4

conflict. Both also insisted that thesenior theater Air Force officershould have operational control ofall aviation units with combatcapability, including the carrier airgroups of Task Force 77 and the1st Marine Aircraft Wing.Ridgway's coolness to anyamphibious operation and hiswarmth toward the Weyland-Everest interdiction campaign,Operation Strangle, would havecritical effect on both the 1stMarine Division and the 1st MarineAircraft Wing for the rest of thewar.

For the 1st Marine Division thehigh-level discussions on the rela-tive weight of the ground and airwars on bringing the Communiststo terms had no immediate effectsince X Corps' mission remainedunchanged: seize the Kansas Line.Nevertheless, the Marines neededat least a brief pause, whichAlmond would not grant the divi-sion on 31 May. He ordered theattacks to the north to continue,and on 1 June the 5th and 7thMarines dutifully pushed on—andwent nowhere. With the 11thMarines short of artillery shells, air

arrangements uncertain, and the7th Marines in need of a break,Thomas did not push Haywardand Nickerson until they all had achance to think about the newattacks.

The terrain alone appeared for-midable. A long, high ridge of theTaebaek Mountain chain dominat-ed the 1st Marine Division's zoneof action. The ridge was known asTaeu-san and Taeam-san for itstwo highest peaks, 1,179 metersfor the northern most Taeu-sanand 1,316 meters for the southernTaeam-san. Taeu-san/Taeam-sanwere bordered on the west by theSochon River, which ran into theHwachon Reservoir just pastYanggu. The Marines also inheritedthe southern part of another paral-lel ridge to the west, but dominat-ed by the Taeu-san/Taeaum-sanhill mass to the east, which meantthat any force attacking directlynorth of Yanggu would receive firefrom its right flank. The terrain sit-uation to the east was even moredaunting. The division's easternboundary ran generally along theSoyang; the distance between thetwo rivers was 15 miles, more orless, and the entire zone stretchedanother four miles to the west. TheTaeu-san/Taeam-san ridge, howev-er, did not uniformly run north-wards. The whole ridge complexhad once been a volcano, and thecrater created a depression in themountain, the "Punchbowl," openat its eastern edge where theSoyang River had eroded a hole inthe crater wall. The southern lip ofthe crater, remained, however, as aformidable extension at a rightangle east of the main ridgeline,which provided a transverse posi-tion for fire directly along all thelower ridges to the south. In asense the whole Taeu-san/Taeam-san complex looked like a giantleaf with its thin tip to the southand its thicker (higher) base to the

A rifle platoon of the 5th Marines does some "ridge-running" as it moves to anassault position in the broken terrain south of the Punchbowl.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A8868

24

north; many veins (ridges) ranwest and east from the centralspine, some creating separate com-partments to cross, others eche-loned southwest or southeast andrunning uphill to the central stem,dominated by a series of separatepeaks. The terrain is a defensivecommander's dream.

The 1st Division attack on theTaeu-san/Taeam-san massif andthe ridge adjoining it to the westbegan on 2 June and ended almostthree weeks later with all fourinfantry regiments very bloodied,but unbowed and with three ofthem on or beyond the originalKansas Line. The advance uphillfor about eight miles took the mea-sure of the entire division as hadno fight since the Chosin Reservoircampaign. For the 1st Marines, itslosses exceeded those of Decem-ber 1950, and the entire divisionsuffered 183 dead and 1,973wounded. Both Generals Van Fleetand Almond questioned GeneralThomas about his division's losses.Especially aggravated about thepoor quality of his close air sup-port and the Eighth Army's timo-rous treatment of the Fifth AirForce, Thomas felt no need toapologize to Van Fleet for com-pleting his mission. "Well, General,you told us to take the KansasLine, and we took it for you. I'msure we paid for what we got, butwe got what we paid for." Thomaswrote his family that his Marineswere the best he had ever seen,and "Big Foot" Brown told hisfriends that the feats of his regi-ment had to be seen to bebelieved. Thomas fully appreciatedthe North Koreans' tenacity: "Theyfight like Japs!"

The battle began in earnest on 2June with the 1st Marines and 5thMarines attacking abreast, eachwith two battalions, with the 7thMarines and 1st KMC Regiment inreserve. The 1st Marines took one

intermediate objective (a small hillcalled X-Ray) and entered thelower ridges of the hill mass northof the Hwachon Reservoir andwest of the Sochon River. The fightwas an uphill slog all the way.General Thomas learned that thepress identified the engagedAmericans as "GIs." He wrotehome: "That is us, and we are notGIs." Expert at the coordination ofsupporting arms, Colonel Brownused artillery to the limit of itseffectiveness, but each objectiveultimately had to be taken byMarine infantry, savaged withgrenades and mortar shells as theyliterally crawled uphill. Brown hadto pay special attention to his leftflank, his boundary with the 7thROK Division, and he often had todeploy one battalion against flank-ing attacks while the other twocontinued their forward crawl. AsBrown recalled: "it was the tough-est fighting I have ever seen."

Over the same period (2-10June), the 5th Marines faced aneven greater ordeal, especially its1st Battalion, whose zone includedseven ascending peaks before it

could reach the crest at Hill 1316(Taeam-san). The 2d Battalion'szone was somewhat less demand-ing, and Lieutenant Colonel GlenE. Martin more deft in paving theway with air strikes and artillery,and the weight of the NorthKorean defense faced the 1stBattalion anyway. It took two longdays for the 1st Battalion to cap-ture Hills 610, 680, and 692, a dis-tance of about 2,000 yards. In addi-tion to the stubborn defense by theNorth Koreans, the three rifle com-panies survived one "friendly"artillery barrage and one errant airstrike as well as tank fire from thevalley below to the west that,while welcome in bunker-busting,did not seem especially concernedabout the position of friendlytroops. At one point an inexperi-

25

National Archives Photo (U5MC) 127-N-A9304

The look on the Ma rine's face tells thewhole story. Having just engaged in asavage firefight with enemy forces,these Marines continue their gruelingupward climb.

enced company commanderallowed his men to be trapped in aNorth Korean mortar barrage, andanother company, run off its objec-tive by Corsair-dropped napalm,found itself the target of Com-munist artillery. McCloskey's pla-toon in Company C started thetwo-day ordeal with sergeants assquad leaders and ended it with acorporal and two private first class-es in command; almost every pla-toon commander suffered at leastminor wounds. In the meantime,the 2d Battalion had advancedalmost 5,000 yards along the east-ern edge of the ridge, but its move-ment did not put it on terrain thatmenaced the North Koreans onTaeam-san.

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At this point, General Thomasdecided he needed to bring histwo uncommitted regiments intothe battle since the burden of closecombat in May-June 1951 had fall-en disproportionately upon the 5thMarines. (Nine members of the

regiment received Navy Crossesfor heroism, the 7th Marines four,and the 1st Marine two.) The 7thMarines, after all of two days rest,went into the attack on the right ofthe 1st Marines, which allowedBrown to slide left to guard his

loose connection with the 7th ROKDivision. Nickerson's regiment alsoinherited the highest and mostheavily defended ridgelines thatran eastwards to Taeu-san (Hill1179) and the western rim of thePunchbowl. Thomas put the 1st

fter a short stop at Kobe, Japan, the Marines ofthe 6th Replacement Draft joined the 1st Marine

ivision in late January 1951. In the process ofretraining and reorganizing, the division was conductingcounter-guerrilla operations around Pohang, an eastcoast port within the Republic of Korea. Jack Davis (pic-tured on the left in the first row) was assigned toCompany G, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, somewhere nearAndung, northwest of Pohang. Known within the regi-ment as "Bloody George" Company, Jack's new com-rades were little more experienced than he was with theexception of a handful of officers, noncommissionedofficers, and privates. The original Company G hadlanded across Blue Beach at Inchon and fought in theliberation of Yongdung-po and Seoul. It earned its nick-name during the Chosin Reservoir campaign. The com-pany first met the Chinese at Majon-ni and lost ninedead and 15 wounded (including attachments) when its

26

truck convoy was ambushed. Filled with wide-eyedreservists from the 1st and 2d Replacement Drafts, thecompany started north toward the Yaki with a full com-plement of seven officers and 224 enlisted men. It alsohad a new company commander, Captain Carl L. Sitter,a World War II combat veteran. He had replaced the firstcompany commander, quietly sent home after breakingdown in combat in Seoul.

In just about one month, the second Company Gpractically disappeared, lost to battlefield deaths,wounds, and frostbite. The company fought its way intoHagaru-ri on 29 November as the spearhead of TaskForce Drysdale, taking 48 casualties from the gauntlet offire the Chinese created for the convoy of tanks andvehicles. At Hagaru-ri the company tried to retake EastHill, but faced too many Chinese with too few Marines.The dwindling ranks of Company G, nevertheless, heldthe shortened perimeter and took 60 more casualties.

Captain Sitter received the Medal of Honor, and 10 othercompany Marines were awarded decorations for valor,including a Silver Star for the first sergeant, MasterSergeant Rocco A. Zullo. Within 10 days of battle, thecompany lost all but 87 officers and men, and fully athird of these "originals" had been wounded andreturned to duty. Jack Davis had not yet experienced thephysical and emotional ravages of combat when hejoined Company G, but he could appreciate having evena handful of veterans around to stiffen the thirdCompany G.

Assigned to the 3d Platoon as a BAR-man, Jack soonlearned that Sergeant Robert W. "Blackie" Jones, new tothe company but a World War II veteran, had strongopinions about weapons. Sergeant Jones liked theBrowning Automatic Rifle, and he had a way of findingadditional BARs for his squad. Sometime in February,between Operations Ripper and Killer, as the EighthArmy ground its way back toward the 38th Parallel,Colonel Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller inspected Company G.Puller found Jones' squad armed in an unusual manner."How many BARs are there in a Marine rifle squad?" heasked the squad sergeant. "Three, sir!" Jones smartlyresponded. "How many BARs do you have in your firstsquad, sergeant?" Puller continued. "Six, sir!" Pullerthen asked: "How did you get these weapons?" Jonesresponded with even more snap in his voice: "We liber-ated them from the Army, sir!" Puller grunted hisapproval and went on without further comment. Jack,standing next to Johnson in the ranks, almost laughed atthe spirited exchange.

Sergeant Jones also demonstrated quick thinkingunder fire. Sitting on a rice paddy dike somewherebetween Wonju and Hoengsong in late February, Jack'ssquad watched spouts of cold, muddy water rise fromthe paddy less than a foot beyond their outstretchedboots. "Blackie" did a back-gainer off the dike to alower-level paddy and screamed at his men to takecover. The Chinese burp-gunner faded into the woodswithout molestation. Jack also learned the value ofwater from Sergeant Jones and soon carried two can-teens, the only man in the squad to do so. He checkedhis water sources carefully, especially after he found arotting horse upstream in one clear, bubbling brook, andused halazone tablets liberally. His health remainedgood despite his constant fatigue and unrelenting diet ofC-rations. Nevertheless, he lost weight and seemed toshrink within his parka and field equipment.

The new Company G received another opportunity toadd to its "bloody" reputation in the first days of theChinese Fifth Offensive, April 1951. Upon the collapseof the 6th ROK Division on the division's left flank,Major General Oliver P. Smith sent the 1st Marines westof the Pukhan River to seize the critical hills that domi-nated the river valley and the only road by which he

could extract the 5th and 7th Marines from the HwachonReservoir sector to the north. Hill 902, a 3,000-foottower, became the 3d Battalion's objective; the hill dom-inated a road into the Pukhan River valley and a criticalbridge on the road south to Chunchon and the No NameLine where the division was to establish a new defensi-ble position. The battalion beat the Chinese to the peak(aided by Marine trucks) and moved down three paral-lel western ridges where Lieutenant Colonel Virgil W.Banning, the battalion commander, expected to meetthe Chinese on their belated climb toward the peak ofHill 902. Banning placed one rifle company on each ofthe three entrant ridges and arranged his supportingarms into the evening of 23 April. Around 2000 theChinese attacked, first striking Company G, the mostadvanced (by plan) and defender of the center ridgeline.

Huddled behind barriers of rocks—no foxholes couldbe dug here—Company G threw back a Chinese regi-ment with the assistance of Companies H and I, whichfired across its flanks and sent reinforcements. Marineand Army howitzers and mortars showered the attackerswith shellfire. Rallied by Technical Sergeant Harold E.Wilson, an Alabama reservist, the center platoon ofCompany G barely held. Jack Davis' platoon held its hill-side position along the southern slope of George Ridge;the platoon suffered two or three killed and severalmore wounded, popping up to spray the Chinese inbetween the artillery barrages. Jack made it through thenight unscathed, but the next morning, as the battalionbacked away from the Chinese under an umbrella ofclose air support strikes, Jack fell victim to someunfriendly "friendly fire." As he and some other Marinesstruggled down the steep eastern slope of Hill 902 withstretchers loaded with dead and wounded Marines, twoMarine F4U Corsairs strafed the column, showered thecowering infantrymen with ricocheting bullets and rockfragments. Although he took no life-threatening hits,Jack found himself a bleeding, lacerated, and thorough-ly enraged member of the "Society of WalkingWounded" and headed for the battalion aid station fortreatment. Rested, fed, and patched up, he returned tothe company on the No Name Line.

Although he avoided telling his parents about hiscombat experience, Jack wrote his brother Vince that heshould forget about leaving Vanderbilt and joining theMarine Corps to fight in Korea. If Vince became an offi-cer, his chances of surviving would not be as good as anenlisted man's since the Marines expected all officers tolead from the front. Artillery officers—to which Vinceaspired—had no greater chances of survival since theyall had to serve as forward observers with rifle compa-nies before assigned to the comparative safety of a fir-ing battery. "Stick to the Navy for my sake as well as thefolks. I'll do both our shares of the dodging." Jack's warhad just begun.

27

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KMC Regiment into the 5thMarines hard-earned footholdbelow Hills 1122, 1216, and 1316(Taeam-san). Hayward's regiment(with the exhausted 1st Battalionin reserve) moved into an expand-ed sector east of the Taeu-san/Taeam-san massif and startedto work its way north toward thesouthern lip of the Punchbowl.Thomas did not pressure Haywardto move aggressively since such anadvance would have put the 5thMarines in a salient below an L-shaped hill mass still occupied bymuch of the 12th NKPA Division.Before the 5th Marines could pressforward to its share of the KansasLine, the South Korean Marineswould have to take Taeam-san.

For five days (5-10 June), the 1stKMC Regiment repeatedly assault-ed the Hill 1122-1218-1316 com-plex but, despite maneuvering tothe right and left of the peaks, theKorean Marines made no progressand lost over 500 men without tak-ing even one objective. Anytimethe Marines gained a foothold, aNorth Korean counterattack threwthe Marines back. Neither sidetook prisoners; one South Koreanassault discovered 10 bound ROKMarines executed with neat head-shots. In desperation, Colonel KimSuk Bum, the Korean Marine regi-mental commander, decided toabandon the American way-of-warand ordered a three-battalionunsupported night attack. on Hill1122, the most exposed NorthKorean position. Advancing byslow infiltration, the South KoreanMarines fell on the Communists at0200 with complete surprise andran the defenders off to Hill 1216.With a solid hold on at least a partof the crest, the Korean Marineregiment held its ground while itsAmerican advisers called inartillery and air strikes on Hills1216 and 1316. The North Koreanssoon fell back to the north to

each tree an enemy sniper.

Taeu-san to avoid being cut off bythe American Marines nowadvancing steadily on both theirflanks.

Service with the 1st KMCRegiment came as a surprise tosome Marine officers. Assignedagainst his wishes to the 1st ShoreParty Battalion, Second LieutenantDavid J. Hytrek, a former privatefirst class in the 5th Marines in1950, wanted an infantry assign-ment to avenge the deaths of hiscomrades who had already fallenin Korea. Instead a crusty mastersergeant serving as a personnelofficer assigned many of the for-mer enlisted men of the 7th BasicClass to combat service supportbattalions. "Let the college boysget killed in this war," he growled.Hytrek, however, had barelyarrived at his new unit when hereceived orders to report to theKorean Marines as a liaison officer.General Thomas wanted experi-enced lieutenants sent to assist theKoreans, so David Hytrek foundplenty of war in the battles fought

28

by the Korean Marines around thePunchbowl.

To the west the 1st and 7thMarines fought from one hill to thenext hill with consistent but costlysuccess. The 1st Marines reached aline of hills identified as the BrownLine, a more defensible positionthan the original Kansas Line,which ran through the SochonRiver valley to the regiment's rear.The 1st Marines started the regi-mental advance on 6 June andcompleted its mission on 14 June.The experience of the 2d Battalionrepresents the regimental ordeal.After two days of modestadvances, the battalion, with the1st Battalion on its left flank, raninto a very stubborn and skilledNorth Korean force on Hill 676.The attack stalled, in part becausea heavy mortar concentration fellshort and inflicted 40 casualties,including the battalion comman-der, Lieutenant Colonel Robert K.McClelland. On 10 June, the battal-ion sent two companies against theeastern face of the hill since it

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A155066

The natural beauty of this quiet scene in North Korea means little to theseMarines as they rest during a lull in the struggle for the Punchbowl. In the wide,calm valley before them, each green field may hide a Communist gun position,

Born in Terre Haute, Indiana, in 1931, he attendedpublic schools in Las Vegas, Nevada, beforeenlisting in the Marine Corps in 1948 at the age

of 17. Following recruit training at Parris Island, SouthCarolina, and a short assignment on board the USSNoble, he was sent to Korea in 1950 where he took partin five successive operations: Inchon, Seoul, Chosin, andtwo against the Chinese Communists. For his boldactions on 7 November 1950, he was awarded theCommendation ribbon with Combat "V.',

As a fireteam-leader with Company E, 2d Battalion,1st Marines, he gave his life on 10 june 1951 at Hill 676near Hangnyong. His Medal of Honor citation reads, inpart:

While advancing with his platoon in an attackagainst well-concealed and heavily-fortified enemyhill positions, Corporal Abrell voluntarily rushedforward through the assaulting squad which waspinned down by a hail of intense and accurateautomatic-weapons fire from a hostile bunker situ-ated on commanding ground. Although previouslywounded by enemy hand-grenade fragments, heproceeded to carry out a bold, single-handedattack against the bunker, exhorting his comradesto follow him. Sustaining two additional woundsas he stormed toward the emplacement, he res-olutely pulled the pin from a grenade clutched inhis hand and hurled himself bodily into the bunkerwith the live missile still in his grasp. [He was]

Corporal Charles G.Abrell

fatally wounded in the resulting explosion whichkilled the entire enemy gun crew within thestronghold—Captain John C, Chapin, USMCR(Ret)

could then take advantage of sup-porting tank fire from the valleybelow. Many of the North Koreanbunkers, however, were sited toprotect them from tank guns,75mm recoilless rifles, and 3.5-inchrocket launchers. Air strikes wouldhave eliminated them, but repeat-ed requests for close air supportwent unanswered until 2000 whenone four-plane strike broke theNorth Korean defense. All daylong, Marine squads inchedupwards through the bunker com-plex, eventually destroying thebunkers with grenades and satchelcharges. In one case a lone Marinejumped into a bunker, killed threeKoreans with his rifle and stran-gled the fourth with his barehands. Throughout the day "chiggy

bearers" struggled forward throughconstant shelling with ammunitionand water and stumbled back-wards with loaded stretchers. Intwo days the battalion took morethan 300 casualties and lost morethan 200 members of its loyal forceof Korean porters. The Marinesfound more than 100 North Koreanbodies in the bunkers, includingthe NKPA battalion commander.The battalion went into reserve on12 June when the 3d Battalionreplaced it.

Wedged into a narrow but diffi-cult sector between the 1st Marinesand the 1st KMC Regiment, the 7thMarines fought for 10 days (9-19June) to establish the regiment(two battalions abreast) along thecritical hill complex to the west

29

and the Taeu-san/Taeam-sanpeaks to the east above thePunchbowl. Colonel Nickersonused his supporting tank companyto good effect, but Communistmines in the Sochon River valleyput more than half of the company(10 of 17 tanks) eventually out ofaction despite heroic and costlyefforts by Marine engineers tosweep the ground. Nickerson's useof supporting arms mirroredBrown's—long on artillery andshort of crucial close air support. Ifthe 7th Marines rifle companiestook their assigned hills withslightly less cost than the 1stMarines, they had to defend themagainst even more stubborn night-ly counterattacks. The NKPA battal-ion commander in this sector

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employed reverse slope defenses,which swept each topographicalcrest with fire and put the NorthKorean soldiers close enough forsudden assaults. One 7th Marinescompany had to throw back fivesuch attacks in one night before itcould call its hill secure.

On the eastern side of Taeu-san/Taeam-san ridge, the 5thMarines advanced through theridges that ran down to the SoyangRiver valley. Alternating in theattack, Hayward's three battalionshad to cross five different east-westtransverse spur ridges before theyreached the last (and highest)ridgeline above the Punchbowl,some 8,000 yards from the regi-ment's original line of departure on6 June. As the regiment pushednorth, the North Korean defenderstook their toll, although somewhatless than the regiments to the west.Again, supporting arms and closeair strikes that arrived broke thedefensive positions until the regi-ment, lead by the 1st Battalion,reached the last objective, the Hill907-Hill 920 ridgeline. No longerable to fall back to another defen-sive position, the remaining sol-diers of the defending NorthKorean regiment went into theirbunkers with no intention of con-ceding Hill 907 to the oncomingMarines.

The final assault on Hill 907, theregimental objective of the 5thMarines, caught the desperatecharacter of the mountain war inKorea in June 1951. The long, nar-row ridge that led to Hill 907allowed no more than a reinforcedplatoon to deploy against the lineof North Korean bunkers thatstretched to the peak. So the 1stBattalion, 5th Marines, had theobjective, which it assigned toCompany B, which passed the mis-sion (at Lieutenant Colonel John L.Hopkins' direction) to SecondLieutenant Charles G. Cooper's 3d

Platoon. As the Marines workedmethodically through the bunkersystem, supported by mortar andmachine gun fire, their casualtiesmounted. Cooper called in moreartillery and air strikes, but enemyfire from his front and from twoflanking ridgelines cut his ranksdown to squad size. He lost tworadio operators and then had thedisconcerting experience of listen-ing to Hopkins, who had turnedferocious on the eve of his changeof command, screaming obscenechallenges to the North Koreansover the battalion tactical net, pre-sumably to confuse the listeningenemy. Cooper managed toarrange for one more air strike, AirForce jets armed with napalm.Marking the target with whitesmoke, Cooper ordered anadvance through the swirlingmess, only to find the NorthKoreans attacking him. Knockeddown by a ricocheting bullet in theback, Cooper lost his carbine toanother bullet and ended the fight

30

with a Ka-Bar and a hole in his leftside that filled with blood and adamaged kidney. Just as the sur-viving Koreans reached the "LastStand of the 3d Platoon," the AirForce jets—which had flown onedummy run to get the route right—returned and dumped their napalmtanks in the middle of the melee,only 30 yards from Cooper's posi-tion. The Marines almost suffocat-ed, and most of them sufferedburns, but the North Koreans dis-appeared, incinerated in theflames. The Marine attack ended100 yards short of the summit, butthe next day the 3d Battalion occu-pied Hill 907, abandoned by theNorth Koreans after the divisionheadquarters they were protectinghad displaced.

On 18 and 20 June, GeneralAlmond and General Thomas visit-ed the high ground now held bythe 1st Marine Division, and the XCorps commander agreed thatpatrols in the mountains aheadwould be all the offensive action

Department of Defense Photo (USMc) A8745

Crewmen of Battery C, 1st 4.5 Inch Rocket Battalion, reload their multiple-rock-et launcher for another devastating ripple against North Korean troops. The bat-tery of six launchers could fire 144 rounds on target in less than a minute.

required of the Marines. In themeantime, the defensive positionsof the Kansas Line should bedeveloped into complexes oftrench lines, barbed wire, bunkers,and minefields, and before thesummer monsoon made the sup-ply effort even more difficult thanit already was. Thomas could tellthat major changes in the warmight be underway since he had toentertain an endless stream of vis-iting military officers of all theServices, most of whom simplywanted to see the Punchbowl fromthe 5th Marines' observation post.Only admirals bearing gifts ofgood bourbon were truly wel-come. General Thomas knew hisdivision needed rebuilding withreplacements and some rest. In themeantime, he had some unfinishedbusiness with Eighth Army overthe issue of close air support.

When the 1st Marine Divisionsettled down to a life of night

patrols and the daytime construc-tion of trenches and bunkers, twodifferent changes of climateenveloped the men spread alongthe mountain ridges of the KansasLine. The changes started a sum-mer of discontent, a season of dis-comfort and uncertainty that didnot reach the level of demoraliza-tion, but nevertheless took its tollon the morale of the Marines. Thefirst change in the weather waspredictable, the arrival of the sum-mer monsoon, which advancesnorthward from the island ofCheju-do until it reaches centralKorea in late June and blankets thehills with daily showers and occa-sional downpours that seem towash half of Korea into the westsea. The summer rains of 1950 hadbeen light, a welcome blessing forAmerican airmen. Even though itarrived weeks behind schedule,the next monsoon reversed thetrend. The rains of 1951 gaveKorea its normal ration of water.Twenty-six inches fell in July, andAugust brought about 20 inches

more rainfall before the delugestopped in September. Theomnipresent mud and cascadingstreams made the patrols and con-struction an ordeal, even withoutan active enemy.

The other atmospheric changebegan with the preliminary trucenegotiations on 7 July between themilitary delegations of China andNorth Korea on one side and agroup of American officers on theother. When the negotiators atKaesong—a neutral enclave withinCommunist lines—finally came toan incomplete agreement on anagenda, the one that most affectedthe Marines was the question of aceasefire boundary between thetwo armies. The Communistswanted a return to the 38thParallel. The United Nationsdemanded a line based on the for-ward edge of the battlefield if andwhen an armistice went into effect.Presumably the two forces wouldfall back by some agreed distance,and the intervening No Man's Landwould become a demilitarizedzone. To those with no sense ofmilitary geography, one hillseemed no different from another,but the relationship of dominantpeaks, road networks, river val-leys, and intersecting corridors inthe mountains made the control ofterrain an important issue, not justa matter of "face." From the front-line foxholes, however, the gloomymountains all looked alike andsimply reinforced the sense that nodisputed peak could be worthdying for. Conditioned by WorldWar II to think of victory in termsof geographic advances, the com-bat troops of the Eighth Army felttheir martial ardor wash away withthe rain.

No stranger to the challenges ofcommand created by poor weatherand endless action—Guadalcanalhad provided both—Gerald C.Thomas pressed his regimental

Marines wait for an air strike by Marine aircraft before moving on an enemyposition.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A9308

31

rc .%

jNational Archives Photo (USN) 8O-G-432028

United Nations delegates to the Kaesong ceasefire talks pose Craigie, USAF, MajGen Paik Sun Yup, ROKA, VAdm C.with Gen Matthew B. Ridgway atMunsan-ni. Picturedfrom TurnerJoy, USN, Gen Ridgway, and MajGen Henry!. Hodes,left are RAdm Arleigh A. Burke, USN, MajGen Laurence C. USA.

Pictured from left are Chinese and North Korean negotia- Cho, and Gen Chang Pyong San of the North Koreantors, MajGen Hsieh Fang and LtGen Teng Hua of the People's Army.Chinese People's Army, and Gen Nam II, MajGen Lee Sang National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-431929

32

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commanders to do the digging andpatrolling Almond ordered, Spor-adic shelling by the Communistsprovided extra incentives, and theMarines still took casualties, 39 inthe last week of June. Thomasfought a successful rearguardaction against Eighth Army and XCorps to hold pointless casualtiesdown. On 22 June, Almondordered Thomas to execute anEighth Army plan to push forcesnorthwards to the Badger Line,between a mile-and-a-half to two-and-a-half miles in front of theKansas Line defenses. (Later in thewar the Badger Line would becalled the Combat Outpost Line.)Each frontline regiment was sup-posed to occupy a combat outpostof battalion strength; Thomas gotAlmond on 26 June to agree thatone outpost was sufficient for theentire 1st Marine Division front,given the nature of the terrain. The1st Marines sent its 3d Battalion

forward to Hill 761 and received a7th Marines battalion to plug thegap. Like Thomas, "Big Foot"Brown thought the patrol baseconcept dangerous and pointless;both sides had maintained veryclose contact with shelling andpatrols and needed no additionalaction. The North Koreans immedi-ately shelled the patrol base withsuch enthusiasm that Thomas andBrown withdrew the battalion andthen told Almond that they wouldmeet X Corps reconnaissancerequirements in other ways.

Aware that Almond would soonleave command of X Corps,Thomas had one overriding reasonto remain on friendly terms withhis difficult corps commander: theclose air support controversy. Witha pause in the action, Almond mar-shaled an array of studies forEighth Army that demonstratedthat the Fifth Air Force's close con-trol of each day's quota of close air

33

support sorties limited the groundadvances and caused avoidablecasualties. Thomas consistentlyraised the issue with high-rankingmilitary visitors to his headquar-ters, including Van Fleet, whodropped in on 8 July to giveThomas, Nickerson, Hayward, andfive other Marines the Distin-guished Service Cross. Thomaspersuaded Major General Frank F.Everest to approve the movementof Marine Aircraft Group 12, thepremier close air support group ofMarine Corsairs, from Hoengsongto the east sea fishing town ofKangnung. The move to Airfield K-18 put the Marine fighter-bomberscloser to their supply sources andonly 40 miles from the front. Sheerproximity offered new opportuni-ties to circumvent the JointOperations Center request system,including Everest's promise to allo-cate 40 sorties a day for offensiveoperations. Closer division-wingrelations seemed at least temporar-ily acceptable to Eighth Army andFifth Air Force because Van Fleethad his planners hard at work onanother version of OperationOverwhelming, the amphibiouslanding up the east coast thatwould involve the 1st MarineDivision.

General Almond, however, didnot relent in his demands for morefighting of dubious value. Hisaggressiveness brought GeneralThomas' only embarrassment as adivision commander, the Taeu-sanAffair, an abortive operation thatremained unnoticed because thevictims were the valiant men of theKorean Marine Corps' 1st Reg-iment. Almond had convincedhimself that the North Koreans(despite the Hill 761 experience)would not fight for the lines theycurrently held. Therefore, Almondordered the 1st Marine Division tocapture the peak of Taeu-san (Hill1179) and develop it into a regi-

National Archives Photo (USA) 11 1-SC378978

R!flemen of the 5th Marines are issued a portion of the initial 40 armored vestsdeveloped by the Naval Medical Field Research Laboratory, Camp Lejeune, NorthCarolina, for field-testing in Korea. The new vest weighed eight-and-one-halfpounds and combined curved, overlapping doron plates with flexible pads of bas-ket-weave nylon. The garment was said to stop a .45-caliber pistol or Thompsonsubmachine gun bullet, all fragments of a hand grenade at three feet, 75 percentof 81mm mortar fragments at 10 feet, and the full thrust of an American bayo-

ith a chastened Jack Davis back in its ranks,the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, held its part ofthe No Name Line and watched the last

Chinese offensive of May 1951 slide past the 7th Marinesto its front and fall upon the left flank of the 2d InfantryDivision. With the 1st Marines on the corps and divisionleft flank, the Marines went on the attack on 23 May anda week later reached the high ground overlooking thereservoir. Squeezed out of the advance, the 1st Marinesreverted to division reserve.

With the 5th and 7th Marines struggling to penetratethe Communist hilltop positions north of Yanggu, the 1stMarines soon joined the slugfest. Somewhere in the bar-ren ridges Jack Davis' platoon found itself in a grenade-throwing match with the stubborn—and uphill—Chinese defenders. Chinese mortar shells fell among theattacking Marines and took their toll, mostly in wound-ed. Jack saw five Marines from his squad go down inone shower of grenade and mortar fragments. Amazedby his own apparent invulnerability, Jack attacked aChinese position with his rifle and grenades after crawl-ing to a protected firing position. His attack and a flankassault by his buddy Frank Brown (carrying a BAR)wiped out the Chinese bunker and spider-traps. MoreAmerican grenades completed the task. Jack thought hemight have killed three Chinese, his only victims of thewar.

During the fight, Jack received his second wound ofthe war, a grenade fragment that tore open his upper leftarm and made him a one-armed Marine. While a corps-man bandaged Jack, his platoon commander asked himif he would take charge of three other walking wound-ed and lead them down the mountain to the battalioncollecting and clearing station. Jack agreed, and off hewent—slowly—trailed by his more seriously woundedcomrades, one of whom had both eyes bandaged. Asnight fell, Jack's forlorn band had reached the foot of themountain, but had strayed through a "no man's line"into the lines of the 5th Marines. Jack had no idea whatthe challenge and password was, so he simplyscreamed: "Wounded Marines! Wounded Marines!"Persuaded that no Chinese could scream with aTennessee accent, the Marines brought in the woundedand sent them off to safety by jeep. Jack had a secondPurple Heart, but his second wound was not severeenough for the Navy doctors to invoke a welcomeMarine Corps policy: two wounds serious enough torequire hospitalization bought a Marine a trip home.

Jack's arm healed more rapidly than his spirit. Afteralmost six months in a rifle company with no realescape from the most primitive and exhausting field liv-ing conditions as well as combat, Jack Davis felt himself

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weakening in the psychological sense. He wrote Vincethat he was not sure whether he could take the constantmortar and artillery fire. "You can't imagine what it doesto a man's insides to see a big, six-foot man crying andshaking with fear, just because his mind has had all thekilling and bloodshed it can take. When this happens toman, it also [is] because he is scared to death and wantsto run but his loyalty won't let [him] and that if he didrun, there's no place to go. Sometime they get evacuat-ed and sometimes they don't . . . if they do come backin a couple of weeks . . . as soon as the first mortar orartillery shell comes screaming over and explodes near-by they are worse than ever." Jack was proud that hehad not yet broken down, but he had some doubtsabout his ability to carry on. "I was a dope fiend aboutthe last month I was in the hills." He took a quarter grainof Phenobarbital, dispensed by a corpsman, so that hewould quit shaking from cold and fear while he stoodwatch at night. He could not eat or sleep without drugs.Unfortunately, the barbiturates gave him a "don't give ashit attitude" that worried him.

Upon his return to Company G, Jack requested aninterview with the new company commander, CaptainVarge G. Frisbie, and asked if he could get some creditfor his two Purple Hearts and be transferred somewhereout of the battalion. Frishie promised to take the matterup with the battalion personnel officer, and within daysPrivate First Class Jack Davis had orders to report to theService Battery, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, for retrainingas an artilleryman—and a survivor.

mental patrol base on which toanchor the Badger Line. Thomasobjected to the mission, pointingout that all the evidence suggestedthat Taeu-san anchored the maindefensive position of the entireNorth Korean V Coi'ps. Unmoved,Almond ordered the attack to bemade, and Thomas assigned themission to the 1st KIVIC Regiment,whose lines were closest to Taeu-san and who had shown someaptitude for mountain warfare.One suspects that Thomas saw noreason to squander one of his ownMarine regiments on a forlornhope. Colonel Kim Dae Sik accept-ed his assignment without a mur-mur, and the 1st Marine Divisionprovided all the fire support it

could possibly mount on behalf ofthe 1st KMC Regiment. Han PonHaepyong Un Yongwon HanHaepyong! (Once a Marine, Alwaysa Marine!)

For five days (8-12 July), theKorean Marines—one battalion ata time—tried to take and holdTaeu-san but managed only tohang on to Hill 1001, a hillock onlyhalfway to Taeu-san. Successiveassaults on Hill 1100 produceddead Korean Marines, but no per-manent foothold on the Taeu-sanmain ridge. All combinations ofshelling, air strikes, and infantryattacks did not break the NorthKorean defenses. Colonel Gould P.Groves, senior adviser to the 1stKIVIC Regiment, demanded that thefruitless attacks cease before theregiment became permanentlyruined by the loss of its key lead-ers; one KMC battalion lost all itscompany grade officers and all butfive of its sergeants. Thomas insist-ed to X Corps that Taeu-san wouldtake an entire American regimentto capture (as indeed it later did)and that the security mission couldbe performed without the BadgerLine. Almond insisted, however,that the Koreans hold on to the

outpost on Hill 1001 even if the 1stKMC Regiment returned to theKansas Line, which it did on 12July. Of the 77 Marines killed ormissing and 360 wounded in July,55 of the dead or missing and 202of the wounded were SouthKoreans.

At the 1st Division headquartersthe bad taste of the Taeu-san Affair

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faded with two bits of welcomenews: Almond was finally leavingX Corps for a new posting in theUnited States and the division hadbeen ordered to turn over its sec-tor to the U.S. 2d Infantry Divisionand withdraw to corps reserve.Almond flew off to Seoul after giv-ing Thomas a DistinguishedService Medal. He left X Corps in

National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC382938

MajGen Gerald C. Thomas joins MajGen Clovis E. Byers, left. Gen Edward M.Almond's replacement as commander of X Coips, on board a helicopter atKwandae-ri, the Coips' airstrip. Thomas and Byers developed a strong workingrelationship that profited the 1st Marine Division.

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the capable hands of MajorGeneral Clovis E. Byrs, a 52-year-old Ohioan and Military Academygraduate (class of 1920) with animpeccable professional reputationand companionable personality.Thomas, who knew Byers, couldnot have been happier. In WorldWar II, Byers had served with dis-tinction in the Southwest Pacifictheater as commanding general,32d Infantry Division, chief of staffof I Corps, and chief of staff ofEighth Army. He had then com-manded the 82d Airborne Division,the Army's only combat-ready con-tingency force, before becomingthe G-1 (Personnel) of the ArmyStaff. Byers, however, had one glar-ing weakness. In a faction-riddenArmy, he was a protégé ofLieutenant General Robert L.

Eichelberger, just retired, and not amember of the European clique ofGenerals Eisenhower, Bradley,Collins, Ridgway, and Van Fleet.

After the various elements of the1st Marine Division reached theirreserve areas, Thomas ordered ademanding training program oflive-fire exercises, designed by hisnew chief of staff, Colonel VictorH. Krulak, and the G-3, ColonelRichard W. Hayward, former com-mander of the 5th Marines. Thomasprowled the regimental trainingareas by helicopter and jeep: the5th Marines near Inje, the 7thMarines near Yanggu, and the 1stMarines near Hongchon. The pat-tern of deployment (with the bat-talions of the 11th Marines posi-tioned to either fire for the 2dInfantry Division or train with theMarine infantry regiments) reflect-ed Byers' concern about a suddenattack on the 2d Infantry Divisionor the 5th ROK Division. Byers alsofelt some anxiety about his easternflank with the South Korean I

Corps. Eighth Army's nervousnessexceeded Byers', and Van Fleet

ordered X Corps to form a taskforce built around the 1st Marines(Task Force Able) to be preparedto move east for a preemptiveoffensive. Thomas liked none ofthis business and said so to Byers,who supported Thomas' insistencethat Army ad hocery would giveway to Marine command if a realcrisis arose. There was none, butThomas and Byers cemented theirsound working relationship. AsByers wrote another Army general:"the 1st Marine Division under thecommand of Major GeneralThomas, with Brigadier GeneralWhaling as Assistant DivisionCommander and Col. Krulak asChief of Staff, has become a vastlydifferent outfit from that which itwas under its former commander.They cooperate with the other divi-sions of the Corps smoothly andwillingly."

Byers showed his appreciationin tangible ways. His staff ensuredthat the equipment rehabilitation ofthe division went forward withoutfriction. X Corps engineers andartillery helped the Marines turnswamps into muddy camps with afew amenities like shower andmess tents with floors anddrainage. Army and Marine techni-cal experts worked together totrain novice personnel and puteverything from ordnance, tanks,radios, watches, motor vehicles, toengineering equipment in workingorder. The military policemen ofboth Services cooperated in tryingto control the flood of Koreanssweeping toward the Marine tentcamps to sell carnal and alcoholicpleasures. In turn, Thomas ordered12 special Marine training teamsfrom his infantry regiments to workwith the 1st KMC Regiment toimprove the regiment's use of sup-porting arms. All units conductedat least a third of their training atnight. Night patrols went to workwith rounds in the chamber and

Combat-ready division replacements disembark from a US. Naty landing ship.In the movement of Marines the Coips functioned as a single great unit, eventhough an ocean separated the vanguard in Korea from rear echelons in theUnited States.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) Al 57123

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engaged guerrillas along the reararea roads. Marines worked withKorean security forces and laborersconstructing additional defensivepositions to protect both I Corpsflanks.

Although only Thomas and hisimmediate staff knew about thecontinuing exchanges betweenRidgway and Van Fleet over futureoperations, the focus and pace ofthe 1st Marine Division trainingprogram suggested that the divi-sion might provide the spearheadof a new Eighth Army offensive.Van Fleet urged OperationOverwhelming upon Ridgway, butonly if Eighth Army receivedAmerican reinforcements. The newRidgway, a paragon of caution, didnot embrace the plan. Thomas andKrulak anticipated a landing untilthey received a clear signal thatthere would be no Inchon in theirfuture when Van Fleet on 3 Augustruled that the 1st AmphibianTractor Battalion and 1st ArmoredAmphibian Battalion would not bereturned to the division's opera-tional control.

The disappointment did notchange the urgency of bringing the1st Marine Division to a new peakof strength in numbers and effec-tiveness. Two new replacementdrafts (the 11th and 12th) wouldarrive in August and earlySeptember with more than 4,000officers and men, more thanreplacing casualties and a smallrotation draft. By mid-August thedivision had the responsibility ofcaring for 32,000 American andKorean personnel, making thedivision almost a small Armycorps. The division's combatpower—enhanced by its ability touse close air support as available—made it difficult for Van Fleet tomove it from the eastern part ofthe front where the only otherAmerican division was the hard-used 2d Infantry Division.

From General Byers' perspectiveX Corps and the neighboring ROKI Corps occupied a vulnerable partof the Kansas Line, more vulnera-ble than the western sectors andthe "Iron Triangle" where U.S. I

and IX Corps faced the bulk of therecovering Chinese expeditionaryforce. Byers' G-2 made a specialstudy of the activities of the NorthKorean III Corps (three divisions of8,500 each) and concluded that theNorth Koreans had the capabilityto mount a serious offensive onany X Corps division sector alongthe Kansas Line. Well ahead of theChinese rearmament programs, IIICorps had accepted a full set ofnew Soviet weapons and showedevery intention of using themagain in the attack. Over the latterpart of August the intelligence ana-lysts saw the usual omens of anattack: increased patrolling andcounter-patrolling ambushes, in-creased desertions, a reduced flowof refugees, tank sightings, themass distribution of ammunitionand rations, a decline in vehiclemovement, and the imposition ofradio silence. In the meantime, atVan Fleet's insistence, Byers hadordered the 2d Infantry Divisioninto action west of the Punchbowl,and the division had exhausteditself again fighting the NorthKoreans and the rain over terrainonly too familiar to the Marines.Only the names of the hills("Bloody Ridge" and "J Ridge") andthe Service of the bodies changed.To the west Major General PaikSun Yup's ROK I Corps made nosignificant progress against threeNKPA divisions, all entrenched andvery combative in the hills east ofthe Punchbowl. The campaignwrecked the North Korean IICorps, but III Corps remained readyto enter the fray, perhaps in a

major counteroffensive. The onlyfresh force in the eastern sectorwas the 1st Marine Division.

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With neither a ceasefire norgreat offensive in prospect,General Van Fleet ordered hiscorps commanders to plan opera-tions that would improve theircontrol of the critical terrain intheir sectors. They should prepareeither for some later offensive(should the truce talks remain inrecess) or to defend South Koreafor the indefinite future. With thedefenses of the Kansas Line largelycompleted, Van Fleet on 30 Julydecided to convert the combat out-post line (the Wyoming Line) intoan advanced main line of resis-tance where the terrain allowed.The distance between Kansas Lineand the Wyoming Line variedbetween two miles and 10 miles.In X Corps' sector Van Fleetthought that the trace of the frontin July did not allow Byers to dom-inate the Punchbowl and theSochon and Soyang River valleys.Van Fleet wanted X Corps to shiftthe focus of its attacks to the highground (including Taeu-san) westof the Punchbowl, but the heavyrains of early August made itimpossible for Byers to begin theattacks of the U.S. 2d InfantryDivision and the 7th ROK Division(Brigadier General Kim Yong Bae).The 8th ROK Division (BrigadierGeneral Choi Yong Hee) wouldattack the dominant hills east ofthe Punchbowl.

Having designated an intermedi-ate phase line (Hays) between theKansas and Wyoming Lines, Byersquickly learned that the terrain, theweather, and the North Koreanswould prevent any easy victories.The battles west of the Punchbowlproduced such disappointing re-sults and bad blood between theAmerican and Korean commandersthat Byers narrowed the divisionsectors and committed the 5thROK Division (Brigadier General

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Mm Ki Shik) west of the 2dInfantry Division, which meant thatX Corps had three committed divi-sions west of the Punchbowl andonly the 8th ROK Division in theSoyang River valley and the domi-nant hills on either side of the val-ley. On 23 August, Byers warnedVan Fleet that he might have torelieve the 2d Infantry Divisionwith the 1st Marine Division,which was "very anxious to takeaction," but Van Fleet still had anamphibious role in mind for theMarines, and he vetoed the idea.Van Fleet thus spared the 1stMarine Division the mission ofcapturing "Heartbreak Ridge."Only the 8th ROK Division haddone better than anticipated, cap-turing some of the high groundeast of the Punchbowl, but the

South Korean divisions on its east-ern flank had not kept pace, thusgiving Byers some concern abouthis corps boundary.

Meeting on both 25 and 26August, Van Fleet and Byers con-cluded that they could no longerhold the 1st Marine Division inreserve since all the rest of X Corpsdivisions had bogged down, andthe corps could not change the tac-tical balance with artillery andclose air support alone. Ammuni-tion shortages, caused principallyby transportation problems, hadalready affected operations. Troopmovements, for example, on 28-30August prevented the stockpilingof 1,800 tons of munitions. TheFifth Air Force, anticipating a breakin the weather that would allow asurge in the interdiction bombing

campaign, announced on the 23dthat the Eighth Army would haveto manage with less close air sup-port through the end of the month.On 26 August, Byers calledGeneral Thomas and told him tomove at least part of his division tothe front east of the Punchhowlwhere the Marines would take upthe missions of the 8th ROKDivision. Thomas had four dayswarning since Byers alerted him toa possible move on 23 August.With the plans already in place,Thomas ordered the 7th Marines tostart for the front that night, fol-lowed by the 1st KMC Regiment.The 5th Marines would move last,and the 1st Marines not at all sincethe regiment would be the onlycorps reserve.

Thomas knew that the division

Rain and mud fail to halt the mortarmen of the 5th mortars at enemy-held positions.Marines' 4.2 Inch Mortar Company as they fire their heavy National Archives Photo (USA) 11 1-Sc380808

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would receive an offensive mis-SiOn: capture a ridgeline, an east-ern extension of the hill mass thatformed the northern rim of thePunchbowl. A corps objective des-ignated Yoke, the ridge had fourdominant west-to-east peaks (Hills930, 1026, 924, and 702) andanother north-south extension thatbegan at Hill 702 and ran souththrough Hills 680, 755, and 793,thus forming a large L just west ofthe Soyang River. The river itselfcurled westwards, bounding YokeRidge on the north. Since theNorth Koreans showed no sign ofreduced morale and fighting tenac-ity—they, in fact, had mountedmany aggressive counterattackswest of the Punchbowl—theassignment had nothing easy aboutit. The rains and planning changesmade 27-3 1 August some of themost discouraging days Thomasand his Marines had faced togeth-er.

From the division commander'sperspective, the mudslides andfloods that slowed his truck con-voys were bad enough, but theoperational confusion within XCorps, fed by tactical errors andbad blood between the 2d InfantryDivision and 8th ROK Division,made the changes of orders reachepidemic proportions. Before itcould displace, the 5th Marinesdetached a battalion to the opera-tional control of the 2d InfantryDivision to defend the Kansas Linewhile the 23d Infantry slipped tothe west. The 1st KMC Regimentalso picked up part of the KansasLine defense, which meant thatonly the 7th Marines, struggling tocross the swollen Soyang River bywading or by a shuttle of DUKWs(amphibian trucks) could man thesketchy positions on the edge ofYoke Ridge held by dispirited sol-diers of the 8th ROK Division.Confusion reigned, and the rainfell. Warning orders flooded the

airwaves, and commanders andstaff officers scurried by helicopterand jeep from headquarters toheadquarters. General Byers, forexample, made 12 commands callsin one week (25-31 August) andreceived General Van Fleet threetimes. General Thomas and hisstaff made the best of a bad situa-tion, pushing the 7th Marines and1st KMC Regiment into their for-

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ward positions. He tried to preventthe diversion of the 5th Marines tothe 2d Infantry Division and keptthe 1st Marines ready for suchtime, as Byers would release theregiment from corps control. In themeantime, the 11th Marines firedmissions all along the corps front,scattered about the valleys in adesperate attempt to stay close toits ammunition supply and to

Courtesy of the Naval Institute Press

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avoid having its fires masked bythe hills to its front.

During a Van Fleet-Byers confer-ence on 29 August, the army andcorps commanders agreed thatthey could not wait for more suc-cess west of the Punchbowl beforeordering the 1st Marine Divisioninto action. Byers passed the news

to Thomas the next day: attackYoke Ridge on 31 August. Two fac-tors related to the enemy situationhelped shape Thomas' plan.Patrols by the division's Recon-naissance Company and the 5thMarines discovered enemy patrolsactive on either side of the KansasLine, but no more than a nuisance.

On the other hand, North Koreanprisoners taken by the 8th ROKDivision and the Marines reportedlarge troop movements to thenorth and much talk about anotherCommunist offensive while theweather limited United NationsCommand air support. Visual sight-ings and other intelligence sources

Jack Davis, an old man at 19, found a new home inService Battery, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines. His prin-cipal responsibility was driving a dump truck and

working as a laborer on the battalion's gun positions andother construction projects. As the weather cooled in thefall of 1951, the 1st Marine Division resumed its attackson the high ridges northeast of the Punchbowl. Its oppo-nents were troops of the re-born Korean People's Army2d Division. Another enemy was a monsoon season thatlasted through the entire month of August, washingaway roads and bridges and making life generally mis-erable for all hands. Jack Davis found his dump truck inhigh demand. In addition to the usual construction mate-

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rials, Jack hauled cut wood for the battalion's stoves. Hebecame an expert at fitting out bunkers with furnituremade from used shell boxes and other handy materials;he and his fellow engineers used layers of sandbags,logs, and loose dirt to build sleeping bunkers that couldwithstand a direct shell hit. Jack estimated that theymade seven-foot thick ceilings to provide overhead pro-tection.

Even if the pace of the combat froze along with theweather and Panmunjom peace talks, danger still waitedfor the unwary and unlucky. Employing their newRussian field artillery, the Chinese and North Koreansstarted to fire short counterbattery barrages late every

second or third afternoon. Even the bunkers to whichthe Marines fled to avoid the shelling could be deathtraps of their own; weakened by the rains and shellingsand too heavy for their supporting walls, bunker roofshabitually collapsed. One such roof fell on top of Jack,bruising his body and pride and burning parts of hisbody when a stove overturned and ignited the bunker'sinterior. Jack took his third trip to sickbay with crackedribs.

There were few diversions north of the Soyang River.Jack grew his third mustache, not as long and menacingas his "infantry mustache" of the summer. One day hereceived a call to report to battery headquarters, only tolearn that the battery commander and first sergeant hadarranged a little ceremony to award Jack his first and sec-ond Purple Hearts (a medal with gold star affixed). Jackhad no idea what to do with the medal and presentationbox until the first sergeant suggested he send it home.The final package featured paper torn from boxes in themess tent, secured with communications wire. The Davisfamily received the box and properly concluded thatJack had not been entirely honest in his summer letters.

Although his anxiety about dying eased some, Jack'sfears about living grew as his tour in Korea shortened.Under the rotation policy adopted in 1951, he couldexpect to rotate home sometime in early 1952, and theMarine Corps, having little need for short-timer reservistsat the end of a two-year contract, promised to releasehim go to college short of his two-year obligation. Jackthought about getting his personal life in some order.He wrote a "Dear Jane" letter to a girl friend whose reli-giosity and immaturity now struck Jack as intolerable.

He warned Vince that no one in Tennessee should dis-cuss his love life. Jack also continued to send moneyhome for his college savings account. His sense of dutyreceived a jump-start with his promotion to corporal iiiNovember. His greatest leadership accomplishment todate was organizing the theft of an Army jeep that thebattery sorely needed. He did his work, and he stayedout of trouble as he watched veterans of earlier replace-ment drafts turn in their equipment and head for pro-cessing for a flight or transport berth back to California.

By Thanksgiving the 3d Battalion had endured twosnowfalls, general freezing, and the news that it was noton the itinerary for Bob Hope's Christmas show. Jackbought a contraband bottle of Canadian Club to hoarduntil Christmas. He liked the brand new thermal bootsissued to the battalion—until he had to change hissweat-soaked socks in the cold. After a muted celebra-tion of Christmas, Jack started watching the organizationof each rotation group. He wrote Vince that he nowstood 29th on the list and that 37 men had started homein December. Jack reported that he was "kinda nervousabout coming home. I'm still not doing much work perusual." He worried about his future relations with hisparents, whom he remembered as full of sermons aboutall the things he should not do and think. "If they start abunch of harping and bulishit, I ship into the regularMarines because I really like this outfit." He admitted toVince, however, the he would really have to be aggra-vated with civilian life to re-up for a second tour. He cer-tainly was not going to miss his ride back to the UnitedStates. On 18 February 1952, Jack Davis left Korea forhome.

confirmed that fresh enemy troopswere going into position on YokeRidge. The 1st Marine Divisionattack of 31 August was designedto squeeze out the Koreans on theeastern part of Yoke Ridge and toprevent the objective area frombeing reinforced from the northwhile the battle raged. TwoKorean Marine battalions advanc-ing in column from their positionon Hill 755 would attack north totake Hills 1026 and 924 while twobattalions on the 7th Marineswould attack westwards from theSoyang River valley with two bat-talions abreast. They would seizethe ground east and north throughHill 702 to Hill 602, another lowerridge that ended at the river as itchanged its direction from east-west to north-south. Catching the

North Korean 2d Division in theprocess of moving into thebunkers of the North Korean 1stDivision on the morning of 31August, the initial Korean Marineand 7th Marines attacks still facedextensive minefields and mortarbarrages as the troops workedtheir way uphill. Marine artilleryfire damped some of the enemyfire. The two 7th Marines battalionstook their objectives, but the 1stKMC Regiment advanced no far-ther than the base of Hill 924, themost heavily-defended positionencountered on eastern YokeRidge. Almost all the division'scasualties for August (three killedand 57 wounded) fell on the firstday of the Battle for Yoke Ridge.

Second Lieutenant Frederick F.Brower moved into his first big

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fight at the head of the 1st Platoon,Company H, 3d Battalion, 7thMarines. Occupying Hill 680 on 30August, the company had endureda heavy mortar barrage andlearned that North Korean regularshad replaced the scattered Chinesethe company had chased north ofthe Punchbowl. The next day thecompany attacked Hill 702, YokeRidge, against "light resistance."Brower had commanded his pla-toon for three months, but he andhis Marines had not yet closed withthe enemy since they alwaysseemed to be patrolling the divi-sion's western-most flank, keepingan eye on the neighboring SouthKorean division. As the skirmishline approached Hill 702, theNorth Koreans greeted it with abarrage of mortar fire. Only mm-

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utes into the battle, Brower crum-pled with multiple wounds in hisleft leg, and he looked with dismayat his bloody and misshapen leftknee. Pistol marksman, modelMarine platoon commander, dedi-cated to a career in the MarineCorps, Brower ended his first bat-tle on a stretcher carried by ner-vous Korean "chiggy bearers."Although he eventually served hisfull Korean tour as a semi-cripple,his career in a rifie company endedon 31 August 1951, and his dam-aged knee forced him into disabil-ity retirement in 1955. It had beena short but final war for SecondLieutenant Brower.

The fight gave few hints of theordeals ahead. On 1 September,General Shepherd visited GeneralThomas and found no cause foralarm. Thomas felt confident thatthe attacks that day would takecare of the Yoke Ridge problem.After seeing Byers, they agreedthat X Corps had problems west ofthe Punchbowl where the 2dInfantry Division still had notsecured all of "Bloody Ridge"despite the loss of 2,772 Americanand attached Korean soldiers since18 August. For the Marines, how-ever, the attacks of 2 Septembertook only Hill 924 (but not Hill1026) and consolidated the 7thMarines defenses on Hill 602.Throughout the day and the next,the North Koreans bombardedYoke Ridge and mounted counter-attacks of up to battalion-size. The1st Marine Division's modest suc-cesses came in no small part fromthe artillery fire from two 11thMarines battalions and three Armycorps artillery battalions, whichfired 8,400 rounds on 1-2September, an amount of fire thatexceeded the "Van Fleet Day ofFire" for the five battalions (6,000rounds). The battle drew in theremaining battalions of the 1stKMC Regiment and the 7th

Marines. With American Marinesholding the northern edge of YokeRidge, the South Korean Marinesfinally took Hills 924 and 1026,which completed the mission. Itdid not end enemy counterattacksand shelling, but the two regimentsheld the objective. The 7th Marinessuffered five dead and 75 wound-ed, the Korean Marines 70 deadand missing and 274 wounded.The North Koreans left behindalmost 600 bodies to be countedand 40 prisoners. None of theallies thought the victory had beeneasy.

The capture of Yoke Ridgemight have been less costly if theMarines had received more effec-tive close air support, GeneralShepherd made it one of the high-est priority issues when he visitedthe war zone from 27 August to 12

September. The CommandingGeneral, Fleet Marine Force,Pacific (and likely Commandant)met with the Major GeneralChristian F. Schilt, commander, andBrigadier General William 0.Brice, deputy commander of the1st Marine Aircraft Wing. "A dis-cussion of the close air supportproblem revealed that unsatisfacto-ry conditions still prevail in regardto close air support for the 1stMarine Division." Shepherd thencomplained about the poor airsupport to Van Fleet and Everesteven before he consulted withByers and Thomas on 1

September. Shepherd recruitedVice Admiral C. Turner Joy,Commander, Naval Forces, FarEast, to join a coalition of seniorofficers who would force the issuewith Ridgway.

During his Korean inspection trlp, LtGen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., CommandingGeneral, Fleet Marine Force, Pac/ic, left, discussed not only close air support, butalso the performance of the Sikorsky HRS-1 helicopter. Pictured to his left areMajGen Christian F Schilt, Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing,LtCol George W. Herring, commander officer of Marine Helicopter TransportSquadron 161, and newly-promoted MajGen William 0. Brice, the wing's deputycommander.

Department of Defense (Photo) A131870

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4

The battle of Yoke Ridge pro-vided ample evidence that the FifthAir Force would not modify therequest system and that the realpurpose of the Joint OperationsCenter was to prevent the diver-sion of fighter-bombers fromOperation Strangle, the campaignagainst the Communist lines ofcommunication. The 1st MarineDivision had requested 26 aircraftto support the attack of 1

September. Despite the fact thatthe requests had been made 40hours before the mission, only 12aircraft were assigned. Requestsmade by the forward and other aircontrollers in the heat of combattook more than an hour to pro-duce aircraft on station. One 7thMarines request for air strikesagainst a heavy North Koreancounterattack had been canceledby X Corps' G-2 because he didnot believe the counterattack wasreal. Despite the mounting evi-dence—and much of it came fromthe 2d Infantry Division's ordealsto the west—the Fifth Air Forcemade no concessions. The 1st

Marine Division's fire supportcoordinator made the point in hisbriefing for Shepherd: "Close airsupport furnished by the Fifth AirForce JOC was inadequate andoften not opportune."

Shell shortages, complex plan-ning by both Eighth Army and XCorps headquarters, and the deter-mination of the North Koreansbrought a pause of six days to 1stMarine Division operations. Thelikely artillery shell expenditures ofany future offensive—combinedwith road conditions betweenHongchon and the front—wouldmake an immediate offensivebeyond Yoke Ridge difficult. Thedivision goal was to stockpile 10days of fire in artillery shells ("VanFleet days") at ammunition supplypost-60B, the ammunition dumpand distribution point run by XCorps and division ordnance menlocated 48 miles from Hongchonand five miles from the gun line.Until the roads dried and engineersrepaired the washouts andstrengthened the roadbed, theround trip to ASP-60B took 25

hours. Some trucks still had to bediverted to lift troops to and fromthe front. In fact, the estimates forshells fell short of the actualexpenditures, 24,000 tons (874,000rounds) for X Corps in September1951.

Intelligence officers believedthat X Corps would need everyshell it could find. The combataround the Punchbowl revealed asystem of defensive fortificationsthat had been built before 1951and strengthened since April.Much of the NKPA I Coips hadbeen withdrawn, but its replace-ment—the NKPA III Coips—wasone of the largest (30,000 soldiers)and best-trained in the NorthKorean army. Unlike the Chinese,the North Koreans had plenty ofartillery, too, out-numberingMarine artillery pieces in thePunchbowl sector. In the Marinedivision's zone of action the NKPA1st Division appeared to beassigned the bunker defense rolewhile the NKPA 45th Divisionmounted counterattacks.

General Van Fleet did not winapproval of his amphibious hooknorth to .Tongchon, but his plan-ners produced some more modestvariants that might have put all orpart of the 1st Marine Divisionwithin the ROK I Corps area andcloser to the air and naval gunfiresupport that Task Force 77 couldprovide. An offensive westwardfrom the coast might bring theMarines and the ROK I Corps inbehind the fortified belt so well-manned by the North Koreans. Foralmost 10 days, Van Fleet andByers examined their contingencyplans and ruled them out as toorisky and subject at any moment toanother Ridgway veto. The resultof the operational paralysis wasthat General Thomas learned on 8-9 September that he would repos-sess the 1st Marines from corpsreserve, which would release the

The body of a Communist soldier lies atop a bunker captured by elements of the7th Marines during the assault against Hill 673.

National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC380918

43

The "Chiggy Bearers"

Theycould be found trudging along after every

Marine rifle company in Korea's mountains in thesummer of 1951. Small men, powered by muscu-

lar but thin legs, bent under the loads of their A-framesor cbigae, struggling along with ammunition, rations,and water, they were the "chiggy bearers." The 1stMarine Division depended upon them to close the gapbetween the supply points served by trucks and theMarine companies engaged in battle. The "chiggy bear-ers" made it possible for the Marines to search out anddestroy the enemy.

Organized by the U. S. Eighth Army in 1950 and orig-inally called the Civil Transportation Corps, this army ofKorean laborers provided the United Nations forces withconstructidn workers and pack bearers. For carryingsupplies, the Koreans relied upon their traditionalwooden A-frame packboard or chigae. Althoughrenamed the Korean Service Corps (KSC) in 1951, thebearer corps remained the chigaebudae (A-Frame Army)or "chiggy bearers" to the Marines.

The "chiggy bearers" had either been drafted intotheir country's service or had volunteered. Members ofthe KSC had to be medically unfit for duty in the SouthKorean army or be over age 38. Marines often charac-terized the "chiggy bearers" as "elderly," but, in fact, theKSC included men and boys who had convinced some-one that they were unfit for frontline service in the SouthKorean army. The South Korean government had almostabsolute power to commandeer people and things forthe war effort, but in reality the KSC competed withother American-financed Korean service agencies forpersonnel and could count only on unskilled workers(often displaced farmers and farm laborers) for the bulkof its manpower.

In many ways the lot of the average "chiggy bearer"was not a happy one, however essential. His contractsaid that he would carry up to a 50-pound load for asmany as 10 miles each day, but the bearers often carriedheavier loads for longer distances, especially if mea-sured from valley floor to hilltop. The lines of bearers,shepherded by Korean soldiers assigned as KSCcadremen, often came under artillery and mortar fire.American divisions did not keep track of KSC casualties.Any man could be pressed into service as a bearer forsix months, and the living and medical conditions forthe bearers were no better than most refugee camps.

the end of the war an estimated 300,000 Koreans hadserved a tour as a "chiggy bear," and at the height of thefluid war of 1951 the South Korean governmentimpressed an average of 3,000 men and boys a weekinto the KSC. A postwar accounting of KSC personnellisted 2,064 porters killed in action, 2,448 missing inaction, and 4,282 wounded in action.

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If a KSC "regiment"—with one assigned to eachAmerican division—had efficient and honest officers,the KSC bearer did not fare badly—provided he lived tocollect his pay. Clothing and food were not a problem,which could not be said for his countrymen; the "chig-gy bearer" ration was supposed to provide 3,500 calo-ries a day and included a ration of 10 cigarettes. Aftersome strident protests in 1951, KSC pay scales movedfrom' those set for the South Korean army toward thosepaid other Koreans working as civilians for the UnitedNations Command.

One American army logistician calculated that anAmerican infantry company required just about as manybearers as its own strength, around 150-200. If so, the1st Marine Division had a "chiggy bearer" shortage sinceit had only 1,922 KSC members in support in May 1951.The bearer "gap," however, applied to all of UnitedNations Command. By war's end the KSC had a paperstrength of 133,000, but its "A-frame strength" was about100,000 or roughly one bearer for every six Americanand allied soldiers in Korea. Like everyone else on theUnited Nations side of the war, the "chiggy bearers" car-ried more than their prescribed load.

Del

5th Marines from the Kansas Linefor additional offensive operationseast of the Punchbowl. Except forthe 8th ROK Division on Thomas'right flank, the rest of X Corpswould seize another hill mass sooncalled "Heartbreak Ridge." Byersexpected the Marines to resumethe attack on 11 September.

With only 48 hours to mount anattack, Thomas had little alterna-tive but to look again to the 7thMarines to lead the advance onKanmubong Ridge, the hill massdirectly north of Yoke Ridge andthe division's next objective. Theconcept of the operation envi-sioned a two-phase operation thatwould begin with the 7th Marinesseizing the two most dominantpeaks at the eastern edge of theridge, Hills 673 and 749. To elimi-nate a transverse ridge spur (Hill680), a secondary attack wouldstrike directly north from the HaysLine on Yoke Ridge. This missionwent to 3d Battalion, 7th Marines,commanded by Lieutenant ColonelBernard T. Kelly, with the mainattack to 1st Battalion, 7th Marines,under Lieutenant Colonel James G.Kelly, relatively untouched by thefight for Yoke Ridge. When the 7thMarines had secured the Hill 673-Hill 749 area, the 1st Marineswould come forward and continuethe attack up Kanmubong's longaxis, "ridge-running," to capture aseries of peaks designated (east towest) Hills 812, 980, 1052, and1030. The scheme of maneuverwould allow tanks to fire acrossthe front of the advancing troopsand artillery fire (even naval gun-fire) to converge in concentrationsfrom the firing positions to thesouth and southeast. The advanceshad to be supported by hundredsof "chiggy bearers" since therewere no roads of any kind to bringthe ammunition, food, and waterforward in any other way.

Fighting from cleverly-con-

cealed and strongly-built bunkersand trench systems, the NorthKoreans made the 7th Marines (allthree battalions) pay dearly inthree days of fighting, 34 dead and321 wounded. The assault compa-nies that crossed the line of depar-ture in the morning fog of 11September did not expect a walk-over. Despite the hour of intenseartillery preparation, the NorthKorean defenders fought withunflagging tenacity until killed.Each bunker system came ringedwith mines and booby-traps, andKorean mortar shells and grenadesshowered crippling fragmentsacross every contested position.Long-range heavy machine gunfire from higher up KanmubongRidge took its toll among theMarine assault units that struggledforward with flamethrowers andsatchel charges.

Once again dark memories ofIwo Jima and Okinawa came to theveterans. More heirs of theJapanese military tradition than theSoviet, the North Koreans showedno hesitation in launching counter-attacks large and small and atunexpected times and from unex-pected directions. Although theenemy did not overrun any Marinepositions, only quick shooting andquick thinking broke the backs ofthe attacks with bullets andartillery shells. Although the 3dBattalion took its objective with noassistance, Colonel Nickerson hadto commit his 2d Battalion to aidthe 1st Battalion on 12 September.Only a converging two-battalionattack—the companies in col-umn—finally seized Hill 673, andthe subsequent 2d Battalion attackon Hill 749 fought itself Out farshort of the crest. In all the fightingtank fire proved decisive when thebunkers could be identified andfired upon, line-of-sight. Manybunkers, however, could havebeen reached by close air support,

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conspicuously absent. The keyground maneuver came from acompany of the 1st Battalion thatmade an undetected night marchto reach a poorly-defended entrantto Hill 673, then assaulting througha breach in the North Koreandefenses. Nevertheless, the 2dBattalion's attack on Hill 749stalled with the three rifle compa-nies reduced, scattered, and bat-tling back small counterattacks inthe dark before a battalion of the1st Marines replaced them on 13September. So hard-pressed andscattered were the Marines of 2dBattalion, 7th Marines, that the bat-talion misreported its location andgave Nickerson the impression thathis regiment had taken Hill 749,which it had not. Moreover, theapproaches to the hill were stillheld by some very combativeNorth Koreans. Assuming opera-tional control of the 2d Battalion,the 1st Marines, under ColonelThomas A. Wornham, picked upthe responsibility for occupyingHill 749. Only a helicopter recon-naissance proved that Hill 749would have to be taken first.

The logistical burden of sup-porting five committed infantrybattalions (the situation on 13September) proved too much forthe "chiggy bearers" of the KoreanService Corps 103d Division, butthe Marines now had an alternativefor the emergency resupply ofammunition and medical goodsand the evacuation of the serious-ly-wounded: the Marine Corpshelicopter. Although the light heli-copters of Marine ObservationSquadron 6 (VMO-6) had been afixture in operations since August1950, the battle for KanmubongRidge opened a new era in MarineCorps history, the combat employ-ment of helicopters as an integralpart of Marine air-ground opera-tions. General Thomas andColonel Krulak had both played

Second Lieutenant George H. Ramer

Born in 1927 at Meyersdale, Pennsylvania, heenlisted in the Navy in 1944. After the war, heentered Bucknell University, from which he grad-

uated in 1950 with a degree in Political Science andHistory. While attending Bucknell, he enrolled in theMarine Corps Reserve Platoon Leader's program andwas commissioned in the Marine Corps Reserve. Hetaught high school civics and history in Lewisburg.Pennsylvania, before being called to active duty inJanuary 1951 at his own request.

As a platoon leader with Company I, 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, in Korea, his bravery in covering the with-drawal of his platoon on Kanmubong Ridge on 12September 1951 was recognized by the posthumousaward of the Medal of Honor. His citation reads, in part:

Second Lieutenant Ramer fearlessly led his men upthe steep slopes and, although he and the majori-ty of his unit were wounded during the ascent,boldly continued to spearhead the assault. . . . hestaunchly carried the attack to the top, personallyannihilated one enemy bunker with grenade andcarbine fire and captured the objective with hisremaining eight men.Unable to hold the position against an immediate,overwhelming hostile counterattack, he orderedhis group to withdraw and single-handedly foughtthe enemy to furnish cover for his men and for theevacuation of three fatally wounded Marines.Severely wounded a second time, SecondLieutenant Ramer . . . courageously manned his In 1963, a facility for physical conditioning at Marinepost until the hostile troops overran his position Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, was named in his mem-and he fell mortally wounded. ory.—Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)

key roles in developing the con-cept of vertical envelopment andfighting for funds to procure andtest helicopters in HMX-1, theexperimental helicopter squadroncreated at Marine Corps Air Station,Quantico, Virginia. HMX-1 gavebirth in January 1951 to MarineTransport Helicopter Squadron 161(HMR-161), commanded by a heli-copter pioneer, Lieutenant ColonelGeorge W. Herring. Herringbrought HMR-161 to Korea inAugust 1951 ready to make itscombat debut under the sharp eyeof Krulak, who had made verticalenvelopment his latest magnificentobsession. Herring's squadron of

300 Marines and 15 Sikorsky HRS-1 transport helicopters arrived atthe airstrip (X-83) near the divisioncommand post at Sohwa-ri andmoved in with VMO-6. Anticipat-ing some employment in theweeks ahead, Krulak and Herringprepared the squadron for opera-tions in combat landing zones anddeclared it ready for commitmenton 12 September. Thomas toldHMR-161 to carry supplies to theembattled Marines near Hill 793.

Operation Windmill I on 13September lasted only about threehours, but its impact stretched intothe future by years. In the shortterm it made sure that 2d Battalion,

46

1st Marines, commanded byLieutenant Colonel Franklin B.

Nihart, faced another day's battlewith plenty of ammunition, water,and rations and without the bur-den of casualties. The first liftbrought in a helicopter supportteam from the 2d Battalion to runthe landing zone, and the remain-ing 27 flights delivered nine tons ofcargo and evacuated 74 casualties.Not one helicopter was lost toground fire or accident. A similarresupply mission would haverequired almost 400 Korean bear-ers and a full day to accomplish.Unlike an earlier parachute resup-ply mission to the Korean Marines,

4'

-,——IlII.

;4 'I -

Whirlybirdshen Marine Transport Helicopter Squadron(HMR) 161 deployed to Korea, the squadrontook with it an aircraft that pushed the techni-

cal state-of-the-art in helicopter design into a new fron-tier. Designated the HRS-1, the Sikorsky-designed andbuilt helicopter had endured the inevitable ups anddowns that characterized the introduction of any pio-neering aircraft. Without government contracts, theSikorsky Aircraft Division of the Vought-SikorskyCorporation, Stratford, Connecticut, produced an aircraftdesignated the S-55, first flown in 1949. Initially market-ing the aircraft as a commercial utility helicopter, IgorSikorsky hoped the S-55 could compete with the PiaseckiH-21 (or PD-22), which had been adopted by the U.S. AirForce for its air rescue service. The Navy, however, wasin the hunt for a general-purpose helicopter that could beadopted for shipboard use. Naval aviators liked the S-55because of its economical design, modest size, and ser-viceability.

Redesignated the HO4S-1 in its naval model, the S-55represented at least two major engineering advances: theaddition of a tail rotor for greater stability in flight and afront-mounted Pratt & Whitney R-1340-57 engine thatcould generate a respectable 600 horsepower. The engineplacement helped solve a nagging problem of weight-dis-tribution and flight characteristics. Prior helicopter mod-els placed the engine directly under the rotor-blades, adesign that gravely limited any so-designed helicopter to

47

very light loads and insured flight instability. The front-mounted engine dramatically increased the helicopter'scarrying capacity and simplified maintenance since theHRS-1 had clam-shaped nose doors that provided easyaccess to the engine for the ground crew mechanics. Thenew design also improved vertical flight stability.

In the earliest stage of evaluation, 1948-1949, Navy andMarine Corps officers, encouraged by Sikorsky, saw capa-bilities the helicopter did not yet have, even under opti-mum weather and altitude conditions. The originalrequirement the naval aviators placed on the helicopterwas a 10-man load (225 pounds per Marine) to be carried150 miles. The requirements shrank, as it became moreand more obvious that the HRS-1 was not going to be atwo-ton-plus lifter. All the helicopter's other characteris-tics, however, made it the aircraft of choice for theBureau of Aeronautics, and the Marine Corps joined theprogram in August 1950, with an initial order of 40 air-craft.

The HRS-ls that went to Korea came into service witha gross weight rating (7,000 pounds at sea level) about1,000 pounds slighter than originally designed with apayload reduced to 1,420 pounds under optimal flightconditions. Its troop load dropped from 10 to four to six.The helicopter's maximum speed remained at 90 knots,but its range had dropped by half to 70-mile round trips.Nevertheless, the HRS-1 was not a "whirlybird" of disap-pointment, but promise.

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-433347

w

t4

none of the cargo drifted off toplaces and users unknown. Theuse of externally-slung, quick-release loads in cargo nets madeeasy. For the corpsmen andwounded Marines, helicopter evac-uation meant that a hard-hit casu-alty could be transported to a med-ical clearing station ("battalionmed") in 30 minutes, not doomedto a day-long stretcher ride. Evenwithout accumulated statistics,medical personnel could alreadytell that medical evacuation heli-copters would save lives and boostmorale.

The plan for the 1st Marines toattack up Kanmubong Ridge con-tinued to unravel despite the heli-copter resupply and the commit-ment of two battalions, the 2dBattalion to take Hill 749 and the

3d Battalion to seize the ridgelineacross the Soyang on Nihart's rightflank. Nihart's battalion finallycleared Hill 749 after sharp fightingone company at a time with only aplatoon in battle by the evening of14 September. Before Nihart couldmount another attack the next day,the North Koreans deluged hisMarines with heavy artillery andmortar fire, pinning them to theirHill 749 positions. The NorthKorean regiment with accompany-ing artillery tried to throw the 2dBattalion off Hill 749 for four hoursduring the night of 15-16September and left almost 200bodies and many blood trailsbehind when it withdrew, but thebattle cost the 2d Battalion almost200 casualties and limited it as anoffensive threat. Two Korean

deserters reported that their regi-ment had 1,200 casualties.

Wornham now had to commithis reserve 1st Battalion to ensurethat the complete Hill 673-Hill 749complex was secure, leavingThomas only one unbloodied regi-ment (the 5th Marines) to assaultthe heights of Kanmubong Ridge.At the cost of more than 800 casu-alties in the 7th and 1st Marines,the 1st Marine Division had onlyseized the ground identified fivedays before as the departure pointfor the more demanding advanceup the spine of the ridge. Now itwas the turn of Colonel Richard G.Weede's 5th Marines to continuethe attack.

The battle of Kanmubong Ridgecontinued for four more days (16-20 September) and ended with the5th Marines reduced by some 250casualties and only Hill 812 secure-ly under Marine control. The com-manders of Weede's two assaultbattalions believed they could alsohave taken Hill 980, but it wouldhave been difficult to hold with thepeak (Hill 1052) still under NorthKorean control. The problems ofCommunist enfilade fire from thenorth simply got worse as theMarines worked their way to thewest along the ridge. TheLieutenant Colonel Donald R.

Kennedy's 3d Battalion in the leftzone of action had its flank pro-tected by Yoke Ridge and by tankfire, but the 2d Battalion workingalong the opposite slope enjoyedno advantages in cover and friend-ly fire, except close air support—which did not arrive. Staggered byits mounting casualties, the 2dBattalion stormed Hill 812 on theevening of 17 September. Withoutphysical contact, the two battalionswent into perimeter defenses,expecting North Korean counterat-tacks from the heights to their frontor, in the case of the 2d Battalion,from the broken ground to the

A wounded squad leader of the 5th Marines ensures that a North Koreanemplacement no longer threatens the advance along Kanmubong Ridge. TheSeptember attacks into the ridge mass north of the Punchbowl produced the mostintense combat since the Chinese Ffth Offensive of April and May.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A156867

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