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Transcript of Applying our analytical tools to Student Research! READING: Holkeboer, Christian and James Raymond...
Applying our analytical toolsto Student Research!
READING:
Holkeboer, Christian and James Raymond Vreeland. 2011. Calling Democracies and Dictatorships: The effect of political regime on international long-distance rates. Paper presented at the 2012 Meeting of the Public Choice Societies, Miami, Florida.
1
Plan1. The deep historical origins of gender inequality
2. Canadian foreign aid: Buying political support
3. Korean foreign aid: Buying export markets
4. Trading market access for political influence: The effect of recognizing Taiwan on trade with China
5. Calling Democracies and Dictatorships: The effect of political regime on international long-distance rates
6. Regional Organizations and International Politics The effect of Security Council membership on ADB loans
3
Political Economy, Culture, and Gender
• Women
– in the labor force
– as leaders of private firms
– as public leaders in government
4
Vast cross-societal differences in cultural attitudes about the appropriate roles for women
• Reflected in both value-based survey responses & objective measures like female labor force participation
• World Values Survey example:– “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to
a job than women”– Proportion of the population that answers “yes”:– Iceland 3.6%, USA 10.6%, Rwanda 28%, Switzerland
35.1%, Japan 60%, Pakistan 79%, Egypt 94.9%
• Female labor force participation rates in 2000:– Burundi 93.2%, Tanzania 89.3%, Iceland 83.3%, USA
70.4%, Japan 59%, Italy 46%, Pakistan 30.3%, Egypt 21.5% 5
On the Origins of Gender Roles: Women & the Plough
Alberto Alesina, Paola Giuliano and Nathan Nunn
14
Boserup’s hypothesis1. Certain parts of the world traditionally used plough agriculture
2. In these places, men had an advantage for work in the field
– The person had to pull the plough or control an animal that pulled the plough (neither of which is an easy task)
– The use of the plough also leaves little need for weeding, a job in which women almost always specialize (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1996)
– Plough agriculture was less compatible with simultaneous child care (Brown, 1970)
3. Therefore, men tended to work in the field outside of the home, while women worked within the home
4. Over centuries, the belief that the home was the “normal” or “natural” place for women evolved
5. These beliefs continue to persist today (even after a movement out of agriculture) 15
Country-level: Outcomes of interest
1. Female labor force participation:– Proportion of women in the labor force (employed or
seeking employment)
2. Female representation in positions of power:
– Proportion of firm owners/managers that are female
– Proportion of seats in national parliament held by women
• Control variable:
– Log real per capita income, log real per capita income squared
18
Also consider labor force participation of US immigrants
• If a woman’s parents come from “traditional-plough-use” countries, participation in labor force is lower
• Splitting the effect between having an immigrant mother/father from “plough-country” – which effect is stronger?
– Mother
– Father
23
Does culture exist?• Yes!
• Should be rigorously defined/measured
– e.g., Female labor force participation
• Can be treated as a dependent variable
– Caused by ancient agricultural practices
• Then you can think about its effects
– If you want to change culture, it is helpful to understand where it comes from
– In this case, a history of the plough should bear no relationship with life-choices
– There’s nothing “natural” about women working in the home24
Take awaysI. Vast cross-societal differences in cultural attitudes about the
“appropriate” roles for women
II. Differences in female participation in the labor force can be explained by
1. Discrimination in the workplace
2. Discrimination in the family
3. Maximizing family-income & age spouse
4. Culture???
a) YES!
b) Rooted in ancient agricultural practices
c) Plough-use led to men working in the field, women at home
d) A view that women belong at home developed and has been handed down generation to generation
25
O Canada, we stand on guard for thee:Foreign aid benefits for members of the Bretton Woods Canadian-bloc
Argument
• Foreign Aid as a foreign policy instrument
• States act strategically
• Buying seats on the Executive Boards of IMF & World Bank?
ResultsMODEL(ALL W/ YEAR EFFECTS AND HUBER-WHITE STD. ERRORS)
ECONOMIC(INCLUDES LAGGED DEPENDENT VARIABLE)
POLITICAL-ECONOMIC(INCLUDES LAGGED DEPENDENT VARIABLE)
POLITICAL-ECONOMIC-CULTURAL (INCLUDES LAGGED DEPENDENT VARIABLE)
REGION FIXED EFFECTS(INCLUDES LAGGED DEPENDENT VARIABLE)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
LOG REAL NET CANADIAN ODA
LOG REAL NET CANADIAN ODA
LOG REAL NET CANADIAN ODA
LOG REAL NET CANADIAN ODA
MEMBERSHIP IN THE CANADIAN EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR BLOC
1.14***
(6.74)
0.93***
(5.19) 1.16***
(5.38) 0.64**
(3.63)
LOG OF REAL GDP PER CAPITA
-0.34***
(-5.75) -0.40***
(-6.10) -0.41***
(-5.58) -1.15*
(-2.16)
LOG OF THE LAGGED POPULATION
0.19***
(4.64)0.20***
(4.84) 0.21***
(4.90) 1.16***
(4.56)
NET FDI (% OF GDP)
-0.02(-0.54)
-0.02(-0.62)
-0.02(-0.59)
-0.02(-1.11)
TRADE OPENNESS (IMPORTS+EXPORTS AS A % OF GDP)
0.002(1.13)
0.003(1.39)
0.004(1.77)
0.003(2.01)
LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY (POLITY II SCORES)
0.03**
(3.00)
0.03***
(3.34) 0.02
(1.77)
MEMBERSHIP IN LA FRANCOPHONIE
0.13(1.03)
0.28(0.97)
FORMER BRITISH COLONY
-0.21(-1.64)
0.26(1.15)
N 2398 2396 2396 2396
“It would be interesting to see if the membership in the IMF by the other small island state members of the constituency was stimulated not only by Australian diplomatic efforts but by increases in development aid, though there is no evidence to support or reject the case of which the author is yet aware” (Carroll 2011: 11).
Professor Peter Carroll, Australia Historian
Member of Australian BWI bloc
1.74*** 0.35*** -0.31*** -0.29***
-0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08
Log of population -0.02** 0.14*** -0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.08Log of gdp per capita -0.41*** 0.09*** 0.08** -0.01 -0.03 -0.03Log of total flow of trade 0.32*** 0.07*** 0.08*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01British colony 0.26*** 0.95*** 0.3 -0.03 -0.26 -0.3Oceania region 2.01*** 1.91*** 1.18*** -0.08 -0.28 -0.39_cons 2.94*** -3.22*** -1.03 -0.23 -0.54 -1.08Number of observations 5091 5091 5091Adj. R-squared 0.54 0.81 0.82Country FE No No Yes YesYear FE No No No Yes
Australian foreign aid:
It is well known that foreign aid is correlated with trade for large-country donors (United States, Japan)
39
As Jaffe and Oak (2010:59) explain, “when your
country’s economic health depends on exports, the
economic fundamentals of the countries to which you are exporting most of your goods are just as important
as your fundamentals.”40
South Korea
• A relatively small donor (used to be a recipient!)
• HOWEVER: No correlation between its trade and foreign aid
• Is Korean aid a-political? Altruistic?
• Started giving aid around the time of democratization (1988)
41
Still, Korean aid is controlled by:
• The Export-Import Bank of Korea
• The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
• Maybe Korea is too small to influence all countries
• Many rich trade partners
• Test for the conditional effect of trade - conditioned on level of development!– INTERACTION EFFECT
42
Calling Democracies and Dictatorships:
The effect of political regime on international long-distance rates
Christian Holkeboerand
James Raymond VreelandEdmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown
University
2012 PUBLIC CHOICE SOCIETY
48
Regulation theory & accountability
• Idea in Zurich…
• Telecommunications:– Increasing returns to scale– Naturally Monopolistic
• Democracies regulate better than autocracies?
51
2nd Argument:
• Political control!• Autocracies desire higher prices to lower
communication with the outside world.
59
Data
• Cross-section: 156 countries
• Dep. variable: – Average Revenue Per Minute (ARPM)
• Indep. variable:– Political regime
61
The effect
65
• The coefficient of –0.31 suggests a democracy-discount of about 27 percent, statistically significant at the one percent level.
Implications
• Democracy is good for cross-border communication in a very real sense:
• It lowers the price
Syriatel owner: Rami Makhlouf
March 2011 August 2011
66
The International Sources of Intrastate Conflict:
Regional Organizations and International Politics:Trading Asian Development Bank Loans for United Nations Security Council Votes
Regional Organizations and International Politics:Trading Asian Development Bank Loans for United Nations Security Council Votes
Daniel Yew Mao Lim and James Raymond VreelandGeorgetown University
January 2011
68
ADBADB Prominent role of JapanProminent role of Japan
UNSCUNSC Exogenous measure of political importanceExogenous measure of political importance
Argument Findings Implications DiscussionPuzzle 70
Argument Findings Implications DiscussionPuzzle
Developing Countries
Developing Countries Loans > UNSC votesLoans > UNSC votes
Developed Countries
Developed Countries UNSC votes > LoansUNSC votes > Loans
71
Propensity Score
Matching
Propensity Score
Matching• UNSC member: +87%• UNSC member: +87%
Country & Year Fixed
Effects, Lagged
Dependent Variable, Control
Variables
Country & Year Fixed
Effects, Lagged
Dependent Variable, Control
Variables
• UNSC member: +38%• UNSC member: +38%
Argument Findings Implications DiscussionPuzzle 74
Japan uses its influence at the ADB to gain influence over the UNSCJapan uses its influence at the ADB to gain influence over the UNSC
Regionalization of global governanceRegionalization of global governance
Argument Findings Implications DiscussionPuzzle 76
Time-line
78
Enrolls in Political Economy of International Organizations (MSFS)
Jan 2010
Paper idea
Mar 2010
Mortara Working Paper &Present research in Zurich
Jan 2011
Submit to World Politics
Feb 2011
R&R
June 2011
Resubmit
Mar 2012
Accepted!!!
Apr 2012
Take aways1. Political ties drive foreign aid
Canada provides more foreign aid to countries that vote for the Canadian Executive Directors at the IMF & World Bank
2. Trade ties drive foreign aid Korea provides more foreign aid to poor countries that buy more
Korean exports
3. Trade ties can be influenced by politics China rewards countries with market access – exports to China
go up when countries cease recognizing Taiwan
4. Global communication is influenced by political regime type It is cheaper to call democracies than dictatorships
5. International politics influences multilateral development banks Japan (& the United States) pressure the Asian Development
Bank to funnel loans to strategically important countries 79