Assessing the Military Benefits of NEC Using a Generic Kill-Chain Approach David Nevell QinetiQ...

Assessing the Military Benefits of NEC Using a Generic Kill-Chain ApproachDavid NevellQinetiQ Malvern21 ISMOR September 2004

ContextProviding a quantified example of the benefits that Network Enabled Capability (NEC) will bring to Network Enabled Fires (NEF) by:

• Analysing a specific NEF kill chain

• Conducting a more general analysis using multiple generic NEF kill chains

A secondary aim is to develop an approach that could be used more generally to address benefits that NEC may bring to military missions.

For the purposes of this work Network Enabled Fires is defined as:

"The exploitation of network enabled capability to flexibly utilise ISR, C2 and effectors from land, sea and air to synchronise fires in time, space and purpose".

Approach

DevelopNEF

Architectures

• Initial• Transitional• Mature

Benefits Analysis(single Kill Chain)

• Qualitative benefits

System Performance &

Military Effectiveness

DevelopDynamic & Benefits

Models

Dynamic Analysis(single & multiple KCs)

• Quantitative analysis

Identify Metrics

UnderstandNEC & NEF Concepts

Requirements of Single Kill Chain

The kill chain was created to ensure that it satisfied the following requirements:

• Tactical participation by multiple components• Effect against time sensitive target• Involvement of UK only assets• High degree of mission complexity• High degree of communications complexity

AWACS

IDM

Div HQ

Phoenix

Harrier GR7/9

Enemy FARP

MLRS

CVS

SAM Launchers

Formation Recce

Phoenix BCP

Phoenix GCS

MLRS DFDC

JFAC HQ

Formation Recce RHQ

Satellite

Elements of Single Kill Chain

Need for a Multiple Kill Chain model

• Output from single Kill Chain model was restricted to:– overall process times

– slack times

– critical paths

• The multiple Kill Chain model provides a richer environment in which; – a wider range of dynamic metrics can be analysed (e.g.

concurrent Kill Chains allow aspects of co-ordination, synchronisation and competition)

– resources can be limited to more realistically reflect the context of a wider battlespace (variable battlespace activity)

– longer simulations allow a representative steady state to be reached which is not dependent on specific starting conditions

– more complex event-based rules can be used to better model aspects of subjective decision making

Modelling Issues

• Lack of credible or verifiable data for medium/far term– Develop generic approach that is not dependent on precise data

– Make comparative rather than absolute evaluations

– Present results in terms of trade-offs (assuming x --> implies y)

– Use consistent and generic assumptions across epochs

• Difficulty in measuring costs and benefits– Need to find measurable outputs that best capture the key metrics

(timeliness, utilisation, flexibility, synchronisation)

– Metrics will be based in the “modelling world”

• Difficulty in representing decision making processes– Need to use simple rules and be consistent

Generic Breakdown of Functions

Inform

Gain

Analyse

Exploit

Disseminate

Maintain

Networked FiresFunctions

Inform

Command

Operate

Gain

Exploit Collection Assets

Secure Data

Disseminate Data

Generic NEF (Last updated 08/08/03)

Apply Effects ManoeuvreAnalyse Exploit Disseminate Battlespace ManagementGII COMMANDMaintainGain

Secure Data

Collate DataDisseminate Data

Create Information Create intelligenceproducts

Disseminateintelligenceproducts

Access relevantinformation

Analyse anddevelop options

Choose COA (1)

Co-ordinateResources to

achieve desiredeffects

Task attack asset

Transistion totarget

Confirm decisionto engage target

Engage target toachieve desired

effects

Disseminateengagementinformation

Choose COA (2)

Decideappropriate ISTAR

asset

Requestdeconfliction

Task ISTAR asset

Transit to target

Secure Data

Disseminate Data Collate Data

Create Information Create intelligenceproducts


Task attack asset




SA

Deconfliction ofBattlespace

Detailedplanning

Disseminateplanning &

deconflictioninformation



effects



Collate BDA Data

Secure BDA Data

Disseminate BDAData

Preparation ofattack asset


Confirm decisionto engage target

Secure BDA Data

Disseminate BDAData


Detailedplanning



Collate BDA Data

© copyright QinetiQ Ltd 2003 QinetiQ inConfidence

Generic NEF Kill-Chain

Generic NEF (Last updated 08/08/03)

Apply Effects ManoeuvreAnalyse Exploit Disseminate Battlespace ManagementGII COMMANDMaintainGain

Secure Data


Create Inf ormationCreate intelligence

products

Disseminateintelligence

products

Access relev antinf ormation

Analy se anddev elop options

Choose COA (1)


achiev e desiredef f ects

Task attack asset


Conf irm decisionto engage target

Engage target toachiev e desired

ef f ects

Disseminateengagementinf ormation

UK RESTRICTED - Conceptual Model

Choose COA (2)

Decideappropriate ISTAR

asset

Requestdeconf liction

Task ISTAR asset

Transit to target

Secure Data

Disseminate Data Collate Data

Create Inf ormationCreate intelligence

products

Disseminateintelligence

products

Task attack asset

Analy se anddev elop options


achiev e desiredef f ects

SA

Deconf liction ofBattlespace

Detailedplanning


deconf lictioninf ormation


Engage target toachiev e desired

ef f ects

Disseminateengagementinf ormation


Collate BDA Data

Secure BDA Data

Disseminate BDAData



Conf irm decisionto engage target

Secure BDA Data

Disseminate BDAData


Detailedplanning


deconf lictioninf ormation

Collate BDA Data

© copyright QinetiQ Ltd 2003 QinetiQ inConfidence



effects



AttackDecide

appropriate ISTARasset

Requestdeconfliction

Task ISTAR asset

Transit to target


ISTAR Planning

Access relevantinformation


Choose COA (1)



Task attack asset

Analysis and choice of COA

Choose COA (2)


Detailedplanning



Planning and deconfliction

Collate BDA Data

Secure BDA Data

Disseminate BDA

Data

BDA

ISTAR Execution and Exploitation

Secure Data


Create InformationCreate intelligence

products


Elements of the Generic Kill-Chain

• The kill-chain is constructed from generic elements

• The elements can be used to construct other kill-chains

Generic Kill Chain - factors (1)

Driven by changes to NEC across epochs

• ISR assets and effectors– types, resource levels

• Targets– types, generation rates

• Suitability of ISR assets and effectors against targets. A function of:– resource capability

– target behaviour (e.g. self defence)

– terrain

– depth

– mobility

– proximity of sensitive targets

– existing ISR information

Generic Kill Chain - factors (2)

• Process times

– minima

– maxima

– distribution type

• Background battlespace activity

• C2 structure

– number of components

– connectivity

• Quality of SA

– access to correct information during simulation

Multiple kill chain model - detail

Component 1 ISR ASSETS

Component 1

EFFECTORS

Component 1 2 CELL

Component 2 3 CELL

Component 1 3 CELL

Component 2 2 CELL

Component 3 2 CELL

Component 3 3 CELL



Component 2

EFFECTORS

Component 3

EFFECTORS

Other battlespace activity

INTERACT

CO

MM

AN

D &

CO

NTR

OL

CO

MM

AN

D &

CO

NTR

OL

MISSIONS

Multiple Kill Chain model - metrics• Distributions of process and overall Kill Chain times (TIME)

• Synchronisation between engaging related and primary targets(CO-ORDINATION)

• Degree of choice available when choosing assets (FLEXIBILITY)

• Utilisation/loading of resources (OPTIMALITY)

– ISR assets, effectors

– Cells

• Suitability of assets used against targets (ISR and effector) (MISSION SUCCESS)

Presentation of Results

Number of first choices of assets

Utilisation

Time between engaging targets

Choice of asset type

0.00

10.00

20.00

30.00Percentage Improvement (%)

Diagrammatic only

Time

Mission Success

Flexibility

Co-ordination

Optimality

Summary

• Single kill chain provided necessary context for addressing problem and eliciting baseline information

• Extension to multiple kill chain model was necessitated by need to address more complex issues (e.g. concurrency)

• Lack of detailed information about future epochs led to adoption of generic kill chain approach

• Generic kill chain made up of re-usable sub-chains which are functionally (not organisationally) based

• Analyses comparative, not absolute

• Results presented in terms of high level metrics and their trade-offs

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