I believe in Sherlock HolmesThe Case for Personhood

Daniel Gruszczynski ENGL 1102: Writing for Academic Contexts II

Professor WaldenMarch 30, 2014

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Introduction: A Study in Fiction

All good fiction dares the audience to question the truth by accepting a white lie. It is

self-deception, the suspension of disbelief, that opens the path to something more profound; it

helps us arrive at the essence of the human experience. This was my experience when watching

Sherlock, a BBC television series based on Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes canon.

During my observations of season three, I became captivated with the series and its devoted

fanbase. In particular, I began to wonder about the philosophical basis of fiction when characters

and fans alike rallied under the phrase “I believe in Sherlock Holmes”1. This profession of faith

towards the esteemed detective was both endearing and baffling. Was this genuine belief in the

realness of Holmes, or playful self-delusion? I was inclined to accept the latter explanation, but

then I noticed something strange. While I clearly did not believe that the contents of the Sherlock

world were in any way real, I wrote my observations of Sherlock Holmes and Dr. John Watson as

if they were physical, breathing people, and seeing their friendship develop on-screen seemed

like an example of life imitating art2. Was I engaging in self-delusion as well?

As I continued to mull over these thoughts, I had come to question the dichotomy of

reality and fiction itself. There seemed to be inconsistencies in how I and most other people talk

about and assert claims about fictional entities, and maybe, it was the dichotomy itself that

motivated these inconsistencies. Hence, I formulated two questions:

1. Daniel Gruszczynski, “Sherlock Observation Notes.” S3E1.2. Ibid., S3S2.

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(1) What qualities distinguish fictional characters, such as Sherlock Holmes, from “real” people?

(2) Why do we assume that there are fictional characters to begin with?

It soon occurred to me that these were very bold questions to ask, and finding a decent

answer that goes beyond conventional wisdom would be an arduous task. Nonetheless, I

approached this endeavor with intellectual curiosity and found myself trying to build a case to

establish the personhood of my favorite fictional character. Thus, the remainder of this paper will

explore the dialogue and positions regarding the status of fictional entities, addressing literature

from three perspectives that are, upon first glance, only tangentially related, and attempt to

provide a response that cohesively integrates these sources as answers to the above questions.

Without further ado, let us get started.

The Philosophy of Fiction Terms

Before we proceed with the literature review, I would like to give an overview of the

necessary philosophical terms and ideological positions regarding fiction. If you are already

familiar with these terms, go straight to the literature review. You can cross-reference these terms

from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy3 for more elaboration:

Metaphysics – for the purposes of this discussion, metaphysics is the study of the fundamental

concepts of being and nature; these concepts include: what does it mean to be, what is space and

time, how do we uniquely define and describe these terms, etc. This ultimately makes my first

question a metaphysical one.

3. Fred Kroon, and Alberto Voltolini. “Fiction.”

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Ontology – the study of existence; while related to metaphysics, we can think of ontology is

asking whether something exists or not. In contrast, metaphysics seeks to describe and explain

phenomena that philosophers believe exist (the what, how, and why questions). We can think of

my second question as an ontological inquiry on whether fictional characters exist.

Narrative Identity – the idea that individuals form their identity by constructing an internalized,

evolving story of the self from their life experiences; this gives the individual a sense of unity

and purpose

Fiction anti-realist – this is the stance that fictional characters do not exist; any and all

descriptions concerning fictional entities are in regards to the literal work that describes them

Fiction realist – this is the stance that fictional characters exist in some way or form. Note that

this is an umbrella term and some would object to grouping the following theories under one

label, but nonetheless, here are the specific positions:

• Platonism – fictional characters exist in every world as transcendent abstracta (they exist

independently in space and time)

• Possibilism – fictional characters do not exist in our world, but could exist in other

worlds consistent to the conditions and descriptions needed for said characters to

plausibly exist (called ontological datum)4

4. Jeffrey Goodman. “Where is Sherlock Holmes?”

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• Meinongianism – fictional characters occupy a third category of object; there are objects

that exist spatial-temporally, objects that do not, and objects that fit neither category. The

latter describes fictional characters, which have a general kind of 'being' insomuch as

they have basic characteristics

• Creationism – this is also an umbrella term, but it will suffice for our purposes. This

view posits that fictional characters are products of the human mind. A subset of

creationism is artifactual theory – fictional characters are abstract artifacts (intangible

things with a socially agreed meaning or set of characteristics) inextricably dependent on

those who create, evoke and perpetuate them

Literary Theory Terms:

Furthermore, we will need a few more terms pertaining to the analysis of the Sherlock

Holmes universe(s). The first set of terms come from Bartlett and Holland's “Theorizing the

Space of Literary Practices” 5:

Figured world - “large social environment with its own set of actors, artifacts, rules, and

conventions; it is the container for various discourse communities and provides structure for how

actors engage with one another.”6 I will employ this term liberally to mean both the fictional

world as well as the meta-world of its fans and audience.

Artifact – an item, object, emotion, or idea with a socially agreed meaning (or set of

characteristics)

5. Lesley Bartlett and Dorothy Holland. “Theorizing the Space of Literary Practice” , 10-14.6. Daniel Gruszczynski. “Sherlock Observation Notes”, 1.

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Discourse community – a group with a similar way of communicating and interacting

S herlock-specific terms:

Lastly, we will need Sherlock-specific vocabulary:

Holmesque – this term refers to the qualities that Doyle attributes to Sherlock Holmes; this

includes, but is not limited to: being a detective, living at 221B Baker Street, having an assistant

named Watson, etc.7

Sherlockian – a devout fan of the Holmes canon (part of a larger discourse community); this

individual actively invokes the tales through role-playing, discussions, fan-fiction, and a “belief”

in the feats of Holmes (whether that faith be literal or figurative is to be debated)8

naïve believer – an individual who believes that Sherlock Holmes is/was a real person

ironic believer – an individual who facetiously treats Sherlock Holmes as a real person for self-

satisfaction

The sources I will review fall into three distinct categories: (1) the philosophy of fiction

and narratives, (2) the legacy of the Sherlock Holmes canon, and (3) a psychological profile of

Holmes and his admirers. Each component will provide a set of observations that I will draw

upon to unite this multi-faceted issue and provide my conclusions regarding the personhood of

Sherlock Holmes.

7. David Liebesman. “Necessarily, Sherlock Holmes Is Not a Person”, 2.8. Vera Tobin. “Ways of reading Sherlock Holmes: the entrenchment of discourse blends.”

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The Philosophy of Fiction and Narratives

What is Fiction?

The question “What is fiction?” seems to be as old as fiction itself. Some of the earliest

inquiries into this topic date back to ancient Greece with Plato. Plato believed that fictional

characters and numbers exist independently from space and time, and thus exist in every possible

world. This view is called Platonism9. Few contemporary scholars hold this view.

Since Plato, philosophers and literary theorists have contributed to this debate by

introducing possibilism, Meinongianism, and creationism. Much of what surrounds this debate is

the notion that being and existence are distinct (as proposed by the Stoics). Philosopher David

Lewis (a possibilist) rejected this distinction (accepted by classical possibilists) on the grounds

that there is no specific ontological property that determines whether a being exists or not. He

uses the term actuality to describe relationships between spatial-temporal beings. However, in

the case of fictional characters, Lewis does not find a lack of actuality to be significant10. The

fact that Sherlock Holmes is not in my vicinity says nothing fundamental about his existence. In

contrast, those who accept Meinongianism treat Holmes as having a generic beingness with traits

from the canon (regardless of whether individual traits logically contradict other traits, which is

an issue for possibilists). Both possibilism and Meinongianism have moderate support among

scholars.

The most popular view among contemporary scholars is Thomasson's Artifactual theory.

Jeffrey Goodman explains that artifactual theory is the only fictional theory that accounts for

authorial intent11. Both Goodman12 and David Liebesman agree that our ability to discuss and

hold relatively consistent depictions of fictional characters means that they exist on some level

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(unlike the anti-realist stance) . Tim Button explores this issue called the operator or “spotty

scope” problem. Basically, those who are fiction anti-realists (or irrealists) face a logical

dilemma when they intuitively try to compare fictional entities to entities of another figured

world, both real or fictional. Simply extending the domain of discourse (figured world) does not

eliminate this problem13.

For Liebesman, the primary issue in determining whether fictional characters qualify as

nonphysical persons is the task of uniquely ascribing a set of qualities to one name and entity.

This is an extension of Saul Kripke's argument about Sherlock Holmes. According to Liebesman,

the connection between the name “Sherlock Holmes” and being Holmesque fails to meet this

requirement, leading to the conclusion that Holmes could not be a real person in any world11.

While Liebesman does not explicitly say he is in favor of Artifactual theory, he does say that his

conclusion is compatible with it14. Thus, these scholars lead one to conclude that Holmes is an

abstract artifact dependent on Doyle and his fans. Within this perspective, Sherlock Holmes is a

cultural and historical product, and we will explore the consequences of this perspective in the

literary legacy section.

8. Mark Balaguer. “Platonism in Metaphysics”.9. Christopher Menzel. “Classical Possibilism and Lewisian Possibilism.”10. Jeffrey Goodman. “Where is Sherlock Holmes?”11. Ibid.12. Tim Button. “Spotty Scope and Our Relation to Fictions.”13. David Liebesman. “Necessarily, Sherlock Holmes Is Not a Person”, 3-5. 14. Ibid., 6.

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The Narrative as a form of understanding

One of the compelling features of fiction is how it conveys truth in the seemingly unreal.

In terms of structure, most fictions are narratives with a predetermined beginning, middle, and

end. There appears to be a philosophical basis for this phenomena. Kim Atkins argues that

human understanding is a narrative and thus our identities take a narrative form, which

incorporates the blending of the three points of view as an extension of our bodily experience15.

The narrative model gives rise to the ordering of events in time, leading us to construct a past,

present, and future as if they were a proper beginning, middle, and end. Ergo, we mold these

events to fit a cause-and-effect relationship16. Identity also arises from embodiment; we must

appropriate the accounts of a “character”, and that character must be the subject of our narrative.

In doing so, we become both the writer and reader of our life's narrative and establish constancy.

In claiming actions, we gain liability from them, which gives rise to agency17.

What all of this means is such: the development of (realistic) fiction stems naturally from

the human experience. Another way of phrasing this finding is that we as individuals embody our

own narrative by imposing order to events in times and their relative significance. Our ability to

tell cohesive stories in which we are the main actor is analogous to Doyle writing tales about

Sherlock Holmes. Thus, it would seem that the process of creating characters as opposed to

forming the self is not so dissimilar after all.

15. Kim Atkins. “Narrative identity, practical identity and ethical subjectivity”, 343-346. 16. Ibid., 348.17. Ibid., 351-353.

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Literary Legacy of Sherlock Holmes

This section will provide a brief comparison between the original Sherlock Holmes tales

and its recent adaptations and predecessors to show Holmes as a dynamic entity. The different

theories of fiction can explain the changes from each adaptation. A possibilist may see the

different versions of Holmes as “actualizations” in differing worlds. A Meinongianist might see

all of these as the same beingness that is Holmes. And if you accept artifactual theory, then this

section portrays Holmes as an artifact that changes and adapts to the culture of those who

continue to reference him. For practical purposes, I will keep my phrasing consistent with

artifactual theory as that is the most intuitive method for making this comparison.

The Evolution of Sherlock Holmes

Sir Arthur Conan Doyle began with The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes, which was a

collection of twelve short stories published in 1892. This figured world reveals Doyle's ideology

and as well as the ideals of the prevailing culture in Victorian London. Doyle portrays Holmes as

a man of rationality and science, a quintessential hero who uses cutting-edge technology and

problem-solving techniques to crack cases. Ellen Harrington would argue that because Doyle

emphasizes the scientific method above characterization, it is ironic that many of the cases were

far-fetched and contained faulty (abductive, not deductive) reasoning on Holmes' part. Doyle

provides escapism through professed rationalization, and so, the mysteries themselves require a

certain suspension of disbelief 18.

In contrast, the contemporary versions of Sherlock Holmes contain different elements of

the original, but the biggest change is that Holmes is no longer a hero, but a postmodern anti-

hero. Benjamin Poore agrees with this view, calling Holmes the “new man for the new age”19.

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Similarly, Ashley Polasek describes the postmodern Sherlock as an “acerbic social outcast” 20.

She compares BBC's Sherlock, CBS's Elementary, and Guy Ritchie's Sherlock Holmes franchise

in how they each emphasize different aspects of Holmes' personality to create a unique yet

relatable version of him for the current audience. The adaptations infer and make assumptions

about Holmes in these alternate figured worlds, and while they seem to inherit Doyle's emphasis

on methodology, there is much more characterization. The audience can see Holmes explicitly

grow and react to circumstances, and even more noteworthy, the audience can watch social

dynamics unfold. Altogether, this makes Sherlock Holmes the most portrayed character of all

time21.

What is left from this digression is to analyze whether this view of Sherlock Holmes as an

abstract artifact tells the entire story. We have authors and directors spawning new versions of

Holmes (or characters highly inspired by him), and it would seem that Holmes' transformation is

a container for larger social contexts. The next section will explore at the individual level what is

happening when people engage with these figured worlds. But first, we must ponder if Holmes'

coming to life, or in the case of some researchers22, Holmes' expertise as a detective mirrors that

of a person whose influence persuade fans to see him not as a fictional character, but as a role

model and as a mentor. And so, given that Holmes is a character we can learn from and reflect

upon, does this quality contradict the way artifactual theory reduces fictional entities to mere

social containers?

18. Ellen B. Harrington. “Nation, identity, and the fascination with forensic science in Sherlock Holmes and CSI”, 367-371.19. Benjamin Poore. “Sherlock Holmes and the Leap of Faith...”, 161.20. Ashley D. Polasek. “Surveying the Post-Millennial Sherlock Holmes...”, 385.21. Guinness World Record. 22. Didierjean André and Gobet Fernand. “Sherlock Holmes – an expert's view of expertise”.

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The Psychological Profile of Sherlockians

The previous section provided some historical background as well as gave a glimpse into

the postmodern Sherlock Holmes in contrast to Doyle's traditional Holmes. This section will

attempt to place this information in a more relevant light. This section will also provide evidence

to challenge the intuition behind referring to Holmes as an abstract artifact by exploring the

psychology of Sherlockians and their devotion to Holmes.

Sherlockians: Faith in Logic

Harrington noted the role the Sherlock Holmes stories played for its audience – while the

tales emphasized logic and rationality, the premises and conclusions within certain cases were

dubious. On some level, the stories operated on faith. Even within my observations of Season

Three of BBC's Sherlock23, the individuals within that figured world held a faith-like devotion to

Sherlock as a person and as an ideal. This mirrors the legions of fans found online who continue

to contribute and explore the mythos of Holmes. Benjamin Poore suggests that the role of devout

fans are similar to faith-based practices, developing some of the characteristics reminiscent to

religion. Preferences to one adaptation over another, and the differences in adaptations

themselves are analogous to sects. Since adaptations often build from or reinvent the original

canon from a new perspective, they are similar to the role the Gospels play in the Bible. Poore's

comparison is not unfounded; in fact, the first Sherlockians, inspired by an essay by the

theologian Ronald A. Knox “Studies in the Literature of Sherlock Holmes” (c.1911) , had rituals

and engaged in carefully researched play that delegated Holmes and Watson as larger-than-life

people and treated Doyle as simply “the literary agent”. Even the stories themselves have biblical

parallels, such as Sherlock's “death” in the Reichenbach Fall24 and subsequent return mirroring

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the crucification and resurrection of Jesus. Sherlock's inner circle, inspired by the effect Holmes

has had on the world, act as disciples by perpetuating his mythos25.

Inside the Mind of a Sherlockian

The final piece to this puzzle comes from Vera Tobin's paper titled “ Ways of reading

Sherlock Holmes: the entrenchment of discourse blends.” This paper connects the philosophical

basis for the narrative with the faith-based zeal of Sherlockians – it examines how narratives can

provide numerous readings depending on the individual's disposition, experiences, and world

view. For this, we come back to the discourse community of the Sherlockians, contrasting the

psychological difference between naïve and ironic believers in how they interpret and internalize

the stories. It turns out that this process is closely related to how we make sense of our own life.

The identification of characters occurs as one identifies actors in a play, through their

consistency between label (name) and their personality, gestures, verbal patterns, and actions26 .

This is remarkably similar to Atkins' description of how we construct our own narratives based

on the raw data at our disposal – our experiences are akin to words on a page in that neither hold

significance in of themselves until we connect them to a cohesive structure.

23. Daniel Gruszczynski, “Sherlock Observation Notes”.24. The Reichenbach Fall refers to the event in which Sherlock Holmes and Jim Moriarty face off to their deaths. In the canon, they both fall from a waterfall of the same name in Germany. In BBC's Sherlock, Moriarty shoots himself in the mouth and forces Sherlock to jump off of a building to his supposed death. In both versions, Sherlock miraculously returns after some extended period of time. 25. Benjamin Poore, 159-163.26. Vera Tobin, 75-78.

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Cerebrally, the reader has two modes of engagement. The first is immersion, which

provides the suspension of disbelief; the brain simulates the meaning of the words read as if the

reader were witnessing the event in real-time. The second mode allows us to hold the meta-view

that the work is fiction. The two modes occur simultaneously and seamlessly. The naïve believer,

which historically made up the newly literate British working class, having been exposed to few

books other than the Bible, were ill-equipped to handle the certain qualities of fiction that the

ironic believer could. One such skill lacking was the necessity to question the veracity of the

author and thus, they did not hold the meta-view that the stories they read were in any way false.

In contrast, the ironic believer engaged in self-delusion to mimic the reactions of a naïve believer

while still having a functioning second mode of engagement26. In other words, without a learned

concept of fiction, realistic fiction tricks our brains into treating the details of the work as true.

This implies that Sherlock Holmes was/is indeed a real person to those lacking a fully-formed

concept of fiction. While one cannot make claims about Sherlock's existence based on this alone,

it does lead one to ask: do the naïve believers have a potentially valid view of Holmes?

Response: Who or What is Sherlock Holmes?

Now that we have had the chance to review the necessary literature, it is time to present

my argument. My response will begin with a brief explanation and response to the two original

questions, and then I will digress into the details and implications of my view.

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My View of Holmes

If we are to define “personhood” in the abstract sense – that is, an individual who thinks,

feels, acts with a sense of agency, and occupies a space wholly their own, then I am inclined to

accept that Sherlock Holmes is indeed a person. My observations of Sherlock in the BBC

adaptation fit this criteria quite easily, and because the figured world follows the natural laws that

mirror our own, there is no issue with plausibility that one cannot ascribe to slight exaggeration

of feats and ability27. However, I must address the criticisms of Liebesman, Goodman, and the

other artifactualists. Their arguments are sound, but I think that there is an equivocation with

how they are using the name “Sherlock Holmes” which I will clarify.

It would seem that David Lewis' version of possibilism28 is incompatible with artifactual

theory, and they would be if they were mutually exclusive theories. However, this is only the

case when we compare them on the same level of abstraction. If we use Jesus as an example,

Jesus has dual existence as a historical figure and the proclaimed son of God. The former is Jesus

as a person, and the latter is Jesus as an artifact of the Christian faith. I believe we can view

Sherlock Holmes in a similar light. Sherlock Holmes, the man and detective, is a person under

Lewis' possibilism, but Sherlock Holmes, the cultural icon, is an artifact. By making this

distinction, the previous inconsistencies cease to be an issue. Together, possibilism and

artifactual theory form a holistic view of Sherlock Holmes in such a way that the other theories,

when taken alone, cannot.

26. Vera Tobin, 81-82.27. Daniel Gruszczynski, “Sherlock Observation Notes.”28. Christopher Menzel. “Classical Possibilism and Lewisian Possibilism.”

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(1) What qualities distinguish fictional characters, such as Sherlock Holmes, from “real” people?

Response: Other than a lack of spatial-temporal location in our particular world, fictional

characters in realistic fiction are isomorphic to real, physical people.

(2) Why do we assume that there are fictional characters to begin with?

Response: Ultimately, I think we fall back on the assumption that physical presence is

reality and everything else is in the realm of thoughts and fiction. Because we refer to

Holmesque individuals as being Sherlock Holmes29, we conflate what we mean when we refer to

the different versions of Holmes. What makes Holmes fictional is the level of abstraction that

delegates him as an abstract artifact lacking a physical basis. It is the same way we treat

caricatures of real-life individuals – as containers for larger cultural and social ideals. The

individual the caricature represents is real, but when said individual is immaterial, we become

inconsistent and treat both entities as fictional rather than just the artifact.

Holmes as a person

Both the artifactualist (and irrealist) and naïve believer operate on faulty logic, but in

opposite ways. The former conflates all versions of Holmes as fictional (artifacts)30 whereas the

naïve believer conflates all versions of Holmes as real. I believe that the ironic believer

recognizes the true nature of Sherlock Holmes, and thus, they engage in witty discourse

exploiting the relationship between person and artifact. Tobin's description of our minds

simulating the events of a narrative represent an abstraction of Holmes the person, and this

abstraction is the basis of how we compare him to physical people31. This resolves the spotty

scope problem Button addresses32.

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When it comes to the different adaptations of Holmes, I think it is most consistent to treat

them as different people who share the same name. The differences in setting between Sherlock,

Elementary, and the others represent distinct worlds in which that particular Holmes is a person

who thinks, feels, displays agency, and has a spatial-temporal location. They each establish their

own identity by appropriating the Holmesque traits and actions. The set of their mutual traits

makes them all Holmesque, and since being Holmesque is sufficient for being Holmes, this

means that each distinct Holmes also share the artifact name of Sherlock Holmes. This

eliminates Liebesman's objection while keeping his overall argument intact33.

We can think of the episodes of BBC's Sherlock as actualizations of Sherlock's life as a

narrative. The events have already transpired in that world, but Steven Moffat and Mark Gatiss

provided the means to which we can observe said events by having it as a visual medium34.

Whatever logical inconsistencies appear in the narrative thus become the fault of its teller(s), and

it does not in any way invalidate the veracity of Holmes' plausibility as a person. More

intuitively, this is what happens when we recall past events and reconstruct a narrative to tell to

others. Mistakes occur, but these errors do not invalidate the fact that similar events took place.

Holmes as an artifact

We can account for authorial intent by saying that Doyle both actualized Sherlock

Holmes the person as well as created an artifact of the same name. Thus, one can continue to

think of the literary legacy of Holmes in terms of artifactual theory. This is convenient for our

29. David Liebesman. “Necessarily, Sherlock Holmes Is Not a Person”, 2.30. Fred Kroon, and Alberto Voltolini. “Fiction.”31. Vera Tobin. “Ways of reading Sherlock Holmes...”32. Tim Button. “Spotty Scope and Our Relation to Fictions.”

Gruszczynski 17

33. David Liebesman. “Necessarily, Sherlock Holmes Is Not a Person.”34. Steven Moffat and Mark Gatiss. Sherlock: Season Three.intuition as well as for historical purposes. When the different versions of Sherlock Holmes

affect and influence us in different ways, we can view it either on the personal level, or on the

ideological level. Polasek describes the transition from the heroic classic Holmes to the anti-hero

postmodern Holmes by evoking Holmes the artifact and noting how being Holmesque has

changed because the artifact of Holmes has changed35. Each Holmes has a fixed disposition on a

personal level, but then is part of the larger artifact that serves to relate them to the prevailing

ideas of our culture.

Poore's discussion on Sherlockians show the consequences of how using the same label to

alternate between Holmes the person and Holmes the artifact leads to confusion36. I would argue

that this conflation leads to myths and legends, which might explain why this result encourages

fanaticism. This makes the phrase “I believe in Sherlock Holmes” a double entendre: a belief in

the existence of Holmes as a person and a belief that Holmes as an artifact is something we can

depend on.

Case Closed?

Before I conclude my discussion and let the reader decide what to take away from this

paper, let me make one final point. It is imperative that those who value and seek knowledge

must be the ones who further discussion on the topics that intrigue them. In this case, the topic of

fiction inspired me because fiction gives people something to believe in. Fiction resonates with

us because fiction gives us a true glimpse into the human experience. Fiction is not just

escapism, it is a mirror and a crystal ball that allows us not only see the world for what it is, but

also gives us the audacity to actualize something better. Thus, my discussion on the personhood

of Sherlock Holmes is not strictly literal, but rather, it is a metaphor and a manifesto. It is a creed

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to not simply accept the conventional, the obvious, or the immediate. It is a call to arms to push

boundaries, to question, and to inspire others to dream big and actualize the unreal. It is to say, “I

believe in Sherlock Holmes.”

35. Ashley Polasek, “Surveying the Post-Millennial Sherlock Holmes...”36. Benjamin Poore, “Sherlock Holmes and the Leap of Faith...”

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