Army Aviation Digest - Jun 1972

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Jun 1972

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UNITED RMY VI TION1 G E SOF ARMY AVIATION, ACSFOROF THE ARMY

BG William J. Maddox Jr.U. S. ARMY AVIATION

MG Allen M. Burdett Jr.COMDT, U. S. ARMY AVIATIONCOL Hubert S. Campbell Jr.

STAFFRichard K. Tierney, EditorCPT Tom GreeneCW2 Mike LopezWilliam H. SmithJohn MarusichLinda McGowanBetty S. WallaceDianne HorneJulie Martinez

ARTS SUPPORTHarry A. PickelDorothy L. CrowleyAngela A. AkinU. S. ARMYFOR AVIATION SAFETYCOL Francis M. McCullar

DIVPierce L. Wiggin, ChiefWilliam E. CarterJack DeLoneyT.d KontosCharles MabiusPatsy R. ThompsonArnold R. LambertEugenia M. BertaOw.n B. England Jr.Mary W. Windham

AIOUT THE COVIIA wounded man i placedaboard an OH13 helicopter tobe evacuated to a rear area hospital during the Korean War.Colonel Hubert D. Gaddis, whoevacuated the 1O OOOth wound.dsoldier in Korea, comment. onthe back cover on air medicalevacuation developments andoutlooks

JUNE 1972 VOLUME 18 NUMBEViews From ReadersFrom Fabric To FURThat They May LiveAviator Support To A Counterinsurgency WarAeromedic - Visual IllusionsInstrument CornerNCOES - What, When, Where, How?Horizontal EnrichmentMaintenance Training Goes Self-PaceSound Mind, Sound Body SenseMishap Data - Current Or Obsolete?That Great Leap ForwardHow's Your Circadian Rhythm?Pearl'sThe Art Of Breeding Crash Facts MessagesThe WordAviation Accident Prevention ForumUSAASO Sez

T. . . . . . of u AIMY AVIATION D ''' I. t. . . . . .yw. Infor l .n . rt la_1 .r funcH. . . . . ' , . . . . . . . . . . t o ty rcroft .ccld.nt .. .y.ntl tra . t ICe, ............ . . . cII . . .y .Ia ... t, ayl.tl.n lcln., .nd . th.l . t H d....Th. DIGUI I. I .......... f lito A ay ItOriatilcal ..u . 1........ Iy utho .u . . . . . . . . . . of lito , U. I. A t . y Avlatl Sch_I. VI.w ..,. . . . . h.,. not c.... lly ..... of of th A ...y .r tho U s Ar.y Ayl.tI.n Ic..h.t . U. S. AI Y I. . . . . . . t . r l . 1 . . . ,. . lnt... pr.yc, . . t I y t . the D ..... to tIto u.I h.rwl.. Indlcat '.Artlcl . . . . . . . , ..... of Into, . . . A,..y .vlatl .n .r. Inyltod. Dlr.d ctl Is .utherl . . . t . . , U.I. Anly Avlatl DI... , t .uck.r, Ala. 36360.U fund. for frlntl t i l l ,u . leotl.n h ~ ..... .y . . y H.ad .uart.r., D. t . f tho Ar.y, OctoIMr 70.

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R

JEWSROE DERS

Sir:Could you furnish me a list of AeroClubs operated by the U. S. Army inEurope, or information as to where Imay obtain a list.Thank you for your consideration.John E . LaChappelleTulsa, OK 74135 The DIGEST does not maintain infonnation on Aero Clubs; however, youshould be able to obtain such a list bycontacting the Office of the Chief of Infonnation, Headquarters, Departmentof the Anny, Washington, D. C. 20310.

ir:I am writing to congratulate CaptainMeyer on his article Low Level Proficiency." t is most assuredly a timelytopic and one which needs all Armyaviators' immediate attention.I must, however, take this opportunityto "thought-smith" some of the author'sideas.First, I am afraid that many of us maviation do not know the difference between low level flight and nap-of-theearth (N OE) flight.

With regards to low level flight, mostfolks define it as 50 feet above the highest obstacle at cruise air speed.Speaking of NOE, we in Armor defineit as 0-50 feet at 0-40 knots. In essence,we've brought our helicopters back intothe true ground environment. At 3 feetyou can surely use both terrain andvegetation to conceal your movements.I might quickly add that our accidentrate decreases proportionately to thedecrease in air speed and altitude.Concerning NOE navigation, the primary training the aviator needs is basicmapreading. When in the ground environment navigate as the ground forcesdo ." Every aircraft has two bodies, oneflies and one navigates. A lot of us willbe surprised how easy it is and withnothing more than an inexpensive andcost effective map.

Sir:

MAJ James W. BradinFt. Knox, KY 40121

desire to obtain two free copies ofyour fine magazine u. S. ARMY AVIATIONDIGEST each month.As a USAF aerospace physiologist T

have had an opportunity to read yourmagazine at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH ,each month. Now here in Vietnam it isnot available to me I desire to use thearticles on aviation medicine in implementing a physiological training program for the Vietnamese Air Force.Thanks. LTC Giles W. HallPhysiologist AdvisorAir Force Advisory GroupMACVAPO 96307 Your complimentary letter is mostappreciated and we wish it were possible to place you on distribution of theU. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST atthis level. However, the DIGEST is anofficial Department of the Army magazine with distribution being handled in

W a ~ h i n g t o n In order for you to receiveour magazine it will be necessary foryou to conform with the instructions onthe attached sheet [see page 20, February 1972 DIGEST].The DIGEST does have some extracopies available of back issues and whenthese are requested we are happy to sendthem. f you can advise of any specificback issues which you desire, we may beable to furnish them for you.

GETTING OUT SOON?f you are getting out of the Army soon, don't hangup your wings. The same joys of flying plus someextra money may be yours if you join up with theNational Guard or a Reserve Unit. For a list of the sand where they are located write--

JUNE 1972

EDITORU S ARMY AVIATION DIGESTFORT RU KERALABAMA 36360


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rom abric 0 LIRBrigadier General William J. Maddox Jr.Director of Army Aviation

Congratulations on the first 30 yearsT I R T Y YEARS in the longchronology of military historyis a short period of time. t is approximately the same period asAlexander the Great's total lifespan (he died at age 33 after having conquered the known world).t is the length of an obscure Euro

pean war of the 18th century.Thirty years is less than the timebetween the Civil War and theSpanish American War. t is thetime between the present and theblack days of early World War II.Thirty years is the precise age ofArmy aviation.Not long ago I read a statisticwhich said that over 90 percent ofall the scientists who had everlived are living today. This statisticpoints up the fact that technologyis moving extremely fast. Over thelife of Army aviation it is easy tosee the difference between the L-4Cub and the AH-56A Cheyenne.Measured in technological terms,30 years is the difference betweenfabric-covered airplanes and FLIR(Forward Looking Infra Red)equipped helicopters.So "Fabric to FLIR is the hardware side of the story and hardware has advanced the state ofwarfare by leaps and bounds in 30years. t has enhanced the participation of Army aviation in corecombat actions. In recent yearsArmy aviation has carried theArmy in the Republic of Vietnamand the war under its wings androtor blades. But that is a storyto be recounted later.During Army aviation's 30

years of change and turbulence onething has remained constant. Thisis the dedication to land combat.The visionaries who procured andoperated the Piper Cubs in 1942had no way of knowing about thehelicopter of the 1960s. They didnot know the words gunships, aer-i l cranes, C Cs and SLARs Yetthey had the concept. And the concept has been firmly fixed throughout the 30 years.

At the time Army aviation congealed at Ft. Sill, OK, the U. Shad lost the bulk of its Pacific fleet.t did not control the sea lanes toEurope or the coastwise steamerroutes along our own coasts.Troops of the 5th Division had justlanded in Iceland but only Ameri

can observers were in active warzones in Europe and Africa. In thePacific our toehold was in Australia. The Solomon campaign wasyet to come.In such a situation the U S wasforging the means for a comeback.Divisions were forming in theStates. Our national policy was directed toward a 50,000 airplaneforce. This force was air power.Ground power was separate, geographically and philosophically. Asthe Army visionaries looked at thesituation, if air power were to beseparate then aviation technologystill had something to offer groundformations.

So it all started in the artillery.As the result of tests in 1942, every artillery battalion was assignedtwo fabric-covered Cub airplanes,each with a crew of one pilot and

one observer. Initially the generalconsensus was that such aircraftcould not survive on the modernbattlefield. The original tacticscalled for flights of 7 minutes durat ion-in other words, pop up, lookand sideslip to a landing.The World War II experiencewith the Cub reproved the basiclaw that theory usually is differentfrom practice. In the case of theCub, what was conceived to be avery short sneak-and-peek missionturned out to be the backbone ofartillery observation. Statistically,over 90 percent of the observedartillery mISSIOns fired duringWorld War II were adjusted fromArmy aerial platforms.Instead of vulnerable the Cubturned out to be survivable. t livedand worked for the ground soldiersbecause it was integrated withthem. The fabric skins seldom werepunctured because the enemy soonlearned that to trifle with the Cubre ulted in a battalion artillery volley. The Messerschmitt found itwas too fast to catch the hedgehopping Cub. Instead of 7 minutemissions, the Cub normally flewto the extent of its fuel supply.Most divisions maintained aerialartillery observation from dawn todusk and as required during thehours of darkness.The philosophy of assigningaircraft to individual artillery battalions is known to many as decentralization. However, decentralization is a long and sterileword. What the light aircraft didfor artillery battalions has much

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more emotional appeal. t providedthe ground commander with thetools he needed on a full time basisto do his assigned tasks. t meantthat doctrine- did not stand in theway of getting the job done. To thePiper Cub pilot it meant that hisfirst call and duty was to the soldieron the ground.

The Army pilot became knownfor his Cub spirit . This was hisintense desire to perform the mission and to remain customeroriented. He placed first priority onhis unit's assigned mission. He hadno other loyalties and no other mission to reduce his effectiveness aspart of the land battle. This earlyArmy aviator was an innovator. Heflew in miserable weather, he maderoad landings, he landed in cabbage patches-if these things werenecessary to get his job done. Herecognized early that he must retain his prime orientation towardthe ground. He became an Armyofficer first and an aviator second.

Perhaps the largest lesson learnedfrom the Cub was that technologyis not the exclusive province ofany restricted group. f aircraftcould assist in doing the groundjob better, it followed that theArmy needed aircraft. Accordingly, Cubs ceased to be the exclusive province of the artillery. Atthe conclusion of World War II infantry, armor, engineer and signalunits also justified the fulltime requirement for light aircraft. Anynumber could play if they had afull time need.

The Korean War was prettyJUNE 1972

much a replay of World War IItype aircraft. Most of the equipment was the same and so were thepeople. However, there was onenew ingredient: the helicopter. Thismachine was used extensively forcommand and control and medicalevacuation, but only in the laterstages of the war was the helicopterused to a limited degree in troopmovement behind friendly lines.

What occurred in Korea provided an impetus for testing andexperimentation on the part of thevisionaries of the 1950s. By the1960s a second generation of hardware was available for the Vietnamconflict. The concepts followedrapidly. We found that we couldbe truly airmobile-that is, wecould perform all five functions ofcombat for the first time with aircraft. So we in aviation became theworkhorses of the Vietnam war.We air assaulted into landingzones; we provided covering firesfor insertions; we reconnoiteredahead of our advancing troops; wecovered them with accurate fires;we pounded the enemy; we pickedup the wounded; we inserted thevital supplies and personnel; wescreened the flanks; we deliveredthe water, the fuel , the ice, the icecream, the entertainers. We controlled both airmobile and groundoperations for helicopters. Thiswas true integration and it was trueairmobility

In the performance of thesetasks we demonstrated to the restof the Army and to the world howtechnology could produce breakthroughs in the conduct of landcombat. We showed that the helicopter was not a transient visitorto the battlefield but was a full timemember of the team. One point ofmajor significance was that theArmy completed its shift from dependence on airplanes to helicopters. While fixed wing craft haveperformed yoeman service and stillare highly important for utilitywork (U-21 Utes) and sophisti-

cated reconnaissance (OV-1 Mohawks), the 30th anniversary ofArmy aviation finds the helicopteras the capital ship of the aircraftinventory. This is because the helicopter is highly flexible and is socompatible with the operation offront line ground units. On a quantity basis aviation organizationshave reached division size. Todaywe have aviation groups, aviationbattalions, cavalry squadrons andaerial artillery battalions. In suchan aggregation it is reasonable toask, Should there not be an Aviation Branch?

The answer lies back in 1942 .Aviation entered the Army thatyear to assist in doing the groundiob better. Aircraft and aviatorswere integrated into ground formations. The key word is integrationWhere there is integration there isa coincidence of interest; wherethere is separatism there tends tobe exclusiveness and a divergenceof interest. For this reason theaviator must do as he historicallyhas done: opt for integration.

As we survey the status of Armyaviation on this 30th birthday, wefind oup;elves translating our recent history into gunships, doctrineand organization for the future.Once again we are challenged bothin terms of effectiveness and survivability. The situation is verysimilar to 1942 when the role ofthe Cub was being debated: Couldit survive? Could it contribute?

On this birthday we can detecta quantitative shrinking from ourpeak of over 25 ,000 aviators andover 12,000 aircraft. However,there can be no reduction in quality. The Cub spirit and the dedication of the aviator to the groundsoldier must continue to guide us.What was launched of necessity inWorld War II, sustained by technology ever since, is destined toreach new heights i we maintainour spirit. The future is limitedonly by our imagination and determination.

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group soon to become the International Committee of the Red Cross.The world was' ready for theproject of the committee. It wasthe era of Florence Nightingale andClara Barton. The committeeworked fast and by 1864 a diplomatic conference called by theSwiss Federal Council adopted thefirst Geneva Convention for Ameliorating the Condition of the Sickand Wounded in the Field. Thebasic principle underlying that convention was that the wounded andsick who are no longer combatants,whether friendly or enemy, must becollected and cared for without anyadverse distinction. Medical personnel, ambulances and installations were likewise to be protected.t was recognized that effectiveprotection was dependent on recognition. For this purpose the RedCross on a white background became the distinctive emblem ofprotection. It was to be displayedconspicuously on medical personnel, ambulances, hospitals andother medical installations andunits.The First Geneva Conventionwas revised and updated in 1906,1929 and 1949. In the meanwhilethe International Committee of theRed Cross has gradually expandedits efforts on behalf of war victims.t has been instrumental in initiating Geneva Conventions for theProtection of the Wounded, Sick,and Shipwrecked at Sea (SecondConvention, 1868, 1907, 1949),Prisoners of War (Third Convention, 1929 and 1949), and Civilian(Fourth Convention, 1949).The International Committee ofthe Red Cross has recently undertaken new initiatives in preparingnew rules to elaborate the humanitarian law for the protection of warvictims and to secure its better application.Having over 100 years of experience with the First GenevaConvention, it is reasonable to expect that the Geneva Convention

JUNE 1972

dealing with the wounded and sickin the field would have fewer deficiencies than the newer and morecomplicated conventions. The principle deficiency of the First Convention involves the protection ofaeromedical evacuation.

Ambulance aviation was recognized by the First Geneva Convention at the time of its 1929 revision.Relying for recognition on a conspicuous display of the Red Crossemblem on an aircraft otherwisepainted white, the 1929 conventionprotected medical aircraft to thesame extent as mobile medicalunits except that they were prohibited from operating forward ofthe line of clearing stations.By 1949 it was apparent to theexperts who considered the massive revision of the Geneva Conventions that the capability to engage aircraft by interceptor planesand from the ground had exceededthe means to recognize protectedaircraft by visual means. Only anagreed flight plan appeared to be afeasible measure to afford medicalaircraft a real degree of securityand to provide belligerents withadequate safeguards against abuse.Accordingly, the 1949 conventions afforded no protection tomedical aircraft unless they wereflying at heights, times and routesspecifically agreed upon betweenthe belligerents concerned. Moreover, unless agreed otherwise,flights over enemy or enemy-occupied territory are prohibited.The effect of these provisionswas either to keep medical aircraftpermanently grounded, or to subject their operations to the risk ofattack without any legal protection.Agreements on flight scheduleshave seldom been feasible particularly because a technical channelof communication was not provided. Two technological developments since 1949 justify a re-examination of these legal limitations: The development of helicopterambulances makes feasible the

prompt evacuation of wounded directly from the battlefield, thusgreatly enhancing prompt treatment and the chance of survival. Advances in identification procedures, particularly involving radio communication and electronicidentification procedures, togetherwith flashing lights, make feasiblebetter identification of medical aircraft.The problem was first consideredby the Commission medico-juridique de Monaco in 1965 whichdrew up a draft protocol regulating Medical Transport by Air inTime of Armed Conflict.The Monaco draft does awaywith the requirement for an agreedflight plan except in battle areasand while flying over enemy orenemy-occupied territory. t envisions that a system of flashinglights, radio links and beacontransponders would serve to reduce the danger of misidentification, but primarily in rear areas.The salient provisions of the Monaco draft are:Article I Military aircraft used,whether temporarily or per-manently, by parties to a conflict for the evacuation ofwounded and sick and for thetransport of medical personneland equipment shal'l not be at-tacked, but shall be respectedand protected throughout theirmission.

rticle 2. ll aircraft operatingfor army medical services shallbe respected and protected inall circumstances, both in timeof peace and of war.rticle 4. The aircraft men-tioned in the foregoing articles

shall display conspicuously thedistinctive sign of the red crossred crescent, red lion and sun).They shall, moreover, be

fitted with a continuous sys-tem of either light signals orof instantaneous electrical andradio identification, whicheveris appropriate to operating


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conditions or with both.rticle 5. It s forbidden for all

aircraft mentioned in the present regulations to fly over enemy or enemy-occupied territory or areas where belligerents are engaged in militaryoperations.

Notwithstanding the preceding clause exceptions shall bepermissible by special agree.ment between belligerents orwith an international organization.

rticle 6. All aircraft coveredby the present regulationswhen flying over enemy or

enemy-occupied territory shallbe respected but shall obeyany order to land or alight onwater.

In the event of a landing onenemy or enemy-occupied territory whether forced or as aresult of fortuitous circum-stances the wounded and sickmay in the absence of anycontrary agreement betweenthe parties in conflict be takenprisoner of war. The medicalpersonnel and crew shall betreated in conformity with theprovisions of the present con-vention.

In June 943 Major Victor E. Frazier(inset) installed a trapdoor and litterbehind the pilot's seat of this L 4. AtBouginville L 4s were similarly modifiedlater in World War II, and used extensively in the Philippines for med evac

Commenting on the Monacodraft, a U. S. expert at the 1971Conference of Government Expertssponsored by the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross commented in part as follows:Article 1 is a good approachand provides an excellent foundation on which to build a protocolwhich would enable swift battlefield evacuation of wounded, butfrom that point on everything isdevoted to world organizations andairline type operations with theevacuation of battle areas ignoredand inhibited to the point of stripping them of protection and theactual prohibition to fly where belligerents are engaged in militaryoperations.There is a golden period of surgery when a wounded soldier'schance of survival, if placed in thehands of skilled medical personnel,is enhanced. The helicopter has thecapability of rapid evacuation,spanning in minutes distances thatit would take conventional groundmeans of evacuation literally hoursto traverse, thus placing the seriously wounded in field medical fa-

light observation helicopters established thefeasibility the battlefield aeromedicalevacuation concept during the Korean War


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Medical evacuation techniques were developed and practiced for most Army aircraftsuch as this U6 Beaver during the 1950scilities within this golden periodand greatly increasing his probability of survival. But, alas, r-ticle 5 prohibits flying where belligerents are engaged-the veryplace where swift medical evacuation is needed most."The discussion refers to as theyapproach a combat a r ~ a it i sportant that their medIcal mISSIOnshould be clearly and distinctlysignaled to the troops of both sidesand also observes that a helicopterapproaching enemy units is liableto offer an excellent target. Fromthis the articles of the draft revertto ~ g r m n t and forbidding allaircraft mentioned in Articles 1 &2 from flying in areas where belligerents are engaged in militaryoperations which takes backto the basic problem wIth the1949 convention of keeping themgrounded or flying their b a ~ t e f i e l dmissions of mercy at theIr ownperil."The ideas on radio detection(radar) , additional light signalsradio links are excellent andkeeping with advances in aircraftdetection and antiaircraft defense.The principles put forth regardingsafety of medical transport aresound but appear to fall short ofthe desired goal of providing protection for evacuation of the battleareas."Further in the discussion it isstated that it would be desirablethat the adoption of an identification system using blue lights shouldbe preceded by preliminary consultations carried out by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). I can find no placein Volume VII where this has beenaccomplished. With all due respect

The CH37 Mojave, a medium tacticaltransport helicopter of the 19505,was designed to carry 24 litterswhen used for aeromedical evacs

JUNE 1972

to the learned delegates at thistable I would question our qualif i c t i ~ n s to discuss electronic orradio-electrical identifications andto know if we are in fact givingprotection or placing impossibledemands which cannot be adheredto. We must study what the expertshave to say before reaching anyrecommendations.

For these reasons, I would submit that this committee should recommend that further study andconsideration should be given tothis protocol by experts who ~ r etechnically qualified in electromcs ,communications , aviation and naval operations before being considered by this committee. We ca lagree with the principle that addItional protections are needed forthe safety of medical transport,but I would go one step furtherand recommend that considerationshould also be given to battlefield

evacuation by dedicated medicalhelicopters and that d e f i ~ i t i v eguidelines should be establIshedthat would enable these helicoptersto carry out their mission with somereasonable assurance of safety."

The above remarks by the U. Sexpert were taken seriously by theConference of Government Experts, by the ICRC, and b y theDepartment of Defense. I t IS expected that in the second ICRCConference of Government Experts which will meet in Genevathe U S delegation will proposea study of rules and guidelines under which battlefield medical evacuation may be taken with greatlyreduced danger of misidentificationand attack.

The Distinctive SignalEssential to any system for theContinued on page 5


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backbone of the fleet. After dropping troops into a rice field nearBien Hoa, Huey crews cover their advance into dense jungle to hunt VC

t takes a great deal of time totranslate increased pilot objectivesinto deployable aviators. A leadtime of 15 to 18 months is requiredto recruit, train and deploy aviatorsafter a decision to increase traininghas been made. Furthermore, inorder to increase aviator production, training bases must be expanded and aviators must be diverted into the base to function asinstructors. These aviators wouldotherwise be available for earlydeployment.

At the outset it was readily apparent that the aviator personnelprogram must be closely managedto ensure maximum utilization ofthe force. This rquirement fell primarily to the Executive for ArmyAviation OPXAA) within theOfficer Personnel Directorate. (Alldata discussed in this article wasobtained from this office.) Severalactions were taken at the Department of the Army level to minimize10

the problems associated with therapid expansion and the resultantaviator shortage.First, the policy of a I-year tourin Vietnam and Korea was to becontinued. There also would be aminimum of 12 months betweenVietnam tours with the ultimateobjective of attaining a 25-monthturnaround interval.Second, a worldwide rotationalbase was established and all stabilized tours were eliminated with theexception of the aviation trainingbases. Instructor pilots assigned tothe various training bases were re

tained onstation for 18 months toprovide a degree of utilization after they had received instructortraining. The only exception to thisrule were aviators who had notserved in Vietnam or those volunteering for Vietnam. Aviators inthese categories were stabilized foronly 12 months.Third, nonaviation or ground

duty assignments for commissionedofficer aviators below the grade olieutenant colonel were suspendedalong with reductions in militaryand civil schooling for aviatorsThose on such assignments werconsidered a part of the supplemental force or reservoir of aviators available for assignment tomeet contingency requirements.Fourth, there was a worldwidedraw-down of aviators to supporVietnam. In some cases commandswere reduced to as low as 10 percent of their total aviator authorizations.

The requisitioning authority foeach command was reviewed andrevised quarterly by OPXAA whichprovided increases in commandmanning levels as rapidly as resources and priorities permittedRequisitions were closely monitored to assure fill action providedfor an adequate mix of aviationqualifications based upon the asU. S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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sets available for assignment thenumber and type aircraft within thecommand and the established priority of fill action for the requisitioning command. In this regard aliberal policy of branch and gradesubstitution was pursued in orderto assure the greatest amount offlexibility in meeting the desiredskill requirement and to providefor equity of assignment.

A fifth action taken at DA levelwas to deploy the maximum number of aviation units as quickly aspossible and to attain a I-year interval between short tour areas.Vietnam was manned at only 90percent of its aviator authorizationwhile most other combat unitsmaintained over 100 percentstrength. Therefore it was not uncommon for some aviation units toperiodically operate at strengthsas low as 65 .percent of authorization. This occurred because thereare always a number of people whoare not available for duty due toabsences caused by wounds accidents sickness leave rest and recuperation details and the like. Asa result many aviators were required to fly a significant numberof combat hours above the 9hours maximum recommended fora 30-day period.

Sixth aviators were assigned topositions for which a lower gradewas authorized. This permitted additional flexibility of assignments.Lieutenant colonels often f i l l ~lower ranking positions and all majors through warrant officers wereconsidered as cockpit aviators. Atpeak strength Vietnam had over200 lieutenant colonel aviators ofwhich over 1 ) ) were filling lowerranking positions. This also resulted in some aviation companies

A worldwide drawdown of aviators wasnecessary to support Vietnam. A CH-S4AFlying Crane lifts a 6 ton 1 mm how-itzer on a 27 mile trip to the Mekong Delta

JUNE 1972

authorized one major as commanding officer deploying to Vietnamwith over 3 majors assigned. Inaddition many aviation positionsfor which rated personnel were notabsolutely essential were filled withnonrated officers. This depleted theexpertise available in the unit andundoubtedly injected a measure ofdegradation in the overall effectiveness of the unit; however itprovided increased flexibility andfilled many positions which otherwise might have remained vacant.

After initiation of the buildup in1965 many other problems had tobe resolved in order to accommodate the growing number of aviators and to sustain the force in Vietnam. One of the major difficultiesencountered was simply attempting to put a handle on this explosive hitherto small branchoriented force. Data concerningaviator skills assignments availability aircraft qualifications andinnumerable other items were required to properly manage thesecritical assets. t was found that thebasic information available on thecentral data files was often incomplete or in error and could not be

entirely relied upon as the basis forsignificant decisions or projections.One of the primary areas of concern was the requirement to project the time between repetitivetours so that it would not drop below the minimum 12-month tour

interval. This was necessary to determine fill dates for activatingunits and to ensure that sufficientaviators were available to satisfyother Vietnam replacement andunprogramed loss requirements.Initial efforts in this area werehandwritten flow chart incorporating the best available data on information such as anticipatedavailability dates retention ratesaviation school output Vietnamand other short tour personnel requirements stabilized training basetours combat loss rates and projected nondeployables. The information was continually refined andthe U. S. Army Behavioral Research Laboratory developed acomputer rotational model fromthis basic data. This model eventually proved to be so accurate thatrequisitions for Vietnam replacements were actually validated fromContinued on page 8


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o

K- -----

M

EXAMINATION -Eleven Simple Questions To Boggle Your Mind's Eye1. Are the two horizontal lines acrossthe eyes at the top of the page straightlines?2. In the letter 'T' of Visual whichline is the continuation of C, A or B?3. Are the parts under the U's inVisual Illusions equal in size to thosein the bottom of the ''U's'' or larger?4. Are the long lines surrounding theA and L of Visual parallel?12

S. Which I in the word Illusions istaller?6. Looking at the "L's" in Illusionswhich is greater, the distance from thetop of the band to the top of the hat(JK), or the distance across the brim(LM)? '7. Which circles look bigger, the innerones (P) of Visual or the inner ones (Q)of Illusions?8. f you move the page in a circular

motion. do the 0 and last S of Illusions rotate?9. Is the cross piece (XY) of the N iIllusions shorter than the line YZ?10. Are the dot on the I of Visuaand the dot of the exclamation point athe end of Illusions two dimensional othree dimensional figures?11. In the bar of the exclamation at thend of Illusions do you see two profileor one vase?

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ONUS QUESTION

WHICH P ST IS TALLEST

JUNE 1972

Major Nicholas E Barreca M.D.

Provided by the Society 0U S. rmy Flight Surgeons

RE THE EYES truly capableof seeing? Can they be accurately depended upon? Is whatyou see really what you get, toquote a recent quip? Usually yesSometimes no From the preceding little test, perhaps you've become more cautious? (With theaid of a ruler most of the realanswers can be determined.)

Sometimes then, the objects weview are influenced by their surroundings. Take a look at the"moon-rise." Early, just abovethe horizon, among the housetops, skyline or mountains, itlooks quite large. Hours later,brighter, it looks quite small, surrounded by the void of space. fmeasured by a ruler or sextant, onewould see that its size was equalin both instances.Consider a group of individualswitnessing an accident, some havediffering vantage points, others thesame. How many varied accountsdoes an accident investigator hearabout? Many to be sure, but why?Haven' t all seen the s me accident?Most certainly, but each has seenit from a slightly different angle,some perhaps with a slightly oreven markedly different surroundor background. Each witness invests his account with his individual knowledge, experience andability to understand what he has

13


16/68


17/68

to move backward to the path ofmotion and far ones seem to movewith it.Most of the clues to depth perception require the use of centralvision and good illumination. Asnight falls so does depth. Thusnight brings with it many illusions.Since depth perception is a complex process, one can expect thatillusions would be commonly associated. The common landing illusions of runway width, slope andother conditions have been previously discussed for both fixed

( Aeromedic-Visual Illusions,May 1971 DIGEST) and rotary( Aeromedic-Look Out Below,August 1971 DIGEST) wing aircraft. These are by far the mostcommon and complex of the visualillusions.There are a series of other visualillusions that we must also beconcerned with. Remember thatvision is a strong stimulus to orien-

JUNE 1972

tation. When clues to orientationare scarce, our eyes can easilydeceive us even in daylight, evenmore so at night. Let's considersome of the more common illusions, some of which you may haveexperienced: False horizons (see figure 1).This is an illusion experiencedwhen objects other than the actualhorizon are interpreted to be horizontal. For example, an aircraftflying between two cloud banksmay be flown in relationship tothe lower cloud bank because thepilot feels that the lower cloudbank is horizontal. In actuality thelower cloud may be at an angle tothe horizon. The plane then flieswith a wing low. Confusion o ground lightswith stars Many pilots have puttheir aircraft into very unusual attitudes in order to keep someground lights above them, havingmistaken them for stars (see fig

Figure

ure 2). Less frequent, but just asdangerous, the illusions caused bycertain patterns of ground lightsare imagined to be things whichthey are not. Some pilots, for example, have misinterpreted thelights along the seashore as beingthe horizon, maneuvering their aircraft dangerously close to the seawhile under the impression offlying straight and level (see figure3). Pilots have also confused certain geometric patterns of groundlights such as moving trains withrunway and approach lights andhave been badly shaken by theirnear misses. A utokinetic illusion (see figure 4). Autokinesis or the autokinetic illusion is the illusory phenomenon of movement which astatic light exhibits when stared atfor a long enough time in the darkness. The phenomenon can bereadily observed by taking a lightedcigarette into a completely dark

15


18/68

VISUAL ILLUSIONSroom and staring at it until thelight appears to move. The apparent movement will begin afterapproximately 8 to 1 seconds.The cause is unknown but appearsto be related to the fact that theeyes are unable to remain fixed ona single light view against a darkbackground. The illusion can beeliminated by visual scanning byincreasing the number of lights onaircraft or by varying the light intensity. This illusion is not exclusively limited to lights in darkness. It can occur whenever asmall bright still object is staredat against a dull dark or indescriptbackground. Place a pink-coloreddot about 3 inches in diameter onthe chalkboard in class. Have yourclassmates stare at the dot. Eventually you will see it move. Flyingover still water toward a raft could

produce such an illusion. Fixingon a marker in the snow couldproduce similar results. Size and distance illusion

The size-distance illusion resultsfrom staring at a point of lightwhich approaches and recedes fromthe observer. In the absence ofadditional distance clues accuratedepth perception is extremely difficult. Instead of seeing the lightadvancing and receding the pilothas the illusion that it is expandingand contracting at a fixed distancefrom him. This illuc;;ion may alsobe dispelled by continually shiftingthe gaze. Relative motion This illusion is similar to a person sittingin a car waiting for a train to pass.The train is actually moving butthe person in the car has the sensation that he is moving. This is

Figure

often encountered by a pilot iformation flight. He sees motion ohis wingman or leader and interprets that motion as his own. Thonly way to manage this illusiois for the pilot to be experiencedenough to understand that suchillusions do occur and not to reacto them on the controls. A misinterpretation of relative motiocan also take place when two aircraft showing lights are ahead oan observer and are rapidly separating. The illusion that one aircraft is approaching the other mayoccur. Finally an illusion of turning can be produced in straightlevel and parallel formation flighwhen the aircraft involved are flying at different speeds. Reversible perspective illusion An aircraft may appear to bdeparting when it is in fact approaching. This illusion is oftenprofound when a visually acquiredaircraft is turning toward or away



19/68

igure3

JUNE 972

igure4

The autokinetic effectis less :

The greater the brightnessof the light

The greater the sizeof the light

The greater the numberof lights

7


20/68

VISU L ILLUSIONS illusions, however, such phenomenon may certainly be distracting,irritating or annoying to some aircrewmen.rom your path of flight. Part ofthis phenomenon may be due torelative motion. A ltered planes of reference.

In this illusion there is an apparenttendency to climb as an aircraftapproaches a line of mountains orclouds, even though altitude isadequate for clearance. The reverse is true when leaving such aline. In flying parallel to a line ofclouds there is a tendency to tiltaway Structural illusions. Structural illusions are caused by heatwaves, rain, snow, sleet or other

disturbances of the air mediathrough which we see. For example, a straight line may appearcurved as seen through the heatwave of the desert. As seen throughslanting rain or .sleet, a singlewingtip light may appear to thepilot as a double light or not inthe location it actually is throughthe reflection. epth perception illusion.Day and night flying over desert,

snow or water are characterized byinadequate visual reference points.This results in poor or diminisheddepth perception and consequentlypotentially dangerous situations.This is a special hazard to helicopter pilots during night autorotations. The ground appears furtheraway in these instances. Haze canproduce a similar illusion. The useof polaroid lenses over water reduces reflections from the surface.This too could give one the impression that they were higher upthan actually so. Water has claimedmany an aviator, perhaps somewith polaroid sunglasses. Fascination fixat ion) in fly-ing. Fascination is said to occurwhen a pilot for one reason oranother ignores orientation clues

while his attention is focused onsome other object or goal. Target18

hypnosis is a common type offascination and is characterized bythe incidents that occur when pilotsbecome so intent upon hitting theirtargets during gunnery that theyneglect to pull up in time to preventcrashing into the target. Perhapsthe dual pilo t gunner stations ofour HueyCobra system are a necessary safety feature. Other types offascination are associated withwheels-up landings, rigid fixationon the lead aircraft during formation flight and overconcentrationon one instrument during blindflight.

Effects of flicker vertigo. Thepossibility that flickering lights inthe range of 4 to 30 cycles persecond) might cause disturbingsymptoms including rare seizureepisodes has been examined. Todate few, if any, have been documented as caused by flickeringrotor blade interrupted light. I t isunlikely that flickering light of thistype produces very many profound

Regardless of these recognizedvisual illusions, vision is still themost trustworthy sense of balance.One must learn to realize the minorlimitations of the visual sense andcompensate for known conditionsthat predispose to illusions. Whenever the eyes seem to be playingtricks, the time for careful reexamination, mi ssed approach orinstrument flight is recommended .The s v ~ t e m doesn't oftenfool us twice. With increased concentration and purposeful pursuitof additional clues, orientation isrecovered. Future Army aviationaircraft and missions will tax man'sof orientation to the limit.The pursuit of a mid to high intensity conflict, with nap-of-the-earth flying, pop-up engagement .. concealment by night, weather . .all impossible without reliable visual surveillance and acquisitiontechniques . . . these will be thevisual challenges of t o m o r r o w ~

INSTRUMENT ORNER When p _ _ IFR fll . . . ' deltlttatlon to alternateal .... dl and .st IMe . . . , . . . f t I ) computecI

from tJae lnatlon point or h n athe point of natlon of . . . . . . . . . . . approacl l procedure?A. I t is recommended to compute mileage and BTE to altemateairfield from the destination airfield missed approach point to thetermination of the missed approach procedure, ttten setectod routingto the alternate airfield.TM 1-225, appendix c page c-3 para.gnl.ph 1(3) states, "Computethe ETE to the alteniate airfield from the destination or otherposition aloDg the ftight path." This is general in nature, however, i tshould be noted that planning to the alternate airfield is mentioJJ.ed andnot to a fix serving the alternate airfield.The use of the above procedure would include planning for anmown or foreseen delays. Reserve fne1 is for unforeseen circum-stances.TltotOuah ttiPt planning for the proposed fti. bt should prepare thepilot to recoJDizo when ho can accept deviations in routing or earoutedelays at ATe

U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


21/68

What, When,

Where, How?The author relates the obiectives of Army-wide NCOES and in detailhow the program will enrich the careers of enlisted men in the airtraffic management field . . . basic NCOES ATM courses are being initiated at the Aviation School, Ft. Rucker, on the 26th of this month.Advanced NCOES programs are scheduled to begin early in 1973

TH NONCOMMISSIONEDOfficer Education System(NCOES) will become a realityfor the air traffic managementcareer field this year at the U. S.Army Aviation School USAAVNS), Ft. Rucker, AL.The NCOES concept has developed from recommendations for

an enlisted career education system proposed by the enlisted gradestructure study conducted byDCSPER, Department of theArmy, in July 1967. The plan ofthe NCOES program is to revitalizethe Army s noncommissioned offi

Lieutenant Colonel ody L Williams

cer corps and lead it to a high levelof professionalism through militaryeducation.Military occupational specialties(MOSs) within the air traffic management career field are: 93H ATC Tower Operator, 93J ATC Ground ControlledApproach GCA), 93K ATC Enroute Specialist, 93D Flight Simulator Operator and 71P Flight Operations Coordinator.Three levels-basic, advancedand senior-are being developed toprovide continuity through all

NCO grades. The Aviation School sDepartment of Nonresident Instruction also is planning to prepare correspondence courses whichwill parallel the NCOES air trafficmanagement series.The Aviation School s basic levelcourses are for NCOs and specialists in grades E-4 and E-5 toprepare them for duties appropriate to grades E-5 , E-6 and E-7.Additionally a limited 12-monthpilot test of selected regular ArmyE-3s directly from advanced individual training AIT) has beenapproved.Advanced level courses also are

NCOES ELIGIBILITY BV GRADE LENGTH OF SERVICEc::=J Advanced

rr mmOBasic

E 2 ~ ~ - - - - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - - - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - - - 4 - 4 - 4 - ~E l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ L L L L ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ L L ~ L ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~o 5 10 15 20 25 30Vears of Service

JUNE 1972 19


22/68

NCOES-BASIC LEVEL OBJECTIVES To prepare selected enlisted men in grades of E.3, E4 and E5 to perform duty

as noncommissioned officers in the grades of E.5, E6 and E7 To train in appropriate supervisory skills To develop a willingness to assume responsibilities and the confidence to apply technical knowledge To instill a feeling of dignity and a sense of duty and obligation for service

BASIC LEVEL MULTITRACK OURSE DESIGNPhase I Y Phase IICareer Management Training)

(Common to all)Essential and selected Training 93H K

Course length

being implemented by the Aviation School to train E-6s and E-7 sin duties applicable to grades E-8and -9.The senior level course has beenapproved in concept only at thiswriting.The basic level course objective

is training designed to prepare theselected individual to perform ata high degree relative to his grade.The student will learn to use appropriate supervisory skills anddevelop a willingness to assumeresponsibilities with the confidenceto apply technical knowledge. Indoing this he will gain a feelingof dignity and a sense of duty andobligation for service.Training will be conductedwithin the MOS or Army CareerManagement Field ACMF) context to qualify individuals to command comparatively small groupsof enlisted personnel of similarMOS or of the same or similarACMF. Training will be orientedto appropriate MOS qualificationat the 4 skill level.Emphasis during training will betoward basic leadership skills andknowledge of those military subjects required to effectively command enlisted personnel at theteam, squad, section or comparablelevel.20

93J

The air traffic managementcourses will be developed on themulti-track concept and the organizational concept will be considered as two phases:Phase I-Training Sul1jects

a) Essential trainingb) Selected trainingPhase II-Career ManagementTrainingPhase I will be given concurrently to all MOSs. In this phase

training encompasses that instruction essential for each soldier toperform the minimum duties of hisprofession. The selected trainingcategory includes those subjectswhich DA or CONARC havedesignated for special emphasis.Most training subjects are includedin this category and will be taughtat the discretion of the School commandant, as developed by the systems engineering process.Phase II training will be taught

along the lines of career management in the same or a related MOS.The ATC management field is being developed to provide 93J training for the 93Hs and Ks and 93Htraining for the 93Js. Selected93Ds and 71Ps will receive special71 P training to provide the necessary phaseover of the 93D to the71 P field at a later date. This will

930 71P

also bridge the wide gap of the 71Parea from the 71 P20 level to the71 P50 level.

The course length will vary according to the involvement of thecareer management training, however, CONARC guidelines are forthe courses to be between 8 to 12weeks. The individual will begranted TDY by his commandefor the purpose of attending thecourse and will return to his formerunit when he completes it.NCOES selection procedureswill be through unit commandersThey must ensure that enlisted personnel with potential leadershipqualities are identified and programed into the basic course at theappropriate point in their careersPrerequisites are that the individual be an enlisted member othe active Army or of a ReserveComponent in grade E-4 or E-5The candidate must have alreadydemonstrated leadership potentiafor middle grade noncommissionedofficer positions. Selected E-3spossessing outstanding potential asidentified during AIT will fill approximately 25 percent of theavailable quotas for the courseEach selectee must be MOS quali

fied in an MOS served by thepertinent course. The service reU. S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


23/68

maining requirement upon completion of the course will be in accordance with paragraph 11-2, AR614-200.

The promotion policy for theNCOES basic course provides foran individual s promotion byschool commandants to grade ~ 5for academic achievement, provided he graduates number one inthe class and is in grade E-4 atthe time. An E-3 attending thebasic level course will be promoted to E-4 on satisfactory completion.The award of 42 promotionpoints for successful completion ofthe basic NCOES course has beenannounced for all personnel. The

multitrack ACMF courses are notMOS producing or ASI awarding.Rather they are career courses asdefined in AR 351-1.The objectives of the advancedNCOES program are: To prepareselected enlisted personnel ingrades E-6 and E-7 to performduty as noncommissioned officersin the grades of E-8 and E-9; totrain them in appropriate supervisory skills; to increase bothskills and confidence; and to instill a sense of pride and esprit decorps.Emphasis in the advancedcourse will be on leadership skillsand knowledge of subjects requiredto effectively perform duties asfirst sergeant, sergeant major, staff

sergeant major, or comparablenoncommissioned officer duties atthe company, battalion, brigade orequal level of homogeneous units.This training will be oriented onthe appropriate arm, service orACMF to produce ultracompetentsenior noncommissioned officers.

The emphasis during trainingwill be on the philosophy underlying Army objectives and Armysystems. Training will be directedtoward a firm comprehension ofthe noncommissioned officer s rolein combat, combat support andcombat service support units.The advanced air traffic management courses will be developedalong the same multitrack conceptas the basic.Phase I-Career SubjectsPhase II-MOS Skill Subjects93L50, 71P50)Phase I will be taught concurrently to both MOSs with Phaseseparating into the career management field of the ATC facility chiefand flight operations sergeant.The length of the advancedcourse will vary according to theinvolvement of the career management training. t will follow thesame guidelines as for the basic;i.e., 8 to 12 weeks in duration.Selection procedures, to be developed by the Department of the.Army, will ensure that noncommissioned officers with the highestperformance potential are pro-

gramed into the advanced NCOEScourses as part of the centralizedcareer management function. Selection and quotas will be on abest qualified basis and will becontrolled by DA.Prerequisites will require thatan enlisted member: be in the active Army or in aReserve Component in the grade ofE-6 or E-7 with not more than15 years of service; possess leadership potential; have a minimum service remaining upon completion of thecourse in accordance with paragraph 11-2. R 614-200; and be MOS qualified in one ofthe feeder MOSs to the pertinentcourse.Although no promotion pointswill be given at this time) for attendance to the advanced NCOEScourse, it is probable that personnelwill not advance beyond gradeE-7 without having completed thiscourse.The basic NCOES course will beinitiated this year, the first classscheduled to start on 26 June. Theadvanced NCOES program isslated to begin during the thirdquarter of fiscal year 1973. Withthe implementation of theseNCOES courses, NCO educationaland professional development willbe placed in its proper perspectivein developing a truly professionalcorps of noncommissioned officers.

NCOES-ADVANCED L V L OBJECTIVES

JUNE 1972

To prepare selected enlisted personnel in grades of E 6 and E 7 to perform duty asnoncommissioned officers in the grades of E 8 and E 9 To train in appropriate supervisory skills To increase skills, confidence and a sense of pride esprit de corps

DV NCED L V L MULTITR CK COURSE DESIGNPhase I

(Common to all)Career subjects

Course length

Phase IIMOS skill subjects

93L50

71P50

21


24/68

Horizontal Enrichmentn improved educational program is a major accomplishmentespecially when it can be implemented with existing facilities.The viation Maintenance Officers Course conducted by the FtEustis viation Maintenance Training Department has come up

with su h an improvement. Entitled horizontal enrichment the pro-gram exempts the experienced student from having to sit throughclasses covering material with which he is already well versed

T H AIRCRAFT MaintenanceOfficers' Course AMOC) atFt. Eustis, VA, has long presenteda problem to the developers of theprogram of instruction of thecourse. t is open to commissionedand warrant officers, and it is notunusual to find a second lieutenantfresh from his basic course sittingbeside a W-3 who has over 15years of aircraft maintenance experience. A W-l just out of flightschool may find that he is in a classwith a major who has had maintenance company command time.The problem is in the developmentof a universal program of instruction that would benefit all.

How does one present instruction in the T-53 turbine engine toa class in which at one end of thespectrum there are people whoaren't even sure what a turbineengine is, while at the other extreme there may well be peoplewho contributed through EIRs andDA Form 2028s material whichhas subsequently been incorporated into the instruction itself?

The answer may lie in self-pace.Self-paced education is the darlingof academicians today. Articles

CW3 Robert R Vaughan Jr

appear in educational journals,learned scholars attend seminarsand educators appear on radio andtelevision talk shows to discuss itsmerits. t is not a panacea but itdoes offer many exciting possibilities.There are many avenues whichself-paced instruction can take.The most ideal path is to presentthe instruction in such a fashionas to allow the individual studentto control the rate. Like a selffeeder in a poultry operation, everykernel of education absorbed is replaced immediately by a new kernel, and the rate of replacementis controlled solely by the rate ofstudent absorption. This can bevery sloW or very fast withoutsacrificing the total, and the endresult is identical knowledge garnered by all students fast and slowalike.

The obvious advantage to thissystem is that it prevents the fastt u e n t s from becoming bored byredundancy and allows the slowstudents to take as much time as isrequired to ensure mastery of eachcubject.But there are disadvantages.

One disadvantage is in the fact thatoutside of mastering the subjectearly, there is no program of en-ri hment beyond the total learnedby the whole class. And completingthe class ahead of the program isnot always advantageous in theArmy, since in a recent experimentwith the project at one Armyservice school those who finishedup to 2 weeks early were givenadditional duties such as cuttingthe grass in order to make workand keep them busy. This is hardlyan incentive for fast learning.Another disadvantage of thisprogram is the equipment requiredto make it truly effective. Individualized booths, programed textsand teaching aids, such as selfregulated video tapes and computerresponses to student efforts andinquiries, would create the optimum teaching situation. And, thisequipment would require a budgetof fantastic proportions.A second path of self-pace is aprogram which takes into consideration the disadvantages of thefirst and effects a compromise. tis a program of vertical enrichment. Vertical enrichment elimi-



25/68

nates to some extent the requirement for the equipment by actingas an adjunct to more conventional instruction. But, just asin the ideal self-paced programit recognizes the fast learner, thusproviding enrichment beyond thatreceived by the overall class.For example: The class receivesinstruction on the aforementionedT 53 engine. The class learns thatit is a turbine engine, that it usesa special oil and fuel, and that itis utilized on various models of theUH 1 Huey helicopter and theOV 1 Mohawk airplane. The fastlearner will advance into the various components of the engine andbe given a much more indepthknowledge. t is knowledge beyondthat required for the bare completion of the course but definitely anenrichment for the student. He isprovided the instruction throughextracurricular handout material,such as programed texts, etc. Sincethe participation is much smallerthe amount of equipment requiredis greatly reduced.JUNE 1972

As you can see, there are severaladvantages here. There is the prevention of boredom for the faststudent while still allowing theaverage, and the slightly belowaverage, student time to absorb thematerial required to reach the classgoal. And, it solves the problem ofwhat to do with the fast studentwho would find himself with timeon his hands (and possibly a lawnmower in them) by completing thecourse earlier than scheduled.Finally, it provides enrichment forthe fast student above the classgoal.But, and this is the major drawback of this system, the enrichment is gained by the participantonly. The ideal solution would beone in which there is enrichmentnot only for the participant but alsofor the entire class. An example ofthis is in the old oral book-reportconcept of grade school. Johnny isgiven a book report requirementand he selects Farmer Brown sWonderful Garden Pets or something similar perhaps two grades

below the class reading level. Andrew, on the other hand, selectsGulliver s Travels. The class isthus enriched by the oral book report rendered by Andrew. Although Andrew was the biggestgainer, the rest of the class benefited from the fruits of his labor.And that leads us to the methodof self-pace instruction being usedin the AMOC the method referred to as horizontal enrichment.Horizontal enrichment has allthe advantages of vertical enrichment, but it also benefits the othermembers of the class as well asthe participant. t derives the termhorizontal from the fact that theprogram in which the advancedlearner participates is an adjunctprogram to, and not a building onof, the basic instruction.

In the strictest sense the horizontal enrichment program asconducted by the Aviation Maintenance Training Department is nota self-paced program of the standard type. t is, instead, a programwhich is designed to relieve the23


26/68

experienced student from the necessity of having to sit throughclasses in the areas in which he hasexpertise rather than accelerate therapid learner through them.As the AMOC students arrive

they are asked to fill out background sheets with particular emphasis being placed on their priorexperience in maintenance in threesubject matters: UH-l, CH-47and fixed wing. These backgroundsheets are studied by faculty members and those who show sufficientbackground are tested in their fieldof expertise. An exceptionallywell-rounded student may be testedin all three subjects.)The validation tests are designed

to authenticate the student's experience. They are given during thestudent's first introductory hour tothe technical subjects phase ofAMOC and graded immediately sothat the students may have the results as quickly as possible.

Once the student's experiencehas been validated and he is accepted as a candidate, he is giventhe opportunity to select a projectwhich he may develop in lieu ofattending classes in the subjectmatter in which he was found to beexceptionally qualified. The projects are varied; the only requirement is that it relate strongly to thesubject in which the student wasvalidated.Every effort has been made toprovide maximum assistance to thestudent during his project. He isgiven access to the TransportationSchool Library which has exceptionally fine technical materialavailable. He is provided with aquiet room and encouraged tomake telephone calls to researchhis proiect to USAAAVS (formerly USABAAR , Bell or Vertolhelicopter companies, or anyplacenecessary. He is provided with aliaison officer who will give allthe assistance of the Aviation Maintenance Training Department. Heis relieved from classes during the24

period of instruction covering hisfield and is left to his own devices,working with assistance when requested but without supervision.Just exactly what type of projects do the students select?The first one dealt with theUH-l input quill oil seal and thestudent participant made contactwith the factory engineers at theBell helicopter plant as well asother agencies concerned. He presented the findings of his projectin the form of a staff study, andthen gave an .oral presentation tothe rest of the class, thus providingclass enrichment from his project.This student also made a video tapewhich has been shown to subsequent classes, providing additionalenrichment even beyond the original ~ c o p e Many of the students'projects are of a nature that wouldbe of interest to people throughoutArmy aviation and, thus they arebeing encouraged to develop theirworks into articles for the AVIA

TION DIGEST.How does the student participant in the program fare in hisacademic career achievement? Inparticular, what about the honorgraduate? f he is relieved fromtaking the exam in his area ofexpertise, then he may be penalized

~ j n c e this exam obviously standsto best improve his overall average.The honor graduate system ofrecognizing the student whoachieves a grade average score ofone-hundredth of a point higherthan his nearest competitor is asystem of questionable value but,nonetheless, one to which the Armyis inexorably committed. Becauseof this the participant in the horizontal enrichment program is giventwo options: he may take the examoffered covering his area of expertise, or he may have his projectscore fed back into the system aspart of his course grade. He mayeven take the exam and do theproiect. then select the higherscore. The hope is however. that

participation in the program will initself ~ s s u m e a status comparablewith that of being an honor graduate.There are many advantages tothis program, not the least of which

is economics. In a time of tightening budgets, an innovative educational OrOQTam which can be implemented with existing facilities is amajor accomplishment in itself.Of course there are disadvantages to this system. But no goodpurpose is served in belaboring thedisadvantages. Rather, we shouldbe concerned with the existingfaults in the administration of theprogram with emphasis on whataction is required to correct these

faults.The greatest shortcoming of theexisting system is the method ofvalidation. As it stands now thevalidation tests are merely vehiclesto judge recall. Rote memory stimulation of obscure facts and figuresgive only a very poor indication ofthe candidate's actual knowledge.A system of validation is neededwhich can provide us with acceptable candidates without having torely on the flash card memory system of testing. But this requirementis recognized and an improvedvalidation system is being activelysought by the administrators of theprogram.

The other problem currentlyfacing the candidate is the lack ofawareness of the program throughout the Army and the aviation industry. Until there is completeawareness of the program, reactionto the student's inquiries and requests is not as comprehensive asmight be desired. This is a problemthat will be alleviated, however, asthe program becomes betterknown.With the development of thehorizontal enrichment program theU. S. Army Transportation Schoolat Ft. Eustis continues to live upto its motto: Through LearningWe Progress In science, progress.

U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


27/68

Thai They May iveContinued rom pageprotection of medical evacuationis a universally accepted system ofidentification which is commensurate with the capability of weaponssystems to engage and destroy aircraft.Fortunately the InternationalCivil viation OrganizationICAO) has developed and prescribed air traffic control A TC)systems and equipment in usewherever civil aviation flies Thusthe basic systems and hardwareare available off the shelf to mostcountries. A very much improvedand feasible universal identificationsystem can be devised using existing ICAO air traffic control procedures and equipment.

The basic guidelines for the identification systems which are to beproposed by the U S delegationinclude: Medical aircraft should beequipped with very high frequencyVHF) and ultra high frequencyUHF) radios. Using internationaldistress frequencies to be allocatedby the International Telecommunication Union, radio links may be

used to communicate with ATCand with the adverse party givingverbal identification and intentions. Visual identification signals toinclude 1) the conspicuous displayof the distinctive Red Cross emblem on a white field and 2) flashing blue lights, or some otherequally effective light system, whichshould double or triple the rangeat which medical aircraft can beidentified by visual means.

A beacon transponder, similarto the equipment now used byICAO A TC. As a basis for identification procedures internationalstandards and practices containedin Volume I of Annex 10 to theConvention on International CivilAviation should be used. This involves the transmission of anagreed mode 3A code reserved formedical aircraft which can be received and identified by ATCground radars and military groundbased radars. Medical aircraft equipped withthe above-mentioned means ofcommunication shall be given a

common call sign to be used as aprefix to the aircraft number. Acollective international call signshould be approved and assignedby the International Telecommunications Union. In order to accommodate theidentification system to changingtechnology, a standing joint international civilian-military authorityshould be established. The groupshould be empowered with authority and means for recommendingto the appropriate agencies the revision and improvement of existinghumanitarian air ambulance procedures.The Concept of The U. S DraftProtocol include:

Protected aircraft are any belonging to or under the control ofthe military service of a party toconflict whenever used solely in theperformance of a medical mission.These aircraft may be permanentdedicated medical aircraft whichare protected at all times, or theymay be temporary medical aircraftprotected only while performing amedical mission. They may beowned by military services, international organizations or civil airlines, but they must be controlledby the military service of a party toa conflict. Temporary medical aircraft may display the Red Crossemblem and transmit the distinctive signal only while performing amedical mission. The safety of medical aircraftengaged in battlefield evacuationcan never be absolute, yet the lifesaving potential of prompt evacuation from the battlefield is so greatthat risks involved should be takenif the risk of misidentification canbe reduced to acceptable limits bythe use of improved identificationsystems.Recognition of the need to provide for protection to temporary

The versatile UH-l Huey has beenthe backbone of battlefield aeromedical evacuations in Vietnam

25


28/68

medical aircraft involves particularrisk of abuse in the battle area. Ahelicopter is probably most vulnerable as it is lifting off Thus an enemy may be particularly suspiciousif a helicopter lands at a fire baseloaded with supplies and replacements and then quickly convertsitself to a medical aircraft evacuating wounded.Accordingly, the U S proposeddraft provides, Aircraft operatingin areas in which opposing groundcombat forces are in hostile contact with each other shall benefitfrom the respect and protectionextended to medical aircraft only

if they serve as such both in approaching and departing from suchareas and during their stay in suchareas.26

In order to be protected, themedical aircraft must conspicuously display the distinctive emblem. ffeasible, it should also transmit thedistinctive light or radar transponder beacon signal.The UHF and VHF international distress frequencies reservedfor the use of communications relative to medical aircraft provide achannel of communication underwhich those employing the aircraftcan, if they wish, notify the enemyof information which will aid in theidentification of medical aircraftoperating in the combat zone.Medical aircraft operating inbattle areas must conform to guidelines applicable to all medical aircraft. These include, medical aircraft [which] shall be neither armed

In Vietnam aeromedical evacuation helicopters have saved tens of thousands of livethrough the rapid evacuation of woundedirectly from battlefield to surgical hospitanor reconnaissance configured andshall contain no armament othethan small arms and ammunitionbelonging to the wounded and sick. . . and such small arms as may bnecessary to permit the medicapersonnel and crew members toprotect themselves and thewounded and sick.As far as is practicable undethe circumstances, the medical mission shall be performed in suchplaces and in such a manner as tominimize the risk that the conducof hostilities by combatants mayimperil the safety of medical aircraft.The last mentioned provision irecognition of the principle that although medical aircraft and medical personnel may not be the objecof attack, they are not protecteagainst the danger of incidentadamage resulting from an attacagainst a military target if they artoo close to that target. t is moreover forbidden to use military aircraft as a shield to protect a military target.The most difficult problem oproviding legal protection for medical aircraft is the determination ocircumstances under which protected overflight across enemy territory is to be permitted and, if soa determination of the guidelineto prevent abuse. Although rarethe problem must be faced in relation to-evacuating wounded from besieged area or an established airhead.The present law prohibits sucoverflight unless agreed otherwise. The U S proposal does norequire express agreement but ieffect a tacit agreement as to flighplan for overflight results.

The U. S draft provides thamedical aircraft shall continue tenjoy the respect and protectiounder the protocol while flyinU. S RMY AVIATION DIGEST


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over territory physically under thecontrol of an adverse party. Theparty controlling the aircraft, how-ever, has the burden of complyingwith certain specific procedures.The key procedure is The partyemploying medical aircraft shallprovide to the party physically incontrol of the territory over whichthe medical aircraft will fly timelynotification, including the follow-ing: The aircraft involved are med-ical aircraft; The description and numberof aircraft involved; The time, altitude, and routeof travel of the aircraft, and Any other information whichwill aid in the identification of theaircraft.

The party physically in controlof the territory will cknowl-edge receipt of the information . . .and may require reasonable alter-native altitudes and routes of travel,and the party employing medi-cal aircraft shall comply with suchrequirement.The foregoing provisions reallyamount to prescribing a procedurewhereby a flight plan is tacitlyagreed on using international dis-tress frequency radio channels re-served for this purpose. BecauseJUNE 1972

timely evacuation may be para-mount, the adverse party must per-mit the flight at the time prescribed,although it may vary the altitudeand route.Other measures calculated toprevent abuse, and induce tacit per-mission for such overflight are: Medical aircraft, while en-gaged in such overflights, shall notcarry cameras or other intelligence-gathering equipment or intelligencepersonnel (other than those whoare wounded and sick). Overflying medical aircraftmay be ordered to land for inspec-tion and they are required to com-ply with such order. If inspectionestablishes that it is in fact medicalaircraft it shall be permitted to con-tinue its mission. On the otherhand, if inspection shows that theaircraft is guilty of a violation itmay be seized and the crew andpassengers would be treated asprisoners of war or in accordanceto whatever status they are en-titled under the 1949 Geneva Con-ventions.On 29 November 1971 AdmiralAlan B. Shepard, U. S. represen-tative, addressed the Human RightsCommittee of the United NationsGeneral Assembly on HumanRights in Armed Conflicts. In part

he said, Experience in recent con-flicts shows that there is a greatenhancement of the chance of sur-vival if a wounded person can bepromptly evacuated and treated.This makes urgent the establish-ment of proper safeguards for med-ical transports, such as helicoptersand fixed wing aircraft.The U. S. draft proposal is afeasible alternative to the prioragreed flight plan. At the very leastit would provide the mechanismand the communication channelsfor arriving at a tacit or actualagreement on overflights of terri-tory held by the adverse party.Of course, little can be expectedunless there is confidence amongthe parties that there will be goodfaith observance of the rules. Sub-ject to some exception, the experi-ence of the Red Cross for over 100years has been that its emblem andprotection of the wounded and sickin war have been respected. Thevalue represented by the conven-tions concerning the wounded andsick are shared by all countries andparties to a conflict. There is goodreason to hope the air ambulancefor all wounded and sick will befree to perform its essential human-itarian services from the presentrestraint of an agreed flight plan.

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viatorSupport To A Counterinsurgency WarContinued from pageinformation obtained from thecomputer runs.

Units were not always deployedto Vietnam in even monthly increments. Rather than spreading themout evenly they were often sent asquickly as men and materiel couldbe combined, training accomplishedand overseas transportation provided. In October 1967 about 800aviators deployed with variousaviation units. This large group deployment, coupled with the usualindividual requisitions, necessitateda replacement requirement 1 yearlater of almost 1,200 aviators forthe month. This was an unusualrequirement with most months requiring substantially fewer aviators.Although Vietnam inaugurated aninfusion program and used otherpersonnel policies in an attempt toease the situation and spread theflow of replacements, it remaineda problem for several years. Thetraining base output for new aviators hit its programed high of 610per month in the summer 1968.The uneven replacement flow created additional difficulties in fullyutilizing this large group immediately after graduation.

There were also problems encountered in attempting to obtaintwo tours in Vietnam for all aviators. After graduation from flighttraining, aviators incurred a 3-yearcommitment. However, after a 1-year tour in Vietnam most aviatorswere returned to the training basesas instructors where they werestabilized for 18 months. Considering other factors such as normalintransit leave, many aviators hadonly 3 or 4 months active duty remaining on their obligation beforethey were eligible to return to Vietnam. Thus, in most cases secondtours were provided from withinthe relatively small base of careeraviators. However, in an attempt

to secure the maximum number ofthese initial obligation aviatorsand attempt to elongate the timebetween tours for all aviators, personnel were assigned to Vietnamas individual replacements if theyhad 6 months remaining on theiractive duty commitment, or theycould also deploy with units if theyhad only 3 months remaining whenthey arrived incountry.Vietnam requirements and thetraining base accounted for most ofthe Army s aircraft fleet. Unlessaviators were assigned to the training bases, they were faced with theproblem of remaining proficientafter they, returned from Vietnam.At that time flight waivers were notauthorized and some aviators wereforced to travel great distances justto meet minimum requirements.However, some overseas commands possessing older aircraft notused in Vietnam were faced withthe opposite dilemma. They hadaircraft and no aviators. There wasa general tendency in these commands to reduce aviation spacesand turn in aircraft. This laterproved to be a significant problemwhen aviation resources becamemore plentiful. Commands laterfound they could modernize theirfleet and obtain the full authorization of aircraft, but they did nothave the aviation spaces to supportthem.Another continuing problem facing aviation planners was maintaining officer input into flighttraining. Initially, aviation was limited to only seven officer branchesand the warrant officer branch.(Subsequently, the program wasenlarged so that all commissionedbranches were authorized to sharein the program.) A sustained output of 610 aviators a month, whichwas programed for FY 69, requiredthat nearly 9,000 personnel beplaced into flight training. This was

a significant drain on those fewbranches authorized aviators. Somhad to place one out of every fouof their second lieutenant accessions into the program just to meethe minimum yearly officer requirements.,Some 60 percent of the aviatiotraining input consisted of warranofficer candidates, but they coulnot be used at the complete exclusion of commissioned officersThere are many requirements thamust be filled by commissioneaviators for which warrant officerare neither trained nor qualified. Athere was very little difficulty securing sufficient numbers of warrant officer candidates, any officeshortfalls were quickly replaced bwarrant officer candidates so thatraining bases would be utilized tmaximum capacity.Regardless of recruiting effortthere continued to be a shortage ocommissioned officer aviators ithe lower grades. A program watherefore, initiated to provide drect commissions for warrant officers. This was to prove extremelsuccessful in providing additionaincentives and career opportunitiefor a good number of outstandinwarrants.Attaining an adequate aviatostrength was based on the assumption that there would not be drastic personnel losses at least untthe increased training output coulbe realized. The attrition loss fromall causes during the year endinJune 1966 was about 9 percent othe total inventory. During the nexfew years it was to increase to 1percent of the aviator force. As thfigure includes all grades, its implication is not immediately obvous as the majority of the losseoccur after the initial obligation.Additional steps were taken timprove retention rates. For instance, service attractiveness fo

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warrant officers was further increased by initiating a progressivecareer development program incorporating intermediate and advanced branch schooling. N onregular aviators were offered 2 yearsadditional active duty beyond thetime they would usually retire.Aviators were not automaticallyallowed to go off flying status attheir own request. The only way toleave the program was for medicaldisqualification, fear of flying orunsuitability for the program. Reserve Component aviators on flightstatus were offered an opportunityto volunteer for active duty. Aviators who had been retired for nomore than 5 years were also giventhe option of returning to activeduty.

Of importance also to aviatorswas the realization that career development (nonaviation assignments) would be resumed asquickly as possible and that everyattempt would be made to reach a25-month repetitive tour interval.All aviators realized that theywould be assigned to Vietnam forat least one tour and many wouldbe called upon for repetitive tourswith very little time between thetours. Upon returning from Vietnam many aviators were placed inunits activating for deployment toVietnam 1 year later.

All that most aviators desiredwas to be treated equitably withtheir fellow aviators. They also desired to remain competitive withtheir nonaviation contemporaries.Aviators are proud to wear thewings and cognizant of their accomplishments, but they do not desire their career jeopardized by extenuating circumstances or adversepersonnel policies. It was, therefore, extremely important not onlyfor retention purposes but also formorale that the Army live up to itspromises and ensure that aviatorsbe given equal career opportunities.The extent of second tour assign-JUNE 1972

ments to Vietnam was significant.Helicopter companies were amongthe units to deploy to Vietnam asearly as 1962. This was considerably ahead of the large U. S build-.up which commenced in 1965. Because of factors such as the earlydeployment, relatively low aviatorinitial strengths, rapid Vietnambuildup, requirement for exoerienced aviators in Vietnam and thelong lead time to train substantialnumbers of new aviators, manywere returned to Vietnam for repetitive tours.From 1962 to mid-FY 71 a totalof 8,028 aviators were assignedtwo tours. Of this number about18.5 percent were volunteers. Itmust be realized that if aviators hadnot volunteered they would stillhave been required to return for anadditional tour.While the time between toursnever fell below an average of 22.4months, this figure by itself is notparticularly descriptive of the problem encountered. Because of thesignificant number of personnel inthe training base who were stabilized for 18 months, a great num-

ber of aviators were returned withonly 12 months between tours.The substantive increase to thetraining rate greatly relieved theaviator shortage and restrictiveassignment policies' were eased.Even as early as FY 67 careerbranch schooling for aviators wasresumed on a limited basis, andthere were a few officers in nonaviation related duties. Beginningin 1969 significant numbers of aviators were released for these assignments. Throughout the V ietnam buildup, however, there wasnever an attempt to limit the number of aviators or restrict their attendance at any of the senior service colleges or the command andstaff colleges. Personnel plannersfully realized the importance andbenefits to be derived from theseschools.Commands were once again reconstituted with aviators. Initially,when aviators returned from Vietnam they were assigned to commands consistent with prioritiesand availability of aircraft. However, as they became available ingreater numbers, they often ex-

ARMY AVIATION EXPANSIONRatio ofTotal Training Aviator Total Aviators to

FY Aviators Output Authorization Aircraft Aircraft62 6 788 652 8 722 4 738 1.4363 7 294 877 9 500 5 047 1.4464 8 276 1,283 10 459 5 532 1.4965 9 074 1 432 10,441 6 203 1.4666 9 650 1 536 14 307 7 360 1.3167 12,908 3 907 17 917 8,781 1.4368 16,735 5 345 23 725 10 527 1.5769 22 429 7,561 23 960 11,625 1.9370 24 153 6,981 24,431 12 166 1.98

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ceeded the number of aircraftwhich could support them. Thisplaced a heavy strain on availableaircraft and often resulted in misutilization of personnel, particularlyamong warrant officer aviators.While officers can be assignedagainst a variety of positions, warrant officer aviators are specialistsand it is difficult to assign them outof their field.It has been said that it is easierto build than to tear down. This isparticularly true for Army aviationin drawing down the force in Vietnam and preparing for the unknowns of the future.The importance of mobility infighting a counterinsurgency war

has been firmly established. Helicopter units were among the first inVietnam, and they will probably beamong the last to be withdrawn.Aviator training is geared to theVietnam requirement. Long rangeforecasts, therefore, play an important part in determining theaviation training rate. Because ofthe long lead times involved incountry strength and replacementrequirements must be establishedwell over a year in advance.Additional problems affectingaviator training such as funds,spaces, personnel allocations andequipment must be resolved well inadvance of any fiscal year. If a decision is reached to reduce trainingbased on programed incountrystrength, and those anticipated reductions never materialize, it takestime to increase the force. If, onthe other hand, training is not reduced and the withdrawal is greaterthan originally programed, thereare a good number of aviationschool graduates who must be diverted elsewhere.Many important lessons havebeen learned from experience inVietnam. They must not be forgotten if aviation is to remain a viableforce responsive to the requirements of the Army. In any futurecontingency the Army may not be30

afforded the opportunity of building up an aviation force over aperiod of time. Because of the longlead times required to increase aviator strength, a substantial supplemental aviator force will be required during peacetime. The costsassociated with maintaining thisf0rce will be minimal compqredwith the loss of preparedness if theforce is skeletonized.Army aviators must be immediately available and responsive insufficient numbers to meet initialwartime requir

Army Aviation Digest - Jun 1972

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Transcript of Army Aviation Digest - Jun 1972