Army Aviation Digest - Feb 1972

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Feb 1972

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The cost of premiums dependson many f ac to r s such as age,heal th and occupa t ion . Armyaviators are usually young,healthy and mature which helpskeep premiums from being toohigh. But since they are flyingthey have to pay some extra.

A nonflyer would pay about7 .50 a m o n t h o r a 5 ,000

s t ra ight life insurance policytaken out at age 20. This amountremains constant for the duration of the policy. The cash andloan value, however, builds upyear after year. At the end of 10years a mature pol icy shouldhave a cash or loan value ofabout 450. f by chance payments must be discont inuedthere are alternatives that can betaken-collection of cash valueof the policy and thereby canceling out, or continuing a 5,000protection without payments fora number of years by forfeitingthe cash value. At age 40, fori n s t ance , p ro tec t ion could bediscont inued until age 65 isr eached . Ano the r choice is toconvert to a paid up policy andcontinue protection at a lesseramount for the duration of theinsured's life. At age 40 a paiduppolicy of about 2,350 is realized.

As a military aviator, age 23, apremium of about 32 a monthfor a 25,000 policy would coverall aircraft accidents. Such policies are usually written with anaviation rider. Without this riderthe cost would be about 22, butthe policy would not pay in the

event of an a i rc ra f t accident .The rider can usually be droppedwhen military flight is discontinued. A pol icy of this amoun tusual ly can be conver t ed toabout a 14,000 paidup policy atage 65 (minus the a-viation rider).

t also will have a loan or cashvalue of about 11,000 at thattime.

Term i n su rance is usually a

FEBRUARY 1972

temporary type of protection. Acontract is written for a certainamount of insurance for 5, 10 or15 years. At the end of this timerenegot ia t ion of the con t rac tmust be accomplished. Term isthe least expensive insurance butunder most circumstances thecost goes up each time the insurance is renegotiated, thus eventually it can become costly. Forinstance, term insurance is permitted in National Service LifeInsurance (NSLI) which manystill hold . However, the cos t

goes up every 5 years and byage 65 the premiums are so highthat the insured finds it hard tomake the payments . For thisreason most holders of N S L Iterm insurance usually convertbefore they reach age 50.

Term insurance issued by civilian insurance companies doesnot necessar i ly al low renewaland conversion privileges. Checkany term insurance before buying to be sure that these privileges are written into the policy.

Limited payment insurance issometimes called a paidup policy. Essentially it is the same asa straight life policy except thatpremiums are paid only for alimited number of years. Forinstance, a 30-year policy at age20 will be paid up by age 50.The premiums will be higher,but when the policy is mature nomore premiums will be paid.

An endowment policy is likean insured savings plan. A certain amount is paid each monthand when a preselected age isreached the policy becomesmature. f death should occurbefore that age the beneficiary ispaid.

At one time it was hard formilitary personnel to get life insurance through a civilian company at a reasonable rate. Eventoday many companies have awar clause in their policies. Because of this the governmentintervened and offered life insurance at an inexpensive rate toservicemen and women.

One of the earlier programscalled the United States Government Life Insurance (USGLI)was a permanent plan type insurance policy with a face valueof up to 10,000. It was initiallyissued in 1919 and remainedavailable to active duty person

nel until October 1940 when itwas replaced by NSLI. Thiscoverage was available to activemilitary personnel from October1940 to April 1951.

Up to 10,000 could be purchased with NSLI either as a 5year level term or straight lifeinsurance program. From April1951 through December 1956 thegovernment paid all premiums.

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In January 1957 the depen-dency and indemnity compensa-t i o n p r o g r a m ( D I C ) w a sintroduced. In order to be eligible for DIC the insured had toresume paying his own NSLIpremiums.

DIC is not strictly an insurance program but it is vital forthe protect ion of dependents .Basically it provides payment onthe basis of rank. Payments alsoare available to survivors ofdeceased retired members whodie of diseases or injury incurredor aggravated in line of duty.

In September 1965 Public Law89-214 authorized the Service-man s Group Life Insurancewhich is the present coverageavailable. Initially it provided upto 10,000 in term insurance butthe ceiling was raised to 15,000in 1970. The insured is automati-cally covered by this programunless he elects otherwise. Hemay accept full coverage or reduced coverage in 5,000 increm e n t s P a y m e n t f o r t h i sinsurance is deducted from theinsured s pay at the rate of 1.00each month for each 5,000.

After leaving the service theinsured will be protected for 120days without further payment ofpremiums. However, conversionof the policy during these daysis anticipated. The conver tedpolicy is issued by one of the

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participating civilian insurancecompanies that underwrites theterm program.

The ability to convert the policy when leaving the service is avaluable benefit. Conversion isguaranteed wi thout physica l

examination at a premium basedon age at the time of conversion.This means that while the premi-ums may be higher because ofage, this right is guaranteed regardless of one s physical condi-tion at that time.

Another protective programavailable to the military is socialsecurity. In 1957 all military per-sonnel were brought under socialsecurity which offers both familyprotection and social securityretirement benefits. Social secu-rity s not an insurance program,but it should be considered inthe development of an insuranceprogram.

Among the civilian insurancecompanies there are a number ofspecial insurance programs de -signed for the military. Theseinclude life, automobile, homeowner and even health designedto back up retired medical bene-fits.

Although these programs arenot endorsed by the Army, theydo provide major benefits. Thelow cost of the various grouplife programs can provide anexcel lent means of building asizable insurance program with alow premium outlay.

Even a young man just out ofschool with no dependents, relatives or friends to leave moneyto needs insurance. It may not

be much, perhaps just enough tocreate a small estate and takecare of posthumous debts. Forimmediate needs the term insur-ance provided by SGLI is proba-blyenough.

Try looking into the fu tureand anticipating that a beneficiary might be desirable. A wifeand perhaps some young ones

might have to be taken care of.When looking into the future theneed of a small straight life insurance or perhaps a limited paypolicy needs considera t ion .When young the premiums on astraight life policy are low whichs an advantage. Also, if a lim

ited payment policy s started ata young age it can be paid up ina few years.

The greatest need for insurance occurs when supporting a

wife and children, at least untilthe children are grown. Then ifthe need arises a woman maywork. Remember though thatafter years of taking care of children a woman s earning powerwill be much less.

U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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Army aviators often quit flyingfollowing their obligated service.But while flying they desire extra protection . This is where agood te rm pol icy comes inhandy. When the aviator hasquit flying he may drop the pol

icy. Another good use for thistype insurance is protection of adebt. Suppo se it is necessary tobuy something that requires alarge monthly payment and thata woman could not handle thepayments alone. A term policywould pay for it. There are special term policies to payoff amortgage on a house and thereusually i s a requirement to takea special term policy when buying an automobile on time.

Consider a 25-year-old manwho intends staying in the Arm yfor another 20 years before retiring . On Army pay more insurance can be afforded , but maybenot after retirement. A 20-ye a rlimited p ay polic y is be st suitedfor this situation. Or supposepremiums are paid until age 65,but after that a premium wouldbe hard to pay. Also , extra protection for the family now and alittle extra pay after age 65 isdesired. An endowment policy isthe an swer .

Here is how s uch a policyworks: A 40- year-old man takesout an endowment policy for

16 , 000 paying abou t 55 a

FEBRUARY 1972

month. I f he should die beforeage 65 his wife would receive

16 ,000 either in a lump sum orin monthly payments . f heshould live until age 65 he wouldstart receiving payments.

These a re only examples of

course. Everyone must determine which policy best meets hisneeds. Often a combination ofplans may be the answer. Somecompanies offer what is called afamily protect ion plan. Thiscombine s straight life with termand may be cheaper in the longrun.

The following table can beused to help de t e rmine theamount of insurance needed:

GE OF R EC P ENT F CTO R

18-24 2125-30 2031-35 1936-39 1840-43 1744-47 1648-51 1552-54 14

Example: A total of 30,000 ininsurance policies will be paid abeneficiary upon death. Socialsecurity , DIC and other assetswill pay 200 a month to thedependen t s , a 24-year-o ldwoman and a 3-year-old child.To find out how much the dependents will get to live on incase of death , divide 30,000 bythe factor opposite the woman ' sage. The figure will be about

1,428 per year or 119 permonth. Thi s plus the 200 fromassets give s the dependents anincome of 319. This m y o rmay not be enough depending on

various situations.Here ' s another example: Awife is 30 years old. The husband want s her to have an income of 400 per month for there st of her life in the event ofhi s death. Investment s, insurance and other sources of income along with the amount ofmoney the wife can earn will

bring 300 per month. She willtherefore need an additional income of 1 ,200 annually ( 400 - 300 = 100 X 12 months). Multiply the factor 20 by 1,200 andit can be determined that an insurance policy worth 24 ,000 is

needed .It must be remembered thatthere are provisions in DIC andsocial securi ty to pay extramoney to under age children andolder children attending institution s of higher learning. Thismoney will not continue to bepaid after the children reach a

certain age or are graduated.Also, it must be remembered

that as insured and dependentsgrow older the value of insurance changes. For instance , inthe second example the 30-yearold woman would receive 100 amonth from an insurance policyof 24,000. At age 52 she wouldreceive about 142 a month.

In conclusion , keep in mindthat responsibilities are greaterwhen the family is young. During this time a lot of insurance isneeded. As the years pass responsibilities decrease and lessinsurance can be held. The timemay even come when the onlyresponsibility is to provide for apersonal funeral. An insuranceprogram should be tailored toreflect this. . i i i i II

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McNair Versus The ull

ontinued from page 5

After ponder ing all thesethings I elected to do the onlyhonorable thing and land at

some intermediate point, unob-served and remove the pitotcover. Throughout the country-side there were small clearingsdesignated for practicing con-fined area approaches. Theseareas were on private timberlandor pasture but were leased bythe government for studenttraining. I spotted one of theseclearings along my route andmade a high reconnaissance. tappeared satisfactory except that

there were cattle grazing in anadjacent clearing only a scant1 yards away.

Feeling that I had an adequatemargin of safety I descendedsteeply over the trees. With thehelicopter sitting on a level pieceof ground I locked the controlsand jumped out to remove theforgotten cover. As I looked upfrom untying the warning flag , ahelicopter flew noisily over theadjacent field and a few cattlebegan to move my way. Recog-nizing this as a potentially cata-strophic situation should thecattle wander into the whirlingrotor blades of my helicopter,my visions were of a bankruptlieutenant paying for damages toboth helicopter and cattle .

I moved quickly to meet thesituation and approached thelead cow with my bright blueflight cap in hand, waving it vio-lently to turn the herd awayfrom the helicopter. t worked,the lead cow turned on me andgave chase , Only then did itdawn on me that this was not infact a cow, but a large and blus-tery bull

Moving with the agility of atrack star, I made it to the near-est tree and shinnied up. Thebull pawed the ground anxiously

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as the remainder of the herdmilled around closer and closerto the spinning blades still turn-ing under idle power. t couldonly be a matter of time untilone of them would hit a bladeand the entire helicopter wouldtear itself into a million pieces .

When the bull was momentar-ily distracted I cautiously sliddown the tree and lunged to anadjacent tree, thence to anothertree always keeping stout timberbetween us to thwart the bull sobvious intent. Finally I hadhalf circled the entire clearingand was within 1 yards of thehelicopter.



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FEBRUARY 972

As the bull was once againdistracted I leaped madly for theplexiglass door, flung it open andunlocked the controls as slidinto the seat. Almost before myfeet had touched the pedalswas pulling in pitch and rolling

on throttle. The helicopter rosevertically but not gracefullyfrom the clearing. As the bullcharged under my skids he sur-pr i s ing ly encounte red onlyempty air. The ugly whirringorange irritant was now movingup and out of his reach.

With a deep sigh of reliefleaned back in the seat but myheartbeat still sounded like atriphammer when I realized thatin my haste I had not fastened

my safety belt. The frequency ofthe hammer quickened.

In the normal conduct of flightin a helicopter, both hands andboth feet are used to control andfly the machine. Only for briefintervals can one hand be takenfrom the collective pitch to tunea radio or adjust an instrument,

but under no circumstances canone ever take both hands fromthe controls without cataclysmicresults.

now found myself relievedfrom the pitot cover problemand the subsequent encounterwith the bull only to face ah-other dilemma: How could fas-ten my safety belt before landingat the stagefield? To chance anarrival in full view of my in -structor with my safety belt

flapping outside the door wouldsurely result in a pink slip Thishumiliation also could lead tothe exposure of my two earliergoofs if an explanat ion J eredemanded as to why was flyingaround without a safety beltfirmly affixed around my poste-rior.

Collecting my thoughts de-cided to land again and correctthe discrepancy. This t imecarefully selected an unusedfarm road without an animal ofany description be it male orfemale in sight. skillfully ma-neuvered the ship onto a wideplace in the road where the skidsfit neatly outside the ruts.

Everything seemed under con-trol so elected to take advan-tage of the situation and recoupmy badly shaken composurewith a much needed cigarettebreak. locked down the con-trols walked about 50 feet awayand spent the break time goingover in my mind just what hadgone wrong on this flight. Notonly had my early oversight ledme into a face to face encounterwith a stern bull without a mata-dor in sight but my hasty depar-ture without a fastened seat beltcould have smeared me all overa wide swath of pine trees.


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chalked it all up to experience,confident that I had had threestrikes for the day, was not outand, equally important to themorale of a trainee, had not gotten a p nk sl p for the day.

More confident than ever in

my capabilities judgment andskill I took off and flew the fewremaining miles to the stagefield.Buoyed up by my earlier evasions and anxious to give thebusiness as usual impressionto those on the field who werewatching, I turned on the baseleg calling for a touchdown autorotation. This poweroff emergency procedure disengages theengine and allows the helicopterto descend with lift generated bythe freewheeling rotor blades.While an approved training maneuver, it is somewhat morerisky than an ordinary landingand consequently had some restrictions attached to it whichwere momentari ly dimmed bymy complacency ~ n overconfidence.

The autorota t ion i tself waswell do n -e for a 15-hour studentif I must say so myself. Yet, as

I hovered to the parking area, Isensed that something wasn ' tright by the gait of the -instructoras he walked to my parkingspot. The look in his eye wasmore determined than that of thebull and as the engine noise wasdying away he didn ' t have tospeak. On his clipboard - he ~ sinserting a very pink grade slipand beginning to write.

All manner of thoughts racedthrough my mind as I busiedmyself in the procedure of securing the electrical switches,radios and controls. Was it thepitot cover on takeoff? Was hisdual instruction helicopter theone that flew over the cattle inthe next field and then saw meup in the tree? No one had seenme land on the road or hadthey?

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As I stepped from the helicopter my questions were immediately answered in language morerepresentative of nautical personnel than aeronautical , butnonetheless effective in getting amessage across. In brief it wasM o n d a y, an i m p o r t a n t f a c twhich I overlooked mentioningearlier but a very important factfor a s tudent . We were expressly forbidden from performing a u t o r o t a t i o n s a f t e r twononflying days until we had firstdone a dual autorota t ion withthe instructor on Monday.

As I read fur ther down thepink grade slip not a word aboutthe pitot cover, the bull or theroad-just the simple statement:

Violat ion of standing safe typrocedures ; i .e . , execut ing asolo autorotation at beginning oftraining week without first demonstrating sustained profic iencyto the instructor.

As my fellow students gathered a round me inqu i r ing ,

What did he get you for? myface was as pink as the slip. Iwanted to tell how it took fourstrikes to get me out that day,but I knew deep down that I hadstruck out myself before I everpressed the starter.

In a rationalizing way I triedto convince myself that I hadskillfully overcome three problems which could have becomemore serious as well as verydamaging to my professionalpride in the presence of my fellow students.Thus, the bee cameback to sting for that first mist a k e n o t following the pre

sc r ibed pref l ight i n s p e c t i o nchecklist. In no way could I rationalize away that responsibilityand the possible consequences.A few weeks later I completedthe transition training not onlyas a qualified helicopter pilot butalso as a more mature , moredemanding, more conservative

and consequently safer aviator.Ten years have now passed

and I suppose if there is a statute of limitations on flying mistakes I hope I have passed it.But to this day I have never lostmy appreciation for the lesson Il ea rned f rom tha t cha in ofevents which were triggered by asimple ground oversight before_he flight began.

Today, as I conscientiouslyinspect the aircraft before I flyother pilots sometimes ask why Ibother when the crew chief orcopilot has already made thechecks. I simply say i t 's .a habitof mine and go on about myresponsibility. Even in Vietnamas unit commander with a very

busy schedule and a full crew ofgunner, crew chief and copilot atmy disposal I always took thetime to check the vital parts. It 'ssurprising how of ten you willfind an oil cap not secured or aforgotten safety wire. Strange asit may seem, I even landed onceat a major installation in a transient status and the main fueltank was serviced with 50 weightoil. Had this not been discovered in draining the fuel pump Ihesitate to think about the consequences when switching to themain tank.

Twenty-five hundred morehours have been added to mylog since I learned that memorable flying lesson in Texas, yetthe moral of that episode lingerswith me. While the story itself isreplete with personal embarrassment, I have told it frequently toother aviators-especially the

young-hoping that they couldreap the benefit without the chagrin which befell me. It has always been good for a laugh onthe Old Man, and I only hopethat it has had its intended effectof being good for a life whichcould be lost due to a faultyinspection blunder like I oncemade.



37/68

Sir:

Continued from page 1

J E W S

R O ME D E R S

I am presently serving in the positionas Chief, Defense Advisory Branch,United States Army, Japan. In thiscapacity I am responsible for advisingand maintaining liaison with the JapanGround Self Defense Force.

Currently the Japan Ground Self Defense Force is increasing the use of

rotary wing aircraft in their tacticaltraining and as a result are very interestedin all aspects of helicopter operations.

I have been requested by the JapaneseHeadquarters in Tokyo to obtain a copyof an article by MAJ Jolley, FormalOperational Authorization for SteepAngle GCA Operations at Hanchey Arnl)'Airfiel d published in the April, 967AVIATION DIGEST .

Would you please forward to me anysuch information available concerningthe state of Illinois

Sir:

CW2 Robert C. LeVeeQuarte rs 7236AFt. Carson, CO 80913

Plea se forward to the above address alist of Army Reserve and National Guard

aviation units in the state of Arizonaalong with a list of authorized slots andequipment.

Also, I would like to know if being inthe National Guard or Reserves wouldaffect the residency requirements withregard to tuition at a state college oruniversity? Thank you .

CPT William H. Pennegan8144 Cal mont #140Fort Worth, TX 76116

At the present time there are no provisions in this area.

The DIGEST nas received many inquiries in response to the July features on the

Reserve Components. If you're planningon getting out soon and are thinkingabout joining the Reserves-wri te the DIGEST tor a list of Reserve units in yourstate. Coming next month-an update onthe status of the Reserve Components.

Sir:On September 97 Major Denni s

Engen, active Army advisor to the 92ndA viation Company in Seattl e, a nd CW2Michael Lazares, a unit pilot, probablysaved the life of an injured automobileaccident victim.

They were flying a training missionduring a week-end Army Re serve drillwhen they spotted an automobile accidentnorth of the town of Roy near Ft. Lewis,W A . Noting the apparent seriousness ofthe accident, the pilots landed to see ifthey could be of assistance.

Due to the serious injuries of one ofthe accident victims, the pilots elected tomedevac the man to St. Joseph's Hospitalin nearby Tacoma. While CW2 Lazares,a Tacoma police officer in civilian life,piloted the Huey, Major Engen maderadio calls, and the State Trooper onboard administered first aid to the victim.

FEBRUARY1972

A hospital spokesman said the patient'slife was probably saved by the officers'actions. It is doubtful the victim wouldhave survived a long ambulance ride, ashe was bleeding profusely and was unconscious.

Both officers were commended fortheir actions.

CW2 Ward L. GabrielPublic Information Officer92nd Aviation Company (ASH)HANGAR 27, U. S. Naval

Support ActivitySeattle, WA 98115

Since this article is not available herein Japan, I am requesting your help inobtaining a copy for the Japanese. I favailable, please send the article to mefor forwarding to the Japanese GroundSelf Defense Force. Thank you for yourkind assistance.

MAJ Guy E. DainesChief, Defense Advisory Branch

A copy is in the mail.

INSTRUMENT ORNER

EACH MONTH significant changes are made to FLIP instrument approach charts that may go unnoticed. Thesechanges are made to improve chart presentation and aid pilotinterpretation of the procedure. Here are some examples ofthe more recent changes that are now appearing in FLIP.

1. Line weight of NoPT procedural t rack has been increased.

(new)

\ 500 ~q P T /\9 ~ I F\\ \ . 7 ) OPAL

I

(old)

N O P ~ 80 (11.3) \ : : : ~

2. Distance associated with air speed and time for nonprecision approaches is changed as indicated below. Note too thechange in air speeds.

(new) (old)

3. When the term Radar Vectoring appears in the upperleft corner of the chart, the pilot may expect radar vectors forthat approach.

4. For approach procedures where straight-in minima arenot authorized, the procedure titles will include the letters AB etc., as indicated in this example.

VOR-A VOR-BRemember, this does not prevent a straight-in landing i f i t

is within the capability of the aircraft and pilot.

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dapt ed from US V T echn ica l R eport 72-2 Octob er 97

viation afety n Combatn ppraisal of the Experiences of rmy

A viation Unit Commanders in R V N

HIS APPRAISAL was based on the opinionsof approximately 300 Army aviation unit

commanders on critical aviation safety subjects.These commanders were surveyed by questionnaire while they were serving in the Republic ofVietnam RVN). Many issues about aviationsafety practices have arisen during the recent

dramatic growth of Army aviation but a consensus of commanders about these issues has notemerged. The purpose of the appraisal was to solicit opinions about these issues from those whohave a major influence on aviation safety-aviation unit commanders in the field. The significanceof this information can only be measured by theinfluence it has in reducing accidents when fedback to those engaged in aviation accident re-


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prepared ypplied Research Division

Technical Researchand pplications DepartmentUnited States rmy gency

for viation Safety


40/68

VI TION S FETY IN COMB T

search and to unit commanders and aviationsafety officers in the field.

A questionnaire was developed by which theopinions of aviation unit commanders and aviation safety officers could be solicited concerningmajor aviation safety issues. Issues resulting inspecific items for the questionnaire were selectedfrom RVN oriented safety conferences, interviews with returning aviators and corrective-measure comments from accident reports. Threeforms of the questionnaire were developed-ACand BC for unit commanders and AA for aviationsafety officers (ASOs). Forms AC and BC contained 73 questions, of which 24 asked background information. The remaining 45 questionsconcerned aviation safety issues and required aresponse of (a) strongly agree, (b) agree, (c) undecided, (d) disagree, or (e) strongly disagree. Thesetwo forms were identical, except that form ACstated questions positively and form BC statedquestions negatively. This procedure was used toensure that-should positive or negative wordinginfluence responses to questions-bias would becancelled out by using responses from bothforms. However, no such bias was revealed andboth forms were considered reliable.

Form AA (ASOs) included 100 questions, ofwhich 21 requested background information and79 sought aviation safety information. Among the79 safety questions, 13 were the same as thoseasked of commanders and were included to obtain

a comparison of opinions between ASOs and unitcommanders on issues of mutual interest. ASOresponses were not used in determining cumulative response percentages for commanders or themedian.

The exact number of unit commanders andASOs in RVN during the period March-July 1970could not be determined due to continuous turnover. Therefore , the commander and ASOstrength of 156 aviation units , in RVN was estimated and a total of 1,141 questionnaires wasmailed (399 AC, 399 BC and 343 AA), with instructions to distribute one questionnaire to each

ASO unit commander from brigade to platoonlevel. Of the questionnaires distributed, 155 ofform AC (39 ), 142 of form BC 35 ) and 131 ofform AA (38 ) were returned. Since the numberof unit commanders and ASOs in the 156 unitsreceiving questionnaires could not be determined,the percentages of all such personnel representedby this sample are unknown.

Figure 1 presents background descriptions ofresponding commanders. Each table shows a dis-

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tr ibution of the 297 commanders by levels ofcommand and the percentage each level represents of all responding commanders. Each tableshows platoon commanders (152) are the largestgroup (49.5 ) of the sample. However, had thesample been precisely apportioned by commandlevel, this group would have been even larger, so

the sample can be viewed as representative ofcommanders at each level within aviation units inRVN. All background information collected fromthe questionnaires is not shown in figure 1 andsome of the following descriptions are based onthis unreported information.

Platoon Level Platoon commanders surveyedwere mostly young aviator rated captains who hadcompleted about 3 years of Army service. Mostof their time in service had been spent as rotarywing (R/W) aviators and they were currently qualified to fly only the aircraft they piloted in RVN.

f qualified to fly fixed wing F W) aircraft, theygenerally flew the 0-1. They had completed morethan half of their first 12-month combat tour,spending most of this time as platoon commanders.

Company Level Company commanders surveyed were mainly majors, had been aviatorsabout 8 years, were dual rated and on their second combat tours. They were probably platooncommander captains during their first combattours and had completed 75 percent of their current RVN tours. They had been company commanders for 4 months, revealing a rotation time

of approximately 6 months.Battalion Level Other than rank and years rated, the 25 battalion commanders surveyed did notappear significantly different from their counterparts at company level. They were lieutenant colonels who had been rated aviators about 12 yearsand their current combat tour was their second.Only one had served more than two full tours,while three platoon and five company commanders had completed more than two combat tours.

Brigade Level Only four brigade commanderswere surveyed. All were full colonels and dualrated aviators, two for 9 years and two for 12.

One had more than two combat tours , two wereon their second tours and one was on his first.Two had completed half their current tours andnone had more than 6 months in his presentcommand.

Unreported Level Of the commanders surveyed, 20 did not report command levels. Of thisgroup, 11 captains may have been detachmentcommanders. One colonel and four majors servedat unknown levels. Nevertheless, the responses



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Level of CommandBrigade or BattalionCompanyPlatoon

LevelUnreportedof Total

Brigade or BattalionCompanyPlatoon

Level Unreportedof Total


Level Unreportedof Total


of Total

r i g ~ d eor BattalionCompanyPlatoon

Le,vel Unreportedof Total

Brigade or Battalion

CompanyPlatoon

Level Unreported%ofTota l

FEBRUARY 1972

FIGURBACKGROUND OF RESPONDING COMMANDERS

CPT MAJ LTC COL0.06.5

86.57.0

55.5

0.092.0

3.5

4.5

32.5

92.57.5

0.0

0.09.5

Years as an Army Rated Aviator

80.00.00.0

20.02.0

of Total10.534.5

49.5

5.5

Less than 3 but less 6 but less 9 but less More than3

0.03.5

83.013.547.5

Less than 36.5

25.060.0

8.5

42.0

than 6 than 90.0 0.0

31.5 91.5

59.0 6.59.5 2.0

14.0 15.5

Months in Command

36 7816.0 4.043.0 30.539.5 61.5

1.5 4.044.0 8.0

Type of Mission

Cargo Utility20.5 41.527.5 26.520.5 24.522.0 27.0

Number of Tours in RVH

Less than 1 1 tour nowfull tour in 2nd tour

2.5 14.05.5 47.5

77.5 33.014.5 5.537.5 56.0

Months Remaining in This Tour

Less than 3 36 7810.5 11.5 12.034.5 38.0 29.051.5 39.0 48.5

3.5 11.5 9.536.0 32.5 14.0

than 12 1211.5 73.583.0 17.5

0.0 6.0

5.5 3.0

12.0 11.5

910 or more0.0 0.0

20.0 50.080.0 50.0

0.0 0.03.5 1.5

Observation Attack10.5 27.531.5 14.528.0 26.528.5 22.0

2 full More t h a ntours tours

0.0 17.071.5 41.528.5 25.00.0 16.52.5 4.0

910 or more2.5 7.0

13.0 28.571.0 43.013.0 21.512.5 4.5

39


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from this group are considered as valid as thosefrom other commanders and are included.

Only the positive form of each question is pre-sented because no differences were found be-tween responses to positively (A C) and negatively

(BC) stated questions. The most outstanding fea-tures of the results are presented in several majorsections. Within these sections, questions of simi-lar topics are grouped for discussion. At the endof each major section, conclusions are made andthe questions from which they were drawn identi-fied in parentheses.

Unit A viation Safety Enforcement. The sevenquestions of this section probe unit safety en -forcement by asking who is responsible for safetyattitudes; why these attitudes exist; and what canbe done to enforce aviation safety.

Question 1 The inexperienced aviator's atti-

tude toward aviation safety s a reflection of theflight procedures and practices the unit employs toaccomplish its operational missions.

The purpose of this question was to verify along standing assumption that the safety attitudes

of inexperienced aviators are highly influenced bypractices they observe and procedures they arerequired to follow during operational unit assign-ments. A large majority (75.5 ) of commandersagreed with this statement. Its validity is strength-ened in that those in charge of assimilating newaviators into units (platoon and company com-

manders) expressed strongest agreement. Devel-opment of the proper attitude toward aviationsafety is a prime objective of the unit assimilationprocess and platoon/company commanders havethe closest view of this developmental process.

Question 2. The flight procedures and prac-tices that the unit employs to accomplish its oper-ational missions are a reflection of the unitcommander's attitude toward aviation safety.

Responses to question indicated that a unit sprocedures and practices influenced avia torssafety attitudes. Question 2 asked who is respon-sible for these procedures and practices. Re -

sponses evidenced that commanders (87.5 ) andASOs (93 ) strongly agreed that a unit s safetyprocedures and practices reflect the commander sattitude toward safety. In effect, then , unit com-manders can determine the safety attitudes new

Most commanders recognize the effect of combat stresson accident rates, but are not willing to trade safety for

m'tss'ton accomplishment and are striving to do something

about it


43/68

aviators develop and probably retain throughouttheir careers. There is evidence in Army aircraftaccident files that inexperienced aviators may takea commander s casual remark about a flight procedure as license to trade off safe flight principlesfor mission accomplishment. Commanders mustconstantly be aware of the impact carried by their

words, actions and even their mannerisms.Question 3. In a combat environment, a higheraccident rate should be accepted as well s ex-pected.

Question 4. Only when an accident occurs dosafe operations receive sufficient emphasis.

Responses to question 2 indicated that commanders attitudes are responsible for unit safetypractices and procedures. Questions 3 and 4 thenasked what these attitudes actually were on twobasic issues. Question 3 is two-pronged, based onthe assumption that the violence, added hazards

and uncertainty of combat environments put agreat deal of stress on aviators and lead to higheraccident rates. Assuming this would be verified,the intent of the second prong was to determinewhether commanders would simply accept such

higher accident rates in a tradeoff between mis-sion accomplishment and safety. Surprisingly,67.5 of the commanders indicated they mightexpect higher accident rates, but would not sim-ply accept them. This is encouraging when interpreted to mean that most commanders recognizethe effect of combat stress on accident rates, but

are not willing to trade safety for mission accomplishment and are striving to do something aboutit. However, a significant number (30 ) of thecommanders revealed they expected and acceptedhigher accident rates in combat. This group issufficiently large to account for increases in accident rates which always seem to accompany flightoperations in combat. The reason for this groupexpecting and accepting higher accident ratesprobably results from some combination of: (a)inexperienced aviators; (b) difficult terrain turningforced landings into accidents; (c) combat stress

on aviators; (d) command assignment too short tostructure and implement a good accident prevention program; and (e) management and commandshor tcomings . Never theless , all commandersshould recognize the safety hazards of combat


44/68


environments and strive to overcome them byimproving their accident prevention programs.

Question 4 also had a dual purpose. First, it is awell recognized human characteristic to oil thewheel that squeaks. This problem is not exclusive to Army aviation. Therefore , the first purp o s e o f q u e s t i o n 4 was to d e t e r m i n e howwidespread this tendency was among aviationunits in combat. Surprisingly, % of the commanders told on themselves by agree ing tha tsafety receives sufficient emphasis only after accidents occur. Commanders with this opinion weredistributed rather evenly over different levels ofcommand, indicating that either the tendency tooil the wheel that squeaks is a stable phenomenon

or that only 35 % of the commanders were willingto tell on themselves. Unfortunately, many (60 % )of the commanders disagreed with the statementand Army aircraft accident files contain ampleevidence of aviator/aircraft losses resulting fromthis attitude. The second purpose of this questionwas to compare responses of commanders withthose of ASOs. t was anticipated that some disagreement would be evidenced. The results againwere surprising, this time because of close agreement (33 % agreed and 53.5 % disagreed) betweencommanders and ASOs. This close agreement

lends support to the hypothesis that oiling thewheel that squeaks is a stable phenomenon. But itmay also be interpreted to indicate that only 33 %of the ASOs were willing to admit shortcomings

of their unit accident prevention programs.Question 5. To be effective n accident pre-vention program in addition to being well con-ceived and publici ze d needs to be v igorouslyenforced.

Question 4 asked when the commanders devoted emphasis to safe aviation operations andquestion 5 asked how much they recommendedenforcing this emphasis. Responses to question 5(92 % agreement) disclosed a dramatic shift towardrecognizing the need for strong enforcement ofaccident prevention programs. In the past, theonly enforcement evidenced in aviation safetywas appropriate actions, taken when blatantneglect resulted in accidents. That mode of enforcement was prevalent early in the RVN conflict when avia tors were in short supply andallowed considerable latitude regarding safetypractices. However , violations which were thensimply overlooked now warrant appearances before flight evaluation boards. This increased scrutiny is reflected by responses to question 5 andreveals a replacement of the forgive-and-forgetphilosophy with one depending on vigorous en-

The tendency of aviators, especially ine xperienced ones to takeunnecessary risks to accomplish missions is very real

4 U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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forcement of safety programs before accidentsoccur.

Question 6. Wise application of the collateralinvestigation system would e helpful to the avia-tion safety program.

Question 7. The assignment of an aircraft ac-cident rate ceiling, which considers the relativehazard of each unit's operation, is a sound man-agement practice.

Responses to question 5 indicated respondingcommanders overwhelmingly support the idea ofvigorous enforcement of accident prevention pro-grams. The purpose of questions 6 and 7 was todetermine their opinions about two methods ofenforcing these programs. Question 6 probed theusefulness of collateral investigations which are acommander's prerogative and can lead to punitive

actions where aviator negligence is suspected inaccidents. Of all the commanders, 62.5 agreedthese investigations would be helpful to aviationsafety programs, but the amount of agreementdecreased at lower command levels. Several pos-sible reasons for commanders at lower levelsbeing hesitant to subject fellow aviators to suchscrutiny and possible punitive action exist. Theseare: (a) lower level commanders are closer in age,rank, experience and physical contact with avia-tors and may be reluctant to bring action against

FIGURE 2How Answers to Each Qut st ion Were Tabulated

in Percentages

QUESTION 29. Individual aviators, more so than the unitcommander, seem to be willing to accept unnecessary risksto complete a mission.

Level ofCommand

Brigade orBattalion

Company

Platoon

LevelUnreported

AllCommanders

ASO's

StronglyAgree

31.0

26.0

24.5

11.0

A24.5

30.0

FEBRUARY 1972

StronglyAgree Undecided Disagree Disagree

51.5 7.0 10.5 0.0

46.5 7.5 18.0 2.0

46.5 5.5 18.0 5.5

26.0 11.0 29.5 22.5

\

45.0 6.5 18.5 5.5

39.0 4.0 20.0 5.0

their near peers for performance they themselvesmight not have been able to improve; (b) hearsayknowledge of the conduct and consequences ofcollateral investigations may have resulted in afear of these actions; or (c) as a method for en -forcing aviation safety programs, collateral inves-t iga t ions might not be the b e s t m e a n s ofenforcement. Regardless, commanders, especiallyat higher levels, lent support to the use of collat-eral investigations for enforcing safety programs.

Question 7 asked for opinions about accidentrate ceilings as a method for enforcing safety pro-grams. The criterion is a given accident rate foreach unit based on the risks involved in the unit 'soperations. Essentially, commanders were unde-cided on tlJe worth or practicality of this methodof enforcement (54.5 against, 19.5 undecided

and 26 for). It should be noted, however, thatthe largest negative reaction 41 strongly disa-greed and 24 disagreed, total 65 ) came frombrigade/battalion commanders. This response ofhigher level commanders is not surprising for twopossible reasons: (a) it may be recalled that highlevel commanders overwhelmingly (99 ) sup-ported vigorous enforcement of accident preven-tion programs (question 5); they strongly (75 )supported collateral investigations of aviator neg-ligence (question 6); but in the case of accidentrate ceilings (question 7), where they would bedirectly responsible for the failure or success ofaccident prevention programs, 65 were againstsuch a method of enforcement; and (b) in all fair-ness to the commanders, it is recognized there israpid turnover in command assignments in RVNand, where units do not have established andeffective accident prevention programs, it is ex -tremely difficult for new commanders to analyzeaccident situations, set up effective programs andadjust them as accidents occur, all within a fewmonths. It appears the only way accident rateceilings could be accepted and used as a methodof enforcing accident prevention programs is after

sound and effective programs have been estab-lished for each unit. Commanders are understand-ab ly r e l u c t a n t to t ake r e s p o n s i b i l i t y fo runsatisfactory safety programs established byothers. However, where unsatisfactory unit pro-grams exist, some authority has to recognize suchprograms and take necessary steps to improvethem, even if it means removing commanders.

Conclusions:(1) The safety attitude of inexperienced aviators

43


46/68


s highly influenced by unit practices and procedures and, aside from flight school, the unit s thebest place to develop proper safety attitudes.

(2) Unit commanders form the safety attitude of

inexperienced aviators because they control unitsafety practices and procedures.(3) In combat environs, commanders expect,

but do not accept, higher accident rates. Theyare, therefore, not willing to trade safety for mission accomplishment.

(4) A surprisingly large number of commanders(35 ) and ASOs (33 ) agree that safety receivessufficient emphasis only after accidents occur,lending support to the hypothesis that a tendencyto oil the wheel that squeaks is a relativelystable phenomenon.

(5) Agreement among 92 of the commandersdisclosed a dramatic shift away from the forgiveand-forget philosophy about accidents, and toward recognition of the need for vigorous enforcement of accident prevention programs.

(6) Of all commanders, 62.5 agreed collateralinvestigations were a useful method for enforcingsafety programs, but the amount of agreementdecreased with decreasing command levels.

(7) As a second method for enforcing safetyprograms, commanders did not approve (54.5 against, 19.5 undecided and 26 for) of assigning accident rate ceilings to each unit.

Safety Training Requirements of Aviation UnitsThe previous section focused on enforcement ofsafety at unit levels in determining who was responsible for forming safety attitudes, why theattitudes exist and what should be done to im-

A vi tion unit commanders overwhelmingly agree that groundcomm nd ers need further tr ining in vi tion operations

44 FEBRUARY 1972


47/68

prove them. One of the major findings was thataviators attitudes toward safety are significantlyshaped by unit experiences. t follows that ifproper safety attitudes are not shaped by the timeaviators are assigned, safety training requirements

have gone lacking and need to be satisfied somewhere other than during combat. This section investigates these requirements and suggestspossible remedies.

Question 8. Individual aviators, particularlythose at unit level, do not have a good under-standing of the Army's aviation accident preven-tion program.

f aviators are to develop a proper attitude toward aviation safety, they should understand theArmy s overall concept of safety (encompassingentire aircraft life cycles) and know their role inthe program. However, 55.5% of the commandersand 67.5 % of the ASOs agreed that aviators donot have a satisfactory understanding of theglobal Army program. Among commanders, thisb e l i e f is m o s t p r e v l e n t (72 .5 % ) a tbrigade/battalion level. f aviators at unit level donot have a clear view of aviation safety s overallprogram, it is easy to understand why aviatorsfresh out of flight school can have their attitudesswayed by risky unit practices and even casualremarks by unit commanders. In this same light,it is also easy to understand difficulties experienced by commanders and ASOs in enforcing unitaccident prevention programs. f aviators do nothave a solid foundation in aviation safety , it willbe difficult for them to understand safety at theunit level and to ensure their compliance withsafety procedures formulated by particular units .

Question 9. The Army's aircraft accident pre-vention program should be taught as a subjectduring flight school.

Responses to question 8 revealed aviators donot have a sufficient understanding of the overallaviation safety program. This finding, along withthose of the preceding section, suggests that unitshave enough trouble teaching and enforcing their

own safety programs, without the handicap ofaviators who do not have a good basic understanding of aviation safety. Question 9 askedwhere aviators should be given this basic understanding. Overwhelmingly (92.5 % ), the command-ers agreed the Army s accident preventionprogram should be taught as a subject duringflight school. The few disagreeing may have reasoned that the hectic forced pace schedule oftraining during flight school cannot stand yet an-


other subject. However, additional time requiredby an Army-wide aviation safety course couldprove significant to unit safety programs by reducing accidents and increasing mission accom-plishment.

Question10

Monthly safety meetings withmandatory subjects should be abolished in favorof more frequent informal discussions of currentunit safety problems.

In questions 8 and 9, commanders agreed thataviators do not have a basic understanding of theArmy s safety program and it should be the topicof a course taught in flight school. Question 10seeks to reveal a further dimension of the prob-lem by asking if monthly safety meetings arecompromised by set mandatory subject mattersthat should be taught in flight school and whetherthese meetings should be changed to more frequent informal information exchange discussionsof unit safety problems. To this dual question , thesingle response 61 % ) was yes.

From questions 8 and 9, it is clear that commanders recognize a need for formal safety training and feel it should be a flight school subject.The response to question 10 verifies that they feelbasic safety subjects are topics for flight schooland should not consume monthly safety meetingswhere pressing matters of unit safety require anundivided exchange of views and experiences.The disagreement (32 % ) evidenced perhaps reflects the opinion of commanders who, throughcareful planning and execution, are able to successfully combine formal subject matter and cur-ren t un i t s a f e ty p r o b l e m s . H o w e v e r , theresponses indicate these commanders are in adefinite minority and most can ll afford the timeand effort required to teach subjects in combatsettings that should be taught in school.

Question 11. Ground commanders need addi-tional training in aviation operations such as load-ing of troops, preparation of PZs, selection andtraining of padmasters, observation and reportingof weather conditions, etc.

The subject of question 11 diverges from theother questions in this section, but it does con-cern unit training and requires responses fromaviation unit commanders who are most familiarwith the problem and its results in terms of accidents. Commanders strongly agreed (92 % ) thatground commanders need additional training inaviation operations. Close and coordinated interaction between aviation and ground personnel is

Continued on page 56

45


48/68

omex Underwear

This unit is a VIP flight detachment supporting a majorcommand. We are required towear the class A (AG-44 orkhaki) uniform for all flightstransporting General/Flag offi

cers or equivalent civilians. Themajority of our flights fall in thiscategory.

I recently obtained information about the availability ofNomex underwear from Atlas-A

V I T IO N C C I D E N T

P R E V E N T I O N

O R U M

6

an interch nge o f

ideas between readersnd US VS

on subjects ofaviation ccident

prevention

Company . The price quoted forthe shirt was $6.25; trousers,

5.75; and socks, 2.00.Do you have any information

about Nomex underwear, suchas protection afforded, availability through normal supply chan

nels, provisions for fundingpurchases and alternate supplysources at more reasonableprices?

f we are unable to obtainf lame-re tardant underwearthrough supply channels, wehope to be able to fund themthrough local procurement channels. The information requestedwill enhance the possibility ofapproval for this procurement.CWO, ASO

With respect to protectionafforded by Nomex underwear,USAAA VS s not aware of anyexperimental work or data collection regarding the flame protection of Nomex underwear wornunder standard Army uniforms.Results o f a recent US ArmyAeromedical Research Laboratory s tudy, Knox, Et. A I . ,tend to indicate the best flameprotection is obtained through acombination of standard Army50-percent cotton/50-percentwool underwear worn under thestandard Nomex flight suit. Thisprotection is equal to or betterthan that provided by the experimental Nomex underwear wornunder the Nomex flight suit.

There is no authorization(TDA, TOE , etc.) for Nomexunderwear. Author i ty may beobtainable through a special letter of authorization submitted

through channels, with completejustification for the item. Nomexunderwear is no t ava i l ab lethrough normal A r m y supplychannels . Final determination ofthe flight clothing system mayormay not include Nomex underwear.

Additional sources of supplyfor flame-retardant underwearinclude but are not limited to

Sears and Penney's. Their prices,however, are higher than thosequoted in your letter and currentavailability s unknown.

We checked with a representative o f the US Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory, and it

is his opinion that if the classA uniform must be worn inlieu of the Nomex flight suit, thebest protection can be obtainedthrough the wear of Army issue(all wool) class A uniformwith Army standard long underwear.

B o t h U S A A R L a n dU S A A A V S recommend thatunder no circumstances shouldthe outer uniform be of the typethat uses nylon, orIon, rayon orany other man-made fibers.When exposed to heat, thesefibers melt , forming a moltenmass.

urvival

Recently I ran across an article on survival with your address. I am very interested insurvival and would appreciateany assistance possible in helping locate information on survival, survival training, equipmentused and the uses of this equipment.

My sources seem to be verylimited so far. There isn't muchwritten about it.-Civilian reader

Thank you for your letter andyou r interest in survival and survival equipment. Your letter doesnot indicate a military affiliationor connection which would permit us to send you the pertinentgovernment publications. There

fore, we offer the following information on how a member of thecivilian community can obtainmilitary publications relating tosurvival.

Department of the Ar m y FieldManual, FM 21-76 , and Department of the Air Forc e Manual ,AFM 64-5 , both deal exclusivelywith survival and are availablefor purchase at a cost of 1.00



49/68

each from the Superintendent ofDocuments, US GovernmentPrinting Office, Washington,D.C. 20402.

Periodicals are published byeach of the three services andcover all facets of aviation safe

ty, including survival and survival equipment. These are listedbelow and are available by subscription from the Superintendento f Documents , GovernmentPrinting Office, Washington,D.C. 20402.

a) u .s. A R M Y A VIA T I O N D I-GEST 4.50 per year (domesticrate)

(b) AEROSPACE SAFETY (U.S.Air Force), 4 .00 per year (domestic)

(c) APPROACH (U.S. Navy),7.00 per year (domestic)Civilian publications on sur

vival and survival equipment andtraining appear to be few. At thiswriting, only one such periodicalis available in our library, SAFEEngineering, which is the journalof the Survival and Flight Equipment Association and is publ ished bimonth ly by ValueEngineering Publications, Inc.There have been a few bookswritten on the subject, however,and in recent weeks, one of thesportsman magazines has published a good, well-illustratedvolume. Perhaps your local li-brary may be a possible sourceof materia/.

nsigniaIn response to many queries

about whether enlisted flight crewmembers should be allowed to

wear cloth insignia on theirNomex flight suits, USAAA VSposition is that cloth insigniasewn on flight suits are preferable to metal pin-on insignia froma safety standpoint. Pin-on insignia are a source of FOD and ofinjury to face and neck in crashor postcrash escape sequences.Further, they present a definiteentanglement hazard for shoulder

FEBRU RY 1972

harness, communication cordsand personal equipment. Thenature and location of sewn-oninsignia are not considered significant from a safety standpoint.

PublicationsWe've also had many queriesabout available aviation safetypublications. In addition toweekly and monthly mishapsummaries, the following publications are currently availablefrom USAAA VS. Army unitsmay obtain copies by writing to:CO, USAAA VS, ATTN: E&P,Fort Rucker, Alabama 36360.

Guide to A viation ResourcesManagement for Aircraft MishapPr evention, Second Edi t i onThis booklet was prepared forcommanders, staff officers andleaders of the varied activities inArmy aviation. As its name implies, it serves as a guide forpreventing aircraft mishapsthrough the judicious and skillful use of aviation resources.

Sample A viation AccidentPrevention Prog ra m-1971 -From submissions o f aviationaccident prevention programs ofunits throughout the Army, thispamphlet was developed to helpaviation unit commanders andsafety supervisors to implementeffective accident prevention programs.

Technical Report 72-2 October 1971 entitled A viation Safetyin C o m b a t - B a s e d on an appraisal o f the experiences o fArmy aviation unit commandersin RVN, this publication di,s

closes an analysis of commanders opinions about criticalaviation safety issues arisingduring Army aviation's dramaticgrowth in response to demandsof the conflict in RVN.

OH-58 Accident SummaryThis summary includes statistics,analyses and selected mishapbriefs for the period May 1969through February 1971.

Readers are invitedto participate in this

forum. Send yourideas omments and

recommendations toUSAAAVS

Fort Rucker AI. 3636 Technical Report 71-1 Army

Midair Collisions-This reportcontains analyses o f 56 Armymidair collisions which occurredduring the period January 1963-November 1969 and conclusionsand recommenaations based onthe analyses.

Technical Report 72-1 ArmyHelicopter Terrain CollisionSt udy - This study contains anal

yses of 836 Army helicopter collisions with terrain obstaclesduring a I-year period. It summarizes major cause factors pn aworldwide basis and presentsrecommendations to prevent recurrence of similar type mishaps.

Flight Surgeons NewsletterThis publication, to be publishedfour times each year, will contain items of interest to flightsurgeons in the areas of aviationsafety, human factors, life support equipment and aviationmedicine. Flight surgeons whowish to receive this publicationmay do so by writing to theabove address.

Technical Report 71-2 WireStrike Report-This report identifies. factors and circumstanceswhich caused or contributed toArmy aircraft wire strikes. Theinformation it contains was updated in:

Preventer, the first issue ofthe Aviation Safety OfficersNewsletter , dated 1 October1971.

To obtain distribution of theU. S. A R M Y A VIA TION DIGEST and D aviation safetyposters, submit D Form 12-4 inaccordance with instructions onthe form (see AR 310-2 and page20 of this issue).

7


50/68

OBLIQUE SPIR L

s I STEPPED out of operations, I glanced upat the sky and saw the forecaster had been

right about the haze. t was dense and yellow. Ilooked across the runway at a church steeple 3miles away. I could just make out the shape and afew details, putting the field right at the visibility

minimum for VFR.I was starting out on an OV 1 photographicmission. My unit had been flying photo missionsto cover all the bridge crossings and adjacentfording sites along a river for several days and mymission was to cover three bridges and adjacent

48

T LESFBOM

TBETBOJ NThe following two stories werewritten by members of a recent

Communications Skills cl ss ofOL Daniel M. Lewis USAF, Ret.),

Institute of Aerospace Safety andManagement, University of Southern California

shorelines in a river valley. The entire misssionwas within our local flying area and I filed a local1080 for 1:30.

As I started toward the flight line I dropped bythe photo shop and told them I wanted a yellowfilter on the camera to cut through the haze. Igave the Mohawk a thorough preflight and re-checked the camera system. The photo repairmanhad just finished putting in the filter and helpedme make the functional camera test. Everythingwas working smoothly.

I started both engines, turned on the radios andcalled the tower for taxi clearance to the runuparea. Five minutes later, I was cleared for a VFRdeparture and rolling down the runway. I liftedoff at 80 knots, watched the air speed climb rap-idly through 100 knots, pulled up the gear andflaps then climbed at 140 knots. I had planned on6 500 feet for my flight to the target area. Thatwould keep me above most of the light VFR andhelicopter traffic along the north-south corridorsbetween three cities.

As I reached the target area, I rolled into awide left turn and looked the area over. Thisstretch of the river ran through a deep valleywith the hills reaching 700 to 1 000 feet above thevalley floor. The haze was thick, restricting visi-bility to 3 to 4 miles. For the scale I needed onthe photos, I was going to have to make mypasses at about 700 feet above the river. Concerned about other possible traffic along the river

I decided to go down and make a pass directlyover the targets to take all the vertical shots firstthen climb back to altitude and check for trafficbefore going back down to shoot the obliqueshots individually. These would have to be takenwhile I was in a left turn.

I looked up and down the river and didn t seeany helicopter traffic in either direction. I pulledthe power levers back and rolled into a descending turn toward the river, leveling off at 700 feetand 200 knots. I pushed the power levers forward

FEBRUARY 1972


51/68

to maintain 200 knots and checked my headingand alignment with the first target. It looked goodand I flipped on the camera switch as I approached the first target. The camera pulse lightflashed its steady rhythmical pulse, showing thecamera was working.

I switched the camera off after the first targetand started lining up on the second target. Ilooked across the river at the hills on the far side.The valley was a little over 3 miles wide at thatpoint and I reasoned I would have no troubleturning when I started shooting the oblique photos. As I flipped the camera switch off after passing the third bridge, I pulled up into a climbingturn to take another look at the area before Istarted the oblique photos. I leveled off at 4,500feet, checked the film footage remaining in thecamera and pulled the camera sight up from itsstowed position to the left hatch canopy. I set thecamera sight to 3 degrees. I planned to use about15 degrees of bank in my turns and this wouldgive me the 45 degrees oblique photos I needed.

I checked for traffic again, lined up for the firsttarget and started a descending left turn. Iplanned my descent so I would reach 700 feet andbe in a left turn around the target with about 15degrees of bank. I leveled off still turning and myposition looked good. I readjusted the camerasight and, turning my head to my left shoulder,took a look. The sight was right on target andholding. I turned my head back into the cockpitand looked under my right arm to locate the cam

era switch on the rear of the center console. Ifound the switch and flipped it on with my righthand. As I turned my head back to the camerasight, I felt the aircraft rolling to the right and outof the turn I had established. I immediatelymoved the stick left to hold the turn. Looking tomy left through the camera sight, I could not seemy target. I reasoned that I had leveled too muchand applied more left stick.

Suddenly, all I could see through the sight wasriver-straight down I jerked my head away fromthe sight, realized I was rolling past 90 degrees ofmy bank and saw my air speed increasing to al

most 300 knots. My heart sank. I was in a tightspiral, below 700 feet. By instinct, I wrenched thestick to the right to level the wings and startedhauling back on it. I could see the ripples of smallwaves on the river and felt I was surely going intothe water. My eyes started to blur. The g meter was showing 4 g. All I could see down thetunnel my eyes were forming was water. DecidingI was too low to eject, I pulled back harder onthe stick, hoping my wings were level. My visiondimmed almost into blackout, then I saw a pin


hole of the sky. I relaxed some of the pressure onthe stick and slowly saw more of the sky. I wasclimbing I pushed the power levers forward andlooked out at the river. It was barely 50 feet below. I was shaking all over and drenched insweat.

I leveled off at 9,500 feet and headed home. I

decided I'd get the oblique photos later. Besides,I was out of film. I had left the camera runningduring the pullout from the spiral. Before tryingagain, I told myself, I would develop a procedurefor turning the camera on without having to turnmy head from looking left, to looking backwardunder my right arm

QUALIFIED

T 1415 HOURS on a fall day, an OH-23crashed just west of a small southern town.

A group of NCOs witnessed the crash and rushedto the scene to give first aid to the passenger who

had fallen from the helicopter as it crashedthrough the trees. Someone tried to help the pilot,but was unable to remove him because the helicopter was inverted. The pilot's personal effectswere removed and sent back to his unit with thereport o his death I was that pilot

I graduated from flight school 7 months beforethe accident. Since that time I had flown about 4hours in other type helicopters and 4 hours inOH-23s.

I was a member of a helicopter company whereI had been assigned after graduation. A missionorder came in requiring five OH-23 qualified pilots

to go TDY for several months. They were to pickup five OH-23s and fly them to another post tosupport a vehicle transportation group. Four OH-23 qualified warrant officers volunteered immediately. I also volunteered, though I was not OH-23qualified. Flying time was hard to come by inthose days and I was young and eager. I alsothought I could fly anything. Since no other pilotsshowed any interest in the mission, it was decidedto give me a qualification ride around the traffic

49


52/68

T LES FROM THE TROJ N

pattern and make me the fifth pilot for the mission.

I was given a I-hour ride in the traffic pattern atthe local field and, early in the afternoon, wewere issued our OH-23Bs. It was near dark whenwe left on the first leg of our flight. My first reali

zation of lack of training came as I started mylanding approach. It was pitch black and I didn'tknow where the landing light switch was. When Ifound the switch and turned on the light I foundmyself less than 5 feet above the ground and descending. I managed to get it on the ground buttold no one for fear of having my ability questioned. After all I did salvage the landing and Iwas sure I was beginning to get the feel of theOH-23.

The next day we flew on to our destinationwhere we remained to become familiar with our

new unit and its method of operation, mainlygroup headquarters support. It was here that welearned that we would soon be on our way to another state to participate in a field maneuver. Fifteen days after our arrival we left for our fieldposition. Twenty miles east of our first plannedfuel stop I had to make an emergency landing ina cotton field. The coupling joining the enginecooling fan with its drive shaft from the transmission failed and dropped into the fan. I gained mycool in time to recover from the autorotation Istarted at the first loud noise and landed withpower. I was a little shook and rightly so. The fan

blades almost severed the collective push-pulltube when they were knocked out of alignment bythe failed coupling.

Three weeks after we arrived at our field position I had accumulated approximately 40 hours inthe OH-23 and thought that I could fly the box itcame in. Little did I realize my inexperience wasabout to make me a statistic. A mission came intooperations and it was my time up. Shortly afterlunch I left to pick up my passenger and takehim on an area recon. I remember landing in a

50

very small confined area then woke up in a hospital the next afternoon.

Approximately 30 minutes after the accidentsomeone discovered that I was still alive. I wasextracted from the wreckage and my passengerand I were evacuated to the hospital. It was thereI regained consciousness the following afternoon,approximately 4 hours after the accident. I remembered nothing since landing the day before.

Witnesses reported the helicopter took off,reached an altitude just above the tall pines appeared to stop turned sideways to the right andthe rotor blades struck the tops of the trees. TheOH-23 started down through the trees flippedupside down and came to rest on the mast, withthe bubble in a depression in the ground. Thepassenger was thrown or fell out and sustained adislocated hip and numerous lacerations.

I had started the flight with a full load of fuel

and flown about 30 minutes before the accident.Needless to say in an inverted OH-23 the pilot isgoing to get a good fuel bath. I smelled like gasoline for a week and realized that I was very luckyto be alive. It was a one-in-a-million chance that,as the helicopter hit the ground, the cockpitwould come to rest over a hole in the ground.Had it been on level ground I doubt if I would behere today because this was during the era beforeflight helmets. It was also a miracle the wreckagedid not burn.

I was hospitalized for 3 months then releasedand returned to flight status. During my stay in

the hospital and since I have wondered if it wastruly as the accident board stated: Pilot error forlanding in an area of insufficient size and poortechnique on takeoff.

Was I really qualified and experienced enoughto handle that mission? Was the only cause of thisaccident pilot error, or was it a contributingcause? Was there another factor involved thattoday's aircraft accident investigation boards aremore aware of? Could the real cause of this accident be called sup rvisory error?



53/68

PEARL S

personal equipment andrescue/survival lowdownDear Pearl:

In the past the AVIATION DIGEST has published several articles and photographs stressingthe proper wear of protect iveflight equipment. I believe theseefforts have fostered a genuineconcern by the individual aviatortoward the proper wear of hispersonal equipment in such amanner as to provide him maxi-

mum protection. In regards tothe Nomex flight suit however there is a protect ive neck tabwhich I feel has been overlooked as an item of protection.To date I have never flown withanother aviator who used thistab properly and I constantlyget strange looks when I usemine. Another distressing fact isthat I have known aviators who

have cut this neck tab off sotheir collars would lie downneatly. I think everyone canreadily see how beneficial thisneck tab could be in case of fire.How about printing an up-todate photo showing the neck tabbeing proper ly worn so tha teveryone can start getting themaximum protection availablefrom their flight equipment.

CPT Lawrence T. SmithOperations OfficerAdvanced Instrument

Flight DivisionDepartment of Advanced

Flight TrainingUSAAVNSFt. Rucker AL 36360

Dear Captain Smith:I certainly agree that no one

should cut the neck tab from hisNomex flight suit The accompa-nying picture shows how thisneck tab should e used to affordm ximum protection duringemergencies or other hazardoussituations Thank you for bring-ing this to our attention

Pearl

5


54/68

5

To be found guilty o grossnegligence fter 4 ye rs o

honor ble service w s difficult cross to be r

U S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


55/68

ajor Roy P HookEducatio n and Prevention epartment

US VS

GUILTYIGUILTY UILTYIAJOR OVERSIGHT thought his head wouldexplode from the resounding effect the ver-

dict created as his mind retraced the events lead-ing to his predicament. To be found guilty of

gross negligence after4

years of honorable ser-vice was a difficult cross to bear. He suddenlyrealized that his own occasional disregard for reg-ulations and technical manuals had directly con-t r ibu ted to the t r ag ic acc ident involvingLieutenant Hapless, the accident for which henow faced castigation.

t all began during Major Oversight's initialofficer training. While he'd been given some in-struction on the supply and use of official publica-tions, there hadn't been much emphasis placed onthe subject and the sense of importance was miss-ing. t seemed only natural that he was apprehen-sive when he was assigned the additional duty ofunit publications officer during his first tour. Hisuneasiness was allayed when Captain Dunder-head, his unit commander, told him: Don ' tworry about it, Oversight. Publications are justguides and can't take the place of common senseanyway. Besides, they're hard to get and keep upwith. If you need one we don't have, you canborrow it from battalion.

But Major Oversight recalled being embar-rassed when the unit received an unsatisfactory

FEBRUARY972

rating for publications during an Adjutant GeneralInspection (AGI) that year. The inspector admon-ished him, saying, You must establish an effec-tive publications supply and utilization program

Publications provide all the information essentialto the performance of official duties. DA publica-tions are published by order of the Secretary ofthe Army in the name of the Chief of Staff andauthenticated by the Adjutant General, as repre-senting the acts, orders and directions of the Sec-retary of the Army.

Unfortunately, Major Oversight had been reas-signed shortly after the AGI and did not becomeinvolved with management of publications supplyand use programs again until he had assumedcommand of his company 6 months before histrial. But he recalled many intervening signalswarning of the need to have, study and use offi-cial publications. Emphasis had been placed onthe use of publications during flight training, onArmy regulations in particular. The opening state-ment by the academics instructor had set thestage: Army regulations are our most significantpublications, since they contain missions, respon-sibilities, policies and administrative proceduresnecessary to ensure uniform compliance withthose policies. While regulations are directive in

53


56/68

GUILTY GUILTY GUILTY

nature, they also serve as guides in many instances. The directive nature of instructions willbe clearly indicated, if such is intended, by theuse of imperative (do this) and future indicative(will) language.

Then came Vietnam, where many violations ofregulations and operating procedures were clothedin the false fur of combat necessity. There,Major Oversight fell victim to the to hell with it,this is war syndrome. This debilitating attitudeaccompanied him on his return to Fort Downfallwhere he assumed command of a unit filled with

personnel with similar experiences. Most had recently returned from Vietnam and were still afflicted with the here's the way w do it in thereal world attitude. t was only a matter of time,and Lieutenant Hapless just happened to be thevictim.

The sharp rap of the gavel brought Major Oversight back to reality. Do you have anything tosay for yourself before I charge the jury to determine your sentence, Major Oversight?

Yes, your Honor. Yes, I do. When I enteredmy plea, I really felt I was innocent. I feel different now. t is eminently clear to me now that aneffective publications supply and use program isessential to the orderly and effective accomplishment of assigned missions. I did not provide thatfor my unit. While I can't change the past, I canhelp chart the future. f given a chance to continue as commander, I will establish a model publications supply and use program.

First, I'll appoint a unit publications officer.After briefing him on his duties and what I expectof him,I will require him to study AR 310-1, AR310-2, DA Pam 310-10 and DA Pam 310-13. Thesepublications govern general policies, supply, posting and filing of publications. Next, I'll have himprepare a publications SOP for the unit. This SOPwill include requirements and procedures forquarterly inventories, semiannual reviews of theDA Form 12 series, posting and filing, review ofthe weekly bulletins from the publications supplycenters, requisitions and use of publications.Once I have approved this SOP, the publicationsofficer will present a class to all supervisory personnel on our publications supply and use program.

54

We should then have an effective program.

However, to ensure that it has a proper foundation, we will accomplish a comprehensive initialreview. Each section will prepare a list of all publications it requires, using the DA Pam 310 series.One copy of the list will be kept on file in the section and one copy provided the publications officer. Each sec t ion will then inven tory i tspublications. Those on hand, but not needed, willbe turned in to the publications officer. Thosewhich have been superseded will be destroyed. Alist of current requirements will then be prepared.One copy will be kept on file and one copy provided the publications officer. Each section will

then prepare a current copy of each DA Form 12series applicable to its area. One copy will bekept on file and one provided the publicationsofficer. The publications officer will consolidate alllists and forms and make the appropriate requisitions and submissions.

Finally, I am personally going to assist thepublications officer in establishing the proper useof publications within the unit. Each supervisorwill maintain a supervisor's bookshelf which willinclude those publications which affect his day-today operations most closely. Each section willmaintain a publications familiarization chart forall assigned personnel. Section commanders willpersonally supervise the review of new publications and changes to existing ones for any impactthey may have on present operations, policies orprocedures. All personnel will be made aware ofthe importance of and procedures for recommending necessary changes to publications. And allsupervisors will include publications supply anduse as a topic for initial briefings of newly assigned personnel.

I know that what I have said represents a bigchange from my past attitude, but now realizethat if I had enforced the proper use of publications through example and supervision, therewould have been a dash 1 checklist in that aircraft. Lieutenant Hapless would have used it andprobably been alive today.

That's all I have to say, your Honor. Thankyou.

Instructions to the jury seemed to take forever.The shrill buzz of his alarm clock caused MajorOversight to sit up sharply. Boy, what a nightmare, he thought, reaching for his s l i p p e r s

FEBRUARY 1972


57/68

ORT WOLTERS, T E X A S - C W 3 Brian R.Arsenault, left, a check pilot assigned to theArmy Primary Helicopter School s Flight Evaluation Branch, was presented the Army aviation Broken Wing ~ w r dby Brigadier General Leo E.Soucek, commandant. CW3 Arsenault was conducting a student evaluation ride in a TH-SSA. On climb-

Broken Wing wardsORT WOLTERS, TEXAS-CW2 Gary M.

Butler, right P at Dempsey Army Heliport,

was presented the Army aviation Broken WingAward by Colonel James D. Bowen, a sistantcommandant of the Army Primary HelicopterSchool. CW2 Butler was on a TH-SSA trainingmission at t 000 feet over rocky and hilly terrainwhen the throttle eized. He was unable to maintain ufficient power to make a running landingand decided to autorotate. He flew to the heliportand autorotated, landing without damage. Analysis revealed that an accumulation of dirt and otherresidue caused binding in the throttle mechanism.


ou t fro m the stage field with the stude n t at thecontrols, the engine failed at approximately 100 feetand S knots. CW3 Arsenault immediately took control and entered autorotation, turning 20 degrees leftto land in the only available open area, approximately the same dimension as those of the helicopter. He landed with only incident damage.


58/68

S FETY IN COMBAT continued from page 45required for all aviation supported operations.The strength of the commanders' response to thisquestion indicates this interaction is not adequate.Army aircraft accident files contain much datasupporting this opinion. This suggests that trainingfor aviation supported operations would be prop-

erly included in ground commander careercourses.Conclusions:(8) Aviators do not sufficiently understand the

overall concept of aviation safety, making it diffi-cult to teach them unit level safety and to policetheir compliance with each unit's particular safetyrequirements.

(9) The Army's safety program should be thesubject of a course in flight school because unitshave enough trouble teaching and enforcing theirparticular safety requirements without being hand-icapped by aviators not having a basic under-

standing of aviation safety and their role in it.(10) Commanders feel a solid background inaviation safety is a flight school responsibility andshould not consume the monthly safety meetings,where pressing matters of unit safety require fre-quent informal exchanges of information.

(11) Commanders overwhelmingly (92%) agreedthat ground commanders need further training inaviation operations, indicating the interactionbetween aviation and ground personnel is unsatis-factory and suggesting that aviation supportedoperations should be included as a topic in groundcommander career courses.

Role of A viation Safety Officers. In precedingsections, the role of unit commanders in aviationunit safety and training was explored. The pur-pose of this section is to investigate the role ofunit ASOs by exploring how they are used, wherethey are needed and the command support theyreceive.

Question 12. At unit level the aviation safetyofficer should be an authorized TO&E position.

The purpose of question 12 was to determinecurrent opinion about the use of ASO positions.In the past, many have subscribed to the theorythat each aviator should be responsible for hissafety and that of his colleagues. However, com-manders (70 ) clearly recognized the usefulnessof ASOs by endorsing the idea of an authorizedTO&E position. In spite of this strong support,19 of the commanders disagreed, perhaps be-cause of unsatisfactory experiences with ASOs.Or, this minority might still subscribe to the no-tion that, where safety is concerned, each aviatorshould be his brother's keeper. f this is the case,

56

these commanders should review the discussionof question 2, where it is noted that accident filesevidence inexperienced aviators taking evencommanders' casual remarks as license to tradesafe principles of flight for mission accomplish-ment. Not many experienced aviators want aninexperienced aviator as their keeper when their

lives are on the line. I t is the policy of most unitcommanders to appoint ASOs, even though noregulatory requirement exists for their establish-ment as a TO&E position at or below companylevel.

Question 13. The most qualified and experi-enced aviation safety personnel are found at bat-talion level or higher.

Question 14. There is a need for well qualifiedand experienced aviation safety personnel at com-pany level.

In response to question 13, 67% of all com-manders indicated the most qualified and experi-

enced ASOs were at battalion level or higher.Higher level commanders strengthened this bys t rong ly agree ing (89.5 of those atbrigade/battalion levels and 84.5% of those atcompany level). The opinions of higher levelcommanders might be more valid because theyhave worked at both lower and higher levels ofcommand and are in a better position to comparethe qualifications and experience of ASOs at both.Nevertheless, the majority of all commandersagreed that ASOs with the highest abilities wereat upper command levels. This raises a crucialpoint about whethe

Army Aviation Digest - Feb 1972

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Transcript of Army Aviation Digest - Feb 1972