Appendix B:Lifeline Vulnerability Functions - FEMA.gov · and for other important lifelines not...

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Appendix B:Lifeline Vulnerability Functions

Table of Contents

Page

R1 T-Ticrhwav" F , sLT............................... --- ~~1 %

B 11 Itinr Rrdias.. 1IQw_ _ _ _ _, _ _ _4, _ _Llj::-.-.- >';'s1Qt B.1.2 Tunnels............................................. ..................197 .......................................................................B.1.3 Conventional Bridges............................................................................................ .................. 200B.1.4 Freeways/Mighways.............................. <§.6.............et..........a. ....... .............. .. 203B 1u..f Tnr-Al nsd,

B.2 Railway........................................................... I)nQ.........................................................................................-

B.2.1 Bridges........................................... .........208.................................................................................B .2.2 Tunnels.............................................. ................................................................................. ......... 211B.2.3 Tracks/Roadbeds............................ ................................................................................. ........ 215R 9 4 TerminqI Sttinns 91A . .mr

B.3 Air Transportation. .........218.................................................................................B.3.1 Terminals. ................................................................................. ......... 218B P2 Rnvnwavqand 7':h-iwvs. .. 991i

=. r A-_ILL TT J 1H LIL L q IL T

B.4 Sea/Water Transportation.........................I ......... . M.................................................................................B.4.1 Ports/Cargo Handling Equipment. ................................................................................. ......... 223

ThndandL;.I L 1Rd9 .LJUL.LlZ 1 iWtwernvra 996 .. fi T

B.5 Electrical......................................................... ......... 229.............................................. ..................................B.5.1 Fossil-fuel Power Plants................. .................................................................................. ........ 229

.. _ R 59_ sy-lOlLA Pnwer rP1ants_v.s - T2vlreiertrir s W,s. ..___, _

X,2 E

B.5.3 Transmission Lines .......................... ........ 235..................................................................................B.5A Transmission Substations................................................................................................ ........ 238P 5-5 Tlistrihutinn Tines 9.49._ . so,.sv_ssv B.5.6 Distribution Substations ................................................................................................. ........ 243

B.6 Water Supply.................................................I................................................................................ ......... 243B.6 1 Transmisinn AnneTncfq - .. 2455

_ . _ _ _ a .. . 1voX. .' i sH

........ 248B.6.2 Pumping Stations ............................I................................................................................B.6.3 Storage Reservoirs...........................I....................... ........................................................ ......... 251_ R 64 Trefmentf PInts. *.Kr. 1 s v.L.Ls:L; I 1Ws. 955

B.6.5 Terminal Reservoirs/Tanks. .........260................................................................................B.6.6 Trunk Lines. ................................................................................ .........262B.6.7 Wells. ................................................................................ .........266

PR7 Saqnibty Sevwer .. wq

_ _ , 2S,

3.7.1 Mains . ........268. ................................................................................B.7.2 Pumping Stations. ............................................................................... ........ 271B.7.3 Treatment Plants . ................................................................................ ........ 274

B.8 Natural Gas. ................................................................................ ........ 277B.8.1 Transmission Lines. ................................................................................ ........ 277P R 9 CnrnnressnrStahtnn . .. n

.. ,.vU]UZ]L8X s .,sU >s

B.8.3 Distribution Mains.. ........ 283.................................................................................B.9 Petroleum Fuels. ................................................................................ I.........Z

B.9.1 Oil Fields. ....................... a......................................................... ........ 286B.9.2 Refineries. .......... 2.................................................................................B.9.3 Transmission Pipelines. ................................................................................. ........ 2913.9.4 DistributionStorage Tanks. ................................................................................. ........ 294

B.10 Emergency Service. ................................................................................. ........295iRfll TMelnthCre .. 05

. | W. JL v 1 '@u1sU \_

. IG00B.1,0.2 Emergency Response Services. ........................................................................................ -1

ATC-25i AT5AppendixB:Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 195

Included in this appendix. are vulnerability bridge piers and supporting foundation functions used to describe the expected or (commonly piers, piles, or caissons) and the assumed earthquake performance superstructure including the bridge deck, characteristics of lifelines as well as the time girders, stringers, truss members, and cables. required to restore damaged facilities to their Approaches may consist of conventional pre-earthquake capacity, or usability. Functions highway bridge construction and/or have been developed for all lifelines inventoried abutments. for this project, for lifelines estimated by proxy, and for other important lifelines not available Typical Seismic Damage: Major bridges are for inclusion in the project inventory. The typically well- engineered structures methodology used to calculate the quantitative designed for lateral loading (seismic loading relationships for direct damage and residual was not typically considered until the 1970s). capacity are described in Chapter 3. In most cases, damage will be limited to

ground and structural failures at bridge The vulnerability function for each lifeline approaches. However, major ground failures consists of the following components: including liquefaction and submarine

landsliding could lead to significant damage * Generalinformation, which consists of to bridge foundations and superstructures.

(1) a description of the structure and its main components, (2) typical seismic Earthquake-resistant Design: Seismically damage in qualitative terms, and (3) resistant design practices include dynamic seismically resistant design characteristics analysis, which takes soil-structure for the facility and its components in interaction into account. Foundations particular. This information has been should be designed and detailed to included to define the assumed withstand any soil failures that are expected characteristics and expected due to unstable site conditions. performance of each facility and to make the functions more widely 2. Direct Damage applicable (i.e., applicable for other investigations by other researchers). Basis: Damage curves for highway system

major bridges are based on ATC-13 data for * Direct damage information, which FC 30, major bridges (greater than 500-foot

consists of (1) a description of its basis in spans). Standard construction is assumed to terms of structure type and quality of represent typical California major bridges construction (degree of seismic under present conditions (i.e., a composite resistance), (2) default estimates of the of older non-seismically designed bridges as quality of construction forpresent well as modern bridges designed for site-conditions, (3) default estimates of the specific seismic loads). quality of construction for upgraded conditions, and (4) time-to-restoration Present Conditions: In the absence of data curves. on the type of construction, age, etc., the

following factors were used to modify the B.1 Highway mean curves, under present conditions:

B. 1.I Major Bridges MMI Intensity

1. General NEHRP Map Area Shift California 7 0

Description: Major bridges include all highway system bridges with individual spans over 500 feet. Steel bridges of this type include suspension, cable-stayed, or truss.

California 3-6 Non-California 7 Puget Sound 5 All other areas

+1 +1 +1 +2

Reinforced concrete arch or prestressed concrete segmental bridges are also common. The main components include the

The modified motion-damage curves for major bridges are shown in Figure B-1.

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25 196

Bridge Major

D=1118

a

0)

C

D=Y I)' VII Vill IX X

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Figure B-1 Damage percent by intensity for major bridges.

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it Heavyy timbers and wood lagging (grouted appears cost-effective to improve facilities, and urigrouted) may also be used to support assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades tunnel walls and ceilings. Tunnels may result in a beneficial intensity shift of one chang4F in shape and/or construction unit (i.e., -1), relative to the above present materiial over their lengths. conditions.

Typiaii Seismic Damage: Tunnels may Time-to-restoration: The time-to- experi ence severe damage in areas affected restoration data assigned to SF 25a, major by permanent ground movements caused by bridges for highway systems, are assumed to IandsliIdes or surface fault rupture, but rarely apply to all major bridges. By combining suffer significant internal damage from these data with the damage curves for FC grouniI shaking alone. Landslides at tunnel 30, the time-to-restoration curves shown in portal s can cause blockage. Damage has Figures B-2 through B-4 were derived for been i ioted at tunnel weak spots such as the various NEHRP Map Areas. inters( ctions; bends, or changes in shape,

construction materials, or soil conditions. B3.2 Tunnels Dama.ge to lined tunnels has typically been

limite(I to cracked lining. 1. General

Seism ically Resistant Design: Lined tunnels Description: In general, tunnels may pass have rperforned better than unlined tunnels. through alluvium or rock, or may be of cut Consequently, general Seismically resistant and cover construction. Tunnels may be design*practices for tunnels include lined or unlined, and may be at any depth providlingreinforced concrete lining; below the ground surface. Tunnel lengths streng thening areas that have been may range from less than 100 feet to several traditionally weak such as intersections, miles. Lining materials include brick and bends,, and changes in shape and in both reinforced and unreinforced concrete. construction materials; and siting tunnels to

ATC-25 Appendix B:Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 197

Br idge mlajor R=t00y - 5a 1.00 30 t .00

a b 6 0.217 0.795 7 0.215 0.780

.5 B 0.142 0.434

C-) 9 -0.204 0.831 10 -0.103 0.015

-(A)C) R b * days a

n- n.F I i I I I I I I l

DAYS: 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 Z70 300 330 365 Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-2 Residual capacity for major bridges (NEHRP California 7).

Bridge t ajorn-r a an -nH=100x - L34 I [lo J 1. I"E

a b / MH~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1

0.215 0.780 7 _0 142 8.434

.5 8 - 0.204 0 .031 co 9 -10 .103 0.815a

/ ~ ~~ -1B .248 0.006to ( R= ex Ja =

b * days a/ : R =~~~ .c

C).Lr

p I I I

DAYS: 30 68 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 330 365

Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-3 Residual capacity for major bridges (NEHRP Map Area 3-6, Non-California 7, and Puget Sound 5).

19w8 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25

Bridge hajor

a b 8.142 8.43 2,ZB4 8.31 8.1EJ 0.815.5

.24H8 0.086

-0.421 8.B03 M

R= FEZ

* ay0

D5(0

R= x BAYs: 30 8E 90 128 15 186 218 248 2?8 381 330 365


Figure B-4 Residual capacity for major bridges (Al other areas).

eliminate fault crossings. Slope stability at Present Conditions: In the absence of data portals should be evaluated and stabilization on the type of lining, age, etc., use the undertaken if necessary. following factors to modify the mean curves,

under present conditions.: 2. Direct Damage

MMI Basis: Damage curves for highway tunnels Intensity are based on ATC-13 data for FC! 38, NEHRP Map Area Shift tunnels passing through alluvium '(see California 7 '0

Figure B-5). Tunnels passing through California 3-6 +O

alluvium are less vulnerable than cut-and- Non-California 7 Puget Sound 5

cover tunnels, and more vulnerable than All other areas +1tunnels passing through rock; they were chosen as representative of all existing Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it tunnels. If inventory data identify tunnels, as appears cost-effective to improve facilities, cut-and-cover or passing through rock, then assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades use FC 40 or 39, respectively, in lieu of FC result in a beneficial intensity shift of one 38. unit (i.e., -1), relative to the above present

conditions. Standard construction is assumed to represent typical California highway tunnels Time-to-restoration: The Social Function under present conditions (i.e., a composite class time-to-restoration data assigned to SF of older and more modern tunnels). Only 25b, tunnel for highway system, are assumed minimal regional variation in construction to apply to all tunnels. By combining these quality is assumed. data with the damage curves for FC 38, the

time-to-restoration curves shown in Figures

ATC-25 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 199

Tunnel (Highway)

D=108Y

,Sa D=S&; ECO

Other

VI VII VIII IX P.S.5 X


Figure B-5 Damage percent by intensity for I

B-6 and B-7 were derived for the various NEHRP Map Areas.

B.1.3 Conventional Bridges

1. General

Description: Conventional bridges in the highway system include all bridges with spans less than 500 feet. Construction may include simple spans (single or multiple) as well as continuous/monolithic spans. Bridges may be straight or skewed, fixed, moveable (draw bridge, or rotating, etc.), or floating. Reinforced concrete is the most common construction material while steel, masonry, and wood construction are common at water crossings. Typical foundation systems include abutments, spread footings, battered and vertical pile groups, single-column drilled piers, and pile bent foundations. Bents may consist of single or multiple columns, or a pier wall. The superstructure typically comprises girders and deck slabs. Fixed (translation prevented, rotation permitted) and expansion (translation and rotation permitted) bearings of various types

highway tunnels.

are used for girder support to accommodate temperature and shrinkage movements. Shear keys are typically used to resist transverse loads at abutments. Abutment fills are mobilized during an earthquake as the bridge moves into the fill (longitudinal direction), causing passive soil pressures to occur on the abutment wall.

Typical Seismic Damage: The most vulnerable components of a bridge include support bearings, abutments, piers, footings, and foundations. A common deficiency is that unrestrained expansion joints are not equipped to handle large relative displacements (inadequate support length), and simple bridge spans fall. Skewed bridges in particular have performed poorly in past earthquakes because they respond partly in rotation, resulting in an unequal distribution of forces to bearings and supports. Rocker bearings have proven most vulnerable. Roller bearings generally remain stable in earthquakes, except they may become misaligned and horizontally displaced. Elastomeric bearing pads are relatively stable although they have been known to


Tunnel (Highway) 2sb 1.t0 3B t.0

MIII a. b

6 0.344 0.839 7 0.240 8.456

0.204 la.2128 -o 9 0.13 8.189

1e 10.953 0.036 O R= SE0 co

R * das + a ._

Go

l ; i l l l l lR= efl ,Ig,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~DAYS: 30 60 90 120 150 IBB 218 240 Z7 38 330 365


Figure B-6 Residual capacity for highway tunnels (NEHRPMap Area: California 3-6, California 7, Non-California 7 and Puget Sound 5).

5; 5; 5;

2iEm Tunnel (Highway) R=1007 25h, 1.B 38

MI L

6 9.24B 11 .456

7 0.204 8 .212 8 B. 183 0.189 9 ;0. 953

w 10 _0.039 0.819 ce R= SEz }I

R = * days +- a. m

R.= O; L L I II I7 - I I f a i i I

DAYS: 30 60 90 128 150 198 210 240' 278 308 330 365


Figure B-7 Residual capacity for highway tunnels (All other areas).


"walk out" under severe shaking. Failure of energy absorption features including ductile backfill near abutments is common and can columns, lead-filled elastomeric bearings, lead to tilting, horizontal movement or and restrainers. Foundation failure can be settlement of abutments, spreading and prevented by ensuring sufficient bearing settlement of fills, and failure of foundation capacity, proper foundation embedment, members. Abutment damage rarely leads to and sufficient consolidation of soil behind bridge collapse. Liquefaction of saturated retaining structures. soils in river channels and floodplains and subsequent loss of support have caused 2. Direct Damage many bridge failures in past earthquakes. Pounding of adjacent, simply supported Basis: Damage curves for highway system spans can cause bearing damage and conventional bridges are based on ATC-13 cracking of the girders and deck slab. Piers data for FC 24, multiple simple spans, and have failed primarily because of insufficient FC 25, continuous/monolithic bridges transverse confining steel, and inadequate (includes single-span bridges). Highway longitudinal steel splices and embedment system conventional bridges in California into the foundation. Bridge superstructures located within NEHRP Map Area 7 have have not exhibited any particular either been constructed after 1971 or have weaknesses other than being dislodged from been recently analyzed or are in the process their bearings. of being seismically retrofitted, or both.

These bridges are assumed to be best Seismically Resistant Design: Bridge represented by a damage factor half of FC behavior during an earthquake can be very 25, continuous/monolithic (see Figure B-8). complex. Unlike buildings, which generally The conventional bridges located outside are connected to a single foundation California NEHRP Map Area 7 are through the diaphragm action of the base assumed to be a combination of 50% slab, bridges have multiple supports with multiple simple spans (FC 24) and 50% varying foundation and stiffness continuous/monolithic construction (FC 25) characteristics. In addition, longitudinal (see attached figure). If inventory data forces are resisted by the abutments through identify bridges as simple span, or a combination of passive backwall pressures continuous/monolithic, then use the and-foundation embedment when the bridge appropriate ATC-13 data in lieu of the moves toward an abutment, but by only the above. abutment foundation as the bridge moves away from an abutment. Significant Standard construction is assumed to movement must occur at bearings before represent typical California bridges under girders impact abutments and bear against - present conditions (i.e., a composite of older them, further complicating the response. To and more modern bridges). accurately assess the dynamic response of all but the simplest bridges, a three- Present Conditions: In the absence of data dimensional dynamic analysis should be on the type of spans, age, or implementation performed. Special care is required for of seismic retrofit, etc., the following factors design of hinges for continuous bridges. were used to modify the mean curves, under Restraint for spans or adequate bearing present conditions: lengths to accommodate motions are the most effective way to mitigate damage. MM/ Damage in foundation systems is hard to detect, so bridge foundations should be designed to resist earthquake forces elastically. In order to prevent damage to piers, proper confinement, splices, and embedment into the foundation should be provided. Similarly, sufficient steel should be provided in footings. Loads resisted by

NEHRP Map Area

California 7 California 3-6 Non-California Puget Sound 5 All other areas

a

7

Intensity Shift

FC24 FC25 NA NA* +1 +1 +1 +1 0 +1 +3 +3

bridges may be reduced through use of * Special case, damage half of FC 25


Br idge Conventional

a

00) E virco

0e2~~~~~~~C~~~~


Figure B-8 Damage percent by intensity for conventional major bridges.

Upgraded Conditions: For areas.where it Description: Freeways/highways includes appears cost-effective to improve facilities, urban and rural freeways (divided arterial assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades highway with full control of access), divided result in an beneficial intensity shift of one highways, and highways. Freeway/highway unit (i.e., -), relative to the above present includes roadways, embankments, signs, and conditions. lights. Roadways include pavement, base,

and subbase. Pavement types may be either Time-to-restoration: The time-to- portland cement concrete or asphaltic restoration data assigned to SF 25c, concrete. Base and subbase materials conventional bridges for the highway system, include aggregate, cement treated are assumed to apply to all bridges with aggregate, and lime-stabilized, bituminous, spans shorter than 504 feet. By combining and soil cement bases. Embankmrents may or these data with the damage data from FC may not include retaining walls. 25, the attached time-to-restoration curves for conventional bridges within California Typical Seismic Damage: Roadway damage NEHRP Map Area 7 were derived. By can result from failure of the roadbed or combining the time-to-restoration data for failure of an embankment adjacent to the SF 25c with the damage curves derived by road. Roadbed damage can take the form of using the data for FC 24 and 25, the time-to- soil slumping under the pavement, and restoration curves shown in Figures B-9 settling, cracking, or heaving of pavement. through B-11 were derived for the various Embankment failure may occur in NEHRP Map Areas. combination with liquefaction, slope failure,

or failure of retaining walls. Such damage is B-1.4 Freeways/Highways manifested by misalignment, cracking of the

roadway surface, local uplift or subsidence, 1. General or buckling or blockage of the roadway.

Sloping margins of fillswhere compaction is

ATC-25 AppendixATC-25 Appendix B:Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 203 B:Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 203

1 Bridge Canventiona Hz 10Hz

I1111 a b 16 0.297 0.907 7 0.272 0,759

>1 8 0 .096 0.049 0. 9 0 .874 0 . 021

10 -0.894 0.004 °-- R= Sex:

R =b *days + a

(na)

I I I I I IR= DAYS: 30 60 90 120 150 1B0 210 240 270 300 330 365


Figure B-9 Residual capacity for conventional bridges (NEHRP California 7).

Br idge Conventional H=1WZ Z!Sc 1.00 25 0.0

24 S

aL 6 0.017 0 .060 7 0.00 0.830 8 0.010 0.8: ,

f -0.:16 0.02a) R= 0e

Rb * days a C (I,

Cc

l l z= nz. I i i i - TI

l, il il il i I

DAYS: 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 330 365 Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-10 Residual capacity for conventional bridges (NEHRP Map Area 3-6, Non-California 7, and Puget Sound 5).


0

Bridage Conventicual

_5 c

_ R= Z

-Dco cc

-

R= ex

DAYS: 31 60 9B 12 15 180 210 241 ZYS S6 Jbb Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-1 1 Residual capacity for conventional bridges (Allother areas).

commonly poor are particularly vulnerable Present Conditions: In the absence of data

to slope failure. Dropped overpass spans can on the type of construction, age,

effectively halt traffic on otherwise surrounding terrain, truck usage, etc., the

undamaged freeways/highways. following factors were used to modify the mean curves,under present conditions:

Seismically Resistant Design: Seismically MMIresistant design practices include proper

Intensitygradation and compaction of existing soils as

NEHRP Man Area Shift 3well as bases and subbases. Roadway cuts California 7 Th

and fillsshould be constructed as low as, California 3-6 practicable and natural slopes abutting Non-California 7

01highways should be examined for failure Puget Sound 5 potential. All other areas 0

2. Direct Damage UpgradedConditions: It is not anticipated that it will be cost-effective to upgrade

Basis: Damage curves for freeways/highways facilities for the sole purpose of improving

are based on ATC-13 data for FC 48, seismic performance, except perhaps in very

highways (see Figure B-12). Standard isolated areas where supporting soils and/or

construction is assumed to represent typical adjacent embankments are unstable. The

California freeways/highways under present effect on overall facility performance in

conditions (i.e., a composite of older and earthquakes will be minimal, and no

more modern freeways/highways). It is intensity shifts are recommended.

assumed that no regional variation in construction quality exists. Time-to-restoration: The time-to-

restoration data assigned to SF 25d, freeways and conventional highways, are


Freeway/Il ighway .40 4 Oa,to I.Mi

a, 0) E W

VI VII Vi: l lx X Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Figure B-12 Damage percent by intensity for freeways/highways.

assumed to apply to all freeways/highways. failure of an embankment adjacent to the By combining these data with the damage road. Pavement damage may include curves for FC 48, the time-to-restoration cracking, buckling, misalignment, or settling. curves shown in Figure B-13 were derived. Failed embankments may include damaged

retaining walls, or landslides that block B.1.5Local Roads roadways or result in loss of roadbed

support. Damage to bridges--including 1. General dropped spans,settlement of abutment fills,

and damage to supporting piers--can restrict Description: Local roads include roadways, or halt traffic, depending on the severity of embankments, signs, lights, and bridges in the damage. urban and rural areas. Localroads, on the average, are older than freeways/highways Seismically Resistant Design: Seismically and are frequently not designed for truck resistant design practices are not typically traffic (inferior quality). Local roads may incorporated into local road design, expect travel through more rugged terrain and perhaps for bridges. Proper gradation and include steeper grades and sharper corners, compaction are necessary for good seismic and may be paved or unpaved (gravel or performance. Cuts and fills should be dirt), engineered, or nonengineered. Paved constructed as low as practicable and the roads are typically asphaltic concrete over stability of slopes adjacent to roads in steep grade and subgrade materials. Traffic could terrains should be evaluated. Seismically be blocked by damaged buildings, broken resistant design practices for bridges include underground water and sewer pipes, providing restraint for spans and/or downed power lines, etc. adequate bearing lengths to accommodate

motions. Approach fills should be properly Typical Seismic Damage: Roadway damage compacted and graded and pier foundations can result from the failure of the roadbed or

AppendixAppendix B:Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25 B:LifelineVulnerability Functions ATC-25 206 206

55Žx

'reeuag/Highuay =100 25& 1.0 48 1.08

nMI b

h 0. 130 1.393 7 8.171 8 8 . H O.V73

9 E .824 8.2853

to e .024 0.032 R= 5;

R = * days a

R7 Oz: I I I I I 4 I

DfAYS: 36 68 90 126 158 188 218 240 272 380 330 36


Figure B-13 Residual capacity for major bridges (NEHRP Map Area: California 3-6, California 7, Puget Sound, and all other areas).

- shouldbe adequate to support bridge spans following factors were used to modify the if soil failure occurs. mean curves for the two facility classes listed

above, under present conditions: 2. Direct Damage

MMI Basis: Damage curves for highway system Intensity local roads are based on ATC-13 data for Shift

FC 48, highways, and FC 25, NEHRP Map Area FC25 FC48

continuous/monolithic bridge (includes California 7 o 0

single-span,'see Figure B-14). All local roads, California 3-6 +1 0 Non-California 7 +1 0

were assumed to be a combination of 80% PugetSound 5 +1 0 roadways and 20% bridges. If inventory data All other areas +2 0 permit a more accurate breakdown of the relative value of roadway and bridges, such Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it data should be used and the damage curves appears cost-effective to improve facilities, re-derived. assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades

result in a beneficial intensity shift of one Standard construction is assumed to unit (i.e., -1), relative to the above present represent typical California local roads (i.e., conditions. In most cases. upgrades will be a composite of older and more modern local limited to strengthening of bridges, and roads). It is assumed that no regional perhaps, areas where embanluments and variation in construction quality exists. adjacent slopes are most unstable.

Present Conditions: In the absence of data Time-to-restoration: The time-to-on the type of surrounding terrain, restoration data assigned to SF 25e, cityconstruction material, age, etc., the streets for highway systems, are assumed to

ATC-25 AppendixATC-25 Appendix B:Lifeline VulnerabilityVulnerability Functions 207

B:Lifeline Functions 207

80

Local Roads Cram n n[z t D=100v 4b t.WJ

25 0.20

: '

Other~~~~~~/a) ' D=S07. E(an

:R/ / : CA 3-6

< NonCA7 f~~~~.. -:

- .; ~~~~~~CA77

' D=6/. X

UI V11l - : 1i Ix


Figure B-1 4 Damage percent by intensityfor local roads.

apply to all local roads. By combining these supported on piers. Only a few of the more data with the damage curves derived using recently constructed bridges have the data for FC 25 and 48, the time-to- continuous structural members. restoration curves shown in Figures B-15 through B-17 were derived. Typical Seismic Damage:The major cause

of damage to trestles is displacement of B.2 Railway unconsolidated sediments on which the

substructures are supported, resulting in B.2.1 Bridges movement of pile-supported piers and

abutments. Resulting superstructure 1. General damage has consisted of compressed decks

and stringers, as well as collapsed spans. Description: In general, railway bridges may Shifting of the piers and abutments may be steel, concrete, wood or masonry shear anchor bolts. Girders can also shift on construction, and their spans may be any their piers. Failures of approaches or fill length. Included are open and ballasted material behind abutments can result in trestles, drawbridges, and fixed bridges. bridge closure. Movable bridges are more Bridge components include a bridge deck, vulnerable than fixed bridges; slight stringers and girder, ballast, rails and ties, movement of piers supporting drawbridges truss members, piers, abutments, piles, and can result in binding so that they cannot be caissons. Railroads sometimes share major opened without repairs. Movable span bridges with highways (suspension bridges), railroads are subject to misalignments, and but most railway bridges are older and extended closures-are required for repairs. simpler than highway bridges. Bridges that cross streams or narrow drainage passages Seismically Resistant Design: Seismically typically have simple-span deck plate girders resistant design practice should include or beams. Longer spans use simple trusses proper siting considerations and details to

AppendixAppendix B:Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25 -B:Lifeline Vulnerabilityviinations .ATC_25 208 208

Local PkLds R= 5B7 - 25e B i .130

5 ,0.20

a b

L -1. 808 'T. 125

-0 160

-5 -B. 166 'B. 140

-B .180 B. B9

-3 -0. iii 8. B2B ru

0 R =b *das + a

a)

R= DAYS: 30 6 90 128 150 188 218 Z48

I Z? I

38 330 C

365 Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-1 5 Residual capacity for local roads NEHRP California 7).

Local oads R=1BWA - e 1.03 4d

sn. Ul.bn ns

Zs 8.28

MII a 6 -0. 253 7.855 7 01.464 8 -a.242 0.103

5 .1

.9

to -8.141 -W.0to

0.843 H.O21

;) E- soy R= * +dysa

r 1

H= z 1' 3 I 1I 1I

1I

a a

IE i . I I

DAYS' 3a 68 98 128 158 188 218 248 27 3 330 365 Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-t 6 Residual capacity for local roads (NEHRP Map Area 3-6, Non-California 7, and Puget Sound 5).

ATC-25 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 209V

Local Roads lfR=0ofl -- are 4ff n faf1UI.OU 25

MlII 6 7 B.5

9 10

°CU R=57 a R

_,

0.28

a -0.439 -8.345 -0.168 -8.123 -0.091

= b * days

b

1.950 0.441 0.059 0.838 0.017

+ a

R= x I I I I I I i


Figure B-1 7 Residual capacity for local roads (All other areas).'

prevent foundation failure. Restraint for curve for continuous/monolithic bridges by spans and/or adequate bearing lengths to one beneficial intensity unit. accommodate motions are effective ways to mitigate damage. Reinforced concrete piers Standard construction is assumed to should be provided with proper confinement represent typical California railway bridges and adequate longitudinal splices and under present conditions (i.e., a composite embedment into the foundation. of older and more modem bridges).

2. Direct Damage Present Conditions: In the absence of data to the type of construction (fixed or

Basis: Damage curves for railway system movable), age, type (fixed or movable) etc., bridges are based on ATC-13 data for FC. the following factors were used to modify 25,continuous/monolithic bridges (see the mean curves, under present conditions: Figure B-18). Railroad bridges tend to be both older and simpler than highway bridges MMI

Intensityand have survived in some areas where highway bridges (simple-span bridges) have NEHRP Map Area Shift

Caliornia 7 -1collapsed. Possible reasons for this superior California 3-6 -1performance are the lighter superstructure Non-California 7 0 weight of the railroad bridges due to the Puget Sound 5 0 absence of the roadway slab, the beneficial All other areas +1 effects of the rails tying the adjacent spans together, and the design for other transverse Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it and longitudinal loads even when no seismic appears cost-effective to improve facilities, design is done, Consequently, railroad assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades system bridge performance is assumed to be result in a beneficial intensity shift of one represented by shifting the mean damage


Bridge (Railway) 25 .O0

a)

ra D=90M E

Other

Non-CA7 CAPS3

CA 7

VI X Modified Mercalli ntensity (Mlii)

Figure B-1 8 Damage percent by intensity for railway bridges.

unit (i.e., -1), relative to the above present may change in shape and/or construction conditions. material over their lengths.

Time-to-restoration: The time-to- Typical Seismic Damage:Tunnels may restoration data assigned to SF 26a, railway experience severe damage in areas affected bridges, are assumed to apply to all railway by permanent ground m ovements due to bridges. By combining these data with the landslides or surface fault rupture, but rarely damage curves for FC 25, the time-to- suffer significant internal damage from restoration curves shown in Figures. B-19 ground shaking alone. Landslides at tunnels through B-21 were derived. portals can cause blockage. Damage has

been noted at tunnel weak spots such as B.2.2 Tunnels intersections; bends; or changes in shape,

construction materials, or soil conditions. 1. General Damage to lined tunnels has typically been

limited to cracked lining. Description: In general, tunnels may pass through alluvium or rock, or may be of cut- Seismically Resistant Design: Lined tunnels and-cover construction Tunnels may be have performed better than unlined tunnels. lined or unlined, and may be at any depth Consequently, general Seismically resistant below the ground surface. Tunnel lengths design practices for tunnels, include may range from less than 100 feet to several providing reinforced concrete lining; miles. Lining materials include brick, strengthening areas that have been reinforced and unreinforced concrete, and traditionally weak such as intersections, steel. Heavy timbers and wood lagging bends, changes in shape and in construction (grouted and ungrouted) may also be used materials; and siting tunnels to eliminate to support tunnel walls and ceilings. Tunnels fault crossings. Slope stability at portals

ATCC-25 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerabiliy Functions 211

Bridge (Railway) 4 GO 4 O,R=100;x -. Dd

Ra

1111 a b

7 -0.8 1.451 8 -8.189: 1.192,. 9 -0.878 0.069

CZ C) 16 -0.065 0.0Z9Q

H= 5% a)

R = b * days a

coa) rc

it 0 - . if I II I I I I� I I n- V. II I I I I


Figure B-19 Residual capacity for railway bridges (NEHRP California 7).

Bridge (Railway) 1v."u- ,h=100, 1.00 25 4 01

H111 a b 6 -0.208 1.451 7 -0. 9 1.i192

: >s 8 -0.078 0.069

a 9 -8.065 0.829 16 -8.023 0.005 ._

CUco C_

-- H = b * days + a 0 R=Se a)Er

R= e L 3 6 | l l i~ ~~ I I I - - i

oun oqn ona ono Sf c

DAYS: 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 I'M Ir JOU JJU J= Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-20 Residual capacity for railway bridges (NEHRP Map Area 3-6, Non-California 7, and Puget Sound 5).

T212. Appendix B:Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25 . I - 1 I,

R=180Z

lilf a b - . 183 1.192

7 -. 87, 8.8&9 B -E.865 8. M2-5

0- 9 -E.823 E.BE5 Ca 10 -0.012 0. 0400 R= SE

= da9s + & -D

.0

R= fly -


Figure B-21 Residual capacity for railway bridges (All other areas).

should be evaluated and stabilization factors were used to modify the mean undertaken if necessary. curves, under present conditions:

2. Direct Damage mm[ Intensity

Basis: Damage curves for railway tunnels NFHRP Map Area Sh ift

are based on ATC-1¶3 data for FC 38, California 7 0 tunnels passing through alluvium (see California 3-6 0

Non-California 7Figure B-22). Tunnels passing through Puget Sound 5 00

alluvium are less vulnerable than cut-and- All other areas 1 cover tunnels, and more vulnerable than tunnels passing through rock; they were Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it chosen as representative of all existing appears cost-effective to improve facilities, tunnels. If inventory data identify tunnels as assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades. cut-and-cover or passing through rock, then result in a beneficial intensity shift of one use ATC-13 FC 40 or 39, respectively, in unit (i.e., -1), relative to the above present lieu of FC 38. conditions.

Standard construction is assumed to Time-to-restoration: The time-to-represent typical California railroad tunnels restoration data assigned to SF 26b, railroad under present conditions (Le., a composite - system tunnels, are assumed to apply to all of older and more modem tunnels). Only tunnels. By combining these data with the minimal regional variation in construction damage curves for FC 38, the time-to-quality is assumed. restoration curves shown in Figures B-23

and B-24 were derived. Present Conditions: In the absence of data to the type of lining, age, etc., the following

... . t


Tunnel (Railway) D=1800 )O- 4 MA4

:~~~ :

0) CD

E D=SOY.

Ca0

Othe CA 7

I 1 1 Kl~~~~nn-r.A7

VI VII Vill ix P.S.5 X Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Figure B-22 Damage percent by intensity for railway tunnels.

_

R=1Ovv 38My)

1.00

MHI a b 6 0.344 0.839 7 i0,248 0.456 B 0.284 0.212 9 8.183 0.109

Ca' 10 0.053 8.036 aCZ'

R = b * days + a

na)cc

R= 0X DAYS: 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 ZI 38 JJU zbb


Figure B-23 Residual capacity for railway tunnels (NEHRP Map Area: California 3-6, California 7, Non-California 7, and Puget Sound 5).

214214 Appendix B:Appendix B:Lifeline Vulnerability FunctionsLifeline Vulnerability Functions

ATC�25L ATC-25-

5 M

Tunnel fRnilwvavI

10 38 i

MMI

2 3

P7 8.2 1

B 81.0

3 9 2.2

ie -E. 11Eoa 0C,

C R 5; R b *

R= x S

DAYs: 30 68 9U 120 158 10 218 248 I

278 300 338 365 Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-24 Residual capacity for railway tunnels (All other areas).

B.23 Tracks/Roadheds potential for track failure can be reduced by properly grading and compacting imported

I. General track bed materials and by keeping cuts and fills as low as practicable. Track alignments

Description: In general, track/roadbed in must be precise and the track clear of debris the railway system includes ties, rail, ballast for train operations. or roadbed, embankments, and switches. Ties may be wood or prestressed concrete. 2. Direct Damage Rail is exclusively steel and is periodically fastened to ties with spikes and/or steel clips. Basis: Damage curves for railroad system Roadbed typically includes imported tracks/roadbedsare based on ATC-13 data aggregate on prepared subgrade. for FC 47, railroads (see Figure B-25).

Standard construction is assumed to Typical Seismic Damage: The most represent typical California tracks/roadbeds frequent source of damage to track/roadbed (i.e., a composite of older and more modern is settlement or slumping of embankinents. tracks/roadbeds). Age may not be as Landslides can block or displace tracks. important a factor for tracks/roadbeds as it is Settlement or liquefaction of roadbeds in for other facilities, because the compaction alluvial areas is also a source of damage. *of soils in poor grounds through usage may Only in extreme cases are rails and roadbeds improve their behavior significantly. Only damaged by shaking alone. minimal regional variation in construction

quality is assumed. Seismically Resistant Design: Seismic design practice includes providing special Present Conditions: In the absence of data attention to the potential for failure of to the type of material, age, etc., the slopes adjacent to the tracks; cut slopes and following factors were used to modifr the fills are particularly susceptible. The mean curves, under present conditions:

A.TC-25 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 2-15

Track/Roadbed ID=10v 47 i -A0

g" D=90Y E 0

uu/.s iI IXMI IVI Modified.Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Figure B-25 Damage percent by intensity.for.tracks/roadbeds.

MMI Desc ription: Terminal stations may be large Intensity or snrWaIl.The structure housingthe station

NEHRPMap Area Shift may Igenerally be any type of construction California 7 0 from steel frame to unreinforced masonry California 3-6 0 b ng walls. The terminal station typicallyNon-California 7 0 beal des switching and control equipment, as Puget Sound 5 inclu is electrical and mechanical equipmentAll other areas 0 well

comE nonly found in commercial buildings.

Upgraded Conditions: It is not anticipated Limitted lengths of rails are also included in

that it will be cost-effective to retrofit termiinal stations.

facilities for the sole purpose of improving seismic performance, except perhaps in very Typilcal Seismic Damage: In general,

isolated areas where the slopes and soils are termiinal stations in railway systems may

unstable. The effect on overall facility expelrience generic building and equipment

performance in earthquakes willbe minimal, dameage. Building damage may range from

and no intensity shifts are recommended. crackks in walls and frames to partial and total collapse. Unanchored or improperly

Time-to-restoration: The time-to- anch,ored equipment may-slideor topple,

restoration data assigned to SF 26c, railways, experiencing damage or causing attached

are assumed to apply to all tracks/roadbeds. pipinig and conduit to fail. Rail damage in

By combining these data with the damage the switching yard will occur due to severe

curves for FC 47, the time-to-restoration shakiing or ground failure only.

curves shown in Figure B-26 were derived. Seis] nically Resistant Design: Seismically

B.2.4 Terninal Stations resistLantdesign practice includes, performing all bijilding design in accordance with

seisniic provisions of national or local 1. General

Appendix B:Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25 216

>

Track/Roadbed 4 aniR-IF10 - 26k 1.80 :4 Il.sDU

I a b 0.163 0.S5 El153 .s239

_ 0.148 'M. 1

CL06 8.145 a.142

0.835 0.021

c) R= 58x . _ :3 412

R =I * days + a in

Rz O/ I j| lI il


Figure B-26 Residual capacity for tracks/roadbeds (NEHRP Map Area: California 3-6, California 7, Non-California 7, Puget Sound, and all other areas).

building codes. All critical equipment should roadbed/embankments within the station be well-anchored. Provisions should be and that only minimal variation exists for made for backup emergency power for mechanical equipment. control and building equipment essential for continued operations.. Present Conditions: In the absence of data

to the type of construction material, age, 1. Direct Damage etc., the following factors were used to

modify the mean curves for each of the Basis: Damage curves for the railway system three facility classes listed above, under terminal station are based on ATC-13 data present conditions: for FC 10, medium-rise reinforced masonry shear wall buildings; FC 68, mechanical MM! equipment; and FC 47, railways seee Figure Intensity B-27). FC 10 was chosen to represent a Shift generic building, based on review of damage NEHRP Map Area FC OFC 47FC 68 curves for all buildings. Railway terminals California 7 0 0 0 were assumed to be a combination of 60% California 3-6 +1 0 0 generic buildings, 20% mechanical Non-California 7 +1 0 0

equipment, and 20% railways. Puget Sound 5 +1 0 0 All other areas +2 0 +1

Standard construction is assumed to Upgraded Conditions: For areas,where it represent typical California railway system appears cost-effective to improve facilities,terminals under present conditions (i.e., a assume on a preliminary basis that upgradescomposite of older and more modern result in one or two beneficial intensityterminals). It is assumed that there is no regional variation in construction quality of


Terninal Station 1

Other 80

a)

E cE0

VI VII Vill Ix X


Figure B-27 Damage percent by intensity for railway terminal stations.

shifts (i.e., -1 or -2), relative to the above wood long-span structures. Equipment at air present conditions. terminals ranges from sophisticated control,

gate, and x-ray equipment to typical Time-to-restoration: The time-to- electrical and mechanical equipment found

in commercial buildings. Airplane refuelingrestoration data assigned to SF 26d, terminal stations for railway systems, are assumed to is accomplished by either on-site or off-site apply to all terminal stations. By combining fuel tanks and underground pipelines. these data with the damage curves derived using the data for FC 10, 47, and 68, the Typical Seismic Damage: Damage may

time-to-restoration curves shown in Figures include generic building and equipment B-28 through B-30 were derived. damage. Building damage may range from

broken windows and cracks in walls and B.3 Air Transportation frames to partial and total collapse.

Unanchored or improperly anchored B.3.1 Terminals equipment may slide or topple, experiencing

damage or causing attached piping and 1. General conduit to fail. The source of this damage

can be ground shaking or soil failure, as Description: In general, air transportation many airports are located in low-lying terminals include terminal buildings, control alluvial regions. Gate. equipment may towers, hangars, and other miscellaneous become misaligned and inoperable. Fuel structures (including parking garages and tanks and fuel lines may rupture or crash houses). These structures may be experience damage, reducing or eliminating constructed of virtually any building refueling capacity. Tank damage may material, although control towers are include wall buckling, settlement, ruptured typically reinforced concrete shear wall piping, or loss of contents, or even collapse. buildings and hangars are either steel or Such collapses could lead to fires and

Appendix B:Lifeline VulnerabilityAppendix B:LifelineVulnerability Functions ATC-25 Functions ATC-25 218 218

Termial Station - 26d LOB to 1.

HI

6 0.2 7 8.2

iiB E.1-5

3 1.1O:L u E 0. w

R = * -o(n

E

R= ;e I - - -f ; - - - 4 I - - - I , & , , b


Figure B-28 Residual capacity for railway terminal stations (NEHRP California 7).

rerminaI Station 1.82 1 1.82

MI a b 2.222 H. 1321

7 O. 141 8. I6 O.H19-U

0- 8 .8138 .. . 21I H wC-a 10 H.H&M

R= 07 -oU B * days a 'n

QcfE

I ' ll- - --- F -j 1 1

I I~~~~~~~~~

DAYS 38 60 92 120 152 182 218 240 272 300 330 365 Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-29 Residual capacity for railway terminal' stations (NEHRP Map Area 3-6, Non-California 7,and Puget Sound 5).


Terminal Station -10 1.00R=t11Bi/

1MI a b 6 0.141 0035 7 0.187 8.819 B 0.08 0.810

._ 9 1.860 8.886 (a 10 11. 52 e.005

-Ca R= H =b * days a

U) a)EC

U- MU I I I - . I, , ,1

DAYS: 3 60 90 120 150 IBO 210 240 270 30 330 365


Figure B-30 Residual capacity for railway termiinal stations (All other areas).

structures (see Figure B-31). FC 10 wasexplosions. Damage to ground access and egress routes may seriously affect chosen to represent a generic building,

operations. Airports in low-lying areas may based on review of damage curves for all

be subject to damage due to flooding or buildings. Air transportation system

tsunamis. terminals are assumed to be a combination of 40% generic buildings, 40% long-span

Seismically Resistant Design: Building structures, and 20% on-ground liquid

design should be performed in accordance storage tanks. with seismic provisions of building codes. Control-tower design should receive special Standard construction is assumed to

attention based on its importance and the represent typical California air terminals under present conditions (i.e., a compositefact that the geometry of the tower makes it

prone to earthquake damage. Enhanced of older and more modern terminals). Only

design criteria (e.g., a higher importance minimal regional variation in construction

factor) may be appropriate for control quality of long-span structures is assumed, as

towers. All critical equipment should be design wind and seismic loads may be comparable.anchored. Provisions should be made for

backup emergency power for control equipment and landing lights. Present Conditions: In the absence of data

on the type of construction, age, etc., the

2. Direct Damage following factors were used to modify the mean curves for each of the three facility

Basis: Damage curves for air transportation classes listed above, under present conditions:system terminals are based on ATC-13 data

for FC 10, mid-rise reinforced masonry shear wall buildings; FC 43, on-ground liquid storage tanks; and FC 91, long-span


Terminal Dz=IUz

91 8.4< 43 0.20

0,CD

co Dz=9tY

co

Other A/

Dz=Ox HI VII Vil IX X

Modified Mercalli Intensity (MM[)

Figure B-31 Damage percent by intensity for airport terminals.

MMI B.3.2 Runwaysand Taxiways . Intensity

Shift NEHRPMap Area FC 10 FC 43 FC 91 1. General

California 7 0 0 0 California 3-6 +1 +1 +1 Description: In general, runways and Non-California 7 +1 +1 +1 taxiwaysin the air transportation system Puget Sound 5 +1 +1 +1 include runways, taxiways, aprons, and All other areas +2 +2 +1 landing lights. Runways and taxiways

comprise pavements, grades, and subgrades.Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it Pavement types include portland cement appears cost-effective to improve facilities, concrete and asphaltic concrete. assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades result in one or two beneficial intensity Typical Seismic Damage: Runway damageshifts (i.e., -1 or -2), relative to the above is a direct function of the strength present conditions. characteristics of the underlying soils.

Airports tend to be located in low-lyingTime-to-restoration: The time-to- alluvial areas or along water margins subjectrestoration data assigned to SF 27a, air to soil failures. Hydraulic fillsare especiallytransportation terminals, are assumed to prone to failure during ground shaking.apply to all terminals. By combining these Runways can be damaged by liquefaction,data with the damage curves derived using compaction, faulting, flooding, and tsunamis. the data for FC 10; 43, and 91, the time-to- Damage may include misalignment, uplift, restoration curves shown in Figures B-32 cracking, or buckling of pavement. through B-34 were derived

Seismically Resistant Design: Seismic design practices include providing proper

- gradation and compaction of soils or imported fills, grades, and subgrades-

ATC-25 AppendixATC-25 Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerabilijy Functions 221 B:Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 21

R=10v Terminal

27a (Air Transportation)

1.00 10 H.41I

91 0.40 43 8.20

Mi,1 a b 6 0.010 11.262 7 0,848 3.864 B -0.004 0.206 9. -8.10 0. 056

0a( 10 -8.012 :.013 ° R= 'a R = b * days + a

a) cc

I I I I I IR= W*e t I- S: I8 6 r

90 120 15 180 216 240 270 300 338 365DAYS: 30 60 Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-32 Residual capacity for airport terinals (NEHRP California 7).

Terminal (Air Transportation)aAa�Iflt3/.H=1JU 2, - a IL~ M fa

U 4 0

y ~ s 91 .46 43 8.20

/MNtH a b

" 6 0.040 3.864 7 -0.004 0.206 8 -0.010 0. 056

.0C, 9 -0.612 0.013a CO 18 -0.006 0.004

0 R= I / / - U L .1. n - U - "ayl, - a-.'a

r i' n- B.. I I I I

. ,. r. ,. .. .. .. .. .. ,

DAY"3: 30 60 960 128 156 180 210 240 276 300 338. 365


Figure B-33 * Residual capacity for airport terminals (NEHRP Map Area 3-6, Non-California 7, and

Puget Sound 5). I

222 ATC-25Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions A

R=20;y

Cuco

C,

R= O DAYS: 3 68 90 128 I58! 180 218 240 278 308 330 365

Elapsed Time n Days

Figure B-34 Residual capacity forairport terminals All other areas

2. Direct Damage result in a beneficial intensity shift of one unit (e., -1), relative to the above present

Basis: Damage curves for air transportation conditions. system runways and taxiways are based on ATC-13 data for FC 49, runways, (see Figure Time-to-restoration: The time-to-B-35). Standard construction is assumed to restoration data assigned to SF 27b, runwaysrepresent typical California runways and and taxiways, are assumed to apply for all taxiways under present conditions (ie., a runways and taxiways. By combining these composite of older and more modern data with the damage curves for FC 49, the runways). time-to-restoration curves shown in Figure

B-36 were derived. Present Conditions: In the absence of data on the type of soils, material, age, etc., the B.4Sea/Water Transportationfollowing factors were used to modify the mean curves,under present conditions: B.4.1PortslCargoHandlingEquipment

Mm/ 1. General Intensity

HfRP Map Area Shift Description: In general, portslcargoCalifornia'7 0, 000 0

7 handling equipment comprise buildings (predominantlywarehouses), waterfront structures, cargo handling equipment, paved aprons, conveyors, scales, tanks, silos, pipelines, railroad terminals, and support

California 3-6 Non-California Puget Sound 5 Allother areas

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it services. Building type varies, with steel appears cost-effective to improve facilities, assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades

frame being a common construction type. Waterfront structures include quay walls,

AppendIx 3: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions AT,C-25ATC-25 Appendix B:LifelfineVulnerability Fu-nations

- 223 223

I

Runwaylaxiwa-9 Il I RSnO

D100HY ,if, i.UU

ao.O a)M D=90:/E Ca :

ID=0f

VI VII Vill IX X


Figure B-35 Damage percent by intensity for runways/taxiways.

Runwal/Tax iway 49 .1.00

MtII a b

6 0.458 0.834 7 0.435 0.413 8 H.315 0 .039

. 9 0.325 0.818

Co 10 0.270 0.011

:0 R b dags + a

U)'a).

R= ex 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 330 365DAYS 30 60

Elapsed Time in Days,

Figure B-36 Residual capacity for runways/taxiways (NEHRP Map Area: California 3-6, California 7,

Non-California 7, Puget Sound 5, and all other areas).


sheet-pile bulkheads, and pile-supported piers. Quay walls are essentially waterfront masonry or caisson walls with earth fills behind them. Piers are commonly wood or concrete construction and often include batter piles to resist lateral transverse loads. Cargo handling equipment for loading and unloading ships includes cranes for containers, bulk loaders for bulk goods, and pumps for fuels. Additional handling equipment is used for transporting goods throughout port areas.

Typical Seismic Damage: By far the most significant source of earthquake-induced damage to port and harbor facilities has been pore-water pressure buildup in the saturated cohesionless soils that prevail at these facilities. This pressure buildup can lead to applicationof excessivelateral pressures to quay walls by backfill materials, liquefaction, and massive submarine sliding. Buildings in port areas are subject to generic damage due to shaking, as well as damage caused by loss of bearing or lateral movement of foundationsoils.Past earthquakes have caused substantial lateral sliding, deformation, and tilting of quay walls and sheet-pile bulkheads. Block-type quay walls are vulnerable to earthquake-induced sliding between layers of blocks. This damage has often been accompanied by extensive settlement and cracking of paved aprons. The principal failure mode of sheet-pile bulkheads has been insufficient anchor resistance, primarily because the anchors were installed at shallow depths, where backfill is most susceptible to a loss of strength due to pore-water pressure buildup and liquefaction. Insufficient distance between the anchor and the bulkhead wall can aso lead to failure. Pile-supported docks typically perform well, unless soil failures such as major submarine landslides occur. In such cases, piers have undergone extensive sliding and buckling and yielding of pile supports. Batter piles have damaged pier pile caps and decking because of their large lateral stiffness. Cranes can be derailed or overturn by shaking or soil failures. Toppling cranes can damage adjacent structures or other facilities.Misaligned crane rails can damage wheel assemblies and immobilize cranes. Tanks containing fuel may rupture and spill their contents into the

water, presenting fire hazards. Pipelines from storage tanks to docks may be ruptured where they cross areas of structurally poor ground in the vicinity of docks. Failure of access roads and railway tracks can severely limit port operations. Port facilities, especially on the West Coast, are also subject to tsunami hazard.

Seismically Resistant Design: At locations where earthquakes occur relatively frequentlyit is the current Seismically resistant design practice to use seismic factors included in local building codes for the designof port structures. However,past earthquakes have indicated that seismic coefficientsused for design are of secondary importance compared to the potential for liquefaction of the site soil materials. Quay wall and sheet-pile bulkhead performance could be enhanced by replacing weak soils with dense soils, or designing these structures to withstand the combination of earthquake-induced dynamic water pressures and pressures due to liquefied lls. Pier behavior in earthquakes has been good primarily because they are designed for large horizontal berthing and live loads, and because they are not subject to the lateral soil pressures of the type applied to quay walls and bulkheads. However, effects on bearing capacity, and lateral resistance of piles due to liquefaction and induced slope instability should also be considered.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for ports/cargo handling equipment in the sea/water transportation systemare based on ATC-13 data for FC 53, cranes, and FC 63, waterfront structures (see figure B-37). Ports/cargo handling equipment were assumed to be a combination of 60% waterfront structures and 40% cranes.

Standard construction is assumed to represent typical California ports/cargo handlingequipment under present conditions (ie., a composite of older and more modern ports/cargo handling equipment). Only minimal regional variation in construction quality is assumed, as seismic designis performed only for selected port


Port/Cargo Handling Equipment D=180Y

co D=5S& c:0

D=ax XVI VIl Vll Ix


Figure B-37 Damage percent by intensity for ports/cargo handling equipment.

structures, and soil performance is the most and SF 28b, cargo handling equipment, were critical determinant in port performance. assumed to apply to all ports/cargo handling

equipment. Ports/cargo handling facilities Present Conditions: In the absence of data were assumed to be a combination of 60% on the type of material, age, etc., the ports and 40% cargo handling facilities. By following factors were used to modify the combining these data with the damage mean curve for the two facility classes listed curves derived using the data for FC 53 and above, under present conditions: 63, the time-to-restoration curves shown in

Figures B-38 and B-39 were derived. MM!

Intensity B.4.2 Inland Waterways Shift

NEHRPMap Area FC 53 FC 63 1. General California 7 o 0 California 3-6 o 0 Description: In general, inland waterways of Non-California 7 o 0 the sea/water transportation system can be Puget Sound 5 o

+10

natural (rivers and bays) or human-madeAll other areas +1 (canals). The sides and/or bottoms of inland

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it waterways may be unlined or lined with

appears cost-effective to improve facilities, concrete. Portions of the waterway may be

assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades contained through the use of quay walls,

result in a beneficial intensity shift of one retaining walls, riprap, or levees.

unit (i.e., -1), relative to the above present Typical Seismic Damage: Damage to inlandconditions. waterwayswillbe greatest near ruptured

Time-to-restoration: The time-to- faults. Channels or inland waterways may be

restoration data assignedto SF 28a,ports, blocked by earthquake-induced slumping.

Appendix B:Lifeline VulnerabilityAppendix B:Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25 functions ATC-25 226 226

Port/Cargo ait RE=108, r 2Ba a

20b 3

l1HI b i6 I 8. 1183

7 a 3

0U 9 3 8 813M

to 0B88Ca

lays + a

a)o:

R= v I Ir DRYS: 38 68 90 128 15O 188 218 240 27 3080 330 365


Figure B-38 Residual capacity for ports/cargo handling equipment (NEHRPMap Area: California 3-6, California 7, Non-Cafifornia 7, and Puget Sound 5).

Pot/Cargo Handlinq Equipment co a a UD u Uu

53 '3.40

MIl a b 6 W306 8 8 7 0.206G O022 B 8.248 8.8,13 9 8.160 8.887

10 0826 0.805 R= SE

R = * days +.a

R= / I

DAYS: 3 68 S 128 1S 188 218 240 27 3 330 365 Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-39 Residual capacity for ports/cargo handling equipment All other areas).

ATC-25 AppendixAppendix B:Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 227 ATC:-25 B:LifelineVulnerability.Functions 227

Inlania Uaterway D1=100V 61 1.00

0

C)0) D=50O E C]

Other 7-- ~CA

CA 3-6 Non-CA 7

trll VII i P D=O/

V I VI[ Vill IX X


Damage percent by intensity for inland waterways.Figure B-40

Quay walls, retaining walls, or levees can be damaged or collapse. Deep channels dredged in soft mud are subject to earthquake-induced slides that can limit the draft of ships that can pass. Channels lined with unreinforced concrete are susceptible to damage due to differential ground displacement. Loss of lining containment can lead to erosion of soil beneath lining. Waterways can be blocked by fallen bridges and are made impassable by spilled fuel or chemicals from tanks or facilities adjacent to the waterway.

Seismically Resistant Design: Seismically resistant design practices include providing walls of waterways with slopes appropriate for the embankment materials used, and/or designing quay walls and retaining walls to restrain soils in the event of soil failure.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for inland waterways in the sea/water transportation system are based on ATC-13 data for FC 61, canals (see Figure B-40).

Standard construction is assumed to present typicaal California inland waterways under prese.nt conditions (i.e., a composite of natureal as well as new and old human-made waterways). It is assumed that the regional variation in construction quality is minimal.

Prese nt Conditions: In the absence of data on thee type of lining, age, etc., use the follovwingfactors to modify the mean curve, underr present conditions:

MMI Intensity

EtHJRPMap Area Shift

California 7 0 California 3-6 0

on-California 7 0puget Sound 5 0

Al1iother areas +1

aded Conditions: For areas where it appegirs cost-effective to improve facilities, assurr ie on a preliminary basis that upgradesresult in a beneficial intensity shift of one unit (i.e., -1), relative to the above presentconditions.

Time -to-restoration: The time-to-restoiration data assigned to SF 35b, levees


5 3

Inlrn4 lJateruay nR=t8ffX 61 I

4 .fOU

Km aL b 6 0. 245 8.127 7 E ,369 2.810 8 8. 95 8.899 9 8. 112

8.054 -o I'D .0.238 2 B= 07:U)

[) B b * days * a

m9

RW; Ox l Il l Il l

DAYS: 30 60 90 128 158 108 210 248 27C 388 330 365 - Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-41 Residual capacity for inland waterways (NEHRP Map Area: California 3-6, California 7, Non-California 7, and Puget Sound 5).

in flood control systems, are assumed to conveyors, de-aerators, heaters, and apply to all inland waterways. By combining associated equipment and piping. The fan these data with the damage curves for FC area houses the air preheaters as well as the 61, the time-to-restoration curves shown in forced-draft fans and related duct work. Figures B-41 and B-42 were derived. Other components include instrumentation

and control systems, water and fuel storage B.5 Electrical tanks, stacks, cooling towers, both

underground and above ground piping, B.5.1Fossil-fu el Power Plants cable trays, switchgear and motor control

centers, fuel handling and water treatment 1. General facilities, water intake and discharge, and

cranes. Associated switchyards step up Description: In general, fossil-fuel power voltage and include transformers and circuit plants can be fueled by either coal or oil. breakers. Structures at fossil-fuel power plants are commonly medium-rise steel braced frames. Typical Seismic Damage: Damage to steel A generation building typically comprises structures at power plants in past turbine, boiler, and fan areas. The turbine- earthquakes has usually been limited to generators are typically supported on overstressed connections or buckled braces. reinforced concrete pedestals that are Turbine pedestals may pound against the seismically isolated from the generation surrounding fldor of the generation building building. Boiler feed pumps are usually and damage the turbine-generators. Boilers located below the turbine-generators. The may sway and impact the support structure, boiler area typically includes the boilers causing damage to the expansion guides and (which are usually suspended from the possibly the internal tubes of the boiler. support structures), steam drums, coal silos, Structural damage to older timber cooling


J. . . A. ._ .. A.

1.R- 100x/ q no 4 4

MtIl a b

6 0.369 0.018 7 0.9S5 0.099 B 0.112 0.054

Ca, 9 8.230 8.616a Ca 18 8.268 0.004 Ax R 5x

. -Z) R = b * days a z an(jrW

lLSR= i I 1 I lI l li lI Il

1


Figure B-42 Residual capacity for inland waterways (All other areas).

towers may occur due to deterioration and provided between the boiler and the weakening of the structures with age. Fan generation building to prevent pounding; all blades and gearboxes in cooling towers have equipment should be anchored; sufficient been damaged attributable to impact with clearance and restraints on piping runs fan housing. Water and fuel tanks may should be provided to prevent interaction experience buckled walls, ruptured attached with equipment and other piping; and piping piping, stretched anchor bolts, or collapse. should be made-flexible to accommodate Piping attached to unanchored equipment relative movement of structures and or subjected to differential movement of equipment to which it is attached. Generous anchor points or corrosion may lose its clearances between adjacent equipment pressure integrity. Coal conveyors can should be provided to prevent interaction. become misaligned, and coal bins without Sufficient joints between the turbine proper seismic design may be severely pedestal and the generation building are damaged. Unrestrained batteries may topple required to prevent pounding. Maintenance from racks, and equipment supported on programs for some systems, including wood vibration isolators may fall off supports and timber cooling towers, piping transporting rupture attached piping. In the switchyard, corrosive materials, and steel tanks, should improperly anchored transformers may slide be established so that these components are and topple, stretching and breaking attached not in a weakened condition when an electrical connections and/or ceramics. earthquake strikes. An emergency power

source consisting of well-braced batteries Seismically Resistant Design: Seismically and well-anchored emergency generators is resistant design practices include, as a necessary to permit restart without power minimum, designing all structures to satisfy from the outside grid. Heavy equipment and the seismic requirements of the applicable stacks should be anchored with long bolts local or national building code. In addition, anchored deep into the foundation to allow well-designed seismic ties should be for ductile yielding of the full anchor bolt

Appendix B:LifelineVulnerability Functions ATC-25 230

Fassi -Fuel Pouer Plamt -4 no-,

Li- LruiA 13 adzf

69 0.58 66 .3

0

0 DI)

'~~> Other CAC -6

CA7

I - - ____ I I

VI WII VIII IX X Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Figure B-43 Darnage percent by intensity for fossil-fuel power plants.

length in extreme seismic load conditions. regional variation in construction quality of Expansion anchor installation procedures mechanical equipment is assumed, as should be subject to strict quality control. operational loads frequently govern over

seismic requirements. 2. Direct Damage

Present Conditions: In the absence of data Basis: Damage curves for fossil-fuel power on the construction type, age, etc., the plants in the electrical system are based on following factors were used to modify the ATC-13 data for FC 13, m edium-rise steel mean curves for each of the three facility braced-frame buildings; FC 66, electrical classes listed above, under present equipment, and FC 68, mechanical conditions: equipment (see Figure B-43). Fossil-fuel power plants are assumed to be a MM combination of 20% mid-rise steel braced- Intensity frame structures, 30% electrical equipment, Shift

and 50% mechanical equipment. Over the NEHRP Map Area FC 13 C 66FC 68 years power plants have been designed using California 7 -1 -1 -1

seismic provisions that equal or exceed California 3-6 10 0 0 those used for conventional construction. Non-California 7 10 0 0

Puget Sound 5 o 0Consequently, the beneficial intensity shifts All other areas 0 1 1 0indicated below are assumed appropriate.

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it Standard construction is assumed to appears cost-effective to improve facilities,represent typical California fossil-fuel plants assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades (and geothermal power plants) under result in a beneficial intensity shift of one present conditions (i.e., a composite of older unit (i.e., -1) relative to the above presentand more modern plants). Only minimal conditions.


0

Fossil-Fuel PowerPlant Z-ja H.711 13 .20

66 0.58 66 0.30

Ml a b

7 0.871 0317 8 0.828 0.082

. 9 -8.805 0.836

Q 10 -0.038 O.817

-H = b days a

_0

a) Cr

I -n_ .UPS l3888 338U-- as. YS T I I I I I 27no DAYS: 30 68 98 120 158 180 218 240 Z70 30 330 365


Figure B-44 Residual capacity for fossil-fuel power plants (EHRP California 7).

Time-to-restoration: The time-to- Typical Seismic Damage: Hydroelectric restoration data assigned to SF 29a, powerhouses and dams are more likely to be electrical generating facilities, are assumed seriously damaged by rock falls and to apply to all fossil- fuel power plants. By landslides than by ground shaking. When combining these data with the damage slides do occur, turbines may be damaged if curves derived using data for FC 13, 66, and rocks or soils enter the intakes. Penstocks 68, the time-to-restoration curves shown in and canals can also be damaged by slides. Figures B-44 through B-46 were derived. Intakes have been damaged by the

combination of inertial and hydrodynamic B.5.2 Hydroelectric Power Plants forces. Most engineered dams have

performed well in past earthquakes, 1. General although dams constructed using fills of fine-

grain cohesionless material have Description: In general, hydroelectric power experienced failures. Equipment in power plants consist of a dam and associated plants typicallyperforms well in earthquakes equipment including water-driven turbines, unless unanchored. In such cases the a control house and control equipment, and equipment may slide or topple and a substation with transformers and other experience substantial damage. switching equipment. The dam may be Unrestrained batteries have toppled from earthfill, rockfill, or concrete and may racks. Piping may impact equipment and include canals, penstocks, spillways, conduit, structures and damage insulation. Piping tunnels, and intake structures. Gantry attached to unrestrained equipment may cranes are frequently located on top of the rupture due to equipment movement. The concrete dams. Equipment inside the dam control house may experience generic typically includes turbines, pumps, piping, building damage ranging from dropped switchgear, and emergency diesels. ceiling tiles and cracks in walls and frames to

partial and total collapse. Substation

Appendix B:Lifeline VulnerabilityAppendix B:LifelineVulnerability Functions ATC-25 Functions ATC-25 232 232

Fossil-Fuel Power Plant fl Sl 712 Jf[ 0.20

315

0.30

11 a b

8.071 0.317 7 8. BZ a. 'Boz

_5 3g -13 . BBS -1 .830

0. B36

8. B17

co 13 -1.071 1.0.99

O_2 ra ( R= S07

R *days + a C0

I l Il l l~~~I

. .R= 0;, DYS: 30 60 98 120 150 150 2L1. 240 278 300 338 36S

Elapsed Time n Days

Figure B-45 Residual capacity for fossil-fuel power plants (NEHRPMap Area: California 3-6, Non-California 7, and Puget Sound 5).

Fossil-Fuel Power Plant 10.7B 13 0.20

,60 3.5a B.30

MI ba 6 M.034 B. 111

7 B.613 -0.021 B 023.5

9 -0.054 MU01 c-C '1 -M. 081 .00

R= sox

R b * days + a -o

a)Er

R= Mx I I I~~~ I I I I DAYS: 30 60 90 120 150 I1B 210 240 278 300 338 365


Figure B-46 Residual capacity for fossil-fuel power plants (All other areas).

Appendfx B:Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 233 ATC-25ATC-25 Appendix B:Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 233

Hgdraelectric Pwer Plant D=100

E

0CH

Other

VI Vii Vill IX X


Figure B-47 Damage percent by intensity for hydroelectric power stations.

equipment, and ceramics in particular, are other critical systems function with turbine vulnerable to damage. Higher-voltage trip and loss of power from the outside grid. ceramics tend to experience the most damage. 2. Direct Damage

Seismically Resistant Design: Seismically Basis: Damage curves for hydroelectric resistant design practices for earthfill dams power plants in the electrical system are include providing ample freeboard, based on ATC-13 data for FC 35, concrete mechanically compacting soils, and using dams; FC 36, earthfill or rockfill dams; and wide cores and transition zones constructed FC 68, mechanical equipment (see Figure of material resistant to cracking. Generally, B-47). Hydroelectric power plants are reducing slopes of earthfill dams can reduce assumed to be a combination of 35% vulnerability. Thorough foundation concrete dams, 35% earthfill or rockfill exploration and treatment are important. dams, and 30% mechanical equipment. Over Dynamic analyses can be used to determine the years power plants have been designed the liquefaction or settlement potential of using seismic provisions that equal or exceed embankments and foundations, and the those used for conventional construction. cracking potential of concrete dams and Consequently, the beneficial intensity shifts dam appurtenances. All buildings should be indicated below for mechanical equipment designed, as a minimum, to satisfy the Bare assumed appropriate. seismic requirements of a national or local building code. All equipment should be Standard construction is assumed to anchored and generous clearances between represent typical California hydroelectric adjacent equipment provided to prevent power plants under present conditions (i.e., interaction. An emergency power source a composite of older and more modern consisting of well-braced batteries and well- plants). Only minimal regional variation in anchored emergency generators is necessary construction quality is assumed for to ensure that control systems, lighting, and mechanical equipment, as operational loads


"C, .

38

0 =03 a b

17? BAK42

165-8.. lis . _

8 0.839(a Ceg 134 0.820c

tJ R= 587

(a * days + a _

M- InA- C. ll l

DAYS 38 60 90 128 158 1B 218 248 278 388 330 365


Figure B-48 Residual capacity for fossil-fuel power plants (NEHRP California 7).

frequently govern over seismic Time-to-restoration: The time-to-requirements. restoration data assigned toSF 29a,

generating facilities, and SF 30c, storage Present Conditions: In the absence of data reservoirs, are assumed to apply to all on the type of material, age, etc., the hydroelectric power plants. By combining following factors were used to modify the these data with the damage curves derived mean curves for each of the three facility using the data for FC 35, 36, and 68, the classes listed above, under present time-to-restoration curves shown in Figures conditions: B-48 through B-50 were derived.

MM B.5.3 Transmission Lines Intensity

Shift 1. General NEHRP Map Area FC 35 FC 36 FC 68 California 7 0 0 -1 Description: In general, transmission lines California 3-6 +1 +1 0 may be underground or above ground Non-California 7 +1 +1 0 (supported by towers). Towers are usually Puget Sound 5 +1 +1 0 All other areas +2 +2 0 steel and carry several circuits at high

voltages (64 kV or higher). Each circuit

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it consists of three conductors, one for each appears cost-effective to improve facilities, phase. Towers are, provided with reinforced

assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades concrete footings and may be supported on

result in a beneficial intensity shift of one piles. Most transmission systems are ac, but

unit (i.e., -), relative to the above present some long-distance lines are dc. The dc

conditions- systems require convertor stations at each end of the line.

ATC-25 A -Appendix B:Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 235

s1

*.35 .30

MIl a b

6 . 77 0. 426

7 ,065 0.115 B 048 0.H39

C. 9 .34 0 .020

10 ,09 0.008 o R= y

-a * days a

CC0)

l l l l l l l l | l aH= B/ y I - i I i I I i i I

DAYS: 30 60 90 120 158 188 210 Z40 Z70 30 330 365 Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-49 Residual capacity for hydroelectric power stations (NEHRP Map Area: California 3-6, - Non-California 7, and Puget Sound 5).

Hydroelectric PauerPlantt R=t1o8

36 0.35 68 0.30

MII a b 6 0.069 0.170 7 08854 0.853 B 8.040 0. H26

Co 9 0.814 0.809 to -0.002 0.005

a R = b * days + a (:)

*0a)

I I I I= A Y : 3 I I I I DAYS: 30 60 90 120 150 18 210 248 270 30 330 365


Figure B-50 Residual capacity for hydroelectric power stations (All other areas).


Transmission Lines (Electrical) DztIOO S6 1.B

S 0aCC W

C

DwOx VI 1IJl VIII IX X


Figure B-51 Damage percent by intensity for electric transmission lines.

Typical Seismic Damage: Transmission 1. Direct Damage towers and the lines they support are principally subject to damage through Basis: Damage curves for transmission lines secondary effects such as landslides, and in the electrical system are based on ATC-13 rock falls, liquefaction, and other ground data for FC 56, major electrical transmission failures. This is also true for the line towers (over 100 feet tall, see Figure B-underground lines. It ispossiblethat the 51). Standard construction is assumed to conductors supported by towers can slap represent typical California transmission against each other and bum down. Ceramics lines and towers under present conditions used on transmission towers typically (i.e., a composite of older and more modern perform well in earthquakes because they towers). It is assumed that no regional are in compression rather than in tension or variation in construction quality exists, as bending. Fault slippage is unlikely to seismic loads are relatively unimportant in damage underground lines,(unless the line the design of transmission towers. crosses the fault fracture) because transmission lines have a thick-wall, welded- Present Conditions: In the absence of data steel pipe jacket. on the type of tower, age, etc., the following

factors were used to modify the mean Seismically Resistant Design: Seismic loads curves, under present conditions: do not generally have much influence on the design of transmission lines and towers. The MMI

towers are designed to,withstand heavy wind Intensity and ice loads, as well as loads due to broken NEHRPMap Area Shift

wires. The primary Seismically resistant California 7 0

concern is siting towers and conductors in California 3-6 Non-California 7

locations where soils are stable, or providing Puget Sound 5 U special foundations designed to survive All other areas effects of soil failure.

ATC-25 AppendixAppendix B:Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 237 ATFC-25 B:Lifeline Vulnerability Functions, 237

xx :; H Transmission Lines (Electrical)

.,OL I GM Ct 4 IRRR- 100 I .U - U L ._-v -.

M1111 a b 6 0.898 1.384 7 0.814 0.790 B -0.013 0.606 9 -0 .111 0,277

ia0 10 -0. 280 0. 168

:3.n H = b * days a

U)

a:

a.,DH= "/Ut1-

| I I I I I I I

DAYS: 60 90 120 150 188 210 240 270 308 330 365 Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-52 Residual capacity for electric transmission lines (NEHRP Map Area: California 3-6, California 7, Non-California 7, and Puget Sound 5, and all other areas).

Upgraded Conditions: It is not cost- ground wires, underground cables, and effective or practical to upgrade existing extensive electrical equipment including transmission towers or lines unless banks of circuit breakers, switches, wave supporting or adjacent soils are known to be traps, buses, capacitors, voltage regulators, unstable. Therefore, no intensity shifts for and massive transformers. Circuit breakers retrofitting are recommended. (oil or gas) protect transformers against.

power surges due to short circuits. Switches Time-to-restoration: The time-to- prevent long-term interruption of the restoration data assigned to SF 29b, circuits. Wave traps enable transmission of transmission lines for the electrical system, supervisory signals through power lines. are assumed to apply to all transmission Buses provide transmission linkage of the lines and towers. By combining these data many and varied components within the with the damage curves for FC 56, the time- substation. Capacitors are used to keep the to-restoration curves shown in Figure B-52 three phases of a transmission circuit in were derived. proper relation to each other. Transformers

and voltage regulators serve to maintain the B.5.4 Transmission Substations predetermined voltage, or to step down or

step up from one voltage to another. 1. General Porcelain lightning arresters are used to

protect the system from voltage spikes Description: Transmission substations in the caused by lightning. Long, cantilevered electrical system generally receive power at porcelain components (e.g., bushings and high voltages (220 kV or more) and step it lightning arresters) are common on many down to lower voltages for distribution. The electrical equipment items. substations generally consist of one or more control buildings, steel towers, conductors,


Typical Seismic Damage: Control buildings are subject to generic building damage ranging from dropped suspended ceilings and cracks in walls and frames to partial and total collapse. Unanchored or improperly anchored control equipment may slide or topple, experiencing damage or causing attached piping and conduit to fail. In the yard, steel towers are typically damaged only by soil failures. Porcelain bushings, insulators, and lightning arresters are brittle and vulnerable to shaking and are frequently damaged. Transformers are large, heavy pieces of equipment that are frequently unanchored or inadequately anchored. Transformers may shift, tear the attached conduit, break bushings, damage radiators, and spill oil. Transformers in older substations that are mounted on rails frequently have fallen off their rails unless strongly anchored. Other top-heavy pieces of electrical equipment can topple or slide when inadequately anchored, damaging connections. Frequently, inadequate slack in conductors or rigid bus bars result in porcelain damage resulting from differential motion.

Seismically Resistant Design: Porcelain is used extensively in ways that make it susceptible to damage (bending and tension). Recent developments including gas-insulated substations and installation details that base isolate, reinforce, or add damping, may reduce the problem in the future. Seismically resistant design practice includes the use of damping devices for porcelain; proper anchorage for equipment (avoid the use of friction clips); provision of conductor slack between equipment in the substation; use of breakaway connectors to reduce loads on porcelain bushings and insulators; and replacement of single cantilever-type insulator supports with those having multiple supports. Transformer radiators that cantilever from the body of transformer can be braced. Adequate spacing between equipment can reduce the likelihood of secondary damage resulting from adjacent equipment falling. Control buildings and enclosed control equipment should be designed to satisfy the seismic requirements of the local or national building code, as a minimum.

2. Direct Damage

Basis: Damage curves for transmission substations for the electrical system are based on ATC-13 data for FC 66, electrical equipment (see Figure B-53). High-voltage porcelain insulators, bushings, and supports are vulnerable to damage, even when the porcelain components have been designed and qualified to enhanced seismic criteria. Consequently, the detrimental intensity shift indicated below is assumed appropriate.

Standard construction is assumed to represent typical California transmission substations under present conditions (e., a composite of older non-seismically designed substations as well as more modern substations designed to enhanced seismic requirements).

Present Conditions: In the absence of data on the type of equipment, substation voltage, age, etc., the following factors were used to modify the mean curves, under present conditions:

MM! .intensity

NEHRP Map Area Shift California 7 +1 California 3-6 +2 Non-California 7 +2 Puget Sound 5 +2 All other areas +3

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it appears cost-effective to improve facilities, assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades result in a beneficial intensity shift of one unit (i.e., -1), relative to the above present conditions.

Time-to-restoration: The time-to-restoration data assigned to SF 29c, transmission substations, are assumed to apply to all transmission substations in California. For transmission substations in other areas, response planning is not as complete, and the restoration time is assumed to be 1.5 times longer. By combining these data with the modified damage curves for FC 66,the time-to-restoration curves shown in Figures B-54 through B-56 were derived.


Transmission Substation transnission SubstationD=108x

813

E 0co

wD=Sox

Dlix IVI VII Vill Ix x

'Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI)

Figure B-53 Damage percent by intensity for electric transmission substations.

transnission Substation U- en.,. 4 aa 11 I .n

i~ii- LUur. -00_

1.un nb i.nn3-

Mlil a b 6 0.126 0.092 7 0.101 0,030 B H.882 0.019

: tf 9 8.67 0.01Oa0- 18 8.858 0.009:-5.

R= sez

R b *days a co

R= OXL I I I I I I i l

,DAYss:1 30 60 90 120 150 180 218 248 Z71' 300 330 365 Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-54 Residual capacity for electric transmission substations (NEHRP California 7).


Transnission Substation 14=100v 1 n r r I n

J 1 .V[!I UU g sULI'

.=Zz MM a b 6 8.101 0.03B 7 8.802 0.019 8 8.867 8.812

C. 9 8.8;52 0.009 a 18 H.844 0.007

O R= S/z r£_ R =b days + a~0 Cd,0co rD

R= z I lI lI l l l l

l

DAYS: 38 G8 98 128 158 188 218 240 278 308 338 365


Figure B-55 Residual capacity for electric transmission substations NEHRPMap Area: California 3-6, Non-California 7 and Puget Sound 5).

Transmission Substation 1.08 68 1.02

MKIl Ia b

6 8.8198.86?

7 . 012 8.858 E.289

9 8.8 8.887:CsCL

R b * days + a -a

EG

n- O., I .M= "-> - :. 3 I II I I DAYTS: 8EI 9 128 I58 188 218 248 278 308 330 365

Elapsed Time in Day,

Figure B-56 Residual capacity for electric transmission substations (All other areas).

A+TC-25 Appendix B: Liteline Vulnerability Functions 241

Distribution Lines DzI100v s5 1.af0

0 =80

axCY)

E

Other

CA 7

- CA3-6 - Non-CA 7-

D=O/ P.S.5 VI ViI U111 ix X


Figure B-57 Damage percent by intensity for electric distribution lines.

B.S.SDistribution Lines Seismically Resistant Design: Seismic loads do not generally have much influence on the

1. General design of distribution lines and towers. The towers are typically designed to withstand

Description: In general, distribution lines wind loads. The primary concern is siting may be underground or above ground towers and poles where soils are stable to supported by towers or poles. Towers are prevent foundation failures. usually steel, and poles are usually treated wood. Towers are provided with concrete 2. Direct Damage footings, and poles may have footings or may be embedded directly into the ground. Basis: Damage curves for distribution lines Transformers on poles may be supported on in the electrical system are based on ATC-13 platforms or anchored directly to poles. data for FC 55, conventional electrical Distribution lines typically operate at lower transmission line towers (less than 100 feet voltages (64 kV or less). tall, see Figure B-57). In general, less

conservative design criteria are used for Typical Seismic Damage: Unanchored pole- distribution lines than for lines in the mounted transformers may be knocked transmission system. down and some will burn. Towers and poles are generally undamaged except by Standard construction is assumed to secondary effects such as landslides, represent typical California distribution liquefaction, and other ground failures. lines, towers, and poles, under present Conductor lines swinging together can cause conditions (i.e., a composite of older and burnouts and/or start fires. Settlement of more modern lines and towers). Only soils with respect to manholes can minimal regional variation in the sometimes cause underground line routed construction quality is assumed. through the manhole to fail.

Present Conditions: In the absence of data on the type of tower/pole or conductor, age,


istribution Lines 4 an!9L 1.80 55 1.v.alu

lil a. b S 8.448 1.375 7 0.445 e.882 8 .443 8. 59

_5 9 8.432 8.174a co 10 8.393 0.08 (3

R =3 * Jays + a (/2C, mr

llR= z I Il

i - lI l l l,, - I

DAYS: G0 98 128 158 188 210 248 278 380 338 365 Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-58 Residual capacity for electric distribution lines (NEHRPMap Area: California 3-6, California 7, Non-California 7, and Puget Sound 5).

etc., the following factors were used to modify B.516Distribution Substations the mean curves, under present conditions:

1. General MMI

Intensit Description: Distribution substations in the NEHRP Map Area Shift electrical system generally receive power at California 7 0 low voltages (64 kV or less) and step it downCalifornia 3-6

7 0 to lower voltages for distribution to users. Non-California 0

Puget Sound 5 0 The substations generally consist of one All other areas +1 small control building, steel towers,

conductors, ground wires, and electrical Upgraded Conditions: It is not cost- equipment including circuit breakers, effective or practical to upgrade existing switches, wave traps, buses, capacitors, transmission towers, unless supporting or voltage regulators, and transformers. adjacent soils are known to be unstable. Therefore, no intensity shifts for upgrading Typical Seismic Damage:Control buildings are recommended. are subject to generic building damage

ranging from cracks in walls and frames to Time-to-restoration: The time-to- partial and total collapse. Unanchored or restoration data assigned to SF 29d, improperly anchored control equipment distribution lines, are assumed to apply to all may slide or topple, experiencing damage or distribution lines. By combining these data causing attached conduit to fail- In the yard, with the damage curves for FC 55, the time- steel towers are typically damaged only by to-restoration curves shown in Fiugres B-58 soil failures. Porcelain bushings, insulators, and B-59 were derived. and lightning arresters are brittle and

vulnerable to shaking and are frequently


listribution Lines 4 a .. "u-R= 100 29d 1.08 55

8488x MtlI a b 6 0.445 8.80Z 7 0.443 8.589 8 0.432 8.174

co 9 B.393 0.8DB 0- 10 0.297 0.847 ° R= Sex C5iaW H = b * days a (U

Rz_

H= I. . I. I II i . -I.

II. I.

I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I

1AYS: 30 68 98 120 150 188 218 240 Z78 300 338 365


Figure B-59 Residual capacity for electric distrit )ution lines (All other areas).

damaged. Transformers are large, heavy single cantilever-type insulator supports pieces of equipment that are frequently with those having multiple supports; and unanchored or inadequately anchored. provision of adequate slack in conductors Transformers may shift, tear the attached and bus bars connecting components that conduit, break bushings, damage radiators, may experience differential movement will and spill oil. Transformers in older significantly reduce seismic vulnerability. substations that are mounted on rails frequently have fallen off their rails unless 2. Direct Damage strongly anchored. Other top-heavy pieces of electrical equipment can topple or slide Basis: Damage curves for distribution when inadequately anchored, damaging substations for the electrical system are connections. Frequently, inadequate slack in based on ATC-13 data for FC 66, electrical conductors or rigid bus bars result in equipment (see Figure B-60). It is believed porcelain damage resulting from differential that this facility class best approximates the motion. expected performance of distribution

substations. Seismically Resistant Design: Porcelain in distribution substation is susceptible to Standard construction is assumed to damage but is less vulnerable than porcelain represent typical California distribution in transmission substations by virtue of its substations under present conditions (i.e., a shorter cantilever lengths. Seismically composite of older non-seismically designed resistant design practices include the use of substations as well as more modern installation details that base isolate, substations designed to enhanced seismic reinforce, or add damping devices to the requirements). porcelain. Proper anchorage details should be used for all yard equipment. Breakaway Present Conditions: In the absence of data connectors for porcelain; replacement of on the type of equipment, substation

A244 Appendix B:Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25 .'. I

Distribution Sstation Dzt0lH

)Ea)

E (U

C

D=O 1l ViI VIII Ix X

Modified Mercalli ntensity (MMI)

Figure B-60 Damage percent by intensity for electric distribution substations.

voltage, age, etc., the following factors were with the damage curves for FC 66, the time-used to modify the mean curves, under to-restoration curves shown in Figures B-61 present conditions: through B-63 were derived.

Mm/ B.6Water SupplyIntensity

NEHRPMap Area Shift B.6.1 Transmission Aqueducts California 7 0 California 3-6 +1

1. GeneralNon-California 7 +1 Puget Sound 5 +1 All other areas +2 Description: In general, various types of

transmission aqueducts can be used for Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it transporting water, depending on appears cost-effective to improve facilities, topography, head availability, construction assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades practices, and environmental and economic result in a beneficial intensity shift of one considerations. Open channels are used to unit (i.e., -1), relative to the above present convey water under conditions of conditions. atmospheric pressure. Flumes.are open

channels supported above ground. Channels Time-to-restoration: The time-to- may be lined or unlined. Lining materials restoration data assigned to SF 29e, include concrete, bituminous materials, distribution substations, are assumed to butyl rubber, vinyl, synthetic fabrics, or other apply to all distribution substations in products to reduce the resistance to flow, California. For distribution substations in minimize seepage, and lower maintenance other areas, response planning is not as costs. Flumes are usually constructed of complete and restoration time is assumed be concrete, steel, or timber. Pipelines are built

where topographic conditions preclude the 1.5 times longer. By combining these data

:Lfln unrblt ucin 4 ATC-25AT-2Apni

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions 245

Distribution Substation

R=10f 29e 1.00 66 1.0n

MITI a b

6 0.0838 0.273

7 08,05 8.139 8 0.082 0.055 9 0.806 0.826

a () n_r

10 0.078 0.015Ca

Ca R = b * days + a

n

cR

a,

Ay, I I II DA. i I I I I I I I

DAYS 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 Z70 300 330 365 Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-61 Resicdual capacity for electric distribution substations (NEHRP California 7).

Distribution Substation.

Rz!S A -2Z9e I.001 bb 1. 00L

KH1 a b

6 0.085 0.139 7 0.802 0.655

>. 8 0.080 0.026 9 0.070 0.815aC_ 10 0.077 0. 11I0

I- -=

B b * days + a ._ a)

I

. ?,/I

- -- IV- uv L

n- u. - I I I i I I I I 1 I I

DAYS: t30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 330 365 Elapsed Time in Days

Figure B-62 Residual capacity for electric distribution substations (NEHRP Map Area 3-6, Non-California 7, and Puget Sound 5).

Appendix B: Lifeline Vulnerability Functions ATC-25,,,246 A

DistributionSstation

tMl1I a b, 6 8 82 8 .855 7 2.80 BI26

-0 co

8 9

8.878 8.877

.8.815 8.8i

0 R= 50;x

10 0.876 8.888

-DC)[I0 R = lb days a

. _

R= 80/ DIr 60


Figure B-63 Residual capacity for electric distribution substations (All other areas).

use of canals. Pipelines may be laid above- Seismically Resistant Design: Seismically-or below ground, or may be partly buried. resistant design practices include providingMost modern pressure conduit are builtof reinforced concrete linings for channels and concrete, steel, ductile iron, or asbestos tunnels. Channels should have slopes cement. Tunnels are used where it is not appropriate for embankment materials to practical to lay a pipeline, such as mountain prevent slumping. Tunnels, should be or river crossings. They may be operated strengthened at intersections, bends, and under pressure or act as open channels. changes in shape and construction materials. Linings may be unreinforced concrete, Aqueducts should be sited to eliminate or reinforced concrete, steel, or brick. minimize fault crossings. Aqueducts that

cross faults can be routed through pipeTypical Seismic Damage:Channels are buried in shallow loose fill or installed above most susceptible to damage from surface ground near the fault, to allow lateral and faulting and soil failures such as differential longitudinal slippage. settlement, liquefaction, or landsliding. Unreinforced linings are more susceptible to 1. Direct Damage damage than are reinforced linings. Small fractures in the lining can result in a Basis: Damage curves for transmission transmissionaqueduct being taken out of aqueducts of the water supply system are service, as water leaking through the lining based on ATC-13 data for FC 3, tunnels could erode supporting embankments or passing through alluvium, and FC 61, canals surrounding soils and cause significant (see Figure B-64). Aqueducts are assumed damage. Regional uplift could result in long- to be a-combination of 50% tunnels and term loss of function by changing the 50% canals. Tunnels passing through hydraulic flow characteristics of the alluvium are less vulnerable than cut-and-aqueduct. cover tunnels and more vulnerable than


- -Transmission Aqueduct

_u=lnnz - En n.:n-1-1 61 O.so

80

a)0)

PA-U. E

0

Other

CA 7

GA3-6I)^ V I V II I P,-s- I X1 ,XIu tu,. V I

VI V11 Vill IX P.S. X


Figure B-64 Damage percent by intensity for transmission aqueducts.

tunnels passing through rock; they were assume on a preliminary basis that upgrades chosen as representative of all tunnels. result in a beneficial intensity shift of one

unit (i.e., -1), relative to the above present Standard construction is assumed to conditions. represent typical California aqueducts under present conditions (i.e., a composite of older Time-to-restoration: The time-to-and more modern aqueducts). Only minimal restoration data assigned to SF 30a, regional variation in construction quality of transmission aqueducts, are assumed to aqueducts is assumed. apply to all transmission aqueducts. By

combining these data with the damage Present Conditions: In the absence of data curves derived using the data from FC 38 on the type of construction, age, etc., the and 61, the time-to-restoration curves shown following factors were used to modify the in Figures B-65 and B-66 were derived. mean curves for the two facility classes listed above, under present conditions: B.6.2PumpingStations

MM! 1. General Intensity

Shift Description: Pumping equipment forms an NEHRPMap Area FC 38 FC 61 important part of the water supply system California 7 0 0 transportation and distribution facilities. In California 3-6 Non-California 7 Puget Sound 5 All other areas

0 . 0

0 +1

0 0 0 +1

general, pumping stations include larger stations adjacent to reservoirs and rivers, and smaller stations distributed throughout the water system intended to raise head. Large pumping stations typically include

Upgraded Conditions: For areas where it appears cost-effective to improve facilities, intake structures. Pumping stations typically

Appendix B:LifelineVulnerability Functions ATC-25 248

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