Armed Resistance to Crime

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    |GunCite Home|

    Reprinted by special permission of Northwestern University School of Law, Journal

    of Criminal Law and Criminology, vol !", issue #, #$$%

    &rmed Resistance to Crime'

    (he )revalence and Nature of Self*+efense with a Gun

    I. INTRODUCTION

    Crime victims used to be i-nored by criminolo-ists (hen, be-innin- slowly in the

    #$./s and more rapidly in the #$0/s, interest in the victim1s role in crime -rew 2et a

    tendency to treat the victim as either a passive tar-et of another person1s wron-doin-

    or as a virtual accomplice of the criminal limited this interest (he concept of the

    victim*precipitated homicide3#4 hi-hli-hted the possibility that victims were not

    always blameless and passive tar-ets, but that they sometimes initiated or contributed

    to the escalation of a violent interaction throu-h their own actions, which they often

    claimed were defensive

    )erhaps due to an unduly narrow focus on lower*class male*on*male violence,

    scholars have shown little openness to the possibility that a -ood deal of 5defensive5

    violence by persons claimin- the moral status of a victim may be 6ust that (hus, many

    scholars routinely assumed that a lar-e share of violent inter*actions are 5mutual

    combat5 involvin- two blameworthy parties who each may be re-arded as both

    offender and victim (he notion that much violence is one*sided and that many

    victims of violence are lar-ely blameless is dismissed as naive

    & few criminolo-ists have re6ected the simplistic mutual combat model of violence,

    thou-h they sometimes limit its re6ection to a few special subtypes of violence,

    especially family violence, rape, and, more -enerally, violence of men a-ainst women

    and of adults a-ainst children374 However, the more one loo8s, the more e9ceptions

     become evident, such as felony 8illin-s lin8ed with robberies, bur-laries, or se9ual

    assaults, contract 8illin-s, mass 8illin-s, serial murders, and homicides where the

    violence is one*sided :ndeed, it may be more accurate to see the mutual combat

    common amon- lower*class males to be the e9ception rather than the rule :f this is so,

    then forceful actions ta8en by victims are easier to see as -enuinely and lar-ely

    defensive

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    ;nce one turns to defensive actions ta8en by the victims of property crimes, it is even

    easier to ta8e this view (here are few robberies, bur-laries, larcenies, or auto thefts

    where it is hard to distin-uish offender from victim or to identify one of the parties as

    the clear initiator of a criminal action and another party as a relatively le-itimate

    responder to those initiatives (he traditional conceptualiuential form of forceful resistance is armed resistance,

    especially resistance with a -un (his form of resistance is worthy of special attention

    for many reasons, both policy*related and scientific (he policy*related reasons are

    obvious' if self*protection with a -un is commonplace, it means that any form of -un

    control that disarms lar-e numbers of prospective victims, either alto-ether, or only in

    certain times and places where victimiuences of victim self*protection'

    the defensive actions of crime victims have si-nificant effects on the outcomes of

    crimes, and the effects of armed resistance differ from those of unarmed resistance

    )revious research has consistently indicated that victims who resist with a -un or

    other weapon are less li8ely than other victims to lose their property in robberies3?4

    and in bur-laries3.4 Consistently, research also has indicated that victims who resist

     by usin- -uns or other weapons are less li8ely to be in6ured compared to victims who

    do not resist or to those who resist without weapons (his is true whether the research

    relied on victim surveys or on police records, and whether the data analysis consisted

    of simple cross*tabulations or more comple9 multivariate analyses (hese findin-s

    have been obtained with respect to robberies3%4 and to assaults3"4 Coo8304 offers his

    unsupported personal opinion concernin- robbery victims that resistin- with a -un is

    only prudent if the robber does not have a -un (he primary data source on which

    Coo8 relies flatly contradicts this opinion National Crime =ictimi

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    8ind of weapon were less li8ely to have the rape attempt completed a-ainst them

    Findin-s concernin- the impact of armed resistance on whether rape victims suffer

    additional in6uries beyond the rape itself are less clear, due to a lac8 of information on

    whether acts of resistance preceded or followed the rapist1s attac8 (he only two rape

    studies with the necessary se>uence information found that forceful resistance by rape

    victims usually follows, rather than precedes, rapist attac8s inflictin- additional in6ury,undercuttin- the proposition that victim resistance increases the li8elihood that the

    victim will be hurt3#?4 (his is consistent with findin-s on robbery and assault3#.4

    II. THE PREVALENCE OF DEFENSIVE GUN USE (DGU) IN PREVIOUS SURVEYS

    A. THE NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY (NCVS)

    However consistent the evidence may be concernin- the effectiveness of armed victim

    resistance, there are some who minimi

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    e>ual to that of all of the alternative estimates3774 :n effect, even the National

    &cademy of Sciences -ives no more wei-ht to estimates from numerous independent

    sources than to an estimate derived from a sin-le source which is, as e9plained below,

    sin-ularly ill*suited to the tas8 of estimatin- +GU fre>uency

    (his sort of bland and spurious even*handedness is misleadin- For e9ample, Reissand Roth withheld from their readers that there were at least nine other estimates

    contradictin- the NC=S*based estimate instead they va-uely alluded only to 5a

    number of surveys,537?4 as did Coo8,37.4 and they down played the estimates from

    the other surveys on the basis of flaws which they only speculated those

    surveys might  have Kven as speculations, these scholars1 con6ectures were

    conspicuously one*sided, focusin- solely on possible flaws whose correction would

     brin- the estimate down, while i-norin- obvious flaws, such as respondents @RsA

    for-ettin- or intentionally concealin- +GUs, whose correction would push the

    estimate up Further, die speculations, even if true, would be wholly inade>uate to

    account for more than a small share of the enormous nine*to*one or more discrepancy

     between the NC=S*based estimates and all other estimates For e9ample, the effects

    of telescopin- can be completely cancelled out by the effects of memory loss and

    other recall failure, and even if they are not, they cannot account for more than a tiny

    share of a discrepancy of nine*to*one or more

    K>ually important, those who ta8e the NC=S*based estimates seriously have

    consistently i-nored the most pronounced limitations of the NC=S for estimatin-

    +GU fre>uency (he NC=S is a non anonymous national survey conducted by a

     branch of the federal -overnment, the US Iureau of the Census :nterviewers

    identify themselves to Rs as federal -overnment employees, even displayin-, in face*

    to*face contacts, an identification card with a bad-e Rs are told that the interviews are

     bein- conducted on behalf of the US +epartment of 6ustice, the law enforcement

     branch of the federal -overnment &s a preliminary to as8in- >uestions about crime

    victimi

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    the weapon, either in -eneral or at the time of the +GU, mi-ht itself be unlawful,

    either in fact or in the mind of a crime victim who used one ore li8ely, lay persons

    with a limited 8nowled-e of the e9tremely complicated law of either self*defense or

    firearms re-ulation are unli8ely to 8now for sure whether their defensive actions or

    their -un possession was lawful

    :t is not hard for -un*usin- victims interviewed in the NC=S to withhold information

    about their use of a -un, especially since they are never directly asked whether they

    used a gun for self-protection (hey are as8ed only -eneral >uestions about whether

    they did anythin- to protect themselves37"4 :n short, Rs are merely -iven the

    opportunity to volunteer the information that they have used a -un defensively &ll it

    ta8es for an R to conceal a +GU is to simply refrain from mentionin- it, ie, to leave

    it out of what may be an otherwise accurate and complete account of the crime

    incident

    Further, Rs in the NC=S are not even as8ed the -eneral self*protection >uestionunless they already independently indicated that they had been a victim of a crime

    (his means that any +GUs associated with crimes the Rs did not want to tal8 about

    would remain hidden :t has been estimated that the NC=S may catch less than one*

    twelfth of spousal assaults and one*thirty*third of rapes,3704 thereby missin- nearly all

    +GUs associated with such crimes

    :n the conte9t of a non anonymous survey conducted by the federal -overnment, an R

    who reports a +GU may believe that he is placin- himself in serious le-al 6eopardy

    For e9ample, consider the issue of the location of crimes For all but a handful of -un

    owners with a permit to carry a weapon in public places @under . of the adult population even in states li8e Florida, where carry permits are relatively easy to -etA

    37!4, the mere possession of a -un in a place other than their home, place of business,

    or in some states, their vehicle, is a crime, often a felony :n at least ten states, it is

     punishable by a punitively mandatory minimum prison sentence37$4 2et, !! of the

    violent crimes which Rs reported to NC=S interviewers in #$$7 were committed

    away from the victim1s home,3?/4 ie, in a location where it would ordinarily be a

    crime for the victim to even possess a -un, never mind use it defensively Iecause the

    >uestion about location is as8ed before the self*protection >uestions,3?#4 the typical

    violent crime victim R has already committed himself to havin- been victimiuirements

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    concernin- re-istration of the -un1s ac>uisition or possession, permits for purchase,

    licensin- of home possession, stora-e re>uirements, and so on :n li-ht of all these

    considerations, it may be unrealistic to assume that more than a fraction of Rs who

    have used a -un defensively would be willin- to report it to NC=S interviewers

    (he NC=S was not desi-ned to estimate how often people resist crime usin- a -un :twas desi-ned primarily to estimate national victimiuestions which include response cate-ories

    coverin- resistance with a -un :ts survey instrument has been carefully refined and

    evaluated over the years to do as -ood a 6ob as possible in -ettin- people to report

    ille-al thin-s which other  people have doneto them (his is the e9act opposite of the

    tas8 which faces anyone tryin- to -et -ood +GU estimates**to -et people to admit

    controversial and possibly ille-al thin-s which the Rs themselves have done

    (herefore, it is neither surprisin-, nor a reflection on the survey1s desi-ners, to note

    that the NC=S is sin-ularly ill*suited for estimatin- the prevalence or incidence of

    +GU :t is not credible to re-ard this survey as an acceptable basis for establishin-, in

    even the rou-hest way, how often &mericans use -uns for self*protection

    B. THE GUN SURVEYS

    &t least thirteen previous surveys have -iven a radically different picture of the

    fre>uency of +GUs (he surveys, summariuestions pertainin-

    to -uns (hey are an e9tremely hetero-eneous collection, some conducted byacademic researchers for scholarly purposes, others by commercial pollin- firms

    oreover, their sponsors differed some were sponsored by pro*-un control

    or-aniuency, even thou-h they

    otherwise seem to have been conducted >uite professionally Some of the surveyswere flawed by as8in- >uestions that used a lifetime recall period @5Have you

    ever 5A, ma8in- it impossible to estimate uses within any specified time span3?74

    Some surveys limited covera-e to re-istered voters, while others failed to e9clude

    defensive uses a-ainst animals, or occupational uses by police officers, military

     personnel, or private security -uards3??4 Some as8ed the 8ey >uestions with

    reference only to the R, while others as8ed Rs to report on the e9periences of all of the

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    members of their households, relyin- on second*hand reports3?.4 ethodolo-ical

    research on the NC=S indicates that substantially fewer crime incidents are reported

    when one household member reports for all household members than when each

     person is interviewed separately about their own e9periences3?%4 (he same should

    also be true of those crime incidents that involve victims usin- -uns

    (he least useful of the surveys did not even as8 the defensive use >uestion of all Rs,

    instead it as8ed it only of -un owners, or, even more narrowly, of 6ust hand-un owners

    or 6ust those who owned hand-uns for protection purposes3?"4 (his procedure was

    apparently based on the dubious assumption that people who used a -un defensively

    no lon-er owned the -un by the time of the survey, or that the -un belon-ed to

    someone else, or that the R owned the -un for a reason other than protection or 8ept it

    outside the home

    ost importantly, the surveys did not as8 enou-h >uestions to establish e9actly what

    was done with the -uns in reported defensive use incidents &t best, some of thesurveys only established whether the -un was fired (he lac8 of such detail raises the

     possibility that the -uns were not actually 5used5 in any meanin-ful way :nstead, Rs

    mi-ht be rememberin- occasions on which they merely carried a -un for protection

    56ust in case5 or investi-ated a suspicious noise in their bac8yard, only to find nothin-

     Nevertheless, amon- these imperfect surveys, two were relatively -ood for present

     purposes Ioth the Hart survey in #$!# and the auser survey in #$$/ were national

    surveys which as8ed carefully worded >uestions directed at all Rs in their samples

    Ioth surveys e9cluded uses a-ainst animals and occupational uses (he two also

    nicely complemented each other in that the Hart survey as8ed only about uses ofhand-uns, while the auser survey as8ed about uses of all -un types (he Hart survey

    results implied a minimum of about "./,/// annual +GUs involvin- hand-uns, while

    the auser results implied about 0//,/// involvin- any type of -un3?04 :t should be

    stressed, contrary to the claims of Reiss and Roth,3?!4 that neither of these estimates

    entailed the use of 5dubious ad6ustment procedures5 (he percent of sample

    households reportin- a +GU was simply multiplied by the total number of US

    households, resultin- in an estimate of +GU*involved households (his fi-ure,

    compiled for a five year period, was then divided by five to yield a per*year fi-ure

    :n effect, each of the surveys summari

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    usin- the same >uestion auser used (he >uestion was addressed to all Rs it

    concerned the e9periences of all household members it pertained to the use of any

    type of -un and it e9cluded uses a-ainst animals (he full set of ad6ustments is

    e9plained in detail elsewhere3?$4

    Kleven of the surveys permitted the computation of a reasonable ad6usted estimate of+GU fre>uency (wo surveys for which estimates could not be produced were the

    Cambrid-e Reports and the (imeMCNN Neither as8ed the +GU >uestion of all Rs

    thus, it would be sheer speculation what the responses would have been amon- those

    Rs not as8ed the +GU >uestion &ll of the eleven surveys yielded results that implied

    over 0//,/// uses per year None of the surveys implied estimates even remotely li8e

    the "%,/// to !7,/// fi-ures derived from the NC=S (o date, there has been no

    confirmation of even the most appro9imate sort of the NC=S estimates :ndeed, no

    survey has ever yielded an estimate which is of the same ma-nitude as those derived

    from the NC=S

    However, even the best of the -un surveys had serious problems First, none of them

    established how many times Rs used a -un defensively within the recall period :t was

    necessary to conservatively assume that each +GU*involved person or household

    e9perienced only one +GU in the period, a fi-ure which is li8ely to be an

    underestimation Second, althou-h the auser and Hart surveys were the best

    available surveys in other respects, they as8ed Rs to report for their entire households,

    rather than spea8in- only for themselves (hird, while these two surveys did use a

    specific recall period, it was five years, which encoura-ed a -reater amount of both

    memory loss and telescopin- (he lon-er the recall period, the more memory loss

     predominates over telescopin- as a source of response error,3./4 supportin- the

    conclusion that a five year recall period probably produces a net under reportin- of

    +GUs Fourth, while the surveys all had acceptably lar-e samples by the standards of

    ordinary national surveys, mostly in the "// to #%// ran-e, they were still smaller

    than one would prefer for estimatin- a phenomenon which is fairly rare Bhile on

    avera-e the sample siuency, it will

    affect the amount of samplin- error Finally, none of the surveys established e9actly

    what Rs did with their -uns in reported +GUs, ma8in- it impossible to be certain that

    they were actually used in any meanin-ful way :n sum, while the -un surveys are

    clearly far superior to the NC=S for estimatin- +GU fre>uency, they have si-nificantshortcomin-s (hese are discussed in -reater detail elsewhere3.#4

    :t was the -oal of the research reported here to remedy those flaws, to develop a

    credible estimate of +GU fre>uency, and to learn somethin- about the nature of +GU

    incidents and the people who defend themselves with -uns

      C. THE NATIONAL SELF-DEFENSE SURVEY

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    1. Methods

    (he present survey is the first survey ever devoted to the sub6ect of armed self*

    defense :t was carefully desi-ned to correct all of the 8nown correctable or avoidable

    flaws of previous surveys which critics have identified Be use the most anonymous

     possible national survey format, the anonymous random di-it dialed telephone surveyBe did not 8now the identities of those who were interviewed, and made this fact

    clear to the Rs Be interviewed a lar-e nationally representative sample coverin- all

    adults, a-e ei-hteen and over, in the lower forty*ei-ht states and livin- in households

    with telephones3.74 Be as8ed +GU >uestions of all Rs in our sample, as8in- them

    separately about both their own +GU e9periences and those of other members of their 

    households Be used both a five year recall period and a one year recall period Be

    in>uired about uses of both hand-uns and other types of -uns, and e9cluded

    occupational uses of -uns and uses a-ainst animals Finally, we as8ed a lon- series of

    detailed >uestions desi-ned to establish e9actly what Rs did with their -uns for

    e9ample, if they had confronted other humans, and how had each +GU connected to a

    specific crime or crimes

    Be consulted with North &merica1s most e9perienced e9perts on -un*related surveys,

    +avid Iordua, James Bri-ht, and Gary auser, alon- with survey e9pert Seymour

    Sudman, in order to craft a state*of*the*art survey instrument desi-ned specifically to

    establish the fre>uency and nature of +GUs3.?4 & professional telephone pollin-

    firm, Research Networ8 of (allahassee, Florida, carried out the samplin- and

    interviewin- ;nly the firm1s most e9perienced interviewers, who are listed in the

    ac8nowled-ements, were used on the pro6ect :nterviews were monitored at random

     by survey supervisors &ll interviews in which an alle-ed +GU was reported by the R

    were validated by supervisors with call*bac8s, alon- with a 7/ random sample of all

    other interviews ;f all eli-ible residential telephone numbers called where a person

    rather than an answerin- machine answered, "# resulted in a completed interview

    :nterviewin- was carried out from February throu-h &pril of #$$?

    (he >uality of samplin- procedures was well above the level common in national

    surveys ;ur sample was not only lar-e and nationally representative, but it was also

    stratified by state (hat is, forty*ei-ht independent samples of residential telephone

    numbers were drawn, one from each of the lower forty*ei-ht states, providin- forty*

    ei-ht independent, albeit often small, state samples Given the nature of randomly

    -enerated samples of telephone numbers, there was no clusterin- of cases or

    multista-e samplin- as there is in the NC=S3..4 conse>uently, there was no inflation

    of samplin- error due to such procedures (o -ain a lar-er raw number of sample

    +GU cases, we over sampled in the south and west re-ions, where previous surveys

    have indicated -un ownership is hi-her3.%4 Be also over sampled within contacted

    households for males, who are more li8ely to own -uns and to be victims of crimes in

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    which victims mi-ht use -uns defensively3."4 +ata were later wei-hted to ad6ust for

    over samplin-

    Kach interview be-an with a few -eneral 5throat*clearin-5 >uestions about problems

    facin- the R1s community and crime (he interviewers then as8ed the followin-

    >uestion' 5Bithin the past five years, have you yourself or another member of yourhousehold used  a -un, even if it was not fired, for self*protection or for the protection

    of property at home, wor8, or elsewhere )lease do not  include military service,

     police wor8, or wor8 as a security -uard5 Rs who answered 5yes5 were then as8ed'

    5Bas this to protect a-ainst an animal or a person5 Rs who reported a +GU a-ainst a

     person were as8ed' 5How many incidents involvin- defensive uses of -uns a-ainst

     persons happened to members of your household in the past five years5 and 5+id this

    incident 3any of these incidents4 happen in the past twelve months5 &t this point, Rs

    were as8ed 5Bas it you who used a -un defensively, or did someone else in your

    household do this5

    &ll Rs reportin- a +GU were as8ed a lon-, detailed series of >uestions establishin-

    e9actly what happened in the +GU incident Rs who reported havin- e9perienced

    more than one +GU in the previous five years were as8ed about their most recent

    e9perience Bhen the ori-inal R was the one who had used a -un defensively, as was

    usually the case, interviewers obtained his or her firsthand account of the event Bhen

    the ori-inal R indicated that some other member of the household was the one who

    had the, e9perience, interviewers made every effort to spea8 directly to the involved

     person, either spea8in- to that person immediately or obtainin- times and dates to call

     bac8 Up to three call*bac8s were made to contact the +GU*involved person Be

    anticipated that it would sometimes prove impossible to ma8e contact with these

     persons, so interviewers were instructed to always obtain a pro9y account of the +GU

    from the ori-inal R, on the assumption that a pro9y account would be better than none

    at all :t was rarely necessary to rely on these pro9y accounts**only si9 sample cases

    of +GUs were reported throu-h pro9ies, out of a total of 777 sample cases

    Bhile all Rs reportin- a +GU were -iven the full interview, only a one*third random

    sample of Rs not reportin- a +GU were interviewed (he rest were simply than8ed for 

    their help (his procedure helped 8eep interviewin- costs down :n the end, there were

    777 completed interviews with Rs reportin- +GUs, another #,"#/ Rs not reportin- a

    +GU but -oin- throu-h the full interview by answerin- >uestions other than those

     pertainin- to details of the +GUs (here were a total of #,!?7 cases with the full

    interview &n additional ?,#.% Rs answered only enou-h >uestions to establish that no

    one in their household had e9perienced a +GU a-ainst a human in the previous five

    years @unwei-hted totalsA (hese procedures effectively under*sampled for non*+GU

    Rs or, e>uivalently, over sampled for +GU*involved Rs +ata were also wei-hted to

    account for this over samplin-

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    Duestions about the details of +GU incidents permitted us to establish whether a

    -iven +GU met all of the followin- >ualifications for an incident to be treated as a

    -enuine +GU' @#A the incident involved defensive action a-ainst a human rather than

    an animal, but not in connection with police, military, or security -uard duties @7A the

    incident involved actual contact with a person, rather than merely investi-atin-

    suspicious circumstances, etc @?A the defender could state a specific crime which hethou-ht was bein- committed at the time of the incident @.A the -un was actually used

    in some way**at a minimum it had to be used as part of a threat a-ainst a person,

    either by verbally referrin- to the -un @e-, 5-et away**:1ve -ot a -un5A or by pointin-

    it at an adversary Be made no effort to assess either the lawfulness or morality of the

    Rs1 defensive actions

    &n additional step was ta8en to minimiuency bein-

    overstated (he senior author went throu-h interview sheets on every one of the

    interviews in which a +GU was reported, loo8in- for any indication that the incident

    mi-ht not be -enuine & case would be coded as >uestionable if even 6ust one of four

     problems appeared' @#A it was not clear whether the R actually confronted any

    adversary he saw @7A the R was a police officer, member of the military or a security

    -uard, and thus mi-ht have been reportin-, despite instructions, an incident which

    occurred as part of his occupational duties @?A the interviewer did not properly record

    e9actly what the R had done with the -un, so it was possible that he had not used it in

    any meanin-ful way or @.A the R did not state or the interviewer did not record a

    specific crime that the R thou-ht was bein- committed a-ainst him at the time of the

    incident (here were a total of twenty*si9 cases where at least one of these

     problematic indications was present :t should be emphasi

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    anyone in their household @household*based estimatesA (he person*based estimates

    should be better because of its first*hand character Finally, some of the fi-ures pertain

    only to +GUS involvin- use of hand-uns, while others pertain to +GUS involvin-

    any type of -un

    (he methods used to compute the (able 7 estimates are very simple and strai-ht*forward )revalence @5 Used5A fi-ures were computed by dividin- the wei-hted

    sample fre>uencies in the top two rows of numbers by the total wei-hted sample si

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    on how many household +GUs had been e9perienced in the recall period by those Rs

    reportin- any such e9periences Usin- a shorter recall period undoubtedly reduced the

    effects of memory loss by reducin- the artificial shrin8a-e to which earlier estimates

    were sub6ect &lthou-h telescopin- was also undoubtedly reduced, and this would, by

    itself, tend to reduce estimates, the impact of reducin- telescopin- was apparently

    smaller than the impact of reducin- case loss due to for-ettin- Kvidence internal tothis survey directly indicates that a one year recall period yields lar-er estimates than

    a five year recall period compare fi-ures in the ri-ht half of (able 7 with their

    counterparts in the left half (his phenomenon, where less behavior is reported for a

    lon-er recall period than would be e9pected based on results obtained when usin- a

    shorter period, also has been observed in surveys of self*reported use of illicit dru-s

    3%#4

    Furthermore, basin- estimates on Rs reports about +GUs in which they were

     personally involved also increases the estimates ;ne of the surprises of this survey

    was how few Rs were willin- to report a +GU which involved some other member of

    their household Ki-hty*five percent of the reports of +GUs we obtained involved the

    ori-inal R, the person with whom the interviewer first spo8e Given that most

    households contain more than one adult eli-ible to be interviewed, it was surprisin-

    that in a +GU*involved household the person who answered the phone would

    consistently turn out to be the individual who had been involved in the +GU ;ur

    stron- suspicion is that many Rs feel that it is not their place to tell total stran-ers that

    some other member of their household has used a -un for self*protection Some of

    them are willin- to tell stran-ers about an incident in which they were themselves

    involved, but apparently few are willin- to 5inform5 on others in their household Still

    others may not have been aware of +GUs involvin- other household members

    Kvidence internal to the present survey supports this speculation, since person*based

    estimates are "" to 00 hi-her than household*based estimates a fi-ure that su--ests

    that there was more complete reportin- of +GUs involvin- the ori-inal respondent

    than those involvin- other household members3%74 For this reason, previous surveys

    includin- those which yielded only household*based estimates, four of the si9 -un

    surveys which yielded usable annual estimates, and all of those which were national in

    scope, probably substantially underestimated +GUs

    Be also had information on the number of times that +GU*involved households hade9perienced +GUs durin- the five year recall period Bhile it was necessary in

    computin- previous estimates to conservatively assume that each +GU*involved

     person or household had e9perienced only one +GU, our evidence indicates that

    repeat e9periences were not uncommon, with 7$% of +GU*involved households

    reportin- more than one +GU within the previous five years (he avera-e number of

    +GUs in this time span was #% per +GU*involved household (his information alone

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    could account for a rou-hly %/ increase in +GU incidence estimates based on the

    five year recall period

    Finally, our survey was superior to the NC=S in two additional ways' it was free of

    the taint of bein- conducted by, and on behalf of, employees of the federal

    -overnment, and it was completely anonymous

    :t would be incorrect to say that the present estimates are inconsistent with those

    derived from the earlier -un surveys &voidin- apples*and*oran-es comparisons,

    compare fi-ures from (able 7 with earlier results summariuestion most similar to the one used in the present survey, indicate that in

    #$$/, ?! of households reported a +GU involvin- a -un of any 8ind in the previous

    five years3%?4 and in #$!#, . reported a +GU involvin- a hand-un in the previous

    five years3%.4 (he past*five*years, household*based 5 Used5 fi-ures in (able

    7 indicate ?$ for all -uns, and ?/ for hand-uns Bhere directly comparable, the present results are within samplin- error of the results of the best two previous

    surveys :ndeed, the consistency is remar8able -iven the substantial differences

    amon- the surveys and the twelve year difference between the Hart survey and the

    current one Further, the only prior survey with person*based estimates and a one year

    recall period, the #$0" Field poll in California, yielded a #. prevalence fi-ure for

    hand-uns,3%%4 compared to #/ in the present survey3%"4

    Bith a sample si

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    ? @7% millionM$? millionA of the people with immediate access to a -un could have

    used one defensively in a -iven year

    Hu-e numbers of &mericans not only have access to -uns, but the overwhelmin-

    ma6ority of -un owners, if one can believe their statements, are willin- to use a -un

    defensively :n a +ecember #$!$ national survey, 0! of &merican -un owners statedthat they would not only be willin- to use a -un defensively in some way, but would

     be willin- to shoot  a bur-lar3%$4 (he percenta-e willin- to use a -un defensively

    in some way, thou-h not necessarily by shootin- someone, would presumably be even

    hi-her than this

     Nevertheless, havin- access to a -un and bein- willin- to use it a-ainst criminals is

    not the same as actually doin- so (he latter re>uires e9periencin- a crime under

    circumstances in which the victim can -et to, or already possesses, a -un Be do not

    8now how many such opportunities for crime victims to use -uns defensively occur

    each year :t would be useful to 8now how lar-e a fraction of crimes with directoffender*victim contact result in a +GU Unfortunately, a lar-e share of the incidents

    covered by our survey are probably outside the scope of incidents that realistically are

    li8ely to be reported to either the NC=S or police :f the +GU incidents reported in

    the present survey are not entirely a subset within the pool of cases covered by the

     NC=S, one cannot meanin-fully use NC=S data to estimate the share of crime

    incidents which result in a +GU Nevertheless, in a ten state sample of incarcerated

    felons interviewed in #$!7, ?. reported havin- been 5scared off, shot at, wounded

    or captured by an armed victim53"/4 From the criminals1 standpoint, this e9perience

    was not rare

    How could such a serious thin- happen so often without becomin- common

    8nowled-e (his phenomenon, re-ardless of how widespread it really is, is lar-ely an

    invisible one as far as -overnmental statistics are concerned Neither the

    defenderMvictim nor the criminal ordinarily has much incentive to report this sort of

    event to the police, and either or both often have stron- reasons not  to do so

    Conse>uently many of these incidents never come to the attention of the police, while

    others may be reported but without victims mentionin- their use of a -un &nd even

    when a +GU is reported, it will not necessarily be recorded by the police, who

    ordinarily do not 8eep statistics on matters other than +GUs resultin- in a death, since

     police record*8eepin- is lar-ely confined to information helpful in apprehendin-

     perpetrators and ma8in- a le-al case for convictin- them Iecause such statistics are

    not 8ept, we cannot even be certain that a lar-e number of +GUs are not  reported to

    the police

    (he health system cannot shed much li-ht on this phenomenon either, since very few

    of these incidents involve in6uries3"#4 :n the rare case where someone is hurt, it is

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    usually the criminal, who is unli8ely to see8 medical attention for any but the most

    life*threatenin- -unshot wounds, as this would ordinarily result in a police

    interro-ation )hysicians in many states are re>uired by law to report treatment of

    -unshot wounds to the police, ma8in- it necessary for medically treated criminals to

    e9plain to police how they received their wounds

    Finally, it is now clear that virtually none of the victims who use -uns defensively tell

    interviewers about it in the NC=S ;ur estimates imply that only about ? of +GUs

    amon- NC=S Rs are reported to interviewers3"74 Iased on other comparisons of

    alternative survey estimates of violent events with NC=S estimates, this hi-h level of

    under*reportin- is eminently plausible Loftin and ac8enuent as NC=S estimates indicate, while spousal

    violence could easily be twelve times as hi-h3"?4 (here is no inherent value to

    8nowin- the e9act number of +GUs any more than there is any value to 8nowin- the

    e9act number of crimes which are committed each year (he estimates in (able 7 are

    at best only rou-h appro9imations, which are probably too low :t is sufficient to

    conclude from these numbers that +GU is very common, far more common than has

     been reco-niuency with which -uns are

    used for criminal purposes (he hi-hest annual estimate of criminal -un use for the

     pea8 year of -un crime is the NC=S estimate for #$$7, when there were an estimated

    !.0,"%7 violent crime incidents in which, accordin- to the victim, at least one

    offender possessed a -un3".4 (his NC=S fi-ure is not directly comparable with our

    +GU estimates because our +GU estimates are restricted only to incidents in which

    the -un was actually used by the defender, as opposed to incidents in which a victim

    merely possessed a -un any of the 5-un crimes5 in the NC=S, on the other hand, do

    not involve the -un actually bein- used by the criminal (hus, the NC=S estimate of

    5-un crimes5 overstates the number of crimes in which the offender actually used the

    -un (he only 5-un crimes5 reported in NC=S interviews that one can be confident

    involved offenders actually usin- -uns are those in which they shot at a victim but

    these were only #"" of 5hand-un crimes5 reported in the NC=S from #$!0 to #$$7

    3"%4

    &nother ."! of the 5hand-un crimes5 are labelled 5weapon present5 cases by the

    Iureau of 6ustice @IJSA3""4 and an un8nown fraction of these could  involve actual use

    of a -un in a threat but NC=S data do not permit us to 8now 6ust how lar-e a fraction

    For these cases, the relevant NC=S interview items are ambi-uous as to whether the

    -un was used to threaten a victim Response cate-ory four of >uestion fourteen @5How

    were you threatened5A of the NC=S Crime :ncident Report reads' 5Beapon present

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    or threatened with weapon53"04 Bhen this cate-ory is recorded by the interviewer, it

    is impossible to determine whether the victim was actually threatened with a -un or

    merely reported that the offender possessed a -un :n the remainin- ?"" of the

    5hand-un crimes,53"!4 there is no indication at all that the -un alle-edly possessed by

    the offender was actually used

    Kven the presence of a weapon is debatable, since victims are not as8ed why they

    thou-ht the offender possessed a -un or if they saw a -un (his raises the possibility

    that some victims assumed that the offender had a -un, or inferred it from a bul-e in

    the offender1s clothin-, or accepted the word of an offender who was bluffin- about

    havin- a -un

    (hus, somewhere between #"" and "?.3"$4 of NC=S*defined 5hand-un crime5

    victimiuently victimi

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    Ioth parameters also are sub6ect to underestimation due to intentional respondent

    under reportin- :t is also probable that typical survey Rs are more reluctant to tell

    interviewers about >uestionable acts that they themselves have committed, such as

    threatenin- another person with a -un for purportedly defensive reasons, than they are

    to report criminal acts that other people have committed against  them &ssumin- this

    is correct, it would imply that +GUs, even in the best surveys, are under reportedmore than -un crime victimi

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    & total of 777 sample cases of +GUs a-ainst humans were obtained For nine of

    these, the R bro8e off discussion of the incident before any si-nificant amount of

    detail could be obtained, other than that the use was a-ainst a human (his left 7#?

    cases with fairly complete information &lthou-h this dataset constitutes the most

    detailed body of information available on +GU, the sample siuency are reliable because they are based on avery lar-e sample of .,$00 cases, results pertainin- to the details of +GU incidents are

     based on 7#? or fewer sample cases, and readers should treat these results with

    appropriate caution

    &part from the sample siualify as relevant to our in>uiries

    (hus, in addition to the mostly le-itimate and serious cases covered in our sample,

    there are still other, less le-itimate or serious +GU incidents that this or any other

    survey are li8ely to miss (his supposition would imply two 8inds of bias in our

    descriptive results' @#A our +GUs would loo8 more consistently 5le-itimate5 than the

    entire set of all +GUs actually are and @7A our +GUs would loo8 more serious, on

    avera-e, than the entire set of +GUs really are (hese possibilities should be 8ept in

    mind when considerin- the followin- descriptive information

    (able ? summari

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    the -un crimes reported in the NC=S involve the offender shootin- at the victim, and

    only ? involve the victim sufferin- a -unshot wound3004

    Low as it is, even an ! woundin- rate is probably too hi-h, both because of the

    censorin- of less serious cases, which in this conte9t would be cases without a

    woundin-, and because the survey did not establish how Rs 8new they had woundedsomeone Be suspect that in incidents where the offender left without bein- captured,

    some Rs remembered with favor5 their mar8smanship and assumed they had hit their

    adversaries :f !? really hit their adversaries, and a total of #%" fired at their

    adversaries, this would imply a %? @!?M#%"A 5incident hit rate,5 a level of combat

    mar8smanship far e9ceedin- that typically observed even amon- police officers :n a

    review of fifteen reports, police officers inflicted at least one -unshot wound on at

    least one adversary in ?0 of the incidents in which they intentionally fired at

    someone30!4 & %? hit rate would also be triple the #! hit rate of criminals

    shootin- at crime victims30$4 (herefore, we believe that even the rather modest !?

    woundin- rate we found is probably too hi-h, and that typical +GUs are less serious

    or dramatic in their conse>uences than our data su--est :n any case, the !? fi-ure

    was produced by 6ust seventeen sample cases in which Rs reported that they wounded

    an offender

    &bout ?0 of these incidents occurred in the defender1s home, with another ?" near 

    the defender1s home3!/4 (his implies that the remainin- 70 occurred in locations

    where the defender must have carried a -un throu-h public spaces &ddin- in the ?"

    which occurred near the defender1s home and which may or may not have entailed

     public carryin-, ?" to "? of the +GUs entailed -un carryin-

    Guns were most commonly used for defense a-ainst bur-lary, assault, and robbery

    3!#4 Cases of 5mutual combat,5 where it would be hard to tell who is the a--ressor or

    where both parties are a--ressors, would be a subset of the ?/ of cases where

    assault was the crime involved However, only #$ of all +GU cases

    involved only assault and no other crime where victim and offender could be more

    easily distin-uished Further, only ## of all +GU cases involved only assault and a

    male defender**we had no information on -ender of offenders**some subset of these

    could have been male*on*male fi-hts (hus, very few of these cases fit the classic

    mutual combat model of a fi-ht between two males (his is not to say that such crimes

    where a -un*usin- combatant mi-ht claim that his use was defensive are rare, but

    rather that few of them are in this sample :nstead, cases where it is hard to say who is

    victim and who is a--ressor apparently constitute an additional set of >uestionable

    +GUs lyin- lar-ely outside of the universe of more one*sided events that our survey

    methods could effectively reach

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    (his survey did not attempt to compare the effectiveness of armed resistance with

    other forms of victim self*protection, since this sort of wor8 has already been done

    and reviewed earlier in this paper )anels + and K nevertheless confirm previous

    research on the effectiveness of self*defense with a -un**crime victims who use this

    form of self*protection rarely lose property and rarely provo8e the offender into

    hurtin- them :n property crime incidents where bur-lary, robbery, or other thefts wereattempted, victims lost property in 6ust ## of the cases Gun defenders were in6ured

    in 6ust %% of all +GU incidents Further, in !. of the incidents where the defender 

    was threatened or attac8ed, it was the offender who first threatened or used force

    :n none of the eleven sample cases where -un defenders were in6ured was the

    defender the first to use or to threaten force (he victim used a -un to threaten or

    attac8 the offender only after  the offender had already attac8ed or threatened them and

    usually after the offender had inflicted the in6ury (here is no support in this sample

    for the hypothesis that armed resistance provo8es criminals into attac8in- victims this

    confirms the findin-s of prior research3!74

    Bhile only #. of all  violent crime victims face offenders armed with -uns,3!?4 #!

    of the -un*usin- victims in our sample faced adversaries with -uns3!.4 &lthou-h the

    -un defenders usually faced unarmed offenders or offenders with lesser weapons, they

    were more li8ely than other victims to face -un*armed criminals (his is consistent

    with the perception that more desperate circumstances call forth more desperate

    defensive measures (he findin-s undercut the view that victims are prone to use -uns

    in 5easy5 circumstances which are li8ely to produce favorable outcomes for the victim

    re-ardless of their -un use3!%4 :nstead, -un defenders appear to face more difficult

    circumstances than other crime victims, not easier ones

     Nevertheless, one reason crime victims are willin- to ta8e the ris8s of forcefully

    resistin- the offender is that most offenders faced by victims choosin- such an action

    are unarmed, or armed only with less lethal weapons Relatively few victims try to use

    a -un a-ainst adversaries who are themselves armed with -uns &ccordin- to this

    survey, offenders were armed with some 8ind of weapon in .! of +GU incidents but

    had -uns in only #! of them3!"4

    (he distribution of -uns by type in +GUs is similar to that of -uns used by criminals

     NC=S and police*based data indicate that about !/ of -uns used in crime are

    hand-uns,3!04 and the present study indicates that !/ of the -uns used by victims

    are hand-uns3!!4

    :ncidents where victims use a -un defensively are almost never -unfi-hts where both

     parties shoot at one another ;nly 7. of the incidents involved the defender firin-

    their -un, and only #" involved the defender shootin- at their adversary3!$4 :n only

    .% of the cases did the offender shoot at the defender3$/4 Conse>uently, it is not

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    surprisin- that only ? of all the incidents involved both parties shootin- at each

    other

    &mon- our sample cases, the offenders were stran-ers to the defender in nearly three

    >uarters of the incidents3$#4 Be suspect that this a-ain reflects the effects of sample

    censorin- Just as the NC=S appears to detect less than a tenth of domestic violenceincidents,3$74 our survey is probably missin- many cases of +GU a-ainst family

    members and other intimates

    Bhile victims face multiple offenders in only about 7. of all  violent crimes,3$?4 the

    victims in our sample who used -uns faced multiple offenders in %? of the incidents

    3$.4 (his mirrors the observation that criminals who use -uns are also more li8ely

    than unarmed criminals to face multiple victims3$%4 & -un allows either criminals or

    victims to handle a lar-er number of adversaries any victims facin- multiple

    offenders probably would not resist at all if they were without a -un or some other

    weapon &nother possible interpretation is that some victims will resort to a defensivemeasure as serious as wieldin- a -un only if they face the most desperate

    circumstances &-ain, this findin- contradicts a view that -un defenders face easier

    circumstances than other crime victims

    &nother way of assessin- how serious these incidents appeared to the victims is to as8 

    them how potentially fatal the encounter was Be as8ed Rs' 5:f you had not  used a

    -un for protection in this incident, how li8ely do you thin8 it is that you or someone

    else would have been killed  Bould you say almost certainly not , probably not, mi-ht

    have, probably would have, or almost certainly would have been 8illed5 )anel E

    indicates that #%0 of the Rs stated that they or someone else 5almost certainlywould have5 been 8illed, with another #.7 respondin- 5probably would have5 and

    #"7 respondin- 5mi-ht have53$"4 (hus, nearly half claimed that they perceived

    some si-nificant chance of someone bein- 8illed in the incident if they had not used a

    -un defensively

    :t should be emphasiualify as relevant to our in>uiries

    :f we consider only the #%0 who believed someone almost certainly would have

     been 8illed had they not used a -un, and apply this fi-ure to estimates in the first two

    columns of (able 7, it yields national annual estimates of ?./,/// to .//,/// +GUs

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    of any 8ind, and 7./,/// to ?//,/// uses of hand-uns, where defenders stated, if

    as8ed, that they believed they almost certainly had saved a life by usin- the -un Just

    how many of these were truly life*savin- -un uses is impossible to 8now &s a point

    of comparison, the lar-est number of deaths involvin- -uns, includin- homicides,

    suicides, and accidental deaths in any one year in US history was ?!,?7? in #$$#

    3$04

    Finally, we as8ed if Rs had reported these incidents to the police, or if the police

    otherwise found out about them ". of the -un*usin- victims claimed that the

    incidents had become 8nown to the police (his fi-ure should be interpreted with

    caution, since victims presumably want to present their use of -uns as le-itimate and a

    willin-ness to report the incident to the police would help support an impression of

    le-itimacy Rs who had in fact not reported the incident to the police mi-ht have

    wondered whether a 5no55 reply mi-ht not lead to discomfortin- follow*up >uestions

    li8e 5why not5 @as indeed it does in the NC=SA Further, it is li8ely that some Rs

    reported these incidents but did not mention their use of a -un

    IV. WHO IS INVOLVED IN DEFENSIVE GUN USE?

    Finally, this &rticle will consider what sorts of people use -uns defensively, and how

    they mi-ht differ from other people (able . presents comparisons of five -roups' @#A

    5defenders,5 ie, people who reported usin- a -un for defense @7A people who

     personally own -uns but did not report a +GU @?A people who do not personally own

    a -un @.A people who did not report a +GU, re-ardless of whether they own -uns

    and @%A all people who completed the full interview

    Some of the earlier -un surveys as8ed the +GU >uestion only of Rs who reported

    ownin- a -un (he cost of this limitation is evident from the first two rows of (able .

     Nearly ./ of the people reportin- a +GU did not report personally ownin- a -un at

    the time of the interview (hey either used someone else1s -un, -ot rid of the -un since

    the +GU incident, or inaccurately denied personally ownin- a -un &bout a >uarter of

    the defenders reported that they did not even have a -un in their household at the time

    of the interview &nother possibility is that many -un owners were falsely denyin-

    their ownership of the 5incriminatin- evidence5 of their +GU

    any of the findin-s in (able . are unsurprisin- Gun defenders are more li8ely tocarry a -un for self*protection, consistent with the lar-e share of +GUs which

    occurred away from the defender1s home ;bviously, they were more li8ely to have

     been a victim of a bur-lary or robbery in the past year, a findin- which is a tautolo-y

    for those Rs whose +GU was in connection with a robbery or bur-lary committed

    a-ainst them in the precedin- year (hey were also more li8ely to have been a victim

    of an assault since becomin- an adult

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    +efenders are more li8ely to believe that a person must be prepared to defend their

    homes a-ainst crime and violence rather than lettin- the police ta8e care of it

    compared to either -un owners without a +GU and nonowners Bhether this is cause

    or conse>uence of defenders1 defensive actions is impossible to say with these data

    Some mi-ht suspect that +GUs were actually the a--ressive acts of ven-efulvi-ilantes intent on punishin- criminals :f this were true of -un defenders as a -roup,

    one mi-ht e9pect them to be more supportive of punitive measures li8e the death

     penalty :n fact, those who reported a +GU were no more li8ely to support the death

     penalty than those without such an e9perience, and were somewhat less li8ely to do so

    compared with -un owners as a -roup Similarly, -un defenders were no more li8ely

    than other people to endorse the view that the courts do not deal harshly enou-h with

    criminals

    )erhaps the most surprisin- findin- of the survey was the lar-e share of reported

    +GUs that involved women Iecause of their lower victimi

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    occupational +GUs Gun defenders were in fact somewhat less li8ely to have a -un*

    related occupation than other -un owners

    V. CONCLUSION

    :f one were committed to re6ectin- the seemin-ly overwhelmin- survey evidence onthe fre>uency of +GU, one could speculate, albeit without any empirical foundation

    whatsoever, that nearly all of the people reportin- such e9periences are simply ma8in-

    them up Be feel this is implausible &n R who had actually e9perienced a +GU

    would have no difficulty respondin- with a 5no5 answer to our +GU >uestion because

    a 5no5 response was not followed up by further >uestionin- ;n the other hand, lyin-

    with a false 5yes5 answer re>uired a -ood deal more ima-ination and ener-y Since we

    as8ed as many as nineteen >uestions on the topic, this would entail spontaneously

    inventin- as many as nineteen plausible and internally consistent bits of false

    information and doin- so in a way that -ave no hint to e9perienced interviewers that

    they were bein- deceived

    Suppose someone persisted in believin- in the anomalous NC=S estimates of +GU

    fre>uency and wanted to use a 5dishonest respondent5 hypothesis to account for

    estimates from the present survey that are as much as thirty times hi-her :n order to

    do this, one would have to suppose that twenty*nine out of every thirty people

    reportin- a +GU in the present survey were lyin- (here is no precedent in

    criminolo-ical survey research for such an enormous level of intentional and

    sustained falsification

    (he banal and undramatic nature of the reported incidents also undercuts the dishonestrespondent speculation Bhile all the incidents involved a crime, and usually a fairly

    serious one, only ! of the alle-ed -un defenders claimed to have shot their

    adversaries, and only 7. claim to have fired their -un :f lar-e numbers of Rs were

    inventin- their accounts, one would thin8 they would have created more e9citin-

    scenarios

    Iy this time there seems little le-itimate scholarly reason to doubt that defensive -un

    use is very common in the US, and that it probably is substantially more common

    than criminal -un use (his should not come as a surprise, -iven that there are far

    more -un*ownin- crime victims than there are -un*ownin- criminals and thatvictimiuency as even appro9imately valid (he -ross inconsistencies between the NC=S

    and all other sources of information ma8e it reasonable to suppose that all but a

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    handful of NC=S victims who had used a -un for protection in the reported incidents

    refrained from mentionin- this -un use :n li-ht of evidence on the in6ury*preventin-

    effectiveness of victim -un use, in some cases where the absence of victim in6ury is

    credited to either nonresistance or some unarmed form of resistance, the absence of

    in6ury may have actually been due to resistance with a -un, which the victim failed to

    mention to the interviewer

    (he policy implications of these results are strai-htforward (hese findin-s

    do not  imply anythin- about whether moderate re-ulatory measures such as

     bac8-round chec8s or purchase permits would be desirable Re-ulatory measures

    which do not disarm lar-e shares of the -eneral population would not si-nificantly

    reduce beneficial defensive uses of firearms by noncriminals ;n the other hand,

     prohibitionist measures, whether aimed at all -uns or 6ust at hand-uns, are aimed at

    disarmin- criminals and noncriminals ali8e (hey would therefore discoura-e and

     presumably decrease the fre>uency of +GU amon- noncriminal crime victims

     because even minimally effective -un bans would disarm at least some noncriminals

    (he same would be true of laws which ban -un carryin- :n sum, measures that

    effectively reduce -un availability amon- the noncriminal ma6ority also would reduce

    +GUs that otherwise would have saved lives, prevented in6uries, thwarted rape

    attempts, driven off bur-lars, and helped victims retain their property

    Since as many as .//,/// people a year use -uns in situations where the defenders

    claim that they 5almost certainly5 saved a life by doin- so, this result cannot be

    dismissed as trivial :f even one*tenth of these people are accurate in their stated

     perceptions, the number of lives saved by victim use of -uns would still e9ceed the

    total number of lives ta8en with -uns :t is not possible to 8now how many lives are

    actually saved this way, for the simple reason that no one can be certain how crime

    incidents would have turned out had the participants acted differently than they

    actually did Iut surely this is too serious a matter to simply assume that practically

    everyone who says he believes he saved a life by usin- a -un was wron-

    (his is also too serious a matter to base conclusions on silly statistics comparin- the

    number of lives ta8en with -uns with the number of criminals killed  by victims3#//4

    Eillin- a criminal is not a benefit to the victim, but rather a ni-htmare to be suffered

    for years afterward Savin- a life throu-h +GU would be a benefit, but this almost

    never involves 8illin- the criminal probably fewer than ?,/// criminals are lawfully

    8illed by -un*wieldin- victims each year,3#/#4 representin- only about #M#/// of the

    number of +GUs, and less than # of the number of purportedly life*savin- +GUs

    (herefore, the number of 6ustifiable homicides cannot serve as even a rou-h inde9 of

    life*savin- -un uses Since this comparison does not involve any measured benefit, it

    can shed no li-ht on the benefits and costs of 8eepin- -uns in the home for protection

    3#/74

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    @A (he authors wish to than8 +avid Iordua, Gary auser, Seymour Sudman, and

    James Bri-ht for their help in desi-nin- the survey instrument (he authors also wish

    to than8 the hi-hly s8illed staff responsible for the interviewin-' ichael (rapp

    @SupervisorA, +avid &ntonacci, James Ielcher, Robert Iuntin-, elissa Cross, SandyHaw8er, +ana R Jones, Harvey Lan-ford, Jr, Susannah R aher, Nia astin*

    Bal8er, Irian urray, iranda Ross, +ale Sellers, Ksty

    3#4 arvin K Bolf-an-, )atterns in Criminal Homicide 7.% @#$%!A

    374 Richard & Ier8 et al, utual Combat and ;ther Family =iolence yths, in (he

    +ar8 Side of Families #$0 @+avid Fin8elhor et al eds, #$!?A

    3?4 See -enerally ichael J Hindelan-, Criminal =ictimi

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    3#!4 See Elec8, supra note ?, at ? Gary Elec8, )oint Ilan8' Guns and =iolence in

    &merica #." @#$$#A

    3#$4 Gary & auser, Firearms and Self*defense' (he Canadian Case, )resented at the

    &nnual eetin-s of the &merican Society of Criminolo-y @;ct 7!, #$$?A

    37/4 Rand, supra note #0

    37#4 Coo8, supra note ., at %" c+owall O Biersema, supra note #%3774 Understandin- and )reventin- =iolence, supra note #%, at 7"%*""

    37?4 :d at 7"%

    37.4 Coo8, supra note ., at %.

    37%4 US Iureau of the Census, National Crime Survey' :nterviewer1s anual, NCS*

    %%/, )art + ** How to Knumerate NCS @#$!"A

    37"4 US Iureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal =ictimiuestion refers to5

    3?%4 US Iureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 7", at #..

    3?"4 Cambrid-e Reports, :nc, an &nalysis of )ublic &ttitudes (owards Hand-un

    Control @#$0!A (he ;hio Statistical &nalysis Center, ;hio Citi

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    3.#4 Elec8, supra note ?$

    3.74 Completed interviews, n.,$00

    3.?4 See, e-, +avid J Iordua et al, :llinios Law Knforcement Commission )atterns

    of Firearms ;wnership, Re-ulation and Use in :llinios @#$0$A Seymore Sudman O

     Norman Iradburn, Response Kffects in Surveys @#$0.A James Bri-ht O )eter Rossi,

    &rmed and Considered +an-erous @#$!"A &lan J Liuency @#$!#A

    3%#4 See Jerald Iachman O )atric8 ;1alley, Bhen Four onths K>ual a 2ear

    :nconsistencies in Student Reports of +ru- Use, .% )ub ;pinion D %?", %?$, %.?

    @#$!#A

    3%74 See (able 7

    3%?4 auser, supra note #$

    3%.4 )eter + Hart Research &ssociates, :nc, Duestionnaire used in ;ctober #$!#

    =iolence in &merica Survey, with mar-inal fre>uencies @#$!#A

    3%%4 See (able #, note &3%"4 See (able 7, second column

    3%04 Elec8, supra note #!, at %/ @e9trapolatin- up to #$$., from #$!0 dataA

    3%!4 +avid B oore O Fran8 Newport, )olic Stron-ly Favors Stron-ly Gun Control

    Laws, ?./ (he Gallup )oll onthly #! @#$$.A

    3%$4 Duinley, supra note ?"

    3"/4 Bri-ht O Rossi, supra note .?, at #%%

    3"#4 See (able ?, )anels &, K

    3"74 (he !%,/// +GUs estimated from the NC=S, divided by the 7% million estimate

    derived from the presented survey e>uals /?

    3"?4 Loftin O acEen

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    3"$4 #"" plus the ."! in the ambi-uous 5weapon present5 cate-ory

    30/4 Federal Iureau of :nvesti-ation, US +epartment of Justice, Crime in the United

    States #$$7**Uniform Crime Reports #!, %! @#$$?A

    30#4 )hilip J Coo8, (he Case of the issin- =ictims' Gunshot Boundin-s in the

     National Crime Survey, # J Duantitative Criminolo-y $# @#$!%A

    3074 US Iureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 7", at ??30?4 Elec8, supra note #!, at %0

    30.4 Richard B +od-e, (he Bashin-ton, + C Recall Study, in # (he National Crime

    Survey Bor8in- )apaer' Current and Historical )erspectives #. @Robert G Lehnen

    Besley G S8o-an eds, #$!#A

    30%4 Henry S Boltman et al, Recall Iias and (elescopin- in the National Crime

    Survey, in 7 (he National Crime Survey Bor8in- )apers' ethodolo-ical Studies

    !#/ @Robert G Lehnen O Besley G S8o-an eds, #$!.A Sudman O

    Iradburn, supra note ./

    30"4 See (able ?, panel &

    3004 Rand, supra note #0

    30!4 Billiam & Geller O ichael S Scott, )olice K9ecutive Research Forum, +eadly

    Force' Bhat Be Enow #//*#/" @#$$?A

    30$4 Rand, supra note #0

    3!/4 See (able ?, )anel I

    3!#4 :d at )anel C

    3!74 Elec8, supra note ?, at 0*$ Elec8 O +elone, supra note ?, at 0%*00

    3!?4 US Iureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 7", at !?

    3!.4 See (able ?, )anel F

    3!%4 For a related speculation, see Understandin- and )reventin- =iolence, supra note#%, at 7""

    3!"4 d. 

    3!04 US Iureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 7", at !? US Federal Iureau of

    :nvesti-ation, supra note 0/, at #!

    3!!4 See (able ?, )anel H

    3!$4 d. at )anel &

    3$/4 d. at )anel G

    3$#4 d. at )anel :

    3$74 Loftin O acEen

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    3$$4 Elec8, supra note #!, at %"

    3#//4 &rthur L Eellermann O +onald ( Reay, )rotection or )eril, ?#. New Kn- J

    ed #%%0 @#$!"A

    3#/#4 Elec8, supra note #!, at ## #*##0

    3#/74 See id at #70*#7$ for a more detailed criti>ue of these 56un8 science5 statistics

    See Understandin- and )reventin- =iolence, supra note #%, at 7"0 for an e9ample of a presti-ious source ta8in- such numbers seriously

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