Article Vii - Sec. 1 to Sec. 11 - Executive Department

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    and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition ishereby +#M##5+.

    #A89A+6- . 8A*-58 vs. -AM6( A-/A, . -. (o. ;, ?uly

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    5strada v. +isierto, G.-. (os. $D%$=C$@. April >,

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    7A8A6 et al vs. MA.-. (o. $%=@=+ecember $>,

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    ruleCmaking po'er for the protection and enforcement of constitutionalrights enshrined in the $; /onstitution, albeit limited to these t'osituations. O51tralegal killings refer to killings committed 'ithout dueprocess of la', i.e., 'ithout legal safeguards or udicial proceedings. 6n theother hand, Oenforced disappearances are attended by the follo'ing

    characteristics: an arrest, detention, or abduction of a person by agovernment oEcial or organi)ed groups or private individuals acting 'ith thedirect or indirect ac&uiescence of the governmentB the refusal of the #tate todisclose the fate or 'hereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal toackno'ledge the deprivation of liberty 'hich places such person outside theprotection of la'.QQThe trial court gave considerable 'eight to the discussion in the petition ofbrie"ng papers supposedly obtained from the AFP indicating that the antiCinsurgency campaign of the military under the administration of PresidentArroyo included targeting of identi"ed legal organi)ations under the (+F,

    'hich included the /PA, and their members, as Oenemies of the state.0e hold that such documented practice of targeting activists in the militaryLscounterCinsurgency program by itself does not ful"ll the evidentiary standardprovided in the Amparo -ule to establish an enforced disappearance.n the case of -o1as v. MacapagalCArroyo, the /ourt noted that the similaritybet'een the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction 'iththose surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not,necessarily, carry suEcient 'eight to prove that the governmentorchestrated such abduction. Accordingly, the trial court in this case cannotsimply infer government involvement in the abduction of ?ames from pastsimilar incidents in 'hich the victims also 'orked or aEliated 'ith the /PA

    and other leftCleaning groups.QQThe petition further premised government complicity in the abduction of?ames on the very positions held by the respondents. The /ourt in -ubrico v.MacapagalCArroyo had the occasion to e1pound on the doctrine of commandresponsibility and 'hy it has little bearing, if at all, in amparo proceedings.t may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis tohold militaryJpolice commanders liable for e1traClegal killings, enforceddisappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this urisdiction onthe theory that the command responsibility doctrine no' constitutes aprinciple of international la' or customary international la' in accordance

    'ith the incorporation clause of the /onstitution. #till, it 'ould beinappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of commandresponsibility, as the /A seemed to have done, as a form of criminalcomplicity through omission, for individual respondentsL criminal liability, ifthere be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. n other 'ords, the /ourt doesnot rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even ifincidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may have beencommitted. As the /ourt stressed in #ecretary of (ational +efense v. Manalo2Manalo3, the 'rit of amparo 'as conceived to provide e1peditious andeective procedural relief against violations or threats of violation of thebasic rights to life, liberty, and security of personsB the corresponding

    amparo suit, ho'ever, Ois not an action to determine criminal guilt re&uiringproof beyond reasonable doubt 1 1 1 or administrative liability re&uiringsubstantial evidence that 'ill re&uire full and e1haustive proceedings. 6fthe same tenor, and by 'ay of e1pounding on the nature and role of amparo,is 'hat the /ourt said in -a)on v. Tagitis:t does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for thedisappearance Gthreats thereof or e1traudicial killingsHB it determines

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    responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearanceGthreats thereof or e1traudicial killingsH for purposes of imposing theappropriate remedies to address the disappearance Gor e1traudicial killingsH.1 1 1 1As the la' no' stands, e1traudicial killings and enforced disappearances in

    this urisdiction are not crimes penali)ed separately from the componentcriminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforceddisappearances and are no' penali)ed under the -evised Penal /ode andspecial la's. The simple reason is that the 8egislature has not spoken on thematterB the determination of 'hat acts are criminal 1 1 1 are matters ofsubstantive la' that only the 8egislature has the po'er to enact.1 1 1GAssessing the evidence on record, 'e "nd that the participation in anymanner of military and police authorities in the abduction of ?ames has notbeen ade&uately proven. The identities of the abductors have not beenestablished, much less their link to any military or police unit. There is

    like'ise no concrete evidence indicating that ?ames is being held or detainedupon orders of or 'ith ac&uiescence of government agents. /onse&uently,the trial court erred in granting amparo reliefs. #uch pronouncement ofresponsibility on the part of public respondents cannot be made given theinsuEciency of evidence. o'ever, 'e agree 'ith the trial court in "ndingthat the actions taken by respondent oEcials are Overy limited, super"cialand oneCsided. ts candid and forthright observations on the eorts e1ertedby the respondents are borne by the evidence on record.QQAn inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support orstrengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the

    court before making a decision. A basic re&uirement before an amparo courtmay grant an inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonablydeterminable from the allegations of the party seeking the order. n this case,the issuance of inspection order 'as properly denied since the petitionersspeci"ed several military and police establishments based merely on theallegation that the testimonies of victims and 'itnesses in previous incidentsof similar abductions involving activists disclosed that those premises 'ereused as detention centers. n the same vein, the prayer for issuance of aproduction order 'as predicated on petitionersL bare allegation that itobtained con"dential information from an unidenti"ed military source, thatthe name of ?ames 'as included in the soCcalled 6rder of 7attle. ndeed, the

    trial court could not have sanctioned any O"shing e1pedition by precipitateissuance of inspection and production orders on the basis of insuEcientclaims of one party.

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    D. 0hether -odrigue) has proven through substantial evidence thatformer President Arroyo is responsible or accountable for his abduction.

    eld:

    $. (o. t bears stressing that since there is no determination of

    administrative, civil or criminal liability in amparo and habeasdata proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertainingresponsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance ore1traudicial killing.

    As 'as held in the case of 5strada v +esierto, a nonCsitting Presidentdoes not enoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during thelatterLs tenureB that courts should look 'ith disfavor upon the presidentialprivilege of immunity, especially 'hen it impedes the search for truth orimpairs the vindication of a right. The deliberations of the /onstitutional/ommission also reveal that the intent of the framers is clear that

    presidential immunity from suit is concurrent only 'ith his tenure and not histerm. 2The term means the time during 'hich the oEcer may claim to holdthe oEce as of right, and "1es the interval after 'hich the severalincumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the termduring 'hich the incumbent actually holds oEce. The tenure may be shorterthan the term for reasons 'ithin or beyond the po'er of the incumbent.3Therefore, former Pres. MA cannot use such immunity to shield herself fromudicial scrutiny that 'ould assess 'hether, 'ithin the conte1tof amparo proceedings, she 'as responsible or accountable for theabduction of -odrigue).

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    Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil oradministrative liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility maynevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability 'ithinthese foregoing de"nitions.

    >. es.

    To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, thefollo'ing elements must obtain:a. the e1istence of a superiorCsubordinate relationship bet'een theaccused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as hissubordinateBb. the superior kne' or had reason to kno' that the crime 'as aboutto be or had been committedB andc. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measuresto prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.D

    The president, being the commanderCinCchief of all armed forces, necessarilypossesses control over the military that &uali"es him as a superior 'ithin the

    purvie' of the command responsibility doctrine.D. (o. -odrigue) anchors his argument on a general allegation that on the

    basis of the 4Melo /ommission4 and the 4Alston -eport,4 respondentsin .-. (o. $;$=@ already had kno'ledge of and information on, andshould have kno'n that a climate of enforced disappearances hadbeen perpetrated on members of the (PA. 0ithout even attaching, orat the very least, &uoting these reports, -odrigue) contends that theMelo -eport points to rogue military men as the perpetrators. 0hile theAlston -eport states that there is a policy allo'ing enforceddisappearances and pins the blame on the President, 'e do notautomatically impute responsibility to former President Arroyo for each

    and every count of forcible disappearance. Aside from -odrigue)Lsgeneral averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establishher responsibility or accountability for his abduction. (either 'as thereeven a clear attempt to sho' that she should have kno'n about theviolation of his right to life, liberty or security, or that she had failed toinvestigate, punish or prevent it.

    SOLIVEN vs. MAKASIARConstitutional Law Presidents Immunit !rom Suit Must "e Invo#ed $

    t%e PresidentFA/T#: 7eltran is among the petitioners in this case. e together 'ithothers 'as charged for libel by the president. /ory herself "led a complaintCaEdavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that /ory cannot "le acomplaint aEdavit because this 'ould defeat her immunity from suit. e

    grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued.o'ever, if a president 'ould sue then the president 'ould allo' herself tobe placed under the courtLs urisdiction and conversely she 'ould beconsenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president,the president may not be able to appear in court to be a 'itness for herselfthus she may be liable for contempt.

    http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/nov2011/gr_191805_2011.html#fnt84http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/nov2011/gr_191805_2011.html#fnt84
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    ##*5: 0hether or not such immunity can be invoked by 7eltran, a personother than the president.58+: The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege ofimmunity from suit is to assure the e1ercise of Presidential duties andfunctions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the

    /hief 51ecutive of the overnment is a ob that, aside from re&uiring all ofthe oEceCholderLs time, also demands undivided attention.7ut this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue ofthe oEce and may be invoked only by the holder of the oEceB not by anyother person in the PresidentLs behalf. Thus, an accused like 7eltran et al, ina criminal case in 'hich the President is complainant cannot raise thepresidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceedingagainst such accused.Moreover, there is nothing in our la's that 'ould prevent the President from'aiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed theprotection aorded by the privilege and submit to the courtLs urisdiction.

    The choice of 'hether to e1ercise the privilege or to 'aive it is solely thePresidentLs prerogative. t is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposedby any other person.

    #enate vs. 5rmita , - $%;, April

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    its various #enate /ommittees, conducts in&uiries or investigations in aid oflegislation 'hich call for, inter alia, the attendance of oEcials and employeesof the e1ecutive department, bureaus, and oEces including those employedin overnment 6'ned and /ontrolled /orporations, the Armed Forces of thePhilippines 2AFP3, and the Philippine (ational Police 2P(P3.

    The /ommittee of the #enate issued invitations to various oEcials of the51ecutive +epartment for them to appear as resource speakers in a publichearing on the rail'ay proect, others on the issues of massive election fraudin the Philippine elections, 'ire tapping, and the role of military in the soCcalled Oloriagate #candal.#aid oEcials 'ere not able to attend due to lack of consent from thePresident as provided by 5.6. D%D, #ection > 'hich re&uires all the publicoEcials enumerated in #ection of 5.6. D%D, 'hich re&uires all the public oEcials, enumerated in#ection

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    partnership for mutual opportunity and gro'th 2for both countries3.?P5PA 'hich has been referred to as a Umega treatyL is a comprehensive planfor opening up of markets in goods and services as 'ell as removing barriersand restrictions on investments. t is a deal that encompasses even ourcommitments to the 0T6.

    The comple1ity of ?P5PA became all the more evident at the #enate hearingconducted by the /ommittee on Trade and /ommerce last (ovember

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    treaty negotiations 'ould discourage future Philippine representatives fromfrankly e1pressing their vie's during negotiations. The ighest Tribunalrecogni)ed that treaty negotiations normally involve a process of &uid pro&uo, 'here negotiators 'ould 'illingly grant concessions in an area of lesserimportance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater

    national interest.

    n the same +ecision, the /ourt took time to address the dissent of /hief?ustice -eynato #. Puno. t said: O0e are a'are that behind the dissent of the/hief ?ustice lies a genuine )eal to protect our people!s right to informationagainst any abuse of e1ecutive privilege. t is a )eal that 0e fully share. The/ourt, ho'ever, in its endeavour to guard against the abuse of e1ecutiveprivilege, should be careful not to veer to'ards the opposite e1treme, to thepoint that it 'ould strike do'n as invalid even a legitimate e1ercise thereof.

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    -6M*86 8. (5-, petitioner vs. #5(AT5 /6MMTT55 6( A//6*(TA78T 6FP*78/ 6FF/5-# A(+ (95#TAT6(#, #5(AT5 /6MMTT55 6( T-A+5 A(+/6MM5-/5, A(+ #5(AT5 /6MMTT55 6( (AT6(A8 +5F5(#5 A(+#5/*-T.-. (o. $=%D>, March

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    Province of (orth /otabato v. overnment of the -epublic of the Philippines2.-. (os. $>@;$, $>@;>, $>;@$, I$>;%

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    Philippine /onstitution Association vs 5nri&ue)

    @ #/-A @=% V Political 8a' V 9eto Po'er V Part of the 8egislative Process/onstitutionality of the Pork 7arrel O/ountry'ide +evelopment FundThis is a consolidation of cases 'hich sought to &uestion the veto authorityof the president involving the eneral Appropriations Act of $;;D as 'ell asthe constitutionality of the pork barrel. The Philippine /onstitutionAssociation 2P8/6(#A3 &uestions the country'ide development fund.P8/6(#A said that /ongress can only allocate funds but they cannotspecify the items as to 'hich those funds 'ould be applied for since that isalready the function of the e1ecutive.n .-. (o. $$>%%, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions ofthe AA of $;;D, neither house of congress took steps to override the veto.

    nstead, #enators TaZada and -omulo sought the issuance of the 'rits ofprohibition and mandamus against the respondents in .-. (o. $$>%%. nthis petition, petitioners contest the constitutionality of: 2$3 the veto on fourspecial provisions added to items in the AA of $;;D for the Armed Forces ofthe Philippines 2AFP3 and the +epartment of Public 0orks and igh'ays2+P03B and 2

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    in the (ational e1penditure Program. TaZada et al claimed this asunconstitutional. The #/ ruled that the veto is valid for it is in compliant tothe O6ne Fund Policy V it avoided double funding and redundancy.9eto of provision on prior approval of /ongress for purchase of militarye&uipment

    As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition andprohibition violate the /onstitutional mandate of nonCimpairment ofcontractual obligations, and if allo'ed, Oshall eectively alter the originalintent of the AFP Moderni)ation Fund to cover all military e&uipment deemednecessary to moderni)e the AFP. The #/ aErmed the veto. Any provisionblocking an administrative action in implementing a la' or re&uiringlegislative approval of e1ecutive acts must be incorporated in a separate andsubstantive bill. Therefore, being Oinappropriate provisions./ondition on the deactivation of the /AF*Ls/ongress appropriated compensation for the /AF*Ls including the paymentof separation bene"ts. The President declared in his 9eto Message that the

    implementation of this #pecial Provision to the item on the /AF*Ls shall besubect to prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.+. (o. $@; and -.A. (o.%@. The #/ ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided by the president.Further, if this provision is allo'ed the it 'ould only lead to the repeal of saide1isting la's./onditions on the appropriation for the #upreme /ourt, etcn his veto message: OThe said condition is consistent 'ith the /onstitutionalinunction prescribed under #ection , Article WC7 of the /onstitutional 'hichstates that Uno elective or appointive public oEcer or employee shall receiveadditional, double, or indirect compensation unless speci"cally authori)ed byla'.L am, therefore, con"dent that the heads of the said oEces shall

    maintain "delity to the la' and faithfully adhere to the 'ellCestablishedprinciple on compensation standardi)ation. TaZada et al claim that theconditions imposed by the President violated the independence and "scalautonomy of the #upreme court, the 6mbudsman, the /6A and the /-. The#/ sustained the veto: n the "rst place, the conditions &uestioned bypetitioners 'ere placed in the A7 by /ongress itself, not by the President.The 9eto Message merely highlighted the /onstitutional mandate thatadditional or indirect compensation can only be given pursuant to la'. n thesecond place, such statements are mere reminders that the disbursementsof appropriations must be made in accordance 'ith la'. #uch statementsmay, at 'orse, be treated as superNuities.

    Pork 7arrel /onstitutionalThe pork barrel makes the une&ual e&ual. The /ongressmen, beingrepresentatives of their local districts kno' more about the problems in theirconstituents areas than the national government or the president for thatmatter. ence, 'ith that kno'ledge, the /ongressmen are in a betterposition to recommend as to 'here funds should be allocated.

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    T5/#6( 9#. /6M585/.-. (o. $%$D>D, March >

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    'ho is recogni)ed as such in the host country. o'ever, an e1ception isprovided i.e. unless heJshe e1ecutes, upon registration, an aEdavit preparedfor the purpose by the /ommission declaring that heJshe shall resume actualphysical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than > years fromapproval of registration. #uch aEdavit shall also state that heJshe has not

    applied for citi)enship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause forthe removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the(ational -egistry of Absentee 9oters and hisJher permanent dis&uali"cationto vote in absentia.

    Petitioner claims that this is violative of the residency re&uirement in #ection$ Article 9 of the /onstitution 'hich re&uires the voter must be a resident inthe Philippines for at least one yr, and a resident in the place 'here heproposes to vote for at least % months immediately preceding an election.

    o'ever, 6# held that ruling in said case does not hold 'ater at present,

    and that the /ourt may have to discard that particular ruling. Panacea of thecontroversy: AEdavit for 'ithout it, the presumption of abandonment of Phildomicile shall remain. The &uali"ed Filipino abroad 'ho e1ecuted an aEdavitis deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines and presumed notto have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. #ection @of -A (o. ;$; does not only re&uire the promise to resume actual physicalpermanent residence in the Philippines not later than > years after approvalof registration but it also re&uires the Filipino abroad, 06( he is a green cardholder, a temporary visitor or even on business trip, must declare that heJshehas not applied for citi)enship in another country. Thus, heJshe must returnto the Philippines other'ise conse&uences 'ill be met according to -A (o.

    ;$;.

    Although there is a possibility that the Filipino 'ill not return after he hase1ercised his right to vote, the /ourt is not in a position to rule on the'isdom of the la' or to repeal or modify it if such la' is found to beimpractical. o'ever, it can be said that the /ongress itself 'as conscious ofthis probability and provided for deterrence 'hich is that the Filipino 'hofails to return as promised stands to lose his right of surage. Accordingly,the votes he cast shall not be invalidated because he 'as &uali"ed to voteon the date of the elections.

    E*+ressum ,a(it (essare ta(itum: 'here a la' sets do'n plainly its 'holemeaning, the /ourt is prevented from making it mean 'hat the /ourtpleases. n "ne, considering that underlying intent of the /onstitution, as isevident in its statutory construction and intent of the framers, 'hich is togrant Filipino immigrants and permanent residents abroad theun&uestionable right to e1ercise the right of surage 2#ection $ Article 93 the/ourt "nds that #ection @ of -A (o. ;$; is not constitutionally defective.

    2

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    constitutional mandate of independence of the /6M585/. *nder such asituation, the /ourt is left 'ith no option but to 'ithdra' from its usualsilence in declaring a provision of la' unconstitutional.

    Fernando 8ope) vs erardo -o1asConstitutional Law -udi(ial Powere/ned8ope) and -o1as 'ere the candidates for 9P in the $;%@ elections. 8ope)'on the election. -o1as appealed his lost before the P5T. The P5T 'ascreated by -A $;>. t is provided in the la' that OThere shall be onindependent Presidential 5lectoral Tribunal . . . 'hich shall be the sole udgeof all contests relating to the election, returns, and &uali"cations of thepresidentCelect and the 9iceCpresident elect of the Philippines. n eect, alosing candidate 'ould have the right to appeal his loss. 8ope) assailed thela' and he sought to enoin -o1as and the P5T from proceeding 'ith thecase. 8ope) averred that the P5T is unconstitutional for it 'as not provided

    for in the constitution. Also, since the P5T is composed of the /hief ?usticeand the other ten members of the #/ any decision of the P5T cannot bevalidly appealed before the #/ or that there may be conNict that may ariseonce a P5T decision is appealed before the #/.##*5: 0hether or not the P5T is a valid body.58+: Pursuant to the /onstitution, Othe ?udicial po'er shall be vested in one#/ and in such inferior courts as may be established by la'

    http://www.uberdigests.info/2011/10/what-is-judicial-power/http://www.uberdigests.info/2011/10/what-is-judicial-power/
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    This provision vests in the udicial branch of the government, not merelysome speci"ed or limited udicial po'er, but Othe udicial po'er under ourpolitical system, and, accordingly, the entirety or Oall of said po'er, e1cept,only, so much as the /onstitution confers upon some other agency, such asthe po'er to Oudge all contests relating to the election, returns and

    &uali"cations of members of the #enate and those of the ouse of-epresentatives, 'hich is vested by the fundamental la' solely in the #enate5lectoral Tribunal and the ouse 5lectoral Tribunal, respectively.?udicial po'er is the authority to settle usticiable controversies or disputesinvolving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts ofustice or the redress of 'rongs for violations of such rights. The propere1ercise of said authority re&uires legislative action: 2$3 de"ning suchenforceable and demandable rights andJor prescribing remedies forviolations thereofB and 2

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    The petition corollarily prays for the issuance of a 'rit of prohibition directingthe ?oint /ommittee to cease and desist from conducting any furtherproceedings pursuant to the -ules of the ?oint Public #ession of /ongress on/anvassing.

    ssue:0hether or not legislative procedure, precedent or practice as borne out bythe rules of both ouses of /ongress supports PimentelLs arguments againstthe e1istence and proceedings of the ?oint /ommittee of /ongress after theadournment of /ongress.

    eld:(6. PimentelLs claim that his arguments are buttressed by Olegislativeprocedure, precedent or practice as borne out by the rules of both ouses of/ongress is directly contradicted by #ection D< of -ule W9 of the -ulesadopted by the #enate, of 'hich he is an incumbent member.

    Moreover, the precedents set by the $;;< and $;; Presidential 5lections donot support the move to stop the ongoing canvassing by the ?oint/ommittee. Thus, during the $;;< Presidential elections, both ouses of/ongress adourned on

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    The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration "led by petitioner of the #/Lsdecision dismissing the formerLs petition and declaring the establishment ofthe respondent P5T as constitutional.Petitioner argues that P5T is unconstitutional on the ground that #ec D, Art9 of the /onstitution does not provide for the creation of the P5T, and it

    violates #ec $

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    Article WC/ 2for the /6M585/3 and #ection $, Article 9 2for the #enate andouse 5lectoral Tribunals3 of the /onstitution.6n ?une

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    party 'ho 'ould be bene"ted or inured by the udgment and the party 'hois entitled to the avails of the suit.

    8egarda vs +e /astroP.5.T. /ase ===>March >$,

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    n the instant protest, 8egarda enumerated all the provinces,municipalities and cities 'here she &uestions all the results in all theprecincts therein. The protest here is suEcient in form and substantively,serious enough on its face to pose a challenge to +e /astroLs title to hisoEce.

    /onsidering that the protest is suEcient in form and substance, the #/again stress that nothing as yet has been proved as to the veracity of theallegations. The protest is only suEcient for the Tribunal to proceed and givethe 8egarda the opportunity to prove her case pursuant to -ule %$ of the P5T-ules. Although said rule only pertains to revision of ballots, nothing hereinprevents the Tribunal from allo'ing or including the correction of manifesterrors, pursuant to the TribunalLs ruleCmaking po'er under #ection D, Article9 of the /onstitution.

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    M-AM +5F5(#6- V #A(TA6 versus F+58 -AM6# 2 #/-A @@;3

    Facts:The protestant, Miriam +efensorC#antiago ran for presidency and lost in theMay $;;< election. n her Motion on the $%th day of August in the year $;;@,reiterated in her comment of the

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    6895- 6. 86RA(6 v. 86-A MA/APAA8CA--66

    - 5 # 6 8 * T 6 (

    7efore us are four Petitions pertaining to the oathCtaking of er 51cellency,

    loria MacapagalCArroyo as President of the Philippines. 7ecause theyinvolve the same subect matter, they are hereby consolidated.

    n - (o. $D%@

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    one for declaratory relief, 2par. %.$. of Petition3 and that they 4fullyunderstand the 'ellCsettled doctrine that this onorable /ourt is bereft ofurisdiction to entertain cases for declaratory relief.4crala' virtua$a' library

    #econd, petitioners have no legal standing to "le the suits. They have no'

    sho'n any direct and personal inury as a result of President ArroyoLs oathCtaking. > #peci"cally, Petitioner 8o)anoLs alleged interest as a ta1payer is fartoo detached from the ultimate obective of his Petition: nullify the oathCtaking of Arroyo and declare 5strada as 4PresidentConCleave.4 The otherpetitioners have not even alleged, not to say sho'n, any prima facie legalinterest to &ualify them as proper parties. Sibit)ers, ho'ever 'ellCmeaning,have no locus standi.

    Third, none of the Petitions can be treated as actions for &uo 'arranto. *nder-ule %% of the -ules of /ourt, a plea for &uo 'arranto must be commenced2$3 by the solicitor general, 23 by 4a person

    claiming to be entitled to a public oEce or position usurped or unla'fullyheld or e1ercised by another.4 (one of the petitioners &ualify in la' tocommence the action. Their Petitions do not even remotely allege that theyare.chanrob$es virtua$ $a' $ibrary

    At bottom, the /ourt stands by its -esolution in AM (o. =$C$C=@ #/,promulgated on