Aristotle Religion

8/12/2019 Aristotle Religion

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Traditional and Personal Elements in Aristotle's Religion

Author(s): W. J. VerdeniusReviewed work(s):Source: Phronesis, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1960), pp. 56-70Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181667.Accessed: 02/04/2012 05:57

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TraditionalndPersonalElementsnAristotle's eligion*W. J. VERDENIUS

THERE is a special reasonwhy Aristotledeservesa place on the pro-gramme of this congress. Our general theme, "Tradition andPersonal Achievement," may be interpreted in two different ways.

We may try to determine the proportion of these two factors in theworks of the ancients. This proportion shows a large scale of variations,from the predominance of the traditional element to the predominanceof the personal element. But there is also another scale of variations,which extends from unconscious adoption of traditional views to con-scious criticism. It is from this point of view that I will discuss some ideasof Aristotle. Criticism of traditional views is to be found in the works ofmost of the Greek thinkers, including the work of Aristotle. But whatdistinguishes his attitude towards tradition from that of his predecessorsis the fact that he seems to be the first to take up a definite position withregard to tradition as a whole.' Other thinkers had confined their atten-tion to special elements of tradition, such as some theory or some popularbelief which conflicted with their own view, but they did not reflect onthe value of tradition as such. It was Aristotle who discovered tradition,i.e. who realized that tradition as such, irrespective of its special con-tents, confronts us with a problem. This problem is, whether traditionhas a value simply because it is tradition.Aristotle attached a value to tradition as such, because in his opiniontradition embodies a real experience.2 He argues that we must consider aproblem not only from a scientific point of view but also in the light ofcurrent opinions: "for with a true view all the data harmonize."3 With-out any comment he replaces the expression 'ra'. ey0'Levmy rak rmp-xov'r, and he could do so, because he seriously believed that currentopinion always expresses some real fact. "It is impossible," he writes,"that the views held by many nmenand men of old should be entirelymistaken."' Aristotle does not put the question why the current view islikely to be right. An indirect answer to this question may be deducedfrom the combination of three other passages: "Menhave a sufficient na-tural instinct for what is true, and usually do arrive at the truth,""Everyman has some contribution to make to the truth," "There is thisto be said for the Many. Each of them by himself may not be of a good* A paper readbefore the Third InternationalCongressof ClassicalStudies in Londonin September z9gs. Notes will be found at pp. 64-70 infra.56


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quality; but when they all come together it is possible that they maysurpass collectively and as a body, although not individually thequality of the few best... This is the reason why the Manyare alsobetter judges of music and the writings of poets: some appreciateonepart, some another, and all together appreciateall."5We may add theconclusion that a common opinion,wherein agreatnumberof suchindi-vidualapproaches o the truth is seen to concur, is likely to be right,becausein such a case man'snaturalaptitudefor attainingthe truth hasfounda mutual confirmation.The reliabilityof such a current view becomes still greater, if it isalso a tradition, i.e. if it reaches back to ancient times. In the passagejust quoted the expressions "manymen" and "men of old" are used inone breath. Aristotle sometimes stresses the antiquity of a traditionalview to sucha degree thathe makes the impressionof regarding his an-tiquity as a value in itself.6 The question why the antiquityof a viewshouldbe a guaranteeof its truth, is not answered by him, but in thiscase, too, we may deduce the answer from anotherpassage. "What islong established eems akin to what exists by nature".7Accordingly, theantiquity of a tradition is a justification of its existence and thus aguaranteeof its truth.

In additionto its antiquityand the large numberof itsadherentsthereis a thirdfactor which establishes he value of tradition. "Weare boundto pay some regard to the long past," writes Aristotle, "for almosteverythinghas been discoveredalready."8This means that the value oftradition lies in the fact that it cannot be surpassed.There is no realprogressin the history of thought, but, as Aristotle puts it, "the sameideasrecur in men's minds not once or twice but againandagain. Thequestion why there is such an eternal return in humanthought is notansweredby Aristotle except in an indirect way. Speakingabout poli-tical institutionshe writes: "Thesameinstitutions havebeen invented inthe course of the years on a number of different occasions- indeed anindefinite number. Necessity itself, we may reasonablysuppose, willsteadily be the mother of indispensableinventions."10 f there is ananalogy between the recurrence of these indispensable nventions andthe recurrenceof fundamentaldeas, there must be a kind of necessitybehindthe latter, too. This force which causesthe sameideas to appearagainandagainwould probablyhave been called "Nature" y Aristotle.'"If this assumption is correct, the value of tradition is based on Naturein three respects: tradition starts from a natural instinct for what istrue, its antiquity shows that it exists by nature, and its recurrent cha-racter is determined by nature.

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This natural authority of tradition does not imply that Aristotle feelscommitted to it in every respect. After saying that "almost everythinghas been discovered already," he continues, "though some of the thingsdiscovered have not been co-ordinated, and some, though known, arenot put into practice. "12 Accordingly, the only thing Aristotle holdshimself entitled to add to the views handed down by tradition is someco-ordination. This co-ordination should not be regarded as somethingentirely new but rather as the clarification of a meaning already inherentin tradition itself. The procedure of co-ordination and clarification isdescribed by Aristotle as follows: "From statements that are true butnot clearly expressed, as we advance, clearness will also be attained, ifat every stage we adopt more scientific positions in exchange for thecustomary confused statements.13 This exchange does not imply anessential transformation of the traditional views but only a supplement,as appears from another passage: "We ought to take over and use whathas already been adequately expressed before us, and confine ourselvesto attempting to discover what has hitherto been omitted."'4 Aristotleeven deems it his duty to establish the traditional views by solving theirapparent contradictions, so that their claims to the truth may becomemanifest: "We must, as in all other cases, set the observed facts beforeus and, after first discussing the difficulties, go on to prove, if possible,the truth of all the common opinions .., or, failing this, of the greaternumber and the most authoritative; for if we both remove the diffic-ulties and leave the common opinions standing, we shall haveproved thecase sufficiently. "15 The difficulties are removed by Aristotle by pointingout the relative limits of the conflicting views: "If what is said is truein one sense but not true in another, both the contradictory views standgood. "16

It is well-known that this method of co-ordination, clarification, andreconciliation has led Aristotle both to admirable and to deplorableresults. On the one hand, he is never tired of penetrating into the realmeaning of even the most obscure and strange ideas, always viewing themas serious attempts to arrive at the truth,7 on the other hand,he does notshrink from the boldest distortions and the grossest misrepresentations 18This deformation of history often seems to contradict his intellectualhonesty'9 but it should rather be explained as the inevitable consequenceof a tragic conflict, a conflict between Aristotle's belief in Nature andhis belief in himself. If, as we have seen, tradition is a special manifesta-tion of Nature and if Nature is always looking for the best,20traditionhas to be proved right anyway. If, on the other hand, any belief, tinme-


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honoured though it may be, has to vindicate itself before the tribunalof reason, Aristotle had to maintain his own position. The result wasa constant wavering between his respect for Nature and his respect forhis own reason. When it came to the point, however, Reason triumphedover Nature, and the traditional views were either rejected or adaptedor simply ignored. But in none of these cases does Aristotle plead guiltyof being disloyal to Nature. So he does not seem te be conscious of theconflict at all. It is therefore that I spoke of "a tragic conflict."The three possibilities which I have mentioned, rejection, adaptation,and ignoring, not only determine Aristotle's attitude towards traditionalviews in the field of philosophy but also in the field of religion. Anexample of outright rejection is the following criticism: "The schoolof Hesiod and all the theologians thought only of what was plausible tothemselves, and had no regard to us. For, asserting the first principles tobe gods and born of gods, they say that the beings which did not tasteof nectar and ambrosia became mortal; and clearly they are using wordswhich are familiar to themselves, yet what they have said about the veryapplication of these causes is above our comprehension. For if the godstaste of nectar and ambrosia for their pleasure, these are in no wise thecauses of their existence; and if they taste them to maintain their exist-ence, how can gods who need food be eternal? But into the subtleties ofthe mythologists it is not worth our while to inquire seriously. "21 Inother cases, however, Aristotle took the trouble to bring mythologyinto harmony with his own doctrine. He even interprets Zeus as asymbol of the unmoved mover: quoting the passage from the Iliad inwhich Zeus defies the other gods to fasten a golden rope to the heavensand to pull him down, he remarks: "Homer's words would seem appro-priate... for that which is entirely unmovable cannot be moved byanything."22The fact that Zeus sometimes moves from Olympus toMount Ida is simply ignored by Aristotle.But he does not ignore every religious tradition that is inconsistentwith his own doctrine. It was easier to suppress Nature in philosophy thanin religion. Greek religion seems to have had such an impact on Aris-totle's mind that even into his ideal state he admits such elements as did notconform to his own moral standards. He writes: "We must also preventthe exhibition of indecent pictures and the performance of indecentplays. It should therefore be the duty of the governmenit to prohibit allstatuary and painting which portrays any sort of indecent action. Anexception may, however, be made for the festivals of deities where eventhe use of scurrility is licensed by the law."23This quotation shows that


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Aristotle adoptsa much more liberal attitude towards Greek religioustradition than Plato.24Strictly speaking,however, it was not a questionof liberality, but, asI have already uggested, of an unconsciousconflict. Aristotletakesit tobe self-evident that the traditionalgods should be worshipped,28 l-though the common representations f these gods flatlycontradictedhismost fundamentalconvictions. The Aristoteliangod has no need ofaction, since he is his own end.28AIIordinaryactionsare unworthy ofhim, so that the only activityallowed to him is self-contemplation.27utthe traditionalgods constantlydirect their activities to other thingsthanthemselves. Nevertheless Aristotle does not call into question theseactivities. He accepts, for instance, divine providencewithout any dis-cussion: "Hewho exercises his reasonand cultivates t seems to be bothin the best state of mind andmost dear to the gods. For if the gods haveany care for humanaffairs,as they are thought to have, it will be rea-sonableboth thatthey should delightin that which is best and most akinto them (i.e. reason) and that they should reward those who love andhonour this most, as caring for the things that are dear to them andactingboth rightlyand nobly. And that all these attributesbelong mostof all to the philosopher s manifest. He, therefore, is the dearest to thegods. "28It has been supposedthat Aristotle here simply reports a traditionalbelief, viz. the belief that the gods reward the man who honoursthem,without committing himself to it.29 But thefact that he connects thistraditionwith his own conception of human reason as the element ofmanwhich is most akin to God,showsthat he attacheda realvalue o it.30On the other hand, there is some uncertaintyin his words, for theprovidenceof the gods is posited in a hypotheticalandimpersonal orm:"If he gods haveanycare for humanaffairsas they are thoughtto have(WcmepoxeZ)."The same uncertainty appears n another passage:"Ifthere is any gift of the gods to men, it is reasonablethat happinessshould be god-given, and most surely god-given of all human thingsinasmuchas it is the best. But this questionwould perhapsbe more ap-propriate to another inquiry; happinessseems, however, even if it isnot god-sentbut comes as a result of virtue and some processof learningor training,to be amongthe most godlike things. 31 This isperhaps hemost significantpassage n Aristotle's theology. For the other inquiryto which he refersdoes not exist, and I doubtwhetherhe ever seriouslyintended to devote himself to such an inquiry. On the one hand, hisconviction of the natural character of traditionprevented him from6o


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dismissingthe common belief in divine providence; on the other hand,he intuitivelyfelt that it was incompatiblewith his own idea of god inits strictest form.I have added the words "in its strictest form", because Aristotle didnot alwaysstick to his most rigorous definitions. In such moments hemay have vaguelythought of a kind of reconciliation between his godand the traditionalgods. In his strictest form the Aristoteliangod is thefinalcauseof the world, restingin hisown sphereandactingon theworldas a model of perfection. But the final cause sometimes develops anefficientaspect, e.g. in the following passage: "We must consider alsoin which of two waysthe nature of the universepossessesthe good andthe highestgood, whether as somethingseparateandby itself, or as theorder of the parts. Probably n both ways, as an armydoes; for its goodis found both in its order and in its leader, and more in the latter; forhe does not dependon the order but it dependson him.132 Theimageofthe leader shows that the principle of order not only transcends theworld as a model of perfection, but also pervadesthe world as a forceexercised by the supremepower.33 Consequently,the Aristoteliangod,who is the ultimate source of the good, bringsabout the order of theworld, primarily as the object of the world's desire, but secondarilyas a regulative force.34If this assumption is correct, we can also explain the fact that Aristotlesometimes equates "Nature" and "God", e.g. in the utterance "God andNature create nothing that has not its use."35 Nature as the immanentforce which underlies the order of the world is divine,36 and may becalled God in so far as it is the efficient aspect of God. This efficientaspect, however, is not the essential nature of God, but a secondaryaspect which connects him with the world. From this point of viewNature has a mediating function, transmitting the perfection of God tothe world.37 Now the Greeks called a divine being which has an inter-mediate character a 84Lpwv.38Aristotle adopted this term when hewrote: "Dreams are not sent by God... but they are 8mqL6vLa, forNature is A0L,uoVLx, but not ltoc. "13 He uses the same term whenascribing inspiration to "something 8aL,u6vtov. "40 It is true that Aristotletries to explain dreams and inspiration from natural causes,41 but thisdoes not imply that he did not take their divine character seriously.42For natural causes are at the same time divine causes,43 even if theypertain to normal phenomena. Speaking about the question whetherwe can become good "by nature" Aristotle remarks: "That which be-longs to Nature evidently does not depend on us, but as a result of some

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divine causes is present in those who are truly fortunate."4"From amodem point of view inspiration may be called a supernatural pheno-menon. But in Aristotle's view it is natural as well as divine. Accord-ingly, when he says that "poetry is inspired by God" (9v&eoq) or thatsome utterances of the ancients are "divinely said" (4sL&c),4" we have noreason to doubt that he is speaking from his own conviction. In all thesecases God makes his influence felt in the natural world.We may now venture to ask whether Aristotle may not have inter-preted the traditional gods as operating through Nature in a way ana-logous to that of his own god. There is an interesting passage in whichhe praises the ancients for regarding the primary substances which act asthe unmoved movers of the planets, as gods, and only criticizes the factthat they imagined these gods in the form of men.4" This seems to showthat Aristotle took the traditional gods to be imperfect representationsof the urunmovedmovers of the planets. These unmoved movers aredivine beings of the highest order, they lie beyond the outermost motionof the heavens and live the best and most self-sufficient of lives.47 So theybelong to the same sphere of being as the supreme unnmovedmover.Aristotle does not define their mutual relations, but he probably ima-gined sonmekind of subordination of the unmoved movers as the minorgods to the one unmoved mover as the highest god.48The planets themn-selves are also divine beings, partaking of life and action.49 The last fact,their action, distinguishes them from their unmoved movers and con-nects them with the sphere of Nature. Now the unmoved movers areprimarily final causes, but just as the supreme god, they may have anefficient aspect. In that case the planets are the visible manifestations ofthe gods and it is through the mnovementsof the planets that the gods areoperating in this world.50

We are now treading on dangerous ground. It has been rightly remark-ed that "Aristotle does not even say, as he might easily have done, thatthese visible beings serve as mediators between the highest God andman."'51There is no trace of astrological speculation in his work. Onthe other hand, Aristotle lived in a time when astral religion was gettinga stronger hold in Greece. Plato took the movements of the heavenlybodies to be the most obvious proof of the existence of the gods.52Theauthor of the Epinomis argued that the heavenly bodies are either godsor images of gods fashioned by these gods themselves, that they shouldbe worshipped with higher honours than all others, and that these othergods may be put anywhere provided they conform to the system ofastronomy.53 Aristotle himself explained the origin of religion from two62


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sources, the prophetic power of the soul in dreams and the contemplationof the movements of the heavenly bodies.54 He even derives the word to6from &6w "to run, " "to move. "55 It maybe concluded that in Aristotle'seyes the heavenly bodies are the most divine beings of which man hassome experience. The question remains why he attached, as we haveseen, such a special importance to the planets. An indirect answer tothis question may be found in a passage in which the complex movementsof the planets are illustrated by the complex movements of the livingbeings on earth.56 Aristotle may have attached a deeper meaning to thisanalogy and have regarded the movements of the planets as the mostimpressive manifestation of a divine life pervading our world and some-how connected with our life.It should once more be emphasized that if Aristotle had any idea ofpossible connections between traditional religion and his own theology,it must have been a very vague idea. Why did he not make any strongerattempts at reconciliation, or if he realized that this would be impossible,why did he not reject the traditional gods altogether? 7 I have explainedhis respect for tradition from his respect for Nature. But from whatsource came this respect for Nature? It has often been suggested that thecontradictions in Aristotle's system ultimately derive from the conflictbetween two forces in his mind, Platonism and empiricism.58 But hisrespect for Nature is something more than empiricism: it is not onlya belief in the observation of nature, but also, and in the first place, abelief in Nature itself. This belief in Nature was an inheritance fromPlato, and the main conflict was not between Platonism and somethingelse, but between the different aspects of Platonism as they were devel-oped by Aristotle.59 Plato firmly believed in the unity of Nature,60but thisdid not compel him to accept anything that presented itself as natural.What saved him from becoming a mere naturalist was his idea of a hier-archical structure of reality, everything striving after some model ofperfection of which it is an image, an approximative imitation.61 Accord-ingly, Plato could do justice to tradition and current opinion by givingthem their proper place on the scale of being, and this usually was sucha low position that they were practically rejected. Aristotle adopted theidea of the unity of Nature, but he interpreted this unity in such a radicalway that he could not accept the idea of hierarchical imitation.62Tra-dition and current opinion now had to be admitted to the full status ofnaturalness and as such could not easily be rejected. On the other hand,Aristotle stood by the Platonic principle that only the reasonable can befully true and real. The result was, as we have seen, a constant strugglebetween the claims of Nature and the claims of Reason.

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A further result of Aristotle's rejection of imitation as a principle ofdifferentiation was the complete separation of God and the world. ThePlatonic god is a self-sufficient and transcendent being, but the idea ofimitation enabled Plato to translate the perfection of the highest god intothe providence of the lower gods.63 In Aristotle's system, as we haveseen, there is no -eal synthesis of divine transcendence and divineprovidence. We should not blame Aristotle for this failure, for it maybe doubted whether such a synthesis is possible at all. At any rate,Plato's solution, especially his introduction of the Demiurge, makes asomewhat artificial impression. In this respect Aristotle's inconsistencyis more realistic and more human.Universityof UtrechtI Cf. K. von Fritz, in Histoire et historiens dans l'antiquiti (Vandoeuvres-Gen6ve, 1958),p. 92: "Aristoteles ist der erste, der sich selbst historisch als Glied in einer Entwicklunggesehen hat".' Cf. J. M. Le Blond, Logiqueet methodechez Aristote (Paris, 1939), p. 252: "Ces appels Al'opinion des sages et de la multitude ne constituent pas seulement, ni meme principale-ment, un procede eristique ou persuasif, ad hominem, mais ils sont reellement pour lui,une sorte d'experience, une expe'riencendirecte, qui prolonge et amplifie l'experiencepersonnelle dans le temps aussi bien que dans l'espace".a E. N. 1098 bg axen-r6ov gt 7rtept ouT ovq Fo x6vov&x o cu ppa0XTocroq oal1X cv 6?,6yoq, &aX& al &x Xr7v Xeyo,vov 7?pl oc,'Tj Cj, [LAvyap DXOet 7r&vrotuv4&eL -r&WratpXo0vT. I have adopted, with some modifications, the Oxford translation, except forthe Politics, where I have used Barker's translation, and the EudemianEthics,where I havequoted the Loeb translation by H. Rackham.4 E.N. IO98 b27 To&roiov gA T&r fLV ToXXol xoal 7rMkLolIAyouaLv, T& B& oAMyoLxxlbV8ootl &-8peq- ou8-rTpouq 8A 'ro&rcov e?Xoyov aLotp-rdVvLv 1roq UXotl, &).X' gv yA -rl % xoc'r 7thLdacr XcXropPoi0V. Cf. 1 73 a i& yp nacL 8 oxc, 'rsx' eivoat go 6 8' &vaLpCVt-rrTv 'v 7rlarv oV 7rivunI-r&repm &pEL,De div. 462 b14 To6 iv y&p v&v'xq 0 0oWr0\XlAP&VMLV iXeLV 'rl Lt(L)8?C -r&X&V)7rtoL nopkXeAL7oGrLV 0)4 1. 1jL7reLp(ocq Xey6FLevov.See also Le Blond, op. cit., p. 26o.6 Rhet. 1355 ai S ot dv,&pco7rL 7tp6q 'r D)0iqb 7IYX(XC;LV [XhOV4 xal ' '7TX E>?) TwyXVOUVaLa'),Xoctc,, E.E. 12 I 6 b3 I gXeLyap Exar-ro OtXeL6VL np64 '-v & )&motCv, Pol. 1281a42Touq y&p 7oXXok, i5v 9xasTr6q ?St;V Ou a7toU8vto04 &'p, 68LGaqvXETOcxaUve?6v-ro?tVOCLPEXTEOUq &XEKCOV,o0X c0 gxa-rov a?XX'ov,aq xv'r s... aLx xOC Xp(VtoLV &0LELVOVoL 7toX)tol xal 'r&xq ,ouatxrq lpyo xxl -r&trCoVrOLT)V-&v)&oL y&p6?Jo tApLov, nr&v'cx8& 7rVTEs.6 E.g. Met. 1074 a38 nop8cMo-rat 8&7rapapNrv &pxotcavxal 7a7wocIC0v.7 Rhet. I387 a16 rb &pxatLovyyU rt paxLvcraOV CPt'aCL.his sentence is also quotedby B. A. van Groningen, In the Grip of the Past (Leyden, 1953), p. 8 n. S, who rightlyremarks that the special context of that passage does not forbid us to assume that thewords for Aristotle had a more general significance. His conclusion from antiquity tonaturalness seems to be a special application of the belief that "Nature does nothing invain". What exists for a long time, does not exist in vain, so it exists by nature.64


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8 Pol. 1 264 a2 Xp?i7pottv -rT 7?o)Xi, Xp6v ... &vrmyap aXc&v dSp7ML.9 Cael. 270 b g9ov yr&p&nroc, u8 8 &?W& 7rCLP&XK SCLVO[L(tCLV r&imc&r& &(LKVteCLOxLc6Zx;P_E;a&c. Cf. Meteor. 39 bi8. I cannot agreewith Le Blond, op. cit., p. 262, that"ce sont I&des farons de parler courantes".10 POl.1329 b2s aXE8?V .Lv o5vxxl -r& Wm WCLOFtL(tV e6p7aa=tLNO)XixLq &v r& 7,p6vcp,La&ov 8' irnLp&xt- 'r&.tv y&p &v'cyxz 'rxqv XpeiEv 8t8axV cxbc66 'riv.Cf. cpuatx? nt,&u[ac, p. &pe , .cp.LXMaBonitz, Ind. 834 ai4-28), and especiallyPoet. i448 a4 oExmatl i yewcV mtL ub UX65 riv noLvrtXKV mItrmL 86O tLV&4xzl a5-ropt)OLOxm-r6 -re y&p LLILCeLakau1[Lyu'ov rolr. &v&pc7V0otqx 7rmL8wV&karl -r.12 Pol. 124 4a+&) 'r&i LV ou alnAX-MLLTo q 8' 01'XXpA yrLVy axov're;.18E.E. 1216 b32 kx yip rv &)7i kLFv ,ey0Lv,dCv u accq; 7rpoto5 71VaTOL xXl 'rCaFCtp, ?COX LPM'VOU)5LV &cl V& upLW',rcpm -rv e6&6MrTov?4yea&OL Ut)Lu&VX5CO.14 POl. 1329 b34 CLTOI;1v ELp?MLVOLxmv&qXp'la,& d & pXe)XeLtLvvanetLpas0a~-qrclv.15 E.N. i I45 b3 8Ec 8&, &antp k7d 'r&v &)Uav, 'rtOiwq a& pmvx6evcx ct snprov 8Lm-7cop1Jaov't ouCrc 8eLxv6vaxtLk.L&)tcmttLv r&v-rmr&dv8oE 7repL =ra -r& w& , el 8&'r&nwkea'rxxaxlxuptLcIYrm * T'va'pX1$)rtI TEr &ri p cxl xrl7rroct r'&bv8ota,8W8eLYIAVOV &VEt-7 Ex)OvCO;.'I E.E. 123g bhI )nso 8M yoi 6o=sq utv &uacr&re&oxo5vr 7replnro6cv tLdX'r-m&7rO&cOaCTCLal 'r&rasopEOXMaC xXl 'rk vv-rsdOXaFEL*roiro 8' 'aTr.&c&viA6ycwqpav-nrm&rcI&vov-r(maoxouYTa. l&decrTmy&tp 6V.oXoyoLTt'LoV 6 'roLoxroq or)aXL ?,6yo 'rol; qXWvo-tX&votw CU[LP 8C ,utVELvr&; 1VMv'L64aLq &a llv b &XYu N t b X)ey6tevov*.-L Wc&g 0. Cf. R. Eucken, Die Methode der aristotelischen Forschung(Berlin, 1872), p. IO,who refers to Gen. corr. 323 bi7 axt-Mv8i 'T-, 1vav'rL0X)oyEcz68rt8ov 6Xov 'r &EcipaGcxJpo4 'rL nUyX&vouLXiyovres kX&-TpOL, Phys. 206 aI 3 7r(w)q I TL 7t 6 8' 0o, Met.io86 ai 3 7r&v'rocqCuJpJ(veL xa vrL X yeLv6ptMq, 6Uca 8' o'ux6pM;, Pol. 1280 ag7r&v-rc &oVXlx aL(x(tou 'rLv6(, [ .XPL TLV6; 7ppOk0XOV'racL,al ?1&you(0L o7' r&v rxUP(op 8&xCrLoV.t will be clear that I cannot agree with J. B. McDiarmid, Harr. Stud.6i (19S3), p. 86, who maintains that 'Aristotle is not interested in historical factsas such at all. He is constructing his own system of philosophy, and his predecessorsare of interest to him only insofaras they furnish materialto this end". Cherniss' con-clusion which this quotation claims to summarize, s much more qualified cf. Aristotle'sCriticism of PresocraticPhilosophy,Baltimore, 193S, p. 348).17 Cf. e.g. Met. 985 a4 Ey&p rtq &K0xoXouOoLxxl )al0p4&vot 7rpo, ijv 8t&&voLtMvxl I' 7rp6 &

cXXECvrmtkycovEpre&ox)B xTX., Gen. corr. 3I8 b26 'rp67sovrtv&cxov-res t0,68i )xkyov'req o&Ux&Xrj'&kq.18 This has been madeabundantly lear by H. Cherniss n his books Aristotle's CriticismofPresocratic Philosophy(Baltimore, 193g) and Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy(Baltimore, I944). For some qualifications ee W. K. C. Guthrie, J.H.S. 77 (1957),pp. 3S-41.19 Cf. L. Robin, Aristote (Paris, 1944), p. 299: "undefautde franchise, une indecisionsouvent troublante... cet art du compromis... a toujours quelque chose d'e4quivoqueet de factice".20 Bonitz, Ind. 836 b29-39.21 Met. I 000 ag ot I?&v 5v7reptHatoSov xal 7r&v-re4aoL &eoX6yoLI6vov &pp6v-naOCvro57rL&aIvoio5 Tp6; aOI1'Yro6, iLaV 8' dLy6p-amv - a0u5 yM'p 7tOLOUVrq -r&TXawpx xctlix te&v yeyovivaC,r&. uLyeucasroLevCIo VkXrocpoqXmC q &tL(po0taq& yev&aG}ctpza(v, 8~Xov Cq 5i-3arT'X 6v6[tLX Vp6pL[LX&yovTeC C6UOLZXXcTrOLatx ltu'EI5


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29 Zeller, op. cit., pp. 388-9: "einebeilaufigeBeriihrungdes gewohnlichenVorsehungs-glaubens(E.N. II79 a22) gibt uns kein Recht, diesen Glauben Aristoteles selbst zuzu-schreiben". F. Dirlmeier, Aristoteles NikomachischeEthik (Darmstadt, 1956), p. 597:"kein Lehrstuck n streng philosophischemSinn, daher auch kein Gegensatzzu friiherenAussagen uber die Gotter, sondern die iibliche Einbeziehungvon Traditionellem".Dirlmeier, p. 52 1, refers to E.E. I244 b8 -ro53ropovep6v&tnLeo - 8TXov yap dwqo68e7tpoa8e6jxevoq ou8 (Rou 8e/a"r/cxt, o08' la6rauXc'rC rte [L7nOvSOlkr6 'rou. But "to havea ct)Xoq"resupposesa permanentneed; this is absent from the act of qcthtv,whichhas a more incidentalcharacter.Similarly,man andGodcannot"becpLoL",ecause theirdisparityis too great (E.N. ii8 b32). But this does not imply that incidental (PLIEshould be impossible. Aristotle expresslyadmits the possibility of y)da between Godand man (E.E. 1238 bi8), and only adds (b27): Ycotov y&pet T'L kyxoo (-I 'r& E 6'rLouX61xoEwo&VT-Lq0Xz LptXe t-tc.irlmeier, p. 521, comments on this as follows:"DerGebrauchvon 'lacherlich' zeigt eben, dass die anthropomorpheVorstellung einerwechselseitigen Freundschaftmit Gott abstrus ist." But Aristotle does not exclude&VLtcpLXelv but only 6 ?oEwo&.vrTLpetvcf. E.N. 1i63 b1 -S). The only remarkable hingis that Aristotle mentions the fact that God is too perfectto think of anythingelsebesidehimself as showing that the self-sufficientman cannot be completely like God (E.E.124S bi6), but not as provingthat God cannot 97eplv.soThis seems to be recognizedby Dirlmeierhimself, pp. s98-9: "Sohathier die populareFormulierungdes 'do ut des' eine einzigartigeSublimierung rfahren. Aristotelesdurftediesen Abschnitt in der Tat als die Erreichungseines Zieles betrachten.31 E.N. IO99 bl el it.i o5v xxl W)o -t(&atL fC0)v 8Mp*)1uxc &V&pC')7toLq,eXoyov xocl rhveu'8=lOovlmv ft6agorov eIVXL, xxl lL&XLcMOX'rV &V4Po(EVC0V 6a(p )LTrOV. &XX01T'oio>?v tlao &W-1; &vs axk4icoq oExcLO6repov, mEVvrauLi x&v cEt00 ft67re[?7rt6q *a7Lv &W8' &.pe'hv XOE -LXv IL&0-jatV e &axYnaLV 7opOy(vTroct, 'rGV kCLo-r&t0v e1vot.32 Met. 1075 all ntLaC7rx?r0v g? xo 7o?p0 XL ? 'o5 6Xou?l5an 'r6 yaMv xal Tr6&pLa'roV,7r6-repov XCXOpLatiAVOv TL xocl o xmzO ' oc&ar6,% v 'r&wv.e&p.qot*pwo, tcritpcrp&',euFLax;ot yap &vr -r&4ELso ed xxcl 6 a-rpcrly6, xacttLXXovo6vtor, oi yolp o5toq86C T)V r&fLV &X?X'&xcLv8&& 'rO56v &-t9v.33 Ross, ad loc., maintains: 'God is the source of the good in the world, which is pro-ducedby the desire for him, as the order in anarmy s produced by its striving to do thewill of its leader." But this can hardly be the meaning of 8Lta oi3-rov, hich shows thatorder is effected by the leader. D. J. Allan, The Philosophyof Aristotle (Oxford, I952),p. i 19, remarks: 'it is not Godbut thegood which thuspervadesall being." ButAristotlespeaksof "thegood andthe highest good"; the latter cannotbe immanent n the universe,so that the term IXCL (all) should not be taken in the strict sense of "contains'. Cf.a8-9 (6 &v0pc7rLvoq o5q) IX..... Tr6&pLOtov, 6v &o 'ri, which clearly shows that Godis the source of the good.al The assumptionof an efficient aspect of a secondarycharacter n the Aristotelian godhasalso been madeby the later Peripateticschool. Theophrastus Met. 6 ai) speaksof theunmoved mover as 7rckvrc&pLac otaPouMtvov. n an Arabic excerpt of the pseudo-Aristoteliantreatise On the Virtuesof the Soul publishedby S. Pines, Arch. d'hist. doctr. etlitt. du moyenage 23 (I956), pp. 5-43, it is arguedthat God's care of the world is subor-dinate to his care of his own perfection, andAlexanderof Aphrodisias Apor. II 21, p. 66,17 Br.) seems to have interpreted the providence of God in the same way (cf. Pines,pp. 25-27).'Theseviews are probablycoloured by Platonicand Stoic ideas, but they may havebeen

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'unmovedmovers'", and that "the various planetary spheres re not distinct personalbeings, but psychicalpowers within a complex soul." Allan refers to Cael. II 12, butthere (292 b28i Aristotle connects the movements of the planets with a plurality of&pXodwhich he distinguishes from the 7pw'rrq&pX'. See further J. Owens, "TheReality of the AristotelianSeparateMovers, Rev.Met.3 ( I90), pp. 319- 337, TheDoc-trineof Beingn the AristotelianMetaphysicsToronto, 19i), pp. 278-287, H. A. Wolfson,"ThePluralityof ImmovableMovers in Aristotle andAverroe~s, Harv.Stud.63 (I 958),pp. 233-253.'7 Cael. 279 a2 0 Tr5v 1'7rip Av &c'r&dvr Te-CyUlkv61 vpop(iv... rv &ptac lXovra Clcjtvxacl AVj au'-ropxecsr-drnv.48 Cf. Cael. 92 b2g9VorJaot yp ge-L rr7s~Ca; xol ?qj &pXrqWxa'rn; 7oMXXv 67repoXyVE?VlLr Ppr 7rP6;rp k &X?M, Met. 1073 bi 6rt [Lkvo5v ctcslv oiaEoL, xal 'rot'1r) 'Lg7xpdrrnal 8TE&paa&'rxVr?s V r&EWrats qzopot5 r&v&aSrpcov,q(pmvp6v. See furtherWolfson, Op.Cit., pp. 235- 239." Cael. 292 aig9 CUtCt c' 7replacqukrcov o6rCov{56vov xnl Vovc8&o -rIELvSLkvX6v'cv,dcjXcov 8i 7rd1?7v, 8t4xVOoLtC5o * El 8' (k tex6vrov t'oXexmCivcv 7rp&deo. xal~(-* Cf. De philos. fr. 21 W.50 Aristotle takes the annual course of the sun in the ecliptic circle to be the cause ofcoming-to-be and passing-away (Gen. corr. 336 a32, Meteor. 346 b22, Met. 107I aI6).61 Allan, op. cit., p. 122. Cf. p. 29.52 Leg. 88Se, 886e, 887e, 967d.13 Epin. 983e-4a, 984d, 987d-8a." De philos. fr. I 2-13 W-.66 Meteor. 339 b26 or6ap dc&e&xn F&ov&[ix xal &ct6v-r Av cp6atv IolxcxaLv UCo0rXPv.66 Cael. 292 bi ff.57 Nolte, op. cit., tries to show that there is an evolution in Aristotle's thought, movingfrom the belief in the providence of a plurality of gods to the doctrine of a single self-centred god. But on the one hand, the idea of God as a self-centred being acting on theworld as its final cause already appears in an early work such as the E.E., cf. 1245 b18(#c6;) PkXtTLOVe ?kre &XXo 'rLvoetv 7ocp' OtCr6< ocsrr6v, 1249 bi4 ou yap &7rxtxxrtLXr&pXwv 6 ?r5 &dcX' 5 hexo ^ 9pp6vraLt; 7w rrcLkdTt.On the other hand, the providenceof the gods is mentioned in a passage of the N.E. (quoted supra, n. 28) which is com-monly taken to be much later than the E.E. See further the review of Nolte's bookby A. Mansion, Tijdschr.v. Philos. 7 (1945), pp. 127-140.

This does not imply that we should exclude the possibility of any development inAristotle's religious thought. But our data are too scanty to trace such a development.W. Lameere, Ant.Cl. I8 (1949), 279-324, tries to show that Aristotle orginally accepted,but later abandoned, the idea of a genius accompanying man during his life. But theevidence he adduces is not sufficient to draw such a conclusion: fr. 193 is suspect,Gen.an. 76I b8-23 refers to animals, and An. 41 I a7-I does not exclude the existenceof demons, who would rather consist of 7rvci3i?or ether than of fire or air.68 Cf. e.g. I. During, Arctos I (I9S4), p. 76: "In Aristotle's writings, we can alwaysexpect to meet side by side the two dominant trends: Platonic abstraction and biologicalempiricism."b W. K. C. Guthrie, C]. Quart. 2 8 (I 934) ,p.98, rightly suggests "that Aristotle's system,instead of showing a development altogether away from Platonism, might rather bedescribed as in some respects the furnishing of logical grounds for preserving what heregarded as the essential parts of Platonism intact," and points out how the theory of the

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unmoved mover and that of the plurality of unmoved movers may be explained asdevelopments of different aspects of Plato's cosmology: 'The attainment of the oneunmoved mover as the culminationof his theories of motion had restored to Aristotleone fundamental ogmaof Platonism,that the firstprinciplemust at least be incorporeal.But in the Laws,his last work, Plato supposedfor his theory not only a soul for the firstheaven, but also a separateone for each of the planets, the sun and the moon... inAristotle not only the first heaven but also the planetsare to have external movers...Does it not look as if the discussionswith Callippus he astronomerhadhadanulteriorpurpose in view, that Aristotle had seen in astronomy the possibility of restoringanother little bit of Platonic belief to the realm of true, because demonstrable, phi-losophy?"Cf. 1. During, Eran.j4 (1956), p. I 12: "Aristotlewas struggling o becomea Platonistand to reconcile his empiricaland common sense approach o naturewithPlato's idealism."60 Cf. e.g. Meno 8Icg '6i cpaecos &7rac', auyyevois o5S". Even the Formsare kvrn9Caet (Phd. 103 bs, Rep.598 ai, Parm.132 d2). See further G. R. Morrow, 'Platoand the Law of Nature,"Essaysn PoliticalTheory resentedo G. H. SabineIthaca,N.Y.,1948), pp. I7-44, esp. 31 ff.61 A. Dies, AutourdePlatonParis,1927), p. 594,rightlyremarks: "L'id6ed'imitation estau centre meme de laphilosophieplatonicienne". See furthermy essayMimesisLeyden,i949), pp. I6-17.'9 It is true that Aristotle writes(Met. osob28) [LLtLext'QL& a'& 98apTCc od-r&v ,U'rcx-f3oXj6v'nz,but he did not accept the Platonicidea that the degree of realityof anythingis dependent upon its degree of approximation o eternalBeing.

6s For particulars eemy essay"PlatonsGottesbegriff"n LanotiondudivindepuisHomirejusqu'aPlaton Vandoeuvres-Geneve, 954), pp. 241-293.Additionalnote. On the problem of tradition in Aristotle's thought, see also 0. Gigon inRecherchesur la tradition platonicienne (Vandoeuvres-Geneve, 1g97), pp. 27 ff. On theattitude of the Greek philosophers towards tradition, cf. H. Cherniss, "The History ofIdeas and Ancient Greek Philosophy," in Estudios de historia de la filosofia en homenajeal ProfessorRodolfoMondolfoI (Tucuman, 1957), pp. 93-114.

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