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Paraguay's Archive of Terror: International Cooperation and Operation CondorAuthor(s): Katie ZoglinReviewed work(s):Source: The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Winter - Spring,2001), pp. 57-82Published by: University of Miami Inter-American Law ReviewStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40176523 .

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57

PARAGUAY'SARCHIVEOF TERROR:INTERNATIONALCOOPERATIONANDOPERATIONCONDOR*

Katie Zoglin1

I. Introduction 58II. Political Context 59III.Overview Of Paraguay's Archive Of Terror 61

A. Discovery Of TheArchiveOf Terror 61B. OverviewOf TheArchive'sContents 63

IV. Evidence Of Operation Condor In The Archive Of Terror 64A. International ntelligence ConferencesAndMeetings 65

1. MultilateralMeetings 652. BilateralConferences 683. AdvancedIntelligenceCourses 70

B. OperationCondors Extra-LegalExchange OfPolitical Prisoners 71

Presented at the XII International Congress of the Latin American StudiesAssociation, Miami,Florida March16 - 18, 2000. Not forcitation without the permissionof the author. This research was sponsored by a Fulbright grant providedby the Councilof International Exchange of Scholars. The author would like to thank the Comite deIglesias para Ayudas de Emergencia and the International Human Rights Law Group,and Reed Brodyfor supportingthe grant. Affiliations stated for identificationpurposesonly. The ideas containedin this paper represent the views of the authoronly.1. Katie Zoglin (J.D., Harvard Law School) spent over four months reviewingdocuments in Paraguay'sArchive of Terrorthrough a Fulbright grant provided by theCouncilof InternationalExchangeof Scholars.

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58 INTER-AMERICANLAW REVIEW [Vol.32:11. The Detention,Transfer,AndDisappearanceOf Nell, Insaurralde,Santana,Logoluso,And Landi 712. Detention And ClandestineTransferOf ThreeParaguayans 73

C. PotentialInvolvementOflNTERPOL n OperationCondor 75D. SharingInformationRegardingInternational SubversiveActivities 77

V. Concluding Remarks 81

I. INTRODUCTIONParaguay's Archive of Terror not only records GeneralAlfredo Stroessner's fear of political opponents, but it alsoconfirms accounts that Southern Cone countries such asArgentina,Chile, Brazil,Uruguay,and Paraguayengagedin theclandestineexchangeof intelligenceandprisoners romthe mid-1970s throughthe early 1980s. This secret scheme was knownas "OperationCondor."Certainly, he exchangeof intelligence snotper se inappropriate r illegal. However,OperationCondormust be viewed in the larger context in which these militarygovernments gnoredthe due process rights of individuals andtargetedthose who voicedoppositiono them.Evidence of OperationCondorhas graduallycometo light.In 1999, OperationCondorreceived attention in the UnitedStates when the ClintonAdministration'sChile Declassification

Projectreleaseddocumentsrevealingthat as early as 1976 theUnited States governmentwas aware of and expressedconcernsregardingat least one aspectof OperationCondor.2The work ofSpanish Judge Baltasar Garzon in the cases against Chile'sGeneralAugustoPinochet has also increasedknowledgeof thisscheme.Whilepreviousaccountsofevidencecontained n the Archiveof TerrorregardingOperationCondorhave not alwaysportrayeddocuments accurately, cited specific records, or relied on a2. September 1976 telex on file with the National Security Archive athttp://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/ch23-01.htm.



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2001] PARAGUAY'SERROR 59systematic review of the Archive, this article provides acomprehensivereview of the recordsin Paraguay'sArchive ofTerror hat demonstrate he secret exchangeof intelligenceandprisoners. In doingso, this articleprovidesadditionalevidenceto the developingpictureofOperationCondor.

II. POLITICALCONTEXTFrom 1954 through 1989, General Alfredo Stroessner("Stroessner")uled Paraguay with an iron fist.3 Cold War

politicsplayeda significantroleduringhis authoritarian egime.In the 1950s and 1960s, the United States gave considerablefinancialaid to Paraguay. Paraguaywas seen as a U.S. ally,particularly n its oppositionto communism.4 Stroessner usedthe nationalsecuritydoctrine5 nd the threatof communism s aunifying heme.6He freelylabeledunsanctionedpoliticalactivityas communist.7 Stroessnerrelied upon the alleged communistmenace as a pretext for imposing many of his government'srepressivemeasures.8Throughouthis tenure, Stroessner mposeda state of siegealmostcontinuouslywithoutlegal justification.9Hundredsof so-called"subversives" ere arrestedpursuantto laws entitled "InDefense of Democracy" nd "In Defense of Public Peace andLibertyofPersons."103. See Virginia M. Bouvier, Decline of the Dictator: Paraguay at aCrossroads 4 (1988);Int'l Hum. Rts. L. Group & Comity de Iglesias para Ayudas deEmergencia, Paraguay: Human Rights and the Transition Towards the Rule ofLAW (1996) [hereinafterPARAGUAY:UMAN IGHTS].4. See BOUVIER, upra note 3, at 7-9; KIORDANKOETT& KICHARD COTTSACKS,PARAGUAY:HE PERSONALISTEGACY 47-148 (1991); Andrew Nickson, The Overthrow of

the Stroessner Regime, 8 (no. 2) BULL.LATINAM. RES.185, 195 (1989).5. See Paul C. Sondrol, The Emerging New Politics of Liberalizing Paraguay:Sustained Civil-MilitaryControlwithoutDemocracy,J. INTERAM.TUD.& WORLDFF.,127, 131 (1992).6. See Marcial Antonio Riquelme, Desde el stronismo hacia la transicidn a lademocracia: el papel del actor militar, in PARAGUAYN TRANSICI6N193-95 (Diego AbenteBrun ed., 1993); FATIMAYORE,La DOMINACltiN TRONISTA:ORIGENESY CONSOLIDACI6N174-78, 188-90 (1992).7. See Carlos R. Miranda, The stroessner era: authoritarian kule inParaguay 70 (1990).8. See id.

9. See OAS REPORT, REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN PARAGUAY,OEA/ser.L/V/II.71,Doc. 19 rev. 1, at 21-22, 111 (Sept. 28, 1987) [hereinafter1987 OASReport].10. SeegenerallyMIRANDA,upra note 7, at 7-9.



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60 INTER-AMERICANAWREVIEW [Vol.32:1Real and perceivedopponentsof the Stroessnergovernmentwere detained without warrant, imprisoned without formalcharges lodged against them, neverbroughtbeforea magistrate,held without trial, tortured, "disappeared,"nd killed extra-judicially.11 Many of those tortured were forced to signstatements about their purportedinvolvement in subversiveactivities. Still others were compelled o leave the countryorplaced n internal exile.12Manyoppositionpartieswere banned.13The judiciarylacked independence;udges were appointedandcould be dismissedby the executive branch.14Political, student,

union, and religious groups were closely monitored andrepressed.16 hegovernment hut downa newspaperand a radiostation.16Electionswere held but in nameonly.17Corruptionwaswidespread.18Paraguay was not the only Latin Americancountrythatjustified the suppressionof political opponents based on thepurported"Marxist" r "communist"hreat. Duringthe 1970s,militaryregimesin manyLatin Americancountries, ncluding nArgentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, responded to the

perceived communist menace by detaining, torturing, and"disappearing" olitical opponents.19 These countries createdOperationCondor o combatwhattheyviewed as a pervasiveandimminent hreat to their national nterests.11. See OAS REPORT,REPORTON THESITUATIONOF HUMANRIGHTS N PARAGUAY,OEA/ser.L/V/IL43, Doc. 13 corr. 1, 86-87 (Jan. 31, 1978) [hereinafter 1978 OAS REPORT].12. See BOUVIER,upra note 3, at 23.13. See Jos Luis Sim6n G., La Dictadura de Stroessner y Los DerechosHUMANOS22, 240 (2ded. 1992).14. See Dr. David M. Helfeld & Dr. William L. Wipfler, MbaratS: The HigherLawof Paraguay 86, 208, 211 (1980).15. See BOUVIER,upra note 3, at 23; 1978 OAS REPORT,upra note 11, at 87.16. See 1987 OAS REPORT,upra note 9, at 113.17. See BOUVIER,upra note 3, at 15-16.18. See Dionisio Borda,Empresariadoy transition a la democraciaen Paraguay, inPARAGUAY N TRANSICl6N88 (Diego Abente Brun ed., 1993); VlCTOR-JACINTOLECHA&Carlos Martini, Historia de la Transici6n: Pasado y futuro de la democracia enel Paraguay 27 (1994).19. See generally ARGENTINACOMISI6n NACIONALSOBRELA DESAPARICI6NDEPERSONAS.NUNCAMAS:THE REPORTOF THEARGENTINENATIONALCOMMISSION NTHEDISAPPEARED 1986)(accounts of the political contexts and human rights abusescommitted during this period) [hereinafter NUNCA MAS]; 1 REPORTOF THE CHILEAN

National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (Phillip E. Berryman trans.,1993); Servicio Paz y Justicia Uruguay, Uruguay Nunca MAs (1989); Torture inBrazil: A Report by the Archdiocese of Sao Paulo (JaimeWrighttrans., Joan Dassined., 1986).



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2001] PARAGUAY'SERROR 61III. OVERVIEWOF PARAGUAY'SARCHIVEOF TERROR

A. Discovery Of The Archive Of TerrorIn 1989, Stroessner was overthrownin a military coupengineeredby his brother-in-law,GeneralAndres Rodriguez.20While this change in government and the introduction ofdemocratic ule representsignificantdevelopmentsn Paraguay,Stroessner'sColoradoParty continues to retain power. Indeed,

Paraguay's transition toward democratic rule has been anunsteadyone.UnlikeneighboringChile orArgentina,Paraguayhas not setup a truth commissionor otherfact-findingask forceto examinethe human rights abuses committed during the decades ofdictatorship.It has not prosecutedhumanrightsabuses;rather,that role has been left to human rights groups and individualvictims or their families. The government has made littleattempt to redress the human rights abuses perpetratedunder

Stroessner.21Nor was it the government hat released recordsfrom he Stroessnerregimeto the public.Instead, it was the efforts of some courageous ndividualsthat broughtParaguay'sArchiveof Terrorto light. In 1992,Paraguayan attorney and educator Martin Almada filed apetition for habeas data,22 ursuantto Article 135 of the 1992Constitution, requesting informationregarding his detentionduringStroessner'srule.23 On December22, 1992,AlmadaandJudgeJose AgustinFernandezproceededo the policestationinLambare located ust outside of Paraguay'scapitalin Asuncion)to request the habeas data.24 Initially, the police denied theexistenceof such information.25 ltimately,however,"thepolice

20. See PARAGUAY:UMANRIGHTS, upra note 3, at 3.21. See id. at 23-24, 52.22. See R. Andrew Nickson, Paraguay's Archivo del Terror, LATIN AM. RES. REV.125, 125-27.23. "Everyone may have access to information and data available on himself or hisassets in official or private registries of a public nature. ... He may request a competentjudge to order the updating, rectification, or destruction of these entries if they are wrongor if they are illegitimatelyaffectinghis rights." Para. Const,art. 135 (1992).24. See Rosa Palau, De "Archivodel Horror"a Centro de Documentacion paraDefensa de los Derechos Humanos, at 5-6 (Dec. 1993), (unpublishedarticle, on file withauthor);See Nickson,supra note 22, at 125-27.25. See PARAGUAY:UMANRIGHTS, upra note 3, at 10; Palau, supra note 24, at 6.



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62 INTER-AMERICANLAW REVIEW [Vol.32:1allowed Almada and Judge Fernandez to enter the station wherethousands of documents were stored."26Some of the recordswereactually being buried.27Most of these documents were from thepolitical branch of the police department in the capital, known asthe Investigations Department.28 Judge Fernandez and hiscolleague Judge Luis Maria Benitez Riera understood thesignificance of this discovery, as well as the potential dangerposed to the records.29 They ordered the documents to betransferred to the courthouse in Asuncion.30 These two judges,reporters, and human rights activists formed a human chain tomove the documents from the police station to the courthouse.31Additional confidential police records existed. Again, thegovernment did not voluntarily release them. On December 24,1992, Judge Benitez learned of documents from the DirectionNacional de Asuntos Tecnicos of the Ministry of the Interior ("LaTecnica").32La Tecnica was established during the second half ofthe 1950s to combat communism, and was responsible forpolitical intelligence.33 The majority of the items recovered fromLa Tecnica were so-called "subversive"books (approximately 700volumes) confiscated from individuals, including Bibles andwritings of Lenin and Marx.34 Documents from the policedepartment's legal division, known as the Judicial Department,were also recovered on January 21, 1993.35 All of thesedocuments were removed from police custody and are stored inthe courthouse in Asuncion. They are collectively known as theArchive of Terror or the Archive of Horror("theArchive").36

26. PARAGUAY:UMANRIGHTS, upra note 3, at 10.27. See Palau, supra note 24, at 6.28. See PARAGUAY:UMANRIGHTS, upra note 3, at 10.29. See id.30. See id.31. See id.32. See Palau, supra note 24, at 6.33. See id. at 6-7.34. See id. at 7.35. See PARAGUAY:UMAN IGHTS,upra note 3, at 11.36. In 1993, additional police documents were identified in the town of CoronelOviedo, located in central Paraguay, as the result of a habeas data request.Approximatelyten to twelve files regardingthe Agrarian League (a "campesino" roupwhich was subject to severe repression during the 1970s) consequently were released.However,thousands of additionaldocumentswere reportedlybeingheld by local ColoradoParty authorities.



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2001] PARAGUAY'STERROR 63B. OverviewOf The Archive's ContentsThe Archive is comprised of more than half a milliondocuments created, collected, and maintained by variousdivisionsof the policeand armed forcesin Paraguay. The largenumber of recordsand their detail demonstrate the degree ofcontroland oversightmaintainedby the Stroessnerregime. TheArchiveprovidesa unique opportunity o help understand themethods of operationand mindset of the Stroessner regime.Because police and military files from other Southern Conecountriesremain largely unavailable to the public, Paraguay'sArchiveof Terrorhas become ncreasingly mportant.For example, the Archive contains over 9,000 "fichas,"orcards, on which police recorded basic information aboutsuspectedgovernmentopponents,such as a photograph,name,address,date of birth,fingerprints,profession, upposedpoliticalaffiliation,and dates of detention. The fichas are the generalequivalentof policebookingcardsin the United States, but thefichas also includeinformation oncerning he detainee'salleged

politicalactivities.The Archivehas provideddocumentationof "disappeared"individuals about whom the Stroessnergovernment originallydenied having detained, including Rodolfo and BenjaminRamirez Villalba. These brothers were accused of havingparticipatedn a plot to kill Stroessner.37Theywere held in theInvestigationsDepartmentof the police.38After Stroessner leftpower, Julio Ramirez Villalba filed a criminal complaint onbehalf of his brothers.39Officials nitially denied knowledgeofthe detention, torture, and murder of the Ramirez brothers.40However,documents n the Archiveand testimony from fellowprisonersunderminedheir positions.41Otherprisoners estifiedthat the Ramirezbrotherswererepeatedly orturedduringa six-monthperiod.42LuisAlbertoWagner,a formerpoliticalprisoner

37. See PARAGUAY:UMANRIGHTS, upra note 3, at 30.38. See id. See also INT'LHUM. RTS. L. GROUP& COMITtiDEIGLESIAS ARAAYUDASDEEMERGENCIA,ORTURA NEL PARAGUAY:ASADOY PRESENTE t 81(1993) [hereinafterTORTURA].39. See PARAGUAY:UMANRIGHTS, upra note 3, at 31; See TORTURA,upra note 38.

40. See PARAGUAY:UMANRIGHTS, upra note 3, at 31; See TORTURA,upra note 38,at 20.41. See PARAGUAY:UMANRIGHTS, upra note 3, at 31.42. See id. at 30.



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64 INTER-AMERICANAWREVIEW [Vol.32:1who served as a National Deputy after Stroessnerleft power,testified that Stroessnerhimself told the Ramirezbrothersthatthey would be killed if they refused to admit that they wereplottingto assassinate Stroessner.43Wagneralso witnessed thebrothersbeing removedfrom their cells at aboutmidnightandnever saw themagain.44

The Archive also includes approximately 500 boundnotebooks compiled by the police. These volumes containthousandsofpagesof surveillancereportson knownorsuspectedcommunistsand political opponents, reports from named andunnamed civilian spies, signed and unsigned declarations romdetainees (many of which were reportedly obtained undertorture), and lists of political detainees. Surveillancereportsrecord the activities and whereabouts of suspected politicalopponents who lived in Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil.ANTELCO,he state runtelephonecompany,provided he policewith time, duration,and recipientof telephonecalls. The policesaved communist and "subversive"iterature, books, politicalpamphlets, and newsletters confiscated from Paraguayancitizens. The Archivealso contains ists of politicalpartyleadersandtheir addresses.

IV. EVIDENCE OF OPERATIONCONDORIN THEARCHIVEOF TERRORDocuments in the Archive demonstrate that byapproximately1974, Paraguay, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, andUruguay had agreed to coordinate their efforts to exchangeinformationwith one another in response to the communist

menace that they perceivedhad reached an internationalscale."OperationCondor"was the code name for this clandestinescheme n whichSouthernConemilitarygovernments xchangedintelligence and prisoners during the mid-1970s through theearly1980s.Archive documentsestablish that in Paraguay, OperationCondorwas coordinatedthrough the Second Division of theArmedForces ("ESMAGENFA"),hich was headed by BenitoGuanesSerrano("Guanes").Guanesexchanged he intelligence

43. See id. at 30-31.44. See id. at 31.



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2001] PARAGUAY'SERROR 65he receivedwith Pastor M. Coronel "Coronel"),he Chief of theInvestigations Department, as well as with Francisco BritezBorges("Britez"),he Chiefof Asuncion'sPolice. After Stroessnerleft power,Guanes,Coronel,and Britez were convictedof havingcommitted a range of human rights violations during thisperiod.45n addition,many intelligencereportsweresigned by oraddressed to Alejandro Fretes Davalos, who commandedParaguay'sArmedForces.

Thefollowingdiscussion s basedon recordscontained n theArchive. This information comes from police and militaryintelligencesources. Thus, the Archivepresentsan interesting,albeitone-sided,view ofthe politicalclimate.A. International Intelligence ConferencesAnd MeetingsIt is clear fromthe Archive hat the military governmentsnthe SouthernCone coordinatedheir effortsin the so-calledwaragainst subversionand communism.Discussionof internationalcoordinationappears to have begun as early as 1973 or 1974

during intelligenceconferencesheld among police and militaryofficials. Theseintelligenceconferencesweredirectedat fightingsubversion and reflect a pervasive fear of the perceivedcommunist threat. The intelligence services concludedthatbecause the communist threat had reached an internationalscale, the governmentshad to coordinatetheir activities andresponseson a national,as well as an international evel. Thebulk of the Archive's documents involving internationalintelligencemeetings span a ten-year periodfromapproximately1973through1982.1. Multilateral Meetings

One of the earliest records in the Archive relating tointernational cooperation is a report authored by AntonioCampos Alum, the Director of Paraguay's La Tecnica, andappears to summarize what occurred at an internationalconferencen approximately1973.46Accordingo this report by45. See id. at 24-40.46. Direction Nacional de Asuntos TScnicos, Carpeta 73 (undated) hereinafterDNAT]. The first page of the three-page document was missing. It referred to an



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66 INTER-AMERICANLAW REVIEW [Vol.32:1

Campos, Paraguay accepted Brazil's offer to exchangeinformation through bilateral meetings and other methods withmembers of the Latin American Anti-Communist Confederation("CAL").47 araguay and Brazil agreed to coordinate methods ofsecurity and protection.48 The Brazilian delegation privatelyoffered to provide Paraguay with comprehensive collaboration,information, materials,*and technical support.49Accordingto thedocument, Campos discussed the political situation in eachcountry and methods to combat subversion.50 At the close of thisconference, all the delegates affirmed that the time had come totake offensive action against communism.51 Campos reportedthat he had established valuable contacts for the direct exchangeof informationand methods with the other delegations.52

In 1974, a number of international anti-communistconferences were convened, including the Congress of CALin Riode Janeiro and the Seventh Congress of the World Anti-Communist League ("WACL")n Washington, DC.53 The mostsignificant of the conferences held that year was a meeting of theCoordinating Council of the Anti-Communist Confederation.54The purpose of the meeting was to receive information and toexchange experiences concerning Communists and pro-Communists in order to adopt methods that could be appliedthroughout the continent.55 It was important because one of itsmain resolutions sought to establish a system to exchangeconfidential information among member nations.56 Thus, thismeeting marked a more widespread exchange of information

upcoming WorldAnti-CommunistLeague conference scheduled to begin at the end ofAugust 1973.47. See id at 2.48. See id.49. See id. at 3.50. See id.51. See id.52. See id.53. See Memorandum rom la Policia Federal de Argentina,DPA 8 1973-77W, No.00013F 0298-99 (July 22, 1977) hereinafter DPA 8]; Memorandum, Bibliorata 221(1976)[hereinafterBib. 221].54. Many of the documents in the Archive were found in bound, labeled volumes.Afterthey were "discovered,"many of the recordswere bates stamped. Here, the citationsto records from the Archive include both cites, if they exist. In these notes, the firstreference is to the volume and the second is to the bate stamp number. See DPA8, supranote 53.55. See id.; Bib. 221, supra note 53.56. See id.



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2001] PARAGUAY'SERROR 67than had previously aken place. The CoordinatingCouncilwascomprisedof representativesfrom Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,Chile, Colombia,El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay,Uruguay,andCubanexiles.57

In 1975, the number of high-level meetings among theintelligenceservicesappears o have increased. One of the initialplanningmeetingsof what apparentlywas to becomeOperationCondorwas held fromMay 30 throughJune 4, 1975.58Guanestraveledto Chile to help with the meeting of the chiefs of thenationalintelligenceservicesand the chiefsof communicationnthe nationalintelligenceservicesfromArgentina,Bolivia, Brazil,Chile,Paraguay,andUruguay.59From November 25 through December 1, 1975, a keymeetingwas convened n Santiago,Chile.60Duringthis meeting,manyof the mechanisms hroughwhichOperationCondormightoperatewere discussed.61A planning documentfor this FirstWorking Meeting of National Intelligence explained that"subversion . . recognizes no Borders or Countries, and theinfiltrationpenetratesall levels of National life."62 t discussed

how subversion had developed in the continent during theprecedingyears andhow subversionwas contrary o the history,philosophy, ndreligionofthe continent.63t continued hat:It is to confront his Psycho-politicalWar we havedetermined that we must count on theInternational realm not with a Commandcentralized n its internalaction,but with efficientCoordinationhat permitsan opportuneexchangeof information ndexperiencesas well as a certainlevel of personal knowledgebetween the Chiefsresponsible orSecurity.64

As a result of this meeting, a proposal was made to57. See id.58. See Informe No. 65 from El Comando en Jefe de la Nacion de Paraguay,Bibliorata245, No. 00021F 1558-59(Oct.22, 1975) hereinafterBib. 245];GS CV.59. See id. In October 1975, the Eighth Intelligence Conference ot the AmericanArmies was held in Montevideo.See id.60. See Primera Reunion de Trabajode Inteligencia Nacwnal, Bibliorata 47, No.00022F 0155-65(Oct.29, 1975) hereinafterBib. 47].61. See id.62. Id. at 00022F 0157.63. See id.64. Id.



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68 INTER-AMERICANAWREVIEW [Vol.32:1coordinate the exchange of informationthrough an Office ofCoordination nd Security. Further,a data bank, a centralizedarchivewith the backgrounds f individuals,organizations,andactivities "connecteddirectly or indirectly with subversion,"would be located in one country.65It would generallybe likeINTERPOL,but instead it would be dedicated to combatingsubversion.66A modern nformation enter would allow accesstothe data bank.67Workinggroupswould evaluate and addressspecific problems.68 Under this proposal, all non-Marxistcountrieswouldbe allowed ojoin.69Chile'sNationalIntelligenceDirectorate "DINA")ffered o house the databank.70TheArchivecontainsformal nvitations to this meetingsentby ColonelManuel Contreras, he Director of DINA. OfficialsfromParaguay'spolice departmentand armedforces,includingCoronel,Britez,andGuanes,were invited to attend.712. Bilateral Conferences

TheArchivereveals that SouthernConecountries requentlyheld bilateralconferencesbetweenmilitary intelligenceservicesin the 1970sthroughthe early 1980s. Participantsdiscussed hestatus and activitiesof "subversive roups" s well as methods ocoordinate ffortsagainstthem.

For example, from 1974 through 1977, Paraguay andArgentina held annual bilateral conferences.72At the 1975Bilateral Intelligence Conference between Paraguay andArgentina, the Paraguayan Army presented its views of

65. Id. at 00022F0158.66. Seeid.67. See id.68. See id.69. See id. at 00022F0159.70. See id. The telephone and telex numbers of "Luis Gutierrez"were providedascontact numbers. See id. at 00022F 0162. Accordingto a conversation the author hadwith ManuelGarret6n n Asunci6n in 1995, "Luis Gutierrez"was not a personbut ratherwas the codename forthe Directorof the Departmentof the Exterior of DINA.71. See id. at 00022F 0152-53.72. See generally Conferencia Bilateral de Inteligencia: Paraguay ArgentinaBibliorata 1008, No. 00046F 1344-1377 (1975) hereinafter Bib. 1008]; Letter fromGuillermoClebsch,Sub-jefedel Estado MayorGeneral (Asunci6n),to Francisco A. BritezBorges,Jefe de la Policia de la Capital(Asunci6n),Bibliorata246, No. 00021F 1692 (Sept.5, 1997)[hereinafterBib. 246].



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2001] PARAGUAY'SERROR 69subversionin South America.73The Army concludedthat formany years subversion n Paraguayand other Latin Americancountries had been consideredmerely an internal problembutthat was no longerthe case.74Paraguaythereforerecommendedthe direct exchange of information; he exchange of doctrine,organization,and instruction;and the possibilityof broadeningthe bilateral nature of the Intelligence Conference o includeother countries.75 t explainedthat the efficient coordination fintelligence activities among the Paraguayan and Argentinearmed forces and national police was needed to deal withsubversives.76 Paraguay noted that there were connectionsamong subversivegroups in Argentina,Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,Paraguay, Uruguay, and other countries.77 The Army wasparticularlynterested n the Junta Coordinadora evolucionaria("JCR"),which was comprised of members of the NationalLiberation Movement ("MLN,"Tupamaros from Uruguay),RevolutionaryLeft Movement ("MIR,"rom Chile), and thePeople's RevolutionaryArmy ("ERP," rom Argentina).78 Itunderstoodthat the purpose of the JCR was to make theAmerican ontinentsocialist.79

Beginning in the early 1970s through at least 1982,Paraguay and Brazil convened annual bilateral conferences.80For the 1976 conference,Paraguay'spolice intelligencedivisionwas asked to develop a presentation on internal subversiveactivitiesand their connectionwith the exteriorfor the previousyearor so. In addition, he ParaguayanandChileanarmiesheldbilateral conferences beginning in approximately 1975.81Accordingo the programor the 1982conference,opicsincluded73. See Bib. 1008,supra note 72, at 00046F 1376-77.74. See id. at 00046F 1376.75. See id. at 00046F 1377. At the September197YArgentine-**raguayanBilateralIntelligence Conference held in Paraguay, Coronel was asked to discuss subversiveactivities in Paraguay. See Bib. 246, supra note 72, at 0002IF 1692. In 1980, Guanesparticipated n workingmeeting with the ArgentineArmy.76. See Bib. 1008,supra note 72, at 00046F 1347.77. See id.78. See id. at 0004b* 1347-55.79. See id. at 00046F 1348.80. See Bib. 246, supra note 72, at 00021F 1650;Bib. 245, supra note 35, at 00021F1553; Document from el Departamento de Investigaciones de la Policia de la Capital

(Asunci6n),Bibliorata147, 1-13(1975)[hereinafterBib. 147].81. See generally Programfrom the ConferenciaBilateral de Inteligencia entre losEjercitosde Paraguayy Chile a Desarrollarse,DPA 6 D, No. 00019F 0855-0857(July 25-31, 1982) hereinafterDPA 6 D].



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70 INTER-AMERICANAWREVIEW [Vol.32:1the evolutionof the subversivesituationin Latin Americaoverallas well as in ParaguayandChile.823. Advanced Intelligence Courses

From at least 1979 through 1982, Argentina's StateIntelligenceAgency("SIDE") eld annual advanced ntelligencecourses for high-level officials from "friendly countries."83Althoughthe names of these so-called"friendly ountries"werenot identified, Paraguaywas certainly one of them given thenumerous etters of invitation and coursedescriptions xistinginthe Archive.84These trainingcourses were designedto addressissues of intelligence and counter-intelligence, ubversion andterrorism,andmethodsof socialcommunication.86These courses also discussed the underlying ideologies ofsubversives and sought to providea comprehensiveoverviewofthe situation.86 They emphasizedthe importanceof nationalintelligencegiventhe currentclimate of international errorism.87They cited the extent of the insidious ideologicalpenetration.88

Argentineauthoritiesbelieved that it was indispensable or thesecurityof the nations to developthis intelligence.89Theynoted82. See id.83. See DPA 10 1979-80E, 00010F 0535.84. See e.g. Series of letters fromFrancisco Alcibiades Britez B., Jefe de la Policfa dela Capital (Ascunci6n), to Pastor Milciades Coronel, Jefe del Departamento deInvestigaciones de la Policia (Asunci6n), Bibliorata 81 No. 706, 963, 1771 (May-Dec.1979)[hereinafter Bib. 81]; DPA 10 1979-80 E, No. 00010F 0533; Letter from theSecretaria de Inteligencia de Argentina to D. Benito Guanes Serrano, Jefe del IIDepartamento del Estado Mayoral General de Paraguay, Bibliorata 173 (Sept. 18,

1979) hereinafterBib. 173];Letter fromel Ministro del Interior(Asunci6n) o FranciscoA.Britez, Jefe de la Policia de la Capital (Asunci6n),PQ 53 (Oct. 10, 1981) hereinafterPQ53]; Letter from Carlos Martinez to Guenes, Bibliorata 595, No. 00053F 0617 (May 19,1981) [hereinafterBib. 595]; Letter fromAlejandroFretes Davalos to Pastor M. Coronel,Bib. 246, supra note 72, at 00021F 1658; Letter from Pastor M. Coronel, Jefe delDepartamentode Investigacionesde la Policia de la Capital (Asunci6n),to Francisco A.Britez Borges,Jefe de la Policia de la Capital (Asunci6n) (Dec. 15, 1981), Informes fromPastor M. Coronelto Fransisco A. Britez Borges, 1981 1984 F (Oct. 3, 1980) hereinafterInformes];DPA 10 1979-80 E, 00010F 0532. See also J. Patrice McSherry,AnalyzingOperationCondor:A Covert InteramericanStructure, (March 16-19, 2000)(unpublishedmanuscript,on file with author). McSherrycontends that high-ranking Spanish officialsalso attendingthese intelligencecoursessponsored by the Argentines.85. See Bib. 595, supra note 84, at 00053F 0617;Bib. 173,supra note 84.86. SeegenerallyDPA 10 1979-80E, supra note 84, at 00010F 0535.87. See id at 00010F0533.88. See id.89. See id. at 00010F0533,0535;Bib.173,supranote84.



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2001] PARAGUAY'SERROR 71that it wouldbe beneficialto exchange intelligenceand to havesomepersonnelwith knowledgeof the regional,continental,andworldwide situation.90 Paraguay's representatives to theadvancedcourseswere ordered o reportto the Second Divisionof the Armed Forces to receive instructionsbeforeattending.91Scholarshipsweremade available o someattendees.92

B. OperationCondor'sExtra-Legal Exchange OfPolitical PrisonersThe Archive reveals several examples of suspectedsubversiveswho were detainedin one countryand then secretlytransferred o the custodyof another government'smilitary orpolice authority. These individuals were detained withoutwarrant,basedon their politicalaffiliationsand activities. Theywere transferredextra-judicially: ithoutbeing broughtbeforeacourtof law, withoutlegal representation,and without attentionto extradition reaties.

1. The Detention, Transfer, And Disappearance Of Nell,Insaurralde, Santana, Logoluso,And LandiTheArchive'smostclearlydocumented xampleof OperationCondor's extra-judicial exchange of political prisoners isillustrated by the fate of five individuals from Argentina andUruguay:Jose Nell ("Nell"), ose AntonioLogoluso "Loguloso"),DoraMartaLandiGil ("Landi"), elson RodolfoSantana Scotto("Santana"), nd Gustavo Edison Insaurralde (or Inzauralde)Meliar ("Insaurralde"). These individuals were detained byParaguayan officials without warrant; interrogated byParaguayan,Argentine, and Uruguayan military authorities;never presentedwith formalcharges;and then disappearedbyArgentineauthorities.Nell was a 69-year-old Argentine affiliated with theMontoneros.93 oth Insaurraldeand Santanawere Uruguayans

90. See Bib. 595, supra note 84, at 00053F 0617.91. See DPA 10 1979-80 E, supra note 84, at 00010F 0532, 0534; Informes,supranote 58;PQ 53, supra note 84.92. See Bib. 246, supra note 72, at 00021F 1658;Bib. 81, supra note 84.93. Booking recordNo. 3845 from la Policia de la Capital (Asunci6n),No. 00017F1308-11(Mar.29, 1977) [hereinafter00017F].



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72 INTER-AMERICANAWREVIEW [Vol.32:1who belonged to the Student Workers Resistance ("ROE").94Insaurralde purportedly was involved in other "subversiveorganizations" nd presumablyserved as a leaderfor the Partyfor the Victoryof the People("PVP").95ogoluso,an Argentine,was described as an active member of the Peronist Youth("JuventudPeronista").96 Landi, also from Argentina, wasaffiliatedwith the PeronistYouth.97All five arrived n Paraguayin early1977on variousdates.98

Records n the Archive ndicate that Paraguayanauthoritiesbelieved that Nell, Insaurralde, Santana, and Logolusowereinvolved in a plan to arrange for political dissidents fromArgentinato obtain Paraguayandocumentsso that they couldleave the country and seek political asylum in the UnitedNations' office in Brazil.99The political dissidents would thentravel on to Europe.100On March29, 1977, Nell, Insaurralde,Santana, Logoluso,and Landi were detained by Paraguayanauthorities.101 ll were held pursuantto what the documents nthe Archiverefer to as a "superior rder."102n a rare documentaddresseddirectly o PresidentStroessner,Coronel eported hatthese five individuals had been detained and described their"scheme."103The followingweek, fromApril 5-7, 1977, a workingteamcomprised of military intelligence officers from Paraguay,Uruguay,and Argentinamet in the Politica and Afines division

94. See Document from el Departamento de Investigaciones de la Policia de laCapital (Asunci6n), DPA 63 MOPOCO P, No. 00008F 1371-74, at 1374(undated) hereinafterDPA63].95. Letter from Alberto B. Cantero, Director de Policia y Afines, to Pastor M.Coronel, Sr. Jefe del III Departamento de Investigaciones de la Policia de la Capital(Asunci6n),DPA2 ENE MAY1977A (Apr. 9, 1977) hereinafterDPA 21.96. See Bookingrecord No. 3851 from la Policia de la Capital (Asunci6n), 00017F,supra note 93, at 1320-22.97. See BookingrecordNo. 8850 fromla Policia de la Capital (Asunci6n), 00017F,supra note 93, at 1317-19.98. See id. at 1309-10, 1317-18, 1320; Documents from el Departamento deInvestigacionesde la Policia de la Capital (Asunci6n),DPA 48 W, No. 00008F 1742-80,at1744, 1746 (Mar.29, 1977) hereinafterDPA48 W].99. See DPA 48 W, supra note 98, at 00008F 1743-44;00017F, supra note 93, at1311.

100. See DPA48 W,supra note 98, at 00008F 1743.101. See 00017F,supra note 93, at 1309, 1318,1321.102. See id.103. DPA48 W,supra note 98, at 00008F 1742-45.



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2001] PARAGUAY'SERROR 73("DPA")f the InvestigationsDepartment n Asuncion.104Thisdivision was responsiblefor overseeing internal security andinvestigating subversion within Paraguay. Alberto Canteroserved as the director of the DPA. This working group wascomprisedof high ranking military officials, includingGuanesand Galo Escobar,both of the Second Division of Paraguay'sArmedForces;Jose Montenegro ndAlejandroStada fromSIDE;Carlos Calcagnoof Uruguay'sArmy Intelligence Service;andothers.105 Each of the five detainees was meticulouslyinterrogated,but, accordingo Cantero,noneprovidedany majornew revelations.106OnMay 16, 1977, Nell, Insaurralde,Santana,Logoluso,andLandi were transferred o the custodyof Argentineauthorities,again pursuantto what the records dentifyonly as a "superiororder."107Guanes and Captain Lazaro Sosa of Paraguaywaspresentwhenthese five individualswere delivered o the custodyof two membersof SIDE: Jose Montenegroand Juan ManuelBerret.108 t 4:34in the afternoon,an ArgentineNaval airplanepilotedby CaptainJose Abdalaleft for BuenosAires.109Abdalawas an officialfrom the Naval MechanicsSchool("ESMA"),ninfamousclandestinetorturecenternear Buenos Aires.110Nell,Insaurralde,Santana,Logoluso,and Landihave not been heardofsince,and arepresumed"disappeared."1112. Detention And Clandestine Transfer Of ThreeParaguayans

The case of three Paraguayans NercioAnastacioStumps("Stumps"), otelo FrancoBenegas ("Franco"),nd Lidia EsterCabrera "Cabrera") illustrates the clandestinedetentionandtransfer of political prisoners from Argentina to Paraguay.According o a report by FranciscoOrtiz Tellez ("Ortiz"),he104. See DPA2, supra note 95.105. See id.106. See id. See also DPA63, supra note 94, at 00008F 1371-73.107. InformefromAlbertoCanteroto Pastor M. Coronel,DPA 1 1976-77A (May 16,1977)[hereinafterDPA 1];00017F, supra note 69, at 1311, 1318-19.108. See DPA 1.109. See id.110. See NUNCAMAS, upra note 19, at 130-31.111. See generally, GLADYS MEILINGER DE SANNEMANN, PARAGUAY EN EL OPERATIVOCondor, at 22.



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74 INTER-AMERICANAWREVIEW [Vol.32:1ParaguayanConsul stationedin Posadas,Argentina,to SabinoMontanaro(Paraguay'sMinister of the Interior),Stumps wasdetained in Iguazii, Argentina, by Argentine authorities.112During the night of January 18, 1977, Stumps, Franco, andCabrera were detained in a joint operationby the ArgentineNational Gendarmerieand Argentine police in Misiones.113Atthe same time, the ArgentineofficialsconfiscatedParaguayanCommunist Party ("PCP")propaganda from the detainees'homes.114Ortizreported hat he spokewith the Assistant Chiefof Police of the Province,who indicated hat the Headquarters fthe Military Area in Posadas (Argentina)would presumablyarrangefor the "subversives"o be held pursuantto Argentina'sExecutivePower.115

The next day, Ortiz again reported to Montanaro. Heconfirmed hat Stumps,Franco,and Cabrerahad been detainedin Iguazii.116They were held in the MilitaryUnit in Posadas,Argentina.117Ortiz asked the Chief of the Military IntelligenceService if an official from the ParaguayanArmed or SecurityForces could participate in the interrogations of thesedetainees.118 On May 5, 1978, Alberto Cantero wrote thatStumps, Franco,and Cabrera were in custody and were sentfrom the PoliticalDivision of Paraguay'sPolice to Emboscada.119Emboscadawas a detention center forpolitical prisoners ocatedoutside of Asuncion. These individuals were never broughtbeforeajudgeandchargeswerenever filedagainstthem.

112. See Three letters fromFranciscoOrtizTeller, Consul del Paraguayen Posadas,Argentina, to el Ministro del Consulado del Paraguayen Posadas, Argentina, Bibliorata600, No. 00053F 1527-29(Jan. 20-21, 1977) hereinafterBib. 600].113. See id.114. See id.115. Id. The Organizationof American States (and others) concluded that Argentinaviolated the rights of many by indiscriminately detaining individuals pursuant to theNational Executive Power. See INTER-AM. .H.R., El INFORMEROHIBIDO:NFORMESobre La Situ[a]ci6n de los Derechos Humanos en Argentina (1984)at 289-90.116. See Bib. 600, supra note 112,at 0053F 1528.117. See id.118. See id.119. See Letter fromAlbertoCanteroto Jose Felix Grau,DPA 15 1978-80W, 00013F0380 (May5, 1978).



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2001] PARAGUAY'STERROR 75

C. Potential Involvement OfINTERPOL In OperationCondorRecords in the Archive further indicate that OperationCondormay have subverted the purpose of the InternationalCriminal Police Commission, more commonly known asINTERPOL.120otwithstanding he prohibitionn INTERPOL'sConstitutionagainst involvement n politicalcrimes,INTERPOLseems to have participated in the trading of intelligenceregardingpoliticalopponentsof somegovernmentson at least afew occasions. A handful of INTERPOLdocuments in theArchiveseek and respondto requestsfor informationregardingthe backgroundof various individualsperceivedto be politicalopponents.This exchange of information regarding the politicalaffiliation and backgrounds of certain individuals throughINTERPOL ppearsto have violatedINTERPOL'sConstitution.Accordingo the INTERPOLConstitution, ts purpose s "(a)Toensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance

betweenthe criminalpoliceauthoritieswithin the limits of thelaws existing in different countries and in the spirit of theUniversal Declarationof Human Rights; [and](b) To establishand developall institutionslikely to contributeeffectively o theprevention and suppression of ordinary law crimes."121Inaddition,Article3 of the INTERPOLConstitution pecifies:"It sstrictly forbidden for the organization to undertake anyintervention or activities of a political, military, religious orracialcharacter."122Moreover, he exchange of informationregardingpoliticalopponentsof militaryregimescertainlywas not "in the spirit ofthe Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Freedom ofexpression and association are clearly protected under theUniversal Declaration.123More specifically,Article 19 of the

120. INTERPOL s an internationalpoliceforcecreated in 1923 by policechiefs fromtwenty differentcountries.121. INTERPOLConstitution,Article2.122. In 1984, INTERPOL adopted a resolution allowing it to address issues ofterrorism. However,all incidents discussed in this article took place when INTERPOL'sConstitutionprohibited nvolvementin politicallymotivatedcrimes,beforethat resolutionwas adopted.123. See G.A.Res. 217A(III),U.N. Doc.A/810,at 71 (1948).



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76 INTER-AMERICANLAW REVIEW [Vol.32:1Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that everyonehas the right to freedom of opinion and expression, including theright to hold these opinions without interference and to impartinformation without regard to frontiers.124 Under Article 2,individuals are entitled to rights without regard to politicalopinion.125 Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of HumanRights states that freedom of association shall be respected.126Nevertheless, a few INTERPOLradiograms in the Archive relatenot to "ordinarylaw crimes" committed by individuals, as wasthe proper domain of INTERPOL, but rather to the politicalactivities, views, and affiliations of certain individuals.For example, in February 1979, Asuncion's police chiefindicated in a confidential report that INTERPOL Buenos Aireshad been asked to provide background information regardingJose Tomas Salinas Pintos ("Salinas"), who had returned toParaguay to complete his military service.127Salinas purportedlywanted to join the Cavalry's Presidential Escort Regiment forbetter access to national dignitaries.128 Paraguayan authoritiesexpressed concern that Salinas may belong to unidentified"subversive"Argentine groups.129 There is no indication thatSalinas was suspected of being involved in any "commoncrime."

Two radiograms to INTERPOL Asuncion responded to itsprior requests for information.130In the first, dated March 10,1980, INTERPOLBuenos Aires replied to a communication fromINTERPOL Asuncion.131 INTERPOL Asuncion had forwardedfingerprints and identification cards of several individuals toINTERPOLBuenos Aires.132 n its response, INTERPOLBuenosAires provided INTERPOLAsuncion with the political affiliation

124. See id.125. See id.126. See id.127. See Letter from el Jefe de Policia de la Capital (Asuncibn),DPA 47 W, No. 248(Feb. 19, 1979)[hereinafterDPA 47 W].128. See id.129. See id.130. See Radiogram from Domingo Galeano, Inspector General, Jefe delDepartamento INTERPOL, DPA 14 1977-82 W, No. 00048F 0683 (Oct. 3,1980) hereinafterDPA 14];Radiogram romYsax Ruiz Diaz, Sub-ComisionarioOP., Sub-Jefe, Departamento INTERPOL, DPA 14 1977-82 W, No. 00048F 0669 (Jul. 13,1981)[hereinafterDPA 14 0069].131. See id.132. See id.



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2001] PARAGUAY'SERROR 77of two individuals.133 t explainedthat according o the police,JorgeOmarLewingerwas a memberof the subversiveBolivianNational LiberationArmy(ELN)and presumablyhad receivedtrainingin Cuba.134NTERPOLBuenosAiresalso reported hatJorgeAlbertoRuiz was a memberof the "subversive" RP.135

Next, in a radiogramdated July 13, 1981, INTERPOLMontevideo responded to another inquiry from INTERPOLAsuncion.136INTERPOLMontevideo stated that Julio CesarSuarez Formolliwas identified as a member of the MLN (anUruguayan guerilla group) and had been detained by theMilitaryJusticeonJuly 22, 1972 for his "subversive ctivities."137D. Sharing Information Regarding InternationalSubversiveActivitiesThe exchange of informationamong the Southern Conecountriesregardingalleged subversives s furthersubstantiatedby numerousreportsto and fromParaguay'sSecond Division ofthe ArmedForces,particularlyduringthe periodof 1974through

1980. In many of the reports,instead of naming a particularcountry, he distributionists orsourcesof intelligenceoften referonly to a "friendlycountry,""intelligenceservice of a friendlycountry," r"security gencyof a friendlycountry."138TheArchivealso containsa confidentialdistribution ist thatidentified some of the codes used in these confidentialintelligencereports,althoughthis key does not directly clarifywhich states were the "friendlycountries."139hat these codesandveiled referenceswere used ratherthan the actualnames of

the countries nvolvedinvites speculation. Perhapsthese codeswere usedbecausethe authoritiessoughtto avoidpublicscrutinyoraccountabilityor theiractivities.133. See id.134. See id.135. See id.136. See DPA 14,supra note 130.137. Id.138. See DPA 7 1973-83W;DPA8 1973-77W, 00013F 0340;DPA5 Personal de ABC,

Hoy, Ultima Hora y de Radio Emisoras 1980-3 Q; Informe No. 025/78 from AlejandroFretes Davalos, DPA 6 D, supra note 55, at 00019F 1061 (May 23, 1978);DPA 47 W,supra note 127;Archivador109,00040F 1245(Feb. 10, 1978).139. For example, this "key" hows that a "G"on a distributionlist refers to specificforeignmilitary,aeronautic,and naval attaches. Bib. 595, supra note 84, at 00053F 0719.



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78 INTER-AMERICANAWREVIEW [Vol.32:1Paraguayanauthoritiesrequestedand received informationfrom Argentine, Bolivian, Brazilian, Chilean, and Uruguayanauthorities regarding suspected subversives groups andindividuals who had been detained;they also sought to verifyintelligence hey alreadypossessed.140 fficialsoffered o supportand cooperate with other countries. They also exchangeddocumentsthey seized.141Militaryattaches of these countries,especially Argentina, are frequently identified (by theirdesignated codes) as sources of information and on thedistributionists for these confidential eports.As an example,on November22, 1974, Guanes circulatedareportto the junta of othergovernmentsdiscussingtwo guerillatraining camps located in Argentina and requestedadditionalintelligenceregarding hem.142n a reportdated March14, 1975,distributed o the militaryattaches of Argentina,Bolivia, Chile,the United States, Uruguay,and Venezuela,Guanes noted that"extremist"Latin Americanswere meeting in Argentina.143Hesought further details about the meeting.144Later that month,Guanes circulateda confidentialreport to Argentine militaryauthorities explaining that Paraguayan authorities had beenunable to verify whether Paraguayan dissidents, includingEpifanio Mendez Fleitas and Waldino Lovera, had met inClorinda,Argentina.145

140. See Letter fromGuanes to Coronel,DPA 12 1976-83WP, 00050F 1855(Mar.26,1976);Letter fromAlbertoCantero,DPA 29 ENE FEB 1981A (Jan. 12, 1981).141. In January 1977, the Argentine intelligence service intercepteda card from Dr.TelmoCarrillo and turned it over to Paraguay'sEMAGENFA. Letter fromthe Ministeriode Interiorto FransiscoBritez, DPA 1 DE (Oct. 21, 1976). In July 1978, ESMAGENFAreceived information from Argentina's Armed Forces regarding the plans of variousArgentine subversive organizations based on documents confiscated from the EjercitoRevolucionariodel Pueblo(ERP),PartidoRevolucionariode Trabajo(PRT),and Banda deDelinquent Terrorists (BDT). See Letter from el Jefe de la Policia de la Capital(Asunci6n),to Pastor M. Coronel,Jefe del Departamentode Investigacionesde la Policiade la Capital (Asuncidn),Archivador207, No. 00040F 1353-54 (July 15, 1978). In July1979, Fretes reported on intelligence received from Uruguay's Defense IntelligenceService (SID) regarding two individuals who had held a clandestine meeting ofParaguayan Confederationof Workers(CPT)in Buenos Aires. Accordingto SID, theseindividuals were in touch with leftists in Uruguay and were going to participate ininternational campaigns against "ourcountries." Uruguayan authorities wanted themlocated. SID providedParaguayanauthorities with materials seized in BuenosAires. SeeBib. 246, supra note 72, at 00021F 1675.142. See Bib. 595, supra note 56, at 00053F 0707.143. Bib. 245, supra note 58, at 00021F 1435.144. See id.145. See id. Informe No. 16 at 00021F 1644(Mar.24, 1975).



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2001] PARAGUAY'SERROR 79The Archive containsa series of reportswritten in October1975, approximately ne month before the meeting of the FirstWorkingMeetingof NationalIntelligenceheldin Santiago hat isdescribedabove. A secretreportdated October20, 1975, basedon information rom Brazilian and Argentine military sourcesdiscussed the operations,organization,and plans of dissidentpoliticalgroups.146Guanes concludedthat these organizationsrepresented a threat.147 He emphasized the importance ofcoordinatingall the national intelligence resources throughmeetings and the exchange of intelligence.148 Guanes

recommended hat a commissionevaluate intelligence for theCommander-in-Chief.149He advocated devoting economicresources for trips abroad to verify the intelligence held byagencies of other countries.150n another memo, sources fromBolivia and the United States informedParaguayan officialsabouta "subversive"oordinationenter n SantaCruz,Bolivia.151This informationwas analyzed with Colonel Padilla of theBolivian Army during the 1975 Bilateral Intelligencemeetingheldin Asuncion.152A reportdated July 6, 1976, from Guanes is significantinthat its distributionist cites"Condor ," he apparentcodenamefor Chile.153 araguayanauthorities,Argentineauthorities,andArgentina'sArmyIntelligenceService("SIE") re also identifiedon the circulation ist.154Guanesasked for confirmation hat amilitarymotorizedpatrolwas searching ora guerrillacampandindicatedthat he wanted to coordinateeffortswith the chief ofthe military unit responsible for investigating the guerrillacamp.155Moreover,the Archive establishes that military officialsvisitedoneanother. OnFebruary26, 1979,two officials romtheArgentineIntelligenceService,who oversawthe investigationof

146. See id. InformeNo. 64 at 00021F 1578-81(Oct.20, 1975).147. See id. 00021F 1580-81148. See id. at 00021F 1581.149. See id.150. See id.151. See id. InformeNo. 65 at 00021F 1558-59(Oct.22, 1975).152. See id. at 00021F 1558.153. Id. Pedidio de Busqueda No. 23/76 at 00021F 1522. (Jul. 6, 1976). See PeterKornbluh,ChileDeclassified,THENATION1, 23 (August9/16, 1999).154. See Bib. 245, supra note 58, at 00021F 1522.155. See id.



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80 INTER-AMERICANLAWREVIEW [Vol.32:1Montonero activities, visited the Political Division of Paraguay'sPolice Department.156 On July 10, 1980, Fretes and Guanesreported on intelligence obtained during a visit from severalArgentine officials, including Orlando Ruiz of the IntelligenceUnit of the Naval Mechanics School, and two other intelligenceofficers fromArgentina's Chaco and Formosa provinces.157Fretesindicated that he had previously exchanged information with theArgentine Intelligence Unit.158Fretes requested authorization tocoordinate efforts with Argentina to identify and to follow twoMontonerosdetained by Argentine officials.159

On November 6, 1978, Camilo Almada Sapriza and LuciloBenitez, from Paraguay's Investigations Department, reported ontheir mission to Buenos Aires.160They stated that they were wellreceived by Argentine authorities, especially the commanders ofthe military attachment division and members of SIDE.161Almada and Benitez were allowed to interrogate members of thePolitical Military Organization (OPM, a Paraguayan politicalopposition group) who had been detained in Buenos Aires.162 Itshould be noted that after Stroessner was deposed, Almada andBenitez were convicted of having committed a range of humanrights abuses.163

Brazil and Uruguay participated in the exchange ofinformationwith Paraguay as well. The Archive contains a 1977report discussing the backgroundof certain Brazilian citizens. 164The information contained in this report originated from Brazil'sNational InformationService, ("SNI").165 confidential map withthe stamp from the military attache of the Brazilian Embassy inParaguay shows the locations of various Brazilian, Paraguayan,156. See Letter fromAlbertoCantero to Pastor MilciadesCoronel,DPA 12 Feb. Abr1979 A. (Feb.27, 1979).157. See DPA6 D, supra note 81, at 00019F 0876.158. See id.159. See id.160. See Letter fromAlmada andBenitez to Coronel,DPA5 1978-81 B (Nov.6, 1978).161. See id.162. See id.163. See PARAGUAY:UMANRIGHTS,upra note 3, at 24-40. In 1992, these twoindividualswere sentenced to 25 years in prisonfor the murder of MarioSchaererProno.See id. at 25. In 1994, Benitez was sentenced for his involvement in the detention and

tortureof AmilcarMaria Oviedo. See id. at 35. In 1995, LuciloBenitez was convicted ofhaving torturedAlbertoAlegrePortillo. See id. at 26.164. See Informe No. 004/77,DPA 12 1976-83WP,No. 00050F 1839 (Jan. 5, 1977).165. See id.



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2001] PARAGUAY'STERROR 81and Argentine dissidents living in Paraguay.166As demonstratedby several reports from 1981, Uruguay's intelligence serviceprovided Paraguayan authorities information regarding thepolitical affiliations of Uruguayans detained in Paraguay.167Alengthy report from Uruguay's National Army (Dept. II)discusses the history and operations of political oppositiongroupsin Uruguay.168

The Archive contains numerous lists of "subversives"fromArgentina, Uruguay, and Brazil, including organizational chartsof these groups. Some of these lists are extensive. For example,the Archive holds lists of: Brazilian subversives living inArgentina;169 rgentine terrorists, including one with more thanone thousand names;170 hileans, Brazilians, and Bolivians exiledin missions;171 the Peronist Montonero Movement fromArgentina's SIDE;172 araguayans detained and disappeared inArgentina (including Augustin Goiburiiand Federico Tatter, whoare believed to be victims of Operation Condor);173erroristArgentine criminals;174and Uruguayan "subversives" andpolitical opponents of the Uruguayan government, includingmore than six hundred alleged Tupamaros wanted by theMontevideopolice.175

V. CONCLUDINGREMARKSMore research is required to completely understand the trueextent and nature of Operation Condor in the Southern Cone

166. See Mapof Paraguay,1051 CasoGoiburu,No. 00050F 2474.167. See DPA 10 1974-83WV,00048F 1706 (Jan. 2, 1981);InformeNo. 004/85,DPA6D, supra note 81, at 0019F 0994 (Jan. 9, 1981); Bib. 595, supra note 84; Letter fromCanteroand Coronel,DPA 29 (Jan. 12, 1981);Informe(E.M.G.),DPA 11 1981-3E (Aug.10, 1981);Nota No. B/247,Bib. 246, supra note 72, at 00021F 1672.168. See DPA 48 W, supra note 98, at 00008F 1761. These groups included theAnarchist Federation of Uruguay (FAU), the Student Worker Resistance (ROE), andPopular RevolutionaryOrganization33 (OPR 33, which allegedly had connections withthe Montoneros).See id.169. See Nota No. B/650,Bib. 246, supra note 72, at 0002IF 1653(Aug.6, 1976).170. See Nominade TerroristasArgentinos,DPA 1 1962-83EW,No. 00051F 0382-83(undated)[hereinafterDPA 1 1962-83EW];DPA 36.171. See Documents from la Embajada del Uruguay en Paraguay- AgregaturaMilitar,Bibliorata7 INTERPOL,No. 00046F0341-49 [hereinafterBib. 7 INTERPOL].172. See DPA 6 D, supra note 81, at 00019F 1015.173. See DNAT,supra note 46, at Carpeta30.174. See id. at Carpeta3.175. See Bib. 7 INTERPOL, upra note 171, at 00046F0341.



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82 INTER-AMERICANAWREVIEW [Vol.32:1countries,as well as the level of awareness and involvementofthe United States. Additional nvestigationof INTERPOL'solein OperationCondormay also provide insight as to whetherINTERPOLroutinely exceeded its mandate by exchanginginformation egardingpoliticalcrimes. In any case, it is evidentfrom Paraguay's Archive of Terror that the Southern Conemilitary governments coordinated their efforts against theperceived communist threat. The Archive provides concreteevidenceof the clandestineexchangeof intelligenceandprisonersamong the Southern Cone countries. Unfortunately,compromising ocumentswere likely removedfrom the Archiveof Terrorbeforethey were "discovered."The Archiveof Terroradds to the small but growing number of publicly availablerecordsconfirminghe existence ofOperationCondor.

Archives of Terror

Documents

Transcript of Archives of Terror