Arx Selected Papers Volumes 1-4 2008

ARX- ONLINE JOURNAL OF MILITARY ARCHITECTURE

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ARX - FORTRESS EXPLORER

Fortress Malta 360° is a publicationthat focuses all its attention on themilitary architecture of Malta. It seeks tocapture a representative cross sectionof the great diversity of shapes, forms,and textures that make up Malta’sunique military architecture ensemble.It does so by playing on the visualpower of military architecture,Vitruvius’ venustas. This bookrevolves around the artistic aspect ofthe subject, not its military merits, Itfocuses on those architectural

features that are truly unique to Malta -such as the quality and feel of thebeautiful honey-coloured local stoneover drab [and universal] concreteshapes fabricated from importedcement, wrought iron, and other alienmaterials. All the photographs werespecifically chosen for their artistic andsculptural qualities, even though greateffort was made [given the specialrequirements and format of thepublication] to present them in someform of a chronological order so thatthey could still reflect the salientdevelopments in the art and science offortification. Unfortunately, not all theforts tended to photograph well, andvarious important examples, had to beomitted either because of thecacophany of on-going constructionworks or because of their very poorstate of repair after nearly half a centuryof total abandonment. Fortress Malta360°, is a book about fortifications asmonumental works of architecture, asstructures and buildings.

MIRANDA PUBLICATIONS326 x 322 mm170 pagesISBN 978-99909-85-34-4

Text by Dr. Steghen C. SpiteriPhotography by EnricoFormica

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ARX is published by the FortressExplorer Society (FES) and is onlyavailable (FREE of charge) in PDFformat.

This journal is downloadable onlyfrom the Fortress Explorer Websiteand is subject to the provisions ofinternational copyright laws.

The Fortress Explorer (FE) Websiteis an informational portal dedicatedto the promotion of the subject ofMilitary Architecture andFortification, with a particularemphasis on the Maltese Islandsand on the rich Hospitaller militaryheritage spread around the shores ofthe Mediterranean.

ARX is designed and produced byDr. Stephen C Spiteri Ph.D.


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THE'CASTELLU DILA CHITATI'the medievalcastle of thewalled town ofMdina

by

Stephen C. Spiteri

One of the least understood of all theworks of fortification to have stoodwatch over the Maltese islands inantiquity is the castellu di la chitati (1)- the medieval castle of the old town ofMdina. The arcanum that surroundsthis ancient stronghold stems primarilyfrom the fact that it was dismantled wayback in the 15th century and what littlehad remained of the building thereafter,eventually disappeared altogether in themetamorphosis that accompanied theHospitaller re-fortification of themedieval town into a gunpowderfortress throughout the course of the16th, 17th and 18th centuries. This,coupled with the limited nature ofcontemporary documentary information,has ensured that the true form andfeatures of the medieval strongholdhave been lost to the point that now

only archaeology can hope to reallyfigure out. Whilst acknowledging thesevere limitations imposed by anyapproach that falls short of a fullarchaeological investigation, this paperseeks to re-examine the existingdocumentary, cartographic and physicalevidence unearthed to-date in order tosuggest a rudimentary model of Mdina’smedieval stronghold. Undoubtedly, thegreatest contribution to-date to thestudy of Mdina and its medievalfortifications has been the masterlyworks of Architect Denis De Lucca andof Prof. Stanley Fiorini and Dr. MarioBuhagiar.(2) This paper onlyundertakes to re-evaluate the evidenceand some of the conclusions presentedso far in the light of my own researchinto medieval military architecture andcastle typologies. It has long beenrecognized that the medievalfortifications of Mdina consisted of twomain defensive elements - a fortifiedtown and a castle. Gio. Francesco Abelapointed this out in his DellaDescrittione di Malta as far back in1647. (3) Contemporary medievalarchival documentation has been shownto differentiate between the two entities,referring to the town as the castrumcivitatis malte and the castle as thecastellu di la chitati (4) (nonetheless thedistinction between the two issometimes dropped). The word castrumwas originally applied to large fortifiedRoman military camps but came to beused to describe most walled towns orother fortified settlements of a non-purely military nature throughout themiddle ages. The castellu, or castellum,

on the other hand represents the lowLatin diminutive of castrum and refersto a type of fort, although it also cameto be applied to a specialized fortifiedstructure that appeared with theformation of a new social organizationin the middle ages.(5) At Mdina, thesetwo fortified entities seem to have beenclosely interwoven, such that the wallsof one were coterminous with those ofthe other. (6) Together they occupied arelatively small area at the tip of astrategically sited plateau - part of thesite which once served toaccommodate a much larger Roman, andearlier Punic, fortified town. (7) Thissite, standing as it is at the very heart ofthe island, was a natural focal point ofrefuge commanding clear views of thegreater part of the island’s coastline.Inhabited since prehistoric times, itappears to have originated as one of theisland’s fluchtorte (8) establishedduring the insecure Bronze Age perioduntil it eventually rose in importance asa settlement to become the dominatingadministrative and political centre inPunic and Roman times.Given thiscontinual process of occupation andsettlement, the first difficulty besettingthe study of the medieval defences ofMdina is precisely that of establishingsome kind of date for the transformationof the Roman city into the medievalfortress. As yet, this is still very muchan obscure process. The abandonmentof the greater part of the larger Romanenceinte for a smaller and more easilydefensible perimeter was a commonenough phenomenon throughout theMediterranean in the troubled and

An imaginative depiction of the Roman city of Melite, after Gian Frangisc Abela (17th century).


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insecure times that followed thecollapse of the Roman empire,characterized by a significant shrinkagein urban populations. Inevitably, theancient city itself came to beresponsible for much of the character ofthe subsequent fortress for it providedthe site, possibly a large part of thelateral walls and most of the buildingmaterials for the construction of themedieval ramparts. The lack of anyprecise knowledge of this process oftransformation, however, has seen mosthistorians take refuge behind thepopular notions that accredit theestablishment of Mdina’s medievalenclosure to either the Arabs or theByzantines, or both. Determining thisparticular point, however, is offundamental importance to the study ofthe medieval fortifications of Mdina,and is particularly crucial to understandthe nature and development of thecastellum. Archaeological evidencetends to suggest that the medieval frontwas definitely in existence by the lateArab period. The presence of a lateMuslim cemetery extra muros not farfrom Greek’s Gate (near the Romantown-house), together with thetoponymy of Mdina itself, (derived from‘Medina’, Arabic for fortified city) hasalways been taken as proof that it wasthe Arabs who had redefined the city’slayout, establishing its present form.(9)However, this need not necessarily bethe case for the Arab occupation ofMalta seems to have beenaccomplished over a period of timefollowing a succession of brazen raidsfrom nearby Sicily. Archaeologicalremains at Tas-Silg, for example, haveshown the presence of variousdestruction layers and hastily builtdefensive walls around the Byzantinestructures dating to around the 8thcentury. (10) The same process ofretrenchment may have occurred at thetown of Melita, where the Byzantine

garrison, under increasing Arabpressure could have been compelled torationalize the defence of the large townreducing it to more defensibleproportions over a period of a fewdecades by pulling back the front to anarrower part of plateau, exploiting anydefensive topographical features tosuch effect and reinforcing it with a fort.A Byzantine origin, then, could implythat the latter medieval castle, ratherthan having been built de novo inSwabian times, as has been suggested,(11) may have probably emerged fromthe foundations of a Byzantine fort.Thiswould explain why the medieval castleoccupied the same plane as the townand was actually incorporated into themain enceinte. Unlike the CastrumMaris and the Castrum in Gozo, therewas no attempt to raise the Mdinacastle to a domineering height over itsadjoining burgum - an importantcharacteristic feature of most veritablefeudal strongholds. It is evident thatthe layout at Mdina did not respect theestablished feudal hierarchy wherebythe smaller castle commanded the largertown even though the Norman garrisonwould have been surrounded by apredominantly Muslim population andwould have sought a measure of safetyin such a formula. True, the nature ofthe plateau did not provide the

opportunity but this could have beenquickly remedied by the construction ofan artificial mound - a common enoughpractice with Norman keeps. That thispractice was not sought in Mdinasuggests that the Normans must havefound a existing fort and reutilized andadapted it for their own needs. Indeed,the process of re-adaptation seems tohave been still in progress under theChiaramonti well into the 14thcentury.(12) One must add, however,that the castle did occupy the highestpart of the medieval front but there wasonly a small marginal drop between thetwo extremities, and this would haveentailed little defensive advantage.As amatter of fact, the qualities of the siteare much in keeping with the nature of aByzantine military fort of thepyrgokastellon (purgokastellon) type.This, although housing the governorand his garrison, would not have been acastle in the true later sense of the wordbut a predominantly militaryestablishment concerned primarily withdefence rather than political control.The word is coined from pyrgos, Greekfor tower, and castellum, Latin for fortand typifies a nodal strongpoint, similarto the Frankish keep but designed toreinforce the weakest part of theenceinte as prescribed by Procopius.

Mid-sixteenth century plan of Mdina showingthe system of double walls on the land frontstiffened with two corner bastions. Plan alsoshows a proposal for an internal perimeter.


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(13) In the words of T. E. Lawrence, theGreeks put their keeps and castles‘where they were wanted, the Frankswhere they would be impregnable.’ (14)And truly, the southeast corner markedthe most sensitive part of Mdina’senceinte, overlooking the ascendingapproaches from the surrounding plainsup the Saqqajja. One can find anexcellent parallel in the Castello Gioiadel Colle in Puglia, founded by RichardSeneschal, brother of Robert Guiscardon a pre-existing Byzantine fort whichwas later enlarged by Roger II andrebuilt by Frederick II around 1230.The

Arabs on their part are traditionallyascribed with having begun theexcavation of the main fosse thatisolated the castrum from the rest of themainland. Significant efforts toestablish the ditch as an effectivedefensive feature, however, were stillunderway during the mid 15th centuryso the Arab intervention could not haveinvolved much more than theexploitation of an existing naturaldepression.(15) – as a matter of a studyof the bed-rock beneath the bastionwalls does reveal a drop between thetwo extremities of the front in the

direction of Greek’s Gate. But apartfrom the presence of a few roundedwalls towers, as depicted in early 16thcentury plans, there is very little elsethat can possibly point to theirhandiwork in the formation of thecastellu. Arab preference was forcitadels rather than castles - largefortified and turreted enclosures. Still,any available Byzantine kastron wouldhave been readily utilised - witness thecitadel of the fortress of Tripolicaptured by the Spaniards in 1510. (16) Arab influence in the development ofthe medieval fortifications of Mdina,however, can be traced in otherelements. Documentary sources, forexample, frequently mention the fasil.(17) This is an Arabic word and theinterpretation given to it in the localcontext, that of a mere low parapet,distracts from its true meaning. It isbest described by K.A.C. Creswell, oneof the leading authorities on earlyMuslim Architecture, as the spacebetween two rampart walls. Creswellcites al-Khatib’s description of thefortifications of Baghdad: ‘... the heightof the inner wall, which was that of thecity , was 35 cubits. On it were towerswhich rose 5 cubits above it.... thencame the fasil between the two walls60 cubits wide, finally the first (outer)wall, which was the wall of the fasil, andbeyond was the khandaq (ditch)’ (18)The fasil, therefore, was equivalent tothe intervallum, the fighting spacebetween two walls - the currituriquoted by Fiorini/Buhagiar. (19) Thisdefinition holds important implications,for it immediately hints that Mdina, or atthe least a considerable part of thetown, was enclosed within a set of twowalls - a common enough feature in thefortified towns of the period. In otherwords, the Mdina ramparts consisted ofa main wall, a teichos (teicos), and alower outer wall - the proteichisma(proteicisma) or antemurale - muchbetter understood today as thefalsabraga or faussebraye. (20) Thedefinition of fasil as a ‘fortified wallcapped by a parapet’ is, in my opinionnot exact, and any reference to a lowparapet (parapetto basso) as given inAmari’s translation of at-Tijani, (21)should be read as the low outer wall orantemurale, for a fortress dependentsolely on a low parapet for its defencewould have had very little chance of


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survival. The need for an antemuralwas necessary to protect the base ofthe main wall itself, both as an addedsafeguard against mining and directassault, and as a buffer against siegetowers. Again, it finds its inspiration inByzantine military architecture,particularly in the Theodosian walls ofConstantinople. Actually, one of thebest surviving examples of the systemof double walls built during the 14thand early 15th centuries is to be foundalong the southern part of the enceinteof the Hospitaller fortress of Rhodes.(22) Fiorini/Buhagiar place the fasil, onthe basis of their reading of themedieval documents, on the northernpart of the enceinte in the Salvatur area,identifying the present raised chemin-de-ronde and embrasured parapet withthe fasil. (23) There is no doubt thatthere was a fasil along this part of theenceinte but it is more likely, however,that this feature was enclosed by thepresent outer vertical wall and an innersecondary wall, as hinted by themassive block of solid masonrysurviving inside the nearby BeaulieuHouse. It is also possible, on the otherhand, that the fasil could have beenoutside the present vertical rampart forthe French military engineer Charles

Francois de Mondion, involved in thereconstruction of Mdina’s fortificationin the early 18th century, records thepresence of the remains of ancient outerwalls at the foot of the northernramparts, ‘... quali vestigi non solamentesi vedono nel detto fondo ma anche sidistendono fin quasi il posto baccardove s’attacano con il roccame cheresta scoperto sotto le mura di essaCittà.’ (24) Mondion’s report mentionsthat these ‘replicati vesitgi difalsabraga’ (25) (hence antemural)spanned all the way from belowD’Homedes Bastion - then being fittedout with a low battery - round to the Ta’Bacchar, or St. Mary Bastionoverlooking Mtarfa. D’Aleccio’s andSerbelloni’s 16th century plans ofMdina ignore such detail, though theydo indicate the antiquity of the town’smain northern walls and their ruinousstate. On the other hand, both clearlyshow a veritable stretch of antemuraland fasil on the main land front ofMdina to the south, stretching all theway from the porta principale down tothe tower at Greeks Gate, interruptedsolely by the presence of a largerectangular tower sited in the centre ofthe front. The presence of this outerwall is also borne out by thedocumentary information recentlyunearthed particularly where thismentions the advice of master builders

Georgi Vassaldu and Georgi Dumag asto the dismantling of a beloardo(rampart) beneath the tower annexed tothe property of Peri Caruana and itsreplacement with a scarped buttresswall. (26) The D’Aleccio and Serbelloniplans, actually provide the onlyconvincing graphic clue to theplanimetric layout of Mdina’s medievalfortifications. These show the locationof the town’s four towers and doubleset of walls, the two gates and theremains of the castle itself . By the mid-16th century, however, the brunt of thetown’s defences had then come to reston two new corner bastions begunduring the reign of Grand MasterD’Homedes even though much of theintervening medieval defensiveelements were still intact. It was onlythe castle that was missing from theequation, its place taken over by thenew magistral palace. Thedisappearance of the medievalstronghold entails no enigma. It waspulled down by royal licence inresponse to local demand some timeafter 1453. (27) The excuse was notsome Lacedemonian policy of notfortifying the place but that its oldruinous walls had become a publicdanger and, apparently, its upkeep asignificant drain on the town’s purse;possibly it had come to be a despisedtool of tyrannical oppression, especiallyunder the Chiaramonti. Evidently, as awork of fortification, it must have


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offered very little command anddefensive advantage for the town eldersto request its dismantling at a time whenthe Island had begun to attract theincreasingly hostile attention of Barbarycorsairs. Only some twenty yearsearlier, in 1429, a force of 18,000 menunder Qâ’id Ridwân had invaded theisland and all but captured the city aftersubjecting it to a siege.(28) Actually,the Castellu dili Tyranni (29) was onlypartially demolished since it was justthe internal walls separating it from thetown that were pulled down and themasonry used to repair the townramparts and gate. The castle’s outerramparts and towers, which formed anintegral part of the main enceinte, wereobviously retained. In fact, that part ofthe castle which was embodied into theland front contained at least two towersand a gateway. Both are clearlyindicated in 16th century plans. Thetower to the left of the main gate (whenseen from outside), was known as theTurri Mastra (30) and controlled theentrance and exit into the fortress - thisstructure was eventually replaced in theearly 18th century by the Torre delloStandardo though the this retained theoriginal role as a watch-out/ signallingpost. The Turri Mastra, or Turri dilabandiera, seems to have beenrectangular in plan with a polygonal orsemicircular front. Only in one late 17thcentury plan, very roughly executed, isit shown as having had a circular form.

(31) The tower to the right of the maingate occupied the south east extremityof the land front - the most sensitivepart overlooking the approaches fromSaqqajja. It is no coincidence,therefore, that the plans show it to havebeen the most solidly built of all thetown’s turri, having markedly thickerwalls. In all likelihood this was theMastio, the strong tower or keep of thecastellu (see illustration A). In thedocuments it is referred to as the Turridi la Camera (32) - a faithfuldescription when one sees how it wasintegrated with the adjoining palatialhalls. By the 16th century this massivetower was linked to the magistral palacein a manner that still recalled a cornertower attached to a rectangular ward -the whole layout reminiscent of manyrectangular Swabian castra erected byFrederick II in Apulia such as those ofBari, Gioa del Colle, Trani, Barletta andMonte Sant Angelo. (33) The palazzobuilt by L’Isle Adam after 1530, with itsarched porch, seems to have occupiedthe undemolished east wing of thecastle’s ward, that part of thestronghold which must have served asthe residential quarters of thecapitaneus civitatis. This wasprobably achieved much in the sameway that the Grand Master’s otherpalace at the Castrum Maris replacedthe former castellan’s house there.Indeed, it appears that even as early as1413, the Mdina stronghold was alreadyserving more as a captain’s residencerather than for defensive purposes. (34)Vestiges of the facade of L’Isle Adams

new pallaso, seem to have actuallysurvived within part of the courtyardrebuilt by the French Engineer Mondionin the 1720’s as part of the remodellingof the Magistral Palace complex. Thepresence of a very thick wall, withblocked-up apertures and truncatedwindows having delicately mouldedsurrounds (see photographs) hint at theremains of a 16th century building.Indeed, the inner courtyard itself,remodelled by Mondion, seems to haverespected the footprint of the old castralward. It is not yet clear, however, if thevaulted rooms at ground level (thehospital kitchen) enveloping thecourtyard, particularly those to the eastand south - one of which is threateningto collapse - actually date back to 15thcentury or much later. What is clearfrom the contemporary plans is thatL’Isle Adam’s palace overlooked thecourtyard, was fronted by an arcadedportico and was approached via thenarrow street leading to the present dayXaghra Palace. The rounded tower itselfcontinued to feature in the plans ofMdina well into the early 1700s until themagistral palace was finally rebuilt byMondion. Judging by the D’Aleccio /Serbelloni plans, the left flank of theD’Homedes bastion was actuallygrafted onto this tower. It remainedvisible until it was buried beneath aheavy buttress laid onto the outer wallat the foot of the magistral palace - anintervention which actually blocked-upone of the two embrasures in the sameflank of the adjoining bastion itself. Incidentally, this bastion, referred to in

Proposed configuration of the main entranceinto Mdina around 1530


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the documents as the belguardo delPalacio (35) and known as D’Homedesbastion is also a unique example of theearly type of Italian bastion built inMalta. It may have been designed bythe military engineer AntonioFerramolino for it has now been shownthat it was already under constructionby 1547 (36) (Mdina p.466).Undeniably, its most interesting featureis its little known continuouscountermine gallery running parallel tothe line of the outer walls, serving gunembrasures and sally-ports in theflanks, but mainly designed to helpfrustrate enemy mining activities giventhe clayish nature of the terrain onwhich the bastion was erected. Fittedwith vertical and horizontal flues, thegallery was designed to dissipate theblast of an explosive mine fired beneathit walls. This feature is missing in thebelguardo dila Porta dili Grechi on theopposite end of the land front, a bastionwhich was built many years later. Oneother reason that was cited in favour ofthe demolition of the castle’s inner wallsin 1453, was the need to open up newpublic space for settlement by peoplefrom the surrounding countryside.However, if the castellated enclosurewas merely restricted to the area of thepresent magistral palace, than this couldnot have possibly attracted many newresidents. Ergo, the castle’s inner walls

may have extended further northwardstowards the Cathedral, possibly in theform of a lesser ward. Initially, thesemay have even linked up with the Roccarecorded to have existed on thenorthern part of the town. (37) Still, theRocca, evidence of which appears tohave survived in a massive wall insideBeaulieu House, may more likely thannot have been a detached strong-pointin its own right, as the definition of theword surely implies. In that case,however, it is difficult to explain thepresence of a secondary strongholdwithin the perimeter of such a smallfortified town as Mdina unless, ofcourse, this was merely the vestige ofsome former, probably pre-medieval,fortified structure. Recent excavationsundertaken at Xaghra Palace, justoutside the Magistral Palace to thenorth, have revealed the presence ofsolidly built perimeter walls, composedof large blocks of masonry, all dating toRoman or Punic times, but evidently re-laid in medieval times. Actually, nothingof the medieval ramparts along the eastflank of Mdina seems to have survivedabove ground level for the old townwalls were rebuilt en cremaillere by theKnights. The Order’s resident militaryengineer, Blondel, writing in 1693, tellsus that all that part of the town’sperimeter ‘volta a gregale e levante sinoal Palazzo suo magistrale … fu rinovata

tutta quella cortina dal Gran MaestroOmedes’. (38) By the late 17th century,however, many town houses had alsoencroached onto these walls such thatdirect access to the ramparts was notpossibile ‘...se non per di dentro allecase de particolari, non solo appoggiatema attaccate, et alle quali serve elle dimuro esterno’ - the house of the Muscatfamily, for example, even had latrines,‘gabinetti su l’orlo del bastione’.(39)All this was done to the detriment of thetown’s defences and in 1717 it was feltnecessary to impose upon the Cannonsof the Cathedral Chapter the conditionthat any new windows cut into theramparts in the course of the rebuildingof the Archbishop’s palace had to bemade ‘...in forma di cannoniere capaci diricevere canone secondo il bisogno’.(40) That part of the outer walladjoining the magistral complex seemsto have began to suffer from serioussubsidence of the ground soon after theVilhena’s palace was rebuilt in the earlydecades of the 18th century. As a result,it was found necessary to reinforce thewall with a large masonry buttress,massiccia d’ appoggio.- now itselfpeeling off. Another substantial vestigeof the medieval castle that survived wellinto the 18th century was the system ofbent entrance into the town via threesuccessive gates. This tortuousapproach, designed primarily as a


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was decorated with the coat-of-arms ofSua Cesarea MaJestati, carved in stoneby Maestro Jayme Balistre[ra] (44).Both the main entrance and Greeks Gatewere served by wooden drawbridgesapproached over stone ponti. It is notpossible to say what type of liftingmechanism was employed - Greek’s Gateitself gives no such clue. The basculetype of drawbridge with wooden arms,however, was the most common typeemployed throughout the middle agesfor its simple counterweight mechanism.The bascule was also much favouredthroughout the 17th century and canstill be seen at St. Thomas Tower inMarsascala. The lifting mechanism atMdina definitely comprised the use ofwooden beams, ‘bastaso che levao luponti’ (45) and metal chains, for in1527 a cantaro di ferro was purchased toproduce the ‘catinj dilo ponti’. Thedrawbridges themselves were made fromplanks of oak (46) at one time broughtpurposely from Messina and judging bythe entries in the records werecontinually in need of repair, particularlythat at Greeks Gate. There also seem tohave been posterns and sally ports forsorties and furtive getaways, but novestiges have survived, as hasremained, for example, on the medievalramparts of the Cittadella in Gozo.Contrary to what has been stated,however, the written records do in factallude to their existence. The mandatidocuments of 1527, for example, refer tothe ‘porta falsa Jpsius civitatis’ - portafalsa (or falsa porta) is a term used

frequently to refer to sally-ports orposterns and is encountered even on18th century plans of the Order’sfortifications. (47) Another entry in themandati is even more specific,mentioning the need to wall up an exitinto the ditch, ‘murari la porta dilaputighia (magazine) che apri alofossato’. (48) A most interesting featureof the Mdina fortifications, mentionedby Gian Frangisc Abela in 1647 was thepresence of a barbican, a ‘Torrione fortedi forma circolare con fosso e cistrena’that protected the far side of the bridgeleading to the main gate. (49)Surprisingly, the medieval documentsmake no specific reference to thisstructure. Dr. Albert Ganado, however,citing the history of the Inguanez familyrevealed that this was built by AntonioDesguanecks sometime after 1448. (50)Giacomo Castaldi’s map of Malta (1551),too, shows Mdina with a turretedbarbican although the actual detailsmust not be taken too seriouslyespecially when other obviouslandmarks are shown so confusingly inthe same map. By the 15th century,barbicans were a standard componentof most European castles - even theGozo Castrum had one and this isillustrated in D’Aleccio’s plan. It wasalso the convention to depict castralentities with such features. In any casewe known that Mdina’s barbican wasactually dismantled in 1551 because itwas then considered more of a liabilitythan an asset to the city’s defence (51);presumably it was too small to serve asa mezzaluna in the age of gunpowderdefences and must have obstructed thefield of fire from the adjoining rampartsand the newly built D’Homedes bastion.An inventory of Mdina’s artillerycompiled by Mastro Giullelmo (52) inMay 1560 does, however, mentions theneed to place cannon a basso al fiancodi Barbacana. In this case however, theword ‘barbacana’ is refering to the bententrance approach at the foot of theTorri dila Bandera rather than to the têtede ponte built in the mid-15th centurysince we known that the latter hadalready been demolished. For althoughetymologically deriving from the Arabicbab khank meaning gatehouse or gate-tower, the word is also frequently usedto describe an antemural. Nonetheless,some sort of minor outerwork seems tohave survived in the area, for in 1716 we

precaution against a coup de main, wasa common defensive feature of medievalstrongholds by the 13th century, butthe concept finds its inspiration in thedefence antecedents of the Muslimworld. The three gates were separatedby two courtyards (ingresso primo andingresso secondo). The first of thesecourtyards, confined between the PrimaPorta Principale (also known as Portadi Santa Maria) (41) and the SecondaPorta was nothing more than theintervallum between the antemural andmain wall. This enclosure contained asmall church of Santa Maria dellaPorta, an arched niche within thethickness of the wall containing an altar,and an arcaded loggia. The secondcourtyard, on the other hand, stretchedawkwardly beyond the line of the wallsinto the town and seems to have been,as suggested by Fiorini & Buhagiar,merely an adaptation of part of therooms and corridors of the castle after itwas pulled down in 1453. (42) So muchso that it seems to have served mainlyas a ‘suq’ with a number of botteghecut into two of its walls. (43) The gatesthemselves would have been of the typestill to be seen at Greeks Gate, on theother end of the Mdina front - with avaulted pointed arch of horseshoeprofile. The present walled-up gate tothe right of the main baroque entrancemarks the exact site of the originalmedieval entrance but its boxedrectangular mouldings and rusticatedpilasters indicate an early 17th centuryreconstruction. In 1527, the main gate


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read of the ‘muro che cinge il corpo diguardia avanti la porta’.(53)Little hassurvived to date of the original fabric ofthe medieval fortress of Mdina. Theonly indication of the true nature andtexture of the castle’s ramparts comesfrom the sole surviving section ofmedieval wall still to be seen at Greek’sGate. Apart from the vestiges of thegate itself with its pointed arch there isthe adjoining stretch of vertical curtainwall some 3 metres thick and 10 metresin height. This wall is built mainly ofcoursed rubble-work with increasinglylarger stone boulders in the lowercourses, many of which appear to havebeen re-utilised from some earlierRoman, possibly Punic buildings, orramparts. The practice of cannibalisingancient structures for their buildingmaterials is encountered throughout theMediterrranean during the Middle Ages.To mention one example, the fortress ofBodrum was built with material quarriedfrom the site of the famous Maussoleonat Harlicarnassus. More evidence forthe reuse of classical masonry in themedieval ramparts of Mdina has alsocome up during archaeologicalexcavations in Inguanez Street andXaghra Palace. The site at InguanezStreet revealed that the old medievaltown walls along the land front wereconstructed with much use of ancientmasonry blocks. The walls of theancient city, particularly in the Rabatarea would have provided a goodsource of building material. In 1724,officials of the Università of Notabilecould still write of the presence of a‘pedamento di muro di pietra rustica inthe vicinity of Greek’s Gate claiming thatthis wall was quell’istesso che facevacircuito alla città che era grande fin ilfosso di S. Paolo extra muros: il giadetto muro continuva per sopraGhariexem e passa da diversi luochi’.(54) It is difficult to reconcile the textureof the surviving remains with the manyreferences to the repeated use ofcantuni and balati employed in therepair and maintenance of the rampartsthroughout the 15th and early 16thcenturies, since the latter imply walls ofmore regular ashlar construction suchas can be still seen on the projectingrounded wall-tower on Mdina’s northwall. Even then, the outer masonryshell of this remnant of a medieval walltower could actually date to much later

Hospitaller times when most of the oldwalls had to be rebuilt. In 1693, forexample, Blondel was still effectingrepairs to ‘l’anticaglie spolpate e daltempo smosse, e consumateall’esterno’.(55)

Of crenellations, drop boxes,machicolations, arrow-slits, loopholesand gun loops there is very littlesurviving evidence. However, as averitable fortress, the ramparts of Mdinawould surely have been fitted withmany such features. But these, havingcrowned the crest of the ramparts wouldhave been the first to disappear. If thegenerous use of well-built galleriji tal-mishun on the Gauci tower erected inthe first half of the 1500s by the Captainof the Naxxar militia is anything to goby, then piombatoi seem to have beena regular adjunct of local defences andmust have punctuated the ramparts ofthe island’s main fortress with similarease, particularly in the vicinity ofgateways. The presence of similar box-machicoulis on other towers around theisland, particularly at Birchircara andQrendi (Torri Cavalieri), built well intothe 16th century, also reflects an insulartendency towards technological dragdespite the introduction and widespreaduse of firearms. The Gozo Citadel tooretained various elements that hintlikewise although we know that thecause in this case was the Order’sreluctance to invest in its re-fortification. The Gauci tower alsoprovides unique examples of cruciformslits cut in the faces of themachicolation for use with crossbows.By the early 16th century, Mdina’sgarrison contained both balistrieri andscopetieri and its parapets would havebeen required to provide the necessaryfacilities for its defenders. Cannon toobecame an important element in itsdefence. The documents reveal thepresence of many bombardi by the late15th century. The author has foundtwo remnants of circular gunloops stillin situ on a section of the main wallsituated behind De Redin Bastion. Gunsof the period would still have beenmounted on low static cippi andcavalcature which required apertures,or gun loops, cut low in the parapets inorder for the guns to be fired. By 1522,however, the parapets of the fortressmay even have begun to be fitted with

embrasures to take more modern cannonsuch as the columbina (culverin)mentioned in the mandati and otherstypes mounted on carriages with loruroti. (56)

Despite the increasing reliance ongunpowder artillery for its defence, thefortress of Mdina was stillpredominantly a medieval strongholdgeared towards a medieval form ofwarfare at the time of the coming of theKnights to Malta in 1530. It remainedso, well into the 16th century and onlyreally shed its medieval skin in the earlydecades of the 18th century when itsramparts, and a large part of its publicand private buildings were practicallyrebuilt anew during the reign of GrandMaster Manoel de Vilhena. Theextensive nature of that rebuildingprogramme has meant that very little ofthe old fortress has survived aboveground. The graphic reconstruction ofthe of Mdina’s medieval rampartspresented here is based on the elementsdiscussed above and shows thefortifications as these may have stoodin the late 15th and early 1500s prior to thearrival of the Order in Malta. Author’sNoteI would like to thank Mr. NathanielCutajar BA (Hons) Archaeology MA for hishelp, guidance, and encouragement in thepreparation of this paper, and with whom Ialso had many opportunities to discuss thissubject at length. Some of the ideaspresented here actually owe their origin toMr. Cutajar himself and I hope that he willbe developing these further through thecourse of his own specialized studies in themedieval archaeology of Mdina. I am alsograteful to Mr. Paul Saliba BA (Hons)Archaeology, for drawing my attention tocertain archaeological and historical facts,the existence of various old texts and otherrelevant information.

References and Notes

1. Archivo di Stato di Palermo RC 49, f.51 as quoted in Fiorini & Buhagiar, Thedefence and Fortifications of Mdina inMdina the Cathedral City, vol. II, p. 443(Malta - 1996). 2. Fiorini & Buhagiar,op.cit. 2 Vols. 3. Gio. Francesco Abela,Della Descrittione di Malta, p. 31 (Malta -1647). 4. Giliberto Abbate’s report ofc.1241, quoted in Luttrell A., 1992 and note1 supra. 5. Monreal Y Tejada, L., MedievalCastles of Spain, p.16 (Madrid - 1999). 6.Acta Juratorum, doc. 10 (1540) as quoted inFiorini & Buhagiar, op.cit., p. 443. 7.


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Bonanno A., Roman Malta, pp.19-21(Formia - 1992). 8. A naturally defensivesite used as a refuge place in times ofdanger, see Winter, F.E., GreekFortifications, p. 16 & footnote 65 pp.31-32 (Canada - 1971). 9. Azzopardi, G.,Papers in Maltese Linguistics, p.216(Malta –1970): ‘Arabic ‘almadina’ is theprincipal city, the city held in highestregard.’ Other cities bearing the same nameare MEDINA (Caccaino & Castronuovo,Palermo, and Badajoz, Cadiz & Valladoid inSpain), ALMEDINA (Cuidad Real),ALMEDINILLA (Cordoba), ALMUDINA(Alicante), MADINA (Guipuzcoa);Cagiono de Azevedo, The 1970 Campaignin Missione Archaeologica a Malta,Campagna di Scavi 1970, p.103 (Rome –1973); ‘… and manifestations even in thelate Roman and Byzantine ages, not only inconnection with the church … but also withfortifications and defensive works,particularly M21, M26, M27,M34 whichtake us back to the age of the Arab conquestand testify that it did not happen in onemoment, but rather that it concluded a longseries of decades of war’. 10. Al-Himyarîfirst referred to Mdina as an ancient cityinhabited by the Byzantines. In the year225 (870 AD) the Arabs under Sawada IbnMuhammad captured the fortress of Maltaand demolished it, dismantling manybuildings and carrying away the stones tobuild a castle in Susa. Thereafter the islandremained practically uninhabited for some180 years and was only re-peopled by theArabs in the year 440 (1048-49 AD) whorebuilt its city to make it ‘ a finer place thanit was before’, Brincat, J.M , Malta, 870-1054: Al-Himyarî’s Account, p.11 (Malta –1991). The Muslim cemetery within theRoman town-house is post 1090 AD, i.e. itdates to after the plunder of the Malteseislands by Count Roger, Trump, D., Malta,An Archaeological Guide, p.23 (London –1972).11. Fiorini & Buhagiar, op.cit., p.444. 12. ibid. 13. Procopius of Caesarea,Buildings, ii. 5,8-9, ed. J. Haury p. 38(Leipzig - 1913), translated by H.B.Dewing; London 1940, cited in T.E.Lawrence, Crusader Castles p. 27 (Oxford- 1990 edit) edited by Denys Pringle. 14.Lawrence, op.cit., pp.26-27. 15. Archivesof the Cathedral Museum, Mdina , Misc.437 cited in Fiorini & Buhagiar p.458. 16.Messana G., La Medina di Tripoli inQuaderni Dell’Istituto Italiano di Cultura diTripoli, p. 16 (Roma - 1979); Rossi, E.,Storia di Tripoli e Della Tripolitania DallaConquista Araba al 1911, p. 26 (Roma -1968) 17. Wettinger, G., The Jews inMalta in the Late Middle Ages, p. 16 (Malta- 1985). 18. Creswell, K.A.C., A ShortAccount of Early Muslim Architecture,p.231, (Scolar Press - 1989 ed. revised andsupplemented by James W. Allen). Fiorini

& Buhagiar, op.cit., p.450. 19. Lawrence,T.E., op.cit., pp.27-29 : (Oxford - 1990edit) edited by Denys Pringle; Gabriel, A.,La Cité de Rhodes, p. 133 (Paris - 1921).21. Fiorini & Buhagiar, op.cit., foot note30. 22. Gabriel, op.cit, pp. 122-133;Spiteri, S.C,. Fortresses of the Cross -Hospitaller Military Architecture, pp. 77-81 (Malta - 1994). 23. Fiorini & Buhagiar,op.cit., p.452. 24. National Library ofMalta, University of Notabile, Ms. 187 (?)f.76 (1724). 25. ibid. 26. National LibraryOf Malta, University of Notabile, Ms. 12,f.48 (4.xi.1513) mentioned in Fiorini &Buhagiar, op.cit., p.446: For the Serbelloniplan see Ganado, A., Sixteenth CenturyManuscript Plan of Mdina by GabrioServelloni in Mdina and the Earthquake of1693 ed. by J. Azzopardi, pp.77-83 (Malta- 1993). 27. Abela, op.cit., p.31; for a moredetailed evaluation of this aspect see Fiorini& Buhagiar pp.443-445. 28. Mifsud 1918-19. 29. Archives of the Cathedral Museum,Mdina, Misc. 27 as cited in Fiorini &Buhagiar, op.cit., p.445. 30. Mifsud, A.,La Milizia e Le Torri Antiche in Malta,extracted from Archivum Melitense, p.17(Malta - 1920). 31. Cathedral MuseumMdina - Cathedral Archives MS.60. 32.Archives of the Cathedral Museum, Mdina,Ms. 737 f.363 as quoted in Mifsud, p. 17.33. For more information on Swabiancastles in Italy see Itinerari Federiciani inPuglia - Viaggio nei castelli e nelle dimoredi Federico II in Svevia, edited by CosimoDamiano Fonseca, (Bari - 1997). 34.Archivo di Stato di Palermo RC 49, f.51 ascited in Fiorini & Buhagiar, op.cit., p.443.35. Archives of the Cathedral Museum,Mdina, Misc. 441,Quire B, ff.1-32 quotedin Fiorini & Buhagiar, op.cit., p.466 - NLMUniv. Ms. 84, ff.366-636. 36. NationalLibrary of Malta, University Ms. 13, f.356. 37. Wettinger 1982-87; documentaryreferences to ‘’Rocca’ are discussed in moredetail in Fiorini & Buhagiar pp. 450-452.38. National Library of Malta, Archives ofthe Order of St. John (A.O.M.) 1016, f.157 (21 February 1693). 39. A.O.M. 1016,f.480 (24 May 1701). 40. A.O.M. 1017,f.90 ( 1717). 41. A.O.M. 1016 f. 157. 42.Fiorini & Buhagiar, op.cit., p.447. 43.Cathedral Museum Mdina - CathedralArchives MS.60. 44. Fiorini, S., The‘Mandati’ Documents at the Archives ofthe Mdina Cathedral, Malta 1473-1539,Mandati 2, f.262, p. 103 (Malta - 1992).45. ibid., Mandati 3, f.691, p.175. 46.ibid., Mandati 3, f.623, (1538) p.170. 47.ibid., Mandati 2, 160 (1527), p. 96; fordefinition of porta falsa see G. GrassiDizionario Militare Italiano p. 392(Naples – 1835), ‘porticicciuola, piccolaporta munita d’un rastrello di ferro, fattanel mezzo delle cortine, o sul angolo di esse,o vicino agli orrecchioni, per andar

liberamente e fuori della visita del nemicodalla piazza alle opere esteriori’. The termPorta del Soccorso was also used todescribe a sally-port. 48. ibid., Mandat 3,f.533 (1538), p.163. 49. Abela., op.cit.,p.29. 50. Ganado, A., book review of‘Mdina, the Cathedral City of Malta’ in theTimes of Malta (Wednesday 4 December1996) p.21. 51. Abela., op.cit., p.29. 52.Archives of the Catheral Museum, Mdina,Misc.34, ff.682v-3, cited in Mifsud,op.cit., p. 17 and Fiorini & Buhagiar,op.cit., p.474. 53. A.O.M. 1017, f. 41(1716). 54. National Library of Malta,University Ms. Vol. 187, f. 81 (1724). 55.A.O.M. 1016, f.157. 56. Fiorini, op.cit.,Mandati 1, f. 283b, p. 190; Mandati 3, f.687v, p.199.


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An appreciation of the fortifications in thelocality of the village of Naxxar, or of anyother locality in Malta and Gozo for thatmatter, cannot be undertaken in isolation.The smallness of the island, coupled withits limited resources, ensured that thecountry had to be defended as one entity.Throughout most of its long historyMalta could only support a sole urbancentre, and although with the coming ofthe Knights a second developed withinthe Grand Harbour area, most of the landremained basically subservient to thisarrangement. Outlying district assumedtheir importance, and were in turncommensurably fortified, only in relationto the role each was required to play inthe defence of the whole. No particulararea was fortified in order to satisfy localneeds but only because it fitted within anoverall defensive strategy. Of course,some outlying settlements did seek toprotect themselves from the ever-presentthreat of unannounced corsair incursionswith the building of the occasional towerof fortified farmhouses, but these werepredominantly domestic rather thanmilitary structures. In times of greatdanger, occasioned by serious razzie andoutright invasions, it was only within theislands’city walls that the ruralinhabitants could find some sort of shelter.

The only exception to this rule seems tohave occurred during the Bronze Age

period when human settlement in Maltaapparently revolved around a number offortified villages occupying variouselevated defensible sites spread aroundthe island (1). The presence of a numberof such fortified settlements tends tosuggest that this was a time of conserableinsecurity occasioned more as a result ofinter-village struggles over the island’sdwindling resources rather than as areaction to outside attack. (2) But fromPunic times onwards, the threat becamepurely of one of sea-borne attack and thedefence of Malta came to rest on a singlepoint of refuge at the fortified town ofMelita, later Mdina, together with a stringof lookout posts and a few towers spreadaround the coastline to warn of impendingdanger. A similar situation developed inthe sister island of Gozo where the site ofthe present Cittadella and its suburb ofRabat became the main settlement. Fromaround the late 12th century onwards acastle appeared inside the Grand Harbourbut this was intended mainly to protectnaval interests. The defence of theharbour area only began to assumestrategic importance with the coming ofthe Knights and it was undoubtedly withthe erection of the fortresses of Birgu andSenglea, and more importantly Valletta,that the focus of human settlement inMalta shifted to, and became securelyanchored in, this part of the island.

Nonetheless, the value of the outlyingareas to the defence of the majorsettlements, whether these were thecentral fortified Punic or Medieval town,or the coastal fortresses in the harbourarea, was always a critical one. Theneed for a reliable system to warn ofapproaching danger dictated that manyareas along the coastline had to serveas lookout posts or mustering areas forlocal militia forces. The ever-increasingmilitarisation which accompanied theHospitaller and British occupation ofthe island witnessed the fortification ofmany of these places. Some areas, bytheir very nature and location, played amore critical role than others in assuringthe safety of the island. Naxxar was onesuch a place.

Situated a short distance inland,roughly half way along the island’snorthern coastline and crowning thesummit of a hill, itself girded by ageological fault to the north and deep

valleys to the east, the village of Naxxarcombined the defensive advantage ofdifficult accessibility with the commandinherent in elevated sites. It offered aunique vantage point withuninterrupted views of the northern halfof the island and its accessible shores.Its significance to the safety Mdina andlater Valletta revolved around itscommanding position over the maininland approaches from the manyvulnerable and accessible landing sitesalong the northern shores of the island.If there ever was a location in Maltawhich deserved the title of Wardija, itshould have been Naxxar.

The position itself, however, does notappear to have ever served as the siteof a fortified settlement in antiquitypossibly because the area was too vastto be enclosed within a fortifiedperimeter. From survivingarchaeological evidence we know thatBronze age fortified sites in Malta wereof much humbler proportions, as can bewitnessed by the remains at Il-Qala Hill,Ras-il-Gebel and Borg-in-Nadur (3),: alltook advantage of natural defensivefeatures to minimise the need for man-made ramparts. A fortified settlement ofthis type, however, does appear to haveexisted in the immediate vicinity ofNaxxar on the site now occupied by FortMosta. The French architect GeorgeGrongnet, who was obsessed withfinding the lost Atlantis, records thepresence of the remains of a citadel anda fortified settlement in the area knownas Misrah Ghonoq. (4)Unfortunatelythe construction of Fort Mosta in the1880s wiped out all such traces if thesereally existed, although one can stilldetect a large number of huge bouldersincorporated in the rubble fieldwalls inthat area.

The village of Naxxar does not appear togo back so far in time but it is stillnonetheless an old settlement, datingfrom the ninth or tenth century. It wasestablished as a parish in 1436 and hadjurisdiction over Hal Gharghur, Musta,St. Paul’s Bay, Mellieha and Marfa (6) -practically all of that part of the islandnorth of the Great Fault, the partedisabitata of Malta, roughly a third ofthe whole island.. This was a hugeresponsibility and clearly showsNaxxar’s status and importance as a

NAXXARAND ITSFORTIFICATIONS

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defence nucleus for the northernregions during the middle ages. Prof.Godfrey Wettinger has shown in hiswork on the militia list of 1419-1420 thatNaxxar and its associate villagescontributed one-eight (262 men) of theisland’s militia force, and one-fifth ofthose who owned a horse (20 out of108).(7) Under the Knights theimportance of Naxxar not onlyincreased but the village itself becamethe main staging post for the Birkirkara-Naxxar-Qormi regiment of country militiacharged with the defence of thenorthern parts of the island.

In the middle ages, the island’s militiaforce consisted of the Ghassa orMahras, a maritime watch, and theDejma an inland garrison which keptwatch day and night at a number ofstrategic places. (8) These watch dutieswere called Guardia and for this reasonmany of those places which served aslookout posts retained the nameWardija. Abela writes of a Sciaara talBieb Nasciar o’ spatio dell’entrata alNasciaro, ove e’ destinata una guardia.One other such station was on theheights of Naxxar itself, (9) preciselynear the church of St. George andanother known as Gwejdja or il-Wardijata’ San Gorg near tat-Targa. The cult ofSt. George was connected in manyways with the protection of the coastand many military posts in the parish ofNaxxar reflect this devotion. Near SanPietru in Ghargur there was a militarypost known as il Guardiia ta’ San Gorgand other churches devoted to thissaint at Mosta, on the heights ofBurmarrad, Mellieha and Ghadira alladjoined a military outpost(10). By 1628the Captain of the Naxxar Militia wasresponsible for nineteen watch postsincluding those of Lippija, della Capraand Nadur. The latter wwere thenconsidered too remote and were passedonto the responsibility of the Capitanodella Verga, to be guarded by men whoheld gabelle da Torre Falca versoBingemma, Mgarr et in sino la Ramla eda parte in dentro L’Isola verso CasalDingli (11)

The militia posts occupied naturalvantage points and were generallyunfortified. Nonetheless, a few towersdo seem to have existed even inantiquity. Abela, in 1647, for example,

records the remains of an ancient towerat a place called Burgio Torre (12) andthe militia post il-Borgio tal-Melliehe,the site of Fort St. Agatha built in 1647,tends to denote the presence of yetanother ancient military structure (13). Aclear reference to the presence of earlyfortified structures in the locality pointto the existence of a tower in the area ofBurmarrad overlooking the old port ofSalina. This was an important harbour inantiquity because it was the closestport leading to the old Capital of Mdina.This structure appears to have been stillstanding by 1565. It was only with thecoming of the Knights that militia postsbegan to receive defensive structures.Indeed, one of the Knights’ majorcontribution to the security of theisland was actually the erection of anetwork of coastal towers during thefirst half of the 17th century.

Naxxar was in fact the first localityoutside the Harbour area to receive afortified structure. This was the socalled Torri tal-Kaptan, the Captain’stower, which was erected during themagistracy of Grand Master de Valette.It was was built to house the Captain ofthe Naxxar Militia - a position alwaysheld by a Knight of the Order appointedby the Grand Master. Actually, theOrder had tried to requisition an existingtower, the Torri Gauci, which stood ashort distance away. This had beenbuilt by Francesco Gauci, possibly evenbefore the coming of the Knights, inorder to safeguard his family andproperty against corsair raids - pirateshad actually carried off Gauci’s wife.Obviously, as the only standingfortified structure in the locality, theKnights had sought to take it over fortheir own military use for in 1548,Franceso Gauci, petitioned GrandMaster Juan D’Homedes in order toretain his tower. The Grand Master andCouncil of the Order acceded to hisrequest with a decree dated 16 May1548. (14)

The Captain’s Tower was in many wayssimilar to the Gauci Tower itself. Inmany other ways it was also reminiscentof the many coastal watch towers whichthe Order had built in Rhodes duringthe previous century, particularly in itsbox-like proportions with vertical walls,and features such as the machiolated

parapet and fine mouldings framing theescuthcheons bearing the coat-of-armsof Grand Master de Valette. The tower issquare in plan and consists of threefloors, the rooms spaned by stonearches. Important defensive featureswere the piombatoi, or box-machicolations used for droppingprojectiles or other offensive materialson assailants at the foot of the tower.

These were basically open-basedbalconies supported on stone corbelsand were generally placed abovedoorways or other sensitive parts offortifications. In the Maltese language,such structures are known as Gallerijital-Mishun, a term which clearlyindicates their intended purposes - thatof dropping boiling water on assailants.These piombatoi were actually medievaldefensive features that had by thendisappeared from the bastionedfortifcations and other new militarystructures of the period. That they werestill being incorporated into 16thcentury towers should not be sosurprising for the towers were designedonly to resist small scale attacks, by

Gauci Tower

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raiders unequipped with cannon.Machicolation helped defend againstassault and escalade. These were stillbeing added to the coastal towers in the17th century, but more as decorativeretardataire features rather thanimportant elements in the defence. Aunique and interesting featureappertaining to this tower is thecolumbaria set within the four-foothigh parapet on the roof. Pigeons werethen an important means for relayingmessages and this tower would haveserved a critical role, given its position,in relaying messages from Gozo to theGrand Harbour.

At Torri Gauci, the structural form of thetower is much more business-likedespite it being an earlier building thanthe Captain’s Tower. The morepronounced battered lower half of thetower and the ring of box-machicoulisprojecting from the high parapet,together with an ample provision ofmusketry loopholes and vision slitsmade it definitely much easier to defendthan its neigbour. A tendency to endowlocal towers with box-machicolulis isalso encountered also at Torre Cavalieriat Qrendi and and the Torricella atB’Kara, both apparently early 16thcentury structures. From FrancescoGauci’s own petition we know that thistower cost 400 scudi to build andinternally consisted of three floors (15)

Between them, Torre Gauci and theCaptians tower, together with Torre Falchaon the Dwejra heights below Mdina,comprised the Island’s most important

northern-most defensive structures forthe duration of the 16th century. That theywere important landmarks is attested byone of D’Aleccios fresco’showing a mapof Malta, where they are distinctyillustrated. These are again depicted inthe panel showing the final battle betweenthe Gran Soccorso and the Turkish troopsdisembarked at St. Paul’s Bay, a battlewhich was faught around the plains ofBurmarrad. D’Aleccio’s map also revealsthe existence of two other towers in thenearby Casal Gregor (Gharghur), anothertwo small ones down near the salinenuove and a third at Monte Aliba southof the chapel of Lunciata overlooking theFomm-ir-Rih. None of these towers haveactually survived.

The construction of the Chapel of St. Paulin 1696 immediately in front of Gauci Towersignifies that the latter had by then lostits defensive value. Even the Captain’stower had assumed the semblence of aresendence rather than a military structurefor during this period the burden of thecoastal watch and the defence of thenorthern parts of Malta had fallen on atotally new set of dedicated defensivestructures - the coastal towers built byGrand Masters Wignacourt, Lascaris andDe Redin. (16)

With the Order of St. John firmly settledin their new fortress of Valletta, the Ordercould afford to invest some of itsresources in securing the island’s ruralareas. The building of a string of watch-towers gave the Knights an effectiveearly warning system to signal theapproach of enemy vessels and at thesame time enabled them to resist enemyforces at the point of landing. Indeed, thefirst coastal towers built during themagistracy of Grand Master Alof deWignacourt were designed and intendedmore as forts rather than simple vedettes.These sturdy, massive structures, the firstof which was built at St. Paul’s Bay(actually the first coastal tower was builtin Gozo in 1605 with the money left byGrand Master Garzes), mounted heavyartillery and accommodated smallgarrisons which, in times of impending,were augmented by mercenary and cavalrydetachments to help defend the landingareas in the vicinities of the towers.During the reign of his successor, GrandMaster Lascis-Castellar, the emphasis oncoastal defence shifted from large towers

to smaller watch-towers erected at GhajnTuffieha, Lippija, Nadur, Qawra, St.George’s Bay and Wied iz-Zurrieq, andpossibly another at Ta’ Capra. This towerdefinitely existed during the mid 17thcentury though, according to the Order’sresident engineer Mondion, was alreadyin ruins in 1730, having been built at theedge of a fragile cliff overlooking Fomm-ir-Rih. The limiting factors that haddetermined the reduction in the size of thecoastal towers and the change in their rolewere basically ones of manpower - theOrder did not have the manpower to postlarge detachments of troops at everypossible landing place. (17)

An attempt to revert to large coastaltowers was undertaken in 1649 with theconstruction of St. Agatha’s Tower(TorreRossa) at Mellieha since this was a largeand important bay that had to bedefended. By the time of the next phaseof coastal- tower construction during thereign of Grand Master De Redin thepreference for smaller signaling posts hadonce again taken over though unlike theones built earlier in the 1630’s, those builtby De Redin were also designed to takearillery. Grand Master De Redin paid forthirteen coastal watch-towers, the first ofwhich was built at Ghajn Hadid, north ofSelmun. Together, all the towers formed achain of communication since each wassited in such a way to enable signals tobe relayed visually from one post to thenext all the way down to Valletta. Withthese towers the Knights re-organised thesystem of coastal watch because localmilitia guards were replaced by fixedgarrisons paid for by the Universita. Eachtower was manned by a bombardier andthree assistants with annual salaries of30 and 24 scudi respectively. What thisactually meant was that coastal guardduty was given a national rather thanparochial organisation - the assistants tothe Castellano at Torre St. Agatha in 1650,for example, Gregorio Seychel and AngeloPsaila, both came from Casal Zebbug, aparish whose traditional militiaresponsibilities lay much further souththan Naxxar.(18)

Around 1660, there were in all thirteenmilitary coastal towers guarding theIsland’s shores north of Madliena. Ofthese, two towers fall nowadays withinthe locality of Naxxar, namely those ofQalet Marku and Ghallis. The Ghallis

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Tower was the second of the De Redintowers to be built in the year 1568 andcost 426 scudi. It controlled, together withQawra Tower, the entrance into Salina Bay.Qalet Marku Tower, too, was built in 1658and cost 408 scudi. Like all De Redintowers, these two towers were some thirtyfeet square in plan and about thirty-sixfeet high. Internally they had two vaultedrooms, one on each floor with the mainand sole entrance located securely on thefirst floor and reached by a woodenretractable ladder. The base of the tower,right up to the level of the lower cordonwas given a pronounced batter but abovethis, the walls rose vertical to terminate ina low parapet fitted with shallowembrasures clearly designed to permit thefiring of small cannon. A spiral staircaseset into the thickness of the wall just tothe left of the main entrance led to theroof. The De Redin towers held only smallartillery pieces, generally one or two 3-pdr iron cannon kept mostly for signallingpurposes; comparatively, the Lascaristowers could only mount spingardi. In1659 all watch towers were each issuedwith two moschettoni di posta, or largeheavy muskets (18).

After the death of Grand Master de Redinin 1660, the enthusiasm for coastaldefences appears to have waned and forthe next fifty-five years the knightsshowed little interest in the coastaldefences. The lessons learnt in the 17thcentury , however, were quickly forgottenat the beginning of the 1700s when theKnights again embarked upon thefortification of every bay and inlet aroundthe island with batteries, redoubts andcoastal entrenchments. In 1714, Arginyand De Fontet, two commissioners offortifications, together with Order’ssecond engineer, Francois Bachelieu,proposed that those beaches where alarge army could disembark, be protectedby batteries and entrenchments. Between1714 and mid-1715, a total of 8067 scudiwas spent on the construction ofbatteries around the coasts of Malta andGozo and with the arrival of . With thearrival of the Grand Prior of France, theBali de Vendome, the scheme for thefortification of the coastline was given anadded impetus, not the least because ofhis handsome financial gift to the Orderto be employed in coastal works. Thereasoning behind this strategy of coastaldefence hinged around the notion that the

fortification of the bays would prevent theenemy from attempting to disembark histroops, and in trying to do so, the losseswould be so high that enemy forces wouldbe unable to mount a siege, ..fortificarele Marine in tal maniera che il nemiconormalmente non possa fare nessunsbarco o tentendolo, si facci tantaperdita di gente, che poi non sia in statodi fare l’assedio (19)

The main elements in the coastal systemof defensive as laid down by the Frenchengineers consisted of gun-batteries,infantry redoubts and entrenchmentwalls. Where opportune, existing towerswere to be incorporated into thescheme. Gun batteries, whose role wasto engage the enemy warships with theirheavy cannon, consisted of solidplatforms generally fitted withembrasures and protected to the rearby blockhouses and loopholed wallswith redans. There was no standardplan to the design of caostal batteriesand although most were given semi-circular gun-platforms, such as found atQawra point, Mistra, Ta’ L-Ahrax,Armier, Wied Mousa, Ghallis etc, therewere also pentagonal, Qalet Marku, andtriangular (Qala Lembi) layouts,depending on tactical requirementsdictated by the desired fields of fire.

The redoubts were to serve as ainfantry strongpoints and althoughthere was an attempt to build astandardised pentagonal pattern suchas the one still to be found at Bahar ic-

Caghaq. Armier, M’Scala, they too camein many shapes and sizes; a few likethose of Kalafrana, M’Xlokk andBirzebbuga were built in the form oftowers or blockhouses, in a similarmanner to the French tour-reduit. Themost ambitious of all the elements ofcoastal defence were undoubtedly thecoastal entrehcment walls. These wereintended to stretch for miles on endinorder to seal off all accessible bays. Inthe end only particular short sterches ofcoastline came to be defended in thisway with solidly built ramparts such asstill to be found at Armier, Tas Kassisu(Mellieha), Qawra and Madliena thouheven these were never actuallycompleted as can be witnessed by thesurviving remains and partiallyexcavated ditches. In the end mostentrenchments came to consist of theless durable pietra a secco walls whichwere little better than rubble field walls.

In reality the scheme was to prove tooambitious since the knight did not havethe resources to cover every single baywith fortified works, nor, as it turned outduring the general alarm of 1722, the

Naxxar Entrenchment


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manpower to man all the batteries,redoubts and long entrenchment walls.Consequently a new defensive positionwas chosen along the line of the greatfault and trenches built at San Pawl tat-Targa. and a decade later at ta’ Falcalimits of Mgarr. That at Naxxar is thebest preserved and consist of four v-shaped redans linked together bystraight curtain walls built in the form ofa trinciera di pietra a secco. Theimportance of this entrenchment isattested by the fact that it wasincorporated into the trace of theVictoria lines nearly two centuries later.For the Naxxar entrenchmentcommanded an important road leadingdown to and from the plain of Burmarradand the northern coastline.

The last element of coastal defence,proposed in 1715, but only incorporatedin 1741, was the fougasse. This was a kindof massive rock-hewn stone-firing mortar.Some 48 were built around the shores ofMalta and fourteen in Gozo. Tow of thebest examples of the few fougasses stillto be found are located at Salina Bay, oneof which is placed within the Ximenesredoubt. Anoher fougasses was sitedacross the bay inside the Perellos redoubt,now demolished.

Throughout the 18th century the island’smilitia force was organised into sixregiments of country militia, with theregiments of Naxxar, B’Kara and Qormigrouped toget1her into a NorthernBrigade. Its headquarters was located atBirguma in the limits of Naxxar.(20) The

Northern Brigade was charged with thedefence of the northern parts of the islandbeginning from St. Julians Bay. In 1716,the Regiment of Naxxar consisted of 477men and was responsible for defendingthe stretch of coastline called il-Fliegu,between Torri l’Ahrax and Cirkewwa. Thisarea contained three coastal batteries(Wied Mousa, Vendome and l’Ahrax),three redoubts (Raml;a tal-Bir, Barrireaand Hossiliet), an entrenchment at Armierand a De Redin coastal tower. (20)

None of these fortifications served to playany significant role during the tragicFrench invasion of the island in 1798, theonly instance when the network of coastaldefences, built at such cost, was actuallyput to the test. French troops under thecommand of General Baragey D’Hillierslanded at Mellieha and St. Paul’s bay,where the defences there were under thecommand of the Knights De Bizier and DeLa Penouse respectively, while Fort St.Agatha was under the command of theknight St. Simon. The Maltese soldiersoffered what little resistance they couldbefore hastily retreating to Mdina. AsD’Hilliers made his way southwards hemet some resistance from the BailliTommasi and his troops firing from behindthe Naxxar entrenchments, also defendedby the detachments from the Regiment ofNaxxar militia under the Knight De Paes,but Grand Master Hompesch had orderedthis regiment to take up new positionscloser to Mdina, possibly at the Falca,and its place was taken by another 400men who offered some resistance beforeabandoning their position. Meanwhileother French troops established abeachhead at at St. George’s Bay and acolumn under under Brigadier GeneralLannes advanced north to capture thedefences of Madliena and Bahar-icCaghaq. (21)

Most of the coastal defences wereretained by the British throughout the firstdecades of the 19th century but graduallymany of these military works were handedover to the civilian government as theywere no longer considered necessary forthe defence. The majority of the towersand batteries had been shed off by themilitary by the late 1830’s. Therefater noneof these works were to feature in theislands’defensive stategy, particularlyafter 1860 when the the British graduallyabandoned the idea of resisting the

enemy on the coast, adopting instead amighty fortress system conceivedprimarily for the defence of the GrandHarbour.

Initially the original British plan was fora girdle of detached forts placed oncommanding ground one mile inadvance of the existing harbourfortifications but by 1866 that schemeproved particularly difficult toimplement mainly due to the creation ofsuburbs around the Grand Harbour. Areconsideration of these circumstancesled to the adoption of defensive aposition far in advance of that initiallyentartained. The ridge of commandingground north of the old Cty of Mdina,cutting transversely across the widthof the island at a distance varying from4 to 7 miles from Valletta was chosen asthe new defensive perimeter. The newdefensive strategy sought to seal off allthe area around the harbour within anextended box-like perimeter, with thedetached forts on the line of the greatfault forming the north west boundary,the cliffs to the south forming a naturalinaccessible barrier, while the north andeast sides were to be defended by a lineof coastal forts and batteries. (22)

General Adye, in 1872, rightly observedthat the new line of defence along theridge was to a certain extent a revival ofthe original views of the Knights ofMalta. As already shown above, theidea of using the Great Fault as adefensive position dated back to 1722when the Hospitallers establishedinfantry entrenchments San Pawl tat-Targa and Ta’ Falca. In the followingyear, the Defence Committee approvedAdye’s proposals and recommended thestrengthening of |Ithe already strongposition between Bingemma Hills andthe Heights above St. George’s Bay.|i In1875, work began on what was originallyto be called the |INorth-West Front,|i astring of isolated forts and batteriesdesigned to stiffen the escarpment.Three strong forts were built along theposition, those at Bingemma (1874) andMadliena (1878) to control the westernand eastern extremities respectively,while that at Mosta (1878) commandedthe centre. The first fort to be built wasFort Bingemma. By 1878, work had stillnot commenced on the two other fortsand the entrenched position at Dwejra.

Ghajn Tuffieha Tower


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In 1878, General Simmons recommendedthat the old Knights’ entrenchmentslocated along the line of the escarpmentat Targa and Naxxar were to be restoredand incorporated into the defences.This opinion was once again stated byGenerals Nicholson and Goodenough in1888. Although they were against thereconstruction and re-utilisation of theold Falca lines they were totally infavour , reutilising the Naxxarenbtrenchments since thesecommanded the main road from St.Paul’s Bay which passed through themat a distance of around half a mile inadvance of the village of Naxxar. On thisaccount Nicholson and Goodenoughconsidered it desirable to reconstructthose parts of the old entrenchmentwhich commanded the road. They evenunderlined the importance of defendingthe village of Naxxar, |Ia position .... ofgreat importance,|i in the event of alanding in St. Paul’s Bay (ibid.).(23)

The forts on the defensive line weredesigned with a dual land/coastaldefence role in mind, particularly theones on the extremities. But due to thetopography in the northern part of theisland, there were areas of dead groundalong the coast and inland approacheswhich could not be properly covered bythe guns of the main forts. By 1878, itwas considered desirable that newworks should be thrown up betweenForts Mosta and Benjemma, andemplacements for guns placed in them.It was similarly considered advisable tohave new emplacements for guns built

to the left of Fort Madliena and in thearea between that Fort and FortPembroke. The latter fort was built onthe eastern littoral below and to the rearof Fort Madliena, in order to control thegap caused by the accessible shorelineleading towards Valletta. Gun batterieswere eventually proposed at Targa,Gharghur and San Giovanni. Only thatof San Giovanni, was actually built andarmed, while the two at Gharghur werenever constructed. Targa Battery, on theother hand, although actually built,encountered much criticism and wasnever permanently armed.

Although initially designed as a seriesof detached strong points, thefortifications along the North WestFront were eventually linked together

by a continuous infantry line and thewhole fortified traced was christianedthe Victoria Lines in order toCommemorate the Diamond Jubilee ofQueen Victoria in 1897. The longstretches of infantry lines linking thevarious strong points, consisting inmost places of simple masonry parapet,were completed on 6th November 1899.The cost of the work, including thebuilding of the defence wall, the formingof the patrol path and the scarping ofthe cliff face, covering an 100 acres ofland, was 15,882 - more than the doublethe estimated figure submitted when theworks were authorized on 27thNovember 1897. (24)

The trace of the intervening stretchesfollowed the configuration of the crestof the ridge along the contours of theescarpment. The nature of the wall,varied greatly along its length butbasically consisted of a sandwich typeconstruction, with an outer and innerrevetment bonded at regular intervalsand filled in with terreplein. The averageheight of the parapet was about 1.5meters topped by a musketry parapet. In

Fort Madalena


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places, the deblai from scarping wasdumped in front of the wall to helpcreate a glacis and ditch. The rockyground immediately behind the parapetwas frequently fashioned out to providea walkway, or patrol path, along thelength of the wall. A number of valleysinterrupted the line of the natural fault,and at such places, the continuation ofthe defensive perimeter was onlypermitted with the construction ofshallow defensible masonry bridges, ascan be still seen today at Wied il-Fahamnear Fort Madliena, Wied Anglu andBingemma Gap. Other bridges, nowdemolished, existed at Mosta Ravineand Wied Filip.(25)

During the last phase of theirdevelopment, the Victoria Lines werestiffened with a number of batteries andadditional fortifications. An infantryredoubt was built at the westernextremity of the front at Fomm ir-Rihredoubt and equipped withemplacements for Maxim machine guns.The record plans of the Victoria Lines,drawn around 1901, show that manymaxim machine guns were deployedalong the length of the front and that inmost places the walls were topped byloopholes of which only very fewsections have survived to this date. In1897 a High Angle Battery was built wellto the rear of the defensive lines atGharghur and another seven howitzerbatteries, each consisting of fouremplacements for field guns protectedby earthen traverses, were built close tothe rear of the defensive line. Searchlight emplacements were built at il-Kuncizzjoni and Wied il-Faham. (26)

Described as a military position of greatstrength in 1888, this defensive frontwas nonetheless soon to lose most ofits importance. Military exercises inMay 1900 showed that the VictoriaLines could offer little effectiveresistance against assault by a largelanding force. By 1907 it had beendecided to abandon the position on theVictoria Lines as a front line of defenceand to revert to the policy ofconducting the island’s defence fromher shores. Nonetheless, the forts, withthe exception of Fort Mosta, wereretained in use by being assigned a dualcoastal/land defence role.

The need to defend and fortify thebeaches against invasion, wasseriously rekindled at the outbreak ofthe Second world war when many of theKnights’ long discarded coastaldefences, including the fougasses,were pressed back into service andincorporated, in conjunction with newdefensive structure - the concretemachine-gun pillboxes and barbed wireentaglements.The role of the concrete pillboxes wasto hinder the landings and in-landadvance of enemy forces. Spread outacross the country side in a series ofstop lines each pillbox occupied astrategic position and was cleverlycamouflaged. The earlier pillboxes andbeach post built in 1938 as a directresult of the threat of an Italian invasionfollowing the Abyssinian crisis, wereelaborately camouflaged with rubblestone cladding. In later pillboxes,however, paint-work became theaccepted method for applyingcamouflage. (27)

In the early pillboxes, all the machinegun armament was deployed frontallyand in series, generally in adjoiningpositions of two or four emplacementsthough structures for singleemplacements can also be found. Themethod of mounting the machine gunarmament involved mainly the use ofsemi-circular concrete machine guntables with or without accompanyingconcrete guncrew benches, the latterroughly semi-circular in plan.Considerable attention was given toconcealment, hence the elaborate rubblestone cladding camouflage and thecareful adaption of their form to fit thelie of the land. Such features as stonecladding camouflage, adaptation of planand shape to the requirements of thesite, the use of curved fronts and roundedges were soon abandoned in favourof pillboxes built to simpler and morestandardised patterns that lentthemselves more easily to massproduction. This, inevitably, was adevelopment which reflected a greatersense of urgency and the need for rapidconstruction that accompanied thegrowing threat of war and invasion. Asa result, by 1939, a new type of pillbox,more box-like in shape, began to appear.The second group of pillboxes, of which

there are fundamentally three basictypes, were mainly rectangular orpolygonal in plan and retained theirbare concrete finish. As these pillboxesbecame more box-like in shape, theyacquired in the process a high profilethat rendered them increasingly difficultto conceal in a predominantly flatlandscape. As a result, the onlypractical form of camouflage was todisguise them as rural building and farmhouses. Camouflage was mainly appliedin the form of paint work and sappersfrom units of the Royal Engineers unitwere detailed to undertake the work,adding features such as doors, windowsand brown lines to a sand colouredbackground. A recently restoredexample is to be found in the the ta’Allaw Ommu area just ahead of the Naxxarentrenchments. Another less commongroup of pillboxes consisted offarmhouses and other rural buildingsconverted into defence posts. On suchstructure can still be seen situatedalong the road leading from Naxxar toSan Gwann.

Another important element in theisland’s defence were the anti-aircraftbatteries. In Malta, the need for grounddefences against air attack was first feltduring World War One, when a 3-pdranti-aircraft gun was mounted on theroof of St. John’s Cavalier to helpprotect the harbour and Valletta againstthe possibility of a German Zeppelinattack (28) Although the gun wasdismantled prior to the end of the war,the post-war years were to see a gradualinvestment in anti-aircraft defences.Initially, during the 1920s, there wasonly one battery, the 10th A.A. Batteryof the 4th Heavy Brigade RoyalArtillery, equipped with 3-inch 20cwt QFAA guns. An Instructional Anti-AircraftCamp was established at Tigne and ananti-aircraft practice camp was set up atBenghisa. In 1926 an anti-aircraft rangewas set up at Torri Madliena, atPembroke and later, an RMAinstructional AA practice camp wasestablished at Gharghur, near FortMadliena. The latter was equipped withtwo 3-inch 20cwt A.A. guns on fixedmountings (29)

Malta’s anti-aircraft defences wereeventually augmented during the 1930sand by the outset of the Second World


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War these had increased to thirty-fourheavy guns and eight Bofors guns.Earlier in 1939, however, the Committeefor Imperial Defence had approved aplan to stiffen the Island’s anti-aircraftdefences with 122 heavy AA guns, 60light AA and 24 searchlights. Theimplementation of this plan wasnonetheless a slow affair and by June1940, only the searchlight equipmenthad been brought up to strength. Thesituation had, nonetheless, changedconsiderably by 1942, when the heavyanti-aircraft defences had expanded toinclude five regiments with a total of 112guns of 3-inch (16 guns), 3.7-inch (84guns) and 4.5-inch (12 guns) calibres,deployed in 29 troop positions of fourguns each, except for two 3-inch trooppositions which only had two gunseach. The light guns had also increasedto 118. Two troop positions are locatedwithin the naxxar locality, that at Blata l-Bajda, in Salina, and at Birguma. madeup a heavy anti-aircraft battery. (30)

The other adjuncts of the anti-aircraftground defences which were developedin the inter-war period were thesearchlights, the sound-locators andsound-mirrors, and radar. For earlywarning purposes, the Britishdeveloped huge acoustic mirrors,known as the sound-mirrors. The firstexample was installed on the coast ofKent during the First World War. Otherswere built at Hythe in 1926, and Abbot’sCliff in 1927, capable of detectingaircraft at a range of twenty-five miles.Larger circular ones were built in thelate 1920s. A 200-foot concrete stripmirror was built in 1929 at Lydd InMalta, a large paraboloid sound-mirrorwas built in stone at Ta’ San Pietru, nearBahar-ic-Caghaq and aimed in thedirection of Catania in order to detectaircraft approaching from Sicily. (31)The huge acoustic mirrors met with onlylimited success were superseded withradar. Radar was first brought to Maltain March 1939 when an Air MinistryExperimental Station 242 was set up atDingli Cliffs to track high-flying aircraft(Vella, 1988, p.83). By middle of 1941,three other stations had been set up atTas-Silg (AMES 501), at Madliena(AMES 502) and at Dingli (AMES 504).These were Chain Overseas Low (COL)stations which tracked medium to low-flying aircraft. Later on, they were

complemented by another four stationsat Ghar Lapsi, Qawra, Wardija, andGozo. The information gathered by thestations was relayed to theunderground War Headquarters atLascaris Bastion and to the gunbatteries themselves.(32)

These then comprise the fortifications andmilitary structures that were, and some arestill, to be found in the locality of Naxxar.In short, these can be effectively groupedinto three main categories, firstly, thosewhich were designed to watch the coast;secondly those which built to resistinvasion and thirdly, those whichcontolled the inland approaches towardsthe southern part of the island. All in alla diverse selection of defensivestructures that span over four hundredyears of history and military technology,reflecting Naxxar’s ever important role inthe defence of the island.

Sources

1. Evans, J.D., The PrehistoricAntiquities of theMaltese Islands: ASurvey (London - 1971), pp.6, 116, 229-233; Mallia, F., The Prehistoric FortifiedSites of Malta and Gozo in theProceedings of IBI, VIII Scientific Meeting19682. Blouet, B., The Story of Malta (Malta -1989 ed.) p.303. Evans, op.cit.4. Library Manuscript Ms 614 Tav. XI5. Camilleri E. & Pirota J., Naxxar Parish1600-1650, A Demographic Study(Dissertation, University of Malta 1973)p.3, quoted from Bellanti D., Why Malta?Why Ghawdex? (Gozo -1964), p.596. Camilleri E. & Pirota J., ibid7. Wettinger G., Melita Historica, Vol.V,n2 1969, pp.82-83,858. Mifsud, A., La Milizia e le torre antichedi Malta in Archivum Melitense, IV (1919),p.579. Catania P., Fortifikazzjonijiet fil-Lokalita (Tan-Naxxar), script of lecture199810. Camilleri E. & Pirota J., pp37-38,qoutated from Bezzina J., San Gorg il-Harries tax-xtajtiet article in il-Hajja23.7.1971, p.411. Archives of the University of NotabileVol. 185, ff. 124 & 124v12. Abela, G.F., Della descrizione di Malta(Malta - 1647) p.73

13. ibid., p. 6114. Archives of the Order of St. John inMalta (AOM)Vol.241, f.f.210v-21115. ibid.16. For more information on the historyand development of coastal towers inMalta see Hoppen A., The Fortificationof Malta by the Order of St. John, pp.105-125; Hughes Q., Malta, a guide tothe fortifications (Malta - 1993) pp.95-98,202-209, 278-279, 284-285: Spiteri, S.C.,Fortresses of the Cross: HospitallerMilitary Architecture, 1136-1798,pp.272-274 and 473-504.17. Ibid18. Archives of the University of NotabileVol19. AOM 1012, f.18320. Wismayer, J.M., The History of theKOMR and the Armed Forces of theOrder of St. John (Malta 1989), p.11: ForCountry Militia Regiments seeRegolamenti delli sei Regimenti diCampagna (Malta 1761)21. Testa C.,22. Spiteri, S.C., British MilitaryArchitecture in Malta (Malta 1996),pp.383-40023. ibid.24. ibid.25. ibid.26. ibid.27. ibid.28. Samut-Tagliaferro, History of theRoyal Malta Artillery, Vol I. 1800-1939(Malta 1976) p. 364.29. ibid., pp. 394-395).30. Spiteri, British Military Architecture,pp.539-55731. Hughes, op.cit., pp.58-5932. Spiteri, ibid.


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THE VICTORIALINES

byStephen C Spiteri

The complex network of linearfortifications known collectively as theVictoria Lines, cutting across the widthof the island north of the old capital ofMdina, is a unique monument of militaryarchitecture. When built by the Britishmilitary in the late 19th century, it wasdesigned to present a physical barrier toinvading forces landed in the north ofMalta and intent on attacking theharbour installations so vital for themaintenance of the British fleet, thesource of British power in theMediterranean. Although never testedin battle, this system of defences,spanning across some 12 km of land andcombining different types offortifications - forts, batteries,entrenchments, stop walls, infantrylines, searchlight emplacements andhowitzer positions - consitituted aunique ensemble of varied military

elements all brought together to enforcethe strategy adopted by the British forthe defence of Malta in the latter half ofthe 19th century. A singular solutionwhich exploited the defensiveadvantages of geography andtechnology as no other work offortifications does in the Malteseislands.

Brief Historical Note

The Victoria Lines owe their origin to acombination of international events andthe military realities of the time. Theopening of the Suez Canal in 1869,pushed the importance of the Malteseislands to the fore, particularly

By 1872, the coastal works hadprogressed considerably well ahead butthe question of landward defences hadremained unsettled. Although the girdleof forts proposed by Col. Jervois in1866 would have considerablyenhanced the defence of the harbourarea, other factors had cropped up thatrendered the scheme particularlydifficult to implement, particularly thecreation of suburbs. A regard for thesecircumstances led the military toconsider another proposal, namely, thatput forward by Col. Mann, to take up aposition far in advance of that whichhad till then been entertained..

The chosen position was the ridge ofcommanding ground north of the oldCty of Mdina, cutting transversely

across the width of the island at adistance varying from 4 to 7 miles fromValletta. There, it was believed that afew detached forts could cut off all thewesterly portion of the islandcontaining good bays and facilities forlanding. At the same time, the proposedline of forts retained the resources ofthe greater part of the country and thewater on the side of the defenderswhereas the ground required for thebuilding of the fortifications could behad far more cheaply than that in thevicinity of Valletta. Colonel Mann, R.E.,estimated that the entire cost of the landand works of the new project wouldamount to 200,000, much less than thatwhich would have been required toimplement Jervois’ scheme of detachedforts.

This new defensive strategy was onewhich sought to seal off all the areaaround the harbour within an extendedbox-like perimeter, with the detachedforts on the line of the great faultforming the north west boundary, thecliffs to the south forming a naturalinaccessible barrier, while the north andeast sides were to be defended by a lineof coastal forts and batteries. In a waythe use of the Great Fault for defensivepurposes was not an altogether originalidea for it had already been put forwardby the Hospitaller knights in the earlydecades of the 18th century when theyrealised that they did not have thenecessary manpower to defend thewhole island. Then the Knights haderected a few infantry entrenchments atstrategic places along the general line ofthe fault, namely, at Ta’ Falca and SanPawl tat-Targa, Naxxar. In actual fact, theuse of parts of the natural escarpmentfor defensive purposes can be tracedback even farther to precedingcenturies, as illustrated by the Nadurwatch-tower at Bingemma (mid-17thcentury), the Torri Falca (16th century)and the remains of a Bronze Agefortified citadel which once occupiedthe site of Fort Mosta (De Grognet).

In 1873, the Defence Committeeapproved Adye’s defensive strategyand recommended the strengthening of|the already strong position betweenBingemma Hills and the Heights aboveSt. George’s Bay. Work on what wasoriginally to be called the North-West


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Front began in 1875 with constructionof a string of isolated forts and batteriesdesigned to stiffen the escarpment.Three strong forts were built along theposition, those at Bingemma andMadliena and Mosta, designed to thewestern and eastern extremities, and thecentre of the front, respectively. The

first defence work to be built was FortBingemma. By 1878, work had still notcommenced on the two other forts andthe intrenched position at Dueira, all ofwhich were to be completed on the voteof 200,000. General Simmonsrecommended that the old Knights’entrenchments located along the line of

the escarpment at Targa and Naxxarwere to be restored and incorporatedinto the defences:

Simmons also recommended that goodcommunication roads were to be formedin the rear of the lines and while thosethat already existed were to beimproved. The fortifications of Mdina,the Island’s old citadel, were to beconsidered as falling within thedefensive system

The forts on the defensive line weredesigned with a dual land/coastaldefence role in mind, particularly theones on the extremities. But due to thetopography in the northern part of theisland, there were areas of dead groundalong the coast and inland approacheswhich could not be properly covered bythe guns of the main forts. Asa result itwas eventually realised that new worksshould be thrown up between FortsMosta and Benjemma, andemplacements for guns placed in them.It was similarly considered advisable to

Bingemma Gap Stop-wall with musketry loopholes.

Wied Anglu Stop-wall


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have new emplacements for guns builtto the left of Fort Madaliena and in thearea between that Fort and FortPembroke. The latter fort was built onthe eastern littoral below and to the rearof Fort Madliena, in order to control thegap caused by the accessible shorelineleading towards Valletta. Gun batterieswere eventually proposed at Targa,Gharghur and San Giovanni. Plans forthese works were drawn up but only

that of San Giovanni, was actually builtand armed, while the two at Gharghurwere never constructed and that at tat-Targa, although actually built, wasnever permanently.

By 1888, the line of the cliffs formed bythe great geological fault and the workswhich had been constructed along itslength from Fort Bingemma on the leftto Fort Madalena on the right,

constituted, in the words of Nicholsonand Goodenough, a military position ofGreat Strength. The main defectsinherent in the defensive position werethe extremities, where the high grounddescended towards the shore leavingwide gaps through which enemy forcescould by-pass the whole position.Particularly weak in this respect was thewestern extremity. There, a considerableinterval existed between Fort Bingemma

Musketry parapet, Bingemma Gapbefore restoration.


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and the sea: Military manoeuvres heldin the area revealed that it was possiblefor troops to land in Fomm er Rih Bayand gain the rear of the fortified lineunperceived from the existing works.To counter this threat, recommendationswere made for the construction of twoepaulments for a movable armament ofquick-firing guns or field guns, theconstruction of blockhouses, theimprovement of the wall which closedthe head of the deep valley to the southof Benjemma Fort and the strengtheningof the line of cliffs by scarping inplaces. It was also suggested that theexisting farmhouses in the area be madedefensible.

There were even suggestions for thereconstruction and re-utilisation of theold Hospitaller lines at ta Falca andNaxxar but only the latter put to use,particularly because these commandedthe approaches to the village of Naxxar,described as a position of greatimportance,in the event of a landing inSt. Paul’s Bay.

A serious shortcoming of the NorthWest Front defences was the lack ofbarrack accommodation for the troopswhich were required to man and defendthe works. The lines extended some sixmiles in length and the accommodationprovided in the forts was exceedinglyscanty. Consequently, it was considerednecessary that new barracks capable ofaccommodating a regiment (PRO MPH234) and later a full battalion of infantrywere to be built and a new site waschosen in the rear of the Dwejra Lines,at Mtarfa .Although initially designed as a seriesof detached strong points, thefortifications along the North West

Front were eventually linked togetherby a continuous infantry line and thewhole fortified traced, by then nearingcompletion, was christened the VictoriaLines in order to Commemorate theDiamond Jubilee of Queen Victoria in1897. The long stretches of infantrylines linking the various strong points,consisting in most places of simplemasonry parapet, were completed on 6thNovember 1899.

The trace of the intervening stretchesfollowed the configuration of the crestof the ridge along the contours of theescarpment. The nature of the wall,varied greatly along its length butbasically consisted of a sandwich typeconstruction, with an outer and innerrevetment bonded at regular intervalsand filled in with terreplein. The averageheight of the parapet was about 1.5meters. Frequently, the walls weretopped by loopholes of which only veryfew sections have survived to this date.In places, the deblai from scarping wasdumped in front of the wall to helpcreate a glacis and ditch. In places, therocky ground immediately behind theparapet was fashioned out to provide awalkway along, or patrol path along thelength of the line. A number of valleysinterrupted the line of the natural fault,and at such places, the continuation ofthe defensive perimeter was onlypermitted with the construction ofshallow defensible masonry bridges, ascan be still seen today at Wied il-Faham

near Fort Madliena, Wied Anglu andBingemma Gap. Other bridges, nowdemolished, existed at Mosta Ravineand Wied Filip.

During the last phase of theirdevelopment, the Victoria Lines werestiffened with a number of batteries andadditional fortifications. An infantryredoubt was built at the westernextremity of the front at Fomm ir-Rih andequipped with emplacements for Maximmachine guns. In 1897 a High AngleBattery was built well to the rear of thedefensive lines at Gharghur and anotherseven howitzer batteries, eachconsisting of four emplacements forfield guns protected by earthentraverses, were built close to the rear ofthe defensive line. Search lightemplacements were built at il-Kuncizzjoni and Wied il-Faham.

Fort Pembroke

Xaghra ta' Bingemma, parapet wall before restoration.


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THEDEVELOPMENTOF THEBASTION OFPROVENCE,FLORIANALINES

by Stephen C. Spiteri

The design and construction of theFloriana fortifications, one of the mostextensive and complex works of militaryarchitecture carried out by theHospitaller Knights in the Malteseislands proved to be a lengthy anddrawn out affair - a situation borne,primarily, out of the ambitious nature ofthe undertaking, coupled with aperennially inadequate allocation ofresources necessary for the completionof the task, and a host of technicaldifficulties encountered in adapting thesite to the design solutions imposed bythe conventions of the bastioned trace.It was particularly the latter,compounded further by a continualimprovement in the power of siegeartillery, and a parallel development inthe art of military architecture, that wasto witness a number of interventionsaimed at ‘correcting’ the perceived, andfrequently acknowledged, weaknessesinherent in Pietro Paolo Floriani’soriginal design. Nowhere was thisprocess of rectification and adaptationso evidently manifest than along theMarsamxett side of the Florianaenceinte, particularly at the Bastion ofProvence and its adjoining ramparts.The work of fortification, and re-fortification, along the Marsamxettenceinte, aside from the addition of thefaussebraye and the crowned-hornworks, accounts for the larger part

of the effort invested in thestrengthening of the Floriana defencesthroughout the late 17th and early 18thcenturies. An evaluation of thecharacter and development of thedesign of these defensive works mustinevitably depart from an understandingof Floriani’s original design and theshortcomings inherent therein.

Strategic ConsiderationsFrom a military engineers’s point ofview, Malta in the age of gunpowderfortifications offered few naturallyendowed sites that gave themselves soreadily to the founding of a piazzaforte.The nature of the local landscape rarelycombined the requisites of commandand defensibility inherent in elevatedsites with the vicinage of a safeanchorage, the presence of an adequatewater supply and a topographycongenial to the urban and socialfunctions of a city. Perhaps one of thefew exceptions to this geographicalreality was Mount Sciberras, a mile longpeninsula separating the Grand Harbourfrom Marsamxett. Its potential as averitable sito reale was immediatelyrecognized by the Hospitaller Knightslong before the actual arrival of theOrder in Malta - a commission of eightknights sent over to inspect the Islandin 1524 lost no time to point it out as theideal site for the Order’s new convent.This opinion was reiterated many timesby the Order’s military engineers in thecourse of the early half of the 16thcentury. Antonio Ferramolino,Bartholomeo Genga, and BaldassareLanci were among those who stronglyprescribed the Sciberras heights as thesolution to the Order’s defensiveproblems but on each occasion thefinancial, political, or military situationdid not favour the implementation ofany of the proposed schemes. It wasonly after the Great Siege in 1566 thatthe opportunity was found to build thedesired stronghold and the new fortifiedcity of Valletta which quickly sprang upto the design of the papal militaryengineer Francesco Laparelli did not failto exploit the potential of the site. By acareful combination of man-madebastions and ramparts, and rock hewnscarps, the rocky promontory wasfashioned into a formidable fortress,lauded and eulogized as a classic of themilitary engineer’s art.

Still, Laparelli’s fortress only occupiedpart, albeit the highest area, of thepeninsula since the fortification of thewhole promontory, down from Tarf il-Ghases up to the spring at Marsa (some3 Km) was then considered toograndiose and costly an undertaking,requiring also too many men and canonto garrison and defend. The fact thatLaparelli planted the land front of hisfortified city half way along the lengthof the promontory, however, left aconsiderable stretch of unoccupied landat the neck of the peninsula andironically, it was this ‘left-over’ extent ofground which was to feature soprominently in the defence of thefortress throughout the course of thefollowing two centuries.The reason for this occurrence layinherent in Laparelli’s own rigid design.For by the beginning of the 17thcentury, it had become difficult toreconcile developments in technologyand military architecture with the planexecuted in 1566. The increased rangeand effectiveness of artillery called for agreater depth to the defences in order toprevent the bombardment of those vitalparts of the city. Laparelli’s front, withits restricted bastions and narrow ditch,and devoid of any protective shield ofouterworks, was particularly exposed toattack. The Knights recognized thatonly substantial alterations andadditions to the old front could serve toremedy the situation.The solution that was eventuallyprescribed was the provision of asecond forward enceinte, one whichenveloped the old front within a newouter line of fortifications covering thatsame stretch of ground which had beenleft outside Laparelli’s plan. Thearchitect of this new scheme was theItalian military engineer Pietro PaoloFloriani, who had been sent by the Popeto help the Order undertake a completereassessment of the island’sfortifications following the threat of aTurkish attack in 1635. Althoughapproved and quickly initiated,Floriani’s scheme came in for muchcriticism from the very start. Hisambitious project proved more radicalthan anticipated and after his departurefrom the island the Knights began todoubt its merits. Apprehension as to thetotal cost of the undertaking and theconflicting opinions of a string of


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leading engineers consulted for theiradvice meant that the project draggedon in a dilatory and half-heartedfashion. Still, the Order had invested somuch resources in the building of theFloriana fortifications that anyabandonment of the scheme or itssubstantial alteration was alreadyunthinkable by 1640.By the time of the great general alarm of1669, following the fall of Candia to theTurks, the Floriana fortifications,although for their most part laid out toFloriani’s original blueprint, were still inan incomplete state and obviouslyconstituted a weak point in thedefences of the convent. The task ofbringing these works to completion andperfecting their design fell on theshoulders of Count Antonio MaurizioValperga, chief engineer to the duke ofSavoy who was invited to Malta by theOrder. His intervention (which was toprove one of the most consequential inthe development of the Island’sfortifications, producing the first evermaster-plan for the systematic defenceof Valletta and the harbour areas)helped reshape the Florianafortifications with the addition ofsubstantial supplementary outerworksin the nature of a so-called faussebrayeand a crowned-hornworks, togetherwith modifications to the bastionedfront itself, all intended to correct thelong acknowledged faults inherent inFloriani’s design.

Floriani’s Scheme and its FailingsEver since Floriani had traced out hisplan on site in 1635, many serious flawsbecame apparent in the layout of thenew fortifications. The weaknessesingrained in the design, and theproblems that these were perceived toentail for the proper defence of the newworks, only began to be reallyappreciated once the fortificationsbegan to take shape, slowly fashionedout as these were from the living rock.That these defects were not immediatelyclear on plan is brought out by thepraise lavished on the design byFirenzuola’s when he was consulted forhis views on the matter. Firenzuolaactually commended those elements inthe design which eventually proved tobe the main cause of concern. (1) Themain shortcomings were seen to arisefrom the fact that the front was laid out

along a straight line and that the leftravelin was overlooked by high ground.More alarming, however, was therelative weakness of the extremities ofthe front and their adjoining lateralwalls.An evaluation of these shortcomings,and consequently of the significance oflater interventions, can only follow froman understanding of Floriani’s originaldesign. This, however, is easier saidthan done for accurate details ofFloriani’s original scheme as actuallytraced out by him on site in relation tothe existing nature of the terrain arerather scanty and most of theinformation must, as a result, bededuced from a study of thearchitectural fabric and the reportsproduced by successive engineers.Although several plans attributed toFloriani have survived in the VaticanLibrary many of these seem to beproposals rather than what one wouldterm ‘record plans’ of the executeddesign. Indeed, all the plans tend todefer in their treatment of varioussalient details though all agree on theoverall character of the scheme. Theprincipal elements of the land front, themost critical part of the enceinte,comprised a large central bastion,supported by two demi-bastion and twolarge ravelins, a ditch and a narrowcovered way with star-shaped places-of-arms.Floriani had composed his whole design

around the concept that the bastions onthe Valletta front were too small andrestricted to allow a rearguard action.He therefore produced a bastioned frontwith component parts that were muchlarger than those of the mother fortress.However, the width of the peninsula atFloriana, being roughly equal to that ofthe old Valletta front, only allowed forthree large bastions. As a matter of fact,his idea was not all that original for apreference for a three-bastionedsolution was mooted many times in thecourse of the 16th century - Ascaniodella Cornia, Fratino and possibly evenGenga and Lanci had all envisaged thistype of design for a fortress on MountSciberras. The massive form ofFloriana’s central retrenched bastion,however, only just permitted two othersupporting demi-bastions, but these, tobe adequately accommodated, had to bepushed so much to the sides that theyhung on the precipitous slopesoverlooking the Grand Harbour andMarsamxett, presenting a high profileon the flanks, vulnerably exposed tobombardment from the surroundingheights. The fronts straddling theharbours, although necessary to denythe enemy a foothold on the Sciberasspenibsula, similarly provided a highprofile, for lacking a ditch and theprotection of a counterscarp, these wereeasily overlooked and enfiladed.The main front itself, sitedapproximately 800 canes from the ditch


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of Fort St. Elmo occupied the ridge of aplateau overlooking the low lyingmarshland of Marsa. This was thehighest escarpment south of the oldValletta front and its adoption asFloriani’s main line of defence was anatural logical choice. A stretch of highground in front of the Capuchinconvent, however, could not beincorporated into his symmetrical

design and as a result it immediatelycame to constitute, as acknowledged byFloriani himself, a direct threat to the leftravelin.Even the vast space enclosed by thenew enceinte was seen to constitute adefensive problem for it offered thedefenders no cover in retreat. Florianioriginally intended this esplanade toserve as an area of refuge for the ruralpopulation in times of invasion, butsubsequent military planners deemedthat this space had first to fulfill militarypriorities. During the 1640s militaryengineers put forward a variety ofremedies for this situation. LouisViscount de Arpajon and Louis Nicolasde Clerville recommended that theesplanade be covered by a hornworkemanating from Porta Reale, the mainentrance into the city. Clerville alsoproposed the construction of a numberof earthen and palisaded redoubts whilethe Marquis of St. Angelo actuallysought to retrench the whole areawithin two sets of straigtht walls,virtually converting the Florianaenceinte into a sort of large crownwork.The only intervention that was actuallyimplemented, however, was theconstruction of four counterguards anda lunette, supported by an advancedditch and covertway, designed by theMarquis of St. Angelo, but these wereintended mainly to reinforce the oldValletta front rather than secure theopen space.Faced with this inflexible and pre-castarchitectural ensemble, Valperga choseto react much in the manner of Floriani,

projecting new works ahead of the oldenceinte rather than interfere with theoriginal design. Being himself anadherent of an aggressive form ofdefence as practised all’olandese,Valperga boldly pushed out the mainfront by means of a braye and acrowned-hornwork. The latter, he placedon the left side of the enceinte tooccupy the high ground dominating St.Francis Ravelin. Only on the right demi-bastion of the Floriana front was hecompelled to modify the original layout,at the Bastion of Provence.The Bastion of ProvenceThe most inadequate of all the elementsof the Floriana enceinte proved to bethe two extremities of the linear front,the demi-bastions and their adjoininglines of lateral walls, particularly theright demi-bastion overlookingMarsamxett, known as the Bastion ofProvence. The problem with this demi-bastion was that it had too acute asalient while its long right flank was notadequately covered from adjoiningworks, leaving large areas of deadground which could not be defended orcovered by artillery fire. Its initial form,however, is not outrightly clear, bothbecause of the later alterations and alsobecause of the scarcity of documentaryevidence. All existing plans differ as tothe details of this bastion. All, however,reveal a tiered approach dictated by thesloping nature of the ground. Plan Barb.Lat. 9905/3 and I seem to be earlyproposals terminating in a flankingbattery on the Marsamxett side of theenceinte.The only plan which appears to beactually documenting the early stagesof the Floriana fortifications, andpossibly Floriani’s executed design, isBarb. Lat. 9905/4. This shows a detailedmeasured drawing of works in progress.Although undated it was definitelyexecuted prior to 1640-45 for thecounterguards added by the Marquis ofSt. Angelo do not feature on theadjoining Valletta land front. That thisplan records the works in progress isalso borne out of two other factors,namely thati) various parts of the enceinte areshown in dotted lines, indicating thatwork on these had not yet started andii) the tenailles in front of the land frontcurtains, and three of the flankingbatteries, are missing, implying that the


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depth of the walls, carved out as thesewere from the bedrock had not yetreached the desired level for thesefeatures to be hewn out. Eventuallythese features would appear whencarved out of the living rock as can stillbe seen to this day.Perhaps the closest one can arrive toFloriani’s actual design, is a small plansketched in ink and attached to hisreport dated 29th September 1636, whichhe prepared as written instructions,avvertimenti, to be followed by hisassistant the Architect Buonamici, afterhis own departure from Malta.(2) Thissketch plan shows basically the samelayout illustrated in Plan 9905/4, buthaving a stepped two-tiered salientisolated from the interior works by aditch.Plan 9905/4 also clearly indicates whythe Bastion of Provence was consideredto be the weakest part of the land front.For one thing it was the smallest of thethree bulwarks on the Floriana front;secondly, it had an acute angled salientand a relatively narrow neck or gorge,narrower, in fact from those of the mainbastions on the older Valletta front.Internally the gorge of the bastion was

itself sealed off with a cramped ritirata.The provision of internal, secondarylines of defence, in the form of lowdemi-bastioned ramparts was acharacteristic feature of Floriani’sworks, and is seen employed in all themajor elements of his design includingthe two large ravelins or mezze lune.This same approach is also noted in hisearlier works and is already well speltout in his treatise Difesa et ofesa dellepiazze.The restricted span of the gorge in theBastion of Provence only allowed for asmall and cramped arrangementincapable of containing a sizabledefensive force. The internal bastionsand curtain forming the ritiratapresented a very restricted front withlimited potential for enfilading fire.Floriani seems to have favoured retiredflanks and pronounced orillions andsimilar solutions can be found in hisearlier proposals for the fortification ofthe Cittadella of Ferrara in 1629-30.The sloping nature of the site on whichthe Bastion of Provence was built calledfor a stepped design to adapt it to thelie of the land. The highest part of thework was inevitably the left flank facing

the centre of the front. This wasoccupied by a small iregularly shapedbastion known as San Salvatore, theright elongated face of which formedpart of the ritirata within the Bastion ofProvence, while its left face and flankoverlooked the adjoining curtain laterknown as Notre Dame Curtain with itsPorta dei Pirri. The parapet along theface of the Bastion of Provencedescended in three unequal stepstowards the salient and then turnedsharply north to form a very elongatedflank facing the sea towards Msida. Thesame treatment is encountered inFloriani’s inked sketch attached to the29th September report.

La Vittoria BastionIt was the right flank of the Bastion ofProvence that was particularly exposedto artillery attack and assault since itpresented a high exposed targetunprotected by ditch and counterscarp.Above all, it was practically unflankedexcept for the provision of a smallbattery capable of mounting only asingle cannon, ‘un piccolo fiancocapace d’un sol canone’. (4)This flanking device features in


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Floriani’s plans but seems to have beenincluded merely as an after-thoughtonce it became all too clear that theexcessive length of the right flankwould create a significant weakness inthe defence. That it was consideredinadequate is attested by the reports ofboth Giovanni Bendinelli Pallavicinoand Louis Nicolas de Clerville, both ofwhom recommended that the flank ofthis bastion be protected by theaddition of a new low work in the formof a bastion or a large traverse capableof delivering the necessary enfiladingfire.An important feature of Floriani’sbastions were the internal ritirate formedfrom a ditch and scarp. The fosse at theBastion of Provence is not featured inplan 9905/4 but it appears in Clerville’sillustrated notes dating to 1645. Workon the construction of this internalobstacle was still underway duringValperga’s visit in 1670. Its constructiondoes not seem to have involved muchexcavation, however, for a study of theexisting fabric tends to imply that it wasformed by the raising of the terreplein ofthe piazza within the bastion. This waspartly made possible by raising theheight of the ramparts on thecorresponding sections of the face andflank of the bastion, thus reducing thestepped bastion from three to two tiers.Indeed, in 1670 we find mention of both

the ‘vecchia ritirata’ and the new workswhich were then underway. (5) A newgate with neo-classical architecturalfeatures (later demolished) wasconstructed in the curtain wall sitedbetween the two bastions of theritirata. (6) The construction of theentrenchment involved the cutting of aditch and material excavated thereinused as fill in the construction of a newbastion and the basso forte. (7)

The resultant heightening of theramparts gave the bastion acharacteristic profile quite distinct fromthe other two bastions on the Florianalandfront since the walls on the northflank of the bastion of Provence arehigher at the salient than at the gorge.This characteristic feature is also clearlyillustrated in a stone model now at theFine Arts Museum in Valletta whichshows Valperga’s and Grunenburgh’sproposed alterations to the Bastion ofProvence. Then, as now, architects andmilitary engineers made use of scaledmodels of fortification to present totheir patrons. Usually such models weremade of wax - a modello di cera, forexample, was presented to Knight Galileito forward to the Grand Master. (8)Dal Pozzo, in his history of the Order,makes a specific reference toGrunenburgh’s use of ‘modelli in piertadell’opere principali’ in his efforts to‘completare la Floriana’.

This interesting stone model alsoillustrates how Valperga’s managed toenclose the fragile acute salient of thebastion within part of the faussebrayeand reinforced the flank with theconstruction of a new bastion (LaVittoria) and a bassoforte (a kind ofcounterguard) termed la Conceptione.The construction and development ofthe new bastion ‘La Vittoria’ isdocumented in various plans, Valperga’sown report and Grunenburgh’s stonemodel. A careful study of Valperga’sreport shows that various historianshave been is mistaken in identifying thebastion La Vittoria with the low workadjoining the faussebraye. It appearsthat the name La Vittoria originallyreferred to the right demi-bastion of theritirata within the Bastion of Provence.This small internal work originally had amore acute salient but seems to havebeen redesigned and its face extended

out on the flank of the bastion ofProvence to allow for an adequateartillery platform. Evidence of theincremental development of the Vittoriabastion, illustrating the distinct stagesin its design, is encountered in manyplaces throughout the structure.Possibly, the most archaic remnant ofthe earliest form of the defences in thearea, is the rock-hewn footing of thesalient of a rampart, enclosed within oneof the rooms of the bastion’s casematedinterior - this may have been the narrowflank capable only of mounting a singlegun, mentioned in the documents.Another, is a section of a cordonrunning above the opening of an archedtunnel within the bastion. This bearswitness to the fact the internal wall inquestion was originally the outer face ofa rampart.In order to ensure that the area at thefoot of the salient of Valperga’s newbastion did not construe dead ground,the Italian military engineer proposedthat a large arched opening, what heterms the arcone, be made in the wall ofthe Bastion of Provence to allow gunsin the left flank of the internal ritirata toprovide the required enfilading cover.(9) This large vaulted and skewedarcone presents one of the mostinteresting features of the fortificationsin the area. The arch practically spansthe width of the fosse of the ritirata andcontains, internally, a vaulted gallerywhich leads to the countermines builtinto the terrepleined body of thebastion. Its construction, if we are tobelieve Pietro Paolo Castagna is thework of the Maltese capomastro, orarchitect, Giovanni Barbara ( Degiorgio,The Malta Independent - 28/3/1993.)and was finally completed in 1726.George Percy Badger, writing in hisDescription of Malta and Gozo (1838)was impressed by this ‘very massy arch’and the ‘architecture of this piece ofworkmanship’ so ‘very much admired byconoisseurs; the curve is of a tortuousand oblique form, and extends over aspace abut thirty feet in width.’ (10)The Bassoforte della ConcettioneThe rocky ground at the foot of theflank of the Bastion of Provence, facingMarsamxett, was fitted with a lowplatform , referred to in the documentsas the basso forte detto la Conceptione.This served mainly as a form ofcounterguard intended to protect the


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flank of the bastion and the salient ofthe fausse-braye then underconstruction. It comprised largely arevetted earthern work, since, havingbeen built down at sea-level it could notbe carved out of rock, like most of theadjoining ramparts. The extent of theearthen content used in its constructionis witnessed by the abandunt gardenthat now occupies the site. The use ofthe site as a garden, however, is not amodern practice. In 1719, the Knight FràMartino Muaro Pinto petitioned theGrand Master for the use of the‘giardino e casmento chiamato dellaconcettione sito nella piazza bassa delbeluardo della Concettione dellefortificationi Floriana’, vacated on thedeath of Frà Gio. Battista de Semaisons.By the late 19th century, the garden wasmore popularly known as Giardino SeMaison. (11) A house seems to haveoccupied part of the bassoforte. It wasstill in existance during the 19th century,‘generally hired as a country-seat bysome of the gentry of the island’, forboth the house and its garden wereconsidered ‘... a delightful spot,possessing a most charming view of theQuarantine Habour, the Pieta, and thecountry beyond’. The garden though

small, was ‘laid out with exquisite taste,and ... well supllied with flowers, theadjoining battlements covered with ivy,giving it at a distance a most beautifulappearance. house belongs togovernment, and is Beneath the bastionwhich extends alomg the poor asylum tothis villa.’Early 18th century plans of the Florianafortifications show the Bassoforte tohave been heavily countermined. Thesalient of the bassoforte, adjoining thefaussebraye was raised to a greaterheight than the remainder of the work.Grunnenburgh’s Involvement.Work on Valperga’s proposals seems tohave progressed rather slowly - this isnot surprising given the vast amount ofprojects that were competing for thelimited available funds. The arrival ofthe Flemish engineer Grunenburgh in1681 found most of the works at theBastion of Provence and adjoiningfortifications still in an unfinishedthough advanced stage of completion.Grunnenburgh’s reports, for the largerpart, merely reiterate his predecessorsideas and encourage their completion in‘conformita che fu ordinato dal ConteValperga.’ (12) The remaining works atLa Vittoria bastion comprised the

removal of the muro della fortificationevecchia, the re-alignment of thepolverista curtain in order to create anew flank on the northern side, the re-adjustment of the height of the parapetof the falsa-braga and the flank of therampart of the Bastion of Provence.Other important works he thenconsidered should be completed werethe battery for the ‘defenca oblico’ ofthe ditch and the construction of a‘galeria coperta a volto’.Grunnenburgh also saw to advise onthe construction of the glacis along thePieta front, particularly were it slopeddown to the water’s edge, and gaveinstructions for the use of stone-filledgabions, ‘incasciata di tavole ligatel’una sopra l’altra’, to be placed in thesea so as to give it the same gradientthroughout. For the ‘parapetto dellamezza faccia interna del baluardodella Vittoria, rimasto al arco’,Grunnenburgh recommended that thisbe raised in height and that cannoniere(gun embrasure) be placed in the flankand along the cortina. (13)

Completion of a schemeThe final phase in the development ofthe fortifications of the area in question


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Development of the Floriana Land frontenceinte - 1636-1798 (copyrightStephen C. Spiteri)


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was undertaken under the supervisionof French military engineers during the1700s, particularly by Mondion. This inactual fact only construed acontinuation of Valperga’s scheme andGrunenburgh’s recommendations.These were the works whichrefashioned the fortifications and gavethem the form they have to day.Primarily these includedi ) the re-alignment of the Polveristacurtain; this was pulled back to enablethe formation of a flank and piazzabassa in the north side of the bastion ‘laVittoria’ii) the raising of the height of the curtainand adjoining bastion with theconstruction of a continuous ranged ofvaulted casematesiii) the re-design of the San SalvatoreBastion to accommodate a newretrenchment within the body of theBastion of Provence parallel to theMarsamxett face; this involved thepartial demolition of the curtain wall ofthe old ritirata - this retrenchmentspanned all the way to the rear of theOspizio area.Most of these works were completedthroughout the course of the 1720s asattested by the coat-of-arms and date(1723) inscribed on Polverista curtain.The Polverista Curtain and theGunpowder FactoryThe curtain wall adjoining La VittoriaBastion to the north was known as thePolverista curtain. This title was appliedto it after the construction of agunpowder factory on the site whichwas erected there in the late 17thcentury following its removal from itsold site within the fortress of Valletta, are-location obviously inspired by theneed to abolish such a dangerouspractice. As a matter of fact, the Vallettapowder factor, the ‘Luogo dove si fa lapolvere’ was originally located in thevicinity of the Prigione degli Schiavi(slaves’ prison) on the site of thepresent Cottonera block. This actuallyblew up on 12 September 1634, killing 22people and seriously damaging thenearby Jesuits College and church. TheOrder’s records show that by 1665, theKnights were still looking for ‘un luogofuori della città per raffinar la polvere’.(14) In that same year, however, theCongregation of war , determined toresolve the situation, instructed theresident military engineer, Blondel, to

draw up plans for a ‘casa accomodataper fare e raffinare la polvere’ which wasto be built ‘nella floriana dalla parte cheriguarda il porto di Marsamscetto’.The new polverista was quickly builtand already producing powder by 1667 .The building appears to have consistedof a structure enclosed within a high-walled rectangular enclosure.It was equipped with tre molini used forthe production of zolfo e salnitro . Bythe early 18th century it was also servedby a number of magazines or ‘mine’situated in the vicinity, one of whichwas known as’ dell’Eremita’ andanother ‘del Tessitore’. Soon after theconstruction of the casemated curtainnearby in the 1720s, the master incharge of the Polverista, GiovanFrancesco Bieziro proposed to theutilization of the ‘trogli nuovamentefabbricati’ for the production ofgunpowder. By the beginning of the18th century, the Polverista had becamea prominent landmark, and is seen onmany of the plans and views ofFloriana. This is hardly surprising for itwas then practically one of the largestbuildings within the then largely barrenenclosure of Floriana.Initially the line of the curtain wall laiddown by Floriani was roughly parrallelto that of the flank of the Bastion ofProvence. Valperga, wishing to add anorthern flank to new Vittoria bastionre-designed it and realigned it bypulling it back., thus creating ‘...a nuovacortina, la quale deve poi unirsi a drittalinea con il vecchio fianco attiguo allpolverista’. Work on this aspect ofValperga’s design was only brought tocompletion by the French militaryengineers in the 1720s. Plans producedby the French military mission in 1715/16 show still show the old curtain wallin existence and the Vittoria bastionlargely incomplete. Work on the re-alignment of the curtain wall wasinitiated under the direction of theFrench Military engineer Mondion. Thenew works, however, did not includemerely the re-alignment of the curtainbut also its heigthening. This wasachieved by raising a row of casematesalong the length of the curtain wall andadjoining bastion. The minutes oftheCongregation of War of 8 July 1722,record ongoing works ‘nella Floriana aperfezzionare la Cortina nuova sotto laPolverista, verso il porta di

Marsamscetto, con I fianchi che ladiffendano’. At the same time theconstruction of a row of ‘dodici grandiallogiamenti, o sia caserne a prova ,appogiati all’interiore d’un altracortina sopra di detta polverista’ wasalso initiated (Narrattive of the worksundertaken during the years 1722-1732).In 1723 a sum of 10,000 scudi was thenapproved for the construction of‘magazini per appogiare il muro vicinodella porta di pirri ‘.

By 1725, works on casemates near thepolverista were proceeding at the rate of250 scudi a week (1725). Acommemorative plaque on the polveristacurtain itself, set between the arms ofthe Order and those Grand Master deVilhena bears the date 1723 and seemsto indicate that work on this curtain wallhad been brought to completion bythen. The Order’s records show,however, that in 1758 workers were stilllabouring to cut away ‘un labbro dirocca forte che rimaneva sotto lacortina ... (del’)Opsedale delle donne’(1758).The construction of the PolveristaCurtain, however, does not seem tohave solved the problem of the defenceof the lateral walls of the Floriana linesalong the Marsamxett side. Thepresence of the Isoletto and the Ta ‘Xbiex promontory provided adequatepositions for enemy siege batteries tofire directly into Floriana. With theestablishment of a new town within theFloriana enclosure, up till then stilllargely a barren esplanade, such a threatcame to be seen as being quite serious.Consequently, orders were issued in1731 for the construction of aretrenchment, ‘... un secondo recinto,alla sinistra della Floriana dalla partedi Marsamxetto per supplire alladebolezza di quello gia fatto in quellaparte vicino al mare per altro troppobasso, e che percio non cuopre


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l’interiore di detta Floriana’.This work came to consist of a line ofbastioned ramparts spanning from SanSalvatore Bastion to the salient of St.John’s Counterguard. The new worknecessitated the redesign of part of thebastion of Provence, wherein theMarsamxett side of the San Salvatorebastion was re-aligned parrallel to a newfosse excavated within the body of thebastion of Provence. In the process, theleft half of the vecchia ritirata wasswept away to make room for the newditch. The archival records show thatwork on this entrenchment was still inprogress in 1733, particularly along the‘contrascarpa al nouo interiore recintodestra della Floriana.’

The ‘Ospizio’A concern for the welfare of an agingpopulation drove the Order to provideshelter and food for indigent old menand women within the newly foundedtown of Floriana. In 1729, the GrandMaster, wanting to make use of thelarge casemates ‘nuovamente fabricateal Florina in sopra della polverista’ toestablish ‘un spedale d’Uomini vecchi einvalidi,’ ordered the engineer Mondion‘di accomodare caserne ... facendo nellaloro altezza altri piani o solaci mezzani,scale, diversi muri divisori, ... unacapella decente adornata, ... scavandonella rocca una gran conserva d’acqua.’In the following year, Vilhena,encouraged by the success of thisinstitution, ordered the establishment ofa similar hostel ‘a favore delle femminepovere e vecchie delle caserne dellanuova cortina sotto della polverista conmura sicure, comprendendovi un granspazio per cortile orto. e nell’interiore sifecero le divisioni convenevoli, lacucina e l’avatoio, cisterne e insommatutte le commodita necessarie nel modoche si vedono attualmente stabiliti.’

The House of IndustryThis building was erected by GrandMaster de Vilhena and was originallyintended ‘as a Conservatory for poorgirls, where they were taught to do alittle work, and in other respects toperform all the offices of nuns’. In 1825this establishment ‘ underwent an entirereform and until lately was in a verythriving condition as regards of itsinmates. A great diversity of labour wasdone here, such as weaving, knitting,

making lace, sewing, washing,shoemaking, straw-plaiting, segar-making, and many other very usefulbranches of female manufacture ... Thelower part of the back side of thebuilding forms a barracks for a regimentof the British garrison.’(1) Letter from Barberini to Chigi, Rome16. Feb. 1631,‘... il quale (Firenzuola) ha lodatosommamente il pensiero del Sig.Floriani, et ancora .... ha bene lodatopiu’ difficile et quasi impossible adessere attacati ... nell’altra I due beluardiposti vicinal al mare’.(2) Vatican Library, Fondo Chigi, Ms R I25, f.335.(3) AOM 261, f.26(4) AOM 6554, f.117‘... e’ piu’ difettoso, poiche formatosopra una linea retta quanto e forte nelbeluardo di mezzo tanto e’ debole, emancante di difesa nelli mezzi beluardidelli lati, ma assai piu’ in quello cheriguardo il porto di Marsamxetto pernon haver altra difesa che un picciolfianco capace d’un sol canone, dalquale resta formato un angolo morto, inaltre per venir infilato da diversimonticelli vicini, et sopra tuuto perl’imperfettione del sito che dacommodita all’inimico d’avvicinarsicoperto al corridore, et d’avvinarsilungo il mare nello spatio che li resta diterreno fin a scarpellare il muro conlasciar delusa tutta la robustezza etresistenza della fronte.’(5) AOM 6554, f.120v. ‘... sino al terminedella ponta della vecchia ritirata,affinche questa eccessiva altezza dimuro non impediscono li tiri della dettaritirata’.(6) ibid., f.119, ‘... La nuova portacominciata nella cortina tra i duebeloardi della ritirata si fara di larghezzapalmi nove et altezza sino sotto il dadodell’imposta del doppio portico di formaquadra et compilo che sara il doppioportico conforme al disegno (?) sopra simettera un palmo o due di terra piu omeno se sara bisogno accio rimanga ilmuro fatto della cortina con suoparapetto franco senz obligo dêalzaredetta cortina - ma ben alzare al novofianco cominciato dal detto bastionedella Vittoria al pari di detta cortina enon piu et unire di semplice muro ilparapetto di detto fianco al pari diquello della detta cortina con suoterrapieno necessario.’

(7) ibid., f. 119, ‘... Avanti le due faccie etcortina della ritirata che si statravagliando nel corpo del vecchiobastione di provenza si fara una fossa dilarghezza di sei in sette canne et dellatera che pervenira da detta escavationesi portara per terrapienare il beloardodetto della Vittoria et cortina attiguasopra delle portico, che avanzandoviterra con quella che converra abassarenella ponta del detto bastione diprovenza questa sêimpiegara parte nelbasso forte della conceptione et perriempire i vacui nel corpo dellafalzabraga causati della vecchiafortificatione.’(8) AOM 6554, f.17.(9) ibid, f. 120, ‘... Il vecchio muro delbeloardo di provenza che guarda il mareove s’unisse con la faccia nova delbastione della Vittoria; al piede diquesto si fara un arcone largo di quattrocanne (8 metres) et alto palmi undici,sopra l’imposta, et in manieraaggiustato che non possa impedire i tiriche perveniranno dal fianco oppostodella ritirata, accio da questi venga lanuova ponta di detto bastione dellaVittoria ben fiancheggiata nel suo piede,(10) Badger, G. P., Description of Maltaand Gozo, Malta 1838, Facsimile Edition,Malta, 1989, p.201-202(11) AOM 1015, f.347, ‘... incaricati di farvisitare, e stimare il guasto cagioinatodal fulmine nel Giardino Se Maison nelloscorso Ottobre .’(12) AOM 6554, f. 199-199v.(13) ibid., f.200, ‘... Ala falsa braga soprala concetione, si deve levare una fiilataper fuori acio si possa dare piu declinoal parapetto, questo si fara cominciandodalla guardiola sino al risalto che vie alstremita della cortina, che comprendeuna faccia, un fianco et una cortina’;f.176 ‘... per la parte deMarchemuchette, si halla de minuendo yabasado parte del baluarte de Provenzaque assi lo dispuso il S. Conte Valperga,para que a la retirada del no leempidiesse la vista y fuego a lacampana, como a la falsabraga y glacisde la estrada encubierta, que sera buenode perfeccionar; assi por las raconesreferidos, como de que no poderadominar con tantos ventasas la ultimaretirada, que forma una cortina y mediobaluarde, que se determina a la mar’.(14) AOM 261, f.26.


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FORT RICASOLI

byArch. Hermann Bonnici

Notwithstanding the important roleplayed by Rinella peninsula during theGreat Siege of 1565, particularly in thedown fall of Fort St. Elmo and for thecommand it exerted over the entrance tothe harbour, it was only in 1670 that theknights of the military Order of St. Johnof Jerusalem, embarked on thefortification of this important tongue ofland that shielded the harbour area fromthe rough open seas. The firstfortifications on the promontiryhowever, owe their origin not to militaryconsiderations but to those of internalsecurity. In the seventeenth century,the slave population on the island hadgrown considerably and many soughtto escape by sea, frequently fromRinella point. In 1629, in an attempt todiscourage and hinder such escapes, aBolognese knight, Alessandro Orsi,funded the construction of a tower atRinella Point in order to foil fugitiveslaves in their attempts. Torre San

Petronio, or Torri Teftef as it was morecommonly known, was eventually fittedwith a semicircular fleau d’eau batteryprotected by a sea-filled moat and hadits own drawbridge, and a small roomfor the soldiers.

It was ultimately with the fall ofVenetian oupost of Candia to theMuslims in 1669 that the militarysignificance of the Rinella peninsulabegan to feature seriously in thedefence of the harbour installations. Itwas Antonio Maurizio Conte diValperga, chief military architect to theHouse of Savoy, invited to Malta toadvise the Order on the design of newfortifications, who emphasised the needfor a new fort at Orsi Point andconvinced the Order to undertake itsconstruction. The work was taken inhand thanks to a financial donation of20,000 scudi made by Fra GiovanniFrancesco Ricasoli, a knight from theLangue of Italy - a generous act whichwas rewarded by naming the fort in hishonour. The first stone was laid on 15June1670 and the inistial stages ofconstruction were directed by Valpergahimself. Good quality lime and sandwere specified for the enceintes, and allfortification walls were to be levelledwith a mixture of boulders and soil.Valperga dissuaded any alterations tohis designs and only delegated the workto the resident military engineer inNovember 1670 after he had finalisedthe trace of all fortification works on theground and presented the plan to GrandMaster Cottoner.Fort Ricasoli was eyed with heavycriticism. Commenting in December1670, and April 1671, Lieutenant GeneralBeretta described the fortifications asinsubstantial. The fort did not occupythe whole of the Rinella promontory,while its land front was disappointingly

small. Fra Emederico Blondel, theresident military architect to the Order,who, on Valperga’s return to Italy wasentrusted with the completion of theworks, shared similar views. Blondelwas sceptical of the composite Italianand Dutch system of defence adopted.He regarded the ditch in the land frontas too narrow, and considered thelocation of the barracks buttressing thelandward establishment as unsuitable.Blondel also advised the removal ofOrsi Tower and the construction of asea battery, or fleur d’ eau in its stead.Whilst continuing with the workscommenced by Valperga, he denied anyresponsibilities for the designs he wasemployed to implement.

In July 1671, Count Verneda, engineer tothe Republic of Venice, also consideredFort Ricasoli small for the tongue of


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land it occupied. His solutions to theproblem were however too grandioseand costly both in workmanship andtime. Notwithstanding all criticism,building activity continueduninterrupted as originally intended,and by 12 June1674, the establishmentwas ready to receive a skeletongarrison. Don Carlos de Grunenberg,who, in January 1681 was invited toMalta to compile a report on the state ofthe fortifications, again reported on thevarious shortcomings to thefortifications of Ricasoli to GrandmasterCaraffa. Grunenberg proposed tolengthen the fausse-braye beneath S.Dominic’s demi-bastion by a further 26canne ( 52m ), construct a covertway tothe envisaged extension, and mostsignificantly, lower St. John’s demi-bastion to just 3 canne (6m) above themain gate. In an effort to improve therelative distance between the outworksand the parapet wall, the covertway andthe glacis were also to be lowered. Hisrecommendations were approved on 16March1681, and knight Ugo deVauvilliers was entrusted with theexecution of the works. Works on thebarrack blocks and the powdermagazines occupying the central area ofthe fort began in 1685, while thegovernor’s palace, incorporated into themain gate, was projected by EmedericoBlondel and approved by the council on16 March 1681 and commenced shortlyafterwards. The chapel, too, wascommissioned to Emederico Blondel.Fort Ricasoli was garrisoned, armed,and officially declared complete in May1698. The inherent weaknesses of theland front defenceswere again raised in1693, and great concerns for thecollapsing casemate of St. John’sbastion were revealed. Various masonryworks had eroded, and the quality ofthe globigerina limestone quarried fromthe vicinity and used extensively in theproject was questioned. All parapetsfacing the waterfront were later repairedwith the more durable corallinelimestone.

Despite the great financial expensesincurred by the Order to rectifyValperga’s initial shortcomings, the landfront was still feared a weak point in theharbour’s defence mechanism. Jacop dePuigirand de Tigné, Francois Charles deMondion, and Philippe de Vendosme,

three of the most reputed militaryengineers to visit Malta in 1714criticized Valperga’s dwarf bastions.Tigné was particularly sceptical on theeffectiveness of the bastions, anddespite recommending variousalterations and repairs, particularly tothe parapets, bauchettes, andembrasures, with the use of concrete

manufactured from hard wearing stone,quicklime, iron, and lead, he still fearedthe fort too weak to offer any credibleresistance to attack. With this in mind,he suggested an interior retrenchmenthalf way inside the fort. This secondline of defence was effectively a curtainwall flanked by two demi-bastions, andprotected by a ravelin and a dry ditch.


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He also proposed the construction of alarge semi-circular battery to supersedeOrsi tower, and thus, gain a bettercommand of the harbour mouth. Theprior of France, Philippe de Vendomehad even harsher criticism for the fortand the only solution he could envisagewas for the promonotroy to beseparated from the mainland a canal.Confused by such differing opinions,the Commissioners of Fortificationsadvised the grand master to adhere toTigné’s plans, particularly since hisproposals were within the financialcapabilities of the Order. Still, it wasonly after the general alarm of 1722 thatTigné’s recommendations for theoutworks were implemented. By 1752,the degeneration of the fort’s fabric wasconsiderable. Further repairs in 1761were taken in hand, but lack of fundsbrought an abrupt end to thesemaintenance works.

In 1798, the fortifications of FortRicasoli were finally brought to the test.Well trained and adequatelyprovisioned to withstand repeatedassaults, the garrison of Fort Ricasoli,under the command of Bali de Tillet,

successfully repulsed three Frenchattacks. Despite all predictions, it wasonly after the Order’s capitulation thatthe gates of Fort Ricasoli were thrownopen to the army of NapoleonBonaparte.

It remained in French hands for twoyears, most of which time itwasbesieged by an Anglo-maltese force.When the French eventually surrendedon 5 September 1800, Forts Ricasoli wasdelivered to the British military. A seriesof reports on the state of local defenceswere soon commissioned and theseunderlined the vulnerability of. many ofthe existing works of fortification. Theimportance of Fort Ricasoli, however,was immediately recognised. Its gunswere vital incovering the seaward, andto some extent also the landward,approaches to the Grand Harbour.

During the first years of Britishoccupancy, the fort billeted a regimentof foreign troops who were raised forservice under the British army by M.De Conte de Froberg. The garrison wassubjected to great hardships andmutineed. On Sunday, 12 April 1807, anumber of mutineers blew the mainpowder magazine then containing 650barrels of gunpowder.

The bomb-proof casemate in which thematerial was stored,situated in St.Dominic’s demi-bastion, together withlarge sections of the faussebraye wereextensively damaged. The salient angleof the bastion, together with its rightand left faces were literally blown off.The costs of the damages sustainedwere high. In a detailed report preparedby Lt. Col. Dickens, Chief RoyalEngineer, immediately after the incident,it was repoted that considerablesections of the still standing works werebadly shaken. Only the length of scarpwall below the level of the platform ofthe gun casemates was still sound. Therebuilding of the faces of the bastion totheir former height, and thereconstruction of the destroyedcasemates, was, from this early stageconsidered too costly, and it was thusproposed to bring the level of thereconstructed terreplein to immediatelyabove the unshaken scarp. Also, withthis alteration to the original land frontskyline, the new set-up was to be wellshielded by the front-line ravelins. Aparapet of only 7 ft in height was to beraised above this new construction. Toensure that the left face of the centrebastion was adequately flanked, and toguarantee superiority of fire over thecurtains and opposite flanks of thefausse-braye, Col. Dickens, suggestedthat the shaken flank, together with thefaces, be reconstructed to their formerheight. In this same report, dated 15May 1807, Dickens also proposed theconstruction of a new, bombproofpowder magazine, which, according tohis calculations was to accommodate500 barrels. In order to minimize on anydamages to the scarp should anexplosion occur, this new structure wasto be isolated from the adjoiningramparts by an open space, while thesally-port, severely damaged by theblast, was to be rebuilt to facilitate thecommunication between the sea and theproposed magazine. Al the worksinvolved in the reconstruction of thedamaged section were estimated toexceed £4,523.

The plans for the powder magazine werehowever shelved, until in 1829, anotherstructure calculated to accommodateeight hundred barrels of gunpowderwas proposed. General Whitmore, then

Ramparts damaged by explosion during theFroberg mutiny


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responsible for the works, wasconcerned for the stone deteriorationinstigated by the salt laden winds, andin a letter accompanying his plans,dated 28 March 1829 and addressed toGeneral Mann, he outlined how he Figgalso suggested that the guardroom ofTorri Teftef be dismantled and its stonesused for the same cause.

Reporting to General Mann onSeptember 15, 1821, after the works hadcommenced, Whitmore expressed hisapproval to the employment of materialfrom both the entrenchment and theguardroom. He also suggested that thethickness of the scarp at the cordonwas to be increased from four feet tofour feet ten inches, while the shakensalient angle was to be renewed.

On May 19, 1823, Lt. Col. Whitmoredescribed the deterioration process ofthe fort as fast, and the annualallowance from Parliament allotted forthe maintenance of the fortifications,limited and insufficient. He alsolamented that due to constructionpractices, vegetation was encouraged toflourish in the mortar joints, thusaccelerating deterioration. In order toprocure sufficient funds, he suggestedthat works such as the paving undergateways, and the repairs to publicroads through military establishmentswere to be borne by other departments.

The importance of Fort Ricasoli wasstrongly acknowledged, and by 1844,five hundred soldiers, out of a total ofsix thousand for the whole Island weregarrisoned within its perimeters. InOctober 1848, the inspector general offortifications, Sir John Fox Burgayneinspected the defences and consideredthe Ricasoli, St. Elmo, Tigné line offortifications as impregnable againstenemy attack. Contradictory views werehowever shared by Sir William Reid,new governor to Malta, in 1851, whowas deeply concerned by the threatpresented by well armed enemysteamships outside this harbour line offortifications and thus ordered thatthese forts be equipped with artillery ofa heavier calibre. In this quest foradded security, shell stores for 260boxes and 180 boxes, battery magazinesfor 10, 6, and 4 guns, each containing

between 192 and 80 cases, and shellreceptacles, were, in October 1854proposed to be constructed at variouslocations within the fort, particularly onthe side facing the open sea. In adetailed account compiled by the RoyalEngineers on October 28, 1859, FortRicasoli was described as in good order,the outworks defensible, and itsharbour side well protected by fort S.Salvatore and the Cottonera lines. Itsinterior was also under fire from

collateral works. Similar to that of otherfortifications, the defence mechanism ofFort Ricasoli was considered healthy.

By 1864, the fort was garrisoned byfifteen officers and 676 men, and wasarmed with a total of 104 guns, a numberof which were mounted in casemates onthe No. 1 Curtain, and the No. 2 Bastion.Following 1870, armament technologydeveloped fast, new materials wereintroduced, and innovative building

Fort Ricasoli around 1798 with de Tigne'sproposed internal retrenchment.


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techniques were adopted. By December1872, the fortifications of Fort Ricasoliwere in a state of transition. Thesubstructure of large sections ofbastion walls was remodelled, whilecasemates were being added to PointBattery, No. 2 Bastion, and No. 5 Demi-Bastion. By 1878, the seafront of FortRicasoli had been remodelled. Beforethe turn of the century, Fort Ricasoliwas again re-armed with six-inch quickfiring guns on pedestal mountings,while in 1889 electric search lights wereinstalled. These, together with othersinstalled at Fort St. Elmo ensured theprotection of the harbour entrance even

at nighttime. Additional lights wereadded in 1906.During the same period, a Brennantorpedo station was excavated withinthe ramparts of the fort, overlooking theharbour side. The plans bear thesignature, and hence the approval ofLouis Brennan himself. However, by1904, the project was consideredobsolete, and the structure converted toaccommodate three engines designed topower the fort’s defence electric lights.

Prior to the Second World War, the fortwas re-armed with three twin 6 lb. gunsin metal turrets, while the emplacementson Bastions No. 2, 3, and 4 wereremodelled to accommodate a highconcrete fire control tower. Other

defence electric lights were alsoinstalled.Due to its proximity to the Naval Docksin particular, during the Second WorldWar, Fort Ricasoli was constantly underfire from enemy aircraft. Extensive areasof its fortifications were breached, andin April 1942, the gateway, together withthe Governor’s Palace was demolishedby enemy attack. Architecturally, Maltahad lost one of its finest portals. Thecomposition identified by the gatewayand the palace in the backgroundconstituted a significant detail ofMaltese baroque architecture. Thevisual robustness of the ensemble lentby the pair of spirally twisted columnsflanking each side of the archedentrance was the only local example ofsuch a baroque idiom. Except for thefilling up of the ditch, and the enlargingof its doorway, at some time after 1904to enable access to large vehicles intothe fort, this complex had, until 1942,survived as originally designed.

Immediately after the war, Fort Ricasoliwas used as a naval barracks. The


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interest in its fabric had mitigated, and itwas only after great pressures byMaltese individuals, that thedemolished gateway was reconstructed.However, due to financial difficulties,the Governor’s Palace was notconsidered worth rebuilding. Even so,the original qualities of the portal werenot clearly understood. The twistedpair of columns was not correctlyinterpreted, and instead of six twists,the copy emerged with five apiece.Although seemingly inconspicuous, theeffect on the message that it conveys isgreat. Its masculinity and authorityhave been enfeebled, and itsproportions altered. Similarly to otherblemishes in its fabric, this shortcomingshould, perhaps be accepted as acasualty of war.

Safeguarding Fort Ricasoli.Fort Ricasoli merits to be safeguarded,and our ultimate aim for interveningshould be that of promoting to societyits values, both cultural and economicwhich otherwise risk being lost. Themost important reason for safeguardingFort Ricasoli is that of age. Time movesforward, and with increasing distance,the receding past is enhanced. FortRicasoli also acclaims a distinct qualityof craftsmanship. Every generationcontributed to the fabric of the fort, andthe present set-up is thus, not only anevidence of the different epochs of theIsland’s history, but also a reflection ofthe foreign cultures which at one periodor another influenced its development.The ideas of various foreign and localarchitects and military engineers arecrystallized within its fabric. FortRicasoli also merits to be safeguardedon the basis of its uniqueness. Itsstrategic location within the GrandHarbour, its designs, and thecircumstances which led to itsdevelopment, and, to a certain extent, itsabandonment, are unique to it. Eachintervention encapsulates within itknowledge of a moment in the history ofthe nation’s evolution.

Arguments for its conservation are alsophenomenological in nature, embodiedin the relationship between man and hissurroundings. Human identity is afunction of places and things and thedevelopment of social and culturalidentity is a slow process that cannot

take place in a continuously changingenvironment. In a world increasinglyhostile, there is a yearning for thefamiliar. Humans cannot detachthemselves completely from the past,and the conservation of their culturalheritage can thus satisfy their need forsecurity.Its conservation has also a pragmaticjustification. Large sums of money, andan unquantifiable number of labourhours were invested in its construction.Each stone was manually quarried, andirreplaceable natural resources wereconsumed in its construction. Bymodern standards, its cost isprohibitive, and thus, in a culture wheresustainability has become one of thefew solutions to a sensitive exploitationof the environment, Fort Ricasoli cannotbe left unnoticed. Calculating theamount of non-renewable resources andwork invested in its construction andmaintenance throughout the centuries,its misuse will be a serious loss to thenation.

References and NotesAOM, manuscript 1016 ff. 255, 259 - 260.AOM, manuscript 261 f. 131 v.AOM, manuscript 262 f. 157.AOM, manuscript 442.AOM, manuscript 6402 ff. 305 - 307 v.AOM, manuscript 6551 ff. 48 - 48 v, 176 - 179.AOM, manuscript 6552 ff. 39 v - 40.NLM, manuscript 1301 ff. 97 - 104.NLM, manuscript 142d f. 458.NLM, maps R9, R17.PRO, manuscript MPH 474.PRO, manuscript MFQ 220.PRO, manuscript MFQ 293.PRO, manuscript WO 55/ 1555.PRO, manuscript WO 55/ 909.PRO, manuscript WO 75/ 5310.PRO, manuscript WO 78/ 2531.PRO, manuscript WO 78/ 3640.PRO, manuscript WO 78/ 4376.PRO, manuscript WO 78/ 4436.PRO, manuscript WO 78/ 4438.PRO, manuscript WO 78/ 5305.PRO, manuscript WO 78/ 5310.PRO, manuscript WO 95/ 910.Bosio G., Storia della Sacra Religione etIllustrissima Militia di S. GiovanniGerosolmitano, Vol. III, Venice, 1695.E. S., “The Great Gatehouse, Ricasoli”,Times of Malta, Thursday, November 14, 1946.Galea M., Sir Alexander Ball and Malta,Malta, 1990.Hughes Q., Malta, A Guide to theFortifications, Malta, 1993.Hughes Q., The Building of Malta 1530-1795, London, 1967.

Sammut Tagliaferro A., “BritishFortification and Defence of Malta 1800 -1960”, Archivum, Malta, 1981.Spiteri S., British Military Architecture inMalta, Malta, 1996.Spiteri S., Fortress of the Cross:Hospitaller Military Architecture,1136-1798, Malta, 1994.Tregellas W. H., “Historical Sketch ofthe Defences of Malta”, Journal of theRoyal Engineers Institute, paper VIII,Vol. III, No. 10, 1879, London, 1879.Zammit T., Malta - The Maltese Islandsand Their History, Malta, 1926.


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WIGNACOURTTOWER

Wignacourt Tower, situated at St. Pual’sbay in the north of Malta, is in manyways a unique historical militarybuilding, for this structure representsthe first of a series of coastal watchposterected in Malta by the Knights ofthe Order of St. John in their efforts tosecure the Island against the threat ofsea-borne attack. Throughout most ofthe 15th, 16th and 17th centuries, Maltaand Gozo were plagued by corsair raids,for the Mediterranean Sea was theninfested with pirates. Many aninhabitant was carried off into slaveryby the Turks during the course of arapid unannounced razzia even thoughevery effort was made by the localmilitias to watch and guard the islands’shores. Then, unlike today, thenorthern half of Malta was practicallyuninhabited for most people preferredto live within the safety, or in thevicinity, of the fortified towns. Theremote northern rural and coastal areaswere perilous places. St. Paul’s Bay wasparticularly prone to corsair raids as itafforded direct ingress into the veryheart of the island.

It was Grand Master Alof deWignacourt who on November 9th,1609, brought the matter of the defenceof the northern areas of Malta beforethe Council of the Order, stressing theneed of protecting the Order’s fleetwhen this required to shelter withinSt. Paul’s Bay and also in preventingthe Turks from disembarking there asthey had done on previous occasions.During the meeting, a model of the

tower was displayed and the proposalwas accepted. Grand MasterWignacourt donated the sum of 7000scudi to facilitate the construction ofthe tower and the first stone was laidwith due ceremony on the 10th ofFebruary 1610.

The design of Wignacourt Tower isattributed to the Maltese architectVittorio Cassar, who is said to have alsodesigned the other coastal towers thatsubsequently sprang up around theisland during the reign of the sameGrand Master. The tower consistsbasically of a square block with thickbombproof sloping walls, stiffened byturrets at the corners. Internally thelayout comprises two barrel vaultedrooms, one on each floor. The mainentrance into the tower was through thedoorway on the first floor, via a flight ofsteps and across a wooden pontelevatoio (drawbridge - see model oftower to the right) both of which nolonger exist though the tower stillretains its original stout wooden door.The present ground floor entrance is alate addition. A staircase built into thethickness of the walls leads up to thetower’s roof.

The barrel-vaulted room you arestanding in was the heart of the tower.It served both as living quarters for thegarrison and as storage area for thesupplies and munitions of war. It stillretains many of the features thataccompanied garrison life. A focolare,or small fire-place, built into the wall,with its ventilation shaft opening in theparapet on the roof, served both forcooking and to provide warmth duringthe brief but cold winter months. Astone kenur was used for cooking.Water was drawn up through a shaftfrom a pozzo (well) situated beneath thetower - this was filled by rainwatercollected from the roof. The well shaftreached up to the roof so as to servethe sentinels on duty too. To the left ofthe fire-place is the gabinetto (latrine).A trap door, now occupied by the spiralstaircase, gave access to the vaultedroom on the ground floor, then onlyused for storage.

The tower’s small garrison consistedof a Capomastro (or master bombardier)and two or three assistants. In times of


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danger, brought about by fear ofinvasion, they were generally assistedby more gunners sent from Order’s navyto help man the two 6-pdr andthree 18-pdr iron cannon, thelatter mounted on the battery atthe foot of the tower on theseaward side. This battery wasadded in 1715. The garrison’smain duty was to keep watch forsigns of enemy ships. A pre-arranged system of alarm signalsmaking use of flags and smokeby day, and fire and petards(solfarelli) by night was

employed to relay messagesfrom one watchpost to thenext all the way to Mdina andValletta.

Apart from the cannon, thetower is known to have beenequipped with12 flint-lockmuskets fitted with bayonets,500 scartocci (paper musket

ball-cartridges), 2 flint-lock pistols, 12spontoons and halberds, and a sword.Cannon ammunition stored in the towerin 1785 consisted of 112 (8-pdr) and281(18-pdr) round shot, and 30 (8-pdr)and 64 (18-pdr) sacchetti di mitraglia(grapeshot cartridges), together with aquantity of polvere (gunpowder).


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More often than not throughout therelong history, the main threat to theMaltese islands has come from acrossthe sea. The appearance of sails on thehorizon frequently meant pillage, deathand slavery. The sole refuge affordedto the inhabitants were the few fortifiedtowns and an ever-constant vigilance.The need for a reliable system to warnof approaching danger meant that manyplaces along the coastline, particularlythe secluded and vulnerable landingsites along the northern shores of theisland, had to be watched continually.Amongst such places were the baysand inlets of Mellieha and the Fliegu.

The importance of these areas to thesafety of the island was appreciatedearly in the history of the island. GianFrangisc Abela, writing in 1647, couldalready write of a militia post known asil-Borgio tal-Melleha, a place-namewhich evidently betrays the site of anancient military structure. In Abela’stime, Melleha was then one of 31‘gaurdie marine ... intorno l-isola’ andone of only five around the islandwhich were important enough to beguarded also by day by the mendeputati a questa guardia da i Giuratidella Città Notabile. This pre-occuptaion can be traced even earlierinto the middle ages. The mandatirecords for 1482, for example, show the

A GENERALOVERVIEW OFTHEFORTIFICATIONSIN THELOCALITY OFMELLIEHA


payments which were made to FrankinuXelluki for his services comuguardianu dila Mallacha. Prof.Stanley Fiorini has shown that on moreserious occasions, as happened in 1520when the Turks landed in force atMelleha, a military camp (campu) wasestablished along the heights by theMaltese militia in order to keep watchon the Turkish movements andpossibly also serve as a base for theexchange of hostilities.

For most of its history, however, thedefence of the Mellieha area fell underthe responsibility of the parish ofNaxxar. The militia list of 1419-20 showsthat Naxxar and its associate villagescontributed 262 men to the island’smilitia force, 20 of whom owned a horse.Under the Order this responsibilityremained the prerogative of the Captainof the Naxxar militia, and the villageitself became the main staging post forthe Birkirkara-Naxxar-Qormi regiment ofcountry militia charged with the defenceof the northern parts of the island.

It was not until well into theseventeenth century that Mellieha andthe Fliegu received any form ofpermanent defences. The first fortifiedstructure built to provide some measureof security in the area was the RedTower, erected during the reign of GrandMaster Lascaris Castellar. This sturdy,massive structure, built on the sameplan as the set of towers erected earlierin the century by Grand MasterWignacourt at St. Paul’s Bay,Marsaxlokk, Marsascala, Delle Grazie,Marsalforn, and Comino, was designedmore as a fort rather than a simplewatch-post.

The characteristic feature of the RedTower (Torre Rossa) were the cornerturrets, a rudimentary form of bastionsdesigned to allow some degree of close-in defence by enabling enfilading firealong the faces of the structure. TheRed Tower or Fort St. Agatha(sometimes also referred to Torre Caura)was followed, nearly a decade later, bytwo other works of fortification erectedin the vicinity at Ghajn Hadid and l-Ahrax. Actually, these formed part of astring of thirteen signalling towers builtby Grand Master de Redin in 1658-9 anddesigned to form a chain of

communication whereby alarms wererelayed visually from one post to thenext all the way down to Valletta. Withthe introduction of these towers theknights also re-organized the system ofcoastal watch, replacing the old systemof local militia guards with fixedgarrisons paid for by the Universitas.Each tower was manned by abombardier and three assistants withannual salaries of 30 and 24 scudirespectively.

The Ghajn Hadid tower, north ofSelmun, was actually the first to bebuilt. Before it was demolished by anearthquake in 1855, it stood some 36 fthigh and had two vaulted roomsinternally, one on each floor with themain. The sole entrance was securelylocated on the first floor and reached bya wooden retractable ladder, sometimesalso made of rope. The base of thetower right up to the level of the lowercordon was given a pronounced batterbut above this the walls rose vertical toterminate in a low parapet fitted withshallow embrasures clearly designed topermit the firing of light cannon. A spiralstaircase set into the thickness of thewall just to the left of the main entranceled to the roof. The plan andconfiguration was the same for the L-Ahrax tower, as for the rest of the DeRedina towers. All mounted smallartillery pieces, generally one or two 3-pdr iron cannon kept mostly forsignalling purposes and in 1659 thesewere each issued with two moschettonidi posta, or large heavy muskets.

Next to the Ghajn Hadid tower stood asmall defensible room once used toaccommodate the militia sentinels. It isnot yet clear whether this buildingactually pre-dates the tower, or if it wasadded later. A similarly interestingfeature are the small rubble-wall pansbuilt around the tower and apparentlyused to house farm animals. The wholeensemble tends to betray a self-supporting out-post that must havebeen difficulty to reach and re-supply

No other defensive works were erected inthe area throughout the remainder of theseventeenth century. The picturechanged dramatically, however, during thesecond decade of the following century.In 1714, under the influence of its French


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military engineers, the Order embarkedupon the construction of an ambitiouscoastal defence programme. Thispractically involved the fortification ofevery bay and inlet around the island withgun-batteries, redoubts andentrenchments. The reasoning behindthis strategy of coastal defence hingedaround the notion that the fortification ofthe bays would prevent the enemy fromattempting to disembark troops, and intrying to do so, the losses would be sohigh that the invading forces would beunable to carry on with an assault on themain fortresses around the harbour.

Between 1715 and mid-1716 a total ofsome 41,561 scudi was spent on theconstruction of batteries around thecoast of Malta and Gozo. Mellieha itselfwas fitted out with two batteries and aredoubt, while the coastline along theComino Channel was given fourredoubts and three batteries. The mainelements in this defensive strategy werethe gun-batteries. These were designedto mount heavy cannon and engage theenemy warships seeking to disembarkthe troops. Basically, these consisted ofsolid open platforms ringed by parapetsfitted with embrasures and protected tothe rear by blockhouses and redanswith loopholed walls. There was nostandard plan to their design althoughmost were given semicircular gun-platforms. The ones to be seen atMellieha, Marfa and Armier provide thebest surviving examples still to befound in Malta. The most impressive ofthese is undoubtedly the VendômeBattery at Armier, one of the largest ofits type ever built. Its large semicircularplatform is ringed by nine embrasuresand a ditch while the gorge is occupiedby a blockhouse and redan. In 1785 itwas armed with five 8-pdr and four 12-pdr iron guns. Later on in the century itwas fitted with platforms for mortars.The Wied Mousa Battery, also situatedalong the Fliegu coastline, althoughhaving lost part of its blockhouse andredan as a result of later interventions,has a very well-preserved battery fittedwith thick parapet and ‘zonqor’-slabbedgun-platform. Perhaps the mostfascinating, however, was WestremeBattery, located on the right hand sideof Mellieha Bay. Although this has lostits gun-platform and parapet, it retains aunique barrel-vaulted blockhouse,

currently under restoration, which isamply fitted with musketry loopholes.This structure was placed diagonallyalong the gorge of the battery in such amanner that two of its outer facesserved as a redan and helped defend thelandward approaches to the work.Where opportune, such as at L-Ahrax,only a gun-platform was constructedsince the existing tower wasincorporated into the design and usedto provide the necessary storage andaccommodation facilities. A fourthbattery, was situated on the left side ofthe Mellieha bay, on the site currentlyoccupied by the large hotel. Known asTonnara, Fedeau, Vendôme andMellieha Left Battery, this was oncearmed with four 8-pdr iron cannon.Interestingly enough, this work alsofulfilled a secondary role other than thatof defence. In fact, in 1748 itsblockhouse was reconstructed andenlarged to serve as a tunny-processingfactory. The officina della Tonnaracould then house 300 barrels of fish.

The redoubts on the other hand wereintended to serve as a infantrystrongpoints. The ones erected at

Mellieha and along the Fliegu were alldesigned and built to a standardpentagonal pattern with a simpleblockhouse to the rear. Only one of thefive redoubts in the Mellieha localityhas actually survived, there rest areeither in ruins or were swept awayduring the course of the nineteenth andtwentieth centuries. The Melliehamiddle-redoubt, for example, wasdismantled early in the nineteenthcentury and its stones used to providebuilding material for the construction ofa road across the bay.

As the eighteenth century wore onambitious schemes for securingMellieha and the Fliegu coastline withbastioned entrenchment walls wereprojected and initiated at Ta’ Kassisuand Armier but these efforts soon raninto difficulties and only short stretchesof fortified ramparts were actually builtout of the miles of projected ramparts.The entrenchments at Melliehaconstitute the best surviving examplesof this style of defences still to befound in the whole of the Malteseislands.

The Red Tower or Fort St Agatha asit is also known


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The last element of coastal defenceintroduced by the knights at Mellieha andthe Fliegu were the fougasses. These werea kind of massive rock-hewn stone-firingmortar. Some 48 were built around theshores of Malta in 1741 of which fourseem to have been sited at Mellieha andanother eight along the Fliegu. None,unfortunately, have survived to datewithin the locality under review.

Of the six regiments of country militiadetailed for the defence of the coastthroughout the eighteenth century, it wasthe regiments of Naxxar and B’Karawhich were charged with the defence ofthe northern parts of the island. In 1716,the Regiment of Naxxar consisted of 477men and was responsible for defendingthe stretch of Fliegu coastline betweenTorri l’Ahrax and Cirkewwa, while that ofB’kara was responsible for the defence ofMellieha Bay and St. Paul’s Bay.

As things turned out, however, none ofthe coastal fortifications at Mellieha everplayed any significant role in defence ofthe Island. When invasion eventuallymaterialized in 1798, the network ofbatteries, entrenchments and redoubtswas easily overcome. French troops underthe command of General BarageyD’Hilliers were landed at Mellieha and St.Paul’s bay, where the defences there wereunder the command of the Knights DeBizier and De La Penouse respectively,while Fort St. Agatha was under thecommand of the knight St. Simon. TheMaltese soldiers offered what little

resistance they could before hastilyretreating to Mdina.

Most of the coastal defences wereretained by the British throughout the firstdecades of the nineteenth century butgradually many of these military workswere handed over to the civiliangovernment as they were no longerconsidered necessary for the defence.L’Ahrax tower for example, was taken overas the Governor’s summer residence, andWied Mousa battery was eventuallyconverted into a hostel. The majority ofthe towers and batteries had been shedoff by the military by the late 1830’s.Thereafter none of these works continuedto feature in the islands’defensive stategy,particularly after 1860 when the Britishabandoned the idea of resisting theenemy on the beaches, adopting insteada mighty fortress system conceivedprimarily for the defence of the GrandHarbour.

As a result, the northern reaches of Maltaremained practically unfortified for theremainder of the nineteenth century. Theadoption of a defensive line along theridge of commanding ground north of theold City of Mdina, later known as theVictoria lines, only helped isolate furtherthe largely uninhabited northern partsand reduce the threat of an inland thrustinto the heart of the island. By thebeginning of the 1900s, however theBritish realized that this defensive linewas not as effective as it was thought tobe and in 1907 the position was

abandoned in favour of an attempt torevert to the policy defending the island’snorthern shores. To this end, a whole newsystem of trenches and gun-emplacements, known as Ridge Defences,were cut out along the Mellieha heights.Well preserved trenches and gun pitsdating to this period can bee seen alonglength of the Mellieha, Bajda and Wardijaridges.

A serious effort to fortify and defendthe beaches at Mellieha was onlyundertaken during the late 1930s priorto the outbreak of the Second WorldWar. This time the new element ofdefence was the concrete machine gunbunker, or pill-box as it was popularlyknown. A large number were spread outalong the beaches and across thecountry side in a series of stop-linesdesigned to hinder enemy landings andinland advances. The earlier pillboxesand beach post built in 1938 as a directresult of the threat of an Italian invasionfollowing the Abyssinian crisis wereelaborately camouflaged with rubblestone cladding. A interesting complexexample of this kind of fortification is tobe seen hugging the rocky foreshorebeneath Westreme battery. Laterexamples were constructed to simplerand more standardized patterns that lentthemselves more easily to massproduction. This, inevitably, was adevelopment which reflected a greatersense of urgency and the need for rapidconstruction that accompanied thegrowing threat of war and invasion. Inthese works, paint-work became theaccepted method for applyingcamouflage. The map on page _____shows the distribution of t he existingWWII defences in the locailty.

Torri l-Ahnar (Red Tower), Mellieha


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Undoubtedly, the most substantial andcomplex work of fortification erected bythe British in the area was FortCampbell, built in 1937-38. Effectivelythis was the last fort built on the islandand was intended to replace the Wardijaexamination battery erected hastilyduring the fFirst World War. By the latethirties, however, fortification designhad departed significantly from themaxims of permanent defences practicedin the preceeding centuries asfortifications had to contend with anever-increasing range of newdestructive weapons, the most seriousthreat of which came to manifest itself inthe form of aerial bombardment. Theplan of Fort Campbell, as a result,reflects many new provisionincorporated in the design of permanentfortifications. Whilst earlier forts hadrelied mainly on a low silhouette toblend them in with their surroundingsand conceal them from the enemy theseefforts were now no longer enough tohide them from the eyes of the enemysearching from above. For when viewedfrom the air fortifications revealedvisibly clearand distinct traces. At FortCampbell the formal ramparts andditches were abandoned and replacedinstead by a thin wall constructed toresemble the field walls and the planbroken up into an irregular tracedesigned to imitate the pattern ofterraced fields. Close-in perimeterdefence, previously provided bycounterscarp galleries or caponiers, andearlier still, batteries in the flanks ofbastions, was provided instead by anumber of small machine gun posts, orbunkers, placed at irregular intervalsalong the line of defence, particularly

where the enceinte changed direction,and in other places by a few rifleloopholes.

Internally, the enclosure was ratherbarren, for the vast area was purposelyoccupied by a only small number ofbuildings and then great care was takento scatter all the main component partsof the forts - the command post, gunemplacements, water tank, directionposts and barrack accommodation andmagazines - across the whole area inorder not to create any concentration ofbuildings that would stand out quiteclearly when seen from the air. Themain armament of the fort, two coastalguns, were mounted in concreteemplacements place roughly in thecentre of the enclosure. Each gunemplacement was fitted with adjoiningunderground guncrew accommodation,magazines and shelters. The 6-inchguns were placed on 45 degreeelevation mountings which increasedthe range of the guns to 24,500 yards. Athird gun emplacement, consisting of asunken concrete gun pit, with a nearbypartially underground magazine wasadded sometime later.

The nerve centre of the fort was theBattery Observation Post (BOP) whichwas situated roughly in the middle ofthe enclosure. This long building,stepped building contained theexamination signals room and guncontrol room. The plotting room washowever situated in a nearby underground rock-hewn chamber. In 1943 theBattery Observation Post was modifiedto house a C.A. No.1 MkII Radarmounted on the roof. Barrackaccommodation, unlike in other forts,was sited outside the fortified perimeterand consisted four barrack blockscapable of accommodating 180 men.The officers’ mess, dining room,cookhouse, ablution room, lecture roomand sergeants’ mess were similarlyplaced outside the defensive perimeter.

Apart from the six defence posts alongthe main perimeter, there were two otherconcrete bunkers acting as directionposts. An important adjunct to thedefence were the searchlight needed tolight up the sea. The Defence ElectricLights (DEL) were situated aconsiderable distance away from the

fort and were placed down along theshoreline to the north and west. Therewere four emplacements for searchlights(one of which is demolished). All wereprotected by metal shutters. Theelectricity required to work thesearchlights came from the generatorslocated inside the fort and the cablewhich served the lights was placed inshallow rock-hewn trenches forprotection. Another lightly fortifiedenclosure was also established in thevicinity of Mellieha. This was the civildefence depot. It was, enclosed by alight wall and named Fort Mellieha.

As things turned out the much fearedAxis invasion never materialized. Whatthe war failed to destroy, however, wasdemolished by the development thataccompanied the post-war period.Many concrete works of fortificationsand emplacements were unfortunatelyswept aside to make way for roads,houses and hotels. Even so the area isstill relatively one of the richest inHospitaller and British coastalfortifications, all of which deserve to beprotected and conserved.

Torri l-Abjad, l/o Mellieha


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One of the most interesting adjuncts ofcoastal defence employed by theknights for the coastal defence of theisland was the fougasse, a kind of rock-hewn mortar designed to fire largequantities of stone onto approachingenemy ships. Although not analtogether Maltese invention as claimedby many authors, this weapon was,nonetheless, a unique adaptation of thefougasse, particularly in its method ofconstruction and unorthodoxapplication in a coastal defence role.Various sources have claimed that thefougasses of Malta are not fougasses atall, the word being a misnomer, butsimply singular mortars cut in rock. Thisstatement, however, is not entirelycorrect since the Maltese type ofweapon has features which belong bothto the fougasse and mortar. In actualfact, it is a combination of three kinds ofweapons, the fougasse, the explosivemine, and the mortar. The best wordused to describe it is fougasse-pierrier,the pierrier being a stone-firing cannon.In contemporary documents it is morepopularly referred to as the fougasse acailloux, fogazza, or fornello a selci.Pontleroy , in 1761, referred to themsimply as ‘les puits’.The fundamental uniqueness of theMaltese fougasse stems primarily from

the nature of the Maltese terrain whichdictated that the fougasse had to be cutinto solid rock. The local method ofconstruction gave the weapon apermanence, solidity, and form notenjoyed elsewhere, especially sincemost fougasses were generallyemployed in field defences andearthworks thus earning in the processan ephemeral quality. In Malta, thefougasse was a product of theeighteenth century. It is known that inthe first decades of the 1700s, when theOrder, under the influence of Frenchengineers, decided to implement a coastdefence scheme, the fougasse wasproposed to complement the coastaldefences. In 1715 the council ordered 60stone mortars to be cut at vulnerablepoints around the coasts of the islandbut no action appears to have beentaken. Of these, 48 were to have beenexcavated in Malta.The early attempts to introduce theweapon under the direction of themilitary engineer Mondion seem to havefailed and it was not until 1741, underthe direction of Marandon, that theweapon was adopted successfully.Marandon fired his first experimentalfoggazza a selci on 28 September 1740.This was cut into the rocky foreshorebelow the ‘bastione delle forbici’ at thefoot of the Valletta bastions facingDragut point. On the day of its baptismof fire, Marandon filled the fougassewith 306 stone boulders of varioussizes, totalling in weight to 3,575cantara. A charge of 83 rotuli of ordinarygunpowder was placed in the chamberand when fired this proved powerfulenough to propel the said mass of stoneover a distance of some 300m (160canne), raising it, in the process, to amaximum height of 60 to 80m. Theeffect, in Marandon’s own words, wasthat ‘la pioggia delle selci si stese sinalla ponta Dragut lontana centosessanta canne, e che salirono a 30 in 40canne, e non ne resto’ ne pur una nedentro la Fogazza ne inanti.’ Marandonwas quite pleased with the result and inthe following years he was ordered bythe congregation of war to excavate anetwork of fougasses first in Malta andthen in Gozo. In all around 50 were builtin Malta and 14 in Gozo.In shape the Maltese fougasseresembled a large inclined tumbler with

the lower side prolonged to meet thehorizontal line from the top of the brim.As a result, the mouth of the fougassewas elliptical. The bore was circular butthe shaft of the pit was conical, taperingfrom 2.13m at the mouth to 1.52m at thebottom where it curved towards thepowder chamber. This measured around0.76m in diameter and was 4.5m deep.Arming a fougasse was a lengthy taskthat took about an hour. The procedureinvolved first the placing of thegunpowder charge of ‘100 au 120 livresde poudre’ inside its flat barrel withinthe powder chamber at the bottom ofthe pit. A long cord-like fuse was thensecured to the powder casket andpassed through a narrow channel cut inthe side of the fougasse.The gunpowder chamber was thencovered with a circular wooden lid, orRuota, and the pit then filled in with alarge number of stones, or selci, withthe larger stones placed at the bottom.It appears that the stone projectiles foruse with the fougasse were collectedbeforehand and stockpiled in thevicinity of the fougasse, if not withinthe pit itself, ready for use. Variouscustodians were also employed toensure that these selci were not carried

THEFOUGASSES OFMALTA ANDGOZO



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away. The cone-shaped pit was sodesigned to allow the projectiles, oncefired, to spread out and cover as widean area of ground, or sea, as possible.The stones, to quote Louis deBoisgelin, had the effect of hail andwere not only capable of killing men butof sinking boats.To ensure the greatest tactical effect,the fougasses were employed in pairs inorder that a large area of sea orforeshore in each bay could be coveredby their crossfire. Initially all thefougasses were made to cover theentrances to the bays but, in 1761, theFrench engineers advised the knights toadd others for flanking fire too.The first record of the fougasse beingarmed and readied for war is during theemergency of 1761. The suspiciousappearance of the French Fleet in thevicinity of Malta in 1792 provided asecond opportunity and indeed thecongregation of war then ordered thatthe fougasses be armed and kept readyfor eventual use, ‘...si rettano lefugacce, e si tengono pronte’. Thefeared invasion did not materialize butin 1798 things turned out differently andit appears that a few of fougasses wereactually fired against Bonaparte’stroops as they set about invading theisland. Major Ritchie quotes De laJonquiere’s reproduction of an extractfrom a letter written by a knight of theOrder asserting that fougasses werefired against the Città Vecchia divisionas it was attempting a descent atMarsaxlokk bay.Under British rule the fougasse seemsto have assumed the nature of acuriosity. Various experiments werecarried out with the fougasses at St.Julian’s Bay and St. George’s Bay bythe gunners of the British expeditionaryForce returning from Egypt in 1801. Inthese experiments the fougasses werecharged and fired first with 140 lbss ofpowder and over 10 tons of stones.When the charge was increased to 180lbs, the resultant explosion cracked oneof the fougasses along a vertical axisleaving a fissure cutting through some14 feet of rock.It does not appear that the fougasseswere kept in service during the earlydecades of British rule in Malta. Thesewere probably abandoned by the 1830s,as were most of the de-militarizedcoastal towers and batteries that were

handed over to the civil governmentduring that period. Thereafter, thefougasses do not seem to feature at allin the Island’s defensive stategyparticularly since the British graduallyabandoned the idea of resisting theenemy on the coast, adopting instead amighty fortress system conceivedprimarily for the defence of the GrandHarbour.The need to defend and fortify thebeaches against invasion, however, wasrekindled at the outbreak of the secondworld war when many of the Knights’long discarded coastal defences,including the fougasses, were pressedback into service and incorporated, inconjunction with concrete pillboxes andbarbed wire, into an overall War

Defence Plan. The Royal Irish Fusiliers,for example, were responsible for armingand maintaining the fougasses at SalinaBay. A popular photograph in theNational War Museum Collection showsthe fougasse outside Ximenes redoubt,in Salina, being tested fired in thepresence of HE the Governor General SirW. Dobbie.

Arx Selected Papers Volumes 1-4 2008

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