ST. THOMAS AQUINASREADING SUMMARY NO. 1PREPARED BY: ISRAEL, PATRICIA KAREENA A.SUBMITTED ON: 29 JANUARY 2015MORALITY AND NATURAL LAW (ST. AQUINAS SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES; SUMMA THEOLOGICA)THEODORE DENISE ET AL

Thesis Statement: As the Aristotle of Theology, Aquinas completes Aristotles theory of morality with the concepts of the beatific vision of God as humanitys final goal, a special doctrine of free will, and a theory of natural law. He states that: Human actions are directed towards ends, and such ends, when they are achieved, become means for attaining still other ends. On the basis of this teleological thesis, both Aristotle and Aquinas argue that not only are an individuals activities related as a succession of ends becoming means but also that such a succession can occur only if there is a final end. Both point to happiness as the final end: 1) it is desirable for us for its own sake; 2) it is sufficient of itself to satisfy us; and 3) it is attainable by the wise among us. Happiness can only be the fulfillment of the highest potential of human naturebeing naturally happy and also becoming supernaturally happy upon coming to see God as he isunder the direction of reason, which should develop both of mans sources of truth: those that human faculties provide and those that God reveals.

However, our direct realization of natural and supernatural happiness on earth is systematically limited, because few among us sustain the intellectual activity of philosophers or the spiritual intensity of saints.

Moreover, good character is necessary for both the intellectual virtues and for our social lives.

Aquinas subsumes the Aristotelian analysis of choice under his own concept of free will. This includes Aristotles basic corollary that people bear responsibility for their actions unless they are physically compelled to do them or are inadvertently ignorant about what they involve. 3 Components of Voluntary Acts (all are morally relevant -> bring about different measures of moral worth for nominally identical acts)1. Kind of overt act that it is2. Kind of motive prompting it3. Set of consequence-bearing circumstances

Aquinas ascribes the source and authority of the principles determining proper choice to the natural laws God makes available to humans. Traces ultimate principles to which we refer to in moral judgments back to our intuitive knowledge of the natural law -> back to our experience as rational beings of the eternal law -> Gods plan for rationally ordered movements and actions in the created universe Recognizes gap between (knowing and assenting to the authority of the principles of natural law) and (interpreting and applying them to concrete situations) Conscience -> cannot be infallible, but has moral authority

I. God, Who in Himself is perfect in every way, and by His power endows all things with being, must needs be ruler of all, Himself ruled by none, nor is anything to be excepted from His ruling, as neither is there anything that does not owe its being to Him. Therefore as He is perfect in being and causing, so He is perfect in ruling. For some things are so produced by God that, being intelligent, they bear a resemblance to Him and reflect His image they are directed and they direct themselves to their appointed end by their own actions in thus directing themselves, they are subjected to divine ruling they are admitted by divine ruling to attainment of their last end

II. Every agent, by its actions, intends an end, that towards which the movement of the agent tends; for when this is reached, the end is said to be reached, and to fail in this is to fail in the end intended movement of an agent tends to something determinate1. If action terminates in something made then the movement of the agent tends by that action towards the thing made2. If action does not terminate in something made then the movement of the agent tends to the action itself In the action of every agent, a point can be reached beyond which the agent does not desire to go, or else the action would tend to infinity, which is impossible it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium, so the agent would never even begin to act = NOTHING MOVES TOWARDS WHAT IT CANNOT REACH

III. Every agent acts for a good that to which an agent tends definitely must needs be befitting to that agent, since the agent would not tend to it save because of some fittingness thereto that which is befitting to a thing is good for it End is that wherein appetite of the agent comes to rest, as also the appetite of that which is moved it is the very notion of good to be the term of appetite, since = GOOD IS THE OBJECT OF EVERY APPETITE All action and movement is for some perfection1. If the action be itself the end then it is a second perfection of the agent2. If the action consist in the transformation of external matter then the mover intends to induce some perfection in the thing moved, towards which perfection of the movable also tends, if the movement be natural TO BE GOOD = TO BE PERFECT1. Intellectual agent: acts for an end, as determining for itself its end + does not determined end for itself except under aspect of the good + does not move except it be considered as a good, which is the object of the will2. Natural agent: though it acts for an end, does not determine its end for itself, since it knows not the nature of end, but is moved to the end determined for it by another + not moved + does not act for an end, except insofar as this end is a good, since the end is determined for the natural agent by some appetite SUPEREME GOOD = END OF ALL = GOD

IV. Aristotles account of our quest for happiness is overly optimistic: 1) our nature makes it difficult for us to achieve the moral and intellectual virtues while trying to avoid corruption; 2) the higher wisdom cannot be found within the confines of our natural life We need freedom from disturbances caused by passions, which is achieved by means of moral virtues and of prudence also need freedom from external disturbances, to which the whole governance of civil life is directed. MANS ULTIMATE HAPPINESS = WISDOM = CONSIDERATION OF DIVINE THINGS CONTEMPLATION OF GOD

V. God is the lawgiver + humans, being in Gods image, possess the rational and volitional capacities to comprehend and obey eternal law. Law which is the Supreme Reason cannot be understood to be otherwise than unchangeable and eternal law as dictate of practical reason emanating from ruler who governs a perfect community world ruled by divine providence + whole community of the universe is governed by divine reason, whose conception of things is not subject to time but is eternal = ETERNAL LAW 2 ways law can be in a person:1. As in him that rules and measures2. As in that which is rules and measured, since a thing is ruled and measured insofar as it partakes of the rule/measure ALL THINGS ARE RULED AND MEASURED BY ETERNAL LAW + ALL THINGS PARTAKE IN ETERNAL LAW (insofar as they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends) Rational creature: subject to divine providence in a more excellent way insofar as itself partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both for itself and for others it has a share of eternal reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end = PARTICIPATION IN ETERNAL LAW = NATURAL LAW WHEREBY WE DISCERN WHAT IS GOOD AND WHAT IS EVIL FUNCTION OF NATURAL LAW IS NOTHING ELSE THAN AN IMPRINT ON US OF THE DIVINE LIGHT

VI. Eternal law = Gods idea of an ordered universe pre-exists and control ass animate and inanimate things in it | Natural law = rational creatures participation in eternal law humans, though subject to natural tendencies to act and react in certain ways, possess a natural inclination to know and choose Thing is self-evident in 2 ways: 1) in itself; 2) in relation to us 1st indemonstrable principle: the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time being is the first thing that fails under the apprehension absolutely, so good is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action Nature of good GOOD IS THAT WHICH ALL THINGS SEEKS AFTER FIRST PRECEPT OF LAW: GOOD IS TO BE DONE AND PROMOTED + EVIL IS TO BE AVOIDED All other precepts of natural law are based upon this all things which the practical reason naturally apprehends as mans good belong to the precepts of the natural law under the form of things to be done/avoided Order of the precepts of the natural law is according to the order of natural inclinations1. Inclination to good in accordance with nature which he has in common with all substances, inasmuch, namely, as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being2. Inclination to things that pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in common with other animals; and in virtue of this inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural law which nature has taught to all animals3. Inclination to good according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him MAN HAS NATURAL INCLINATION TO KNOW THE TRUTH ABOUT GOD + TO LIVE IN SOCIETY = WHATEVER PERTAINS TO THIS INCLINATION BELONGS TO THE NATURAL LAW SHUN IGNORANCE + AVOID OFFENDING THOSE AMONG WHOM ONE HAS TO LIVE

VII. Rejected common view that moral responsibility is obviated when one is overcome by fear/overwhelmed by desire. to be human, an act must be voluntary: 1) initiated by the agent; and 2) done for a rationally ascertained end1. Compulsion: will does not consent but is moved entirely counter to that which is done through compulsion involuntary = WILL DOES NOTHING INWARDLY 2. Fear: will moved towards end, in order to avoid an evil which is feared voluntary = WILL DOES SOMETHING Concupiscence does not cause involuntariness but makes something voluntary inclined the will to desire the object of concupiscence has reference to good, unlike fear which references to evil with fear, will retains repugnance to that which he does, considered in itself INCONTINENT MAN OF CONCUPISCENCE DOES NOT RETAIN HIS FORMER WILL WHEREBY HE REPUDIATED OBJECT OF HIS CONCUPISCENCE will is changed

VIII. Knowledge is a necessary condition for involuntariness. Ignorance has a threefold relationship to the act of the will: 1) concomitantly, there is ignorance of what is done, but so that even if it were known, it would be done, so act is voluntary still; 2) consequently, ignorance itself is voluntary; and 3) antecedently, ignorance is not voluntary and yet is the cause of mans willing what he would not will otherwise.

IX. Virtue is a habit through which men wish for good things. A good will is one which is in accordance with virtue. Therefore, the goodness of the will is from the fact that a man wills that which is good. And good and evil in the acts of the will is derived from the objects. evil: will desires that which is not suitable as an end Given that the act of the will is fixed on some good, no circumstance can make the act evil When a man wills a good when he ought not, or where he ought not, then: 1. If this circumstance is referred to as the thing willed act of the will is not fixed on something good, since the will to do something when it ought not be done is not to will something good2. If this circumstance is referred to the act of willing impossible to will something good when one ought not to because one ought always to will what is good Except accidentally, insofar as man, by willing some particular good, is prevented from willing at the same time another good which he ought to will at that time evil results not from willing that particular good but from not willing the other Wills object is proposed to it by the reason

X. If ones conscience (kind of dictate of the reason, since its an application of knowledge to action) is in fundamental errorthat is, ones conscience is mistaken about a moral principle rather than being ignorant of specific facts in a situationthen the will in following errant conscience is evil. accidental evil vs. absolute evil (will is unresponsive to conscience) = INCONTINENT MAN IS ONE WHO DOES NOT FOLLOW RIGHT REASON + ALSO THE ONE WHO DOES NOT FOLLOW FALSE REASON1. If reason/conscience tell us to do something which is of its nature good, there is no error and the same is true if it tells us not to do something which is evil of its nature2. If it tells us we are bound by precept to do what in itself is evil, or that what in itself is good is forbidden, then it errs conscience does not bind, so will which is at variance with erring reason/conscience is not evil3. If it tells us that what is in itself indifferent is forbidden or commanded then it errs conscience binds so that will which is at variance with that erring reason is evil, sinful Ignorance causes act to be involuntary = takes away character of moral good and evil Willed ignorance = does not cause act to be involuntary1. If reason/conscience err voluntarily, either directly or through negligence, so that one errs about what one ought to know, then such an error of reason/conscience does not excuse the will, which abides by that erring reason/conscience, from being evil2. If error arise from ignorance of some circumstance, and without any negligence, so that it cause the act to be involuntary, then that error of reason/conscience excuses the will, which abides by the erring reason, from being evil

XI. What is good or evil about an act is what the agent intends and not the consequences the act produces. consequences do not make a good act evil, or vice-versa, or increase its goodness/evilness, unless they are foreseen unforeseen: 1) if they follow from nature of action, and in the majority of cases, then consequences increase goodness/malice of act; 2) if they follow from accident and seldom, then they do not increase goodness/malice of an act (we do not judge a thing according to that which belongs to it by accident, but only according to that which belongs to it essentially)

Full Citation of the Article: St. Thomas Aquinas. Morality and Natural Law,(Summa Contra Gentiles and Summa Theologica). In Great Traditions in Ethics, edited by Theodore Denise et al., 87-101(Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 1999).