Aristotle on Ideas

8/10/2019 Aristotle on Ideas

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TheArgum ents fromtheSciences 79.3-80. 6

They

used

the

sciences

in

many ways

to

establish that

there

are

ideas,

as

he

says

in the first book of On

Ideas.

And the

arguments

he

seems

to

have

in

mind

here

(nun)

4

are the

following (toioutoi):

5

7 9 5

I

If

every science does

its

work

by

referring

to

some

one and the

same

thing,

and not to any of the

particu lars, then

fo r

each science there wou ld

be

some other (allo) thing besides (para)

the

sensibles, which

is

ever-

lasting and a

paradigm

of the

things that come

to be

within that science

(ton kath

hekasten epistemen

ginomenon).

And

this sort

of

thing

(toioutorif

is the idea.

II

Further,the

things

the

sciences

are

sciences

of,

these

things are.

And the

sciences

are of someother

things

(allon)

besides

(para)

the

particulars;

for

these i.e. the

particulars)

are

indefinite

(apeira) and

indeterminate 7 9 1 0

(ahorista), whereas

the

sciences

are of

determinate things

horismenon).

Therefore

there

are

some

things besides

the

particulars,

and

these things

are the

ideas.

in

Fu rthe r, if medicine is the science not of this hea lth but of health w ithou t

qualification,

there will

be

some health

itself.

7

And if

geometry

is the

science not of this equal and of this commensurate but of equal without

qualification

and of comm ensurate withou t qua lification, there will be

some equal itself

andsome

commensurate itself.

A nd these

things

are the 7 9 1 5

ideas.

IV

Nowthese

(toioutoi)

s

argumentsdo notprove what theyset out toprove,

that there are ideas; but they do p rove that there are some things besides

the particularsand sensibles. But it does not immediately

9

follow thatif

there are some things that are besides the particulars, theyare ideas;for

there

are the

common things

(ta koina)

besides

th e

particulars,

and we

say that the sciences are in fact

(kai)

10

ofthem.

v

Further, there is also the objection that if these arguments succeeded,

they

would prove) that there are also (kai) ideas of the things

falling

79 20


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14 Translation

under

the crafts . For

F)every craft also refers

th e

things tha t come

to be

by its agency (hup

autes)

to some one thing; and

IF)

the things the

crafts

a re crafts of, these things are, and the crafts are of some other

things

besides

th e

par t iculars .

And

IIF)

this last

{argument} ,

1 1

in

addition

to the fact

that , l ike

the

other arguments ,

it

does

not

prove that

there are ideas , will seem to establish that

there

are also ideas ofthings

for w hich they

do not

want ideas

as

w ell

as of

things

for

w hich they w ant

8 0

ideas).

For if,

because medicine

is the

science

not of

this health

but of

heal th w ithout qual i f ica t ion, there

is

some hea lth its elf, then this w ill also

apply to each of the crafts. For none of them is of the particular or the

this either,

but

each

is of the (F )

wi thout qualification that

it is

abou t .

For example, carpentry is of bench without qual i f icat ion, not of this

bench, and of bed without

qualif icat ion,

not of this bed. And sculpture,

8 0 5

paint ing,

house-building, and each of the other crafts is related in a

similar w ay to the things that fall under it . Therefore there

will

be an idea

of

each

of the

things that fall under

the

crafts

as

well as

of the

things

tha t fall under

the

sc iences) , w hich they

do not

w a n t.

The

O ne

over M any Argum ent 80.

8 81.

22)

They alsouse the fol low ing(toioutos) a rgumen tto establish that there a re

ideas:

I

If each of the m a n y men is a m a n , and ifeach of the many an imals is an

8 0

1 0

an imal ,

and the

same applies

in the

other cases;

and if in the

case

of

each

of

these

it is not

that something

is

predicated

of

itself

but

that there

is

something which ispredicated of all of them and which is not the same as

any of them

(oudeni

auton tauton on), then this is

12

some being besides

(para)

the part icular beings w hich is separated from them and ever-

lasting.

For it is in every

case

(aei) predicated in the same way of all the

numerically successive (ton kat arithmon

allassomenon)

par t i cu lars ) .

1 3

And

w h a t

is a one in

addit ion

to

(epi) m a n y ,separated from them,

and

8 0

1 5

everlasting

is an

idea.

Therefore there

are

ideas.

IIA

He

says that this argument establishes that there

a re

ideas both

of

nega-

tions and of things that are not (kai ton apophaseon kai ton me onton .

For one and the sam e negation is predicated of ma ny thing s, including

things

that are not, and it is not the same as any of the things of which it


3/12

Translation

15

is t rue. For not-man is predicated of horse and of dog and of everything

besides man, and for this reason i t is a one over

(epi)

m a n y and is not the

8 0 2 0

same

as any of the

things

of

which

it is

predicated. Further,

it

a lways

remains, since

it is

t rue

in the

s a m e

way of

s imilar things ( i .e.

of the

numerically successive

pa r t icu la rs ) .

For not-musical is t rue of m a n y

things

(of all

those things

th t are not

musical)

in the

s a m e wa y ,

and

8 1

similarly

n o t - m a n is t rue of all those things that are not men. Therefore

there

are

also ideas

of

negations.

This

is

absurd .

For how

could there

be an

idea

of not

be ing?

For if one

accepts this, there will be one idea of things that are di fferent in genus

and

di fferent

in every w ay , such as line and man, s ince a ll these are not-

8 1 5

horses.

A nd there

will also

be one

idea

of

inde terminate

and

indefinite

things

( ton

ahoriston

te kai ton apeiron) ; and

also

of

things

o f

which

one is

pr imary , one secondary (for man and an imal , o f which one is p r im a ry ,

one

secondary,

are

both

not-wood) , and of

such things they

did not

w a n t

genera or ideas.

Ill

And it is c lear that this argument too does no t validly deduce that there

are

ideas; rather,

it too

tends

to

prove that what

is

predicated

in

c om m o n

is

som ething other than

the

part iculars

of

which

it is

predicated

(allo e inai

8 1

1

to

k o inos

k ategoroumenon ton kath hekasta ho n kategoreitai).

V

Further , the s a m e people w ho w a n t to p rove that what is predicated in

c o m m o n

of a plurality of things (pleionon) is some one th ing, and that

it is an idea, establish this

f rom

negat ions. For if someone denying

something of a plurality of th ing s denies it by referring to some one th ing

(for someone saying man

is not

white, horse

is not ( w h i t e ) ,

does

not

deny something peculiar to them in each case but, by referr ing to some 8 1 1 5

one

thing, denies

th e

same white

of all of

them), then someone

aff irming

th e same th ing of a plurality of things

will

not be aff irming something

else (allo)

in

each case,

but

there will

be

some

one

thing

he

affirms

e.g. m a n w i th reference to some one and the same thing. For as

with negat ion ,

so

wi th

aff i rmation.

Therefore there

is

some other being

besides the be ing in sensibles, which is the cause of the

affirmation

t ha t

is both true of a p lural i ty of things and a l so common; and this is the

8 1 2 0

idea.

This argument , then,

he

says, produces ideas

not

only

o f

things that

are


4/12

16 Translation

a f f i rmed

but also of things that are denied. For in both cases t h e r e is a

r e f e r ence

to ) the one t h in g ) in the

s a me

w a y (homoios).

TheObject of Thought Argument 81.25-82.7)

8 2 5

T he

a rgument tha t e s t abl i shes f rom th inking that there

a re

ideas

is the

following

(toioutos):

If ,

wheneve r

we

th ink

of

m a n , f o ote d ,

or

a n ima l ,

we a re

th ink ing

(a)of

some th ing tha t is (ti ton onton) and (b ) of none of the par t iculars for

the same thought r ema ins even when they have pe r ished) , then c lea r ly

there is s o m e t h i n g ) ,

1 4

besides (para) the part iculars and sensibles,

which

we a r e

th inking

of

whe the r

or not

they a r e .

For

surely

we a r e no t

8 2 then th inkin g of someth ing tha t is not . A nd this is a

form

(eidos)

15

and

i d e a .

H e

says, then , tha t th is a rgument a lso establ ishes tha t there

a re

ideas

of

per ish ing and per ished

th ings ,

and in genera l of par t icular and per ishable

th ings ,

such

a s

Socrates

and

Plato.

For (a )we

also think

of

th e m ,

and (b )

we

re ta in and preserve an appearance of them even when they no longer

8 2 5 are.

16

Ill

I n d e e d , we

also think

of

th ings tha t

in no way are

(ta

med

holds onta),

such a sh ippocentaur and Ch ima e r a .

I V

So (hoste)

ne i ther does th is (toioutos) a rgum ent va l id ly deduce tha t the r e

a re

ideas.

LF

adds 82.

7-9 :

So this (toioutos) a r g u m e n t f rom th inking

too

does

not

val id ly deduce

that there

a re

ideas ,

but i t

does validly deduce) tha t the r e

is

som e thing

else besides the part iculars. Now the

universal

1 7

which is in the par t iculars

(to katholou to en tois kath

hekasta)

also fits this desc r ip t i oni .e . it is

someth ing bes ides pa r t icula r s) , and i t does not necessar ily introduce a n

ide a .


5/12

Translation

17

The Argum ent from Relatives 82.

11 83.33)

The

argument that establishes f rom ek) relatives that there

are

ideas

is

8 2

n

th e

fol lowing

toioutos):

I

In

cases where some same thing

is

predicated

o f a

plurality

o f

things

pleionori) no t

h o m o n y m o u s l y ,

but so as to

reveal some

o ne

nature,

it is

true

o f

them either

a)

because they

are fully kurios)

w h a t

is signified by

the

thing predicated,

as

w h e n

w e

call Socrates

an d

Plato man;

o r b) 83.

because they are likenesses of the true ones, as when we predicate man

of

p ictured (men) (for in their case w e reveal the likenesses o f m a n ,

signifying

some same nature

in all of

t h e m ) ;

or (c)

because

one of

them

is 83 5

the

paradigm,

th e

others likenesses,

as if w e

w e re

to

call Socrates

and the

likenesses

of him

men .

II

A nd

w h e n

w e

predicate

the

equal itself

of the

things

here,

w e

predicate

it

of

them

h o m o n y m o u s l y .

1 8

For a) th e

same account logos) does

not fit

them all. b ) Nor do we signify the truly equals. For the quant i ty in

sensibles changes kineitai)

and

continuously shifts

metaballei) and is not

determinate aphorismenon).

(c) But

neither

do any of the

things here

83. 1

accurately

receive

the

account

of the equal.

in

B ut

neither (can they

be

called equal no n- h o m o nym o us ly )

by one o f

them s being

a

paradigm, another

a

l ikeness.

For one of

them

is not a

paradigm or a l ikeness any more than another.

IV

A nd

indeed,

if ei de kai)

someone were

to

accept that

th e

likeness

is not

h o m o n y m o u s

with

the

paradigm,

it

always follows that these equals

are

equals by being likenesses o f w h at is fully and truly equal .

But if this is so, then there is something which is the equal itself and 83. 1 5

which is fully equal), in relation to pros) wh ich , by being likenesses,

th e

things

here

both come

to be and are

called equal.

A nd

this

is an

idea,

being a

paradigm

f a n d

likenesst

19

of the

things that come

to be in

relation

to it.


6/12

18

Translation

VI

20

This, then, is the one argument that establishes that there are ideas even

(kai)

of

relatives

(pros

ft ). It

seems more

carefully

and

more accurately

and more

directly

to aim at the

proof

of the

ideas.

For

this

(houtos)

argument

does

not, like

th e

ones before

it,

seem

to

prove simply (haplos)

8 3 2 that

there

is some common thing besides the particulars, but rather

(it

seems to

p rove)

that there is some paradigm of the things here which

is

fully. For

this seems

to be

especially characteristic

of the

ideas.

VII

He

says, then, that this argument establishes that there

are

ideas even

(kai) of relatives. At least (goun), the present proof has been advanced

on the basis of the equal, which is a relative. But they used to say that

8 3 2 5

there

are no

ideas

of

relatives.

For in

their view

th e

ideas subsist

in

themselves, being, in their view, kinds of substances, whereas relatives

have their being in their relation to one another.

VIII

Further,

if the

equal

is

equal

to an

equal,

there

will be

more than

one

(pleious)

idea

of

equal.

For the

equal

itself is

equal

to an

equal

itself. For

if it were not equal to something, it would not be equal at all.

IX

Further, by the same argument there

will

also have to be ideas of

unequals .

For opposites are alike in that there

will

be ideas corresponding

83 .

3

o to

both

or to

neither;

and the

unequal

is

also agreed

by

them

to be in

more than one thing

(pleiosiri).

x

21

Again, he

made this opinion common ground when

he

spoke

of it as his

own,

saying

of which things we say there is no

in-itself

(kath hauto)

genus ,

speaking

of

genus , instead

of

reality

or

na ture ,

if a

relative

is

8 3 3 3

indeed like

an

appendage,

as he

said elsewhere.

Third an

rguments

EUDEMUS

VERSION (83.

34-84.

y

22

The

argument introducing

the

third

man is the

following

(toioutos):


7/12

Translation 19

They say t h a t the things that a re predicated in co m m o n o f (F ) substances 8 3 . 3 5

are fully

(kurios)

F)

23

and are ideas. Furth er, things that are similar to 84

one another are s imi lar to one another by shar ing in some same thing,

which is

fully

this

( i .e .

fully

F ); and

this

is the

idea .

But if

this

is so, and

i f

w h a t is predicated in co m m o n of things (tinori), if it is not the same as

any

of those things of which it is pred icated, is som ething else besides it

24

8 4 . 5

f o r this

is why

man-itself

is a

genus, because

it is

predicated

of the

part iculars but is not the same as any of them), then there wil l be a third

m an besides

the par t icular

25

(such

as

Socrates

or (kai)

26

P lato)

and

besides the ide a, w hich is a lso one in n um b er .

A R I S T O T L E S

V E R S I O N (84.

21-85.3)

27

The third m an is a lso prov ed in this w ay :

I f

w h a t is predicated truly of some plura l i ty of things (pleionon)

2

is

also

( s o m e )

o ther thing

(allo)

besides

(para)

the things of which it is

predicated, being separated (kechorismenori) f rom them (for this

is

w h a t 8 4 . 2 5

those who posit the ideas think they prove; for this is why, according to

them, there

is

such

a

th ing

as

man-i tse l f , because

the man is

predicated

t ruly

of the

par t icular (katt i hekasta)

m e n ,

these being

a

p lu ra l i ty ,

and i t

is

o ther (allo) t han

th e

pa r t i cu la r m e n ) b u t

if

this

is so,

there will

be a 85

third

m a n .

For if the

( m a n ) being predicated

is

o ther than

the

t h ings

of

which

it is

predicated

and

subsists

on its own

(kaf idian

h uphestos), and

i f )

the m an is

predicated both

of the

particulars

and of the

idea, then

there wil l b e a third m an besides the pa r t i cu la r

2 9

and the idea . In the

same way, there

wil l

a lso be a fourth

( m a n )

predicated of this (third

m a n ) , of the idea, and of the part iculars, and similar ly also a f if th, and so

on to

infinity.

Alexander adds

(85.

4-13):

This argument is the same as the firstone.

30

F or

this

31

resul ts fo r t hem

because they took similar things

to be

s imilar

by

shar ing

in

some same 8 5 . 5

thing.

For men and the

ideas

(o f

m e n )

a re

s imi lar .

N o w h e

refuted both

of the

a rguments that seemed more accurate,

the one on the

g round tha t

it establ ished ideas even of relat ives, and the other on the ground that i t

in t roduces a th i rd man and then mul t ip l ies men to infinity. A n d a s im i l a r

mult ipl icat ion

will

be

suffered

by each of the o ther th ings of which they

say

there are ideas. While various people used the f irst exposit ion of the

8 5 . 1 0

t h i rd m a n i n c l u d i n g E u d e m u s ,

w ho

clear ly used

it in the first

book

of

O n Diction t h e last was used by ( A r i st o tl e ) himself in the first

32

book

of

On Ideas and a l itt le later in this

w o r k .

33


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Aristotle on Ideas

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Transcript of Aristotle on Ideas