Atlantic Voices Vol. 3 No. 4
-
Upload
atlantic-treaty-association -
Category
Documents
-
view
228 -
download
0
description
Transcript of Atlantic Voices Vol. 3 No. 4
ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 4 1
Volume 3 - Issue 4 April 2013
Contents:
After Pandora’s Box: Implications of Misgovernance and Contest-
ed Governance in Syria, and What this Means for NATO
Michael Clark and Renad Mansour examine the threat to Middle Eastern and global security
as a consequence of misgoverance in Syria, particularly in the Kurdish regions in the north of
the country. By drawing from similar scenarios in Mali and Libya, they also explore the po-
tential for unrest in Syria to jeopardize transatlantic security.
The Concept of Ungoverned Spaces: Development and
Perspectives
Ilija Djugumanov and Marko Pankovski explore the concept surrounding the term
“ungoverned spaces” and how these areas have become a paramount concern to transatlantic
security in the modern world. Their analysis bears implications for the future of NATO poli-
cy as they examine the various factors contributing to a lack of security in areas around the
world.
Ungoverned Spaces The Threat That Draws Us In
As conflict continues to proliferate across
the Middle East and North Africa, the question
of how to secure ungoverned spaces becomes
increasingly pressing for the future of the
transatlantic community. Mali and Syria pre-
sent just two of the most recent examples of
how ungoverned spaces can become hotbeds
of extremism that lead to widespread instabil-
ity and state failure, posing a direct threat to
Europe and its surrounding partners.
Ungoverned spaces are not a phenomenon
exclusively outside of Europe, and are often
used as a weapon against NATO and its Al-
lies. Such cases necessitate an examination as
to how these spaces remain ungoverned, often
controlled instead by separatist or even terror-
ist forces.
For transatlantic security to remain stable,
it is essential that NATO address these spaces
as part of its future agenda. Since ungoverned
spaces are often the precondition for conflict
that prompts NATO intervention, NATO
must do what it can to address these threats
before they overwhelm the Alliance and its
Partners. –Matt Bowers
Mali rebels have successfully seized much of the ungoverned territory in the north of the country (Photo: The New York Times)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 4 2
By Michael Clark & Renad Mansour
S ince the first stirrings of protest on 15 March 2011,
the domestic situation in Syria has deteriorated cata-
strophically, with street-
level demonstrations swiftly develop-
ing into overt, armed insurrection,
and with rebellion in certain quarters
escalating to full-blown civil war.
Vast swathes of the country now lie
well outside Damascus’s sphere of
influence; much of the polity has
disintegrated into spaces of weak or
contested governance. While the
exact number of internally displaced
persons is unknown, as of March
2013 over 1 million Syrians had been
forced to flee to neighbouring states.1
In bordering Iraq, Lebanon, Israel,
Jordan and Turkey, there is a risk of
contagion. Since the Syrian Civil War
involves Sunnis, Shi’ites, Kurds,
Christians, and a host of smaller mi-
nority groups, it remains a potential
powder keg at the heart of the re-
gion.
This article analyses the actual and potential ramifica-
tions of the Syrian Civil War for NATO, with particular re-
gard to the notion of ungoverned spaces, or rather spaces of
contested governance and misgovernance. In addition to pre-
senting the issues that such spaces inside Syria pose for the
alliance’s members, this article seeks to address the matter of
contested governance proliferation throughout the Middle
East to assess what this might mean for NATO and suggest
how consideration of these issues might inform future NATO
decision-making. Ultimately, an increased recognition and
awareness of incidences of contested governance and misgov-
ernance, improved information about such incidences, and
the modelling of potential outcomes based on accumulated
data all provide a sound basis for a swift and adaptable NATO
response when alliance members are drawn in.
As has been noted else-
where, the notion of
“ungoverned areas” as spaces
completely lacking in govern-
ance is unsound.2 Areas labelled
as “ungoverned” (in which for-
mal, strong governance has
disintegrated or was never pre-
sent) are in fact better concep-
tualised as alternatively gov-
erned, under-governed, mis-
governed, or of contested gov-
ernance. Localised or informal
governance structures, relying
on substratum tribal rules,
norms, laws and customs, al-
ways emerge. Truly Hobbesian
anarchy is hard to find. This
article focuses primarily on two
types of “ungoverned” spaces that
are of particular relevance to the
Syrian Civil War and to the transatlantic alliance, namely
areas of contested governance and misgovernance.
Defining Contested Governance and
Misgovernance
Given the rarity of absolutely “ungoverned” spaces,
our concern and focus is better directed to those spaces
where state governance structures have been subordinated,
either voluntarily or involuntarily, to other actors.3 Where
control over and performance of governance functions are
ceded voluntarily, we are perhaps better served by talking of
misgovernance, while contested governance would imply an
involuntary surrender of these capacities.
After Pandora's Box Implications of Misgovernance and Contested Governance
in Syria, and What this Means for NATO
Assad’s decline has led to an enormous power vacuum in the
misgoverned regions of Syria (Photo: Reuters)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 4 3
Many Syrian provinces are now areas of contested govern-
ance, zones in which civil conflict impedes the state in its perfor-
mance of its governance functions. In contested areas, the govern-
ance functions normally provided by the state are instead fulfilled
by other actors. This may represent control over the space when
these other actors dominate the provision of security or certain
levels of governance when these other actors provide education,
social services, or assume responsibility for infrastructure.4 Thus,
in areas of contested governance, the state competes with other
actors in the performance of governance functions, while other
actors often compete between themselves.
As has been argued elsewhere,
there is also the possibility that the state
deliberately cedes or ‘softens’ sovereignty
over a given space in order to serve its
interests.5 Such spaces, for example Syrian Kurdistan, are better
described as misgoverned. Here, the state implements its govern-
ance in a manner that, deliberately or not, provides freedom of
action to other actors.6 In the case of Syrian Kurdistan, the Assad
regime's policy of misgovernance has increased the room to ma-
noeuvre for the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and other Kurd-
ish groups in the Kurdistan National Council (KNC). This is a
deliberate act, for reasons that will be outlined below.
In the following section, the problematic issues of contest-
ed governance and misgovernance in Syria will be addressed along
with the implications for NATO, before the threat of contagion
and its ramifications for NATO are assessed in the subsequent
section.
Competing for Governance
In early 2012, a Syrian friend of the authors, Nazir7, decid-
ed to leave his family home in Idlib province, northern Syria, and
seek a future in Lebanon. By early 2013, his visa had expired and
he was obligated to return to his homeland. As he had not yet
completed his military service, he is due to be called up on his
return. Nazir now faces a terrible dilemma. If he refuses to fulfil
his duty of military service, he will be a deserter; in today's Syria,
'deserter' is synonymous with 'rebel'. On the other hand, if he
fulfils his duty, he might shortly be involved in the bloody scenes
being reported around the world. Either choice has potentially
fatal implications for his family, because Idlib province is an area
of contested governance.
Idlib province is a hotspot of the Syrian Civil War.
Hilltops, towns and villages have been repeatedly taken and
lost by both sides in the conflict, although as of early 2013, the
rebels appear to have made and consolidated major advances.
His family, previously on good terms with the representatives
of the regime in the local town, has already suffered from the
success of the rebels, having been stripped of land and build-
ings. With the governance of the area contested, Nazir's pre-
dicament becomes impossible; his decision-making is impaired
by the complexity and uncertainty of the situation and the con-
sequent unpredictability of where govern-
ance will lie, either in the short- or long-
term. Nazir is caught in a Catch-22.
It has been astutely observed that,
in reference to the issue of ungoverned
spaces, the fundamental questions are – or
should be – more about the mode of governance than its ex-
tent; that is to say, the core questions are who is governing, how
are they governing, and what are the consequences of this mode
of governance?8 Such a perspective has been upheld,9 particu-
larly in regard to the establishment of “safe havens.”10 In the
case of spaces of contested governance, this core problem - how
the space is governed and by whom – takes on added signifi-
cance. By definition, in such areas it is frequently unclear who
is governing; often, even when the identity of the dominant
actor is established, the manner in which governance is being
implemented and its consequences remain opaque.
There are thus two fundamental issues for NATO with
respect to spaces of contested governance. The first is the po-
tential for a space to be governed in a manner that provides a
“safe haven” to groups seeking to harm member states, or in-
deed when a space is ceded to such a group. The second con-
cerns the uncertainty over who is accountable within a given
area. Linked to this are issues of communication, diplomacy
and strategy.
The most pressing issue in Syria for the transatlantic
alliance concerns the potential for the establishment of so-
called ‘safe havens’. Safe havens are areas in which ‘illicit’ ac-
tors are able to establish themselves, consolidate, plan, organ-
ize, fundraise, recruit, train, and operate.11 ‘Illicit’ actors refer
to those groups harbouring hostile intentions towards any
NATO member state, as was the case for al-Qaeda
The most pressing issue in Syria for the transatlantic alliance concerns the po-
tential for the establishment of so-called ‘safe havens’
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 4 4
in Afghanistan. More recently, we have seen contested
spaces develop into ‘safe havens’ for al-Qaeda in the Is-
lamic Maghreb (AQIM) in northern Mali, as well as al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen.
It has been contended that the concept of
‘ungoverned’ ‘safe havens’ is somewhat self-
contradictory, in the sense that such chaotic milieus are as
problematic for illicit actors as for any other actor.12 This
notion notwithstanding, in Syria, the phenomenon is one
of contested governance, rather than 'ungovernance’.
However, it remains the case that, whether spaces are
governed in a manner that provides a “safe haven” to illicit
actors, or are actually ceded to such a group, the estab-
lishment of a “safe haven” requires support from both local
power brokers and the local populace. Indeed, the most
robust, resilient, and, therefore, threatening partnerships
are to be found where there are ethnic, linguistic, cultural
and/or political ties and similarities between the group
and the surrounding population.13
Given the reportedly augmenting success of Jabhat
al-Nusra, a faction of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)14, in Syria,
and consequently its cementing dominance over swathes
of territory, there is
initial cause for con-
cern. There remains
an apparently strong
level of support from
within the local popu-
lation15, and a genuine
potential for areas
under its governance
to be either directly
subordinated to AQI
control or at least to
harbour and sustain
AQ-oriented groups espousing sentiments hostile to
NATO member states. Effectively, if control and perfor-
mance of governance functions in parts of Syria are ceded
to organisations like Jabhat al-Nusra, there is a real risk
that a situation analogous to that in Afghanistan that bred
the 9/11 attacks will arise.
It is at this point that the second issue, namely uncer-
tainty over accountability, must be addressed. The problem
with spaces of contested governance is that, in the event of a
hostile act (for example a rocket attack on Turkey or a suicide
bombing of the embassy of a NATO member state), it is not
immediately clear who bears responsibility. Where and to
whom must communication be directed? This problem is
amplified when the contest over governance is not restricted
to government and rebels, but is taking place even between
sub-state actors–a real possibility in Syria given the evident
disagreements between Jabhat al-Nusra and the secular oppo-
sition over visions for the future. Not only does uncertainty
over the source of governance impede effective diplomacy,
but it also has certain strategic ramifications. If an attack on a
NATO member state is launched from a space of contested
governance, the water is muddied as to possible courses of
action. Just as is the case for our friend Nazir, effective deci-
sion-making is impaired by the confusion of contested gov-
ernance.
Misgovernance as a Weapon
As previously defined, misgovernance can be used as a
deliberate political tool to challenge the stability and security
of the transatlantic members. Perhaps the single most devas-
tating incident on NATO
territory since the for-
mation of the organization
was the 9/11 attacks in
New York, Washington,
and Pennsylvania. Misgov-
ernance played a role in
this, insofar as the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan,
characterized by a relation-
ship between its leader,
Mullah Omar, and the lead-
er of AQ, Osama bin Laden.
The regime granted a part of its territory to AQ for opera-
tions and planning. When the Taliban effectively took control
of Jalalabad in the late 1990s, the group made the decision to
keep the al-Qaeda leadership, which had settled in Afghani-
stan since exile from Sudan in 1996, intact.
Bashar al-Assad’s decision to grant Syrian Kurds autonomy has invigorated the
pan-Kurdish movement (Photo: Today’s Zaman)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 4 5
Although the relationship between Mullah Omar and bin Lad-
en is often over-stressed, at the very least the two shared a
similar worldview and rejected American presence in Islamic
lands. This was further catalysed with the death of Mullah
Rabbani, who was an opponent, albeit a marginalized one, to
granting al-Qaeda sovereignty on Afghani territory. It was
Omar’s refusal to extradite bin Laden
following the 9/11 attacks that ulti-
mately triggered the US-led invasion
and crippled both parties. For Omar,
misgovernance was a political tool to
solidify his own standing within the Taliban and also to threat-
en regional (i.e. Iran, Iraq) and international (i.e. NATO
countries) ambitions that conflicted with Afghani national
interests. In this case, a transatlantic response was required,
directly drawing NATO into an armed conflict when the
United States invoked Article 5 of the Charter.
Another recent example of misgovernance as a weap-
on was when Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s granted the
Kurdish population autonomy over their areas along the bor-
der with Turkey. Since then, there has been a tacit agreement
between Assad and the Kurds of Syria, who are free to act as
long as they channel their opposition, politically and militari-
ly, against Ankara, not Damascus.16 Assad compromised a
portion of territory, not for benevolently considered minority
rights, but rather for a strategically calculated opportunity to
retaliate against Turkey’s support for the Syrian opposition.
The newfound autonomous region has invited the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (PKK) back into Syria.
A brief history explains this move. Abdullah Ocalan,
head of the PKK, fled Turkey in 1979 and established political
offices and military bases in Syria, where the group was able
to grow and menace Turkish stability by launching and plan-
ning attacks protected by their Syrian safe haven. Misgovern-
ance during this period ended when a peace deal, exiling
Ocalan from Syria, was signed between Ankara and Damascus
in 1998. As part of this bargain, the Ba’athist government
regained governance over its territory and the threat to Tur-
key was eradicated. Nonetheless, the decades-long presence
of a Turkish Kurd nationalist group in Syria galvanized its
own Kurdish population, who share close links with Turkish
Kurds, such as the Kirmanji dialect, historical trade and inter-
marriages. The Democratic Union Party (PYD) was thus es-
tablished as an off-shoot of the PKK in 2003, and Ocalan re-
mained the figurehead of this movement.
When Ankara decided to begin supporting the Syrian
opposition, militarily and financially,
Assad reverted to an unconventional but
effective weapon: misgovernance. That
is, a tit-for-tat retaliation against Tur-
key’s destabilizing support for the Free
Syrian Army by reestablishing PKK bases
in Syria vis-à-vis the newfound autonomy granted to groups
like the PYD. Indeed, as soon as the central government re-
treated from the al-Jazira province and cities like Qamishli (al
-Hasakah), PKK flags and portraits of Ocalan re-emerged.
Now that the Syrian Kurds have had their first feel of
autonomy, they have successfully repelled both government
and Free Syrian Army (FSA) troops from entering their terri-
tory. This stint of misgovernance has increasingly become
irreversible, in that the Kurds of Syria have become an estab-
lished regional player almost overnight, striking at Ankara’a
traditional pan-Kurdish anxieties. Abdul Basit-Sieda, a Syrian
Kurd and the head of the Syrian National Council at the time,
stated that the onus is now on Turkey to “go further and
move forward” on the Kurdish issue.17 The danger lies here.
Turkey has been forced to address its own Kurdish minority
problem, not on its own terms, but rather, as a consequence
of the destabilizing effect that Syrian Kurd autonomy has had.
In other words, Ankara has been drawn into addressing issues
stemming from misgovernance. “What’s the difference if
Assad goes?” questioned head of the PYD’s External Rela-
tions, Alan Semo, who also expressed the group’s concerns
that the “Syrian opposition are already denying the Kurds, and
they are not even in power yet...there might be another civil
war, if the new regime does not respect the rights of the
Kurds.”18 This is when misgoverannce leads to contested gov-
ernance. The scope of this section, however, is to merely
suggest that the autonomy, which has been granted to Syrian
Kurds and has been a deliberate attack on Turkey’s sovereign-
ty and security, has opened a Pandora’s box to the point
that Ankara, and other transatlantic governments for that
Assad compromised a portion of territo-ry ... for a strategically calculated oppor-tunity to retaliate against Turkey’s sup-
port for the Syrian opposition.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 4 6
matter, will have to grow accustomed to Kurdish sovereigns
along the border.
The threat of misgovernance is often a result of antag-
onized relations, as the two examples above demonstrate.
However, it led to two very different trajectories. In the first
case, misgovernance resulted in a direct attack on a NATO
country. In the second
case, while a few skir-
mishes erupted initially,
Turkey was able to
neutralize the threat vis-
à-vis its relationship
with Iraqi Kurds. It
helped establish a Kur-
distan National Con-
gress, which incorpo-
rated the PYD along
with 15 other Syrian
Kurdish groups, which
convened in Erbil, Iraq
under Iraqi Kurdish President Massoud Barzani in January
2012. This was Turkey’s attempt to address the threat of
misgovernance in Syria. As a result, the PYD has condemned,
at least rhetorically, the use of violence by the PKK. Turkey,
on the other hand, has been drawn into negotiating a long-
term solution with its own Kurdish population. As part of
these talks, Ocalan has begun a process of calling off PKK
violence and Turkey is in the process of legitimizing the
Kurdish leadership.19
The Threat of Contagion
There is a threat of contagion throughout the Middle
East, stemming from spaces of contested governance. We
have already seen the first symptoms of contested governance
along the Iraqi border with Syria, where an attack on Syrian
soldiers seeking temporary respite in Iraq was coordinated
and implemented on both sides of the border.20 There is a risk
that such actions erode Iraq's control over its border region,
and opens the way for AQI to move in, establishing de facto
control over a cross-border zone, akin to the Taliban in cer-
tain areas in the Afghan-Pakistani borderlands. This risk is not
limited to Iraq; indeed, in bordering Lebanon, Jordan, Israel
and Turkey, there is a genuine potential that this trend may
be followed elsewhere. In particular, Lebanon gives cause for
concern; from the outset of the civil war, both the govern-
ment and the opposition have attempted to extend the con-
flict to Lebanon. We have seen skirmishes in Tripoli between
black-flagged Salafists and resident Alawites, and roadblocks
and escalating tensions in Sidon between local Salafists and
Hezbollah. Increasingly, Hezbollah fighters appear to be in-
volved in the conflict on
both sides of the border;
the party has stated that it
considers the stability of
Lebanon irrevocably tied
to the future of Syria.21
The potential for all-out
war between Jabhat al-
Nusra and Hezbollah,
should the former move
into an area that the latter
considers to be within its
sphere of operations, is
great. The porous border is already becoming a space of con-
tested governance; should the regime fall, this is likely to be
exacerbated.
Furthermore, there is a threat that the forces that have
established and consolidated themselves in spaces of contested
governance will go on to cause or take advantage of similar
conditions elsewhere in the wider Arab world (Mali, fighters
from Syria moving on after Iraq, Afghan, etc.). This is based
on precedent since weak governance and domestic unrest is a
recipe for global jihadist infiltration; witness the presence of
AQI, itself a product of the ability of AQ from Afghanistan
and elsewhere to infiltrate themselves into Iraq. It is not a
stretch of the imagination to suppose that AQS (al-Qaeda in
Syria) will move on to the next conflict zone in the Arab
world.
Contested governance may also spread through the
displacement of peoples; a de facto partition of Syria into areas
held by one or many opposition groups and areas remaining
loyal to the Ba'athist regime would conceivably see the move-
ment of Alawites and their allies to the coast or around Da-
mascus while Christians would likely relocate to Lebanon or
seek refugee status in Europe.
Jabhat al-Nusra poses a significant threat to Syrian and Mediterranean stability
(Photo: Christian Science Monitor)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 4 7
absence of viable options for pre-emptive action, NATO and its
member states must focus on improving their ability for rapid
response and adaptability to a range of different outcomes. Both
contested governance and misgovernance within a space must be
recognized as potential threats to alliance members.
Michael Clark is currently undertaking doctoral research at
the University of Cambridge, focusing on the formulation and
development of foreign policy towards the
Lebanese Hezbollah and the Iraqi al-Ahrar
Bloc. He has studied at the University of
Damascus and the American University of
Beirut.
Renad Mansour is a PhD Candidate in
Politics and International Relations at the University of Cam-
bridge and an Assistant Research Director at the Iraq Institute
for Strategic Studies (IIST) in Beirut, Lebanon. He has lived and
worked throughout the Middle East, including Iraq, Lebanon,
Syria, and Iran.
Bibliography
1“Press release: UNHCR Chief: Syria refugees reach one million” UNHCR. 5 March 2013. Accessed 6 March 2013.
2Robert Lamb, “Ungoverned areas and threats from safe havens: Final report of the ungov-erned areas project,” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (2008); Anne Clunan and Harold Trinkunas, “Ungoverned spaces? Alternatives to state authority in an era of softened sovereignty,” International Studies Association (2008); Stewart Patrick, “Are ‘ungoverned spaces’ a threat?” Council for Foreign Relations. 11 Jan. 2010. Accessed 1 Feb. 2013; Yvan Guichaoua, “Mali: The fallacy of ungoverned spaces” University of East Anglia. 12 Feb. 2013.
3Clunan & Trinkunas, 5.
4Lamb, 19.
5Clunan & Trinkunas, 14.
6Lamb, 19.
7For security and anonymity, we have given the pseudonym ‘Nazir’ to our Syrian friend.
8ibid., 20.
9Clunan & Trinkunas.
10Patrick, 5.
11Lamb, 15.
12Patrick, 2.
13ibid.
14“Press release: Terrorist designations of the al-Nusrah Front as an alias for al-Qa'ida in Iraq,” U.S. Department of State. 11 December 2012. Accessed 13 March 2013.
15See the demonstrations of support for Jabhat al-Nusra following the US designation of the group as a terrorist organisation and a faction of AQI, both at grass-roots level and by a number of other opposition groups.
16Escobar, Pepe, “Could a State for Greater Kurdistan be on the Horizon” Al Jazeera English. 02 November 2012. Accessed 2 November 2012.
17Author interview with Abdul Basit Sieda (24 August 2012).
18Author interview with Alan Semo (23 August 2012).
19AFP, “Jailed PKK Leader Confirms Ceasefire Call on Thursday,” Al-Arabiya English. 18 March 2013. Accessed 18 March 2013.
20Duraid Adnan and Rick Gladstone, “Massacre of Syrian soldiers in Iraq raises risk of widening conflict,” New York Times. 4 March 2013. Accessed 14 March 2013.
21Hezbollah, an-nas al-herufi lil-wathiqa as-siyasiya li-hezb Allah (Hezbollah, 2009), 130.
22“Nato forces needed in Mali, says AU's Thomas Boni Yayi,” BBC. 9 January 2013. Ac-cessed 13 March 2013.
Sovereignty and Governance in Mali
It is perhaps useful to consider Mali as a potentially
analogous precedent for Syria. As has been observed, civil con-
flict in northern Mali between the Bamako government and
Tuareg separatists (a situation of contested governance) pro-
voked the utilisation of misgovernance as a weapon by the gov-
ernment. The softening of sovereignty and provision of space
to groups at odds with the separatists merely exacerbated the
contest over governance in the area. Events in Libya bolstered
the separatists, enabling them to massive-
ly enhance their recruitment capacity and
access to advanced weaponry, resulting in
their ability to launch an insurgent cam-
paign resulting in the seizure of large
swathes of the north of the country.
However, this only resulted in many of the vanquished groups
transferring allegiance to AQIM and retaking the disputed ter-
ritory. Ultimately, this drew in France, an alliance member.
At the time of writing, it is still unclear as to whether NATO
will eventually become involved in some way, depending on
the efficacy of the African Union mission.22
In certain senses, Mali could conceivably become a
repeat of pre-9/11 Afghanistan; cycles of contested govern-
ance and misgovernance spiralling until the effects are felt by
alliance members. The danger for NATO or many alliance
members is that Syria might follow suit.
Conclusion
Civil conflicts are, by definition, incidences of contest-
ed governance, and very often involve the usage of misgovern-
ance as a weapon; such alternative forms of governance in-
crease uncertainty over outcomes and thus reduce the poten-
tial for good decision-making, both for those individuals within
a given space and for external actors. As has been seen above,
there are a number of potential issues for the transatlantic alli-
ance inherent in contested governance and misgovernance. For
an external actor such as NATO, the adverse effect on decision
-making is cause for concern; it can only be counteracted by
vastly increased data collection, with particular respect to the
details on the ground, and by modelling as many potential
scenarios as possible. In a context of uncertainty, and in the
In certain senses, Mali could conceivably become a repeat of
pre-9/11 Afghanistan…
About the authors
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 4 8
taining its relations with internal or external actors. Thus,
the state has the exclusive position to legally exercise
force.
It is clear that the values of the modern state con-
cept are constantly changing and that some of them could
even be redefined. However, for the purpose of this arti-
cle, the aforementioned values will serve as the accepted
points of reference.
A t t h e
beginning of the
twentieth centu-
ry, states devel-
oped various
technologies to
exert their sover-
eignty across the
entirety of their
territory. Not
every state, how-
ever, employed
the benefits of
these advance-
ments, such as
surveillance abili-
ties.
The process of globalization brought about numer-
ous changes in international relations in regards to the sta-
tus and concept of the state, particularly after the Second
World War. Non-state actors such as transnational organi-
zations, nongovernmental organizations, and multinational
corporations emerged as new players in the international
sphere alongside states. These non-state organizations be-
gan to consolidate power and exert their influence on state
policy, in many cases questioning the traditional right of
state sovereignty over its territory and population. Some
organizations and multinational corporations often operate
with more resources than many developing countries com-
bined. This allows them to impact the flow of global fi-
nance, directly effecting people around the world and un-
By Ilija Djugumanov & Marko Pankovski
T he concept of modern statehood is characterized
by four main dimensions that have emerged over
time: territory, sovereignty, population and le-
gitimacy. The rise of the modern state as a dominant form
of organization in international relations consequently
shaped the interactions between these values. In different
stages of the development of the state concept, these val-
ues had different
meaning and signifi-
cance. Thus, states in
some periods lacked
the capability to man-
age all four compo-
nents at once, so those
that had larger territo-
ries and populations
struggled to exercise
sovereignty and legiti-
macy in the entirety of
their officially pro-
claimed state areas.
This was often the case
because states had no
mechanisms to be physically present throughout their ter-
ritories and therefore prioritized strategically important
areas, leaving other physical and nonphysical spaces largely
ungoverned at the state level for political reasons. As such,
these states would often collaborate with local power
structures, conceding some degree of their governance
over these areas. In such circumstances, states were forced
to carefully calculate which values of the state concept
should be most paramount in these areas.
Monopoly on the use of force presents another issue
that is critical to the modern state concept. Max Webber
developed this theory in the beginning of the twentieth
century as a basic characteristic which defines the state. In
order to preserve the aforementioned values, the state
must have physical strength in order to be capable of main-
Russian Peacekeepers in Transnistria (Photo: Timpul.md)
The Concept of Ungoverned Spaces Development and Perspectives
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 4 9
Simply put, “ungoverned spaces” are those spaces in
which the officially recognized institutions of the state can-
not exercise their full sovereignty. Commonly, the term
“ungoverned spaces” is understood to encompass govern-
ance in both the physical (territory, institutions) and non-
physical (cyberspace, banking) realms. In this article the
term “ungoverned space” will be used for a broader expla-
nation that includes both physical and nonphysical govern-
ance.
The first derivative of this term will be “ungoverned
areas”, according to the framework used by Robert D.
Lamb, while a second derivative, “safe haven”, will be used
to explain real and final situations of space for operational
activity. To this effect, Kennet J. Menkhaus adds that un-
governed spaces are not representative of anarchical socie-
ty and should not be regarded as such. Thus, Menkhaus
states that ungoverned spaces are characterized by their
hybrid systems of governance, which include various fac-
tors like traditional authorities’ combinations, customary
law, civic and religious
groups, business interests,
neighborhood watch groups,
private security forces, and
tribal self-defence units. An-
other concept that is im-
portant in this direction is the rise of mediated state ar-
rangements when authority is ceded to local unofficial ac-
tors.
In a briefing at the Portuguese National Defense
Institute in Lisbon, Teresa Whelan argues that ungoverned
spaces can be characterized by additional equally important
components: “competing governance”; “exploitation of
legal principles”; and an “opaque area of activity”. These
three concepts shed new light on how the policy makers
should categorize the ungoverned spaces and act accord-
ingly.
Furthermore, Lamb’s theoretical framework is es-
sential due to the significant contribution he made to the
way the concept of “ungoverned areas” are understood.
Lamb argues that there are almost no ungoverned areas,
but there are areas that are governed in a different way.
This distinction is important because it illustrates a new
non
dermining the position of state governance over sectors of
its territory and population.
The definition of state sovereignty changed signifi-
cantly with the end of the Cold War as new actors
emerged and influenced the creation of states that were
often divided, small, and fragile. Such was the case in the
countries that gained or restored their independence from
the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, whose
governments lacked the capabilities to address the needs of
their respective populations. These countries quickly en-
countered a rise of ethnic nationalism on the local level
which was incompatible with the concept of the previous
federation state. In this case, even though the physical
space was governed with the army and police forces, it
eventually became ungoverned and turned against the sov-
ereignty of the previously recognized state. Many of these
new states lacked the human and material resources to
govern the entirety of their territory. Thus, the interna-
tional community had to cope with various new security
concerns arising from the
fragility and turmoil within
these new, states. According
to Clunan and Trinkunas, this
resulted in a “major expan-
sion of the United Nations’
peacekeeping role, significant changes in the attitude of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) towards out-
of-area missions, and the mobilization of the transnational
civil society to address emerging and festering crises”.
The period after the Cold War allowed many non-
state actors the opportunity to infiltrate the physical and
nonphysical sovereignty of states. This included interna-
tional governmental and nongovernmental organizations,
as well as multinational enterprises. However, the empha-
sis in this article will be placed on ungoverned space which
is used by non-state actors in order to threaten national
and international security. The continued process of sof-
tening state sovereignty often results in a constant trans-
fer of power and resources to non-state actors. These ac-
tors are becoming serious threats to international security
as they routinely exploit fragile countries by undermining
their ability to govern their own territory and using this
space as a base from which to operate, recruit, settle and
orchestrate hostile activities.
“Ungoverned spaces” are those spaces in which the officially recognized institutions of the state cannot exercise their full sovereignty
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 4 10
non-government-centric perspective on the concept of
ungoverned spaces, and allows for many actors to contrib-
ute to the management of ungoverned space. This dimin-
ishes the uniqueness of states as a factor in discussion and
collaboration as new
factors come into
play. For practical,
legal, and diplomatic
reasons, Lamb still
proposes the state as
a main subject for
discussion when
dealing with ungov-
erned areas, but
suggests that some-
times it is useful to
avoid the state in
order to ascertain
more favorable re-
sults. This approach
is a vital lifeline
when the official state institutions have no capacity or will-
ingness to deal with the ungoverned areas in their own
borders.
Scholars have discussed various approaches regard-
ing collaboration with non-state actors. According to
Lamb, outside actors should practice collaboration with
the official authorities but this policy should not be used in
every situation. In this manner, Lamb recognizes dynamics
in which pursuing the government can be counterproduc-
tive and the efficiency in these scenarios of acting directly
with local or alternative authorities or factors. Conversely,
Whelan argues for a more state-oriented approach in terms
of the increased determination of the state to return to a
satisfactory level of sovereignty.
Another common characteristic of ungoverned
spaces is that they are often connected to “fragile” or
“failed” states. This notion can be discussed from two per-
spectives. One is the term “ungoverned space” as a syno-
nym for “safe haven” in the physical sense. If the term
“ungoverned space” is oriented to cover both physical and
nonphysical spaces, however, then it cannot be automati-
cally connected to a fragile or failed state since illicit activi-
ties such as illegal financial transactions and cyber warfare
are rarely connected to a specific state entity .
Considerations
Even though most concepts and methods of action
regarding the solution of the “ungoverned spaces” problem
are oriented towards
relationships with the
actors, it is necessary
to address alternative
concepts regarding
this obvious threat to
international securi-
ty.
Determining
what constitutes a
failed state is a criti-
cal feature in this
context. The concept
of ungoverned spaces
sees failed states from
a contemporary per-
spective rather than
exploring the reasons for this failure. When discussing the
ungoverned spaces concept and its relation to fragile and
failed states, a comprehensive analysis of why the state is in
such a condition is necessary. One important step towards
this goal is to abandon the western modern state perspec-
tive on the fragile and failed states. This will allow the in-
ternational community to better understand the ongoing
conditions in FFCS, which will be highly beneficial to poli-
cy makers. This analysis should cover all social, economic,
and political factors alongside security. Moreover, external
factors for state failure must be considered alongside inter-
nal ones. Interventions based on internal factors have failed
many times, and military involvement can easily lead to
spillover effects of violence in the broader region, naturally
resulting in new ungoverned areas. Accordingly, it is im-
portant to comprehensively research:
- The key factors of state failure;
- Contemporary formal and informal actors;
- Internal and external factors.
It is obvious that the numerous ungoverned spaces of the world pose a threat to international peace and secu-rity. Along with the aforementioned problems that arise in
Kosovo presents another case of an ungoverned space that the transatlantic community
must address (Photo: European Commission)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 4 11
application. The constant flux of the state convolutes the
meaning and scope of the term “ungoverned spaces”. Re-
cent works by some US Defence Department policy mak-
ers gave a sound theoretical basis for the term, which re-
sulted in additional publications on this subject. Even
though the meaning, level of coverage, and optimal usage
of the term vary from one
article to another, it is im-
portant that the concept of
“ungoverned areas” is start-
ing to take its own shape in
the focus of more and more
scholars and policy makers throughout the world.
Mr. Ilija Djugumanov is president of the Youth of the
Euro – Atlantic Council of Macedonia (YATA Macedonia)
and vice-president for Public Diplomacy of YATA Interna-
tional. He is now preparing his thesis at his MA studies on
International Relations – Conflict Resolution, at a program
by the University of Goteborg, Sweden.
Mr. Marko Pankovski holds a Bachelor of Arts in De-
fendology at the Institute for Security, Defence and Peace
at Ss. Cyril and Methodius University of Skopje.
Bibliography
H.H., Gerth, Mills C. Wright, and Weber Max, ed. s.v. "From Max Weber: essays in sociology." (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 77 Anne L. Cunnan and Harold. A. Trinkunas, “Conceptualizing Ungov-erned Spaces: Territorial Statehood, Contested Authority and Softened Sovereignty.” In Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authorities in an Era of Softened Sovereignty, edited by Anne L. Cunnan and Harold A. Trinkunas (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 22 Lamb, Robert D., “Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Havens”, Final report of Ungoverned Areas prepared for the Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, Department of Defence, Washington D.C., January 2008, 4-10 Menkhaus, Kenet J., “Constraints and Opportunities in Ungoverned Spaces.” In Denial of Sanctuary: Understanding Terrorist Safe Havens, edited by Michael A. Innes (Westport, Connecticut/London: Praeger Security International, 2007), 69-70 Whelan, Teresa, “African’s Ungoverned Space” (paper presented at the Portuguese National Defense Institute in Lisbon, Portugal, May 24, 2006), 66 Robert D. Lamb, “Ungoverned areas and Threats from Safe Havens”, Final report of Ungoverned Areas prepared for the Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, Department of Defence, Washington D.C., January 2008, 4 Whelan, Teresa, “African’s Ungoverned Space” (paper presented at the Portuguese National Defense Institute in Lisbon, Portugal, May 24, 2006), 66-67
dealing with ungoverned areas, one additional problem is
that such security concerns are not explicitly regulated
within the United Nations Charter. This situation allows
the included non-state actors to use the concept of equal
sovereignty of the states in the international order as a
shield for creating safe heavens. The slow pace of UN Se-
curity Council procedures often
serves to benefit these groups, as
they have time to change their
position as soon as some ungov-
erned space becomes a topic of
intervention discussions in the
UNSC. Furthermore, UNSC resolutions often allow only a
limited range of actions, which prevents the use of full
operational capabilities in order to successfully and effi-
ciently deal with threats arising from ungoverned areas. An
additional issue that arises here is the state-centric concept
of the UN resolutions, which proved impractical in the
case of Afghanistan when the participants in the ISAF mis-
sion had to operate on Pakistani territory, resulting in con-
cerns of the mission’s legality. Borderless threats present a
phenomenon that should be analyzed and integrated ac-
cordingly into international law. Dealing with such threats
often requires actions in two or more countries, which in
some cases can prove problematic in regards to the norms
of international law.
As aforementioned, ungoverned spaces cover physi-
cal and nonphysical aspects of sovereignty. Flows of fi-
nance and information cannot be strictly related to geo-
graphic and political values that result in additional chal-
lenges for the international actors to deal with. The gov-
ernance of this nonphysical space is even more interde-
pendent and is an obligation of every concerned national or
multinational actor. Governing these areas is almost equal-
ly as important as governing conventional physical areas.
Financial and informational flows and developments are
closely related to the development of hostile non-state
actors and the level of their operational capacities. The
capability to govern such nonphysical areas will largely
increase the chances of managing their actions on the
ground and influencing their development.
In conclusion, it should be stated that even though
ungoverned spaces and their relations with FCTS are rela-
tively old, the term “ungoverned spaces” is still fluid in its
About the authors
UNSC resolutions often allow only a limited range of actions, which prevents the use of full operational
capabilities in order to successfully and efficiently deal with threats arising from ungoverned areas
Atlantic Voices is the monthly publication of the Atlantic Treaty Associa-
tion. It aims to inform the debate on key issues that affect the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, its goals and its future. The work published in Atlantic
Voices is written by young professionals and researchers.
The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) is an international non-
governmental organization based in Brussels working to facilitate global
networks and the sharing of knowledge on transatlantic cooperation and
security. By convening political, diplomatic and military leaders with
academics, media representatives and young professionals, the ATA promotes
the values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty: Democracy, Freedom,
Liberty, Peace, Security and Rule of Law. The ATA membership extends to 37
countries from North America to the Caucasus throughout Europe. In 1996,
the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA) was created to specifially
include to the successor generation in our work.
Since 1954, the ATA has advanced the public’s knowledge and
understanding of the importance of joint efforts to transatlantic security
through its international programs, such as the Central and South Eastern
European Security Forum, the Ukraine Dialogue and its Educational Platform.
In 2011, the ATA adopted a new set of strategic goals that reflects the
constantly evolving dynamics of international cooperation. These goals include:
◊ the establishment of new and competitive programs on international
security issues.
◊ the development of research initiatives and security-related events for
its members.
◊ the expansion of ATA’s international network of experts to countries in
Northern Africa and Asia.
The ATA is realizing these goals through new programs, more policy
activism and greater emphasis on joint research initiatives.
These programs will also aid in the establishment of a network of
international policy experts and professionals engaged in a dialogue with
NATO.
The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association, its members, affiliates or staff.
Atlantic Voices is always seeking new material. If you are a young
researcher, subject expert or professional and feel you have a valu-
able contribution to make to the debate, then please get in touch.
We are looking for papers, essays, and book reviews on issues
of importance to the NATO Alliance.
For details of how to submit your work please see our website.
Further enquiries can also be directed to the ATA Secretariat at the
address listed below.
Images should not be reproduced without permission from sources listed, and re-main the sole property of those sources. Unless otherwise stated, all images are the property of NATO.
Editor: Jason Wiseman
ATA Programs
From 12-14 April, the Atlantic Council of Serbia sponsored a
regional seminar entitled “Write as You Speak and Read as it is
Written II” in Ruma. This was ACS’s second seminar for media
representatives from across the former Yugoslav republics, and
was put on with the support of the British Embassy in Serbia and
the cooperation of the NATO Military Liaison Office in Belgrade.
From 18-20 April,
the Slovak Atlantic
Commission sponsored
the Bratislava Global
Security Forum. The
conference was driven
by panel discussions on emerging international security challenges,
with a keynote address from Zbigniew Brzezinski.
The Danish Atlantic Youth Seminar (DAYS) will take place
from 5-11 July at Aalborg Air Base in Denmark. This year’s theme
is “Global Actors-Global Interests”, which will encompass topics
such as Syria, the Afghan exit, drones, NATO’s role post-
Afghanistan, Russia, and China.