicalWorkingGroupfor Transmission composed of representatives from theNational Telecommunications Commission (NTC),Telecommunications Office (TELOF),the telecommunications carriers PLDT/Smart,Globe/Innove, Digitel/Sun including the provincialtelephonecompaniesandthecableTV internetproviders.
• Thisassures therewillbeinternetaccessfromatleast2to3carriersperpollingprecinctnationwide.
• Intheremoteislandprecinctswherethecarriersmayfinddifficulty inextendingtheir servicecoverageandas back-up,mobilesatellitetechnologywillbeused.
• It isexpectedthattheseremoteislandprecinctswill coverless than 1%of the 40k polling centers with an averagevotingpopulationof 200to400per clusteredprecinct, atotalofapproximately200kvotes.
• With the multiple redundancies and servers at themunicipal,provincialandnationallevelsincludingaserverfor media and the political parties and watchdogs, asystemlossishighlyimprobable.
CAN DAGDAG-BAWAS STILL OCCUR?
• No. The counting, canvassing and proclamationprocessforthe2010NationalandLocalElectionswillbecompletelyautomated.ThereisabsolutelyNOHUMANINTERVENTION. Nomore roomformistakesandfraud.
WHAT ABOUT THE FLYING VOTERS?
• Asmentioned,registrationandauthenticationofvotersis outside the scope of the Automation Project.However, the technology can limit the instances offlying voting, as each and every clustered precinct’scorresponding number of voters is programmed intothevotingmachinetobeused.Therefore,forexample,aprecincthas453voters(includingtheBEIs),thevotingmachinedeployedtherewouldonlyaccept453castedvotes.
WHAT HAPPENS IF A VOTER MAKES A MISTAKE?
• Currently, theCOMELEC is considering giving theBEIsthe authority to issue replacement ballots in certaincases, under their discretion (if the voter makes anhonestmistake, forexample). Thefinalpolicywillbedetermined by the COMELEC. However, we shouldhighlight the importance of conducting a very goodVoter Education Campaign. Voters should beencouragedtoprepareacodigobeforehand.
WHAT HAPPENS IF A BEI LOSES HIS KEY?
• The technicians at the municipal level will encrypt anewkeytoreplacethemissing one. Theoldkeywillbe disabled and can no longer be used foranymachine.
HOW MANY SPARE KEYS WILL BE PRODUCED?
• Thedistributionisdoneaccordingtothenumberofprecincts inthemunicipality; thosewithmorePCOSgetmoresparekeys. Thecomputationwillbe done when final POP (Project of Precincts)becomesavailable.
DOES THE PCOS PRODUCE RECEIPTS SHOWING THE SELECTIONS THE VOTER MADE, AS AN AUDIT TRAIL?
• No.ThethermalprinterisusedtoprintouttheElectionReturnsandother reports. Theballots themselvesarethepaperaudittrail.Forpurposeofauditsorrecounts,wecouldcomparetheballotsintheballotboxwiththeresults intheERandwiththeballot images storedinthe machine. The thermal paper to be used for theelections will be manufacturer guaranteed to last atleast5yearsinoptimumconditions.
• NOTE: Receipts generated by the systemuponeachvote, tobekept by thevoter,would be against some basic aspects ofElections: voter-anonymity and vote-secrecy.
• AT WHAT LEVEL WILL THE SERVERS ASSIGNED FOR THE WATCHDOGS AND
THE MEDIA RECEIVE THE ELECTION RESULTS? WILL THIS BE FROM THE PRECINCT OR FROM THE NATIONAL
LEVEL?
• Itwillbedoneattheprecinctlevel.TheBEIshallexecuteacommandto:
• -ElectronicallytransmittheER,togetherwiththeprecinct’sstatisticalreportandthePCOSunit’sauditlogreporttothefollowingdestinations:
-city/municipalBOC; provincialBOC;-NBOCsofCOMELECandCongress;-Dominantmajorityparty,Dominantminorityparty;-Accreditedcitizens’arm,andKBP;and-Centralserver.
CAN MALICIOUS ENTITIES INSERT A VIRUS INTO THE PCOS?
• No.Firstofall,physicalaccesstothesystemislimitedto2memory cardslots, whichwill be securedusing a seriallylabeledlock.Theselockswouldprevent,ormakeitobviousthat themachine has been tamperedwith. Furthermore,theOperatingSystemusedinthePCOSisLinux,whichasaplatformisverysecure, employingaccesscontrols tolimitthe activities of profiles. This Operating Systemenvironment will not tolerate the presence of virus andmalware, or at the very least, prevent such maliciousprogrammingfromrunning.
HOW SOON WILL THE WINNERS BE DETERMINED?
• Based on experience, 90% of results would arrivebetween4to6hours after thecloseof polls. Factorsthat maydelay theprocess aredelays in transmissionduetonetworkunavailabilityandtheneedtoundergocontingency procedures (contingency transmissionsystem).Furthermore,notallpollingplacesarereadytoattheexactclosingtime,dependingonvoterpresenceandaccommodationofvotersbeyondtheclosingtime,asprescribedbylaw.
CAN A FAILURE OF ELECTIONS HAPPEN?
• NO. It isnotpossible.Asthevoterswill still bevotingusingpaper(it is stilla“paper-based”elections), thereis nochanceof failureof elections. Shouldthevotingmachines, despiteall theprecautionsandcontingencyprocedures inplace,still fail intheprecinct, thevoterscan still resort to “manual” elections --- using theballots.Theholdingofelectionsarenotdependentand“held hostage” by the performance of the votingmachines.
succ
essf
ul i
mp
lem
enta
tio
n
• Vigilance of citizenry• Cooperation• Coordination• Support
Salamat po!