Justifiable Conformity?

Research on the Causality behind the Disturbances in the EU’s Cooperation with China

in Priority Area ‘Civil Society’

Master’s Thesis

By Supervisor:Angelina Haralampieva Per LundeEuropean Studies, 10th semester

2010Acknowledgements

1

Herewith I would like to express my appreciation to those who contributed to the

completion of my Master’s Program in European Studies at Aalborg University, marked at

last with the accomplishment of this Master’s Thesis.

I would thank the Authorities of Aalborg University and especially the Study Board for

International Relations for facilitating favorable conditions to carry out the Program.

Furthermore, I would like to state my satisfaction with the opportunity to combine the

European Studies Program with the innovative specialization in Chinese Area Studies, which

I availed of with willingness.

Most distinctively, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Per Lunde, for our

beneficial work together. With his attentive attitude, cooperative manner of supervision and

nevertheless critical appraisals, he held our consultations according to the Chinese proverb -

“Tell me and I will forget, show me and I will remember, involve me and I will understand”,

and, thus, deserved my gratitude.

Angelina Haralampieva

Abstract

2

China’s significance on the world scene justifies EU’s efforts to extend and diversify

its relationship to the People’s Republic beyond the initial trade connections and to carry out

its important economic and political interests as supporting China’s sustainable development

and transition to a ‘stable’, ‘prosperous’ and ‘open’ state.

This paper is concerned with the European Union’s (EU) development cooperation

with China, as regards to the ‘cooperation for establishing civil society capacity’ with the

People’s Republic. The initially stipulated EU’s willingness to aid China’s societal sector

through allocated funding does not meet with the realization of this intention. The aims of

cooperation: increasing of Chinese civil society organizations’ (CSOs) experience in project

and organization management, reiterating networking and mutual understanding between

Chinese and European CSOs, successful completion of pilot programs and participation in

macro-project schemes, etc.; are lined with € 20 million, when the cooperation was to start off

in 2002. However, due to implementation deficiencies, it became apparent that the aid cannot

be fully absorbed and would remain unrealized assets. This triggered alteration in terms of

objectives, activities, implementation, expected results and financial envelope; altogether,

changing the manner the cooperation in the field was carried out.

Hence, the latest relevant EU papers evidence of transforming the ‘cooperation for

establishing civil society capacity’ from ‘priority area’ to ‘complementary activity’ to EU-

China relationship. Regardless of whether this could be defined as failure, or hesitantly as

‘shift of focus’, this change is due to certain causality that has implications both on the

ongoing process of cooperation and on the its prospects.

Table of Contents

3

Chapter 1: Introduction ……………………………………………………………..………1

1.1. Methodological approach ………………………………………………………....1

1.2. Presentation of ‘civil society capacity building’ as an objective of the EU’s

development cooperation with China …………………………………………………2

1.2.1. EU’s development cooperation with China ……………………………..2

1.2.2. EU’s development cooperation with China for establishing ‘civil society

capacity’ ……………………………………………………………………….3

1.2.3. China’s EU Policy Paper ………………………………………………..8

1.3. Problem formulation ……………………………………………………………...8

1.4. Reservations ………………………………………………………………………9

Chapter 2: Disclosing the notion of ‘civil society’ ………………………………………...11

2.1. Methodological approach …………………..……………………………………11

2.2. Conceptualizing ‘civil society’ …………………………………………………..12

2.2.1. Describing the developments the concept ‘civil society’ has been

through………………………………………………………………………..12

2.2.2. Defining the concept of ‘civil society’ and its associations …………...14

2.2.3. Specifying the role that justifies civil society’s worth for the modern

socio-political sphere ………………………………………………………...18

2.3. Civil society – the EU perspective ………………………………………………18

2.4. Civil society for China …………………………………………………………..22

Chapter 3: Analysis …………………………………………………………………………28

3.1. Methodological approach ………………………………………………………..28

3.2. Theoretical framework …………………………………………………………..29

3.3. Analysis ………………………………………………………………………….33

Chapter 4: Finale …………………………………………………………………………...47

4.1. Methodological approach ………………………………………....……………..47

4.2. Warts and all ………………………………………….....……………………….47

Bibliography

4

Annexes

List of Abbreviations

BINGO – Business International Non-Governmental OrganizationCSO – Civil Society OrganizationCSP – Country Strategy PaperEC – European CommissionENGO – Environmental Non-Governmental OrganizationEU – European UnionGONGO – Government-Operated Non-Governmental OrganizationINGO – International Non-Governmental OrganizationMIP – Multi-Annual Indicative ProgrammeNGO – Non-Governmental OrganizationNIP – National Indicative Programme PRC – People’s Republic of China RINGO – Religious International Non-Governmental OrganizationQUANGO – Quasi- Non-Governmental Organization

5

“EU policies toward China and Chinese policies toward the EU developed partly in tandem, partly in reaction to each other and partly in response to other circumstances affecting one side or the other”. 1

1. Introduction

The present thesis is concerned with the European Union’s (EU) development

cooperation with China, as regards to the ‘cooperation for establishing civil society capacity’

with the People’s Republic. The initially stipulated EU’s willingness to aid China’s societal

sector through allocated funding does not meet with the realization of this intention. The aims

of cooperation: increasing of Chinese civil society organizations’ (CSOs) experience in

project and organization management, reiterating networking and mutual understanding

between Chinese and European CSOs, successful completion of pilot programs and

participation in macro-project schemes, etc.; are lined with € 20 million, when the cooperation

was to start off in 2002. However, due to implementation deficiencies, it became apparent that

the aid cannot be fully absorbed and would remain unrealized assets. This triggered alteration

in terms of objectives, activities, implementation, expected results and financial envelope;

altogether, changing the manner the cooperation in the field was carried out.

Hence, the latest relevant EU papers evidence of transforming the ‘cooperation for

establishing civil society capacity’ from ‘priority area’ to ‘complementary activity’ to EU-

China relationship. Regardless of whether this could be defined as failure, or hesitantly as

‘shift of focus’, this change is due to certain causality, which this project will attempt to

examine in the next chapters.

1. 1. Methodological approach This introductory chapter is intended to give the reader a ‘guided tour’ through EU-

China cooperation in the central, for this research paper, area of ‘civil society’. The section

presents the documental base of the EU development cooperation with China, which gets

further disclosed with annexes attached. Consequently, it goes into details, as particularizing

to a concrete sphere within this cooperation –‘civil society’. Accordingly, the chapter follows

chronologically the regulation of the matter with relevant documents, mainly issued by the

EU. Due to objectivity, however, the China’s EU Policy Paper is reviewed to demonstrate

China’s counterweight in the cooperation.

By doing so, we construct the empirical fundament, which reveals the surroundings,

where the problem arises, and thus substantiate the research question. As offering our

1 Snyder, F., “The EU and China 1949-2008”

6

reasoning for problem’s relevance and importance, we, furthermore, formulate theme of the

study.

Any following methodological specifications, including relevant reservations, which

are needed, are introduced consequently in the final subsection.

1.2. Presentation of ‘civil society capacity building’ as an objective of the EU’s development cooperation with China

1.2.1. EU’s development cooperation with China China’s significance on the world scene justifies EU’s efforts to extend and diversify

its relationship to the People’s Republic beyond the initial trade connections and to carry out

its important economic and political interests as supporting China’s sustainable development

and transition to a ‘stable’, ‘prosperous’ and ‘open’ state. The cooperation program is an

important element of this relationship.

The foundation of EU-China cooperation goes back to the 1985 ‘Trade and Economic

Co-operation Agreement’ that provides ‘a basis for institutionalized dialogue’ as regulates

trade, economic and developmental issues between the parties concerned.

The European Commission’s development program in China, stipulated with the

Treaty Establishing the European Community, understands the development cooperation

between both partners as “a multidimensional process covering broad-based equitable

growth, capacity and institution building, private sector development, social services,

environment, good governance and human rights”.

The extending complexity of the overall relationship between EU and China is

updated in the 2006 document ‘EU-China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities’ and the

2007 ‘Partnership Co-operation Agreement’. Thus, besides the regular political, trade and

economic meetings, over 24 wide-ranging sectoral dialogues were established. (see Annex 1)2

Accordingly, the Directorate for External Relations specifies the following core

objectives of EU policy towards China:- Broaden and deepen dialogue with China, both bilaterally and on the world stage to face the global

challenges;

- Support China’s transition to an open society based upon the rule of law and respect for human

rights;

- Encourage the ongoing integration of China into the world economy and trading system, and

support the process of economic and social reforms;

2 Annex 1 goes in further details on EU cooperation objectives as laid down in various applicable documents

7

- Raise the EU’s profile in China, to aid mutual understanding. 3

These objectives are reflected in EU’s long term strategy toward China and over the

years have been subject to change in the EU-China intensifying relations. As the present paper

deals with the civil society matter, we look upon the documents, chronologically regulating

EU-China relations with regard to this very subject.

Thus, the examined documents are as follows:

1995 Communication on "A long-term policy for China-Europe relations";

1998 Communication on "Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China”;

Commission Working Document, Country Strategy Paper China 2002-2006;

National Indicative Programme 2002-2004 China;

National Indicative Programme 2005-2006 China;

China Strategy Paper 2007-2013;

Multiannual Indicative Programme 2007-2010

This list does not pretend to be altogether representative for the EU documents on China

touching upon the civil society issue, but they are selectively chosen as most distinct ones to

draw an overview on the subject.

1.2.2. EU’s development cooperation with China for establishing ‘civil society capacity’

In the 1995 Communication ‘A long-term policy for China-Europe relations’ European

Commission (EC) stated it willingness to “support potential efforts in China to open up and

liberalise all areas of Chinese life, in different sections of society as well as different parts of

the economy. These trends inevitably reinforce moves towards the development of a civil

society based on the rule of law”. In order these undertakings to be effective in practice, “the

EU can promote practical cooperation, such as training and technical assistance in the legal and judicial fields, to back the efforts being made in China to establish a civil society

based on the rule of law.”

Anyhow, the paper admits that “up till now [1995] concrete action by the EU to

encourage cooperation [in this field] has been small-scale. The EU should henceforth

coordinate with the Member States and the many active European NGOs to support the

development of the rule of law in China”. 4

3 European Commission, Directorate General External Relations, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/china/index_en.htm

4 European Commission, A long-term policy for China-Europe relations, COM (1995)

8

In 1998 Communication ‘Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China’, the EC,

considering China’s emergence as ‘an increasingly confident world power’, formulates the

desire “to see China integrated rapidly and fully into the international community, both

politically and economically [and, furthermore,] to support its transition towards an open

society based upon the rule of law.” This should be achieved through strengthening of the

civil society. “The EU should aim to strengthen those practices which make up the fabric of a

strong civil society. It should promote civil and political rights through initiatives such as the

support for a training centre in China for officials engaged in the implementation of the

village governance law. It could also allow for assistance to the most vulnerable groups in

society, including ethnic minorities, women … and children. Initiatives aimed at promoting

consumers' rights and at supporting consumers' organisations could also be a way of

strengthening civil society. The role of Non-Governmental Organisations in implementing

projects aimed at strengthening civil society should be fully exploited.5

Based on the implementation of the above mentioned Communication, EU-China Legal

and Judicial Co-operation Programme, launched in 2000, reconfirms Commission’s “support

to small-scale development aid projects, which have been launched by NGOs in the

education, health, and sanitation sectors … [Moreover,] the EU's support of NGOs does in

itself contribute to the strengthening of civil society.”6

Over the next years, as Directorate General External Relations evidences, the cooperation

with China moved away from the previous areas of infrastructure and rural development

towards support for social and economic reform, the environment and sustainable

development, and good governance and the rule of law. Various regional programs provided

project funding for non-profit-making organisations working in the areas of education,

environment, trade and investment, and human rights and democracy. 7

Based on EU’s “multi-faceted and dynamic relationship with China”, the China Country

Strategy Paper 2002-2006 (CSP) includes among all objectives of the bilateral cooperation the

promotion “grass-roots democracy and the implementation of economic, social and political

and civil rights and strengthening of the structures and processes that make up the fabric of a

strong civil society”.8

5 Commission of the European Communities, Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China, COM(1998)

6 Commission of the European Communities, Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Implementation of the Communication "Building a Comprehensive

Partnership with China", COM(2000)

7 Directorate General External Relations, op.cit. 8 European Commission, Commission Working Document, Country Strategy paper China 2002-2006

9

EU periodically monitors the implementation of its Strategy Papers through the

National Indicative Programmes (NIP) that allow for a critical examination of operations,

which have been undertaken and announce necessary corrections of timing or priorities.

NIP 2002-2004 estimates €20million in Community contribution for priority ‘Good

Governance and Strengthening of the Rule of Law’, within which the civil society

development is viewed as means for betterment of the governance field in China:

Expanding support for the rule of law implies not only top-down initiatives such as support

for drafting new legislation and training of relevant servants, but also initiatives involving the

citizens’ opportunity to seek fairness and redress within the legal and administrative systems.

Such initiatives should involve support for newly-developing NGOs and other organisations

of civil society working for the betterment of communities in the midst of socio-economic

reform. 9

Generally, the objective ‘Support to civil society’ is most distinctive as initially

stipulated in NIP 2002-2004. Therefore, we consider necessary to place it here as it is. →

As can be seen from the abstract, €20 million in Community contribution are provided

to train Chinese CSOs in project and organization management; to involve Chinese CSOs in

number programs; to increase the communication, exchanges and activities between Chinese

CSOs and their European counterparts.

The consequent NIP (period 2005-2006) noticed that some modifications to the 2002-

2004 NIP were required in order to reflect the realities encountered during project

preparation, ‘where political sensitivities were encountered’. In a response, NIP 2005-2006

foresees the financing for EU-China civil society cooperation program to be reduced from

€20 million originally allocated in the prior NIP to €10 million. “This reduction has come

about mainly because of concerns over absorption capacity in the Chinese context.”

Regardless the official organs’ positive attitude and merely indicative character of the

cooperation program, the allocated grant has not been absorbed. Nevertheless, NIP envisages

three areas of cooperation: ‘capacity building’, ‘networking of NGOs’ and ‘grants’, where

cooperation still can be achieved.

In order to either solve or moderate the downsides encountered the following steps are

predicted: “improving the interaction between government and civil society, supporting the

modification of legislation concerning NGOs, building capacity in Chinese civil society

organisations and strengthening public participation in local decision making”. In talks with

9 European Commission, National Indicative Programme 2002-2004 China

10

the Chinese government is decided “that [the] cooperation in this area should be continued

under the 2005-2006 NIP”. In consultation with the non-state actors “ways in which civil

society could play an active role” in the implementation” are discussed.10

Henceforth, the NIP 2005-2006 focused on the CSP priority areas of social and economic

reform, and good governance and the rule of law. Funding has been approved for the creation

of an EU-China Law School (€18.2 million) and for “Governance for Equitable Development:

Strengthening the Rule of Law and Civil Society Participation in China” (€6.8 million not

until 2006). (see Annex 2)

For the following period, the European Commission adopts the new 2007-2013

Country Strategy Paper for China and the Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) for 2007-

2010. Within this timeframe the Union weaves its “guiding, monitoring and reviewing

assistance” into an indicative budget of € 224 million to support EU-China cooperation

programs. Introducing the three areas for action that are on focus evidences where the

cooperation priorities have been reoriented to:

- Reinforcement of the bilateral relationship in the areas of trade, business exchanges, social

and economic development;

- Assistance to China in her efforts to address global concerns over climate change,

environment and energy;

- Support for China's internal reform process in areas of shared interest where EU experience

can provide added value.11

In addition, the Commission declares it’s readiness to continue financing “complementary

thematic interventions” in area “Non-State Actors in Development”, where assistance could

be provided to NGOs and other civil society organisations working in areas related to the

CSP.12

The outlined objectives show noticeable shift in the cooperation discourse. In order to

assist China to come closer to extension of its social wellbeing, EC does not any longer define

non state actors as irreplaceable partners, but talks more about strengthening “[the]

Government capacity to manage social provision at national/regional level”. As to “the

private and informal sector”, EC goes so far as recommendations.

European search for cooperation effectiveness in a long run can be foreseen in the

priority “Human resource development”, stated in MIP. The objective “to contribute towards

China’s human resource development and to strengthen people-to-people links between the 10 European Commission, National Indicative Programme 2005-2006 China

11 Delegation of the European Union to China, http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/china/eu_china/development_cooperation/index_en.htm

12 European Commission, China Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013

11

EU and China” pledges on the presumed effect that the opening up of European academic

institutions for Chinese students would have. It is expected to multiply the social benefits

after these newly educated people return to China and “contribute towards the country’s

development”. 13

Very recently EuropeAid, the institution responsible for EU development services,

called for proposals to grant applicants under the thematic line “EU-China Civil Society

Dialogue” amounting to €1 million. The overall objective is to support the consolidation of a

structured ongoing dialogue between European and Chinese civil societies. The specific

purpose is to formulate common recommendations on public as well as private governance

for the benefit of sustainable development and of poverty eradication. 14

It is worth noticing also that in recent years a main mode of

communication/cooperation between the counterparts turns out to be sectoral dialogues,

which are supportive of China’s reform and development and constitute an important element

of the external dimension of EU policies. More important, by broadening and intensifying

these dialogues, a forum for exchange between policymakers, the business community,

researchers and civil society is provided.

Based on different workshops organized by the EU-China Civil Society Forum, the

associates to the Forum and members of staff of the German Asia Foundation, Sausmikat and

Fritsche define four specific areas in which European NGOs deal with China today: Human

Rights; Labour; Environmental Protection and Climate Change; Education. In two other

areas, Development Aid and Exchange Programs with schools and universities; China

activities are of central concern, but these areas rather fulfil the function of interstate

development aid. All these areas do not exclude each other, but rather could be applied as

cross-cutting issues. 15

1.2.3. China’s EU Policy Paper In so far as European attitude towards its partner was exhaustively introduced, the

Chinese might stay with considerable deficiencies since, whereas the first EU policy paper on

China goes back to 1995, the first Chinese on the EU appeared in 2003. Moreover, it mainly

states the general position of ‘appreciation’ EU’s importance to China, highlights the 13 European Commission, China Multiannual Indicative Programme 2007-2010

14 DEVEX, http://www.devex.com/projects/eu-china-civil-society-dialogue

15 Sausmikat, N., and Fritsche, Kl., eds., Civil Society in European-Chinese Relations, EU-China Civil Society Forum, 2010.

12

objectives of China's EU policy, and outlines the areas and plans of all-round China-EU

cooperation.

Nevertheless, no particularities in a response to EU’s active promotion of ‘civil

society’ are mentioned. In a broad sense, in the social sphere the following is envisaged:- To expand China-EU cultural and people-to-people exchanges under the principle of mutual

emulation, common prosperity and complementarity, and promote cultural harmony and progress

between the East and the West.

- China welcomes more EU development aid, especially in such fields as the environmental protection,

poverty-alleviation, public health and hygiene and education. China also welcomes a stronger and more

active role of the EU in human resources development, in particular, personnel training for China's

central and western regions and build-up of China's capacity of participating in multilateral trading

regime.16

Ever since this Policy paper, the Chinese side kept verbosely reconfirming its

dedication for establishment of a vital civil society before its European partner. Anyhow, if go

into depth of their political, economic and cultural common understanding and interaction, it

is getting clear that whatever China accomplishes in the ‘civil society’ sphere will not be for

the sake of its cooperation with the EU.

1.3. Problem formulationThe introduced overview on the EU’s development cooperation with China in the

priority area ‘Civil society’ discloses if not a failure, at least shifting from the initially

intended logic of implementation. This disruption incites us to look closer at the causality

provoking such a development. The evitable depreciation of the priority reflects at first sight

the nature of the EU-China relationship. Thus, even at the risk of verbosity, we assign the

general actuality of the issue to the new role in the world that China obtained in the past years that led naturally to growth of its significance in the work of the European institutions, European civil society organizations included. Furthermore, the development of civil society in China is particularly attractive to Europe, which hopes to be able to influence China’s development trajectory. Moreover, development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reforms. Europe is thus pursuing a beneficial policy towards China that is based on mutual cooperation.

Our motives to get on the matter are further enhanced by the importance we attach to it

in regard with the throughout significance civil society. Being a power beyond economics and

16 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, China’s EU Policy Paper, 2003

13

politics, the non-governmental sector is considerably growing in influence. Moreover, while it is currently described as a “service provider” for information and expertise (70% in the areas of health, education and social services, the rest in “advocacy for certain interest groups”), its future role will be stronger in “designing and implementing policies.”17

Altogether, the inclusion of the ‘civil society’ in the EU’s documents on China,

but also the subject’s decline as a priority of cooperation, speak about risky ambiguity in

terms of relevance. However, this situation points out that there are many lessons to be learnt

for the cooperation between Chinese and European in the civil society area: in organizational

aspects, in socio-cultural aspects, regarding topic-wise commonalities and differences, and

cooperation questions. Therefore, with putting the focal point of research on the causality

instead of on the consequences of subject’s decline, this paper aims for explanatory value with

added positive implications for future developments.

1.4. ReservationsAfter the problem has been formulated and before proceeding to the next substantial

stage, some reservations need to be made in order to explain project’s general positions,

which are essential to the correct understanding of the applied logic of research. From a

methodological viewpoint the study meets loads of notional obstacles, which if not addressed,

might turn to functional distortions.

Let us first bring to your attention the central term ‘civil society’. When the text

discusses ‘civil society’ what is to be taken into consideration is that the expression is not

used in a broad socio-cultural sense, relating to participatory democracy per se, but rather

defines organized constituent of the society, represented by organizations, which structure the

civil society’s fabric.

Furthermore, we have to clarify what is to be understood under ‘civil society’ in the

perceptions of the actors concerned. Undoubtedly, aiming to disclose ‘civil society’ from the

EU’s intergovernmental stand is troublesome and likely requires numerous reservations to

guard from normative mistakes. Nevertheless, even with a risk of some inaccuracy, this paper

will need to present one generalized picture of EU’s perception of civil society. So it does in

chapter 2.3.

17 Sausmikat, N, “Civil Society Dilemmas in Dealing with China”, EU-China Civil Society Forum, 2009

14

The idea of civil society of a transnational organization is looked at in its correlation

with a national state’s concept of civil society. We, by no means oppose the concepts, but

rather examine how they communicate among each other.

The paper risks to be accused in methodological incorrectness, since it is occasionally

vague on whether the Chinese counterpart is to cooperate with European civil society actors,

or directly with the institutions of the Union. Therefore, it has to be said that the institutional

system allocates Union’s development aid and creates the strategic policy papers towards

China. Chinese organizations apply with own projects to the Indicative Programmes, or

participate in joint ventures with European NGOs. In fact, the latter likely receive their

funding also from the Union’s resources.

Another consideration also has to be noted. In general, there are not many documents,

regarding the cooperation for ‘civil society’, issued on Chinese side. Thus, despite of its initial

idea to represent the matter examined in balance between the EU and China, after acquainting

the reality, we realized the limitations that the time, the logistic, and the scope, etc., were

imposing on us. It was most likely to accent on European side, more specifically the

relationship between EU and China to be viewed as between aid-provider and aid-receiver.

Moreover, when laid down in the EU papers, this relationship is regulated as such.

At some places, where the text cannot manage its intended balance, the notion of civil

society gets to sound obviously ‘westernalized’. To insure against methodological weakness,

it must be stated that although the project is not trying to impose any superiority of the

Western conceptualization, we cannot escape from ourselves, and therefore, our inherent

perceptions. If leaving this aside, still, the accessible resources are created mainly by Western

scholars, or Asian ones, including Chinese, working for scientific centers located in Europe

and the US. So the throughout dealing with the concept is very much dominated by the

Western political tradition.

Due to the necessity to accept a basic position on the ‘civil society’ within the text, the

expression gets its connotation explained in general, as well as in European and in Chinese

contexts in the next chapter.

2. Disclosing the notion of ‘civil society’ 2.1. Methodological approach

15

This section is designed to give the reader as far as possible distinctive idea of the line

of thinking that has been followed, while working with the ‘civil society’ concept. Making the

reservation ‘as far as possible distinctive idea’, is necessary, since the diversity of

interpretations and uses of the ‘civil society’ in multiple contexts enforce to differentiate if not

exclusive at least guiding definition of the term that will facilitate the understanding of ‘civil

society’ as it is used in the present text.

However, in its attempt to overcome this vagueness, the chapter conceptualizes the

notion of civil society per se, as -

describing the developments the concept of civil society has been through;

defining ‘civil society’ and its associations; and

specifying the role that justifies civil society’s worth for the modern socio-political

sphere.

It should be clarified that the postulations made so far derive from the Western socio-cultural

heritage. Accordingly, they serve as a basis upon which the European perception on civil

society is drawn.

Consequently, this paper needs to present one generalized picture of EU’s notion of

civil society and its associations, so that it could further facilitate a well-grounded

examination on the matter within EU-China relationship.

To create such a generalized image, we approach various dimensions of the subject, as

describing -

how and why the ‘civil society’ has emerged as a subject in the common European

‘vocabulary’;

once there, how the EU classifies the organizations of European civil society and what

characteristics does it ascribe to them;

how CSOs are embodied on the European level and what are the roles they perform

within the socio-political dialogue;

furthermore, how has the effectiveness of their participation been manifested.

Having accomplished this, we put for discussion the applicability of the Western/European

concept of civil society to other contexts, in particular in the Chinese realm.

To bring into line with the coming analysis, we compulsorily need to familiarize with

the notion of civil society as it is perceived by the Chinese. The Eastern usage does not just

differ greatly from what the West has been experiencing; it actually offers a whole new

understanding of the theory and practice of civil associational life. Hence, the project gives a

try to -

16

define the ‘Chinese civil society’ in counterweight to EU’s conception;

describe the inception and development of the Chinese notion of civil society;

characterize the organizations of civil society;

depict the roles CSOs play in the Chinese society;

reveal the functional hurdles CSOs meet and thus to incorporate the idea of ‘semi-civil

society’;

deliberate on the ongoing debate whether a civil society has emerged in China;

evaluate the positive impacts and downsides of the cooperation between local and

foreign societal organizations.

At the end, the section bridges the introduced concepts, as demonstrating how the

Chinese CSOs situation is viewed from EU’s point of view, which already lays down some

preliminary hints, relating to the causality of the failed cooperation between EU and China.

2.2. Conceptualizing ‘civil society’ 2.2.1. Describing the developments the concept ‘civil society’ has been through

If we turn to the Centre for Civil Society at London School of Economics, we get to

know that until recently, the dichotomy where the market or the economy is on the one hand,

and the state or government on the other, has dominated the social sciences and has left third-

sector institutions neglected. “The 'society' was pushed to the sidelines … not fitting the two-

sector world view.” 18

However, at the end of the Cold War the term ‘civil society’ became popularized to

describe what appeared to have been missing in state-dominated societies. The 1989 events in

Eastern Europe are thought to have inspired ‘a renaissance’ in thinking about the role civil

society holds in reinforcing democracy. The mass democratization in a number of countries

renewed the interest in popular engagement in political life and everything else that relates to

the way that political cultures affect the way a state is governed. Civil society has become one

of the key parts of the reference framework for governance, seeking to give new dimension of

traditional public action, in which representative democracy is combined with bureaucratic

implementation. The comprehension of ‘civil society’, from citizens’ protests to its

18 London School of Economics, Centre for Civil Society, http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm

17

incorporation into public action, vividly displays an essential shift that makes the ‘civil

society’ objective pivotal to the problems of political and social representation.19

In the introductory article to the book “Civil life, globalization, and political change in

Asia”, its editor and Professor of Anthropology at Boston University, Robert P. Weller,

endorses the assumption that the civil society organizations have become “increasingly

visible and influential over the past two decades … [and they are] thus beginning to reframe

the nation-state both from below, by taking over social functions that the state previously

performed, and from above, by their ability to mobilize political and financial pressure from

beyond the bounds of national politics …[T]hey try to represent interests they perceive as ill

served by the current structure of markets and nation-states”.20

In the book “Changing images of Civil Society”, co-edited by Bruno Jobert, who is

senior researcher at the Centre National de la Recherché Scientifique, France, he proposes

orientation for understanding “the variety of representations of civil society in civic

discourses”. Significantly influenced by the “vast philosophical or ideological controversies,

from Locke, Fergusson, Hegel or Tocqueville to the current debate on deliberation, initiated

by Habermas”, Jobert draws a discourse on ‘civil society’ that relates the notion to “the

conditions of the formation and practice of a political community, based not on tradition but

on the free association of individuals”, realized through ‘horizontal relations’ (opposed to

‘bottom-up’), based on contracts. These agreements occur “in debates between peers” and

thus, bear the commonly shared principles of justice. Thereby, the ‘civil society’ concept

‘transcends’ and even ‘denounces’ the politics shaped through negotiations and compromises

between policy-makers, and seeks a self-organization by citizens.

Nonetheless, as it spreads out to the governance sphere, this theoretical formula proves

troublesome to maintain. “On the public scene it is a powerful myth …a symbol of citizens’

resistance. In the public-policy sphere, mobilization of civil society is embodied in various

frames put to the services of opposing … strategies.” 21 Stephenson, Professor of Political

Science at the University of Hawaii-Manoa, additionally discredits the perception of CSOs as

‘the voice of the people’, representing genuine democracy, and claims that the societal sector

is not able to provide for responsible, democratic representation or accountability, since it

‘reinforces, rather than counters, existing power structures’.22

19 Jobert, B., and Kohler-Koch, B., eds., Changing Images of Civil Society, Routledge, 2008

20 Weller, R., ed., Civil life, globalization, and political change in Asia, Routledge, 2005

21 Jobert, B., and Kohler-Koch, B., op.cit.

22 Stephenson, C., Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), Beyond Intractability, Burgess G. and Burgess, H., eds., Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, 2005

18

2.2.2. Defining the concept of ‘civil society’ and its associationsClarifying the notion of the ‘civil society’ is strategical to unfold this research. Therefore,

in order to cope with the diversity of concepts existing, the present paper needs to adopt an

initial working definition to get us through the mass of assumptions on the matter. Close to

our comprehension is the Centre for Civil Society at London School of Economics’ statement:

Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests,

purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state,

family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and

market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a

diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality,

autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organisations such as registered

charities, development non-governmental organisations, community groups, women's

organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help

groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy group[s].

UN’s definition deliberates further -

Civil society expresses the interests of social groups and raises awareness of key issues in

order to influence policy and decision-making. In recent decades, Civil Society Organizations

(CSOs) have been successful in shaping global policy through advocacy campaigns and

mobilization of people and resources.23

In an article exploring the practical and theoretical significance of civil society,

Michael Edwards, the Director of the Ford Foundation's Governance and Civil Society Unit,

interprets the ‘civil society’ concept as “fundamentally reducing the role of politics in society

by expanding free markets and individual liberty” (Cato in Edwards), and as “the single most

viable alternative to the authoritarian state and the tyrannical market” (World Social

Forum). The ‘civil society’ covers Gidden’s ‘Third Way’, seeking to provide “the missing link

in the success of social democracy”. Adam Seligman calls the civil society the “new analytic

key that will unlock the mysteries of the social order”, Jeremy Rifkin calls it “our last, best

hope”, and international organizations see it as the tool to ‘good governance’ and growth.

23 http://www.fao.org/tc/NGO/index_en.asp

19

Edwards himself builds a conceptualization of ‘civil society’ by combining three

different sets of theories. One school of thought claims that “voluntary associations act as

gene carriers of the good society – microclimates … for developing values like tolerance and

cooperation, and the skills required for living a democratic life”.

As looking at the civil society ‘as the good society’, another theoretical setting

proclaims societal groups as guards against the tendency to some privilege part of society to

transcend over the others.

“In its role as the ‘public sphere’, civil society becomes the arena for argument and

deliberation as well as for association and institutional collaboration”, and this way secures

the ‘public interest’. 24

In “Changing images of Civil Society” Bruno Jobert draws a typology of ‘civil

society’ in accordance with the stand given to the following statements he applies:

Statement: The role of politics in the construction of civil society. The practice shows

that no societal association can conceive independently of politics and socializing institutions,

and also that political class “has a wide range of instruments to act on the constitution of

civil-society organizations”;

Statement: The modalities of involvement of civil society organizations in government

action in its three dimensions: the policy sector, the relation to knowledge, and the relation to

interests;

Statement: The conditions of rehabilitation of civil society when it has been disrupted

are crucial if one is to understand the emergence and legitimizing of civil cooperation.

Hence, the civil society could be functioning in four ‘ideal’ types of civil frame:

1. Tutelary modernization model dates from few decades ago in Western Europe of

economic growth and spread of welfare states. It implies supremacy of “professional elites

and bureaucratic corporations for the conduct of policies … [and to sustain a] system of

interest intermediation”.

2. The neo-conservative model argues that the governance and social institutions are

bringing the fundament of the society - “the family, religion and the fatherland” to decay, as

they increase the dependence on welfare, “resulting in the demoralizing passivity of the

beneficiaries”.

3. The transatlantic Third Way, theorized by Anthony Giddens, aims to “channel

social movements towards beneficial partnership” and to enable ‘social entrepreneurs’ to

24 Edwards, M. (2005) 'Civil society', The Encyclopaedia of Informal Education, www.infed.org/association/civil_society.htm

20

construct “a strong civil society in which rights and responsibilities go hand in hand” (Blair,

2002, in Jobert).

4. The integrative model focuses on the civil society’s ability of “shaping public

interests, rather than [of directing] incorporation of civil-society organizations in the policy

process or their contribution to public services”. The model aims a general change of the

policy-making process through societal involvement on a broad scale that will negotiate the

agreement for the ‘public good’.

It could be altogether concluded that the lapses of each of the models justify the

existence of the rest, since they all outline the saturated objectivity which influence the

constitution of ‘citizenship regimes’. 25

Robert Weller uses Seligman to ascribe to the civil society somewhat inherent

character that indicates its associations as “voluntary, institutionalized groups that stand in

some kind of opposition to the state”. More specifically, they ‘intermediate’ the space

between the family structure and state structure. In connection to the relationship between

states and societies, Weller provides the assumption that they are “independent and usually

antagonistic entities” in ‘a zero-sum game’, where the society’s powers can grow if the state

superiority diminishes, and where the state raises by suppressing the society. At the same

time, undoubtedly, the state and the society do not grow only on each other’s expenses, but

are closely interwoven. 26

Robert Putnam, Professor of public policy at the Harvard University, is in the same

line when stipulating the idea of the ‘social capital’. To introduce it:

… [S]ocial capital refers to connections among individuals – social networks and the

norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them.27

This will mean that the interaction enables people to build social networks, to share

sense of belonging among them, and to benefit out of the social fabric.

If abandon the theoretical dimension, one sees the practical display of this interaction

defined by the broad, inclusive category - ‘civil society organizations’ (CSOs).

The term used includes many types of organizations that constitute civil society as a

vast range of associations. By that, it is important to distinguish between the terms ‘CSO’ and

‘NGO’, although, in practice the majority of CSOs involved in service provision are NGOs,

as study by UN Research Institute for Social Development shows. 28 At the end, “NGOs are

25 Jobert, B., and Kohler-Koch, B., op.cit.

26 Weller, R., op.cit.

27 Smith, M. K. (2001, 2007) 'Robert Putnam', The Encyclopaedia of Informal Education, www.infed.org/thinkers/putnam.htm

28 Clayton, A., Civil Society Organizations and Service Provision, UNRISD, http://www.pogar.org/publications/other/unrisd/intrac.pdf

21

subset of civil society organizations”, according to Weller, created by the relevant laws of a

particular state.

Sausmikat and Fritsche, experts at EU-China Civil Society Forum, explain that both

terms refer to different cultural contexts: CSO is often used as a substitute for NGO in

authoritarian societies without the freedom of association. It is a much ‘softer’, broader

apolitical term, which relates to all kinds of formal or informal organized interest groups

which do not necessarily share the same core value. 29

Weller gives a try to define NGOs’ heterogeneous nature. The long list of acronyms

that has accumulated around NGOs can be used to illustrate this. There exist: NGOs, INGOs

(international NGOs), BINGOs (business international NGOs), RINGOs (religious

international NGOs), ENGOs (environmental NGOs), GONGOs (government-operated

NGOs - which may have been set up by governments to look like NGOs in order to qualify

for outside aid), QUANGOs (quasi-nongovernmental organizations - i.e. those that are at least

partially created or supported by states), and many others. 30

But except for NGOs, Stephenson demonstrates that the civil society may contain:

grassroots organizations that are locally organized groups of individuals which empower their

members to take action on particular issues; social movements that are broader, more diffuse

and represents a segment of society which is interested in inciting or resisting social change;

‘major groups’ that are found to play supportive role to nation-states or intergovernmental

organizations, in various undertakings.31

Regardless to the exact form of CSOs, civil society seems to be strong to the degree

that those CSOs are large and powerful. Thus, the role CSOs play within the modern socio-

political arena should be pointed out.

2.2.3. Specifying the role that justifies civil society’s worth for the modern socio-political sphere

In the 1990s, in human rights, development, environment, and even disarmament,

CSOs (mostly NGOs) had begun to obtain their role in influencing public policy at the

international bodies and in the nation-states. They play multiple roles, varying in their

usefulness, from ‘conflict resolvers’, acting as informal intermediaries, to providers of

29 Sausmikat, N., and Fritsche, Kl., op.cit.

30 Weller, R., op.cit.

31 Stephenson, C., op.cit.

22

development aid and humanitarian assistance, which can sharpen or moderate intractable

conflicts. They endow with human rights and justice advocacy, monitor elections and lobby

governments for conditions which promote international peace and security. Their

contribution is sufficient, despite that they are not primary players in any of these arenas. But,

as Stephenson opposes, “… without these NGOs, many of the accomplishments of states and

international organizations would not have been possible.”32

We will make a use of Edwards’s conclusion, as he claims that the “civil society is

simultaneously a goal to aim for, a means to achieve it, and a framework for engaging with

each other about ends and means. 33 Thus, the idea of ‘civil society’ has potential to explain

and predict the developments of the politics and social change, to incubate alternative ways to

meet and deal with social, economic and political challenges, and to impact the lives of real

people in the here and the now.

In principle, in the European political thought, regardless whether one looks at the

theoretical rise of the notion, or at the practical implications, it is not simple to isolate a single

European concept on ‘civil society’. If in theory the idea is used in multiple, conflicting and

contradictory ways, then in practice it is as well confusing and depending much on the

understanding of the context and conditions in which it is used.

2.3. Civil society – the EU perspective At European level, a discourse on the involvement of civil society has emerged in the

1990s and has been endorsed ever since. With the debate about societal participation beyond

the nation states becoming “mature, increasingly fine-grained and sophisticated” 34, EU faced

“a long way to go in trying to accommodate the frequently divergent interests of [the social

partners]”35. Civil society participation had become “synonymous with good governance”, in

Michel’s wording36 (Helene Michel is a political scientist at the University of Lille and

researcher at the Groupe de Sociologie Politique Européenne). It was supposed to improve the

democratic process of decision-making and to bring citizens closer to European institutions,

thus tackling the so called ‘democratic deficit’ that was deepening than never. Participatory

democracy via societal inclusion, that is representative for the level of integration ‘from below’,

as it is for the vigorous relationship between the Union’s structures and its citizens, was 32Stephenson, C., Ibid.

33 Edwards, M. op.cit.

34 Steffek, J., Kissling, Kl., Nanz, P., eds., Civil Society Participation in European and Global Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008

35 Schak, D., and Hudson, W., eds., Civil Society in Asia, Ashgate, 2003

36 Michel, H., Incantations and uses of civil society by the European Commission in Jobert, B., and Kohler-Koch, B., op.cit.

23

considered as a favorable addition to representative democracy and entered EU documents

such as the European Commission 2001 White Paper on European Governance. The Paper

initiated the reinforcement of ‘a culture of consultation and dialogue’ in European governance

and could be seen as a prelude to formalizing civil society inclusion in policy-making process.

Later, the document was supplemented by 2002 Communication “General Principles and

Minimum Standards”. Furthermore, article of the Constitutional Treaty draft of 2004

specified that “the Union’s institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular

dialogue with representative associations and civil society” (article 47-1). A new generation

of EU consultation regime was set up, characterized by the principle of ‘participatory

democracy’, officially recognized also with the Lisbon Treaty. 37

Such a development make it clear that civil society was figured as proper ‘remedy’ whose

conceptual ‘vagueness’ was not presupposing any established institutional definition but

rather allowed varying notions. So that, the European Commission accepted “all-embracing

definition that integrated trade unions, employers’ federations, business associations, NGOs,

CBOs (Community-Based Organizations) and religious communities”.38

The Commission normally applies the following characteristics in its classification for

NGOs – ‘voluntary’ character, non personal profit aimed; ‘distinguished from informal or ad

hoc groups by having some degree of formal or institutional existence’; ‘independent, in

particular of the public authorities’; ‘not self-serving in aims and related values’.39

Barbara Finke, scholar at German Hertie School of Governance, writes that the EU

civil society “is composed of voluntary groups, organizations and associations which

articulate the variety of societal voices in the EU multi-level system”. 40

From the CSO network perspective, particularly the one of Civil Society Contact

Group, a platform consisting of number CSOs operating within EU, the organizations of civil

society “represent their members and constituencies on a political level by lobbying political

actors on specific issues, by collecting information and channelling it between the national

and EU levels, and by building their network’s ability to participate in the European

process”.41

In “Civil Society Participation in European and Global Governance”, Jens Steffek and

Partizia Nanz, researchers at Centre for European Law and Politics, University of Bremen,

37 Michel, H., Ibid.

38 Michel, H., Ibid.

39 Commission Discusion Paper, “The Commission and Non-govermantal organizations: Building a stronger partnership”, http://ec.europa.eu/civil_society/ngo/docs/communication_en.pdf

40 Finke, B., Civil Society Participation in EU Governance, Living Reviews in European Governance, 2007

http://europeangovernance.livingreviews.org/Articles/lreg-2007-2/

41 Civil Society Contact Group, "Making your voice heard in the EU - A guide for NGOs", 2006

24

concentrate on the democratizing potential inherent to a civil dialogue for the European

governance. The scholars consider the participation of the CSOs in the EU to be prosperous.

On one hand, because by participating in political debate, which transcends the nation states’

borders, non-state actors may communicate wide range of new issues, interests and concerns.

On another hand, they contribute to the emergence of European public sphere in which

“policy choices are exposed to public scrutiny”. Civil society actors collect and disseminate

information about, and critical evaluation of, international governance that enable the social

partners to engage in informal political debate. Organized civil society, claim Steffek and

Nanz, has the potential to function as a ‘transmission belt’ between a European citizenry and

the institutions of EU governance. 42

EU instituions

Collect information from EU ↓ ↑ Take concerns to EU

Inform wider public about international politics

← CSOs → Inform wider public about political alternative

Pass on information to interested citizens ↓ ↑ Gather citizens concerns

Citizens

(Modified figure - CSOs as transmission belt between EU, the citizenry and the public sphere: a normative model)

Nevertheless, argue Alhadeff - president of the Platform of European Social NGOs -

and Wilson - editor and publicist - the discussion about whether NGOs are effective in

changing policy, i.e. in directing the political process, is another story. The civil society,

represented by its organizations, has “no direct part in the political process, but rather act[s]

as catalyst of public opinion”. Civil society is, therefore, looking to increase its ability to

transmit information and opinion between the citizens and the EU authorities.43

Beyond the definitions, the practical embodiment of the intensifying partnership

between the EU and NGO sector is most evident in the European Commission’s financial

support to the non-governmental segment on broad range of issues, from policy dialogue and

policy delivery, to project and program management, both within and outside the EU. In the

launched in 2000 discussion paper “The Commission and Non-governmental organizations:

Building a stronger partnership”, it is estimates that over €1.000 million a year is allocated to 42 Steffek, J., Kissling, Kl., Nanz, P., op.cit.

43 Alhadeff, G., and Wilson, S., European Civil Society Coming of Age, Global Policy Forum, 2002 http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/177/31558.html

25

NGO projects directly by the Commission, mainly in the field of external relations for

development cooperation, human rights, democracy programs, and, in particular,

humanitarian aid (on average €400 million). Other important allocations are in the social

(approximately €70 million), educational (€50 million) and environment sectors. Altogether,

hundreds of NGOs in Europe and world-wide are receiving funds from the Union.

Consequently, the Commission highlights “the continued importance of high levels of public

support for the role of NGOs”. 44

Founded on the theoretical ground provided by the Western political thought, the EU’s

conceptualization of civil society proves itself occasionally dim and disputable even within its

own frontiers. This particularity, consequently, affects the EU’s reflection of the problem

when the Union gets to transmit its model beyond borders.

Although the insights, that have been presented so far, demonstrate the complexity and

delicacy of the European usages and are associated in contemporary forms of civil society, to

insist on their universality would be ‘arguable’ and ‘inadequate’, as Wayne Hudson claims. In

an article included in the book “Civil society in Asia”, the Professor of philosophy and history

at Griffith University, Australia, finds that often the European literature and practice fail to

observe great variety of cultural models existing and, thus, “confuse Western configuration of

civil society with civil society per se”. Such a trend does not tend to lead to ‘responsible’

sociopolitical analysis or ‘mature’ attempts to promote political and social reform. 45

As much of the framework for discussion of civil society comes out from European

cases, it does not translate easily to political, economic and social conditions in Asia. Weller

emphasizes on two problems that are symptomatic. The potential of traditional groups,

especially those based on old communal ties or those less formally institutionalized, is

ignored. Also, the idea of societal hierarchy reflected in the groups’ organization, is not well

perceived. As a whole, approaching civil society matter that concerns Asia requires rethinking

the assumptions about the opposition between state and society.46

2.4. Civil society for China While exploring the notion of the civil society as it is perceived by the Chinese, one

gets the impression of a major discussion going on in the existing sources on the matter; a

44 The Commission and Non-governmental organizations: Building a stronger partnership, op.cit.

45 Schak, D., and Hudson, W., op.cit.

46 Weller, R., op.cit.

26

debate referring to a questionable agreement between Western ideas of public participation

and Chinese capacity/leaning toward accepting the former.

To illustrate the stated, we use Heberer’s article “Creating Civil-Society Structures

Top-Down”, where the author, who is Professor of Politics of East Asia at University

Duisburg, sees the Chinese perception of civil society notion differing conceptually from the

Western. In Chinese the terms used for civil society are shimin shehui, which refers explicitly

to the urban sphere, and gongmin shehui, meaning ‘society of public people’. In other words,

the Chinese concept focuses upon the responsibility of the citizens in terms of “public goods

and good behaviour”. Evidently, to keep up with this definition, the civil part should not

present a model that poses a challenge to the state. Indeed, the stable ‘interconnectedness’

between state and society is not proper prerequisite for the status quo to be dared. The

Economics Professor at Hong Kong University of Science & Technology Ding Xueliang,

quoted in the article, ascribes to this relationship the expression ‘institutional amphibiousness’

that illustrates the two-way infiltration, as the societal associations are closely connected with

party and state structures, but also party and state institutions can be influenced by these

associations. The Western concept of civil society has a hard time to accept this

interconnectedness. By insisting on civil society’s autonomy it misjudges the effects of state-

society interaction. 47

If aiming comprehension, it is worth proceeding by tracing the inception and

development of the Chinese civil society notion. For that, I benefit from Kin-man Chan’s,

Professor of sociology at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, contribution to the volume

“Civil Life, Globalization, and Political Change in Asia“. China’s economic reforms since

1970s, which have been focusing on restructuring the economy while maintaining political

stability, have noticeably changed its economic structure, and social and political arenas,

bringing to the country ‘post-totalitarian regime’ (Linz and Stepan 1996 in Chan).

Accordingly, the “social space for people to associate among each other in the pursuit of

common interests and values” expanded and thus provided possibilities for the public sector

to advance.

Since the 1990s ‘social organizations’ are allowed to play “[an] active and

autonomous role in linking the Chinese state with business, social and cultural sector” ,

aiming eventually to achieve ‘the three selves’ (sanzi) – self-governance, self-management and

self-support (zizhu, zili, zili). In 1998 Ninth National People’s Congress ‘intermediate social

47 Heberer, Th., Creating Civil-Society Structures Top-Down, in Changing Images of Civil Society, Routledge, 2008

27

organizations’, social structures to mediate between individuals and the state, were promoted

“to enhance the development of market socialism”.

However, the state encouraged the development of the ‘third sector’, as it could assist

in implementing a new form of social administration and to provide alternative way to solve

social problems and needs. Additionally, the ‘third sector’ also “creates ‘social capital’ in

terms of trust, norms and social networks” that the state and market are unable to provoke.

But, the Chinese government understands that public participation could become independent

force that obtains potential to threaten the regime, as the 1989 Tiananmen Square events

(political protests that escalated to thousands of deaths) showed, and therefore imposed strict

legal and administrative controls over these groups, to ensure cooperation from them and to

minimize eventual danger. Such restrictions result in number difficult-to-define variations of

societal organization.

NGOs might exist in China in the form of ‘registered intermediate organizations’,

which are legal established groups “mediating among members within certain sector of

society, as well as between sector and the state”. There are three types of registered groups,

according to Chan –

‘social organizations’ (shehui tuanti), registered under Regulation on the Registration

and Management of Social Organizations (1998) and defined as non-profit

organizations voluntarily established by Chinese citizens to pursue common goals;

‘non-profit organizations’ (minban feigiye danwei) registered under the Provisional

Regulation on the Registration and Management of Mass Non-enterprise Units (1998)

and defined as organizations providing not-for-profit social services. They include

organizations like schools, social service agencies, museums, etc.;

the third type includes foundations (jijin hui) registered under the Management Method

of Foundations (1988). It is defined as ‘mass not-for-profit organizations that exercise

management over funds’ with Chinese or foreign origin. They assist the development

of scientific research, education, social welfare, etc. (Zhang 1995).

Besides the registered groups, there are two types of NGOs that are not registered with the

civil authorities.

One variation is ‘patronized intermediate organizations’ (guakao) that are sheltered by

official government, private or social units. They either limit their scoop of activities within

the certain unit, or, if find themselves unable to meet registration requirements, seek to avoid

the strict procedure and regular inspections. Nevertheless, the subsidiaries can be under strict

scrutiny from their umbrella organization.

28

Another type is ‘unregistered intermediate organizations’ that are mostly

nongovernmental and illegal. Such organizations can be: ‘traditional groups’ and ‘advocacy

groups’ supported from communities and local authorities and thus not in need to obtain legal

status; ‘loose friendship or regional organizations’ that refuse to become formalized; and

‘underground organizations’ whose existence may be prohibited by the authorities. 48

The reason that the Chinese government tolerates such groups is because it uses them to

help meet the emerging social and economic needs. This, however, is not to say that the state

is not cautious that they might turn into challenging independent political forces.

Preventively, the state employs some guarantees. According to the Chinese party-state

regulations, specified by He Baogang, associate at East Asia Institute, each social

organization is required to obtain formal approval by registering with the appropriate

department of the Social Affairs Ministry. In order to do this, the organizations must connect

with government agency or department, working within similar field, which becomes

‘superior’ or ‘official sponsor’. By that, only a limited number of representatives are chosen

in each administrative sector. 49 This shows that the Chinese government is promoting a form

of social administration similar to what is defined by some as ‘corporatism’, “a system of

interest representation in which a limited number of constituent units are created and

recognized by the state as monopolizing representatives of their respective sectors”. 50

The exact number of CSOs existing in China is unspecified and some authors give considerably differing data. However, if we wish to talk numbers, we could look at the official national report of China to the UN Human

Rights Commissioner: “China encourage[s] NGOs to play a full role in promoting and

protecting human rights with over 400,000 NGOs currently registered. They [are] active in

such fields as poverty alleviation, health, education, environmental protection, and the

safeguarding of citizens’ rights, and have a growing influence on China’s political and social

life.”51

It is noticeable that there are no CSOs exclusively recognized as being concerned with

individual or collective civic-political rights, as well as that the official rhetoric does not

demarcate NGOs and CSOs.

Hence, the idea of semi-civil society should be introduced. As probable solution to the

ongoing debate that deliberates on whether a civil society has emerged in China and whether

48 Chan, K., The development of NGOs under a post-totalitarian regime. The case of China, in Civil Life, Globalization, and Political Change in Asia, Routledge, 2005

49 He, B., The Making of a Nascent Civil Society in China, in Civil Society in Asia, Ashgate, 2003

50 Chan, K., op.cit.

51 http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session4/CN/A_HRC_11_25_ CHN_E.pdf

29

the Western conceptualization of civil society is applicable to Chinese conditions, He

Baogang proposes the ‘more nuanced’ notion of ‘semi-civil society’ that is more suitable if to

understand the progress of associational life in China. In Chinese terms, social associations

are ‘banguan banmin’ - half-official, half-nonofficial. The autonomy of the organized civil

society is ‘merely a matter of degree’ (Gold 1990 and White 1994 in He) that in the Chinese

spectrum varies “from relatively independent, to semi-dependent, to overlapping with the

power of the state”. The characteristic ‘overlapping structure’, within which “state

corporatism coexists with elements of civil society” leads to a distinction of “enduring pattern

of relations between state and society”. This model connects civil society with the state in

such a way that the development of the former depends on the power of the latter. This

relationship involves interdependence, which, to some extend, empowers civil society. It may

obstruct a radical transition to democracy, as the ‘simplistic view’ points out, but “it may also

provide pressures and checks on the state if members of civil society play an acceptable role

within many levels of the polity”. 52

Chan brings to our attention one of the most difficult problems faced by the Chinese

NGOs, namely, lack of funding. Pressed by this very first need, some organizations are

consciously willing to exchange their autonomy in order to secure themselves resources and

thus acquire ‘semi-official’ character which will “open the access to direct subsidies or

political connections”. This can be read in the sense that the state sets the access to subsidies

as back-up control of its relationship with the civil sector.53

The constrained financial situation is reinforced by what Sharon Liang, contributor to

China Rights Forum, points as ‘financial requirements for registration’, according to which

national level organizations must have on their disposal a minimum of 100,000 yuan, while

local organizations must have at least 30,000 yuan in order to complete the procedure. This

occurs to be an obstacle that many organizations could not overcome. 54

Moreover, the social organizations find it difficult to raise funds from donations due to

lack of civic consciousness and lack of will from the state to provide tax deduction or other

institutional support that holds the people back from making donations. Some oppose to this

opinion the evolving trend expanding middle class and private sector to become significant

source for funding. This is supplemented by widening of participation in voluntary services.

52 He, B., op.cit.

53 Chan, K., op.cit.

54 Liang, Sh., Walking the Tightrope: Civil Society Organizations in China, China Rights Forum, #3, 2003,

http://www.hrichina.org/public/PDFs/CRF.3.2003/Sharon_Liang.pdf

30

This tendency would mean a qualitatively new direction in civic participation in China we could be witnessing in the future.

Meanwhile, another trend is getting clear, there are organizations that as being

‘resources driven’ seek for funds from their communities and overseas. Hence, some official

and semi-official associations are turning into nongovernmental to achieve this purpose.

When it comes to funding coming from developed countries to Chinese NGOs, is worth mentioning that twofold process has been going on, concerning the role many international NGOs have played in the Chinese development. As a major player in most crucial international issues, China has become the focus of many international NGOs (INGOs), so a process of localization of international NGOs and of internationalization of local organizations, has been observed. In sum, foreign NGOs have made substantial contributions in financing

the establishment and maintenance of many NGOs in China ranging from women’s issues,

environment, poverty, education, to public health and so. Except for the direct beneficial

effect, this funding has also been preventing some organizations from having to turn

themselves into semi-official organizations, or even has inspired the reverse process. Foreign

support as well improves the NGO management by sponsoring training programs for

expertise personnel and by pushing China’s NGO sector to meet international standards in

their procedural, accountability and transparency systems. 55 The relations between international organizations and local ones are marked by increasing expectations for gradually occurring change from ‘providers-receivers’-type relations to partnership. In the light of this, despite of the local groups’ continuing need for support from INGOs, they are no longer the objects of general capability building, as the analysis will subsequently prove especially in regard with the support coming from EU.

To wrap up I would use some recent findings about civil society belonging to contemporary Chinese scholars and studiously collected in the paper “30 Years of Civil Society”.

Considering China’s realities, Wang Ming, director of Qinghua University NGO Research Institute, comes to the conclusion that “the Chinese civil society has become an indispensable ally and partner of the

55 Chan, K., op.cit.

31

institutional reform, with considerable public space and influence in public governance and service”.56

To what extend this statement resolves the dilemmas ‘Has the long-awaited civil society come into being in China’ and ‘What characteristics does it bear’? From historical stand, the Chinese progress “in establishing public space and individual freedom” is undeniable. Furthermore, Kang Xiaoguang, Professor of Regional Economics and Politics at Renmin University of China,

notices that the societal sector has gained some obvious Western characteristics. For example, there are many new organizations launched at grassroots level; the organizations are more autonomous and structured; the resources come from both home and abroad; the scope of activities are wider; more focus is placed on participation, equality and voluntary activities.57 And still, this transformation has certain Chinese particularities. “The overall role of the … organizations in reflecting people’s position, in balancing interest groups power, especially in representing the interests of the less-privileged groups, and in empowering citizens, is limited.” (Jia Xijin in Fu) Many NGOs tend to directly meet social needs, and to join activities in the name of philanthropy, instead of initiating and guiding public policies.

According to the more moderate estimate of the EU, stated in China National

Indicative Programme 2005-2006, “civil society in China is still weak but is expanding”.

Most NGOs are considered performing “less of a policy advocacy role and more of a social

service and support role”, which is justified with ‘regulatory intricacies’ and ‘poor

understanding of the importance of a balanced relationship between the state and civil

society’. Nevertheless, the Union notices ‘political signs’ that a greater role for civil society is

increasingly being recognised. The Union considers ‘institutional weaknesses’, ‘the search for

replacements of disappeared familiar organisational structures’, and ‘an increasing awareness

of civil society’s role’ to have facilitated the inception of ‘an increasingly autonomous civil

society’ that “provides valuable support to disadvantaged groups and have actively

contributed to preventing social unrest”. 58

56 Fu, T., 30 Years of Civil Society, EU-China Civil Society Forum, 2009

57 Fu, T., Ibid.

58 National Indicative Programme 2005-2006 China, op.cit.

32

3. Analysis3.1. Methodological approach

What we have been doing so far was collecting ‘material’ so that we could enrich the

fabric of the text. On the next operational level we employ some theoretical sets in order to

lay down a conceptual background, on which the analysis will be carried out.

We use theories as a means to gain an a priori understanding of the phenomenon under

examination. Therefore, to select appropriate ones, we should appraise how much and how

efficient they can explain particular facts and processes. This guarantees that put to the test in

the empirical reality, the chosen theories will vindicate their assumptions. However, the extent

to which the theories justify the assumptions reflects their proximity to reality without

necessarily to prove them all right or all wrong. And even though they are not expected to

provide full explanation of the phenomenon, yet they are expected to satisfy those gropings of

ours while through the perplexity of the issue.

Our selection of theories is due to the factual richness of the matter and to the

theoretical complexity required for entering the analytical stage. The theoretical framework of

the thesis incorporates the systems of liberalism and of communitarianism, as introduces the

latter as a critic to the former. In fact, having been through multitude of resources, concerning

China’s societal pattern, we gained the impression that a discussion between these two

theoretical forms is notably interfering both the Western formulations for China’s societal

realm and the Chinese response to the imposing of Western theoretical sets. Additionally, as

far as China is concerned, no theoretical embracement that pretends to be explanatory for the

Chinese context could be entirely free of the dominant Confucian tradition. This interweave

seems to be needed since by unfavourable conditions one or another theory remain with partly

unrealized potential; and also in order to overcome setbacks one theory encounters while

trying to apply in diversified surroundings where the problem arises.

Hence, the theoretical set-up of this paper follows throughout the interweaving of their

key assumptions, conceded relevant to the matter of concern, in its attempt to further

supplement the research. In the light of this, we position the theories at the entrance of the

analytical section so that they could channel the haunting expectations in a discourse we

would want to form and follow eventually.

The subsequent analytical section will benefit from the empirical worth accumulated

while establishing the leading postulation of the project, namely - the execution in priority

33

area ‘Support to Civil Society’ has been inconsistent and has eventually led to shift of the

priority’s objectives. Moreover, the analysis takes into consideration the theoretical findings

made previously, which facilitate our understanding of the theme. Accordingly with the

expressed insights, the text proceeds to its next stage attempting to compile various objectives

that all can be seen as causes for the disruption. Those are exhaustively presented on the pages

below and they are meant to be looked at as compound parts of a common reasoning. More

precisely, we would ask the reader to imagine, let us say, multitude of ‘dots’, gravitating in

the space – these are our assumptions. As drawing lines between them, they can be connected,

so that they form various combinations, i.e. particular assumptions get combined and create

reasoning, explaining the studied process. However, the shape of the combinations is given by

the one holding the ‘pen’ and depends very much on his/hers approach, purpose and

viewpoint.

This exercise could figuratively show our intention to make numerous claims about the

reasons that have led to disturbance of the cooperation process. Unavoidably some of these

claims will reveal the EU as the one more responsible for the disruption; while some others

rather blame it on the Chinese side. Must be underlined, however, that this distinction does

not aim to compare whose guilt is greater. Because, as getting relatively clearer at the end, no

single factor precedes over others, but they all take part in the final outcome.

3.2. Theoretical frameworkTo draw some hints about how the theoretical frame will be introduced, we need to

declare that the following chapter is largely constructed on the ground of Daniel A. Bell’s

compilation entitled “Communitarianism” and published in Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy. The choice of this source is due to Bell’s prominence in theoretical research,

specifically in the field of the communitarian theory and its justification in withstand to the

liberal theory. Besides torn by these two systems, Bell’s study is very much influenced by the

theory of Confucianism, as in this case Confucianism overlaps with number of communitarian

statements.

In Richardson’s wording (James L. Richardson is Professor of International Relations

in the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at Australian National University) the

“liberal international relations theory relates to democracy and peace, commercial

liberalism/economic interdependence, and international institutions and regimes. The first of

these highlights the significance of the absence of war between democratic states, the second

34

the positive consequences of commerce and interdependence, and the third the increasing role

of international institutions.” These liberal values get discredited in unfavorable social,

cultural and/or economic conditions, which may turn formal democratic institutions

practically ‘meaningless’ and distort the setting for realisation of liberal values.

Challenged, the existing liberal theory is ‘unable to realise [its] potential’ within the

frame of the contemporary international relations. “This can be ascribed to the narrowness of

its focus [to the version currently promoted by Western governments,] and its insistence on a

total separation between the empirical and the normative.” This explains the necessity of

rethinking the meaning of liberalism in a ‘globalising’ world characterised by extreme

economic inequality, social tensions and vindication of cultural differences; and the need of

answering the questions ‘whether and how liberal values can at all be realised in such a

world’. 59

The dilemma of liberalism played a role of incentive for inception of the

communitarian theory. It is given to have begun in the 70’s as number of political

philosophers such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and Michael

Walzer offered an alternative to the liberal theory. Citing Bell, in the system of

communitarianism certain core claims could be distinguished: 1) methodological claims about

the importance of tradition and social context for moral and political reasoning, 2) ontological

or metaphysical claims about the social nature of the self and 3) normative claims about the

value of community.

1) The first argument is in defence of the cultural particularism vs. the universalism of

the liberal theory. Communitarians oppose the perception of universality of ‘the standards of

justice’ (Rawls) to the apprehension that these standards must be found in forms of life and

traditions of particular societies and hence they depend on particular contexts.

The theory of communitarianism argues the self-perception of the liberalism as the one

political alternative all rational people should ascribe to if they had opportunity. Although,

over the years, the Rawlsian liberalism admits (1993) that it ‘may not be exportable at all

times and places’ and acknowledges existence of ‘decent, well-ordered’ societies that are

justifiable in the international realm, this still remains to be regarded as a second best to be

tolerated and perhaps respected, but not idealized or emulated.

59 Richardson, J., Critical liberalism in international relations, Working Paper, Australian National University, 2002, http://rspas.anu.edu.au/ir/pubs/work_papers/02-7.pdf

35

However, 1980s communitarian critique of liberal universalism could not fully

promote the vision of non-liberal societies, since they did not provide any attractive ‘counter-

examples to modern-day liberal-democratic regimes’.

By the 1990s, the serious troubles facing the developing world gave a ‘sober’

assessment of the difficulties of implementing liberal practices outside the Western world.

And yet, the liberalism sees them as ‘an obstacle that may delay the end of history when

liberal democracy has finally triumphed over its rivals’, but will not challenge its ‘ideal’.

But the challenge did emerge – came from the East Asian region. In the 1990s, the

notion of ‘Asian values’ provoked the ultimate Western civil and political freedoms. The

‘system’ of ‘Asian values’ opposes the ‘chaotic and crumbling’ societies of the West to the

family and social harmony in the East, with the implication that the West should think twice

about intervening in Asia for the sake of promoting human rights and democracy. Asians are

certain that they have ‘little doubt that a society with communitarian values, where the

interests of society take precedence over that of the individual, suits them better than the

individualism’ (Lee Kuan Yew in Bell). China in particular looks all set to become an

economic and political counterweight to the hegemony of Western liberal democratic values

in international fora.

However, Bell insists that the theoretical debate on Asian values has not been really

confronting to the dominant Western political setting, but rather ‘a ploy’ used by authoritarian

Asian governments in attempt to justify their rule. Of course, it would be ignorant to neglect

various contributions from East Asia that challenged the liberal universalism from the

position of their own cultural traditions:

cultural factors can affect the ‘prioritizing’ of rights in different societies;

cultural factors can affect the ‘justification’ of rights, which should be justified from the

inside, from specific examples and argumentative strategies that East Asians themselves use

in the moral and political debate;

cultural factors can provide moral foundations for ‘distinctive’ political practices and

institutions.

Realizing this, the communitarianism foresees the need for ‘cross-cultural dialogue’

(Taylor 1999) between representatives of different societal traditions, who rather than argue

for the universal validity of their views, should imagine that their own beliefs may be

mistaken and this way learn from each others' ‘moral universes’.

36

2) Going back to the core claims of the communitarianism stated above, we now

continue with the next argument - the debate over the self.

The communitarian theory deems the liberal conception of the self as ‘overly

individualistic’ in its assumption that the individuals are mainly concerned with ‘shaping,

pursuing, and revising’ their personal life-plans and thus disregards the genuine need of the

individuals to define and constitute themselves ‘by various communal attachments (family

ties, cultural belonging, religious tradition, etc). Therefore, the communitarianism announces

that the politics should facilitate sustaining and promoting of ‘the social attachments crucial to

our sense of well-being’.

This, furthermore, clarifies the third major string of the communitarian thought –

3) The Politics of Community

A second wave of 1990s communitarians such as Amitai Etzioni and William Galston

turn to a more practical political dimension, which is meant to stop the erosion of communal

life in an increasingly fragmented society through enhancing social responsibility and

promoting community-oriented policies. Bell is definite that the modern welfare state ‘with its

universalizing logic of rights and entitlements’ has undermined family and social ties in civil

society by assigning excessive obligations to communities. Thus, the author concludes,

‘community is valuable’. So, the Western societies try to sustain and promote various forms

of communities through civil society participation.

Bell’s insights are esteemed to the present research as the author analyzes the

‘substantial overlap’ between the philosophies of communitarianism and Conficianism. As he

points out, they both appraise the importance of associations among the people as well as

‘stress the importance of education and non-coercive modes of moral education with legal

rights as last resort fall-back mechanisms’. However, although the communitarian theory was

conceived in the individualistic West, it can still supplement the rich and diverse local

philosophy as reminds it that its assumptions may be more appropriate in certain spheres than

in others. One reason can be that Confucianism’s contemporary relevance has been

questioned by ‘its apparent endorsement of immoral practices and patriarchal values’.

Nevertheless, some core Confucian values - commitment to the family, to the material well-

being of the people, to meritocracy in education, and this-world outlook - may be more

beneficial for modern societies than many other philosophies.

37

The communitarianism may contribute to solve Confucian limitation to ‘the family as

the only (or main) catalyst for moral learning’ as introducing the civil society as a space for

moral education, all the more that Confucians agree that it is possible and desirable ‘to extend

family values outside the family’.

Another aspect is that the Confucian emphasis on meritocratic rule by the most

talented and virtuous members of the community may discourage political activity on the

sufficient part of citizens. So, Confucians can look to communitarianism for insights about

values and practices that allow citizens’ contributions to the political process.60

Embraced in so established theoretical frame, the project proceeds to the stage of

essential analysis of the causality that brought the EU-China cooperation process in area

‘Civil Society’ to disruption.

3.3. Analysis Following the lead that has been initiated with introducing various perspectives on

civil society, we open the analysis, elaborating on the irreconcilably differing concepts

between the West and the East. Hudson reminds that the European political, economic and

social theories need to be applied ‘with great caution’ in Asia. European theories, being

constructed in the distinctively emerged Western civil societies, cannot be simply transferred

to Asia, where societal structures are in a process of being formed. However, the author does

not say that the European background is not relevant or in some sense ‘illuminating’. But, any

concept exported to another country should give an account of the particularities of the

country concerned. It cannot be assumed that the civil society is ‘democratic per se’ or

‘desirable per se’. It may be mistake to impose ossified Western notions of public and private,

state and society, sovereignty and autonomy into the analysis of contemporary Asian political

and economic life. Moreover, there is no genuine ground to take some traditional associations

(kinship, racial or religious organizations) out from the conception of civil society, especially

that ‘universal requirements’ to subordinate civil society with ‘modernity’ or modernization

or capitalism or ‘bourgeois society’ are proving unjustifiable. 61

In the Chinese context, specifies Herberer the civil society is viewed as the emergence

of public sphere beyond the party-state where the state plays an activating role for ‘latent civil

society’ top-down. Thus, a public space within which people may pursue their interests exists

only in a restricted way. A civil society requires structures and institutions and the Chinese 60 Bell, D., Communitarianism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, substantive revision 2009, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/communitarianism/

61 Schak, D., and Hudson, W., op.cit.

38

party-state is facilitating these prerequisites in order to solve major social and political

problems. This does not automatically lead to a vigorous civil society, but may enable

democratic structures and thus the transition to civil society in the future. This is to claim that

besides Western concepts, there are other existing ‘settings’ in which civil society could be

built. In support to this, let us remind Heberer’s claim that Chinese social and political

conditions differ from these of the Western countries. In China we find strong interweaving

between state and society and the party-state not only integrates the existing associations into

bargaining process but also strictly controls them. In reverse, the society via its associations

infiltrates the state and thus initiates ‘processes of change’ and socio-political advance. 62

In order to cooperate with Chinese CSOs, it is necessary to know their particular

characteristics, especially, as neither in China or in Europe the term ‘civil society’ has fixed

meaning. This reflects a major obstacle to promote Western concepts. The main difference to

Western applications of that term is perhaps the rejection by Chinese authorities of the

democracy potential civil society bears. They do not want to see the application of the term as

describing citizens’ autonomous movements which could challenge their authority. Therefore,

the four aspects of civil society as described by Merkel, Director of the research unit at Social

Science Research Center Berlin, and Lauth, Professor in political science at the University of

Würzburg, – the protection against state arbitrariness (Locke), the support to rule the country

by law and checks-and-balances (Montesquieu), to train citizens as well as political elites in

democratic thinking, solidarity and participation (Tocqueville) and to institutionalize a public

space for critical discussion (Habermas) - are not applied in the Chinese context.

The officially accepted Chinese understanding of civil society is not focused on a state-society

dichotomy; it rather sees civil society organizations as innovative social forces which help to

shoulder responsibilities in accordance with the state. According to Kang Xiaogang the

government uses them to meet the society’s needs and therefore as a functional substitute by

additionally replacing the Western connotation of civil society as citizens’ society. 63

The prominent political scientist and sinologist Pye argues, that Chinese rules of

civility have elaborate standards of personal civility, but they are weak in the areas of

impersonal interaction; Chinese have vivid standards for superior-inferior relations, but few

guidelines for the behaviour of equals; and they demonstrate over-sensitivity to any sign of

antagonism, which is a serious obstacle to any legitimisation of political competition.

62 Heberer, Th., op.cit.

63 Fu, op.cit.

39

Nonetheless, China’s NGO community, no matter how ineffective it is judged to be from the

standards of an “authentic” civil society of a liberal democratic style, does in general have

democratic implications in challenging those traditional rules of civility and non-liberal brand

of social capital. 64

According to Feng Zhongping, Professor and Director at China Institutes of

Contemporary International Relations’ Institute for European Studies, the difference between

EU and China mainly exists over political freedoms. These differences have not been caused

by different ideologies, but by different cultures and different stages of socio-economic

development. Human rights are still a luxury for developing countries. China’s culture on

human rights is not the same as Europe’s. China will look for its own style of democracy.

China will probably not have multiparty democracy, but it will pay more attention to its

people’s wishes.65 In this sense, the democratising impact of the Chinese CSO community

may not seem significant if one applies the dominant analytical model often used when

discussing civil society’s contribution to the process of democratisation. But, claims the

Professor in International Relations in East Asia Chen, the “semi-civil society” has its

democratising implications. Just the ultimate threshold is too high in the Chinese case, for

which a more realistic but still meaningful perspective should be adopted. 66

The spectrum of this perspective should be set accordingly with the degree to which

an autonomous civil society is a civilization demand for the Chinese development.

Due to the manner the Chinese social realm is built in, the necessity of ‘active’ civil

society is not realized as imperative. It is difficult to assess the importance of enhanced

participation and associational life for a civic culture in China due to the practice the state to

function as a ‘political architect’. It is the state, Heberer continues, that fights the lack of civil

consciousness and heightens the emergence of civic culture (forms of voluntary participation,

civic awareness, a sense of citizens’ duty and a public spirit of the people). He goes even

further claiming the party-state to play a role of a ‘teacher’ who teaches skills of participation

in social affairs and therefore sets the structural frame for civil society. 67

In this sense, the ‘semi-official groups’ seem to be alternatives to NGOs and should

not be overlooked, simply because they do not fit the Western conception of NGOs. In fact,

64 Pye, L., Civility, Social Capital, and Civil Society: three powerful concepts for explaining Asia, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 1999

65 Feng, Z., lecture at BICCS, http://www.vub.ac.be/biccs/site/index.php?id=158

66 Chen, J., Transnational NGO Community in China, China Perspectives, 2006, http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/document3083.html

67 Heberer, Th., op.cit.

40

one study argues that many of these semi-official groups are embedded in civic culture, while

many autonomous or illegal groups lack social consciousness.68

The lacking urge for ‘autonomous’ civil society is explained by Freeman and Geeraerts, researchers at Brussels Institute for Contemporary China Studies, with the different

focus of Chinese governance. “China has … stuck to this simple truth that economic and

social rights have precedence over civil and political rights. Other rights can be enjoyed once

the basic rights have been fulfilled, and China has still barely advanced beyond being in a

position to satisfy even all of the rights to subsistence, hence to focus discussion on the rights

to which Europeans give priority is premature at the very least.” It is obviously, therefore,

that the Chinese government has not put democracy and respect for human rights on top of its

list of priorities. 69

The prediction worth of mentioning is that in the long run, the future of NGOs in

China rests on how the Chinese people understand the importance of civil society in

preserving and promoting their values, rights and interests, to solve public issues that are

beyond the reach of the state and families and to help begin the transition to democracy.

As depicted in Annex 9, Chinese Civil Society Index Research was carried out by NGO Research Centre at Tsinghua University from 2003 to 2005 to assess the status of civil society in four dimensions, namely the structure, environment, values and impact. The results show characteristics of limited citizen participation, low levels of CSOs membership, and limited organisation of CSOs in networks, umbrella and apex bodies and the inadequacy of resources.Generally speaking, the circumstances for CSOs operations have not seen any substantial change, and thus the effect of their participation and the sustainability of their social influence, are yet unclear.70

However, as Fu Tao - Editor of the Chinese language edition of China Development

Brief, publication that aims at promoting the development of Chinese civil society - claims,

scholars hold different opinions on whether the Third Sector will influence China’s future,

whether the civil society can serve as an independent governing and binding power which

cooperates with the government and the market. 71

68 Hudson, W., op.cit.

69 Freeman, D., and Geeraerts, G., Europe, China and the Expectations for Human Rights, BICCS,

http://www.vub.ac.be/biccs/site/assets/files/apapers/Asia%20papers/20100130%20%20Human%20rights%20final.pdf

70 NGO Research Center, SPPM, Tsinghua University; Civil Society Index Report for China: Executive Summary; 2006; http://www.civicus.org/new/media/CSI_China_Executive_Summary.pdf

71 Fu, T., op.cit.

41

As previously established, in China the capability for develop such civil society

capacity, which could be adequate counterpart to European partners is absent.

Recalling Heberer, China is still in a process of both state- and institutions- building of a

rationalized socio-political system. There is a ‘strong lack’ of civilizational competence, i.e.

deficiency of a complex set of rules, norms and values, of a law system and civil liberties.

Among people, groups and organizations there is a lack of respect for the law, a mistrust vis-

à-vis authorities, deficiencies in terms of institutionalized rules, etc. In such atmosphere, the

state exercise an overpowering control and monitors and restricts the activities of its citizens.

We can, therefore hardly expect the existence of an ‘autonomous’ civil society, even less to

place it as a conditionality over cooperation. Nevertheless, although it is debatable whether

under authoritarian conditions civil society structures is likely to thrive, the real question

should be whether key patterns of a civil society can also evolve under different political

systems. 72

Tao Jin, civil society researcher, takes on another perspective. He stresses that “the development of civil society organizations is not only restrained by the government’s power space, a more important factor is the organizations’ structural ability to cooperate.” Due to insufficient bottom-up power, grassroots organizations cannot achieve an effective balance with the government. The government’s strong dominance and the internal lack of abilities of the NGOs are two sides of the same coin.73

Hence the observation, that the Chinese CSOs are structurally unable to adequately answer EU’s conditionality. Plus, the organizations with state participation are designed to implement party-state’s political discourse and at that follow the official line. Thus, fulfilling outer conditionality may confront their mission. On the other hand, the partner also realizes this side of the common cooperation and acts reluctant towards. Due to the socio-political structure in China, Chinese CSOs do not deal with the most significant social and politically sensitive issue

areas such as human rights and the free movement of labour. Thus, any autonomous citizen

groups are predominantly concentrated in what the authorities deem as less threatening areas

72 Heberer, Th., op.cit.

73 Fu, T., op.cit.

42

of social service provision, economic development, gender equality and domestic violence,

environment, migrant workers, children, disabled persons and animal protection. The restrictions on the nature and scope of domestic CSOs naturally translate into the

transnational relations between Chinese and European groups. Thus transnational projects of

Chinese CSOs cannot occur in any politically sensitive issue area and cannot work for

political change.

Julia Bentley, who manages an US Ford Foundation’s NGO capacity-building

program in China, does acknowledge that Chinese societal actors nowadays can acquire a

significant niche for themselves in the authoritarian state; and by addressing social problems

to achieve political implications. And yet, the principal challenges encountered by Chinese

CSOs in influencing policy relate to their unstable status and immature nature, to the Chinese

government’s variable willingness to consider the views of those outside government in

policy matters, and to the relative novelty of civil society actors attaining roles in representing

constituencies. Chinese CSOs thrive in a political and regulatory environment that in many

respects is not supportive for development of a vibrant civil society and is fenced within the

country’s political system, which can hardly be influenced by the limited impact the CSOs

create. Although, it seems accepted fact that development is not possible without including

participation of interest groups in the political reforms, the Chinese organizations are far from

welcomed advisors to the governmental bodies. In China, CSOs have not reached a stance of

being able to deliver independent, critical and reliable background information and policy

proposals of great significance.

And whereas relatively few Chinese CSOs define their objectives in political terms,

the crucial question for the European NGOs remains and sets their determination to work for

civil society capacity building - whether the results from the exchanges influence policy

making at the end of the day and whether adequate NGO participation is possible.74

The lacking commitment for the implementation of the priority activity from Chinese

side is a direct consequence of the Chinese CSOs concept and practice but also of some

additional reasons that are to get further clarified. In order to accomplish this, we use the

reasoning of Sausmikat and Fritsche in the paper “Civil Society in European-Chinese

Relations” in their attempt to identify the reasons for the sluggish exchanges between

European and Chinese societal organizations.

74 Bentley, J., Survival Strategies for Civil Society Organizations in China, International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 2004, http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol6iss2/art_1.htm

43

Chinese CSOs do not refer to Europe or European states as a reference point for

their aims. It is generally assumed that except for some academic and business associations,

there is not Chinese CSOs which exclusively deals with European issues. To back up this, the

first Chinese policy paper on the EU appeared in 2003, whereas the first EU one goes back to

1995. This unequal treatment is also mirrored in the perception of the EU by Chinese CSOs.

For Chinese CSOs, the EU is only perceived as one among many donors, and in this function

as one whose application procedures are among the most exhaustive and lengthy. 75

Additionally confusing, the blur European CSOs administration, haunting somewhere

around the complicated labyrinth of EU bureaucracy, entangles the Chinese counterpart and

further burdens the cooperation. As Daniela Irrera, researcher at the University of Catania,

writes, in the EU system, the concept of CSOs appears ‘extremely flexible’, as it presents

diversified in nature interests pursued with similar methods of pressure and dialogue with EU

institutions. There is a strong presence of organizations variously organized and willing to be

heard in traditional issues, relevant for the social dialogue within the European system, as

well as in issues, which represent ‘beyond borders’ interests.

The EU political arena is spread over several levels of government, involves various

capacities and a high quantity of actors, and follows very complex procedures. This perplexes

CSOs’ engagement in political participation, representation, and accession to the decision-

making processes of the Union and correlates with the civil society capability to influence the

external policy of the EU. However, the growing participation of NGOs in distribution of

foreign aid is part of the NGOs struggle for ‘effective international actorness in world

politics’.76

Having said this, a reasonable question should follow - Do Chinese CSOs really have

an interest in EU-China relations? And another point - they have received many diverse co-

operational and funding opportunities through the EU - but operating within a system that is

considerably closed up for CSOs activities, do they get to have make a use of these

opportunities?

Even leaving this aside, we have to take into account also Chinese civil society may

turn to be a already taken niche since various cooperations already exist between US

governmental and societal organizations and Chinese associations. They carry out research,

hold seminars, and disseminate publications on security, governance, legal reform, energy and

environment. Hemant Kumar Adlakha, Professor at Centre for Chinese & South East Asian

75 Sausmikat, N., and Fritsche, Kl., op.cit.

76 Irrera, D., EU and Civil Society: the Case of NGOs and Humanitarian Intervention; http://www.globalpolicy.org/

44

Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, claims there are many groups outside China pushing

for democracy within the country. Most are based in the US, often supported by private

American foundations, and many include prominent Chinese exiles (Kumar in Chen)77. So,

the EU’s influence needs to be isolated from that of the other international actors.

European politics and EU policy in particular as well as European civil society and its

organizations do not perceive Chinese CSOs and their positions in a sufficient manner.

Sausmikat and Fritsche’s findings help us to proceed revealing some problems of the

cooperation between Chinese and European CSOs.

The researchers generally state that the overall interest of European NGOs in China is

not really big, hence, EU conducts contradictory policy towards China. The growing

societal attention to China contrasts with the limited number of European NGOs whose work

concerns China. Organizations from different interest areas do not have an explicit focus on

China but rather apply an international perspective. As a result, aside from funding

organizations and the big multinational organized NGOs, only a few have regular connections

to organizations from the mainland. One reason Sausmikat and Fritsche find in the fact that

internationally working European organizations traditionally concentrate more on Latin

America and Africa. Not to forget that the most of the European NGOs are very EU-focused

or concentrated on national policies. Also, there are no cross-cultural associations dealing

with China, which could support a better understanding between the parties. Besides, some

internationally working European NGOs are very distant when it comes to deepening the

dialogue with Chinese organizations, the interest in inner-Chinese developments seems to be

insignificant. The reasons can vary - could be the work overload of the staff working in

European NGOs that makes them hesitant to deeper involvement, or, could be the little

amount of cooperation due to the fact that it is unknown how to develop contacts and

cooperation.

In the light of this, another barrier is the lack of knowledge about the peculiarities of

the Chinese CSOs. The EU organizations establish cooperation contacts with Chinese

branches of world-wide groups or limit themselves by following ‘the herd type of model

cooperations’ with one and the same organization in the same region. On the grassroots level

do exist some informal dialogue contacts, especially in the field of human rights and labor

exchange. But on the European NGO level, dialogues with Chinese networks are not

sufficient up to today.

77 Chen, J., op.cit.

45

There is small number of activities organized by NGOs with China-focus on the

European level, apart from the already established 24 official sectoral dialogues. Not to

underestimate another fact - the coordination and communication among European NGOs is

also ‘weak’, in scholars’ wording. The diverging views of the European societal groups on

China may be responsible for this. One reason may be the lack of active partner organizations

in China. Another could be the dim transparency of the negotiation process inside the

European institutions. Whatever it is, it is clear that among EU’s and China’s societal

organizations besides short-time sporadic collaborations based on project-basis, long-term

partnerships or networks practically do not exist. Also, inside each EU-member state NGOs

with China-focus do not exchange experiences or develop a common strategy. Sausmikat and

Fritsche explain this by the specific history of social movements in Europe that still influences

the ideologically different European NGO landscape.

Depending on the areas of interest which European CSOs belong to, they have their

specific relations to the state and political institutions. This could get them bound politically

or financially and could assign certain objectives to their work. This is to mark the NGOs

positioning between social advocacy and assigned governmental responsibilities.

A threat for European NGOs is the semi-incorporation into EU consultation processes.

By functioning as advisors for European policies for China, this could contradict with the

initial role of critically monitoring existing policies or mobilizing the public. Thus, also on the

European side, there is the danger that NGOs will be incorporated into national, inter- and

trans- national politics. This line of thinking could explain why the European NGOs may be

reluctant to cooperate with Chinese side.

The history and the organizational status justify different working strategies for

different types of European organizations. They have different goals, differing assessments of

China and thus, differing working methods. A common denominator is their reluctance to be

considered supportive to the party-state regime.

The NGO scene in Europe fails in a kind of ‘Chinese dilemma’: shall the NGOs engage in

“underground work” by cooperating with ‘illegal’ Chinese associations or shall they risk

being involved in collaboration with GONGOs? And, is that really a matter of preference,

since in some areas it is unavoidable to work with certain GONGOs? It is important aspect

that GONGOs can eventually help the cause of Western NGOs. For example, the Chinese

Association for NGO Cooperation (CANGO), which is the body that most of the foreign

NGOs have to cooperate with, is officially a NGO. At the same time, it performs as a control

organ channeling all the foreign money, contacts and project into a semi-state institution.

46

On the other hand, if the critic voice, inherent for NGOs, gets misinterpreted by the officials

as an attack on their authority, they could set hurdles for NGOs’ work or pose a danger for

Chinese partners.

But again, a non-confrontational cooperative approach which takes into account the

contradictory development in China, could lead to accusations in Europe that this type of

cooperation only strengthens the Chinese government, but restricts and thereby betrays the

self-determined goals of the organizations. Even just a possible risk, this already does not

match with the conception of “giving the weak a voice” and thus shift the objectives European

NGOs are thought to be working for.78

Making a use of the findings in the report "European NGO, China and the European

Union’s policy on China: Civil society perceptions, approaches and perspectives under the

microscope", we stipulate that the EU’s policy on China is contradictory in its fluctuations

between economic and political interests, between economic calculation, human rights

rhetoric and substantive human rights initiatives. There are many contradictions even in the

field of economics. European civil society organizations are challenged to find answers to this

multiple contradictory situation.79

Anyhow, one thing is evitable – ‘the civil-society capacity establishment’ is not a

subject EU could allow itself to worsen its relationship with China over and it will not

become the bone of contention between the parties. The Union does not seek

confrontations with China, but rather prefers conformism on issues that do not concern its

‘mercantilist’ interests. So, the European actors pledge on trade and development policies to

work as a “powerful tools for promoting reform … [and] contributing to better governance

through assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted trade measures”. (European

Security Strategy)80

Kin-man Chan makes us familiar with the difficulties, which accompany the

cooperation between European and Chinese counterparts. For the Chinese organizations,

cooperating with Western NGOs often can be problematic, since the foreign presence is

equalized with foreign influence. The Chinese government believes that Western NGOs are

contributing to an unfavorable image of China among its population, concerning subjects such 78 Sausmikat, N., and Fritsche, Kl., op.cit.

79 Workshop Report "European NGO, China and the European Union’s policy on China: Civil society perceptions, approaches and perspectives under the microscope":

http://www.eu china.net/web/cms/front_content.php?idart=432

80 Holslag, J., and Geeraerts, G., China and Europe: The Myth of a Postmodern World, Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies, 2007,

http://www.vub.ac.be/biccs/documents/Asian_paper_Holslag_Jonathan_and_Gustaaf_Geeraerts_2007_China_and_Europe.pdf

47

as human rights, or China’s ecological footprint. The utility of transnational exchanges can

also be argued for their role in diluting traditional nationalistic restraining sentiments by

offering pluralistic alternatives. Cooperation between societal organizations is considered ‘a

way of attacking China's domestic policies or even of undermining China's domestic

stability’. Being very insecure in dealing with Western NGOs, Chinese government also bears

suspicions of European NGOs influencing national or European policies in a negative line.

This is viewed as a tactic for criticizing China's domestic conduct or a strategy aimed at

forcing China to comply with EU’s foreign policy preferences.

Thus, Chinese CSOs are constantly being confronted with the fact that their Western partners

follow their political agenda of a system change, and are unable to accurately judge the local

circumstances; which places the Chinese organizations under enormous pressure.

Foreign subsidies to these CSOs are welcomed as long as they do not fundamentally

disrupt the strict legal and administrative measures the state imposes to control the sector.

This also depends on whether the Chinese government trusts these foreign foundations and on

China’s changing foreign policy discourse. The government has witnessed the global

mobilization of both Falun Gong and Tibet’s independent movement and keeps a close watch

on beneficiaries receiving foreign assistance. The downside of this support from global civil

society is that CSOs receiving foreign support risk suspicion from the state. 81

To this another pitfall for CSOs’ cooperation has to be added – conditionality, which

is posed by the EU on its counterpart. Fritsche illustrates the questionable effectiveness of

such conditionality with a recent call for proposals for "EU-China Civil Society Dialogue” by

EuropeAid, the institution in charge of EU development aid. The goal of this call is to support

the development "of a structured ongoing dialogue between European and Chinese civil

societies". The activities envisioned intend to encourage what is described as an "increasingly

vibrant civil society sector in China."

On close inspection is evitable that we can hardly speak of a European-Chinese

dialogue when it concerns only the situation in China and does not involve the European side

as a subject. Even contrary, the EU’s call for proposals idealizes European civil societies,

presents them as role models, and limits "dialogue" to the development of civil society in

China. In this vein, it states, "The Chinese civil society is facing challenges that were familiar

to its European counterparts in the past, and would greatly benefit from lessons learned from

81 Chan, K., op.cit.

48

the EU side while looking together with EU counterparts for a Chinese version of approaches

used." 82

It can be generally said that the Western partners are often not interested in small pilot

projects, but rather want to see fast and considerable results. On the other hand, such

expectation cannot be covered by the mostly smaller independent Chinese NGOs, or by many

of the Europeans.

Politically even more problematic is that such calls for proposals fail to take the

difficult situation of Chinese NGOs into consideration. They do not have only difficulties in

dealing with the modalities of financial reporting required by the EU – a constant source of

complaints – but also face the question of whether they can afford to take a public stance by

participating in such a proposal. 83

From what has been said so far, we would like to deliberate some more on the matter

of Europe’s ‘egocentrism’.

In the publication “China and Europe: The Myth of a Postmodern World”, Holslag

and Geeraerts, researchers at Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies, claim that

Europe believes it represents ‘the [superior social and political] model China should aspire

to’. An article in the Maastricht Treaty states: “The Union is founded on the principles of

liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of

law ... [and its] one boundary is democracy and human rights”. Europe assumes that China

must aim for the same goals if it wishes to develop in a sustainable fashion. The European

Commission continues: “China today is experiencing challenges which Europe started to

tackle a number of years ago… The EU is demonstrating its willingness to share this

experience with China. And China has the interest ‘importing’ parts of the ’EU model’ in

these areas”. This message is reinforced by Mr. José M. Barroso’s, President of the European

Commission, compulsory advice: “We are of the opinion that the further improvement of

human rights, good governance and the rule of law and the development of a strong civil

society are key elements for the sustained success of China's reform process” (Barroso in

Holslag and Geeraerts). 84

Anyhow, argue the authors, it is unrealistic to deem that Beijing will conform to

Europe’s discourse. Moreover, being categorized as a state, for which the national interest

exceeds the ‘internationalism’ trends, China is by no means tempted to meet European 82 Fritsche, Kl., EuropeAid: Civil Society Dialogue between Europe and China a False Promise, 2010-06-01, http://asienhaus.de/public/archiv/statement-call-eu-china.htm

83 Fritsche, Kl., Ibid.

84 Holslag, J., and Geeraerts, G., op.cit.

49

expectations. Robert Cooper, British and later EU diplomat, argues that Europe ‘must learn to

live with the idea of double standards’ (Cooper in Holslag and Geeraerts). 85

All the more that EU has no power positions to impose conditions on China.

Western Europe apprehend itself as an attractive partner with a proper sense of values, but it

is becoming increasingly difficult to market these values abroad. Especially as from a Chinese

point of view, as declared by Dr. Jian Junbo, International Studies Professor at Fudan

University, the EU does not weigh as heavily as China had expected it to do in the

international affairs nor satisfies China's major interests in many areas (such as the

establishment of a more equitable economic order, recovery from the global financial crisis,

climate change and the environment, and nuclear non-proliferation), so Beijing is reassessing

the importance of Europe for China's strategic interests.

Compared with East Asia and the US, the EU's contribution to China's economic

growth and scientific and technological advancement, has become increasingly less important.

As for security concerns, the EU's influence is not significant perhaps due to the geographical

distance between Europe and China and the relative lack of historical and cultural ties.86 Even

the economic dimension of the relationship is uncertain indicator, since, in Holslag and

Geeraerts wording, Europe’s economic influence decreases because other countries are

intentionally fine-tuning their policies in accordance with their expectations vis-à-vis China.

This way an important diplomatic tool is lost and the last sign of European power seems to be

‘the soft power’, or rather ‘the art of seduction’. 87

It is generally accepted that the EU’s ability to exert a direct and concerted influence

on China is now limited as well as the fact that any such effort may be counter-productive. In

the light of this, it appears clear that the criteria to judge about the influence of European

NGOs concerning the China policy are very much idealized. Many European NGOs would

wish to be as influential as they were thought to be by some Chinese officials.

However, Dr Jian organizes the objectives influencing the Sino-Europe relationship

into two categories - functional conflicts and structural conflicts.

In general, functional conflicts derive from substantial, temporary or urgent issues that

can be solved through bargaining or cooperation between the EU and China. These include

the trade imbalance, competition for economic and political influence in Africa, the EU's arms

85 Holslag, J., and Geeraerts, G., Ibid.

86 Jian, J., China sizes up EU's new face, 2009, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KL03Ad01.html

87 Holslag, J., and Geeraerts, G., op.cit.

50

embargo on China, recognition of China's market economy status, and issues such as

technical standards, etc.

Structural conflicts, on the other hand, relate to the field of culture and values, and

here there are long-standing divergences that affect the China-EU relations. These will likely

persist, and no dialogue is able to solve those avoiding complications. Meanwhile, the

functional conflicts will be irritated since the structural cannot be handled properly.

Both China and Europe have ancient civilizations, and each cherishes its own values

as embedded in their political systems and foreign policies. However, while the EU wishes to

expand its values to the rest of the world - including to China - Beijing resists any spread of

so-called "universal values" by coercion. Given some bitter historical chapters in its recent

past, China strongly believes in political and cultural independence. 88

Listed in an interconnection with the disturbances in priority area ‘Support to civil

society’, none of these objectives could be proved as distinguishably more responsible for the

unfavourable result than the others. They all gravitate around some hypothetical assumptions:

for failure of the concept of the priority due to irreconcilable differences in the

conceptualization of civil society by both parties; or for failure in the implementation by the

institutions entitled, by the groups involved, by the approaches used; or for failure caused by

lacking commitment of the actors, regarding how they value eventual benefits of the

cooperation, etc. Anyhow, on the sides of this paper, every hypothesis would be partial by

itself but more comprehend in a combination, because the factors do not exceed each other,

but rather interfere in each other.

4. Finale

4.1. Methodological approach

For a finale of this elaboration on the causality that justifies the disturbance in area of

cooperation ‘Civil society’ we intend to accomplish few steps which will lead to closure of

the research. At first, we evaluate the employed theories as operational tool that has helped us

approaching the topic. This goes in accordance with the overall appraisal of whether the

execution lived up to the expectations, as postulating project’s mission.

88 Jian, J., op.cit.

51

The final part of the project will further tend to unfold two complementary to one another

dimensions of the study that has been carried out. On the one hand, the section will aim to

evaluate the project’s scientific worth to add to the clarification of the EU-China cooperation

in a specific area. By presenting notions considered most relevant and adequate to the

problem, the paper fights for its informative value. Beside that, by enlightening about the

reasons for disturbance, the texts gains more functional worth – to envisage path forward. We,

furthermore, touch upon some ongoing developments in the cooperation in the area and finish

with an open end that leads to further discussions.

4.2. Warts and all …The chosen theories, moreover the method of complementary application, incorporate

passably within the analysis and prove to be fruitful in explaining actors’ behaviour. In the

dispute between liberalism and communitarianism China’s firm prioritizing of some values

over some others gets elucidated. China’s ‘Asian values’ could oppose ultimate Western civil

and political freedoms in international fora, which proves that even if a social composition

has another connotation in other conditions, it still might obtain moral foundation for

disparate political practices and institutions. This additionally explains why there are

difficulties implementing Western societal patterns outside the Western world. As much as

this strikes the deeply influenced by the liberal political tradition EU, it also grounds troubling

misunderstanding. This is what communitarianism offers a cure for – a cross-cultural dialogue

between the moral universes of the partners – is the recommended future prospect.

Besides, the communitarian theory clicks well with the non-individualist nature of the

Chinese citizens and the type of society they build and further elaborates on the ‘politics of

community’ where individual obligations are transferred on the community instead of on the

family – also a trend in the Conficianism of 21st century. In the light of this, Conficianism

could look at communitarianism for some more insights about values and practices that allow

citizens’ contribution to political process.

Altogether, even though the theoretical frame satisfies us, there are still dimensions it

could not cover. A more throughout examination of Confucian thought would have had strong

explanatory power for the Chinese context, which would have interpreted better the logic in

Chinese society and its inclination to associate. However, considering the scope limitation,

namely to focus on seeking the rational behind disrupted cooperation in a specific area, such a

profundity was not necessary.

52

While approaching the subject, its expected outcome was narrowed to the intention of

disclosing number of objectives that stood behind the disturbance of EU-China cooperation.

Additionally, it would have added worth as capturing some of more distinctive findings

made in the field by experts from both European and Chinese background and this way it

would have clarified, as far as we understood, an understudied branch of the overall

cooperation between partners.

We believe, the paper accomplishes its initial stipulations and moreover gives us

foundation to envisage some future prospects.

In the post-Lisbon treaty era, Jian Junbo does not see the EU's position likely to strengthen

when it comes to negotiations and cooperation with China. China and the EU will continually

face functional and structural conflicts. In this situation, to make concrete steps towards a

strategic partnership, both sides should build mutual trust at political as well as at societal

level. 89

What is clear for now is that Brussels is stimulating contacts between European and

Chinese business people by means of numerous conferences and several business schools. It

is estimated that 60,000 Chinese students were enrolled at European institutes of higher

education in 2005, who then go back to China with a clearer insight into European society. 90

Barroso goes with this line, claiming that: “[a] fundamental task is precisely to broaden and

deepen cultural understanding by fostering people-to-people exchanges … [T]he success of

our engagement depends on understanding - on holding an open dialogue, and learning about

each other and from each another.”91

Learning partnership requires networking and exchange between the parties

concerned. European NGOs should foster the intensification of debates and therefore

contribute to transmitting an image of China that takes into account the contradictory

development within the country. This requires not only to work on but with China. The

exchange of representatives of CSOs from China and Europe must be promoted. Still more, it

is important to include discussion regarding European responsibilities towards developments

in China with respect to social and ecological standards and human rights. All this has one

incentive – working for mutual understanding. This is characterized by Sausmikat and

Fritsche as endeavour to ‘walk on a tightrope’. It takes much effort to consciously realize the

89 Jian, J., op.cit.

90 Holslag, J., and Geeraerts, G., op.cit.

91 Barroso, J. M., Peoples of yesterday, peoples of tomorrow: 35 years of EU/China relations, Tsinghua University Beijing, 30.04.2010

53

possible problems and confront them, instead of just withdraw. But in return, collaboration

with Chinese CSOs can be of great benefit to both sides. 92

On Chinese side, according the Heberer, new rules of social behaviour will have to be

learnt and internalized. A public sphere, which exercises control on the state bodies, a process

of ‘civilizing’ the way of dealing with co-citizens, and a state which treats its citizens

respectfully are still lacking.

However, it is recognized by the researchers that improvements have been made,

mainly due to party-state inability to operate all societal tasks, thus it is encouraging

engagement in social activities as activating citizenship top-down and accepting the formation

of private associations. Propagating the notion of ‘citizens’, which bears the connotation of

legal and participation rights, is a trend that is very needed to be followed. 93

The increasing globalization will make necessary for both parties to enhance their

bilateral relations through coordinating responses to contemporary issues related to global

governance, particularly issues such as climate change, international terrorism, the global

financial crisis and reconstructing the world's economic order. At this, the civil society matter

should not be overlooked. Because, as Edwards writes, civil society is ‘collective action’

across society that provides counterweight to individualism; civil society is ‘creative action’,

which moderates the cynicism infecting the political sphere; and civil society is ‘values-based

action’ that balances between the overwhelming influence of state authority and the

temptations and incentives of the market. And even though the notion of civil society does not

provide ‘the tidiest of explanations or the most coherent of political theories’, it still remains

‘compelling’. Because it enables the best in us – the collective, creative and values-driven

core of the active citizens - to create societies that are ‘just, true and free’.94

92 Sausmikat, N., and Fritsche, Kl., op.cit.

93 Heberer, Th., op.cit.

94 Edwards, M., op.cit.

54

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