Indonesian Policies Toward the Chinese Minority Under the New Order

8/3/2019 Indonesian Policies Toward the Chinese Minority Under the New Order

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Indonesian Policies toward the Chinese Minority under the New OrderAuthor(s): Leo SuryadinataSource: Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 8 (Aug., 1976), pp. 770-787Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643578 .

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INDONESIANPOLICIES TOWARD THECHINESE MINORITYUNDERTHE NEWORDERLeo Suryadinata

THE CHINESE IN Indonesia,numbering bout 3.5 mil-lion, are a heterogeneous nd complex community.Culturally theycan be divided into Indonesian-speaking eranakans and Chinese-speakingtotoks; egally theycan be classified s Indonesian citizensand aliens cutting cross theabove-mentionedulturaldivisions; poli-ticallythey are split into pro-Jakarta, ro-Pekingand pro-Taipeigroups nd otherswho are not sure of theirorientation. he majority,however,remain politically passive. Economically the Chinese areheavily ngaged n trading ctivities nd are influentialn Indonesianeconomic ife, but they are still far fromcontrolling he Indonesianeconomy n thewaythat the Dutch did priorto 1957.Despite theheterogeneous atureof the local Chinesecommunityin Indonesia,most ndigenous ndonesianleaders,with the exceptionof thoseaffiliatedwith the communists nd minor left-wing arties,perceivetheChinese as a homogeneousgroup which controls he In-donesianeconomy, esists ssimilation nd is loyal to an outsidepower,especially hePeople's Republic of China (PRC). As to the economicpowerof the Chinese,PresidentSuhartohas been quoted as sayingthat theChinese, constitutingess than3% of the Indonesian popula-tion,dominate70% of the Indonesian economy.1There is evidencethat the indigenous ndonesian leaders' perceptionsratherthan theactual conditions f theChinese influence ndonesian policies towardthisminority roup. Understandably,ndonesian governments romSukarno o Suharto have introduced oliciesaimedat curbingChineseeconomic trengthnd assimilating hem nto the indigenouspopula-tion.Nonetheless, hesepolicies have often been modified o suit do-mestic oliticaland economicrealities t specific eriodsof time.Since

1 Shih-chie hua-ch'iao nien-chien English Title: 1969 Universal Chinese Over-seas Directory) Hong Kong, 1970), section on "Yin-tu-ni-hsi-ya" Indonesia), p. 15.770


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CHINESE MINORITY N INDONESIA 771Indonesian policies toward the Chinese minority uring the Sukarnoera have been treated lsewhere, his article will deal primarilywiththe Suhartogovernment olicieswith reference o the economy, duca-tion, cultureand nationality. t will also examine the consistency fthesepolicies with the proclaimed"assimilationist" rinciple.2Economic Policy

The economic ole of the local Chinese has been a major concernof Indonesian governments,nd thus Suharto's economic policies to-ward the Chinese deserve irst ttention. t is commonknowledgethateconomicdeterioration as a contributing actor o the fall of Sukarnoin 1965. With an inflation ate of 650%, Sukarnolost the support ofthepeople, especially he middle and upper middleclass Indonesians.It is not surprisinghat the new authorities, nownas the New Order,attempted o improve he economic situation-at least to reduce therate of inflation-and to enhance the livingstandards f the Indonesi-ans, particularly hosewho lived in urban areas which were centers fpotentialpolitical opposition.Nevertheless,mmediately fter he 1965 Coup, the overseas Chi-nesewere held responsiblefor Peking's alleged role and this resultedin violence against he local Chinese. At first heonslaughtwas on allChinese,but as it developed the attackwas concentrated n the alienChinese. Regional authorities ook independentactions against thisgroup. For instance, he military uthorities n early 1967 prohibitedalien Chinese from rading n East Java and partof Sumatra.3There was also an indicationthat ocal authoritieswere trying oreinforce hewell-known residentialDecree No. 10 (P-P 10) banningalien retail traders n rural areas. Concernedwith economic stabiliza-tion, the Minister f Trade held a conference f governorsnd askedthemto be cautious in enforcing he regulation.The Ministerin-structed hegovernorso reviewthesituation s to whether r not thereinforcementf the above-mentioned egulationwould cause insta-bility n the ndonesianeconomy.4n otherwords, hegovernorswereadvisedto enforce -P 10 at theirdiscretion. conomic realitieshaveprevailed inceand theregulation aw littleenforcement.The economicgrowth-orienteduharto governmentwas deter-mined to improve he Indonesian economicsituation whichwas alsoa means of legitimization.ndeed, the Suhartogovernmentwas verysuccessfuln reducingnflation rom 50% to 15% a year.Nonetheless,

2 The term"assimilation" here means a process of absorption of a minoritygroup into the hostsociety.3 Sinar Harapan, February17, 1967; Yin-tu-ni-hsi-yaih-pao (hereafter, ih-pao)March 16, 1968.4 Kompas, March 14, 1967.


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772 LEO SURYADINATAIndonesia ackedcapital to implement tsdevelopment rogram. hus,thegovernment ought foreign apital. At the beginning of 1967, aforeign apital investmentaw was promulgated hat stated "foreigncapital should be madeusefulto the maximum to accelerate hedevel-opmentof theIndonesianeconomy nd utilized n the fields nd sec-tors n which nvestment f Indonesian capital is not or not yet avail-able within short imeto come." The law defined oreign nvestmentas "direct apital investment." ocal Chinese capital in Indonesia wasnot considered foreign nvestment," ut the capital of the ChineseoutsideIndonesia was considered foreign apital. To obtain foreigncapital, the law offeredmany incentives nd privileges.For instance,foreignersrepared to investat least US$2.5 million were exemptedfrompayingtaxes for the first wo yearsand no restrictions ere im-posed on the transfer f profits nd dividends.5The Indonesian gov-ernment lso signed an investmentgreementwith the U.S. in June1967 to show its seriousness n utilizingforeign apital fordevelop-ment.Apart from "foreigncapital," the Suhartogovernmentwas alsoconcernedwith "domesticforeign apital," defined s "capital whichhas been accumulatedand expanded in the territoryf Indonesia,which s . . . basically national wealth in the hands of aliens."6Thegovernment as eager to utilize thedomesticforeign apital for ndo-nesia'seconomicrehabilitation nd development rograms.In July1968, the Indonesiangovernmentssued a law on Domes-ticCapital Investment hichdifferentiatedetweennational and alienenterprises. national enterprisewas defined as an undertaking nwhich ndonesian citizensowned 51% of the capital (or shares),andthepercentage f Indonesian ownership hould be not less than75%by January1, 1974. All enterpriseswhichdid not meet this require-mentwereclassified s "alien enterprises."For thesealien enterprises, he law stated they were allowed tooperate untilDecember 31, 1977,if theywere in the commercial ec-tor,butup to December31, 1997, ftheywere n theindustrial ector.In otherfields, heywould be restrictedor 10 to 30 years.After1977alien commercial irmshouldbe changedto industrial nterprisesrotherwise ease operations.The interestof the Suharto governmentn utilizing domesticChinesecapitalwas also shown n theestablishmentfthe"IndonesianBusinessCenter" IBC) on June6, 1968, n Jakarta.This organizationwas semi-officialecause it involvedhigh-ranking overnment fficialsandChineseprivategroups. ts statedgoalwas tohelp thenewcabinetcarry ut the first ive-Year lan (1969-1974) through hepromotion f

5 Law No. 1 of the Year 1967 Concerning Foreign Capital Investment SpecialIssue: 014/1967,Djakarta: Department of Information,1967), p. 6.6 Basic Policy for the Solution of the Chinese Problem (Special Issue: 023/1967,Djakarta: Department of Information,RI, 1967), p. 6.


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CHINESE MINORITY N INDONESIA 773cooperationbetween thepublic and privatesectors.Presidentof theCenter was Major-General uhardiman, he Director of the State En-terprise Berdikari,"who was sent to Taiwan representinghe Indo-nesian government o sign a trade agreement.Othermembersof thepresidium ncluded two totok Chinese who were Indonesian citizens:Suwandi Hamid (Ong Ah Lok, a banker) and Sulindro Ma Shih-ling,a businessman).7It was reported hat Suhardiman nstructed ng and Ma to formthe NationalDevelopmentCenter NDC) tomobilize domesticChinesecapital so that t could be used for ndonesia'sdevelopmentpurposes.The NDC was soon establishedwith Ong as its president;Ma, Ch'iuCh'eng-shao, hang Chan-enand fourotherChinese weremembers fthepresidium.8n fact, heNDC was a local Chinese businessorganiza-tion whichaimed at coordinating arious economic activities mongthe local Chinese, ncluding mport-export,ndustry,mining,forestry,fisherynd otherfields. he programwas very mbitiousbut the per-sons involvedwere limited to pro-Taiwanbusinessmen. ro-PRC and"neutral"businessmen id not join. It is also interesting o note thatmostpeople who were active n the IBC and NDC were knownonlyto a limitedcircle and hardlyrecognized s top leadersin eitherthetotok or peranakan Chinese communities.Not surprisingly,he or-ganizationwas ineffective.Despite the government'sntention to utilize "domesticforeigncapital,"differentialreatmenti.e., discrimination) oward the localChinese-in this case, the alien Chinese-continued to exist. Thiscaused manyChinese to collaboratewith license-holderswho wereindigenousndonesians.Even long before he"New Order,"collabora-tion between xperience-richhinese businessmen nd inexperiencedindigenous icense-holders ad been common.ManyChinese made un-officialrrangements ith ndigenous icense-holders.he former ro-vided thecapital,ran thebusiness nd splittheprofitwith the latter.This practice, nownas the "Ali Baba" system, as nowdevelopedinto what is known as the "Cukong System" or Cukongism).Cukongis a Chinese Hokkien) termmeaning "master," ut in Indonesia it isused todenote "skillfulChinesebusinessmanwho closelyco-operatesas a middlemanwith those in power,especiallythe military."9t isworthpointing ut that thispractice s well-knownn other SoutheastAsian countriese.g., Thailand) and is an obvious alliance of mutualinterests. owever,thispractice n Indonesia has seldom been docu-mented.In January197], an article in the Bangkok Post discussed theCukong practice n Indonesia. Accordingto that article,the Cukong

7Jilh-pao,July 4, 1968.8 Ibid.; Ch'in and Chang wverelso membersof the BKUT.9 0. G. Roeder, "Chinese 'Impudence'," Far Eastern Economic Reviewv,May 7,1973), p. 34.


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774 LEO SURYADINATAgroup, onsisting f about twenty ersons, has wide holdingsrangingfrom irlines nd banksto flourmills, mport-exportompanies, ouristcorporations, estaurants, hippingcompanies, tin exporting conces-sions, rice milling plants, timberconcessions and a varietyofothers."'0The article also said thatCukongs had a steady nd insidetrack o governmentontracts,nvestmentredits nd other funds, ndalleged that 90% of project aid moneyended up in the hands of theCukongs. he article inallydentifiedhe generalswho were connectedwiththe Cukongs.When the article was translated and published in Nusantara(January 0, 1971), a leading Jakartadaily closely inked to the in-digenousbusinessgroup, t resulted n numerousresponses n Jakartanewspapers. ome members of Parliament resolved to question thegovernmentn this matter.The government enied the charges.Theeditor f Nusantarawas prosecuted orhis campaign gainstCukongismand latersentenced o two years mprisonment,ending appeal. TheIndonesian government'sction againstthe anti-Cukong ampaignwasinterpreted y some foreign bservers s a measure to "reassure theoverseasChinese that they could safely continue investing n Indo-nesia.""1 At thesametime, hiscould also be interpretedo mean thatthepower lite was in such firm ontrol hat t could remove ny rivalswho attempted o jeopardize its interests. . G. Roeder, author ofSuharto's iography,sserted hatCukongism ontinued o prevail, ndidentified he names of 21 Cukongsand their corporations,withoutdetailing their connectionswith government fficials.12The collaboration betweenChinese businessmen nd indigenouspower-holders ad created resentmentmong some indigenous Indo-nesians, particularly mong the less successfulbusinessmen.Foreigninvestmentlso had been seen as being more beneficialto nonindi-genous businessmen ecause foreign nvestors referred o workwithChinese businessmenrather than their indigenous counterparts orobviousreasons-the Chineseweregenerally etter quipped in termsof business xperience, apital, and technical know-how.The most striking xample of this resentment ccurredduringJapanese Prime Minister Tanaka's visit (January 1974) when Indo-nesian leaders told Tanaka that his countrymenhould seek ethnicIndonesians rather than local Chinese as their partners.The anti-Japanese riotsin Jakarta duringTanaka's visit had an anti-Chineseovertone. he riotsresulted n thedestruction f numerousJapanese-made cars (manyof whichwere owned by the Chinese) and a hugeshoppingcenterwhereJapanese goods were sold but where most oftheshopswere ownedbyethnic Chinese.

10Frank Hawkins, "Indonesia's Own Military-IndustrialComplex," BangkokPost, January28, 1971.11Hugh Mabbett, et. al., The Chinese in Indonesia, the Philippines andMalaysia, MinorityRightsGroup, Report No. 10, London, 1972,p. 12.12 Roeder,"Chinese 'Impudence'," pp. 34-35.


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CHINESE MINORITY N INDONESIA 775The Sulharto overnment as sensitive o the resentments f theindigenous Indonesian businessmen.On several occasions, PresidentSuharto himselfurged nonindigenousbusinessmen i.e., Chinese) to

seek indigenouspartners o that the position of the latterwould im-prove. He stated that all nonindigenous ompanies were obliged tosell 50% of their hares o the government hich would then sell themto indigenous businessmen.'3 owever, this policy was not enforced.The division between indigenous (pribumi) and nonindigenousIndonesians was reemphasizedafter Tanaka's visit and the anti-Japanese riots.President uharto announced that the government n-tended to deny medium-term inancing rom tate banks to nonindi-genous Indonesians. On January22, 1974, PresidentSuharto made astatement oncerningpolicy directivesfor private investment.ThePresident eiterated hat all foreign nvestmentwiththeexception ofmining,banking, nd insuranceoperations) hould be in the formofjoint-ventures:The national holding in joint-ventures hall be increased as fast aspossibleto a majority ositionof not less than 51 per centof the totalholding. . . . It is essential that within the national holding, thereshould be equality of interest etween indigenous and non-indigenousIndonesians.Direct participation n new foreign oint-ventures y non-indigenousIndonesian citizenswill no longerbe permtted. articipation s possible,however, ymeans of a corporatepartnership etween indigenous n-donesians and Indonesians from other ethnic groups which can thenenter nto an agreement ora joint-venturewith the foreign rganiza-tion.14No time schedule was set to implement indigenization"of theabove-mentioned nterprises, nd one suspects that this is morerhetoric han substantive olicy. However, hould t eventually ecomelaw, implementation ould be difficultortworeasons-first, hegov-ernmentwould need a large amount of funds, nd second,it wouldcreatean impression hatthegovernment ractices racial discrimina-tion"against ndonesiancitizens fChinese descent.Given thepresenteconomicsituation n Indonesia where the developmentprogramhasbeen heavilydependent n foreign nvestment,15heexclusionofnon-indigenousndonesianswould in turn eopardizeIndonesia'seconomicstability.f the exclusion aw was applied only to ethnicChinese,itwould stillcreate nstabilityince the Chineseplay a keyrole in \WVest-

13 Merdeka, April 12, 1972; Ching-chiyiieh-pao (Singapore), April 10, 1972, pp.58-59.14 "Policy Directivesfor Private Investment Statementof the Presidentof theRepublic of Indonesia,January22nd 1974)," (Mimeograph), p. 2.15About 78% of the public financefor the First Five-Year Plan came fromforeign sources. Suhadi Mangkusuiwonclo,The Indonesian Development Effort:The First SuccessfulYear," Asia (New York),vol. 19 (1970), p. 31.


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776 LEO SURYADINATAern and Japaneseenterprises.Moreover,the law could result in ap-prehension mong foreignnvestors. n addition,the power elite whogain advantages fromthe present arrangementwould oppose anydrastic ct which might eopardize their position.Ralph Anspach maintained that the Suharto governmentwasclosely allied to indigenousprivatebusiness nterests" nd "tended toact less forcefullyo restrain enophobia than had the previous gov-ernments."16 owever,evidence contradicts is statement,mainly be-cause the presentgovernment as a greater dependencyon foreignsources nd thereforeeemsto have been morerestrainedn its anti-foreign conomic policy than previous governments. he Indonesiangovernment as by no means abandoned "indigenism," specially ntheeconomic ector, s a long-term oal. It is likely that a decree of"indigenism" ould be introduced nly f tdid notdisrupt ndonesianeconomic tability s perceivedbytheruling elite, however.Educational and CulturalPolicies

Suharto's ducationalpolicies toward the Chinese have a stronger"assimilationist" lavorthan his predecessor's.All Chinese-mediumschoolswere closed shortly fterthe 1965 Coup, and the Indonesian-mediumBaperki schools schoolsrun by the socio-political rganizationcalled the ConsultativeBody for Indonesian Citizens), ncludingtheBaperki-sponsored es Publica University Ureca), were also placedundergovernmentupervision nd were eventually aken overby theauthorities.AlienChinesechildrenwere deprivedofany educationfor almosttwoyears.Only early n 1968 did the Indonesian government ssue aregulation,known as the PresidentialDecree No. B12/Pres./I/1968,permittinghe establishment f schools sponsored by privategroupswithin heChinesecommunity.hese schools.called Sekolah.NasionalProjectChusus SNPC) or "Special ProjectNational Schools,"were in-troduced n 1969.17 hey were declaredopen to aliens as well as Indo-nesiancitizens, ut alien students houldnotconstitutemore than40%of the totalenrollment. he curriculumwas identical to that of regu-largovernmentchools.The mediumof nstruction as the ndonesian

16Ralph Anspach, "Indonesia," in F. H. Golay (ed.), UnderdevelopmentandEconomnic Nationalismn in Southeast Asia (Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 200.17 For the full text of the regulation,see Lie Tek Tjeng, Masalah V/NI danMasalah Huakiait (Djakarta, 1970), pp. 60-61. For a detailed studyof various "Spe-cial ProjectNational Schools,"see Mely G. Tan and Leo Suryadinata, The 'SpecialProject National Schools' in Djakarta" (Paper presented at the 28th Orientalists'Congress,Canberra,January 1971). The first wo schools were Ta-t'ung chung-hsiaohsileh-hsiao SNPC Bhinneka Tunggal Ika) and Ch'ung-te hsichl-hsiao SNPC DjajaSakti),both in Jakarta. Aside from the clearance of the Ministry f Education, theconsentof the governorwas required. There was a stipulation that in return forthe permit,the school board involved should build a school for the Djakarta Me-tropolitan rea.


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CHINESE MINORITY N INDONESIA 777language. Teachers and principalsof these schools had to be Indo-nesian citizens pprovedby the Ministry f Education. The "special-ness" of theseschools ay in the inclusionof the teachingof Chineseas a subject for specific umberof hoursa week,but failure n thissubjectwould not affect hepromotion f the students.The fact thatthese "national schools"were "special projects" indicated that theywere experimentalnd subject to modificationnd even elimination.The establishmentf SNPCs was one ofthe government'sttemptsto solvethe"Chinese problem."Even before he SNPC regulation, hegovernment ad issued a decree (PresidentialDecree No. 15/1967)establishing he Staf Chusus Urusan T7jina (SCUT, Special StaffforChineseAffairs) hosepurposewas to assistthecabinetin formulatingpolicies regarding he Chinese and supervising he implementation fthose policies.t8SCUT was headed by Brigadier-General oenarso.Colonel Sukisman, graduateof the Departmentof Sinologyat theUniversity f Indonesia,was appointed secretary. olonel Sukismanwas also the head of Badan Kontak Urusan Tjina (BKUT, ContactBodyfor Chinese Affairs)which servedas a communication ink be-tween hegovernmentnd Chinesecommunitiesespecially otokChi-nese).19Undoubtedly,t was SCUT togetherwith BKUT which rec-ommended he establishmentf SNPCs.The decisionto let the Chineseestablish NPCs was based on var-ious political considerations.After the closing of Chinese-mediumschools, omealien Chinese wereeagerto send theirchildrento Indo-nesian schools. However, places in these schools were limited andprioritywas given to Indonesian citizens. A large numberof alienchildrenpresumably id not go to school at all. Many parentshiredformer hinese choolteachers ogive private essonsto their hildren.It was argued that these former eachersmightbe used by foreignagenciesto propagatean undesirable deology among alien Chinesechildren.t was also difficulto control lien Chinese childrenoutsideschools.20 he government oped that the establishment f SNPCswouldaccommodate hinesechildren nd place themunderthedirectcontrolof the Indonesian authorities.Pressure rom ometotokChinese eaders also contributedoestab-lishment f thesespecial schools. The leadersof the totokswho wereaffiliated iththe Taiwan groupbelievedthat Chinese education was

18For the full text of the regulation ("Instruksi Presiden Republik IndonesiaNo. 15 Tahun 1967"),see Lie, Masalah WNI, pp. 56-59. The SCUT was dissolvedin 1969 and its functionswere transferredo other Ministries.Sinar Harapan, June23, 1969.19There were fiveChinese members n the BKUT, Ch'iu Ch'eng-shao (Hakka),Li Shih-t'ien (Hakka), Liang Hua-jung (Cantonese), Chang Chan-en (Cantonese)and Ch'en yui-hsin Hokkien). All were related to the Kuomintang and were in-volved in the SNPC Djaja Bakti. Colonel Sukismanhimselfwas a special adviser tothe school. The BKUT was also dissolved in 1969.20 Interviewwith a formermemberof the BKUT, 1970.


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778 LEO SURYADINATAstill desirable, although they themselveswere not sure how muchChinesethe children ould learn in the special national schools. SomeChinese eaders also saw an urgentdemand for Chinese schools. Onecan contendthatpermission o set up SNPCs was one of the conces-sionsgivenbythe authorities o the totoks. he Indonesian authoritieshave made several oncessions o the Chinese since early 1968 n orderto win their upport n stabilizing he Indonesian economicand politi-cal situation.There was no reaction n the peranakan Chinese community othe SNPCs. This was understandable ince the peranakans had longbeen interestedn Dutch schools during the colonial period and inIndonesian schools especiallymissionary chools) after ndependence.The peranakansdid not see any prospects or Chinese-medium choolgraduatesn Indonesia. However,the links with Chinese language andculturewere still well-established or the totok Chinese.Not surpris-ingly, heywished to maintain Chinese language and culture throughChinese education. The establishment f SNPCs coincided with thedemandof the totokChinese for "Chinese" education.Totok Chinese who were pro-PRC did not classify he SNPCs asChineseschools. Some even doubted that totokchildrenwould have adecent command of the Chinese language after studying n theseschools.But a groupofpro-Taiwan Chinese who were associatedwithIndonesian officers nd followed Indonesian politics closely realizedthat therewas no possibility hat the pre-Suharto ypeChineseschoolswould be reestablished. s a compromise, hey greedto setup SNPCswith the Chinese language as an extra subject. One of theirleaderseven commented o the author that he did not know whethertheSNPCs could survive. ut one can concludethat these schools were ingreatdemand, especially n the totok community, s shown by theircontinuing ncrease.The indigenous ndonesians exhibited ittle reactionto theestab-lishment f the SNPCs. Surprisingly, ews regardingthe SNPCs wasnot published in Indonesian newspapers.The only significant om-mentswerepublished n Yin-tu-ni-hlsi-yaih-pao Indonesian title: Har-ian Indonesia), the sole Chinese anguage newspaper,which s operatedand controlled yindigenous ndonesians,mainly army fficers.21hepaper published an article criticizing he authorities orallowing theSNPCs to be set up on the groundsthat the teachingof Chinese innational schools was against the national interests f Indonesia as itshifted heloyalty f Indonesian citizensof Chinese descent to a for-eign country. he Chineselanguagewas not necessary or ndonesiancitizens f Chinese origin.Two days ater,thenewspaperpublishedaneditorialwhich argued that establishment f SNPCs would lead to

21The leadership is in the hands of two indigenous Indonesians, M. JusufSirath, B.A., and SIK. HI. Wibowo, both of whom were associated with the army-sponsoredBerita Yudha.


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CHINESE MINORITY N INDONESIA 779exclusivist entimentmongone group of Indonesiancitizens nd thatthis was againsttheprinciples f Indonesiannational education.22In connectionwiththe criticism,heMinistry fEducationmadea public statementwhich stated that the SNPCs were not Chineseschoolsbutwereaimed at accommodating hinesechildrenwho couldnot go to school after he closingof Chinese-mediumchools in early1966. It stressed hatthe SNPCs werenational schoolswitha curricu-lum identical to that of the Indonesian government chools. Themedium of instruction s Indonesian and the schools are under thedirectcontrolof the Ministry f Education.23A fewweeks later,news concerning he SNPCs appeared again.The PAB NewsAgencytheArmedForcesNewsAgency) eported hattheaimsof theSNPCs were to provideChinesechildrenwith nationaleducationand to exercise ontrolover the educationof Chinese chil-dren.24 t was Colonel Sukisman'sopinion that the schoolswere di-rected t mixing ndonesiancitizens f Chinesedescent nd alien Chi-nese in orderto creategood Indonesians.Sukisman sserted hat f theMinistry f Educationdid not takeover the educationof alien Chi-nese,a foreignmbassywould do the ob and thiswouldnot be in thenational interest.Nevertheless, ome indigenous Indonesians weredoubtfulof the abilityof the SNPCs to achieve the goals set by theMinistry fEducation.They were suspiciousof the Chinese languageand did not agreewith teaching t even as a subject to Indonesiancitizensbecauseit was "unnecessarynd had a tendency owardscre-ating exclusivism."25There are no longer ny Chinese-mediumchools;even alien Chi-nese cango onlyto theSNPCs for ducation.According o regulations,the number fChinesewho are Indonesiancitizens houldoutnumberalien Chinese,but in realitymostof the students n theseschoolsarealiens.In early1971,therewereonlyeightSNPCs. More recently, ow-ever, heirnumbers ontinued ogrow incetheseweretheonlyschoolsto whichalien Chinese could be easilyadmitted.26n late 1973,therewere 35 SNPCs in Sumatra alone. The growth f the SNPCs alarmedthe local authoritieswho assertedthat SNPCs in Sumatrahad usedChineseas themedium of instructionnd henceviolatedgovernmentregulations. n March 1974 all SNPCs in Sumatrawereclosed,takenoverby local authorities,nd thenconvertednto regular ndonesianschools.27Nevertheless,NPCs in other areas seem to have managedto survive.One of theobjectivesof Suharto's educationalpolicy towardthe

22 Jih-pao,February 13 and 15, 1969.23 ibid., February 18, 1969.24 Ibid., March 8, 1969.25 Ibid., March 13, 1969.26 No informations available on the precisenumbersof theseschools.27Jih-pao,October 11,December 19, 1973; March 7, 1974.


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780 LEO SURYADINATAChinesewas the reduction n the use of the Chinese language in Indo-nesia.In fact, s early as 1958,the efforto curtail the use of the lan-guagehad begun,when Nasution, s Commander-in-Chieff the Army,issuedan orderdeclaringthatall newspaperspublished n otherthanLatin and Arabic letterswould be allowed to operate only if theypublished n the ndonesian anguage.28 he order,however,was latermodified. fewChinesenewspaperswerepermittedo be publishedonthegrounds hattherewas stilla need for uch newspapersn order toinform he Chineseabout government olicies, regulations nd othermatters.29ut thesenewspapersweresoon banned again. Only in 1963when Sino-Indonesianrelations were cordial did Chinese languagenewspapers ppear again, but this timetheywereall owned by Indo-nesiannationalswhowere affiliated ithexistingpoliticalor mass or-ganizations.30These newspaperswere also short-lived.All Chinese languagenewspaperswereclosedafter he 1965 Coup, and since April 1966onlythe government-sponsoredin-tu-ni-hsi-yaih pao has been publishedin Jakarta,with a Medan editionestablished oon afterward.n April1974the Medan editionwas closed but the Jakarta dition was allowedto continuewith,however, n increase n the columnusingthe Indo-nesian language.The ultimategoal, accordingto a governmenttate-ment, s to print ll pages in Indonesian n thenear future.31Use of the Chinese language in public was discouraged.For in-stance, hePontianak local authorities eld an "Indonesian LanguageWeek"and urgedthe ndonesian citizens fChineseoriginto abandontheiruse of Chinese.32Not only was the Chinese language considered"harmful," ut even Chinese religionand customswere regardedasundesirable. n December 1967,a Presidential nstruction tatedthat"Chinesereligion, eliefs nd customs in Indonesia) originatedn theirancestral and and theirvariousmanifestations ay generateunnaturalinfluenceon the psychology,mentality nd moralityof Indonesiancitizens nd thereforempede natural propensity."33t was thereforeordered that Chinese religionbe observedonly in the familycircle.Religiousand customaryelebrations,f held in public, should not beconspicuous, nd shouldbe regulated ytheMinistry fReligion uponthe recommendationf theAttorneyGeneral.This policywas retainedup to at least1968,but in 1969 thegov-

28 "Penguasa Perang Pusat No. 010/19'8," Sin Po, April 18, 1958.29SinzPo, May 24, 1958.30 Oey Hong Lee, indonesian Governmnentnd Press During Guided Demnocracy(Hull Monographson Southeast Asia, 1971), pp. 128-129. In September1965 it wasreported hat therewere 104newspapers n Indtonesia, f which 13 (all were affiliatedwith either political or mass organizations) were Chinese language newspapers.Chung-ch'eng ao, September 10 and 11, 1965.21Sinar Harapan, January26 and March 27, 1974.32Jih-pao,February 17, 1970.33"InstruksiPresiden Republik Indonesia No. 14 Tahun 1967"; Lie, MasalahWNI, p. 54


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CHINESE MINORITY N INDONESIA 781ernmentofficiallyecognized wo minority eligions-Buddhism andConfucianism. aw No. 5 of 1969 UU No.5/1969) stipulated hatthesetwo religions nd four others Islam, Protestantism,atholicism andHindu-Bali) were officially ecognizedby the government. ince theIndonesian state deology, he Pancasila, included "Belief in God" asthe first rinciple, veryperson n Indonesia was expected to have areligion of some kind. The law was first nnounced in 1965 whenSukarnowas still in power, and was reissued n 1969. Prior to this,various religiousmovementswere already under way, partly as a re-sult of the anti-Communist ovementfollowing he downfall of thePKI and Sukarno.The new Sukarto government robably perceivedreligion as a forcewhich could be used to preventthe reemergenceof thePKI and other eft-wingmovements. veryonewas expected tostatetheirreligiousbelief on their dentity ards and it was assumedthatonly Communists id not have a religion.Confucianism nd Buddhism are observed by some membersofthe Chinese minority especially peranakans).34The recognition of"minority eligions" does not fit n with Suharto's "assimilationist"policy toward the Indonesian Chinese, and thus the adoptionof thispolicy seems to indicate that short-term olitical considerations re-vailed over the long-term oal of "nation-building."However, localconditions, specially the political climate n Indonesia, are not fav-orable to Chinese religions, articularly onfucianism.Many Chinese,especiallyyoungperanakans, re reluctant o associate themselves iththisreligious nstitutionwhich s a prime target f Indonesian nation-alist attack.In order to further urtailChinese cultural nfluence, heJakartaMovie Censor Board ruled that Chinese characterswerenot to be al-lowed in Mandarin movie advertisements,35nd thegovernmentvenconsideredrestrictinghe importation f Hong Kong and Taiwan-made movies. Nevertheless, nce again economic considerationspre-vailed overthe "assimilationist" rinciple.Largenumbers f Mandarinmovieswere importedand consequentlydominated the Indonesianmoviemarket. ome Indonesian leaders were irritatedwith this andattempted o reduce their mport. n Medan, for nstance,Mandarinmovieswerebannedfor timebutwereagain allowedto be shownbe-cause ofthe oss of revenue sufferedy the local government.0The clearestmanifestation f the assimilationist rinciple n thecultural field was the name-changing egulation ssued in December1966.Previously, law (UU No.4/1964)had givenall Indonesian citi-

34 According to the 1971 census there were 1,092,314 Biuddhists primarilyChinese) anid972,133Confuciansin Indonesia. See Biro Statistik, tatistik ndonesia197411975 (Jakarta, 1976]), p. 32. The Ministryof Religion recorded that therewere 242,867 Buddhists in Indonesia, buithad no figureon Confucian followers.Statistik ndonesia 1970/1971 Jakarta,1972),p. 42.35 Jih-pao,January12, 1972.36Jih-pao,April 22, 1974.


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782 LEO SURYADINATAzensofforeign escent he opportunity o change theirnames to Indo-nesian (or Indonesian sounding) names. The applicant was requiredto obtain letters f recommendation romgovernors r local regentsand local police chiefs.37 onetheless, he law was not widely pub-licizedand thegovernment id not actively romote t.In December 1966, however, he Suharto government implifiedtheprocedure n orderto encouragename-changingmong ndonesiancitizens f foreign escent i.e., Chinese). The governmentwas activein promoting ame-changingnd the regulationwas widelypublicized.It statedthat the Indonesian government ntended to accelerate theassimilation f Indonesian citizensof foreign escent nto the "Indo-nesiannation"; changingnon-Indonesiannames to Indonesian nameswasperceived s one wayto speed up theassimilation rocess.38Accordingto the regulation, ndonesian citizensof Chinese de-scentwho intendedto changetheirnames could simply ubmit theirapplications o local authoritiesusually governors, egents r mayors)to be registered. low fee would be chargedforregistration. heseapplicationswould be passed on to the Departmentof Justice. f noobjectionswereraised by the local community n three months,thenew name would become legal. This regulation was effective romJanuary1967 to March 1968,but it was later extendedfor an addi-tionalyearbecause Indonesian citizens fChineseoriginwho changedtheirnameswere fewer hanexpected. n August 1969,theDepartmentof Justice nnounced that only 232,882 persons had changed theirnames.39 easons forname-changing erecomplex.Somebelieved thatit would make lifein Indonesia easier (e.g., to obtain licenses,to ob-tain places in the schools or colleges,to be accepted by indigenousIndonesians).Some liked to identifywith the "Indonesian nation,"and believed thatthesolutionof the "Chinese problem"was throughcomplete ssimilation. ut otherChinese did not thinkthatthe Indo-nesiannationshouldbe definedn terms f an indigenous ndonesiannation.Theywereproudof theirethnicoriginand wantedto remainethnicChinese.Nationalityolicy

Finally et us turnto Suharto'snationality olicytowardthelocalChinese. t was under Suharto that the Indonesian government rozethe continuedmplementationf theSino-Indonesian ual NationalityTreaty (whichbecame effectiven 1960) as well as suspended diplo-matic relationswith the PRC following he 1965 Coup. In 1969,thenewIndonesian Parliamentdecided to renounce the Dual NationalityTreaty.

37"Status Hukum Keturunan Tjina," Ekspres (July26, 1970), p. 11.38Lie, Masalah WNI, p. 45. For a full text of the regulation,see "KeputusanPresidiumKabinet No. 127/U/Kep/12/1966,"n Lie, MasalahHWNI, pp. 45-47.39KAompas, ugust28, 1969.


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CHINESE MINORITY N INDONESIA 783The treaty, ne peranakan awyer rgued,had served ts purposebecause the majority f the dual nationals had opted for Indonesiancitizenshipby the end of 1961.40Nonetheless, he contendedthat the

treaty ontinued o require children f Indonesiancitizensof Chineseextraction orn prior to January 0, 1962, to choose eitherChinese orIndonesian citizenship.n her view, thiswould create "hazy nationalstatus" mong hildren f Chineseextraction ecausethosewho wantedto choose Indonesian citizenshipwere still requiredby law to make astatement bandoningChinese citizenship.A similarrequirement lsoapplied to those who wanted to become Chinese citizens. However,the statement bandoning Chinese citizenshiphad no meaning afterthe suspension f Indonesian-Chinese elations October1967), and anapplicationto become a Chinese citizenwas impossiblebecause therewas no agencyto handle thismatter.She concluded that continuedenforcementf thetreatywas no longer n Indonesia's nationalinter-ests.A moreimportant actor n the Indonesiangovernment's enun-ciationofthetreaty as political.The treaty ermitted hildrenwhoseparentshad chosen Chinese citizenshipduring the option period tobecome ndonesian citizenswithoutbeing screenedby Indonesian au-thorities. he Suhartogovernment antedto discontinue hispracticebecause t suspected he political orientation f theseChinese.41Since 1969, therefore,lien Chinese children ould become Indo-nesian citizens nly through aturalization nder the 1958 CitizenshipAct. This means that the Suhartogovernmentwill be able to screenalien Chinese who want to become Indonesian citizens.As for theChinese whohad alreadyobtained Indonesian citizenship hrough heDual NationalityTreaty,their status remainedunchanged, nd theirchildren are considered ndonesian citizens.42 he 1958 CitizenshipActrequiredan alien who applied for ndonesian citizenship hroughnaturalization o submit a statement ssuedby his country f origindivesting imself f thatnationality.Given the break in relationsbe-tweenthe PRC and Indonesia,it was unlikelythatan alien Chinesecould obtain such an official tatement romChina. The Indonesianauthoritieshave taken a liberal interpretationf the provisionsbywaivingthisrequirement; nstead, declarationofwillingness o giveup Chinesecitizenships considered ufficient.43

The terminationf thetreaty eprived numberofChinesechil-dren undertheage of eighteenof theopportunityf becoming ndo-nesiancitizens asily.On the otherhand, applications ornaturalization40 Nj. Titi Sumbung SH, "Perdjandjian RI-RRT Mengenai Masalah Dwi-Warganegara,"Sinar Harapan, February26 and 28, 1969.41 For thisargument, ee Tambahan Lembaran Negara RI, 1969,No. 2891. TheIndonesian government lso argued that the treatygave "special treatment"favor-ing a particular group of the Indonesian population which was not enjoyed byothergroups.This treatment eviated fromthe principleof equality beforethe law.42 Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia, No. 17 (1969), p. 2.43 "14 Surat Untuk 1 Putus Asa," Tempo, August 17, 1974, p. 2.


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784 LEO SURYADINATAwhichwere seldom processedprior to 1969 are now being accepted.The possibility f naturalizations greaterthan before,but the pro-cedure s complicated nd costly.A recentreport n Tempo revealedthatone neededat least fourteen ocuments o filean application andpay a cost rangingfrom 30,000 to 100,000 rupiahs (approximatelyUS$75-250),44whileothershave claimedthat the costranged fromhalfto one millionrupiahs.45 ven with such high fees,there were stillmany applicationsto be processed.Dr. Lie Tek Tjeng, a peranakanhistorian, ontended that 75-90% of "stateless"Chinese would havebecome Indonesian citizenshad the procedure been simplified ndthefeesreduced.46 ut the Suhartogovernment eemedto have tight-ened the control ver these pplications. n June 1973,the governmentestablishedheCitizenship nvestigation ody to screen he backgroundofeachapplicant. ach applicationhad to be approvedby the AttorneyGeneral'sOfficen Jakarta nd the ocal attorney'sffices erely ervedas a coordinatingbody.47The government's ationalizationfor thispolicy changewas based on alleged attempts y subversives o becomeIndonesian citizens. AKIN (theState ntelligenceCoordinatingBody)was involved n screening ll applicants;without ts clearance the ap-plicationcould not be processed.48

Togetherwithtightening p the "naturalization rocess," hegov-ernment nnouncedthat therewere 1,000 llegal Chinese immigrantswho had enteredJakartafromHong Kong.49Most of these wereformertudentswho went to thePRC duringthe 1960sand laterre-turnedto Hong Kong due to difficultiesn adjusting to life on themainland.The Indonesian authorities elieved that thereweremanysubversive lementsamong the illegal immigrantsn Indonesia. Inmid-1975,hegovernmentnnouncedthat about 1,000 llegal Chineseimmigrants ere underdetention,50nd thatmore were still at large.In connectionwith illegal Chinese immigrants,ocal authorities nJakarta nd WestJava required ndonesiancitizensof foreign escentto re-registerhemselves eforetheycould obtain new identity ards.About thesametime, t wasreported hat n Pontianak WVestaliman-tan),468 Chinese who had acquired Indonesian citizenshipwere later

44 The amount of money was increased from5,000-10,000rupiah to 30,000-100,000rupiabs in accordancewith the decision of the Ministerof Justice n 1968.See Tempo, August 17, 1974,p. 48.45 Mabbett,Chinese in Indonesia, p. 7.46 Lie, Masalah MINI, p. 21. Many alien Chinese want to become Indonesiancitizensforpracticalreasons-Indoncsian citizensenjoy more privilegesthan aliens.For example, alien Chinese are required to register periodically,to pay a specialalien tax, to obtain a permitto work from the Ministry f Labor and, at one time,werenot allowed to reside in West Java,East Java and part of Sumatra.47 SinarHarapan, June 21, 1973; Tempo, August 17, 1974, p. 48.48 "14 Surat 1 Putus Asa." Tempo, August 17, 1974,p. 48; Jih-pao, September16 and 30, 1974.49 Sinar Harapan, August 27, 1974.50 "Liku-liku ImmigranGelap," Tempo (July 5, 1975),pp. 5-6.


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CHINESE MINORITY N INDONESIA 785disqualified n the groundsthat theydid not fulfill he legal require-ments.5'The questionarisesas to thenumberof local Chinesewho holdIndonesiancitizenship. he Department f Immigration eported hatpriorto the 1965 coup, 1,134,240 lien Chinese were registered s PRCcitizens nd only 1,252as "stateless."52his meantthatapproximately1,466,000 ocal Chinese wereIndonesian citizens.Compared with 800,-000 in 1962,the numberof Indonesian citizensof Chinese extractionhad increasedby about 666,000withintwoto threeyears. n the lightof the slow rate of naturalizationbefore 1969 and a limited numberof dual nationality hildrenwho became Indonesian citizens, rapidincreasewas veryunlikely.The authorsuspects hatmany alien Chi-nese,forreasonsunclearto him,did notregister.Dr. Lie Tek Tjeng estimated n 1967thattherewerethreemillionethnic Chinese in Indonesia,of which 1,500,000had Indonesian citi-zenship, 50,000had PRC citizenship,nd 1,250,000were "stateless."53He did not explain whathe meantby "stateless"Chinese. These Chi-nese could not be Taiwan nationals since theywere not likely topossessTaiwan passports r other egal documents ssuedby Taiwan.It was also doubtful hat these "stateless"Chinese would want to iden-tifywith Taiwan. The only reasonableexplanation seemsto be thatDr. Lie used the term n a political rather han legal sense-both Tai-wan passportholdersand alien Chinese who did not wish to identifythemselves ith eitherthe PRC or Taiwan.Nevertheless, r. Lie's estimatefor "stateless"Chinese appearedtoo high while his estimatefor PRC citizenswas too low as is shownby the 1971 registration igures eleasedby the Departmentof Immi-gration n Jakarta.According to the Department,1,010,652Chinesewereregistereds aliens,ofwhich871,090werePRC citizens, 49,486were "stateless"and only 66 were Taiwan nationals (presumablyTaiwan-passportholders).54 he classification f alien Chinese intothese threecategoriesdid not coincidewith existing regulations. nJuly1969 the ndonesian Department fJustice nnounced that "state-less" was used to refer o "A. Those who are not citizens f any coun-try; rB. thosewho hold citizenship fa countrywhich ndonesia doesnot recognize."55Legally speaking, lien Chinese in Indonesia cannot be regardedas "personswho are not citizens fany country." eking claims that allalien Chinesewho are not Indonesian citizensare Chinese nationals.Taiwan also claimsall Chinese (both aliens and Indonesian citizens)

51 Sinar Hra pan, December 9 and 18, 1975.52Komipas,May 5, 1967. Accordingto my estimate,the Chinese population inIndonesia was about 2.6 million in 1965.53Lie, Mfasalal IFNI, p. 20.54Sinar Harapan, November24, 1972.55Sinar Harapan, July21, 1969; Kompas, July92, 1969.


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786 LEO SURYADINATAas nationals of the Republic of China. However,some alien Chinesecan be classified s "personswho hold citizenship f a countrywhichIndonesiadoes not recognize" i.e., Taiwan nationals), nd hence thesepeople, n the eyesof the Indonesian government,re "stateless."Butare those stateless" hinese 149,486) dentified y the Indonesian au-thoritiesnationals of Taiwan in the sense that they hold Taiwanpassports,s 66 Taiwan nationalsdid? The author uspects hat theydonot holdanyTaiwan legal documents. he fact hatthe Department fImmigration ifferentiatedTaiwan nationals" from "stateless"Chi-nese in its statistics lso indicated that they are not the same. Wewouldarguethat stateless" ere s usedin thepoliticalsensetorefer oboth resident hinese who are Taiwan sympathizersnd thosewho donot wishto be associatedwith either the PRC or Taiwan. But legallyspeaking, hey re PRC citizensbecause Jakarta till recognizes eking.The Immigration epartment's igures n alien Chineseare muchtoo low. If alien Chinese constituted nly 1,010,652 f the 3.29 millionChinese population in 1971, this meant thatmore than two millionChinese are Indonesian citizens. t is extremely oubtfulthatwithinfiveor six years (1966-1971) the numberof Indonesian citizens ofChinese extractionhas increasedby more than 100% in the light ofthe factthat applications for Indonesian citizenshiphad been frozenand thenreopenedonly n 1969.The JakartaHigh Court n 1969 ndicated that about 100Chineseweregranted ndonesiancitizenship ach month.56 ssuming hat thisfigure as confined nlytoJakarta nd thetotal numberbeing grantedIndonesiancitizenshipwas 300 each month,within a two-year eriod(1969-71) therewould be 7,200new Indonesian citizens. f each personhad three hildrenunder 18 yearsof age (under Indonesian law theyautomatically ecame Indonesian citizens), hiswould bringthe totalnumber o 18,800.This is stillveryfarfromthesuggested igure,hatis, over one million!The authorsuspectsthatabout two-fifthsf theChineseare Indonesiancitizens nd the rest are still aliens.It appears thatthe Indonesian government as not yetmade upitsmindwithregardto the alien Chinese. If it allows largenumbersof alien Chinese to become Indonesian citizens, t fears that it wouldnot be able to control nd absorb them.On theotherhand,if it main-tains the statusquo, Pekingwould be obliged and entitledto protectalien Chinese,who, by Chinese law, are PRC citizens.The hesitancyof theIndonesiangovernmentn adoptinga more liberal nationalitypolicy eems o lie in the ndonesianperceptions f theChineseminor-itywhichhave been developedovera long periodof time.

o5GJihl-pao, une 11, 1969.


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CHINESE MINORITY N INDONESIA 787Conclusion

Most indigenous ndonesiansresent he higher conomic tatus n-joyed by the Chinese as a group. Various measureshave been intro-duced to curtail Chinese economic trength ut with little success.Be-cause the Suharto governments oriented toward "economic develop-ment," the capital and skills of the local Chinese have not been ig-nored. However, the government, while using ethnic Chinese capitaland skills, s suspicious fthisminority roup and would like to absorbthe Chinese into the indigenouspopulation, providedthattheseChi-nese are not considered oliticalrisksby thegovernment. he name-chanogingegulation, he "Special ProjectsNational Schools,"and theeasingof the naturalization rocess how that the Suharto administra-tion has moved towardassimilating he Chinese into the indigenouscommunity. ut on the otherhand, practices nd regulations hat de-viatefrom his path also exist.For instance, he officialeadoptionofthe derogatory erm "Cina" has offended nd alienated manyethnicChinese. The highfeeschargedfornaturalization rocedures lso barmanyChinesefrom ecoming ndonesiancitizens. he recategorizationof indigenousand nonindigenous ndonesians in the economic fieldand the administrativeractices n some cities,requiring ndonesiansof Chinese descent to re-register or security easons, perpetuatethedivision between he ocal Chinese and indigenous ndonesians.More-over,therevival fminorityeligions nd observations f Chinese cus-toms tend to consolidateChinese "separateness." hese contradictorypolicies and practices re the resultof the conflict etween the in-digenousperceptionsf the Chineseminority nd thecomplexdomes-ticsituation.The assimilation f all Chinese into the Indonesian pop-ulationis stillfarfrom ertain.

LEO SURYADINATA is a research officer t the Institute of Southeast AsianStudies, Singapore.

Indonesian Policies Toward the Chinese Minority Under the New Order

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Transcript of Indonesian Policies Toward the Chinese Minority Under the New Order