Artikel 1 Methodology

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Competing inHigh-Velocity MarketsStanley F. Slater

The rate of market change has accelerated dramatically overthe past decade. Products that we once only dreamed of havebecome commonplace. Other products that recently seemed tobe state-of-the-art are now obsolete. As rapid change has be-come the rule, the requirementsfor competitive advantage haveshifted. This article describes and analyzes the key character-istics of high-velocity markets and offers some suggestions forhow a business might effectively position itseIf in thisenvironment.

INTRODUCTIONNew markets are constantly born and transformed as

the result of deregulation, the fall of international eco-nomic boundaries, the advent of new technologies, andchanges in buyer needs. Product life cycles grow shorterand shorter. Where life cycles were once measured inyears, today they more often are measured in months.For example, the average effective life span for com-mercial electronics products is only 2 years. However,it is certain that a new generation of product will emergeto replace the earlier technology.For many firms, high-velocity markets and the newproduct opportunities they represent are becoming the

Address correspondence to Stanley F. Slater, Dept. of Strategic Managementand Marketing, University of Colorado-Colorado Springs, Colorado Springs,CO 80933-7150.

Industrial Marketing Management 22, 255-263 (1993)0 Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc., 1993655 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10010

most important part of their business. At 3M, productsless than 5 years old account for 25% of sales. Duringthe 197Os, new products accounted for one-fifth of cor-porate profits; in the 1980s they accounted for one-thirdof profits [ 11. In the 1990s this figure could increase toone-half.

The importance of high-velocity markets and the newproduct opportunities they represent are unquestionable.However, the market characteristics that affect both op-portunities and threats for companies competing in thesemarkets have not been well described. Furthermore, thepros and cons of different routes to developing and sus-taining competitive advantage in these markets are notclearly understood.

This article will (1) provide a framework for the anal-ysis of opportunities and threats in high-velocity markets,(2) describe two generic strategies that offer the promisefor superior performance in these markets, and (3) sug-gest some organizational characteristics that will be re-quired of all businesses. In describing the strategicoptions, we will also consider conditions that influencethe likelihood of success for each.CHARACTERISTICS OF HIGH-VELOCITYMARKETS

In terms of product life cycle, high-velocity marketsencompass the embryonic and early growth stages of thenew product. As such, they typically are characterized

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High un cert ainty an d high riskby both high-growth and high-investment requirements.Furthermore, product technology is unstable, and thecompetitive map is constantly changing [2-41. The bot-tom line in high-velocity markets is that uncertainty andhigh risk are a way of life for all market participants,from competitors and customers to suppliers. Figure 1summarizes the influences on uncertainty from the per-spective of each of the primary market participants.

CustomersEstimating market demand and growth is one of the

most difficult tasks of planning in high-velocity markets[5]. However, it is one of the most important tasks, asanticipated demand drives all types of resource require-ments, from building manufacturing facilities to devel-

oping distribution channels to hiring key personnel. Amajor reason why demand is so difficult to forecast atthe emergent stage is that buyers are usually satisfyingtheir generic need with some alternative product or tech-nology [6]. For example, before the transistor there werevacuum tubes. Currently, manufacturers of optical diskdrives are trying to induce users of magnetic disk drivesto switch. Thus, the uncertainty for the seller concernsthe rate at which buyers can be induced to substitute thenew technology for the old technology [2,4,6,7].

Many factors influence the rate at which buyers arewilling to substitute. Predominant among these are per-ception of value advantage, presence of switching costsand magnitude of the cost of product failure, and fear ofobsolescence [2,4,5]. The primary marketing task inemerging markets is to persuade buyers that a new so-lution offers sufficient benefits to offset its higher costs.

Customer InfluencesAdoption Rate

Perception of AdvantageFear of Obsolescence

Cost of Failure

Competitor InfluencesThreatened IndustriesNumber of Competitors

Technology CommitmentInformation Diffusion

Market RiskTechnological Risk

Financial Risk

Supplier InfluencesTechnology CommitmentMaterialsAvailabilityMaterials CostProduct Standardization

Company InfluencesMarket KnowledgeTechnical Knowledge

Low VolumesHigh Costs

Erratic Product Quality

FIGURE 1. Structural influences on risk in high-velocity markets

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Despite the unquestioned superiority of compact discplayers, it took several years for this technology to ef-fectively replace the traditional turntable. Furthermore,there was a substantial switching cost to substitute theCD player for the turntable as collections of records be-came obsolete. Also, it was not very long after the in-troduction of the CD player that manufacturers of stereoequipment began to discuss the next generation of tech-nology, digital audio tape (DAT), which suggested thepossibility of rapid obsolescence of CD players as it of-fered comparable, if not superior, sound quality plus theopportunity for home recording. The question for manybuyers became: Do I purchase a CD player today orwait a couple of years for the next generation? Thisquestion has often been asked in technology-driven in-dustries from personal computers to solar energy.

The results of these buyer concerns include lower brandor manufacturer loyalty and changing key success factors.To encourage substitution, sellers must be able to un-derstand and anticipate the key success factors that willlead to the creation of superior value for buyers and mustbe able to inform and educate buyers about why theiroffering provides superior value relative to the traditionaltechnology and to competitors in the new technology aswell.Competitors

There are two categories of competitors that a sellermust be concerned with. There are the traditional firmsfrom the threatened industries, and there are the com-petitors in the new technology. Each has its own effecton how the industry and technology will develop andmust be considered when setting objectives and devel-oping strategy.

While the task of the innovative firm is to induce rapidsubstitution, the objective of firms in the threatened in-dustry is to slow the substitution rate as much as possible.Firms in threatened industries often become very ag-gressive in defending their markets as they have muchto lose [2,4]. A study of 22 firms in seven threatenedindustries found in all cases that the old technology con-tinued to be improved and reached its highest state oftechnical development after the new technology was in-troduced. In four of the seven industries, sales continuedto expand after introduction of the new technology, andit took from 5 to 14 years for sales of the new technologyto exceed those of the old technology [6].

Aside from continuing to improve the old process,threatened firms are also in a strong position to reduce

prices, thus making it difficult for the new technology tooffer superior price performance. Finally, a substantialproportion of threatened firms also participate in the newtechnology, creating a name-recognition barrier that thenew-technology firms must overcome.

Competitors in the new technology are usually the pri-mary drivers of technology change [8-91. As the tech-nology standard has often not been clearly defined, thisis a period of high uncertainty and risk for developingfirms. Perhaps the clearest example of this tension wasbetween Sonys Betamax and Matsushitas VHS videocassette recording technology. Although Sonys Betamaxwas the first to market and offered what was generallyperceived to be superior picture quality, the VHS tech-nology offered other features that were of greater valueto consumers. Betamax is now an interesting footnote inthe history of the video cassette industry.

Competitive intensity in the high-velocity market alsoaffects the rate at which substitution takes place [37]. Un-der intense competition, technology is likely to advancemore rapidly, and price competition becomes more prob-able. Both conditions serve to increase value for buyersby increasing benefits and reducing costs, respectively.The perception of increased value encourages substitutionbut also reduces average industry profitability.

Finally, it is very difficult to maintain either a prod-uct or process technology lead over the competition.Consultants estimate that competitors secure detailed in-formation on 70% of new products within 1 year of in-troduction and that 60% to 90% of all process learningis eventually acquired by competitors [lo, p.531. Thus,competitive advantage is very difficult to sustain, and thedeterminants of performance are constantly changing.Suppliers

Suppliers can also have a substantial impact on tech-nology development in the emerging market [6,8]. Forexample, chip manufacturers such as Intel have as greatan impact on technology advancement in the personalcomputer industry as do the personal computer manu-facturers. Consequently, manufacturers must developclose relationships with these key suppliers, so that theycan take advantage of the new technology as rapidly aspossible.

On the other hand, suppliers can retard both techno-logical development and product delivery if critical rawmaterials are not available in adequate quantities [2]. Thisproblem is exacerbated in cases where industry standardshave not developed and suppliers are reluctant to commit

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Three strategic alternativesto a specific technology by making substantial invest-ments in manufacturing capability. Involving key sup-pliers early in the product-development process anddeveloping a long-term partnership may reduce the pos-sibility of shortages and erect a temporary entry barrierto competing firms.

CompanyFrom the companys standpoint, the greatest influence

on uncertainty is their lack of experience with the marketand with the technology. Hollister Sykes [ 1 I], the formersenior vice president of Exxon Enterprises and head ofthe new ventures program, noted that venture success isdirectly related to the ventures market and technicalknowledge. Numerous studies have shown that a com-panys risk of failure is greatly reduced when it sticks tofamiliar technologies and products [ 12- 131. Drifting toofar from the businesss core competence often results inhigh development costs and erratic product quality [2].Furthermore, the small volumes sold during the devel-opmental stage of the market increase the financial riskfor the company.

STRATEGY ALTERNATIVES INHIGH-VELOCITY MARKETS

There are three generic strategy alternatives, each withmany variations depending on the market characteristicsand the companys resources for entering a market. Theseare the pioneer, the early follower, and the late follower.Figure 2 depicts the average expected long-term perfor-mance of each of the three types.

Aside from having the lowest performance of the threetypes, the late follower is not an option during the emer-gent stage of high-velocity markets since the market has

Stanley F. Slater is Associate Professor of StrategicManagement and Marketing at the University of Colorado,Colorado Springs, Colorado.

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developed past this point before the late follower is readyto enter. Consequently, the late follower will not be con-sidered further.

There are advantages and disadvantages to both thepioneer and early follower strategies. Pioneering is ahigh-risk strategy, but, for survivors, pioneering resultsin higher market share and greater profitability[2,5,14,15] On average, though, being an early followerthrough imitation costs about one-third less and takesabout one-third less time to get to market than innovation[10,16] which greatly reduces financial risk. Further-more, an early commitment to a technology may laterturn out to be a disadvantage or even a liability as alter-native technologies emerge [5].

As usual, the opportunity for high rewards entails highrisks. The question that the manager must answer is: Dothe potential rewards of being a market leader outweighthe substantial financial, technological, and market risksassociated with being an innovator? In the followingsections we will offer some thoughts for how both thepioneer and early follower strategies can be effectivelypositioned within the structure of high-velocity markets.

The Pioneer StrategyPioneers are innovators. They are the first to identify

new market opportunities, they have the technologicalcapability to develop products that address those oppor-tunities, and they are willing to invest the substantialresources in R&D, manufacturing capacity, distribution,and promotion that are necessary to bring the product tomarket before the competition. Competitive advantagefor pioneers primarily arises from either technologicalleadership, preemption of assets, or creating buyerswitching costs [ 171.

Toshibas line of laptop computers [ 181 and Genen-techs development of the biotechnology drug market [ 191are excellent examples of successful products from thepioneer strategy. However, the experiences of defunctmicrocomputer pioneers such as Osborne, Computer De-vices, and Vector Technologies provide a sober reminderof the downside to this strategy. Besides willingness totake extraordinary risks and invest very substantial sums


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Return onInvestment- Average ROI

0%

Pioneer Early LateFollower Follower

FIGURE 2. Illustrative market performance by strategy typeof money, what are the support strategies that contributeto the pioneers success?CUSTOMERSTRATEGIES. One of the most difficult tasksfor the pioneer firm is to correctly identify new marketopportunities. This task is especially difficult becausepotential buyers often have no frame of reference forunderstanding the new product concept. After performingthe traditional market research on the Sony Walkman,the results indicated little demand for the product. AkioMorita, the president of Sony, did not believe those re-sults and introduced the Walkman based on his own in-stincts. The Walkman went on to become one of the greatnew product success stories of the 1980s and laid thefoundation for numerous follow-on products from Sonyand from their competitors.

This example and numerous others demonstrate theshortcomings of traditional market research techniques innew and emerging markets [13,20]. However, puttingcustomers first was found to be the most important man-agerial practice in a Fortune study of high growth busi-nesses, many of whom are operating at the leading edgeof market development [21]. Other studies have foundthat working closely with lead users whose current needsanticipate those of the general market and who are in aposition to benefit significantly from an early solution tothose needs is effective in these emerging markets[2,20,22-241.

Pioneers also have the opportunity to develop and po-sition products for the largest and most lucrative market

segments [ 151. Successful pioneers start out with a sig-nificant product advantage over earlier technologieswhich stimulates substantial substitution prior to the entryof early followers. To the extent that the pioneer canbuild in switching costs for the buyers to move to acompetitors product, a sustainable competitive advan-tage is created. In the absence of a defensible positionsuch as high switching costs, early followers are oftenable to improve on the original product. To maintain theiradvantage, pioneers must place greater emphasis on non-product sources of competitive advantage such as service,delivery time, and payment schedules [ 121.

After the concept has been developed and the targetmarket identified, a substantial effort to inform and per-suade potential buyers of the value of the new productremains. Practitioners of consultative selling [25] makea commitment to understanding their customers busi-nesses so well that they can quantify the economic valueof their offering to their customers. Rather than pushingthe product, they demonstrate to their customers that useof the new product will have a positive impact on thecustomers organizations bottom line by increasing salesvolume, improving price realization, or reducing costs.To accomplish this, Digital Equipment Corporationsometimes places consultants directly in key customersfacilities.COMPETITOR STRATEGIES. A potentially importantcompetitor-oriented strategy for pioneers is to enter intoan alliance with current or prospective competitors. In

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Closer supplier strategies1988 Texas Instruments announced a cooperative ar-rangement with Hitachi to develop a 16-megabit dynamicrandom access memory (RAM) chip. Wally Rhines, ex-ecutive vice president of TIs semiconductor group ex-plained: We both needed a business partner to minimizeour risks [26, p. 681. In one move, TI reduced both thenumber of competitors it faced in that market and itsfinancial and technological risk.SUPPLIER STRATEGIES. The relationship between man-ufacturers and their suppliers has changed dramaticallyin the past 5 years. To improve quality control, buyershave reduced both the number of components in theirproducts and the number of their suppliers; they expectto see just-in-time manufacturing and delivery techniquesand statistical process quality controls that quickly iden-tify the causes of defects; and they require that vendorsbe able to communicate and handle data electronically.This has major implications for pioneer firms, as manyvendors have been able to reduce from weeks to days thetime it takes for custom designs to be turned into finishedproducts. For example, computer-aided design and com-puter-aided manufacturing in vendors shops enables thebuyers engineers to directly transmit their concepts anddrawings without the time-consuming preparation ofblueprints [27].

An additional benefit for pioneers is that early entrantswith a viable product typically have their choice of thebest suppliers of distribution services (e.g., brokers,distributors, and retailers) in the industry. This can alsoserve as a significant barrier to followers [ 15, p.2 111.COMPANY STRATEGIES. Successful pioneers developmeaningful innovations by effectively integrating theirresearch, engineering, production, marketing, and man-agement practices with a view to the long term and astrong market orientation at all levels of the organizationand throughout all functions [28]. Management tech-niques that innovate companies employ include frequentbut low-risk market experiments [ 181; small, flat, auton-omous subunits within the larger organization [28-291;performance evaluation and reward systems that encour-age risk-taking and innovative behavior [30]; complete

rejection of the not-invented-here (NIH) syndrome [3 11;and intensive collaboration among all groups involved inproduct development [24].The Early-Follower Strategy

Where the pioneer focuses on developing innovativenew products, the early follower is a creative imitator[32] whose objective is to make incremental improve-ments that allow to reduce costs and exploit unattendedmarket opportunities. Early followers have two sourcesof advantage that substantially reduce their financial andmarket risk and provide an attractive opportunity forgrowth and profitability: They almost always start withlower costs than those incurred by pioneering firms [5]and they have the opportunity to assess how effectivelythe pioneer has positioned itself with respect to marketneeds and can then make appropriate adjustments [331.AST Research, Inc., is an excellent example of the early-follower strategy. Between February 1990 and May 199 1the companys market value quadrupled as a result ofoffering a lower cost, higher performing family of per-sonal computers than leaders IBM and Compaq [34].CUSTOMER STRATEGIES. A strong customer orientationis just as important to early followers as it is to pioneers.However, where pioneers primarily focus on lead users,early followers take a broader view of the market. Theirgoal is to determine how effectively the pioneers offeringaddresses the buyers needs. Traditional marketing re-search techniques are much more appropriate for the earlyfollower. The early follower should also be interested inidentifying market segments that do not realize adequatevalue from the pioneers offering.COMPETITOR AND SUPPLIER STRATEGIES. The greatestopportunity to create competitive advantage for early fol-lowers is to learn from the experiences of the pioneersand to create additional value for buyers. This can comefrom cost or benefit improvements. On the cost side, theearly follower typically enters the learning curve belowwhere the pioneer entered. This is because the majorityof all learning effects ultimately diffuse to competitors

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as they learn about technologies in use or purchase sec-ond-generation production equipment from suppliers[ 1 8 1 .Early followers have the opportunity to learn frompioneers market mistakes as well [ 181. For example,when buyers have quality or performance concerns dueto lack of familiarity with the pioneer, well-known earlyfollowers can be very successful with me-too products[33]. Furthermore, pioneers can entirely miss the markwith their initial products but provide key market intel-ligence to astute followers as was the case when MillerBrewing introduced its very successful Lite Beer onthe heels of unsuccessful diet beers. However, followersmust be very careful to avoid positioning their productstoo near the pioneers product, as this often invites ruin-ous price competition [33].COMPANYSTRATEGIES. Early followers differ from pi-oneers in a few key areas. First, early followers havebroader market surveillance efforts than do pioneers [35] _While the pioneers primary emphasis is on the lead cus-tomer, early followers must maintain an intensive dualfocus on both customers and competitors. To developthis information, early followers use market researchtechniques such as conditional forecasting, fatalflaws analysis, and trend evaluation 1361. These tech-niques help assess market potential and competitorstrength so that poor opportunities may be avoided andattractive opportunities effectively exploited.

Not only are early followers adept at developing keymarket information, they also must be able to quicklyproduce and assess information about competitors tech-nologies and products. This enables them to take advan-tage of the pioneers learning, which results in a lowerproduction cost. To accomplish this, successful early fol-lowers are expert at reverse engineering. For example,most Japanese auto makers establish target costs basedon exhaustive comparative studies of competitors prod-ucts. Target costs at Isuzu might be derived from theanalysis of a steering mechanism from a Toyota and abrake pedal from a Nissan [37].

The reverse engineering concept can be applied tononmanufacturing areas through competitive benchmark-ing. The objective of benchmarking is to compare thebusinesss operations with those of industry leaders.These comparisons may be against competitors or againstnoncompetitors. A noncompetitor comparison can pro-vide information about the best functional practices inany industry, which may include technological advances

that are unrecognized in the businesss own industry [38].A major difference between the successful pioneer and

the successful early follower is the fact that the earlyfollower makes a commitment to stability in product de-sign and production process [35,39]. This enhances itsability to reap economies of scale in manufacturing, se-cure lower cost raw materials, and rapidly increase thelearning benefit. All of these are important contributorsto the early-followers development of a cost advantage.

STRATEGIC NECESSITIES INHIGH-VELOCITY MARKETSHigh Quality

The conventional wisdom has been that competitiveadvantage can be achieved either through attainment ofa low-cost position relative to competitors or through theachievement of meaningful product or service differen-tiation, the two routes being basically incompatible asthey require different resources and skills [2]. However,this is not the case when it comes to quality-based dif-ferentiation and low cost. In fact, the management pol-icies that breed high quality reduce costs throughintensive emphasis on learning, lower scrap and reworkrates, and fewer returns from the field. In a comprehen-sive study across six industries, product quality had abeneficial effect on direct cost as higher quality lead tohigher market share with its attendant scale and learningbenefits [40]. Additional studies show that high qualityallows premium pricing, which further enhances returnson investment [4 l-421

Consequently, low quality can no longer be justifiedbased on a lower cost to the buyer. Buyers no longermerely want high quality, they demand it. Poor productquality will result inevitably in high costs and low sales.Unfortunately for sellers, though, high quality may ceaseto be a source of competitive advantage as all survivorsachieve parity. It has or will become a minimum require-ment to be competitive as has become the case in theautomobile industry.Speed to Market

It should go without saying that success for both pi-oneers and early followers requires rapid new productdevelopment and introduction [43 1. Successful compa-nies today make decisions faster, develop new productsmore rapidly, and deliver them more quickly than their

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competitors [21,44-451. However, in too many U.S.businesses, this cycle takes from 36 to 48 months com-pared to 12 to I8 months for the market leaders [46].

This is a very real case of time is money. Studiesby Arthur D. Little [47] and McKinsey and Company[45] show that reducing time to market has a greaterimpact on product profitability than making similar re-ductions in either investment cost or R&D expenses.However, pioneers are cautioned to spend the necessarytime to develop a meaningful advantage over competitorsanticipated offerings, as the marginal returns of thoseR&D and marketing efforts seem to be high enough tooffset the risk of being overtaken by rival innovators [43].

Speed is not achieved by making everyone work faster,though. Speed is achieved by eliminating wasteful stepsand procedures in both the development and productionprocesses, by organizing more efficiently, and by catch-ing mistakes earlier [48]. The good news is that the samemanagement techniques that foster innovation and highquality also improve the efficiency and timeliness of thedevelopment process. This common base of managementtechniques includes the use of multifunctional teams atevery stage of development to avoid mistakes and deadends, minimization of bureaucratic delays by cutting re-quired approvals and reducing layers of management,early involvement of suppliers and distributors so thatbottlenecks dont appear, and the creation and sustenanceof a corporate culture that motivates all employees toproduce and deliver the highest value product to the cus-tomer in the shortest period of time.FINAL REMARKS FOR MANAGERS

In Chinese, the concept of critical turning point isrepresented by two characters. One character meansdanger, while the other character means hidden op-portunity. Entering an emerging market or one that isexperiencing transformation represents a critical turningpoint for most businesses. Long-held beliefs about cus-tomers, competitors, employees, and technology must bereexamined. To find the hidden opportunity in thisdynamic period, managers must develop a culture thatplaces the top priority on customer-driven value as de-fined by quality and timely product offerings. Their busi-nesses will have a core set of skills that enable them tobe continuously innovative. Finally, their managementpolicies will all be integrated with the objective of pro-viding the most productive environment for the companyand its network of suppliers and distributors to accom-

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plish their objectives. The danger in this world ofhigh-velocity markets is real and imminent. Anything lessthan total commitment to customer-driven innovation willresult in failure.

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