Annual Report - TCHRD - 2005

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HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATIONIN TIBET

ANNUAL REPORT 2005

TIBETAN CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY

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There is a great and growing desire for change in the world: change that ushers in a renewed commitment toethical and spiritual values; that resolves conflicts peacefully, employing dialogue and non-violence; that

upholds human rights and human dignity as well as human responsibility.

His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s message toG8 Summit and “Make Poverty History” Campaign

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C O

N T

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T S

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary 5

Recommendations 15

Chapters

Civil and Political Liberties 19

Information 57Religion 81Development 127Education 157

Appendices

1 List of known political prisoners in Tibet 1792. Known arrests in 2005 1853. Known deaths as a result of torture from 1987 - 2006 1864. Prisons and Detention Centres in Tibet 1905. Table of relevant human rights instruments signed and/or ratified by PRC 1936. Glossary of Terms and Abbrevation 1947 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1978. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 200

9. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 212

Map of Tibet

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Human Rights Stituation in TibeHuman Rights Stituation in TibeHuman Rights Stituation in TibeHuman Rights Stituation in TibeHuman Rights Stituation in Tibet: t: t: t: t: Annual Report 2004Annual Report 2004Annual Report 2004Annual Report 2004Annual Report 2004

Dedicated to the Ten years disappearance of the11th Panchen Lama

Executive Summary

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The year 2005 was eventful for Chinese-occupied Tibet. The fourth round of Sino

Tibetan dialogue between the Dalai Lama’s envoysand Chinese representatives took place in Berne,Switzerland. The People’s Republic of China (PRC)celebrated with aplomb the commemorative eventof the 40th founding anniversary of the “Tibet Au-tonomous Region” (“TAR”), completed track lay-ing of Qinghai-Lhasa railway project, released WhitePapers on issues of international concern, and un-veiled its “revolutionary” 11th Five Year Plan for Eco-nomic and Social Development. President HuJintao’s personal interest in Tibet and his direct in-volvement in controlling Tibetan areas is clearly evi-denced by his appointment of close allies to the mostimportant position in Tibet — “TAR” Party Secre-tary. In November 2005, Tibet witnessed Hu’s closeally Zhang Qingli1, appointed as the acting partysecretary of the “TAR”, after Yang Chuantang, whowas appointed as the “TAR” Party Secretary in De-cember 2004, reportedly fell ill.

June 4, 2005, marks the 16 years of bloody crack-down on democracy in and around TiananmenSquare. Nations, mostly of the Third World kind,have rallied to support China’s anti-secession legis-lation of March 2005, which is designed to “takeback” at a time and in a circumstance of its choos-ing a piece of territory called Taiwan.2 The year alsosaw important inspection visits in China of the UNHigh Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Spe-cial Rapportuer on Torture, the President and secre-

tary of the US, British Prime Minister and otherimportant delegations. While Beijing authorities’regular fuss over the Dalai Lama’s meetings withimportant world leaders saw no let up, its top lead-ers like Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao made the roundsof their regular international visits striking up busi-ness deals, renewing contacts and generally attempt-ing to refine and soften its international image.China’s technological prowess was evidently mani-fested and claimed with the success of the secondmanned spacecraft Shenzou VI mission in 2005.

Beijing authorities upheld the age-old rhetoric ofremarkable achievements made in the field of hu-man rights protection and enjoyment of humanrights and freedom in accordance with law in Chinaat every opportune time. At the panel discussion of“TAR” deputies to the Chinese National People’sCongress (NPC) held on 5 March 2005, PresidentHu Jintao stressed the importance of constructing aharmonious socialist society full of “democracy, ruleof law, faith, vitality and order”, echoing a notionrecently endorsed by the central authorities as thenew guidelines for the country’s social and economicdevelopment.3 China’s Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxingsays China has great respect for each individual’shuman rights in China.4

Current buzz that abounds in the legal circles andhuman rights community and generating optimismis China’s possible review of death penalty next yearwith an amendment to China’s Criminal Procedure

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYPico Iyer, celebrated travel writer, writes, “Tibet lives mostly in corners and shadows these days, under its breadth and you have to seek it

out. Today Tibet is in some respects better off than it was then, although it looks less and less like itself. Tibet today is essentially twodifferent countries living on top of, around, and even inside one another: a worn Tibetan amulet inside a gaudy Chinese box”.

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Human Rights Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2005

Law in the upcoming 10th National People’s Con-gress. Beijing and many governments around theworld have hailed its 2004 constitutional amend-ment seeking to protect human rights as the “firsttime ever”. Enforcement mechanism and actualimplementation over the stipulation is where Chinawatchers, legal scholars and human rights organiza-tion, have always had concerns.

That PRC is committed towards upholding the stan-dards of human rights and democracy is revealed inits White Papers on Human Rights, Democracy, Re-gional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China andthe most recent on Peace Development released byChina’s Information Office of State Council in2005. Though human rights abuses and lack ofdemocratic freedom have been a concomitant fea-ture of the PRC for the last 46 years of its rule inTibet, China has in its White Paper on democracyadmitted the problems the country encounters andthe need to reform its political system. The 11th FiveYear Plan too has cited the need to “strengthen theconstruction of socialist democratic politics” and to“respect and safeguard human rights”. Similaracknowledgement of challenges that China faces onits road of development are clearly stated in theWhite Paper on Peace Development which admits,“Chinese government and people are well aware thatChina is still a developing country facing a lot ofdifficulties and problems on its road of develop-ment.” Hopeful observers talk of more and moreopenness, of increased respect for law, greater insti-tutionalization and transparency of government pro-cess and so forth.

Contrary to the signs, statements and show ofprogress, the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights andDemocracy (TCHRD) is alarmed by the increasingreports of human rights violation in Tibet in 2005.Tibetans in Tibet witnessed increased restrictive mea-sures on religion, security and ideological control,limits on freedom of expression, opinion and con-

science, and lack of rule of law. A “culture of fear’and a “palpable sense of fear and self censorship” ispervasive in Tibet. There is a deep seated and wide-spread zero-tolerance level on any activity or view-point that is suspected as challenging the Commu-nist Party’s control over aspects of society it deemscrucial. As of December 2005, estimated 2524 Ti-betan refugees have fled Tibet across the Himalayaand into India, reporting repression and seeking free-dom in exile. According to information received andresearched by TCHRD in 2005, it becomes clearthat severe repression in the eastern regions of Tibetlike Sichuan Province in the recent years has nowonce again shifted towards areas within the “TAR”.

Jampa Phuntsog, Chairman of “TAR”, highlightsBeijing’s current policy in Tibet by referring to “twofamous slogans” as the two most crucial things thatthe Tibetans should do today: “Hold a clear-cutstand in fights against splittism and firmly advanceTibet’s development.”5 At a closed meeting heldprior to the 40th founding anniversary of the “TAR”,President Hu Jintao stressed the importance ofeliminating “separatism” and accelerating economicdevelopment in Tibet. These oft-repeated mantrasof stability and development are used to increasecentral control by pursuing a policy of greater as-similation of Tibet into a “unified’ Chinese state.Following the meeting’s decision to “resolutely op-pose all kinds of separatists and sabotage activities,and uphold the motherland’s unity and Tibet’s sta-bility”, China’s top security officials called for steppedup intelligence work to smash the activities of hos-tile forces. Internally, marked socio-economic ten-sions have forced the People’s Armed Police (PAP)to commission special units, known as anti-riotsquads, to deal with terrorism, violent crimes, riotsand threats to public security, and this squad willalso be responsible for safety during major publicoccasions such as the “TAR” anniversary and the2008 Olympic Games6.

Executive Summary

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The Dalai Lama had expressed regret at the “very,very repressive policies in TAR”7 and China’s hu-man rights records, undemocratic actions, the lackof the rule of law and the unequal implementationof autonomy rights regarding minorities being re-sponsible for tarnishing China’s image.8 The DalaiLama’s envoy Kelsang Gyaltsen had called “no posi-tive change” and “increased repression” inside Tibet,even after opening of direct contact, as the “mostdisturbing” and of “great concern.” 9

civil and political liberties

The Chinese authorities regard “religious extrem-ism” as one of “three evil forces” along with “sepa-ratism” and “terrorism” in the Xinjiang Uighur Au-tonomous Region and Tibet, said Amnesty Inter-national in its first report on China that focusedspecifically on human rights defenders. Reports alsoemerged of military exercise drill code named “TaskForce 05” which began in Lhasa on 14 August 2005to deal with sudden outbreak of untoward incident,and participated by the security wings of Lhasa Se-curity Bureau Police, (PAP) and State Security Bu-reau (SSB).

At a meeting of all cadres of offices and departmentswithin Lhasa City on 18 August 2005, Beijing au-thorities called for unprecedented precautionarymeasures during the events leading up to the 40th

founding anniversary of the “TAR”, described as animportant “political responsibility.” Jia Qingling,Politburo Standing Committee member and Chair-man of China’s People’s Political Consultative Com-mittee (CPPCC), was quoted as saying on the oc-casion, “Separatist activities must be strictly crackeddown on in accordance with law, so as to ensuresocial stability and state safety.”10 Anti-separatistsstrategies like the “summer strike hard” campaignand the “patriotic re-education” campaigns were un-leashed to purge dissent activities and to inculcate

“proper” ideology, and allegiance to the “splittist”Dalai Lama in any form became the chief target ofrepression.

The ambiguous charges of “endangering state secu-rity”, and anti-terrorism provisions in China’s Crimi-nal Procedure Law are widely used to criminalise“separatist” activities in the politically restive regionslike Tibet and Xinjiang. Tibet this year experiencedheightened security and restrictions during the“TAR” founding anniversary.

In 2005, TCHRD has recorded 20 confirmed andknown cases of Tibetans who were arrested for theirpolitical beliefs and possession of items deemed “re-actionary” by Chinese such as the Dalai Lama’s photo,banned Tibetan national flag and literatures fromexile. As of December 2005, TCHRD has recorded132 known political prisoners languishing in vari-ous prisons and detention centres across Tibet.

There is also rampant misuse of administrative de-tention, lack of fair trials, torture and mistreatmentof prisoners, and coerced confessions. The UN Spe-cial Rapportuer on Torture highlighted the existingsystem of “re-education through labour” as serioushuman rights violations necessitating abolition.

religion

Of all the human rights violations of Tibetans, thedramatic rise of religious repression has been the mostconcerning this year. As in the past, the official sus-picion of interlinkage between Tibetan Buddhismand Tibetan nationalism has led to harsher andstricter policies on religion. China’s new regulationson Religious Affairs, which became effective on 1March 2005, and the subsequent meetings on reli-gion only helped to limit and curtail religious free-dom in Tibet.

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In an attempt to adapt religion to socialist way oflife and to exert state control, the Beijing authori-ties has resorted to intensive “patriotic re-education”campaign, anti-Dalai Lama campaign, imposed con-trol over monastic curriculum, practice and studyof Tibetan Buddhism, and persecuted popular reli-gious figures leading to continuous degeneration ofthe essence of Tibetan Buddhism. Drepung Mon-astery was in the highlight this year owing to onedeath, several expulsions and mass sit-in protest ofmonks over denunciation of the Dalai Lama underthe banner of “patriotic re-education” campaign.

2005 being the 10th year anniversary of the disap-pearance of Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, the XIth

Panchen Lama of Tibet, total absence of additionalinformation on his whereabouts and well-being is acause for great concern. In the mean time, Beijingleaves no stone unturned in vigorously promotingGyaltsen Norbu, “fake Panchen”, as the real Panchen.Xinhuanet news service June 28 reported the Chi-nese Panchen Gyaltsen Norbu touring dozens ofcounties in Tibet and cited as saying he would “carryforward the patriotic traditions handed down fromhis predecessors and do his best to promote thecountry’s reunification, unity of the various ethnicgroups, and the social and economic development.”The Dalai Lama’s special envoy Lodi Gyari said, “Itsnot about a young boy, a young prisoner, but theissue of reincarnation. When a good communist sayshe wants to have the final say in reincarnation, that’san issue a good communist should stay out of.”11

information

Control, censorship and surveillance over media andfree flow of information remain widespread in Ti-bet. Owing to concerns over sensitive regions likeTibet and Xinjiang, compounded by Beijing’s sta-bility concerns inside and international image out-side, the information inflow and outflow from Ti-

bet have been severely restricted. Considering thetremendous lack of transparency and secretive na-ture in which Chinese authorities work, monitor-ing and evaluating human rights violations in Tibethas continued to be a challenge.

Internet service providers, Web sites and Internet ca-fes are expected to limit what their customers seeand do online, and U.S. companies that provide Websites to the Chinese are not exempt. Yahoo, for in-stance, filters its search results so that a search for“Free Tibet” in Chinese yields zero web pages.Google does not censor its searches, although theChinese Government’s system blocks many websites that Google links to.12 Microsoft stops internetusers searching for the words for democracy, free-dom, human rights or demonstrations.13 China alsobanned a computer game called “Soccer Manager2005” because it classifies Taiwan, Hongkong,Macau and Tibet as countries.14

Brave Tibetan writers like Woeser, who aired their“incorrect” views on the Dalai Lama, Tibet’s historyand political prisoners in Tibet, faced persecution,while websites that promote discussion on sensitivetopics were ordered closed. China’s media is state-owned and strictly controlled by the government,thereby resulting in denial of the public right toknow and media’s right to provide information oncurrent happenings in China and outside. Radiobroadcast in Tibetan such as Voice of Tibet (VOT),Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA)were most of the time blocked and jammed.

development

The recurrent theme in Beijing’s discourse on Tibethas been its “developmental” and “beneficial” rolein Tibet. The PRC has emphasized the “right to liveand develop” as the “most urgent demand of theChinese people”15 and further considers the “right

Executive Summary

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to subsistence as the most important of all humanrights, without which other rights are out of thequestion.”

Tourism, traditional Tibetan medicine, minerals,wood and traditional craftworks have been listed asthe five pillar industries that “TAR” will develop.Through the 1999 Western Development Programand other development projects specifically target-ing Tibet, Beijing’s effort to develop Tibet has re-sulted in infrastructure developments in certain ur-ban regions of Tibet. Such an effort is noticeable inthe investment of 6.42 billion yuan in 24 projectscovering agriculture, industry, communication, road,school, energy and public health at the “TAR’s” 40th

anniversary while official reports stated an earlier in-vestment of 500 million yuan in 43 projects on the“TAR’s” 20th anniversary and 4.6 billion yuan in 62projects on the 30th anniversary.16 Jampa Phuntsok,“TAR” Chairman said that in 2004, over 16.6 bil-lion yuan (US$ 2 billion) yuan was invested in build-ing infrastructure in the “TAR” with most of theinvestment coming from Beijing under its “West-ern Development Program.”20At a national confer-ence on Tibet, while recording an annual economicgrowth rate of 10.7 percent over the past five years,the Chinese Government has decided to invest 31.2billion yuan (about 3.76 US dollars) in 117 projectsin the “TAR” over the coming five years.17

In contrast to official reports of rapid economicgrowth and improved subsistence and developmentrights and state investments, the actual condition ofTibetans tell a different story with Tibet remainingChina’s poorest administrative units. By any mea-sure, Tibetans are poor, with low Human Develop-ment Index levels, with evidences of systematic ex-clusion, deprivation, discrimination andmarginalisation in all areas of life. Since over 80percent of the Tibetan population is nomads andfarmers residing in rural areas, they have beenmarginalized from the economic growth.Beijing’s spending in Tibet is described as a “bubble

economy with little trickle-down benefit to the or-dinary citizen” because of the state investment be-ing urban oriented and its poor integration with thelocal economy. The impoverishment in Tibetemerges from the very process of state-led modern-ization as Tibetans become less able to participate inthe economic opportunities available. For every yuanthe state spent in the “TAR” in 2001, Gross Do-mestic Product (GDP) increased by only 0.47 yuanand this negative multiplier effect has been a charac-teristic of Chinese investment in Tibet since the1950s.18

The United Nations has warned that the increasingwealth gap between rural and urban areas in China,which is among the highest in the world, couldthreaten the stability of the Communist nation de-spite its government’s efforts to stem the growingtide. Though China has been able to lift 250 mil-lion people out of poverty over the past 25 years,the inequality in income has doubled, according tonew report released by the United Nations Devel-opment Programme (UNDP).21 This is furthercorrobrated by World Bank President, who said on18 October 2005 that China has 150 million peopleliving in acute poverty despite its impressive eco-nomic growth decades in the past two decades.19

While China claims to prioritise economic and sub-sistence rights for the Tibetans as in its 11th Five yearPlan where growth in a “fair, balanced and sustain-able”22 is called for, Tibetans have actually failed tobenefit from Beijing’s development from the rightsand need perspective of development. This failurecan be rightly attributed to the denial of right toself-determination and meaningful autonomy ofTibetans in particular. Reasoning economic devel-opment as political control takes away the essenceand meaning of real and meaningful developmentfor Tibetans. For instance, the completion of tracklaying for Qinghai-Tibet railway project, describeda marvel of engineering feat, has more a politicaland ego motive behind it than to actually benefit

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and develop the Tibetans. Official statements havestressed the need for a railway to “consolidate na-tional defense” and to “unite nationalities.”

Additionally, the urban oriented rapid growth strat-egies and the practice of population transfer of Chi-nese immigrants into Tibet does not help to benefitthe Tibetans. While lauding China’s promise of zero-tax for the agricultural sector within five years, theDharamsala-based exile Tibetan government had ac-cused the local government there of continuing toimpose a range of taxes and fees on the Tibetan farm-ers and nomads.

education

Based on reports and testimonies emanating out ofTibet, TCHRD found no evidence of major im-provements and progress in the field of education.The situation is not the same in every region owingto differences in “local flavors.” As was the patternfor the past many years, the education in Tibet hasnot helped towards freer and fuller development ofthe children. Though Beijing claims increased in-vestments in education in Tibet, the quality and ac-cessibility of broad based education in Tibet still re-mains a distant dream in most rural areas of Tibet.

The ideological content of educational aspect wasstrengthened in 2005 as evidenced by the Educa-tion Department’s decision to “strengthen and im-prove ideology and ethnic education for primary andsecondary school students and ideology and politi-cal education for college students.”23 The extensiveand almost exclusive use of Chinese language in com-merce and administration has relegated Tibetan as asecond rate language. Moreover, biased representa-tion of history, exorbitant school fees and lack ofqualified personnel in rural areas to impart knowl-edge are still factors of concern.

international concerns

China’s lack or absence of human rights and demo-cratic freedom has featured prominently in reports,dealings and statements by many governments, UNrepresentatives and human rights watchdogs. Hu-man Rights Watch had described China’s humanrights situation as “dire” and “dismal”. China wassharply condemned in the US State Department’sreport entitled “Supporting Human Rights andDemocracy” released in March 2005. The US-basedFreedom House has categorised Tibet amongst thetwo “worst-rated territories” for the 2004-2005 pe-riod, in terms of respect for political rights and civilliberties. Listed under “Disputed Territories” and itsfreedom rating as “Not Free”, Tibet scored seven inboth political rights and civil liberties, making it asthe region having the lowest level of freedom.24

The near lifting this year of arms embargo by Euro-pean Union25, torn between the lure of China’s mar-ket and moral scruples, failed owing to China’s adop-tion of anti-secession law threatening military ac-tion against Taiwan. Volker Ruehe, Chairman of theForeign Affairs Committee in the German Parlia-ment, said, “It will not be lifted.”26 Following theninth annual round of dialogue on human rightbetween Beijing and Australia on 27 June 2005,Australia notes continuing areas of concern in hu-man rights regardless of the considerable progressmade by China in the field.27

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights hadraised the issue of the missing Panchen Lama andcalled for ratification of the International Covenanton Civil and Political Rights during her china visit.Upon their China visit, the UN Working Groupon Arbitrary Detention have criticised imprison-ment without trial through its “re-education throughlabour system” (Chi:Laogai), widespread use of am-biguous terms in political arrests such as “disruptingsocial order” and “endangering state security”, and

Executive Summary

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recommended better protection of fundamentalrights guaranteed in the Chinese Constitution. TheUN Committee on Economic, Social and CulturalRights (CESCR), after examining China’s record forthe first time, noted with “concern the reports fromsources other than the State party relating to theright to the free exercise of religion as a right to takepart in cultural life, and the use and teaching ofminority languages in the Xinjiang AutonomousRegion and the Tibet Autonomous Region.” TheCommittee also expressed concern “about the lackof effective consultations and legal redress for per-sons affected by forced evictions and demolitions,including those of historic structures, buildings andhomes in Lhasa, Tibet.”

UN Special Rapporteur on Torture Mr. ManfredNowak, after his two-week investigations of Chi-nese prisons and detention facilities this year, notedsome progress in reducing violence against prison-ers since China signed the Convention Against Tor-ture (CAT) in 1988. Nevertheless, the UN investi-gator condemned the widespread use of torture and“obtaining confessions” and fighting “deviantbehaviour” to be the central goals of criminal jus-tice system. He experienced many attempts to “ob-struct or restrict” his investigation.28 China laterdenied reports of torture and said the general prin-ciple of the visit was fully respected.29 During anexamination of a report on China, the President ofthe UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Jacob Egbert Doek, called for demands for an inde-pendent person to verify the well being of GedhunChoekyi Nyima, XIth Panchen Lama of Tibet. WhileBeijing’s ambassador to the UN in Geneva, ShaZhukhang, told the committee that the child andhis family “do not wish to be disturbed by foreignvisitors because that could have negative effects.”Gedhun was a Tibetan child like any other, whowas in secondary school and received good results,the Chinese delegation said.30

China’s violation of human rights again came underthe scanner at the 61st session of the UN High Com-mission on Human Rights (UNHCHR) in Genevaeven though no member states sponsored resolutionscritical of world’s key human rights violators such asChina, Iran, the Russian Federation in Chechnya,Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe. JoannaWeschler, U.N. advocacy director for Human RightsWatch rightly noted, “This session has been a pow-erful demonstration of the need to scrap the com-mission and replace it with something new and bet-ter. Even though the commission took some posi-tive steps, overall it was even more timid than inpreceding years. This only confirms the need to re-place the commission with a body that would takemore decisive action against human rights violationswherever they occur, respond to human rights crises,and be ready to follow up on commitments madeby violating countries.”31 In that context, the callsfor bold measures by the UN Secretary General KofiAnnan to give human rights their rightful central placein the UN and to succeed in its reform of the UNhuman rights machinery is of paramount impor-tance.32

china, human rightsand dialogue

Human rights in PRC have been a perennial per-plexing issue. Such perplexity originates fromBeijing’s unique outlook, perception and applicabil-ity of human rights in general. Beijing glosses overthe universality of human rights with its cultural rela-tivism concept, defends its lack of civil and politicalliberties with the “paramount” right to subsistence,and the underlying objectives and ideological prin-ciples of Chinese communism that upholds dutytowards state over individual rights limits the natureand content of human rights discourse in the PRC.Politically sensitive and volatile regions under Chinalike Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan, have been Beijing’s

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Achilles’ heel, for whom national stability and re-unification supersedes even the fundamental humanrights. It remains to be seen how long can Chinacontinue to limit free speech and other civil liber-ties with its increasing role in global politics andeconomy and where human rights issues still remainsa bone of contention for smooth relationship be-tween nations.

Since the mid-1990s, Beijing has lobbied intensivelyin the international arena to transform the “confron-tational approach” adopted by many countries intheir human rights relations with China to a facesaving bilateral dialogue. The fact that bilateral dia-logue is characterized by lack of transparency, ac-countability and timeline has not deterred countriesfrom pursuing this “non-confrontational” path. Suchwillingness and effort from both the parties havebeen ascribed to the great global economic prom-ises and a rising superpower that China has come torepresent.

The White Paper on Peace Development released22 December 2005 had acknowledged “China can-not develop independently without the rest of theworld. Likewise, the world needs China if it is toattain prosperity.”33 Most of the third world coun-tries follow China and the developed liberal westhas “adapted to it in varying degrees and numerousways.” Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing re-viewed China’s diplomatic performance in 2005,saying that the country has made substantive achieve-ments on diplomatic stage despite complex inter-national environment.34 In such a scenario, no realprogress on human rights could be achieved, as theissue becomes a mere diplomatic exercise and a po-litical gimmick. The European Parliament expresseddisappointment at the lack of substantial results asregards the dialogue in its resolution passed on 8September 2005.

President Hu Jintao, a fourth generation leader, nowholding the country’s three top positions as chair-man of the Central Military Commission, generalsecretary of the Communist Party, and President ofChina, is a man of many shades. Amid uncertaintyabout his political views and standpoints, PresidentHu is described as an “unyielding leader determinedto preserve the Communist monopoly on power”35.At the same time, with the resumption of Sino-Tibet contacts in September 2002, four rounds ofdiscussions were held between the representatives ofthe Dalai Lama and the concerned officials of thePRC government. The Dalai Lama credits Chinawith economic development in Tibet, acknowledgesits rise as a major global player and further commitsto his long held Middle Way Policy to seek genuineand meaningful autonomy for all Tibetans living inthe three traditional provinces of Tibet within theconstitutional framework of the People’s Republicof China.

Despite lackluster response from the Chinese side,many governments have welcomed the discussionsand hope for substantial result out of the contactsestablished. Vice Minister Zhu Weigqun36 waspleased that direct contact has now become stableand “an established practice”, and that existing gapscould be narrowed down through more meetingsand exchange of views.37 The Dalai Lama’s envoysaid an important beginning has been made and thenecessity for both parties to demonstrate their sin-cerity and trustworthiness by taking small tangiblesteps.38

Executive Summary

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conclusion

The violation of human rights of Tibetans in civiland political rights as well as in economic, socialand cultural rights is rightly traced to denial of rightto self-determination of Tibetans inside Tibet andlack of implementation and abuse of laws. Throughits policies and propaganda, constitutional guaran-tees and international legal provisions to which ithas committed, Beijing claims to provide all free-dom and rights to its citizens.

After the establishment of “TAR” in 1965, China’sConstitution and the National Regional EthnicAutonomy Law of 1984 provides for Tibet’s au-tonomy in areas of politics, economy, religion, cul-ture, economic undertakings, natural resources, edu-cation and others. However, an emerging patternover the past four decades of Chinese rule has beena centralized control in Tibet characterised by top-down approach that is ridden with stability con-cerns and development rhetoric. Such an approachhas resulted in denying Tibetans their due autono-mous rights and the right to self-determination asguaranteed under China’s Constitution as well asChina’s much-hyped Regional National AutonomyLaw and the International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights (ICCPR) and International Cov-enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights(ICESCR) respectively. The unrelenting calls for hu-man rights and freedom by brave Tibetans in themidst of repressive atmosphere, unabated reports ofhuman rights abuses of Tibetans in all sectors of life,and exodus of Tibetan refugees every year clearly con-firms the absence of meaningful autonomy enjoyedby Tibetans in Tibet.

TCHRD believes that a positive outcome in termsof genuine self-rule or meaningful autonomy outof the pre-negotiation contacts between theDharamsala and Beijing would mean more funda-mental rights and freedom for people of Tibet. US

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called freedom,democracy, and human rights “non-negotiable de-mands of human dignity.” TCHRD also underscoresthe importance of openness, transparency, account-ability, freedom and respect for rule of law in China.Otherwise no amount of cosmetic changes, emptysloganeering, and rule making and policy formula-tion will bring about any real progress in humanrights situation in China. With the threat of loss ofTibetan identity39, it is high time Beijing govern-ment realize that the Dalai Lama is “not the prob-lem but the key to the resolution of Tibet’s prob-lems”40 as well as towards the achievement of Tibet’sstability in the long run.

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Notes

1 Mr Zhang was one of the vice chairman of the largely MuslimXinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. He is seen by many asa political ally of President Hu Jintao and the appointment aspart of President Hu’s strategy to move allies to key positions.As many allies of Hu Jintao, Zhang was a member of theChina Youth League from 1979 to 1986 when he served assection chief and later as vice minister with a responsibility foryoung workers and farmers

2 Pema Thinley, “Time not the best to settle Tibet now”, TibetanReview, April 2005, p.2

3 “Hu calls for faster development of TAR for 40th anniversary”,Xinhuanet, 6 March 2005.

4 Li Zhaoxing dismissed criticisms of German Foreign MinisterJoschka Fischer 10 March to grant Tibet more religious andpolitical freedom.

5 “China says Tibet a non-issue, Dalai Lama losing appeal”,Tibetan Review, July 2005

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6 Martin Andrew, “Terrorism, Riots and the Olympics: NewMission and Challenges for China’s Special Forces”,www.jamestown.org

7 “Bush meets Dalai Lama ten days before his Beijing visit”,Washington Asia News Agencies, 10 November 2005

8 “The statement of His Holiness the Dalai Lama on the 46th

anniversary of the Tibetan National Uprising Day”, TibetanBulletin, March-April 2005, pp.12-13

9 Kelsang Gyaltsen, “The biggest problem in dialogue with China:Lack of Trust: Envoy Kelsang Gyaltsen’s speech at the FourthWorld Parliamentarian’s Convention on Tibet”, Edinburg,November 2005

10 BBC News Online, 1 September 200511 B. Blair Dedrick, “Dalai Lama’s Envoy makes plea for cultural

identity”, World, Washington DC, 7 November 200512 Carrey Kirbey, “Chinese internet vs. free speech”, San

Francisco, 26 December 200513 http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=11133&t=114 “Computer game banned for hurting China’s political game”,

Tibetan Review, January 2005, p.1515 Human Rights Progress in China, PRC State Council

Information Office, Beijing, December 199516 A China Radio International, Tibetinfor.com, 17 February

200517 “More Economic Assistance to Tibet in Next Five Years”,

People’s Daily Online, available at http://english.people .com.cn/english/200107/03/print 20010703_74070.html

18 Andrew Fischer, “State Growth and Social Ehxclusion in Tibet:Challenges of Recent Economic Growth”, Far Eastern Review,December 2005, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS),Press, p.213

19 “150 mln Chinese live in acute poverty: WB Chief”, Xinhuanet,18 October 2005

20 Jampa Phuntsok, “TAR” Chairman, at the sidelines of theThird Session of the 10th National People’s Congress in Beijing,9 March 2005

21 “UN warns of China’s wealth gap”, Financial Express, PressTrust of India, 17 December 2005

22 “New Five Year Plan called ‘revolutionary”, Beijing, availableat http://www.atimes.com/atimes/printN.html

23 Speech by Zhou Ji, Minister of Education, at a press conferencesponsored by the State Council Information Office, 27 January2005, available at http://www.china.org.cn/e-news/2005-01-27.htm

24 “Freedom House survey list Tibet with Lowest Level ofFreedom”, 22 December 2005, available at http://www.savetibet.org/news/newsitem.php?id=887

25 European Union imposed arms embargo on China after 1989Tiananmen massacre of unarmed students and demonstrators.

26 AP, 18 May 2005. Ruehe was speaking in Washington DC,where he was seeking US support for a proposal for permanentseats on the UN Security Council for Germany and five othercountries.

27 “Human Rights Dialogue: Australia speaks of progress andconcerns in China”, Tibetan Review, August 2005, p.11

28 “Torture is widespread in China, UN investigator says”, NYTimes, Joseph Kahn, 3 December 2005

29 Audra Ang, “China denies reports of widespread torture”, AP,6 December 2005

30 “UN Rights body demands access to Beijing’s abductedPanchen Lama”, Asia News Agencies, Geneva, 23 September2005

31 “UN Rights Body ignores major abuses”, Human RightsWatch, available at http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/04/22/global10534.htm

32 “2005 UN Commission on Human Rights: Positivedevelopments at the 61st session fall far short of correcting theCommission’s “credibility deficit”, Amnesty International,available at http://news.amnesty.org/index.ENGIOR410472005

33 “China issues white paper on peaceful development”, People’sDaily, 22 December 2005

34 “Foreign Minister on China’s 2005 diplomatic performance”,People’s Daily, at http://english.people.com.cn//200512/21/eng20051221_229648.html

35 Phillip P. Pan, “Insecure Hu tightens controls,” WashingtonPost, 24 April 2005

36 Deputy head of the United Front Work Department of theChinese Communist Party and also a member of the CentralCommission for Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party

37 The statement of the special envoy of His Holiness the DalaiLama, Lodi G. Gyari, head of Tibetan delegation which metChinese representatives in Berne, Switzerland, on 30 Juneand 1 July 2005

38 Full text of Envoy Kelsang Gyaltsen’s speech at the FourthWorld Parliamentarians’ Convention in Edinburg, 19November 2005

39 B. Blair Dedrick, “Dalai Lama’s envoy makes plea for culturalidentity”, World, Washington D.C, 7 November 2005

40 A quote by Prof. Samdhong Rinpoche, the Prime Minister ofthe Dharamsala based Tibetan government in exile in an articleentitled “Dalai Lama is not the problem but the key to theresolution of Tibet’s problem”, Asia News Agencies,Dharamsala, 6 July 2005

41 Pico Iyer, “Tibetan Reflections – Lhasa today is a worn Tibetanamulet inside a gaudy Chinese box”, Tibetan Bulletin, January-February 2005, p.27

Recommendation

15

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”

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)

Civil and Political Liberties

Ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights signed on 5 October 1998, andits two Optional Protocols;Respect rule of law, its universal relevance and application;Incorporate in its domestic law a definition of torture that fully complied with definitioncontained in the United Nations Convention Against Torture and ratify its optional protocol;Abolish “re-education through labour” and similar forms of forced re-education of detainees inprisons and pre-trial detention centers in accordance with the relevant international standards;Ensure that the reform of the criminal procedure law conforms to ICCPR fair trial provisionssuch as the right to remain silent and the privilege against self incrimination; the right to crossexamine witnesses and the effective exclusion of evidence extracted through torture;Provide a definition in China’s Criminal Law for expressions such as “endangering state security”,“state secrets” and “terrorist acts”,Consider a moratorium on all executions of political prisoners;Allow freedom of movement of Tibetans wishing to leave or enter Tibet without restrictions ofany kind;Release all prisoners of conscience held in prisons, labour camps and detention centers inTibet;Grant Tibetans the right to freedom of opinion and expression and the right to self-determination,so that Tibetans can freely choose their leaders and express their thoughts without fear of arrestor persecution.Cooperate with all thematic special rapporteurs and working groups of the Human RightsCommission, and to give consideration and implement to their recommendations.

Religion

Cease all practices of sending “work teams” to religious institutions, and to desist from allefforts to coerce the monastic population to conform to the communist ideologies propoundedin “patriotic re-education” session;Review the role of Democratic Management Committee (DMC) in the monasteries andnunneries;Release Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, the XIth Panchen Lama of Tibet, whose whereabouts hasremained unknown since May 1995;End the anti-Dalai Lama campaign in Tibet and allow Tibetans to worship the Dalai Lama asthe essence of Tibetan Buddhism;

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”

Release from any form of detention all those held for peaceful practice of activities associatedwith their religious beliefs;Withdraw the compulsory education of books on political ideologies under “patriotic re-education” campaign in monasteries and nunneries;Stop persecution of religious figures through arrests, sentencing and restrictions.

Information

Stop limiting the right to freedom of information;Allow for free and unlimited access to radio, TV, internet and all other sources of information;Undertake a review of the domestic legal system with a view to bringing it into line withinternational standards governing the right to freedom of opinion and expression;Take concrete legislative and administrative steps toward the implementation of the principlesanctioned by Article 35 of the Constitution (freedom of the press);Review the legal provisions of the Chinese Criminal Law and the Law of the State secrets that isused to infringe upon the rights to freedom of opinion and expression and information;Make legal provisions for a number of mechanisms to address the problem of a culture ofsecrecy within the government;Provide a definition of “state secrets” in the domestic laws dealing with the right to access toinformation.

Development

Respect the principles set forth in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights, particularly the right to self-determination of the Tibetan people;Engage the Tibetan people in the development processes and ensure that their concerns aretaken into account while policies are formulated;Reprioritize its development strategies in the region and invest more in people, especially inbasic social services such as education and health care;Advocate a different strategy for economic growth, one that supports local economic activity,locally owned and controlled businesses and local capital accumulation;Encourage sustainable small-scale local projects that directly fulfill the basic needs of farmersand nomads in the western regions;Use the ICESCR instruments as a reference for discussing and addressing poverty issues;Halt population transfer practice in Tibet that has adversely affected the livelihood of the Tibetanpeople;Stop the sinicization of the Tibetan people through economic, social and cultural policies.

Recommendation

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”

Education

Respect the Tibetan people’s fundamental right to control the content of the curriculum andthe medium of instruction in their children’s education as stipulated in the Convention on theRights of the Child;Take steps in order to ensure that the nine-year compulsory education is free of charge for allTibetan children;Take concrete measures in order to make schools available in sufficient quantity in the mostremote areas of Tibet;Ensure that Tibetan children are guaranteed full opportunities to learn and study in theirmother tongue as well as the opportunity to develop knowledge about their own culture;Carry out a thorough review of history textbooks with a view to eliminating any biasedpresentation of the history of Tibet.

To International Agencies and Governments:

Put the issue of human rights as a necessary pre-condition for all bilateral or multilateral talkswith the Chinese Government;Put pressure on China for concrete results on the ground with regard to the implementation ofhuman rights treaties;Call upon China to release Gedhun Choekyi Nyima and all other political prisoners in Tibet;Demand that China take concrete steps towards the abolition of the death penalty;Urge China to allow free movement of the Tibetan people within or outside Tibet, especially ofthe exile returnees without fear of persecution or arrest;Urge China to engage in meaningful and constructive dialogue with the representatives of theTibetan people;Urge China to involve the Tibetan people on all development projects in Tibet.

To Multinational Businesses and Corporations:

Ensure that Tibetan people’s participation in all stages of development projects;Undertake comprehensive social and environmental studies and impact assessments;Provide sustainable development initiatives that bring desired community benefits;Any project in Tibet must respect the sentiments and values of the Tibetan people.

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Military parade during the 40th founding anniversary of “Tibetan Autonomous Region”


19

CIVIL AND POLITICAL LIBERTIES

introduction

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) over the pastone year has achieved so much in the sphere of eco-nomic development and technological field with thesuccess of the second manned spacecraft ShenzhouVI mission which was hailed as a symbol of China’stechnological prowess,1 but these developments wereclouded by new repressing states policies designedto assert more control over minority population andgross violation of human rights remain a constantfixture of the situation in Tibet.

The PRC’s continued draconian policies of restrict-ing free civil and political rights of Tibetan peoplewould not help it’s leaders’ long term goal of achiev-ing social stability and economic development. Theyear witnessed Chinese authorities tightenedcontrol on religion, speech, media, expression andassembly. There has been continuous reports ofarrests, torture, mistreatment of prisoners, incom-municado detention, and denial of due process.Authorities remained quick to suppress religious,political or social groups and individuals that theyperceived as threat to the government or nationalstability, often detaining those exercising theirfundamental freedoms.

The year 2005 began with the continued campaignfor Trulku (re-incarnated lama) Tenzin Delek’srelease as his death sentence with two-year reprieve

expired on 25 January 2005. Under heavy interna-tional campaigns, the Higher Court in SichuanProvince, in the southwestern China, on 25 Janu-ary 2005 spared the life of Trulku Tenzin Delekconvicted in a series of fatal bombings, commutinghis death sentence to life imprisonment because ‘heobeyed unspecified legal conditions during thereprieve’, Xinhua2 reported3. But his whereaboutsstill remains unknown and none of his family mem-bers have seen him for the last about three years. Alife sentence in Tibet’s prisons is tantamount to adeath sentence given the prevalence of torture andinhumane prison conditions. The legal processwhich led to death sentence with two-year reprieveto Tenzin Delek and the subsequent execution ofLobsang Dhondup on 26 January 2003 was heavilycriticized internationally.

The late Sergio Vieira de Mello, former UnitedNations High Commissioner for Human Rights,wrote to the Chinese authorities expressing hisconcern that the trial “does not appear to have metminimum standards.” Despite assurances by theChinese authorities to allow them, internationalobservers were not invited to attend the trial. Link-ing the case to the fight against terrorism, a Xinhuareport of January 2003 justified holding the pro-ceedings in secret by stating that “the court did nothold an open hearing because some of the defen-dants’ criminal acts were related to state secrets.” Sofar no evidence against Trulku Tenzin Delek has been

“Human rights are what reason requires and conscience demands. They are us and we are them. Human rights are rights that any personhas as a human being. We are all human beings; we are all deserving of human rights. One cannot be true without the other.”

– Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations

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made public. The year also marks the tenth anni-versary of disappearance of the XIth Panchen Lamaof Tibet since his abduction by the Chinese authori-ties on 17 May 1995. There has been no informa-tion on the whereabouts and well being of GedhunChoekyi Nyima and his parents to the internationalbodies and human rights watchdogs. The latest isthe Chinese campaign to blacklist key Tibetan reli-gious figures known to be close to the Dalai Lama.The campaign began in 26 October in TibetChamdo Prefecture, “TAR” and focuses heavily onbanning the prominent Oser (Woeser) Lama fromreturning to his homeland Southern India.4 He isnot allowed to return to Tibet and no one isallowed to have any contact with him. This is notan isolated case, many prominent Tibetan religiousleaders in Tibet who command respect and inspiresthe local community by their philanthropic worksand shared religious affinity with the Dalai Lamaparticularly become vulnerable targets and manyserving long prison sentence.

This year China escaped condemnation of its poorhuman rights record at the 61st session of the UnitedNation’s Human Rights Commission (UNCHR).No member countries has sponsored resolution criti-cal of China’s human rights record. However, manyhuman rights organizations and NGOs in their state-ment at the United Nations have expressed concernabout poor human rights situation inside Tibet andcalled upon China to improve it.

China’s State Council Information Office releasedthree separate “White Papers” namely, “RegionalAutonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China”5 on 28February 2005 and “China’s Progress in Human Rightsin 2004”6 on 13 April 2005 and “Building of Politi-cal Democracy in China” released on 19 October20057.

The white paper, ‘Regional Autonomy for EthnicMinorities in China’ appropriately eludes to address

major pressing issues of unemployment, basic hu-man rights and civil and political rights, destructionof environment and gross human rights violationand the gross discontentment amongst the ethnicpeople inside these so called “autonomous” areas.The white paper in length boasts the right of self-government of ethnic autonomous areas throughthe representation of the ethnic groups in the people’scongress and the people’s government of the autono-mous area. But it is a universally acknowledged factthat the people’s congress and people’s governmentsare mere rubber stamp committees that work at thewhim and directives of the authoritarian Commu-nist Party of China (CPC). The white paper cat-egorically fails to mention the role that the CPCplays in handling the overall affairs in the ethnicautonomous areas. The most powerful position inTibet is that of the Communist Party Secretary, apost that no Tibetan has ever held, with Beijing di-rectly appointing all the Party Secretaries.

The second white paper covers and highlights China’sprogress in human rights in 2004 in six main areas:People’s rights to Subsistence and Development,Civil and Political Rights, Judicial Guarantee forHuman Rights, Economic, Social and CulturalRights, Equal Rights and Special Protection for Eth-nic Minorities and the rights and interests of thedisabled. The claims filled with communist propa-ganda and plethora of distorted statistical data boast-ing of its achievement in various fields found aprominent place in the white paper.

The PRC’s first white paper on democracy dashedthe hopes for political reform in China; the 12 partsdocument that despite its name reaffirmed the Com-munist party’s determination to cling to power anddefined China as a ‘democratic dictatorship’ in whichthe Communist party had been chosen by historyto play the guiding role. According to Chinese dis-sident writer Liu Xiaobo, the latest white paper wasanother official report eulogizing communist rule.


21

“It is old wine in a new bottle, but at least the hypo-critical government realizes that it needs democracyto decorate its corrupt bureaucracy,”8

The life imprisonment sentence passed on TrulkuTenzin Delek and Bangri Tsamtrul Rinpoche andthe continued silence on the whereabouts and con-dition of the 11th Panchen Lama for the past tenyears reaffirms the worthlessness of the white paper’sclaim of religious freedom. The interference in theancient Tibetan religious practice and belief byDemocratic Management Committee in control-ling and curtailing the religious activities in Tibetclearly shows the magnitude of control and suppres-sion of rights and freedom of Tibetan people.

The number of political prisoners still languishingacross the Chinese administered prisons and deten-tion centers in Tibet and number of unknownpolitical prisoners who remain unaccounted for stillcontinue to suffer various forms of abuses includ-ing torture, indiscriminate beating, harassments,detention, imprisonment for expressing theirpolitical views and conscience, particularly in acampaign late in the year against writers, religiousactivists, dissidents, and petitioners.

civil and political rights

Beijing’s policy of giving territorial integrity andsocial stability the utmost important has led to theviolation of Tibetan people’s right to civil andpolitical rights. Tibet being the albatross around theneck of Chinese leadership, for most Tibet relatedissues having political shades were systematicallycrushed. Under China’s widespread use of vaguelydefined terms, imprecise or sweeping elements inits criminal law, such as “endangering state security”and ‘disrupting social order”, Tibetans face arrest anddetention for peaceful exercise of their fundamentalhuman rights and freedom.

Prior to 1997, many of the offenses now coveredby the criminal law’s chapters on endangering statesecurity and heretical organizations were includedin the chapter on counterrevolution. Although thecounterrevolution was removed from the CriminalLaw in 1997, individuals convicted of this crimeremain in prison with severe prison sentence. Thereis a lack of precise definition of the concept of ‘en-dangering state security’, which is applied to a broadrange of offences, the criminalization of contacts andexchange of ‘classified’ information with individu-als, institutions or organizations based abroad, andthe danger posed to the freedom of expression.

Under the existence of vague, imprecise and sweep-ing elements like ‘disrupting social order’, ‘endan-gering national security’ in the Chinese CriminalProcedure Law (CPL), Tibetans are arrested anddetained for expressing their political belief, possess-ing portrait of the Dalai Lama, banned Tibetan na-tional flag, distributing and pasting pro-indepen-dence leaflets and possessing literatures from exilewhich it deemed ‘reactionary’. In the CPL, the‘endangering of state security’ is regarded as a gravecrime, under the pretext of which many humanrights violations are committed. Many Tibetanshave been arrested, detained and tortured for theirpolitical belief and shared religious affinity with theDalai Lama as the justification for the ‘protectionof state security’ and unity of the motherland’.

The PRC has signed the International Covenant onCivil and Political Rights (ICCPR) on 5 October1998 but is yet to ratify the Covenant. Whilstrecent piecemeal proposals for legal reform have beenpresented by officials or legal academics as a movetowards compliance with the ICCPR, the govern-ment is yet to present a coherent plan of reformthat would bring the Chinese institutions and prac-tice in line with the standards contained in theCovenant. The ICCPR is a key human rights in-strument, that provides, within a legally-binding

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treaty, for fundamental human rights enshrined inthe Universal Declaration of Human Rights(UDHR). The PRC ratification of this covenant isthus an important step in committing the PRCgovernment to the protection of these internation-ally recognized rights, and to follow through on itsearlier promises to fully commit to the terms ofthis covenant.

The recent visit of UN High Commissioner, MsLouise Arbour, to China includes formal steps toprovide assistance to the authorities in clearing wayfor ratification of ICCPR and in implementingrecommendations from the United Nations Eco-nomic, Social and Cultural Committee. The HighCommissioner said China stated commitments toratification and to removing obstacles to acceptanceof the treaty meant that even pending ratificationone should expect ‘more than modest progress’ inthe area of civil and political rights9.

China’s repressive social and political controls con-tinued to limit the fundamental freedom of Tibet-ans and risked undermining Tibet’s unique cultural,religious, and linguistic heritage. During 2005, therewas massive suppression of the right to freedom ofopinion and expression in Tibet. The arrest of fourmonks from Labrang Tashikyil Monastery inSangchu County, Ganan “TAP”, Gansu Province,for postings calling for freedom in Tibet on 23 May200510 and sentencing of two monks of TaktsangLhamo Kirti Monastery in Ngaba “TAP” to threeyears for pasting pro-independence posters11 andmany other cases clearly exemplifies the extent ofcontrol that is being exercised by the Chinese au-thorities on the freedom of expression and opinion.

arbitrary detention

The United Nations Working Group on ArbitraryDetention (WGAD) regards deprivation of libertyas arbitrary in the following cases:

a) When it manifestly cannot be justified on anylegal basis (such as continued detention after thesentence has been served or despite an applicableamnesty act).

b) When the deprivation of liberty is the result of ajudgment or sentence for the exercise of the rightsand freedoms proclaimed in the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights12 and also, inrespect of States parties of the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights.13

c) When the complete or partial non-observance ofthe relevant international standards set forth inthe Universal Declaration of Human Rights andin the relevant international instruments acceptedby the States concerned relating to the right to afair trial is of such gravity as to confer on thedeprivation of liberty, of whatever kind, anarbitrary character.14

The legal tools contained in the Constitution of thePeople’s Republic of China, the country’s CriminalLaw and the Criminal Procedure Law, combine toprovide the state with a multitude of options torepress, prohibit, investigate or punish almost anyform of expression or activity of an individual andcan justify the assertion that the State’s agencies areupholding the law and constitution. It further stipu-lates, “The exercise by citizens of the PRC of theirfreedoms and rights may not infringe upon the in-terests of the State, of society and of the collective,or upon the lawful freedoms and rights of othercitizens.”15

The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention in theirreport released on 25 February 2005 following theirvisit to Tibet in September 2004 criticized Beijing


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for arbitrarily jailing those who peacefully voice theirreligious and political view and urged China to bet-ter safeguard constitutionally protected rights. TheUN group called on China to give “proper weightto the rights of the individual” and better protectfundamental rights guaranteed by the country’s ownconstitution. The report also said that official inter-ference in the September visit to the notoriousDrapchi Prison in Lhasa, was “unacceptable” and theUN investigators were told that prison regulationsprohibited certain prisoners from being interviewedby ‘foreigners’16.

The UN group has identified three matters of con-cern following their visit; China’s lack of precisedefinition of the concept of “endangering nationalsecurity”, which is applied to a broad range of of-fences, the criminalization of contacts and exchangeof ‘classified’ information with individuals, institu-tions or organizations based abroad, and the dangerposed to the freedom of expression by the punish-ment of “control”, a measure introduced in order toreduce the inmate population17. At the same timethe Working Group report said that “Definitions incriminal law legislation having such vague, impre-cise or sweeping elements…shall not be used topunish the peaceful expression of the rights and free-doms that the UDHR grants everyone.”18 And itfurther urged the Chinese authorities to give duerecognition to “the rights of the individual” and tobetter protect these fundamental rights guaranteedin the Chinese constitution.

China’s arbitrary detention of Tibetan people solelyon account of their peaceful and legitimate humanrights activities violates key rights protected in in-ternational law and in domestic laws, for instance,article 9 of the ICCPR states, “Everyone has the rightto liberty and security of person. No one shall be sub-jected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall bedeprived of his liberty except on such grounds and inaccordance with such procedures as established by law.”

And article 18 of the same covenant guarantees free-dom of thought, conscience and religion and article19, which guarantees freedom of expression.

Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of HumanRights prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile.Article 37 of the Constitution of the PRC stipu-lates that, “The freedom of person of citizens of thePeople’s Republic of China is inviolable…”

Almost all Tibetan political prisoners in Chineseprisons in Tibet were arbitrarily arrested and de-tained. More than 132 known political prisonerscontinue to languish in prisons without any formaltrial and 26 Tibetans were known to have been ar-rested this year19, most after peacefully exercisingtheir right to freedom of expression, opinion, reli-gious freedom, assembly and other fundamentalhuman rights. Out of total number of known Ti-betan political prisoners, 52 or 39.3% are servingmore than 10 years prison sentence, whereas monksconstitutes 91 or 68.93% of the total known num-ber of political prisoners. There are also unconfirmedreports of arrest of more than 60 Tibetans leadingto the 40th founding anniversary of the TibetanAutonomous Region “TAR”.

While the nature of arrest and location may vary, allof them have been linked to political activitiesdeemed to “endanger state security”. Detention ofTibetans for being discovered in possession of pic-tures and audiotapes containing speeches of the DalaiLama are common. Others, already serving a prisonterm have had their term extended for exercisingtheir rights of freedom of speech and opinion,lengthy detention periods are of particular concernbecause they provide ample opportunity for inves-tigation authorities to “extract information” fromthe suspect. Testimonies from various detainees, bothformer and current, corroborate this fact.

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1. In December 2004, Lhatse County police arrestedPhuntsok Tsering, a chant master of MagarDhargyeling Monastery in Shigatse Prefecture,“TAR”, because he was found possessing aportrait of the Dalai Lama. Phuntsok was takento Nyari Prison in Shigatse. No furtherinformation is available on his condition andcharges made against him.20

2. According to Tibet Information Network (TIN),on the night of 23 December 2004, SonamPhuntsog21, a monk from Tsozhi Village in DardoCounty, Kardze ‘Tibetan AutonomousPrefecture’ (“TAP”) was arrested following a fireincident at the local hall of the People’sRepresentative Conference. He was accused ofintentionally starting the fire.22

Approximately the same time that the fire brokeout, posters calling for a free Tibet were ondisplay in the area. However, no evidence couldestablish a direct link between the two events.

3. In April 2005, pro-independence pamphlets werefound pasted on the gate of the governmentoffice of Tashigang Township located inMeldrogungkar County, Lhasa Municipality“TAR”. The PSB officers carried out extensiveinvestigations by questioning each monk ofPangsa Monastery. At the time, Chung Tseringwho was out of station became the prime suspect.In the end of April 2005, Chung Tsering wasarrested and taken to Lhasa City DetentionCentre where he continue to be detained23.

4. In April 2004, Kardze Intermediate People’sCourt sentenced Lobsang Khedrup, 22, andGyalpo, 26 from Dartsedo Township andShungteng Township, Sichuan Province “TAP”,to eleven years’ prison term. The monks werecharged with hoisting a banned Tibetan nationalflag on a radio tower in Kardze County in 2003.Gyalpo was arrested in January 2004 whileLobsang was arrested a month later. The familymembers after trying in vain to locate theirwhereabouts only recently came to know about

their relatives’ imprisonment in a prison atDartsedo.24

5. Tsering Dhondup, 32, monk from Sera Monasteryand originally from Chema Township, PhenpoLhundrup County, “TAR” was arrested in earlyJuly 2005 by Lhasa Kyere PSB officials forallegedly distributing ‘pro-independence’ leaflets.Tsering went suddenly missing from themonastery during which time his panic-strickenfamily members and friends along withmonastery administration searched for him.About thirteen days later, Lhasa PSB called themonastery administration and informed themabout him being in their custody at GutsaDetention Centre. The authorities restricted thefamily members from meeting him except to passalong a couple of clothing. There is no furtherinformation available on the status of hissentencing.

In other instances of arrests between 5-9 May 2005,eight monks from Sera Monastery and 13 nuns fromShugseb Nunnery have been reported to be arrestedand their whereabouts are currently unknown25.

enforced disappearance

The PRC’s practice of enforced disappearance ofpersons infringes upon an entire range of humanrights embodied in the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights and set out in both internationalcovenants on human rights as well as in other majorinternational human rights instruments.

Article 1 of the UN Declaration on the Protectionof all Persons from Enforced Disappearance26 statesthat, “Any act of enforced disappearance is an offenceto human dignity. It is condemned as a denial of thepurposes of the Charter of the United Nations and asa grave and flagrant violation of the human rightsand fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Uni-


25

versal Declaration of Human Rights and reaffirmedand developed in international instruments in thisfield.”

Disappearances generally violate the right to a fam-ily life as well as various economic, social and cul-tural rights such as the right to an adequate standardof living and the right to education. According tothe Declaration27, the systematic practice of disap-pearance is of the nature of a crime against human-ity and constitutes a violation of the right to recog-nition as a person before the law, the right to libertyand security of the person, and the right not to besubjected to torture; it also violates or constitutes agrave threat to the right to life. Moreover, the preva-lence of incommunicado detention makes it evenmore vulnerable and susceptible to abuses. The PRCbeing one of the permanent members of the UN, isunder an obligation to take effective legislative, ad-ministrative, judicial or other measures to preventand terminate acts of enforced disappearance andshould make it offences under criminal law.

The PRC’s total disregard of international standardsof the right to life, liberty and security of personcan be best illustrated by the abduction of GedhunChoekyi Nyima, the XIth Panchen Lama for thetenth consecutive years who turns 16 on 25 April2005. Despite strong international concerns andappeals, China continues to conceal the location andcondition of this child. The year 2005 has been de-clared as the International Year of Gedhun ChoekyiNyima, the 11th Panchen Lama of Tibet by theDharamsala based Tibetan Women’s Association.China’s detention of boy Panchen Lama is a clearviolation of the Convention on the Rights of theChild, which it signed in 1990 and ratified in 1997,other international obligations.

On 14 May 1995, the Dalai Lama declared the thensix-year-old Gedhun Choekyi Nyima as the rein-carnation of the Tenth Panchen Lama. The PRC gov-

ernment declared the announcement ‘invalid’ and‘illegal’. Three days later, Gedhun Choekyi Nyimaand his parents disappeared. For the past ten yearsnow, no information on their whereabouts and wellbeing have been available so far.

The meeting of China’s Party Secretary and Presi-dent Hu Jintao with Gyaltsen Norbu-the Childchosen by Beijing as the reincarnation of the PanchenLama on 3 February 2005 at the Great Hall ofPeople28 and the authorities attempt to raise the pro-file of its chosen Panchen Lama by showing himblessing worshippers in a ceremony marking hisenthronement ceremony at Tashilhunpo Monas-tery29, clearly represents intensification of China’songoing campaign to enforce the teenager’s legiti-macy as a religious and patriotic figure. Xinhua wasquoted as saying that, “the ceremony was attendedby devoted Tibetans, including mothers with ba-bies and young men carrying their elderly fathers ormothers on their backs, who viewed Gyaltsen Norbu(Chinese appointed) as their new spiritual leader.”30

In a closed-door meeting in Qinghai Province inNovember 2004, the regional authorities came downheavily on 20 senior Buddhist leaders and Chineseofficials in Amdo region of Tibet, forcing them togive approval and support to Gyaltsen Norbu. TheBuddhist leaders were threatened with unspecifiedpunishment if they failed to comply with this rul-ing and the move apparently came following lack-luster reception Gyaltsen Norbu received while onhis visit to other regions of Tibet in 2003. Chineseofficials told the religious leaders that obediencewould be rewarded with improvements to their “eco-nomic livelihoods,” while failure would be met withpunishments that they didn’t describe.31

The PRC actions are designed to exert unquestionedstate control over religion to the point, in this in-stance, of dictating whom Tibetan may revere as areligious hierarch. In other cases, the state has as-

26


sumed a visible presence in certifying certain incar-nations and harshly suppressing those who dissent.An ethnic Tibetan told a reporter that, “In the olddays, when the 10th Panchen Lama reigned, ordi-nary people would pour into the Tashilhunpo Mon-astery to revere him. Now when the 11th PanchenLama (referring to Gyaltsen Norbu) visit to theTashilhunpo, they have to be ordered to go, or theywill be fined by the government.”32 Most Tibetando not accept Gyaltsen Norbu as the legitimatePanchen Lama for Tibetans maintain loyalty toGedhun Choekyi Nyima, the boy recognized by theDalai Lama, is often a keen way to express theirloyalty for the Dalai Lama. China has failed miser-ably to win over the hearts and minds of Tibetans.

At the session of the UN Committee on the Rightsof the Child (CRC) held on 19 September 2005,the Chairperson of the UNCRC, Prof. Jacob Doekhas highlighted the regular denial of requests foraccess to the Panchen Lama and requested for ‘can-did, open, and frank answer,’ that an independentbody be allowed to visit Gedhun Choekyi Nyima.However, the Chinese representative at the sessionresponded that he would pass on the request tohigher authorities in Beijing33. To a question askedby Ms. Lucy Smith, the CRC expert from Norwayabout the religious freedom in Tibet and religiouseducation in schools in particular and more infor-mation on the current status of XIth Panchen Lama,the Chinese representative repeated the usual rheto-ric that Gedhun Choekyi Nyima is nothing but anormal child who is receiving a good education andattending secondary school and scoring good grades.The Chinese delegates responded that they have notallowed foreign visitors to the Panchen Lama be-cause “too much interference creates too many prob-lems” and the boy and his parents did not wish tobe disturbed due to security reasons. The presentcall for action comes nine years after the UN Com-mittee on the Right of the Child last reviewedChina’s report in May 1996.

Chadrel Rinpoche, former abbot of Tashi LhunpoMonastery, the traditional seat of the Panchen Lama,and the Chairman of the Search Committee for thereincarnation of the 10th Panchen Lama, and his as-sistant Champa Chungla disappeared fromChengdu Airport in Sichuan Province on 14 May1995. On 21 April 1997, the Shigatse IntermediatePeople’s court sentenced Chadrel Rinpoche to sixyears of imprisonment on charges of “plotting tosplit the country” and “leaking state secrets”. He wasaccused of working for and assisting the Dalai Lamain the search for the 11th Panchen Lama. Althoughhis sentence ended on 13 May 2001 following thecompletion of a six-year prison term, there is noinformation available on his whereabouts and well-being, it is believed that he is now kept under housearrest.

Champa Chungla, 66-year-old former assistant ofChadrel Rinpoche, was arrested in 1995 for his par-ticipation in the search committee of the 11th

Panchen Lama and sentenced to a four-year prisonterm. He continues to be held in custody even afterthe completion of his original four-year prison term.

An atheist State like China has implemented vari-ous policies aimed at subordinating religious prac-tices and sentiment to serve the political needs ofthe state. These policies impinge upon the freedomof many Tibetans to peacefully put into practice oreven express certain key aspects of their religiousbelief and such policies are implemented throughthe use of coercion, violent suppression and impris-onment for those who dissent the official dictum.

2005 “summer strike hard”campaign

Following the famous Mao Zedong’s classic dictum,“A spark from heaven can light up an entire plan,”in reference to the fact that one single instance of


27

insurrection, unless muffled quickly at the source,could spread across the country and wreak havoc onthe Chinese Communist Party (CCP) administra-tion. Underlining the importance of maintainingstability and sovereignty of China, Beijing re-launched the hard line policy of striking hard onthose suspected of undermining it. Chinese authori-ties in Tibet has redoubled its efforts to crack downon dissents and other destabilizing forces before the“TAR” 40th founding on 1 September 2005. As aprecautionary measure for smooth celebrations,“2005 Summer Strike Hard” (Ch. Yanda) campaignwas launched for the first time on 22 July 200534

despite the launch of the general “strike hard” cam-paign in the last months of 2004.

The current campaign called by the security com-mittee for the “TAR” founding anniversary and bythe “TAR” development department, aims to curbpolitical activism mainly in Lhasa and other adja-cent areas in the “TAR” through huge Chinese PSBpersonnel presence and intensified security measures.

Under ‘Strike Hard’ campaign any signs of rever-ence for the Dalai Lama are interpreted as equatingto ‘endangering state security’ or ‘effecting stabilityand unity of motherland’ providing an ideal groundto carry out harsh crackdown and stifle political dis-sents. The campaign is characterized by forcefulcrackdown with severe punishment and swift ex-ecution of power by police and authorities withimpunity, lack of transparency and accountability.It empowers authorities’ immense power to carryout arbitrary arrest and detention of any suspectsthereby violating fundamental human rights of theindividual.

TCHRD was informed in early July 2005 that Ti-betans who fall under suspicion of engaging in po-litical activism and former political prisoners are ar-bitrarily detained and rounded up for interrogations.In some cases, they were reportedly ordered to leave

Lhasa City prior to the celebration, whereas in somecases their family members were ordered to signsurety paper to take responsibility for any untowardincident. The restrictions were coupled with round-the-clock surveillance and restrictions on their move-ment apparently to discourage public protest. Anofficial report on 22 July 2005 stated that, “the se-curity committee for the “TAR” foundation anniver-sary and “TAR” overall development department havecalled for the launch of summer 2005 strike hard cam-paign beginning from 22 July 2005 in the whole of“TAR” to achieve grand success in celebration of 40th

anniversary of the “TAR”.” 35

During the campaign, the state law enforcementagencies were given extraordinary power to arbitrarilyarrest, detain, interrogate, and ransack houses andissue illegal threats and warning to people undersuspicion. The nature of the campaign was such thatverdicts were issued swiftly and decisively. “Everytime there is a celebration of national event, secu-rity officials go to these ex-political prisoners andharass them with all kinds of restriction. During theevent, officials went to their homes daily to checkon them and harass them,” one source said. “Whenthe former political prisoners react angrily, the au-thorities use it as an excuse to raid their homes andif they find any contraband, such as photos of theDalai Lama, they go back to jail.”36 The “strike hard”campaign has led to the political crackdown in Ti-bet with arbitrary detention, imprisonment, incom-municado detention, sweeping restriction on reli-gious, cultural and social rights resulting in severeblow on the Tibetan people’s civil liberties.

intensified control during the“TAR”founding anniversary

The “Tibet Autonomous Region” (“TAR”) was for-mally founded at the First Session of the People’sCongress of the Autonomous Region on 1 Septem-

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ber 1965. Since the establishment of the People’sRepublic of China in 1949, the Communist Partyhad agreed to set up autonomous regions in areaswhere the minority group constitutes a substantialpercentage of the population, in keeping withArticle 3 of the 17-Point Agreement signed inBeijing on 23 May 1951, which had promised that“the Tibetan people have the right to exercise na-tional autonomy under the unified leadership of theCentral People’s Government.” By creating thisChina has managed to create a completely new ad-ministrative structure for control of Tibet and topromote its version of autonomy.

It is openly acknowledged by the Chinese authori-ties that the economic development of Tibet is apolitical as well as an economic issue, and lies at thecentre of attempts to maintain ‘stability’. Thus thedevelopment of the autonomous areas and the claimsof more autonomy given to the ethnic minoritiesfurther the Chinese political and economic priorityof integration with the rest of China. The explosivegrowth hasn’t brought about any major politicalchange in China, and the people deemed a threat tothe one-party state are routinely jailed and sentencedwith long prison term. The closed meeting of thePolitburo presided over by the Party Secretary andPresident Hu Jintao, before the anniversary in or-der to determine Tibet policy for the 21st centuryweek, stressed the importance of eliminating ‘sepa-ratism’ and accelerating economic.

A delegation of 52 senior Chinese and Tibetan offi-cials arrived in Lhasa on 27 August 2005 for theformal commemoration of the anniversary, whichrepresents a significant opportunity for Beijing toshowcase the successful establishment of “TAR”, itsachievements in a colorful extravaganza, and thePRC’s ownership of Tibetan areas. Security aroundLhasa has been beefed up prior to the anniversary,with reports that armed police and soldiers have beenincreasingly visible on the streets of Lhasa city to

check any disturbances. Jia Qinglin, ranked fourthin the Communist Party hierarchy said that, PLAtroops were “not afraid of bloodshed, not afraid ofsacrifice, fought heroically, successfully completedtheir mission and put down rebellion…and putdown the disturbance.37

Prior to the anniversary, a major propaganda drivewas launched in the various Chinese medias likeXinhua, when it accused the Dalai Lama of being“hypocritical’ in his wish for genuine autonomy. Theeditorial on 1st September said the Dalai Lama “hasshown little living wisdom when he strains all hisnerves peddling his idea of the autonomy of Tibetin spite of the fact that an autonomous mechanismhas existed on the snowy lands for years.” The edi-torial also questioned the Dalai Lama’s motives sug-gesting that “a former hierarchical regime…is not atall qualified to make any remarks on a democraticstructure.” Other official mouthpiece, the People’sDaily, continued the propaganda stating, “Onlyunder the leadership of the Communist Party…canTibet have today’s prosperity and progress.”38

The PRC authorities’ overriding paranoia aboutmaintaining stability and to avert disturbances byTibetan during the major anniversary and events hassteered the authorities to embark on various pre-emptive measures including heightened vigilance,closer supervision of suspected individuals andformer political prisoners, even resorting to arbitraryarrest and detention and expulsion from one’s resi-dence to distant place until the completion of theevent. Individual with background in political ac-tivism or those previously convicted political pris-oners who have completed their prison sentencesand those Tibetans who were caught, even years ear-lier, after returning from unauthorized trips to In-dia, became vulnerable target and were detained andinterrogated. Such restrictions and tightened con-trol had created an atmosphere of tense and fear indifferent parts of Tibet during the entire period of


29

anniversary celebration. The one-day celebration ofextravaganza was turned into grand suppression ofcivil liberties of Tibetan people by ‘image-hungry ‘Chinese authorities.

On 31 July 2005, the Lhasa City’s People’s Munici-pality forcefully picked up beggars from the streetsof Lhasa and returned them to their native home-towns in order to clean up the environment of thearea. Also tourists and visitors in Lhasa City weremade to report themselves to the Lhasa SecurityBureau office along with their host from the firstweek of July. The hosts were made to promise theiraccountability and responsibility for the guests. Theregulation and control over monasteries in the sur-rounding areas of Lhasa City especially in Drepungand Sera monasteries were intensified more than ithad been in the past. Tibetans are also barred fromgoing to Lhasa city for circumambulation duringthe morning, day and evening. In the Sera Monas-tery, from the first week of July, an extra number ofChinese government officials arrived at the monas-tery and resumed ‘patriotic re-education’ campaignin the monastery.

On 14 August 2005, a big Military Exercise drillcode name “Task Force 05” started in Lhasa to dealwith sudden outbreak of untoward incidents. Thesecurity wings that participated in the Military Ex-ercise were Lhasa Security Bureau Police, People’sArmed Police and National Security Departments.The important leaders such as “TAR” Party Secre-tary, Yang Chuantang and the chairman of ‘securityand stability’ committee made speeches calling formore efforts from the people in achieving a longperiod of ‘peace and stability’ in Tibet.

Again on 18 August 2005 the stationed Securitypersonnel of Lhasa Security Bureau conducted a‘Motivation’ meeting and asked the security person-nel to put extra effort to avert political incidentsduring the celebration. The senior officials directed

security personnel to consider the celebration as animportant political responsibility, not a mere main-tenance of stability and security.

The meeting of the Politburo on 26 August led byHu Jintao concluded that ‘Tibet work holds animportant place in the overall work of the Party andstate’ 39 The meeting emphasized that the Party ‘mustresolutely oppose all kinds of separatists and sabo-tage activities, and uphold the motherland’s unityand Tibet’s stability’. The president also stated that,‘the regional autonomy system has been continu-ally consolidated and perfected’ and that ‘it is neces-sary to seriously make a success of the celebrationsfor the 40th anniversary of the founding of the“TAR”. China pledged to boost the economic de-velopment and maintain ‘social stability’, whichaimed at increasing central control by pursuing apolicy of greater assimilation of Tibet into a ‘uni-fied’ Chinese state. “Tibet has undergone tremen-dous changes. Tibet has a great potential and a broadprospect for development. Tibet now faces twomajor tasks: one is development and one isstability,”40the state news agency Xinhua quoted JiaQinglin as saying.

At the end of August 2005, representative from theCentral government headed by Mr. Jia Qinglin, weregiven lavish welcome ceremony at the Gongkar air-port and near Norbulingka Palace. It was later re-vealed that the welcoming team was selected by thelocal authorities prior to their visit to Lhasa. Fur-ther reports indicates that the welcoming team wascoerced to wait for long hours without any food aseatables, drinks and umbrella were banned due tosecurity reason. Others were coerced into attendingofficial ceremonies, with the threat of loss of payand pension, and foreign nationals were restrictedfrom traveling in the region until the intensifiedperiod of security had elapsed. Restaurants andteashops on their route were ordered to close.41

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arrests and expulsion of Tibetansprior to the anniversary

Although there were many unconfirmed reports ofarrest and detention of Tibetans prior to the anni-versary, sources in Tibet report that around ten Ti-betans were detained in Lhasa, by the Chinese StateSecurity Bureau(SSB) in the days leading up to theanniversary42.

TCHRD has documented few confirmed cases ofpreemptive detention and measures taken by theauthorities in connection with the anniversary. Forinstance, on 28 August 2005, Sonam Gyalpo43, atailor by profession from Lhoka region and a formerpolitical prisoner was arrested by the state securityfrom his home. The arrest coincided with the ‘Sum-mer Strike Hard’ Campaign launched in July 2005.Sonam Gyalpo, 43, from Lhoka region, “TAR” hasbeen residing in Lhasa.

Sonam,44 a monk in his 40s, from Toelung DechenCounty, Lhasa Municipality, “TAR” was reportedlyarrested on or about 21 August 2005 at the rearvehicle entrance of the Potala Palace. Sonam wasone of the first monks allowed to enroll at the PotalaPalace following its reopening several years after theend of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).45

Before Sonam’s arrest, he was reportedly lured by amessage saying that someone was waiting for him.He was quietly taken away in an unmarked vehicle.The incident occurred during a heightened securityalert before the “TAR” founding anniversary. As perthe latest information, he was released on an un-specified date after the anniversary.46

Wangchen, 30, a monk of Sungrabling Monasteryand originally from Khimshe Village, KhimsheTownship, Gongkar County, Lhoka Prefecture,“TAR” is a former political prisoner who reachedexile in November 2005. He had already spent three

years in Drapchi Prison. He reports, “On 1 Sep-tember 2005 during the 40th founding anniversaryof “TAR”, PSB officials from Lhoka Tsethang ar-rived at my shop on Ngachen road, Lhasa and I wasforced to close the shop for three days and orderedto leave for Lhoka right away as they suspect of anyuntoward incidents during the anniversary ceremonyin Lhasa.”47

re-education throughlabour (RTL)

Introduced in 1957 by the Chinese authorities, there-education through labour system (RTL) refers toa system of detention and punishment administra-tively imposed on those who are considered to havecommitted offenses but are not legally consideredcriminal. Re-education through labour (Ch. laodongjiaoyang or Laojiao), according to the Ministry ofPublic Security, is an administrative measure of re-form through compulsory education designed tochange offenders into people who ‘obey law, respectvirtue, love their county, love hard work, and pos-sess certain standards of education and productiveskills for the building of socialism.’

The Reeducation Through Labour ManagementCommittee is responsible for directing and admin-istering the work of reeducation though labour andfor examining and approving those who are in needof reeducation. The management committee is com-posed of officials from the civil affairs, public secu-rity, and labour departments. This committee op-erates in provinces, autonomous regions and mu-nicipalities directly under the central government.Public security organs are in charge of actual labourcamps and the people’s procuratorates’ supervise theactivities of all agencies involved in the re-educa-tional process. The police acting on their own de-termine the reeducation term. Sentence could runfrom one to three years’ confinement in a camp or


31

farm. The sentence could be extended subjected tothe judgment of prison authorities.

The recipients of a re-education through labour sen-tence has no right to a hearing, no right to counsel,and to any kind of judicial determination of his caseand in many cases decisions are made hastily. InRTL, the period of time for which criminalsuspects can be held in police custody without judi-cial approval is too long, and the status of the pub-lic prosecutor does not meet international law andstandard.

China’s practice of Re-education Through Labourand other system of administrative detention standin violation of Article 9 of the ICCPR which clearlyprovides for,

“1.the right to liberty and security of person…2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at

the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrestand shall be promptly informed of any chargesagainst him.

3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminalcharge shall be brought promptly before ajudge or other officer authorized by law toexercise judicial power and shall be entitledto trial within a reasonable time or to release…

4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrestor detention shall be entitled to takeproceedings before a court, in order that courtmay decide without delay on the lawfulnessof his detention and order his release if thedetention is not lawful.”

Moves by the Chinese authorities to abolish or re-form RTL appear to have delayed over recentmonths.48 The UN High Commissioner for Hu-man Rights emphasized the need for judicial reviewof all decisions regarding deprivation of liberty, in-cluding forms of administrative detention such as‘re-education through labour’ system.49 The main

obstacle to reform appears to be the Ministry ofPublic Security, which seems to be reluctant to giveup its broad powers of detention and sanction un-der RTL. The five major problems with reeduca-tion through labour are the lack of any kind of pro-cedural restraints, the use of re-education to incar-cerate political and religious dissidents, the prob-lem of appeal; the condition in the camps, and thesystem of ‘retention for in-camp employment’ thatpermits authorities to keep detainees or prisoners inthe camps after the completion of their sentences.

Unfortunately, China has found its extensive admin-istrative justice system a convenient mechanism withwhich to control dissidents and activists. The fig-ures of the number of people incarcerated in re-edu-cation through labor bear this out. The US StateDepartment estimates that at least 250,000 people—and possibly as many as 310,000—are serving sen-tences in ‘re-education through labour’ camps and‘other forms of administrative detention not sub-ject to judicial review.’ The subjects of such crack-downs have included labour, religious and politicalactivists.50

The report issued by UN Working Group on Arbi-trary Detention following a mission to China be-tween 18 to 30 September 2004, levied a heavycondemnation against jailing citizens without trialthrough its “re-education through labour” policy andthat the rules and practices concerning judicial dep-rivation of liberty used in China are not in line withinternational law and standard.51 The WorkingGroup visited Beijing and the cities of Chengdu,capital of Sichuan Province, and Lhasa, capital ofthe Tibet Autonomous Region and they also visited10 detention facilities included in a list previouslysubmitted to the authorities. This included the po-lice stations, pre-trial detention centres, prisons, re-education through labour camps and psychiatrichospitals.

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re-education through labourcamps in “TAR”

In recent years, the Chinese authorities have beenincreasingly using the labour camps to imprisonTibetans with political incidents and fleeing Tibet-ans. In addition to the two fully functional “re-edu-cation through-Labour” camps in the “TAR”52, anewly built re-education through labour camp inSenge Township, Ngari Region “TAR” was madefunctional in 2004. Ngari region falls in the routeof Tibetans fleeing Tibet and those returning fromIndia. With the newly established facility, the au-thorities will be able to crack down and curb theflow of Tibetan refugees on a massive scale.

A person can be convicted by a local Public SecurityBureau (“PSB”) or by the re-education-through-labour Management Committee without a courttrial. Although it falls in prison category accordingto international law, the Chinese authorities do notconsider the labour camps as prisons.

In practice, conditions in “re-education throughlabour camp”, are harsh and the workload heavy.Inmates have to work in mines and brick factoriesand do heavy agricultural labour. The People ArmedPolice ‘PAP’ guard reeducation inmates just as theyguard those who have been judicially convicted.

An account of a former political prisoner with ex-perience in re-education through labour sheds lighton the existence and practice of labour for reformand re-education. Bhudruk, 52 year-old formerpolitical prisoner from Sarshing County, KardzePrefecture, Sichuan Province, “TAP” escaped intoexile in 2005 year after completion of his prisonsentence in November 2004 reported, “In Decem-ber 1990 Kardze People’s Intermediate Court sen-tenced me to fifteen years… I was imprisoned inRangaka Prison, cell no. one. Everyday I was forcedto perform labour. I served the three years of my

term in Kardze Prison; two of my friends were alsoin the same prison. I served the remaining elevenyears in Maowan Prison53….the rich and influen-tial businessmen from China visited the Prisonguards and officials. They exploit the system of ‘re-form through labour’ and made the prisoners workextensively to produce their own goods without anywages and salary.”54

The process of reeducation is arbitrary in nature, itremoves the legal presumption of innocence, in-volves no judicial proceedings, provides for no publictrial, and makes no provision for defense against thecharges. Access to the case file by the defence coun-sel during the pre-trial phase has been excessivelyrestricted. The rights of the defence are even furtherrestricted if the case concerns charges of endanger-ing national security or state secrets. The system ofre-education through labour go beyond the legiti-mate rehabilitation measures and aim at breakingthe will of detainees and changing their personality.Such measures of re-education of detainees strike atthe very core of the human right to personal dig-nity, integrity and humanity55. The system of re-education through labour is not only a serious vio-lation of human rights to personal liberty, but mustalso be considered as a systematic form of inhumanand degrading treatment or punishment, if not tor-ture and therefore, should be abolished.

torture inside prison

Torture has long been practiced in prisons and de-tention centers across China despite its signing andratification of the United Nations ConventionAgainst Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and De-grading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) in 1986and 1988 respectively. PRC has now signed all themajor United Nations’ laws relating to human rights,however, evidence and testimonies from recentlyreleased political prisoners and detainees highlights


33

low commitment by the Chinese authorities ofupholding its international legal commitments.

Article 43 of the revised Criminal Procedure Lawof PRC states that, “the use of torture to coerce state-ments and the gathering of evidence by threats, en-ticement, deceit or other unlawful methods are strictlyprohibited.” Article 11 of CAT specifies that: “EachState Party shall keep under systematic review inter-rogation rules, instructions, methods and practices aswell as arrangements for the custody and treatmentof persons subjected to any form of arrests, detention orimprisonment in the territory under its jurisdiction,with a view to preventing any cases of torture.”

The arrest and imprisonment of Tibetans are fre-quently carried out as a result of peaceful dissidentactivity and there are serious cases of abuses follow-ing detention. Testimonies given by former Tibetanpolitical prisoners further shed light on the incidentsof severe beatings at the time of arrest, torture dur-ing incarceration, and severe beatings of inmates al-ready sentenced are reported with sufficient frequencyso much so that it put the issue beyond doubt andclearly demonstrate that such abuses are not isolatedincidents but rather the product of a policy of deal-ing with political dissidents. TCHRD continue toreceive report of such abuses.

Torture in Tibet is still used to extract confessions,defeat Tibetan prisoners’ nationalist spirit, intimi-date prisoners and cause humiliation and mentaltrauma that affect the prisoners for the rest of theirlives. While torture can and does take place at allstages of detention in various police stations anddetention centres in China, when a period of deten-tion is prolonged illegally, detainees are at higherrisk of being tortured. This is particularly the casewhen detainees are held incommunicado, that iswithout access to legal representation or the right ofthe family being informed and of their visits. Thefrequent incidence of prolonged detention in China

was clearly highlighted by an announcement pub-lished on the Supreme People’s Procuratorate’swebsite in August 2003, calling for an end to allcases of prolonged detention of ‘three years and over’by 1 October 2003, and all others to be cleared ‘bythe end of the year.’ 56

Furthermore, under Chinese law detainees are notguaranteed immediate access to legal representation;confessions extracted through torture and other illtreatment are often used as evidence against the ac-cused in court despite being outlawed57. And a de-fendant in court is effectively required to prove theirinnocence rather than the prosecution being requiredto prove the defendant’s guilt, all in violation ofseveral provisions of the ICCPR, including Article7 which states that “No one shall be subjected to tor-ture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment orpunishment. In particular, no one shall be subjectedwithout his free consent to medical or scientific ex-perimentation.”

And Article 9 and 14 of ICCPR dwell on fair trialrights for an individual. Forced confessions havebecome the biggest injustice in China’s judicial sys-tem. In many instances, Chinese courts have oftenreached verdicts heavily influenced by the testimonyof the accused. Policemen are prone to exhort con-fessions through torture in order to improve theirrate of criminal case solutions.58 People accused of‘political offences’ continued to be denied due pro-cess, detainees’ access to lawyers and family mem-bers continued to be severely restricted and the trialfell far short of international fair trial standards es-pecially those charged with offences related to ‘statesecrets’ or ‘endangering state security’ had their legalrights restricted and were tried in camera. The CPLshould be revised to establish the principle of pre-sumption of innocence and to allow lawyers to bepresent during interrogation.

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The practice of torture and ill treatment continuedto be reported in a wide variety of state institutiondespite the introduction of several new regulationsaimed at curbing the practice. The common meth-ods of torture and ill-treatment recorded by theTCHRD and given by the UN Special Rapporteuron Torture after their visit includes kicking, beat-ing, suspension by the arms, electric shock baton(esp.cattle prod59) shackling in painful position, ciga-rette burns; hooding/blindfolding; guard-instructedor permitted beatings by fellow prisoners; use ofhand cuffs or ankle fetters for extended period in-cluding solitary confinement or secure holding ar-eas, submersion in pits of water or sewage; exposureto conditions of extreme heat or cold, being forcedto maintain uncomfortable position, such as sitting,squatting, lying down, or standing for long periodsof time, sometimes with objects held under arms;sleep and food or water deprivation, prolonged soli-tary confinement, denial of medical treatment andmedication; hard labour and others60.

The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Prof.Manfred Nowak following the inspection visit toChina from November 20 to 2 December, whichincludes visits to Beijing, Lhasa, “TAR” and Urumqi,Xinjiang Autonomous Region, confirms that tor-ture still remains widespread in China.61 Prof.Nowak told, “There is a growing awareness thattorture is quite widely practiced in the commoncriminal proceedings (in China) by the police andthat something needs to be done.”62. The visit byNowak, who is the first special rapporteur on tor-ture to visit China, comes after years of negotia-tions between the UN and China on allowing un-fettered access to prisons, private talks with detain-ees and no retaliation on prisoners. In the early1990s, a UN Special Rapporteur on ArbitraryDetention visited Drapchi prison in Tibet. But pris-oners were later punished for what they told theinvestigator. Many were beaten and some of the pris-oners got their sentences increased.

Despite minor steps forward in describing offensesof torture and ill-treatment that can be prosecuted,the definition of torture in Chinese law continuesto fall far short of the definition contained in Ar-ticle 1 of the Convention Against Torture. Torturein Chinese law is still essentially defined as the useof physical force (the Chinese word for torture,‘Kuxing’ primarily connotes physical torture), whichhas serious consequences, resulting in permanentinjury or death, to coerce a statement or extract con-fession. Given this explanation, torture is rarely pros-ecuted in China. In particular, physical or mentaltorture that leaves no physical trace is difficult ifnot impossible to punish with appropriate penal-ties in China The law prohibits only physical abuseand does not incorporates mental torture. No pro-vision in the law prohibits psychological torture,which constitutes a major part of torture, particu-larly significant omission in view of China’s docu-mented use of solitary confinement to punish pris-oners who refuse to submit to ‘re-education’ or re-form’.63 While providing impunity for officials whoemploy physical violence, this reality also effectivelyencourages many law enforcement officials to relyon ill treatment, rather than on proper investigativetechniques, to break cases.

With the purported legislative improvements en-acted by its 1997 revisions of the Chinese CriminalCode and the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) of197964; included the redefinition of the charge“counter-revolutionary activities” to “endangeringstate security”. These amendments, however, remaininadequate to deter, punish and redress acts of tor-ture. China’s focus on nominal legislative changebetrays its tacit recognition that the practical reali-ties of Tibet remain largely unchanged. Torture con-tinues to be endemic and prevalent occurrence indetention centres and prisons and it continues to bean instrument of state control in Tibet, resulting inmany serious physical and mental injuries anddeaths. The police, prison guards, Public Security


35

Bureau officials routinely torture Tibetan detainees,particularly for those held for political crimes.65

From various provisions of the CPL, the most per-tinent to Tibet are articles 102 to 106, which rede-fine and expand the scope of crimes against the se-curity of the state, the new practical equivalent of‘counter-revolutionary’ crimes66. Article 103 of thenew Criminal Code is devoted expressly to crimesof ‘splittism,’ a provision ‘clearly aimed at pro-in-dependence movements and activists in restive eth-nic minority regions such as Tibet, Xinjiang and InnerMongolia67.

Almost all the Tibetan prisoners arrested have atsome stage undergone severe physical abuse at thehands of either Public Security Bureau officers orprison guards, or often by both. In practice, mostof these perpetrators enjoy impunity for their actsas Tibet lack genuinely independent judiciary thatfacilitates the impunity for perpetrators and thoseacts in violation of the Torture Convention. More-over, the inadequate sentences or punishmentshanded down to perpetrators of torture demonstratethe ineffectiveness of China’s implementationpolicies.

In short, China has generally failed to take substan-tive measures to prevent torture since its last reportto the Committee in 1999.68 China’s revised Crimi-nal Procedure Law(CPL), along with the revisedCriminal Law(CL), has done little to prevent tor-ture. Combating torture in China is further impededby the absence of essential procedural safeguardsnecessary to make its prohibition effective, includ-ing the effective exclusion of evidence from state-ments established to be made as a result of torture;presumption of innocence; the privilege against self-incrimination; timely notice of reasons for deten-tion or arrest; prompt external review of detentionor arrest; granting on non-custodial measures, suchas bail; the right to habeas corpus; and timely access

to counsel and adequate time and facilities to pre-pare a defence. Other serious limitations are the lackof an independent monitoring mechanism of allplaces of detention and a functional complaintsmechanism.

Unfortunately, claimed progress on human rightsissues has repeatedly been shown as rhetoric and of-ten legislation is proscribed by newer laws. In theCriminal Procedure Law, the ‘endangering of statesecurity’ is regarded as a grave crime, under the pre-text of which many human rights violations are com-mitted. Numerous Tibetans have been arrested, de-tained and tortured with the justification of ‘pro-tection of state security’. In particular, launch of thesummer ‘Strike Hard’ campaign has been used tojustify a swift and very powerful crackdown on po-litical dissidence.

There were many instances where Tibetans died ei-ther in Chinese custody or after release from theprisons in their very poor health conditions due totorture69. Reports indicate that denial of timely andeffective medical attention to the prisoners has beenone of the main causes of their deaths.

1. Rinzin Wangyal a.k.a Rinwang, 59, who wasserving life term, died in Pawo Tramo prison70atthe end of 2004. Neither has there been anyofficial confirmation of his death nor his bodywas handed over to his family. His healthcondition was reportedly known to have gravelydeteriorated due to constant torture over the yearsin prison71.

He was first arrested in 1966-67 for alleged pro-independence underground movement whileworking as a laborer in a cement factory. He spent17 years in Drapchi Prison where he enduredregular torture and interrogation and wasultimately released in 1982. He was rearrested inAugust 1995 being involved in activities aimed

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at disrupting the 30th founding anniversary ofthe “TAR” on 1 September 1995 and sentencedto a 16-year prison term in October 1997. Hissentence was extended to life imprisonment whilein prison because of his involvement in theprisoners’ protest during the visit of the UNWorking Group on Arbitrary Detention on 11October 1997.

In the spring of 1996, Rinzin Wangyal wasrefused permission to see his seriously ill wife,Sonam, who died later that year. During herprolonged illness, the PSB failed to respond toseveral letters of appeal by Rinzin Wangyal andhis wife’s relatives requesting for a last meetingbetween the couple. Political prisoners weredenied even the very basic fundamental humanrights and tortured both mentally and physicallyfor their offences.

2. Dolkar, a nun of Shubtsang Nunnery and aformer political prisoner72, testified to TCHRDabout numerous tortures that she and her friendshad undergone while in Drapchi Prison. “I wasmade to kneel down, kicked and beatendiscriminately. I told that, ‘I would not kneelbefore you as you are not any lamas’. At thatmoment I was hit with belt buckle on my headleading me to bleed profusely. Without even atinge of compassion they continued to hit andslap my face and my friends. Torture and beatingare always part and parcel of every interrogationsession in the detention center. We were allinterrogated and tortured separately and were putinto different cells. We were kept in the detentioncenter for exactly seven months with guard alwayskeeping surveillance.”

3. Ngawang Tsultrim, a former political prisoner73

recounts the torture he and his friends hadundergone, “The four of us demonstrated for afew minutes in the crowded Barkhor market

when a team of officers from Lhasa PSB andAnti-riot police dressed in civilian clothes arrestedand shoved us into a vehicle. We were taken toGutsa Detention Centre where we were lined upand hit on our knee, joints and all over the bodywith a hammer. We collapsed on the groundunable to stand the excruciating pain. Each of uswas then held by our feet by two officers anddragged towards the cells like a corpse. We werelocked up in separate cells. The next day, we werecalled for interrogation separately. An officerasked me questions while two others stood bythe side hitting me when I didn’t answer properly.”Ngawang was severely tortured wheninterrogators were enraged with his answer duringinterrogation session, “they lifted up my monasticrobe from the back and started to lash me withtheir leather belts. One officer took an ironashtray lying on the table and hit me on my head.When I regained my consciousness, they startedto kick and punch me on the face. My co-protestors also met with the same fate.”74

4. Tashi Dolkar along with four other nuns fromShubsang Nunnery in Lhasa, were arrested andsentenced to three years for peacefuldemonstration against the Chinese governmentin Barkhor Street in Lhasa. She shared the painand torture she and her friends had to undergoin the prison and during interrogation session,“Police officials told us to tell the truth and evenwarned us that it would be better to accept themistake. During the hour long interrogationsession, I was banged against the wall. I was evenslapped, punched and kicked indiscriminately.Then we were taken to Gutsa Detention Centerin a truck. When Ngawang Tsetan ask about thedestination, in no time the police gave her a tightslap on her face. On reaching Gutsa, the policeforce handed over the detail interrogation paperto Gutsa officials and we were left standingoutside for hours on end. On the front wall of


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the house following words were written inTibetan and Chinese. “leniency to those whoconfess, severity to those who resist” (Ch. tanbaicongkuan, kangju congyan). We were later takento different cells and questioned by policeseparately one after another. They asked us aboutthe reason behind the demonstration and nameof the group leader.”

“I was solitarily confined in cell no. 8 for more thantwo months. During my two months in solitaryconfinement, I had a severe nose bleeding. I evenasked the police for medical attention which theyrefused.”

A sudden and mysterious death of a monk ofDrepung Monastery, Ngawang Jangchup, 28, in thefirst week of October 200575 can be attributed tomental torture that he had to undergo followingthe ‘work team’ officials visit to conduct “patrioticre-education” campaign. Following a heated argu-ment with the ‘work team’ when he flatly refusedto condemn the Dalai Lama as a ‘splittist’ and pledgehis loyalty to the Chinese government as requiredby the patriotic campaign, he furiously returned tohis quarter and never came back alive. Monks ofthe monastery speculate his death as suicide due toextreme psychological trauma. The authorities’ vig-orous and incessant campaign to denounce their re-ligious and spiritual guide the Dalai Lama lead themto undergo extensive mental agony—sometimesdriving them to take extreme step of committingsuicide.

The use of torture and other inhuman treatmentsare endemic in various detention centers and pris-ons across China, which were used to extract andforced confession from the suspects and prisoners.Torture and inhuman treatment still continue toprevail. And impunity for the perpetrators is majorconcern for all member countries and should takeappropriate measures to check the use of torture.

China has long refused to allow outside inspectors,such as those from the International Committee ofthe Red Cross, to visit its prisons except under con-trolled conditions. Its rigid position has derailed sev-eral proposed tours by the U.N. Special Rappor-teur to investigate allegations of torture in Chinesejails.

The Criminal Law of the People’s Republic ofChina, promulgated by the National People’s Con-gress on July 1, 1979 and amended on March 14,1997 specifically prohibits state functionaries fromextracting confession from criminal suspects bymeans of torture.76 Article 14 of the Prisoner Lawforbids prison official from “coercing confession bytorture, physical abuse, imposing corporal punishmentsagainst imprisoned77 and “from insulting the dignityof the imprisoned.78 The CPL also lacks a clear pre-sumption of innocence and a right to remain silentto avoid self-incrimination, the very basis for a fairlegal system. China should adopt these basic prin-ciples in its criminal law in order to bring the Chi-nese legal system in compliance with internationalhuman rights norms.

Forced confession is common in China althoughineffective measures were taken to tackle torture.The procurator-general of China’s Supreme People’sProcuratorate, Jia Chunwang, made a report toChina’s top legislature, the Standing Committee ofthe National People’s Congress (NPC) that fromJanuary to August 2004, the prosecutor organ na-tionwide had probed and dealt with more than 700cases related to illegal detention and interrogationby torture.79 A law professor told Xinhua that, “Al-though strictly forbidden by law, forced confessionis common in many places in China because thepolice are often under great pressure from above tosolve criminal cases.”80

China lacks an independence judiciary, and the ju-diciary suffers from relatively low status in com-

38


parison to other State organs. Without a court sys-tem that judges cases fairly and independently ac-cording to law, thereby redressing grievances in atimely manner, the problem of torture cannot bebrought under effective control, particularly in acontext where police exercise wide discretion inmatters of arrests and detention and are under pres-sure to solve cases.

The continued use of torture by law enforcementofficials in China is a matter of great concern. Thegovernment has taken steps to minimize the use oftorture, notably the creation of new police affairssupervisory departments within the Public securityorgans to investigate police officers who use tortureto extract confessions and break the law in otherways81 but China lacks the public institutions or anindependent monitoring mechanism necessary tomonitor and expose law enforcement abuses in allplaces of detention and lack a functional complaintsmechanism. And the practice of torture still contin-ues to be widespread despite government measuresand the prohibition of torture by law

lack of judicial independence

Though the PRC has made three major legislativechanges since 1999, a Constitutional amendmentenshrined in the constitution the principle that thePRC is a State governed by the rule of law,82 sec-ondly, in 2000, the National People’s Congress(NPC) enacted the Legislation Law, a statute in-tended to standardize China’s law-making processand define the boundaries of legislative power. Un-der this law, only the NPC, and in some cases itsStanding Committee, can pass legislation on mat-ters relating to the structure of State organs, thecriminal justice system, and the deprivation of lib-erty of Chinese citizens. Before the Legislation Lawwas enacted, the State Council (government branch)was empowered with a wide mandate to regulate;

thirdly, on 14 March 2004, the NPC amended theConstitution by adding a provision: ‘The State re-spects and safeguards human rights’, providing forthe first time in its history a constitutional protec-tion of human rights. Enshrining human rights inthe Constitution is, therefore, a matter of majorimportance and a milestone in the move to pro-mote and protect human rights. As a result of thisdecision, the Criminal Law, the Criminal ProcedureLaw and the framework governing administrativedetention are under consideration by the NPCStanding Committee in order to bring them intoline with the new provisions of the Constitutionand gesture hailed by a law expert in Beijing as ‘onemore step towards judicial justice.’83

Article 126 of the Chinese Constitution states that“courts shall, in accordance with the law exercise ju-dicial power independently and are not subject to in-terference by administrative organs, public organiza-tions, or individuals.” In reality, the Chinese judi-ciary system comes under three bodies in the en-forcement of law: the procuracy, the court and thepolice forces. The fact that all of them operate un-der the close control of the Communist Party is,therefore, in clear contrast with the UN basic prin-ciples on the independence of judiciary which statesthat, “the judiciary shall decide matters before themimpartially, on the basis of the facts and in accordancewith the law, without any restrictions, improper in-fluence, inducement, pressures, threats or interference,from any quarter for any reason.”84

The status of procurator in China does not have therequired independence of an officer as regulated bythe law to exercise judicial power as stipulated bythe article 132 of the Constitution of PRC, “TheSupreme People’s Procuratorate is the highestprocuratorial organ. The Supreme People’sProcuratorate directs the work of the local people’sprocuratorates at different levels and of the specialpeople’s procuratorates; people’s procuratorates at higher


39

levels direct the work of those at lower levels.” As aconsequence of this hierarchical subordination of theorgans of prosecution, procurators are bound by theorders of their superiors. In the absence of any clearprovision stating that individual procurators are in-dependent in exercising their power to take deci-sions in pre-trial detention matters, procurators dono meet the criteria of an officer authorized by lawto exercise judicial power as per the meaning of ar-ticle 9, paragraph 3, of the ICCPR.

Under the Chinese law, the police may detain acriminal suspect without formal charges for 24 hours,which can be extended with the approval of theprocurator for a period of up to seven days, and inexceptional cases to 37 days.85 The approval is ap-parently taken on the basis of the case file, and inmany instances without hearing the suspect in per-son and this does not satisfy the international stan-dards. The rationale behind the requirement is thatthe person in custody shall be brought before a courtor a judicial officer that before taking a decision onhis arrest, the suspect shall be given an opportunityto argue against this decision.

Recently China’s top legislators are considering re-ducing police powers to detain suspects in order tosafeguard citizens’ rights... Under the new draft, thepolice power to detain suspects for 36 hours andkeep them in jail for 30 days would be cut to amaximum of 12 hours detention and 20 days in jailrespectively.

The individual accused of political crimes in ‘en-dangering state security’ and those accused of ex-change of ‘classified’ information with individuals,institutions or organizations based abroad are oftendenied the right to a fair trial and other judicial guar-antees enshrined in the article 10 and 11(1) of theUDHR. Under the international law, a person de-tained on a criminal charge shall be promptlybrought before a judge or other judicial officer au-

thorized by law to exercise judicial power, and shallwithin a reasonable time be entitled to trial or re-leased. This requirement is expounded in article 9,paragraph 3, of the ICCPR86 reflecting the gener-ally accepted standard of customary internationallaw, irrespective of whether a State is a party to theCovenant.

the right to defence ofpeople restricted

During the entire pre-trial phase, access to the casefiles by the defence counsel has been excessively re-stricted and the defence counsel cannot review thedocuments and other evidence relating to the factsof the case before the opening of the trial87. Whereasin the case of charges of endangering state security,the rights of the defence are even further restricted.

Under article 96 of the revised CPL, the right of theaccused to be represented by a counsel of his ownchoosing as from the first hours of detention andthe right of the lawyer to meet his or her client aresubject to a preliminary authorization by the au-thorities in charge of the investigation. During thecourse of the detention the lawyer may meet withthe suspect but the authorities in charge of the in-vestigation can, in view of ‘the serious nature of thecrime and when it deems it necessary’, impose thepresence, of police officers or other investigators as-signed to the case. This provision is manifestly in-compatible with article 14, paragraph 3(b) of theICCPR.

Moreover, in practice, this provision appears to giverise to numerous abuses, either because the notionof state secret is not defined with sufficient preci-sion, or because it is interpreted in an extensive man-ner. In the case of Trulku Tenzin Delek, a seriousprocedural flaws during his closed trial was men-tioned by the three member fact-finding experts of

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the United Nations Commission on HumanRights88. They called on the attention of the Chi-nese authorities to the violation of the right to apublic trial, the violation of the right to chose hisown lawyer, denial of the right to know and havethe opportunity to examine the evidence presentedagainst him in court and for holding incommuni-cado detention and ill-treatment during the pre-trialperiod.

As far as Criminal Law is concerned the situationhas unfortunately not evolved. An official with theCommission of Legislative Affairs under the Stand-ing Committee of the National People’s Congresshas termed the current Criminal Procedural Law,which was enacted in July 1979 and revised in 1996as ‘ineffective’. The amendment draft of the Crimi-nal Procedural Law will be submitted to the toplegislature for deliberation in 2006 and is expectedto be voted on for adoption in 200789.

release of high profile politicalprisoners

Just before the commencement of the 61st sessionof the United Nations’ Commission on HumanRights (UNCHR) in Geneva in 2005, the ChineseGovernment handed U.S. officials a list of 51political prisoners who have been granted sentencereductions or are being considered for early release,a gesture that comes as the Bush administration wasweighing whether to sponsor a resolution criticiz-ing China’s human rights record at a U.N.meeting90.

It was reported that the list includes informationabout 56 people who have been imprisoned forpolitical offenses in China. Fifty-one of them havebeen released early from prison, received sentencereductions or are being considered for reductions,said John Kamm, executive director of the Dui Hua

Foundation based in San Francisco. Though the listincludes prominent political prisoners, it was sig-nificant that more than half of the prisoners on thelist were previously unknown to foreign govern-ments and human rights groups, including Wangdu,a Tibetan sentenced to 17 years for inciting separat-ism.

Recently much of China’s disclosure of informationon some sentence reductions is new unlike previ-ously disclosed document given to U.S. officials.For example, the list includes information about 16people convicted for spying for Taiwan and 13Tibetan prisoners91.

The flurry of activity was unusual because almostall of the prisoners were accused of “endangering statesecurity” or “counterrevolution,” crimes definedvaguely in Chinese law and routinely used to pun-ish dissidents. The law says sentence reductions forsuch prisoners should be “handled strictly,” andstudies indicate they receive clemency at far lowerrates than others in China’s prisons.

The recent release of the list of prisoners by Chinesegovernment just before the 61st session of theUnited Nation’s Commission on Human Rights(UNCHR) was just a political tactic to muffle theinternational criticism of it’s poor human rightsrecord. Many prisoners even after their release suf-fer from physical pain and psychological trauma andface difficulty in merging into normal social life.

Following are profiles of three political prisonersknown to be release in 2005

1 Jampel Jangchub was freed around 7 March2005 after 16 years and four monthsimprisonment in Drapchi Prison. He was accusedof “... illegally establishing a separatist organizationat the monastery, collecting secret intelligence,slipping across the frontier, distributing leaflets


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advocating Tibetan independence and taking partin the March 1989 riots”.92

After having initially been detained for hisinvolvement in Tibet’s first major demonstrationafter the 1959 uprising on 27 September 1987,Jampel was arrested on 19 April 1989 and thensentenced in November 1989 to 19 years prisonterm for his involvement with a clandestinepro-independence organization set up by monksfrom Drepung Monastery. In 1994, Jamphel’ssentence was reduced, reportedly because of hisgood work in the vegetable garden of DrapchiPrison in Lhasa.

Jamphel is now 43 years old and is reported to besuffering from heart and kidney ailments afteryears of torture and maltreatment in the prison.With Jamphel Jangchub’s release, the onlymember of the ‘Group of Ten’ Drepung monks,still in detention is Ngawang Phulchung who isserving 19 years of cumulative prison term.

2. Anu, a.k.a. Ama Anu, a seamstress who lost herleg after being hit by a truck when she was young,was released this year after completing a four-year sentence. Although the exact charges againsther are not known, she was detained as part of a‘Strike Hard ‘crackdown begun in March 2001in Lhasa and sentenced in the following October.Taking food to political prisoners, as well asproviding shelter to some of them after theirrelease, may also have attracted the attention ofthe authorities and led to her arrest. Anu is nowabout 52 years old93.

3. Lobsang Namgyal94, a monk of Lhasa’s NechungBuddhist Institute was arrested in March 2001and sentenced to four years imprisonment inDrapchi Prison after being sentenced to threeyears re-education through labour’ in 1995. Heis now in his late 30s.

clampdown on popularTibetan lamas

Release of political prisoners by Chinese authoritiesdoes not seem to indicate that Chinese policy onTibet has changed for the better. In the past twelvemonths the Chinese authorities took actions toclamp down on certain Tibetans, individuals whohave made tremendous contribution towards thepreservation of Tibetan culture and religion and lookafter the needy people of their locality.

It is widely believed that religious leaders, due totheir mass following and potential to influence thelocal people, have in recent times become prime tar-gets for persecution and faced insurmountable ob-stacles. This pattern of perceiving religious leadersas threat has resulted in a series of arrests of reveredlamas including Geshe Sonam Phuntsok, TrulkuTenzin Delek and Bangri Tsamtrul Rinpoche overtheir alleged links to ‘splittist’ activities and theirloyalty to the Dalai Lama. Such repression of reli-gious leaders have been aimed to set intimidatingprecedent for other religious heads or communityleaders who work for the welfare of the people andtowards the preservation of Tibetan religion—a vi-tal foundation of the Tibetan culture and tradition.Such cases appear to reflect a more stringent trendby the Chinese authorities in Tibet of undermininglocal community leadership by singling out for se-vere punishment individuals, who have been in-volved with work focusing on Tibetan language,culture and religion. The attack is less on commu-nity service and more on their growing popularity,which would threaten the stability and incite sepa-ratist.

Following are few known cases of arrest and subse-quently prison sentence and persecution clamped onthe popular religious leaders and their associates.

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Bangri Tsamtrul Rinpoche andNyima Choedon

Bangri Tsamtrul Rinpoche (a.k.a Jigme TenzinNyima) and Nyima Choedon, a couple whofounded and ran the Gyatso Children’s Home inGyatso Township, Lhasa, are currently serving lifeimprisonment and seven and a half years prison sen-tence respectively for alleged political offences in-cluding ‘espionage and endangering state security’.

After their arrests in May 199995 Bangri Rinpochewas given life term while Nyima Choedon was ini-tially sentenced to ten years. On 29 May 2001 bothwere shifted to Drapchi Prison in the north of LhasaCity and were incarcerated in solitary confinementfor more than a year. They were later shifted to prisonunit no. 5 meant for prisoners with political charges.At least 23 people were arrested in connection withBangri Rinpoche’s case and twelve of them were sen-tenced to imprisonment with varying terms.

Recent information from Tibet indicates that BangriRinpoche has been physically weakened by his im-prisonment and was hospitalized at least once dur-ing his sentence in November 2002, and an eyewit-ness report describes that, “He was shackled to thebed by his wrist and his ankles, although he was tooweak to move anyway. There was no one else in theward apart from prison guards, who were very hos-tile. He didn’t seem to know exactly what treatmenthe need or what was being done, but he was in a lotof pain with his stomach. He was scared to have anoperation as he didn’t trust the treatment he wasreceiving and had been treated so badly.”96

Nyima Choedon has had her sentence reduced twice,by 18 months in 2003 because she had expressed“repentence”, and by another year in February 2004.According to official information given to the SanFrancisco-based Dui Hua Foundation by Beijing,Nyima Choedon is now due for release on 26 Feb-ruary 2007.97

The Gyatso Children’s Home was closed followingthe arrests of Bangri Rinpoche and Nyima Choedonin 1999. The Gyatso Children’s Home housed andprovided education and welfare for about 60 chil-dren between the ages of three and fifteen, many ofwhom were orphans, and others whose parents wereunable to provide care for them for reasons includ-ing poverty or social difficulties. The Home wasrun with the donations from the local communityas well as from overseas charities. After their arrests,some of the children were interrogated by policebefore being sent back to their areas where they hadcome from. The rest took to the streets of Lhasa tobeg for food.

Dechen Choezom, a.k.a ‘Ani (nun) Dechen’, 44-year-old elder sister of Bangri Rinpoche had workedat the Children’s Home as a housemother who uponcompletion of her three years’ imprisonment on 17October 2002, escaped into exile. She recounts,“Before I left Tibet, I saw with my own eyes thatsome of the children we cared for at Gyatso werestill on the streets of Lhasa and are very poor, with-out education or a home. My family and ourorphanage’s home has been broken apart, and I amparticularly fearful for my brother in prison. He wasnot a splittist—he simply felt he was doing his dutyas a Tibetan by helping to provide education and ahome for children.”98

Trulku Tenzin Delek

Trulku Tenzin Delek, popularly known as Ah-NgaTashi, is a highly respected lama in Lithang County,Kardze “TAP”, Sichuan Province. On 5 December2002, Kardze People’s Intermediate Court sentencedTrulku Tenzin Delek to a suspended death sentenceand Lobsang Dhondup to immediate death. On 26January 2003, Lobsang Dhundup, the key witnessto Trulku was executed after a secret trial at SichuanPeople’s Court. Trulku’s sentence was later com-


43

muted to life term due to extensive campaign andinternational pressure in January 2005.

This crackdown came at a time when the ChineseGovernment is hell-bent on branding political ac-tivities with acts of terrorism following the Septem-ber 11 incident. Amendments to the Chinese Crimi-nal Law adopted in December 2001 places severepunishments for those who “organize or lead a ter-rorist organization” from three to ten years’ impris-onment to between ten years and life99. The term“terrorist organization” is not defined, therebyallowing a broad and ambiguous range of interpre-tation including criminalization of non-violentpolitical activities.

The real reason for his arrest may have to do withhis growing popularity over his community welfareservices among the Tibetans, and for his vociferoussupport for the Dalai Lama and his recognizedPanchen Lama. Renowned for his active involve-ment in the restoration of Tibetan culture andreligion, social welfare activities and his bold state-ments about repressive Chinese policies in Tibet,Trulku had always emphasized the need to adhereto the teachings of the Dalai Lama and to preserveTibet’s unique culture. Moreover, he had had anaudience with the Dalai Lama in India before hisreturn to Tibet.

In February 2004, the Chinese Foreign Ministryinformed the German Foreign Ministry in regardto an official EU demarche that Trulku Tenzin Delekis being held in Chuangdong Prison in Dazudistrict, Sichuan Province. In a report to the UNCommission on Human Rights, published in April2005 by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedomof Religion or Belief, the Chinese authorities weredenounced for failing to uphold the internationalstandards of fair trials in Trulku’s case. The failingsincluded “serious procedural flaws during the closedtrial; violation of the right to choose his own

lawyer; denial of the right to know and haveopportunity to examine the evidence presentedagainst him in court.” The report also expressedconcern for Trulku’s mental and physical integrityin light of his incommunicado detention andreports of his torture.

Although the Chinese Constitution provides forfundamental human rights, these protections aremore than often ignored in practice. In most politi-cal cases, the judicial system denies the defendantsbasic legal rights and due process because authori-ties attach higher priority to maintaining public or-der and suppressing political opposition than en-forcing legal norms. With such perverse rules of le-gal process in operation, a high incidence of wrong-ful conviction becomes a virtual certainty.

The Chinese legal system has contributed to theconditions in which disappearances are able to oc-cur in Tibet by allowing for prolonged detentionand administrative detention without trial. Trulku’scase contravenes Rule No.37 of the United Nations‘Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment ofPrisoners (45) whereby it was guaranteed, “Prison-ers shall be allowed under necessary supervision to com-municate with their family and reputable friends atregular intervals, both by correspondence and by re-ceiving visits.”

Like Trulku Tenzin Delek, in July 1999, GyayePhuntsok, a Tibetan scholar from Gyaye village,Rigmon Township, Ghongo County, Tsolho “TAP”Qinghai Province, was sentenced to six years inprison (and reportedly released on medical parole)for the crime of “damaging the stability of the na-tion.” Gyaye Phuntsok had founded a school,funded partially by UNESCO, which caters forsome of the region’s poorest Tibetan families andfocuses on the study of the Tibetan language.100

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freedom of expression

The Chinese authorities continue to suppress theTibetan people’s basic rights to freedom of speech,expression and opinion. Almost all known Tibetanpolitical prisoners languishing in various prisons anddetention centres in Tibet were arrested solely forpeacefully expressing their political views and opin-ions. Under the ‘patriotic re-education campaign”re-launched by Chinese authorities in July this year,monks or nun who ventures to speak their ownopinion, or to question those of the Chinese offi-cials face arrest and expulsion from their monasteryor nunnery.101

In the past one year, the authorities have added newlegal, technological and political measures of moni-toring, controlling, and restricting the free flow ofinformation and expression in various media. Therecent wave of detentions and sentencing of Tibet-ans based on ambiguously worded charges includ-ing ‘illegally leaking state secrets’, ‘disturbing publicorder’, ‘subversion’ among others for the peacefulexercise of their fundamental right of free expres-sion sends a unmistakable message to the Tibetanpeople of the risks they run in exercising their rights.There was not let-up in the relaxation over the press,investigative reporting, the internet, radio and otherforms of broadcasting in Tibet. Chinese Govern-ment uses advance technology, prior restraints, in-timidation, detention, imprisonment, and ambigu-ously and arbitrarily applied censorship regulationsto suppress free expression and control China’s me-dia. China justified its repression of free speech un-der a broad interpretation of “national security.”

The right to freedom of expression and freedom ofpress are internationally recognized and are guaran-teed in the Chinese Constitution and internationalcovenants, which China is a signatory. Article 19 ofthe Universal Declaration of Human Rights states;“everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and ex-

pression; this right includes freedom to hold opinionswithout interference and to seek, receive and impartinformation and ideas through any media and re-gardless of frontiers”

Article 27 of the Chinese Constitution states that“…All state organs and functionaries must rely on thesupport of the people, keep in close touch with them,heed their opinions and suggestions, accept their su-pervision and work hard to serve them.”

Article 35 of the Constitution of the PRC declares:“Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy free-dom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association,of procession and of demonstration.”

However, while protecting the aforementioned citi-zens’ rights, the Constitution also stipulates that theexercise of these rights must not cause harm to theState or to social and collective interests, nor infringeon the rights of other citizens, and all acts in viola-tion of the Constitution and the law will be pun-ished.102

Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civiland Political Rights (ICCPR) clearly stipulates,“Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions with-out interference. Everyone shall have the right to free-dom of expression; this right shall include freedom toseek, receive and impart information and ideas of allkinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writingor in print, in the form of art, or through any othermedia of his choice.”

Despite stipulations and guarantees for the right tofreedom of expression in the constitution and vari-ous international covenants that China has signed,regretfully the Chinese authorities have in practicerestricted the ability of the Tibetan people to fullyenjoy freedom of expression and opinion. The gulfbetween the laws and this application remains sig-nificant as authorities continue to place a higher


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priority of ‘stability’ than on addressing to the na-tional and international laws and norms. Any Ti-betan who express political views differing fromthose mandated by the state are at the high risk ofbeing arrested, tortured and imprisoned with lengthysentence.

1. Lobsang Tenzin and Thupten Nyima, a recentarrival in Nepal, recounts the incident ofexpulsion for voicing their opinion overadmission,103 “In Lhasa Ramoche Monastery, twoofficials permanently resides in the monasteryunder instructions from the Lhasa ReligiousBureau, and conduct ‘patriotic re-education.104

The elected monastery heads Yeshi Lodoe andDrakpa Gyaltsen105 reasoned with thegovernment officials that the admission of newmonks should be done through a reasonable andfairer manner unlike the current criteria ofpolitical ideology test.”106

“The next day, 115 monks of the monastery werecalled for a meeting whereby the elected headswere accused of hindering the administrativework of the monastery and they were declaredexpelled from the monastery.”

2. Three monks and three nuns, were reportedlyarrested on 14 May 2005 for allegedly pastingpro-independence posters in public areas on thewalls in Sangchu County, Luchu County, MachuCounty and other prominent areas in Kanlho,“TAP” Gansu Province. The nuns are, YontenDolma(lay name: Dukar Kyi), 22, TamdinTsomo, 23 and Choekyi Dolma, 23 and they allbelong to Gendun Tengeyling Nunnery. Themonks are Dargay Gyatso, 25, of TsangMonastery, Jampa Samdup, 27 and Lobsang, 25from Labrang Tashikyil Monastery107.

Currently Yonten Dolma and Choekyi Dolmaare known to be detained in Ganan “TAP”

Detention Centre and the whereabouts of othersare still unknown.

3. Four monks108 from Labrang TashikyilMonastery, Sangchu County, Gansu Province,“TAP” were arrested by Chinese PSB officers on23 May 2005. Jamyang Dhondup, 25, DhargayGyatso, 23, and two other unidentified monkswere arrested on suspicion of pasting numerousbills calling for ‘freedom in Tibet’ on the wallsof the monastery and its surrounding areas theday before. Their whereabouts are currentlyunknown after they were led away by the PSBofficers from the Monastery.109

life after release

Many of the former political prisoners after theirprison sentence go back to their respective village ormonastery but many are faced with social difficul-ties as well as psychological trauma of being clois-tered and monitored. Many former prisoners needserious long-term medical attention following theirrelease from prison. And many simply couldn’tafford the exorbitant medical expenses and have towithdraw involuntarily from hospital. The poignantsaga of these political prisoners never ends after theirrelease; monk and nun prisoners in particular find itdifficult to rejoin their monastery and nunnery. Andworst of all, these former political prisoners becomevirtual pariah in the society and are being ostracizedas they are under the constant glare of the authori-ties in their daily lives, have to report and be inter-rogated regularly with no job prospects.

Problems are not limited to the treatment of formerprisoners themselves; their families, friends and otherassociates, can all potentially be affected. Formercolleagues also often fall under official suspicion sim-ply through association. The chance of re-arrest isgreat prior to any major anniversaries or festivals.

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Taking advantage of the poor state of formerpolitical prisoners after their release, they were of-ten used by the authorities to discourage and serveas a deterrent to aspirant political dissents on therisks involved in open defiance and resistance. Mostof the former political prisoners who made it intoexile testify the hard and grueling life after theirrelease and difficulties it bring about for theirparents and friends as well.

1. A recent arrival, Tenzin Choegyal,110 21, reportedon the life outside and after prison sentence forGeshe Sonam Phuntsok. Geshe SonamPhuntsok is a well known Buddhist scholar andTibetan language teacher from Kardze, SichuanProvince. Geshe had spent five years in prisonfor “inciting splittist activities for traveling to Indiaand for seeking an audience with the Dalai Lamaand for taking photographs with him.” He wasreleased on 24 October 2004.

“The Chinese authorities not only disallowedGeshe from joining monastery but alsoprohibited him from going for retreat. Hisfreedom of movement was restricted as he wasordered to seek the permission from the localauthorities to go outside his area. Since his releasefrom the prison, continuous flow of devotedfollowers flock to seek an audience with GesheSonam Phuntsok. Unlike average daily audienceof around thousand people coming from far andwide places on rented vehicle in large numbers,the Chinese authorities have placed restriction onstrength and time duration of the audience. Theauthorities suspected Geshe of instigating peoplewith political and separatist ideologies. Threeofficials from the district religious departmentwould frequent the monastery two days a weekand to question the abbot about the activities ofGeshe and the public talk that he has given duringthe audience.”

“Since 28 January 2005 people coming fromfaraway places to seek Geshe’s audience werestopped at Zakog Bridge and stopped devoteesfrom entering. The authorities have posted twosecurity personnel near Zakog Bridge round theclock. Sometimes three or four officials from thecounty would frequent to round up devotees andwould warn people against keeping photos ofthe Dalai Lama and Geshe Sonam Phuntsok andto denounce ‘separatist’ activities.”

2. Choekyong, a monk of Ado Monastery, NgabaCounty “TAP” was released from Ngaba PSBDetention Center after being detained for threemonths on charges of surfing ‘unlawful’ sitecontaining the Dalai Lama portrait. ‘AlthoughChoekyong was readmitted into Ado Monasteryafter his release, his stay was made uneasy due tohis political ‘crime’. He was not able to carry onhis normal monastic life as he was constantly keptunder the surveillance of monk informants inthe monastery. His political crime waspronounced in front of around 170 monks ofthe monastery and the monastic officialsinstructed other monks against such activities.The PSB officials even threatened the monasticofficials with expulsion and other heavypunishment if they failed to check such activities.”

3. Ngawang Tsultrim, a former political prisonerreleased from Drapchi Prison on 19 June 2000after serving six years in prison for pro-independence demonstration in Lhasa He gavean account of life after prison, “Upon release, Icouldn’t return to my monastery since the prisonauthorities had already asked for my expulsionalthough the monastery authorities would havegiven me permission to rejoin. Hence I wenthome and stayed there. However, I was requiredto present myself at the Township office once amonth in front of the County authorities. Lifeafter release is very difficult for political prisoners


47

since they are not given job by anyone and theirmovements are restricted. They are bound by aninvisible chain.”111

4. Bhudruk, 52, was released from the RangakaPrison in November 2004 after serving fifteenyears prison sentence. He recounts life afterprison, ‘After my release I was deprived ofpolitical rights for five years. In addition, everymonth I had to report to the PSB office topresent myself. I was also instructed to stay outof the monastery for the next three years, andwas especially barred from mingling in the largecrowd.’112

5. Tsering Gyurme113, 32, was arrested in February2001 for singing a song in praise of ThuptenNgodup,(a Tibetan who immolated himselfduring hunger strike in Delhi) at a Nangma barin Lhasa. On 24 August 2001, LhasaIntermediate People’s court sentenced Tsering tothree years’ prison term in Drapchi Prison. Tseringrecounts that a difficult life lies ahead for everyformer political prisoner in Tibet. For Tseringtwo informants were assigned to keep vigil onhim in Lhasa after his release. Unable to toleratesuch surveillance, Tsering left for Shigatse to helphis father in his business.114

hardships faced by Tibetanrefugees

The right to leave ones own country is distinctlyspecified in the major international laws includingthe Universal Declaration of Human Rights,115 In-ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights(ICCPR)116 and Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD)117.

It was a problematic year for Tibetan refugees resid-ing in Nepal and those who seek to escape into exilevia Nepal. Generally the escape into exile is a daunt-

ing and a dangerous task. The most commonly usedroute is over the Himalayas, through the Nangpa-laMountain Pass situated in the west of Mount Everestregion of Nepal’s Solu Khumbu with height of5,716m (18,880 feet) above sea level. On this cross-ing, Tibetans risk hypothermia, snow blindness,frostbite and the possibility of falling to death. Forsome, a twisted kneecap or sprained ankle can meanbeing abandoned by the group or guide. FromNangpa-la Pass, the journey forward to Nepal takesseveral more days and puts the Tibetans at a furtherrisk of arrest and refoulement by border police orrobbery from bandits and Maoist insurgents.

Majority of the Tibetan state the desire to meet theDalai Lama in Dharamsala as their prime motiva-tion for flight. However, this is not the only reasonfor Tibetan deciding to leave their homeland, thereare numerous reasons. The decision must be viewedin the context of the continued Chinese repressionof Tibetan people’s political rights and resultant eco-nomic marginalization that encompasses the realsituation of Tibet today.

Approximately two thirds of all refugees arrive inNepal in the second half of the year, during themonths from August to January and particularlyduring the four winter months. Many attribute thistiming to fewer visible border guards patrolling onthe frozen passes during the winter session. Oblivi-ous of the imposing danger of sudden and furiousstorm in those mountain passes, the asylum seekerswades through waist deep snow and that bad weathercan result in frostbite and constant glare in the snowcauses snow blindness. Temperatures can be as lowas -40 degrees Celsius, and therefore, frostbite plussnow blindness are common occurrence amongTibetans fleeing their homeland through suchtreacherous Himalayan passes. Moreover, manyrefugees undertake the journey without knowledgeof the weather conditions and the terrain they willhave to cross.

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Upon reaching Nepalese area, Tibetans face the fur-ther hazard of possible arrest at the numerous po-lice check posts along the roads and towns leadingto Nepal. The monetary penalties incurred andphysical abuses one has to endure if caught by theNepalese police can be high. Theft of cash and valu-able is a certainty. The dominant fear among theasylum seekers is arrest and deportation back to theChinese border police. Beijing has taken advantageof the turmoil created by the Maoist insurgency andconflict within Nepal following royal coup in Feb-ruary 2005, to exert an increasing political influ-ence on Nepal. As a result Tibetans escaping fromTibet and Tibetan residing in Nepal are put in avery precarious position.

closures of Tibetan officesin nepal

The unceremonious closure of the Office of theRepresentative of HH the Dalai Lama and TibetanRefugees Welfare Office (TRWO) in Kathmandu,Nepal sent the alarm bell ringing across the Tibetancommunity in Nepal and those Tibetan transitingthrough Nepal were put in an increasingly insecureposition in the politically unstable Nepal. TheTRWO has until now been the local partner of theUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees(UNHCR) office in Kathmandu which was incharge of coordinating the transit of Tibetan refu-gees arriving from Tibet and going to India.

In a written notice delivered to the representative ofthe Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Refugees WelfareOffice in Katmandu on 21 January 2005 by theChief District Officer of Kathmandu, an adminis-trative office of Nepal’s Home Ministry,118 orderedboth offices to be closed immediately on thegrounds that they were not legally registered. Thepermanent closure of the TRWO would mean thatthe UNHCR would not have a legal implementing

partner to care for the approximately 2,500 Tibetanrefugees who transit Nepal annually on their way toIndia. In 2005, 2524 new Tibetan refugees have fledTibet across the Himalayas and into India, expos-ing various kinds of repressions and exploitationsand seeking freedom in exile.

Since majority of the Tibetans escaping Tibet intoNepal are minors it is a matter of great concern thatclosure of TRWO might trigger another spree ofrefoulment as there was no domestic legislation inthe Kingdom that covers the rights of refugees andasylum-seekers. Majority of the escapees consistingof children, who have often been sent into exile bytheir parents with unflinching hope to get enrolledin exile schools and monasteries and for a better life,undertake such a risky journey by crossing the treach-erous and sometimes fatal journey across theHimalayas. Most of the adult Tibetans who arrivein Nepal are monks and nuns, seeking religious andbroad-based education that is not possible in Tibet.Others leave because they have been unable to findwork due to competition from Chinese migrants,or have been relocated from their ancestral land tomake way for developmental projects and urban-ization in Tibetan areas under China’s western de-velopment project.

According to the international law, Nepal is expectedto provide safety, security and welfare of the refu-gees taking refuge in its territory. Article 15 of theGeneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refu-gees, that came into force on 28 July 1951, says,“As regards non-political and non-profit makingassociations and trade unions the Contracting Statesshall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their ter-ritory the most favorable treatment accorded to na-tionals of a foreign country, in the same circum-stances.”


49

To assist Tibetan asylum seekers in coping withNepalese Immigration Law while transiting throughNepal to India, the UNHCR has an unofficial agree-ment with His Majesty’s Government of Nepal. Theso-called ‘Gentleman’s Agreement’, a verbal under-standing between the Department of Immigration(operating under the Home Affairs Ministry of HisMajesty’s Government of Nepal) and the UNHCR,Nepal. This agreement states that the Nepalese po-lice should escort Tibetan new arrivals to Kathmandufor processing by the office of the UNHCR. Butthe presence of active Maoist insurgencies on theroute and in peripheries of Tibet Nepal border andsection of the Royal Nepalese army and police sta-tioned at the border region have made Tibetan asy-lum seekers more vulnerable to arrest and height-ened the chances of turning over Tibetans to Chi-nese border guards.

The main international legal tools for protecting thehuman rights of refugees are contained in the 1951Refugee Convention and the refinement to thatConvention are made in the 1967 Protocol. Addi-tionally, there are two fundamental human rightsprinciples contained within the Universal Declara-tion of Human Rights and the Refugee Conven-tion: the Right to Asylum, and the Right Not to beforcibly Deported often known by the French termnon-refoulement. The principle of non-refoulement,too, has become part of international customary law,respected regardless of whether a state has ratifiedthe Refugee Convention or not.

The Right to asylum is contained in Article 14 ofthe UDHR, “Everyone has the right to seek and toenjoy in other countries freedom from persecution.”And that the right to asylum has become a part ofinternational customary law—respected and prac-ticed by UN member states regardless of whetherthey have signed the 1951 Refugee Convention. Inaddition, Article 33 of the Optional Protocol ofthe Refugee Convention of 1951 states that, “No

Contracting state shall expel or return (refouler) a refu-gee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of terri-tories where his life or freedom would be threatenedon account of his race, religion, nationality, member-ship of a particular social group or political opinion.”

Meanwhile the Nepalese Government has decidedto cease the issuance of travel documents to all therefugees in Nepal for an indefinite period.119 Andwith the winter approaching the fate of the Tibetanrefugees pouring in from Tibet on large scale duringthis cold season remains uncertain. Such action bythe government will curtail the mobility of Tibetanrefugees and create a sense of uncertainty amongTibetans residing in the Himalayan kingdom.

Moreover, the number of newly arrived Tibetansprovided for at the Reception Center has grown toaround few thousands lately, thus raising the profileof the Centre and closure of the refugee center wouldleave thousands without critical support. Destituteand often frostbitten, they are helped by the welfareoffice with shelter and papers to proceed to Dharam-sala, North India.

It is evident from the recent development that thePRC Government has increased its direct politicalpressure on Nepal’s Foreign and Home Ministriesalthough Nepal Minister of state for Foreign Af-fairs denied any Chinese pressure120 for the closureof two Tibetan offices in Kathmandu. The authori-ties’ recent attempts to restrict religious and culturalactivities of exile Tibetans living there and harsh newrestrictions on refugees fleeing Tibet for Nepal arewidely thought to be a direct result of China’s in-creased leverage in Kathmandu. China’s ambassadorto Nepal, Sun Heping, said last year that the Tibetissue is “China’s major concern in Nepal.”121 On 28May 2004 speech to the Nepalese Council on WorldAffairs entitled “China’s Foreign Policy in SouthAsia”, Ambassador Sun said: “We appreciate it verymuch that His Majesty’s Government of Nepal is

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committed to the one China policy, understandshow sensitive the Tibet issue is to China and neverallows any anti-China activities to be carried out onNepali soil.”

arrest of Tibetan escapees

1. At the end of August 2005, Chinese border policeofficers fired live ammunition on a group of 51fleeing Tibetans consisted mainly of people fromeastern Tibet like Kardze County, DrakyabCounty, Chamdo, Derge County of KardzePrefecture and Bri Ru County of NagchuPrefecture. Except for three who managed toreach Tibetan Reception Centre based inKatmandu, the situation of the rest of the groupstill remains unknown and it is feared that theymight have been arrested in the aftermath ofpursuit by the armed officers, one member ofthe group opined. It is said that all of themattempted to escape Tibet due to restrictions onreligious teachings, lack of educationalopportunities and poor livelihood in Tibet.122

2. On 13 October 2005, Wangdue 20, NgawangYonten, 22 and Dawa 25, from Shigatse andTsekyi, 23, from Kham Drayab were arrested byNepalese police at the border town of Rasowa.The four were charged with illegally enteringNepal and traveling without documents. Theywere taken to Kathmandu on 19 October andfined over thousand Nepalese rupees by theNepalese immigration office a day later.123

3. From two groups consisting of twelve memberTibetan escapees, three were arrested by Chineseborder officials at Kyirong, Shigatse Prefecture,“TAR” who were trying to flee into exile fromTibet. The Tibetan arrestees are LobsangChoephel (lay name Drakpa), a monk of around19 years old from Minyak, Kham region; a

woman of around 20 years from Rishoel Village,Markham County, Chamdo Prefecture, “TAR”and also a teenage boy from Markham County.The arrestees were detained at a local Chinesearmy camp located in close proximity to KyirongTown.124

4. On 7 October 2005, Sonam Tsering, 18, holdingTong Xin Zhang (Travel permit which allows oneto travel till the border) was arrested by theNepalese police in Kathmandu. Two days laterhe was handed over to the ImmigrationDepartment of the Nepalese Home Ministrywhere he was imposed a monetary penalty ofNepalese Rupees 27,000 (approx:$375) or animprisonment term of three years. Since he failedto pay the penalty, he was subsequently sentencedto three years term in Dilli Bazaar Jail inKathmandu.125.

5. Another Tibetan exile returnee, Norbu Tsering,25, was arrested on 24 September 2005 at theNepal-Tibet border while on his way back toTibet. Norbu was handed over to the NepaleseImmigration Department on 28 September 2005and was imposed a monetary penalty of NRs.28,651 which he failed to pay and consequentlywas sentenced to three years and three monthsimprisonment term.126

Although according to national law or the immi-gration law of Nepal, the Nepalese Governmentclaims the right to detain illegal immigrants, underinternational human rights standards this detentionis termed ‘arbitrary’. As it was determined by theUN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention that‘arbitrary detention’ might arise in cases of ‘depriva-tion of freedom when the facts giving rise to theprosecution or conviction concern the exercise ofthe rights and freedoms protected by the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights and the Civil andPolitical Rights ….”


51

conclusion

Despite fourth round of Sino-Tibetan dialogue be-tween the Dalai Lama’s envoys and Chinese repre-sentatives in June-July this year, issuance of four whitepapers, commemoration of 40th founding anniver-sary of “TAR” and completion of laying track ofGolmud-Lhasa railway project, however, these failedto result in any significant policy changes leading toimproved protection of the basic human rights ofTibetans.

The situation on the ground remained tensethroughout the year in Tibet. Tibet witnessed height-ened restriction measures on the right to freedomof movement, expression, opinion, assembly andconscience and arbitrary detention continued un-abated especially during the days leading to the 40thfounding anniversary of “TAR” and during the ‘sum-mer strike hard’ campaign launched in July this year.

Detainees were denied many fundamental legal rightssuch as fair trial, legal representation and appeal. ThePRC invitation to the UN Special Rapporteur onTorture after the gap of ten years did reveal the loop-holes in the Chinese legal system and widespreadpractice of torture at various stages of incarceration.

The Chinese authorities officially announced an in-tention to reform “Re-education through Labour”,a system of administrative detention used to detainpeople for up to four years without charge or trial.The system is not only a serious violation of hu-man rights to personal liberty, but must also be con-sidered as a systematic form of inhuman and de-grading treatment or punishment, if not torture andtherefore, should be abolished.

The ambiguous charges of “endangering state secu-rity”, “disrupting social order” in the Criminal Pro-cedure Law are widely used to criminalize “separat-ist” activities in Tibetan region. China should amend

its criminal procedure law to ensure that all suspects,particularly those accused of ‘political’ crimes, re-ceive prompt and competent legal representationfrom the moment of their apprehension. The com-bined effects of repressive and vaguely worded crimi-nal legislation, stability concerns, use of administra-tive detention, a weak judiciary and impunity forofficials who abuse their power continued to resultin widespread abuses of human rights.

Though lately the PRC has made dramatic progressin the realization of economic development butthere is need to reduce China’s growing economicdisparities, promote greater transparency, fight cor-ruption, strengthen social justice, undertake balanceand sustainable development and most importantlystrengthen the rule of law and respect the humanrights enshrined in the constitution and internationalcovenants that PRC has signed and ratified. The PRCshould meet the growing and increasingly assertedaspirations that economic changes is generatingamong Chinese citizens. The United Nations HighCommissioner for Human Rights, Ms LouiseArbour, told the Chinese counterparts during herweek long visit to China on 2 September 2005 that“the aspiration translate into calls for transparency,fairness, and full extension of the rule of law. Seenfrom the human rights perspective, meeting theseexpectations means taking seriously the relationshipbetween economic and social rights on the one hand,and civil and political rights on the other. Humanrights and development are mutually reinforcing.”127

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NNNNNotesotesotesotesotes

1 “China hails success of second manned space mission,” Reuters,1 November 2005.

2 The official news agency of the PRC.3 “China Spares the Life of Tibetan Monk,” Associate Presse

(AP) 26 January 2005.4 “Woeser Lama who is recognized by the Dalai Lama will not

recognized by the Chinese government” RFA WashingtonDC, Broadcast 9 November 2005.

5 White Paper released by China State Information Council on28 February 2005 available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-02/28/content_2628156.htm

6 Released by China State Information Council on 13 April2005, Also see http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-04/13/content_2822511.htm

7 “China issues 1st white paper on democracy,” Xinhua, 19October 2005, http://www.china.org.cn

8 Minnie Chan and Kristine Kwok, “White paper just a big lie,say activists,” The South China Morning Post, 20 October2005.

9 The Human Rights Newsletter, http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/issue8respect.pdf

10 “Arrest of Tibetan monks for postings calling for freedom inTibet”, TCHRD Press Release: 15 July 2005.

11 “Two monks sentenced to three years for pasting posters”TCHRD Press Release 08/PR/2005, 13 May 2005.

12 Article 7, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of Universal Declarationof Human Rights (UDHR).

13 Article 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26 and 27 of the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

14 “Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary DetentionAddendum Opinions adopted by the Working Group onArbitrary Detention” UN Doc E/CN4/2000/ADD1

15 Article 51 of the Constitution of the PRC.16 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention on

Civil and Political Rights, including the questions of tortureand detention. 29 December 2004 E/CN.4/2005/6/Add.4

17 Ibid.18 Ibid.19 For detail list see the end of our Annual Report.20 “A Monk From Magar Dhargyeling Arrested For Possessing

Portrait Of Dalai Lama” Gu Chu Sum Movement of Tibet,Tuesday, 4 January 2005.

21 Sonam Phuntsog, who is said to be in his thirties, is a monkaffiliated to Kardze Monastery although he doesn’t stay in themonastery. According to the sources, he has long beensuspected by the authorities of being a free Tibet activist.Prior to his arrest, it is alleged that he shot videos of the longlife prayer ceremonies held for the Dalai Lama in Kardze fromearly 2002 onwards, and also filmed the arrival of the policesent to suppress the ceremonies at Kardze Monastery. He is

said to have evaded arrest in the past by hiding in the mountains.There is no further information available on his whereaboutsand his condition.

22 "Fire in official building in Kardze; monk arrested”, TIN NewsUpdate, 11 January 2005, Tibet Information Network (TIN).

23 “Monk arrested for pasting pro-independence pamphlet ongovernment building.” Human Rights Update, Vol.10, No.5,TCHRD, 2005.

24 “Hoisting of Tibetan national flag lands monks for elevenyears behind bars,” Human Rights Update, Vol.10, No.5,TCHRD, 2005, & Press Release, TCHRD, “Monkssentenced 11 years for Tibetan national flag” dated 11 May2005.

25 “Lhasa PSB lifts monk from Sera Monastery for detention”Human Rights Update, Vol.10, No.10, TCHRD, 2005 &TCHRD Interview No.2. November 2005.

26 UN Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from EnforcedDisappearance adopted by General Assembly resolution 47/133 on 18 December 1992.

27 Ibid.28 “President Hu meeting with Chinese-appointed Panchen Lama:

an intensification of Beijing’s campaign to enforce Tibetanacceptance for the ‘fake Panchen’”, International Campaignfor Tibet, 4 February 2005, available at http://www.savetibet.org/news/newsitem.php?id=708

29 “China Promotes its Panchen Lama as a new Tibetan leader,”AFP, Wednesday 21 December 2005.

30 Ibid.31 Reuters, 24 January and Associated Press, 23 January 2005.32 “Boy Picked by Dalai Lama a virtual non-person in Tibet.”

AFP, Monday, 8 August 2005.33 “CRC Chair Asks China to Receive an Independent Body to

Visit Panchen Lama” 20 September 2005 available at http://www.savetibet.org/news/newsitem.php?id=816

34 “China launches summer 2005 ‘Strike Hard’ Campaign”,Human rights Update, Vol.10, No.7, TCHRD, 2005.

35 Report by the Tibet Daily Newspaper, China Tibet InformationCenter on 22 July 2005, available at www.tibetinfor.com

36 RFA Online News, Saturday 15 October 2005.37 “China vows to maintain grip on ‘autonomous’ Tibet”, Reuters,

1 September 2005.38 The People’s Daily, 1 September 2005 and Free Tibet Campaign

Newsletter, Autumn 2005.39 Xinhua News (in Chinese) 26 August 2005.40 Xinhua News, August 31 2005 available at http://

www.xinhuanet.com41 TCHRD Interview, September 2005.42 “Detention before 40th anniversary of TAR,” Tibet Information

Network (TIN) 9 September 200543 Sonam Gyalpo was one of the 21 group of monks from Drepung

Monastery who participated in peaceful pro-independencedemonstration on 27 September 1987. He was later chargedfor his involvement in this demonstration. He spent fewmonths in Gutsa Detention Centre and later spent three yearsin Drapchi Prison before being released on 20 September1990. His second arrest was on 23 July 1993 when he was


53

traveling without valid papers. He was first detained at theSietru PSB Detention Center for few days, before being takento Nyari Prison (Shigatse PSB Detention Center). After sixmonths at Nyari Prison, where he was denied visitors, he wastransferred to Sangyip prison in Lhasa, where he spent a furthersix months.

44 Sonam was also appointed as a delegate on an official trip toNepal in the mid-1990s, an indication of official trust in hisloyalty. He worked first as a cook but was later promoted tothe position of (Tib. ku-nyer) or caretaker monk, at theMaitreya Temple within the Palace.

45 Human Rights Watch and Free Tibet Campaign.46 See Free Tibet Campaign website at http://www.freetibet.org/

campaigns/stoptorture/index.html47 TCHRD interview No.11, November 21, 2005.48 E/CN.4/2005/6/Add.4, Para 7, 29 December 2004.49 OHCHR, Human Rights Newsletter, available at http://

www.ohchr.org/Engl i sh/about/publ icat ions/docs/issue8respect.pdf

50 “Max: Boot: US Internet companies should be forbidden fromaiding China oppression”, New Hampshire Union Leader, 17September 2005.

51 Report on the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention:Mission to China, E/CN.4/2005/6/Add.4, 29 December 2004)the report was released on 25 February 2005.

52 Trisam Re-education-through-Labour camp was establishedin January 1992 in the west of Lhasa and In January 1998,another “Re-education-through-Labour” camp was establishedin Zithang near Chamdo County, Chamdo Prefecture, “TAR”.

53 Maowan Prison (Ch. Aba Jlan Yu) is located in Maowan QiangAutonomous County in Ngaba “TAP”, Sichuan. This prisonaccommodates prisoners from Ngaba and Kardze regions andis one of the largest prisons in Sichuan Province.

54 “Testimony of Bhudruk: the former political prisoner”, HumanRights Update, Vol.10, No.4, TCHRD, 2005.

55 Article 7 and 10 of the International Covenant on Civil &Political Rights, Article 1 and 16 of the CAT.

56 “Clear up all cases of extended detention within the year,”Announcement of the Ministry of Public Security, Xinhua.Also available on the Supreme People’s Procuratorate websiteat http://www.spp.gov.cn , 14 August 2003.

57 Article 43 of the revised Criminal Procedure Law of PRC, “theuse of torture to coerce statements and the gathering of evidence bythreats, enticement, deceit or other unlawful methods are strictlyprohibited.”

58 “China to revise Criminal Procedural Law for preventingconfessions by torture”, available at http://www.chinaview.cn,18 July 2005.

59 Electric cattle prod which is approximately half a meter inlength and flexible like a rubber truncheon and it delivers ahigh electric voltage when hit.

60 “Special Rapporteur on Torture highlights challenges at endof visit to China,” United Nations Press Release, Beijing 2December 2005.

61 Ibid. Also see “UN investigator says torture widespread inChina, but praises Beijing” AFP, Tuesday, 22 November 2005.

62 Interview with the BBC aired on Tuesday.63 “Words Without Substance: The Implementation of the

Convention Against Torture in the People’s Republic of China,”8 (1996) Human Rights in China, It also fails to incriminateperpetrators of torture, who, while not being officiallyemployed by the state, carry out official functions. NB SeeHuman Rights in China, Impunity for torturers continuesdespite changes in the Law, Report on the Implementation ofthe Convention Against Torture in the People’s Republic ofChina, April 2000, Article 4.

64 China’s revisions to its 1979 Criminal Procedure Law andCriminal Code entered into force on, respectively, 1 January1997 and 1 October 1997. Also See Hostile Elements: A Studyof Political Imprisonment in Tibet, Tibet Information Network(TIN), 1987-1998, p.6.

65 Ibid., p.6 China’s revised Criminal Procedure Law substitutesthe crimes of ‘endangering state security,’ ‘subversion,’ and‘attempts to overthrow the state’ for the prior crime of ‘counter-revolutionary’ activity. But in practice, ‘the underlying contentof the law has remained intact and there is little evidence tosuggestion that the move is anything more than an attempt tobring criminal definition in line with international norms.’

66 Ibid. p.767 Ibid. p.1768 Third Periodic Report of the People’s Republic of China on

Implementation of the Convention Against Torture and OtherCruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment on19 September 1999.

69 For further detail report on death of Tibetan political prisonersfrom torture, refer Kuxing: Torture in Tibet, Special Report,TCHRD, 2006.

70 Pawo Tramo Prison is formerly referred to as the “TAR” No.2Prison. It is situated near the town of Tramo in Pome County,Nyingtri Prefecture (Ch. Linzhi), 500 km east of Lhasa.

71 “Tibetan prisoner serving life sentence dies in Prison” HumanRights Update, Vol.10, No.2, TCHRD, 2005.

72 Dolkar, a nun of Shubtsang Nunnery served three years inDrapchi Prison along with two of her friends on charges ofscreening a video tape of conferment ceremony of the NobelPeace Prize to the Dalai Lama, at a relative’s house. Dolkarescaped into exile after her release from the prison and reachedTibetan Reception Centre Katmandu on 14 February 2005.

73 Ngawang Tsultrim served six years in Drapchi Prison alongwith three other monks for their pro-independence protest in1994 at the Barkhor street in Lhasa. She arrived in exile inMay 2005.

74 “Former political prisoner testifies torture and maltreatmentin Drapchi Prison.” Human Rights Update, Vol.10, No.5,TCHRD, 2005

75 “A young monk dies under mysterious circumstances followingthe ‘patriotic education’ campaign in Drepung Monastery,”Press Release, TCHRD, 8 November 2005.

76 Article 247 of Criminal Law of the PRC.77 Article 14(3) of the Prison Law of the PRC, promulgated by

the NPC standing Committee on 29 December 1994.78 Article 14(4) of the Prison Law of the PRC.

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79 “China cracks down on torture and forced confession” 17May 2005 available at http://english.people.com.cn/200505/17/eng20050517_185482.html

80 Ibid.81 “Top Chinese security official calls for tighter discipline of

police”, Zhongguo Xinwen She News agency, Beijing, 19 June2002, BBC Mon AS1 AsPol cdc, 20/06/2002.

82 The 15th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party hasestablished the rule of law as the fundamental principle forgovernance of the country and called for judicial reform.

83 “China mulls amending Criminal Procedure Law to qualifyfor UN human rights convention”, Xinhua, available at http://english.people.com.cn/200509/08/eng20050908_207203.html.

84 http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_comp50htm.85 Article 60 to 76 of the Criminal Procedure Law of PRC.86 “Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be

brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorizedby law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trialwithin a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be thegeneral rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained incustody, but release may be subject to guarantees to appearfor trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and,should occasion arise, for execution of the judgment.”

87 Article 36, Criminal Procedure Law of the PRC.88 United Nations Human Rights Experts express concern over

situation of Tibetan monk, 15 April 2004. http://www.unog.ch/

89 China to revise Criminal Procedural Law for preventingconfessions by torture. See http://www.chinaview.cn 18 July2005

90 Philip P.Pan, “China Discloses Prisoner Details GesturePrecedes Possible U.N. Vote,” The Washington Post,The Washington Post Foreign Service Monday, 7 February2005, p.15.

91 Ibid.92 “China releases Jamphel Jangchub after 16 years in jail,” Human

Rights Update, Vol.10, No.3, TCHRD, 200593 Tibet Information Network, TIN March 2005.94 Lobsang Namgyal was born in Chushur County, Lhasa

Municipality, “TAR”95 Though the exact circumstances under which they were

arrested in 1999 remain unclear, there has been muchspeculation on their arrests. Initial report suggest thatRinpoche’s arrest came on charges of his alleged connectionwith Tashi Tsering who was implicated for attempting to blowhimself up with bomb in the Potala Square during the NationalMinority Games in Lhasa in August 1999. Tashi Tsering unableto bear continued interrogation through severe torturecommitted suicide on 8 February 2000.

96 “Fears for school founder in Prison,” International Campaignfor Tibet 13 September 2005.

97 “School founder ‘seriously ill’ in prison and children beg in thestreets after closure of children’s home in Lhasa,” InternationalCampaign for Tibet, 13 September 2005.

98 Ibid.

99 Article 120 of the Criminal Law of the PRC.100 “Dedicated Tibetan disappeared” Press Release, TCHRD

available at http://www.tchrd.org/press/1999/pr19990407.html

101 “China recommences ‘patriotic education’ campaign in Tibet’smonastic institutions,” TCHRD Press Release dated 13October 2005.

102 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/4, Report of the Working Group onArbitrary Detention Follow-up information received from theGovernment of China, 28 December 1999.

103 Over the years, the Chinese authorities in Tibet have beenappointing their officials in the monastic institutions tomonitor and control the activities of the monks. Althoughmany Tibetans want to pursue their life in monastic studies,the interference through government appointed officials inthe monasteries make it hard for the monks to live their lifepeacefully. Anyone who fails to abide by the rules set by theauthorities and voice their opinions either face expulsion atthe least or imprisonment.

104 “Monks expelled for voicing their opinion over admissionpolicy,”Human Rights Update, Vol.10, No.3, TCHRD, 2005.

105 Both Yeshi Lodoe and Drakpa Gyaltsen are around thirtyyears old and have been a monk at the Ramoche Monasteryfor a long time.

106 The recruitment process of new monks saw correct politicalideology as a criterion for admission over spiritual knowledge.Anyone who fails to pass the allegiance test is not givenadmission in the monastery. In 2004, around 70 new monksregistered for admission in the monastery. During theexamination, the monks were given a question paper with thefollowing questions; Do you agree that the “separatist” groupsshould be cracked down? How do you think the solidarity ofthe motherland can be achieved? The monastery should sustainon itself and not on the support of the people, what is youropinion? etc… Except for 24 monks, the rest did not give anyanswer to the questions and were automatically disqualifiedfor admission.”

107 “Six Tibetans arrested for pro-independence postings,” HumanRights Update, Vol.10, No.7, TCHRD, 2005.

108 Dhargay Gyatso was born in Arig Village and admitted toLabrang Tashikyil Monastery at an early age. He traveled toIndia in 1996 where he studied Buddhist scriptures for sixyears in a Tibetan monastery in South India. He returned toTibet in 2003. While Jamyang Dhondup is originally fromMalho County.

109 “Arrest of Tibetan monks for postings calling for freedom inTibet,” Human Rights Update, Vol.10, No.6, TCHRD, 2005.

110 Tenzin Choegyal is from Kyilsar Village, Shingsar Township,Kardze Prefecture, Sichuan Province “TAP.”

111 “Former Political prisoner testifies torture and maltreatmentin Drapchi Prison,” Human Rights Update, Vol.10, No.5,TCHRD, 2005.

112 “Testimony of Bhudruk the former political prisoner,” HumanRights Update, Vol.10, No.4, TCHRD, 2005.

113 Tsering Gyurme is from Ngashey Village, Khagong Township,Kardze “TAP” Sichuan Province.


55

114 TCHRD Interview No.12. November 2005.115 Article. 13(2) UDHR, “Everyone has the right to leave any

country, including his own, and to return to his country.”116 Article. 12 (2) ICCPR, “Everyone shall be free to leave any

country, including his own.” 117 Article. 5 (d) (ii) of the ICERD, “The right to leave any country,

including one’s own, and to return to one’s country.”118 “Nepal Govt shuts down Dalai Lama’s office,” Katmandu Post,

28 January 2005, Kathmandu. Visit www.nepalnews.com119 Kamdev Khanal, “Govt not to issue travel documents to

refugees,” Kathmandu Post, 24 October 2005, Kathmandu.Visit www.nepalnews.com

120 “Nepal govt shuts down Dalai Lama’s office”, Kathmandu Post,28 January 2005, Kathmandu. Visit www.nepalnews.com

121 “Nepal Orders Closure of Dalai Lama’s Office and TibetanRefugee Organization in Kathmandu” (ICT) InternationalCampaign for Tibet, 27 January 2005 Also see HamishMcDonald, “Nepal shuts door on fleeing Tibetans (SMH)”Sydney Morning Herald, 29 January 2005.

122 “China’s border patrol opens fire on a group of fleeing Tibetanrefugees,” Human Rights Update, Vol.10, No.9, TCHRD, 2005.

123 Voice of Tibet Radio Service report on 23 October 2005.124 “Three Tibetans arrested for attempted escape,” Human Rights

Update, Vol.10, No.8, TCHRD, 2005.125 “Tibetans jailed in Nepal, deportation likely,” Human Rights

Update, Vol.10, No.9, TCHRD, 2005.126 Ibid.127 The Human Rights Newsletter, available at http://

www.ohchr.org/engl i sh/about/publ icat ions/docs/issue8respect.pdf

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Front side of the Chinese Internet ID card, which all Tibetan arerequired to use to access the Internet

Back side of the Chinese Internet ID card, which all Tibetan arerequired to use to access the Internet

Information

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INFORMATION

introduction

Information is power in today’s world and the rightto information equips an individual with the very“Right to Know” tool and lays the foundation forseveral other freedoms and fundamental rights. Theright to information, although seen as an integralpart of the broader right to freedom of opinion andexpression, of its own, it forms and is a right in andof itself encompassing three interrelated dimensions:“the right to seek information,” “the right to receiveinformation” and “the right to impart information.”The right to information further entails the exist-ence of the free and independent media and, a plu-ralistic system of information through which ob-jective, complete, true and timely information canbe made both accessible and available to anyoneanywhere and anytime regardless of frontiers andwithout interference.

However, the degree of enjoyment of the right toinformation depends on the degree of commitmentand cooperation of the state. The Special Rappor-teur on the freedom of opinion and expression, inhis report to the 60th session of Commission onHuman Rights 2004, endorses definition of the rightto information as “an independent right that im-ports positive obligation on States to ensure accessto information.”1 While the state should strive toensure that objective, complete and timely infor-mation reaches all segments of society without dis-

crimination based on ethnicity, language, religionor gender and political affiliations, it should alsorefrain from interfering in the free exchange and dis-semination of information and from preventingindividuals from accessing information that should,otherwise, be made freely available to the public,including government held information.

The right to information, including the freedom ofspeech and expression and, of press and broadcast-ing, are internationally recognized and these rightsare also, somehow and in some ways, guaranteedunder the laws of the People’s Republic of China(PRC), although a consolidated law on the right toinformation has not been implemented so far.

Although, China now openly claims that it respectsand promotes freedom of information, the situa-tion in Tibet has not eased that much. The past yearshave seen that the Chinese authorities in Tibet con-tinue to implement vague and arbitrarily applied lawsand enforce new and strict censorship regulationsfrom time to time to ensure effective control overmedia and free flow of information. As Paris-basedmedia watchdog, Reporters Without Borders (RSF),stated that, harsh repressive measures deprive mil-lions of Tibetans of the right to be informed and toexpress themselves.2

Heavy and systematic censorship and surveillance,subsequent banning of publication, intimidation,

“The charges against ‘Notes on Tibet’ have mainly centered around my points of view on religion and Tibet’s reality. Asking me to “jumpthe hurdle” is to demand that I state that my believing in Buddhism is false, that I should not have used my own eyes to observe Tibet’sreality, and that in my future writing I must renounce religion and keep in tune with official directives to describe Tibet... From my

perspective, to cooperate is to violate the calling and conscience of a writer.”

Woeser (In her letter, dated 09/14/2003, to the TAR Literature

Association’s highest decision-making circle, the Party group-Wenlian Party Group)

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detention, imprisonment, blocking news broadcastsand websites, and even interruption of personal com-munications at times, are seen to be some of thepopular measures employed by the Chinese authori-ties to prevent individuals from accessing informa-tion. Moreover, the Beijing government continuesto develop and employ new technologies to furtherprevent its citizens from accessing information fromsources it cannot control, including short wave andsatellite broadcasts, foreign web sites, e-mail, andmobile phone text messages. In Tibet, in additionto the above modes of disrupting freedom of infor-mation rights, language barrier and lack of indepen-dent media further hinder free flow of informationand Tibetan people’s right of easier access to infor-mation.

Above all, free flow of information reaching Tibetfrom the outside as well as the information ema-nating out of Tibet has never become easier in re-cent years. This is self-evident from the fact thatdenial of freedom of information has proved to beone primary problem for the outside world to closelymonitor human rights situation inside Tibet.

right to information

Recognising the importance of the freedom of in-formation as the very basis of realizing all other free-doms, the UN General Assembly, in its very firstsession in 1946, firmly laid down:

Freedom of information is a fundamentalhuman right and is the touchstone of all freedomto which the United Nations is consecrated andthat freedom of information implies the rightto gather, transmit and publish news anywhereand everywhere without letters.3

The Preamble to the Johannesburg Principles,adopted in October 1995, reaffirms the belief that

the freedom of information is vital to a democraticsociety and is essential for its progress and welfareand for the enjoyment of other human rights andfundamental freedoms.4

Accordingly, the right to information, which in-cludes the right “to seek, receive and impart infor-mation and ideas through any media and regardlessof frontiers” including the right “to hold opinionwithout interference,”5 has been well rooted in theUniversal Declaration of Human Right and furtherelongated in the International Covenant on Civiland Political Rights (ICCPR). In its Draft Resolu-tion 2005 on the right to freedom of opinion andexpression, the Commission on Human Rights hasonce again strongly reaffirmed its recognition of theright to information.6 Similar provision is also laiddown under the Convention on the Rights of theChild (CRC)7 and in article 10 of the EuropeanConvention for the Protection of Human Rightsand Fundamental Freedoms, article 19 of the Afri-can Charter on Human and People’s Rights and ar-ticle 27 of the American Convention on HumanRights to mention a few.

Thus, right to information helps specify the con-tent of the right to freedom of opinion and expres-sion and better defines some of its constitutive ele-ments without which, the later right will never be-come complete in itself. As such, the right to infor-mation provides freedom for everyone, includingjournalists, to freely move around in order to seekand gather information and to disseminate the same.In short, the right to information guarantees freeflow and exchange of information and ideas regard-less of boundaries and through any medium of in-formation.

According to China’s Constitution, citizens of thePeople’s Republic of China “enjoy the freedom ofspeech, of the press, of assembly, of association, ofprocession and of demonstration”8 and states that,

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“the state promotes the development of literatureand art, the press, broadcasting and television un-dertakings, publishing and distribution services, li-braries, museum, cultural centres and other culturalundertakings, that serve the people and socialism,and sponsors mass cultural activities.”9 And underthe 1984 Law of the People’s Republic of China onRegional Autonomy, the organs of self governmentof national autonomous areas are to independently“develop literature, art, the press, publishing, radiobroadcasting, the film industry, television and othercultural undertakings in forms and with character-istics unique to the nationalities.”10

All the above provisions in the Chinese laws stronglyindicate that the freedom of information is some-how respected, guaranteed and protected in Chinaand in regional national autonomies. Moreover, onesimple statement in the latest White Paper, China’sProgress in Human Rights in 2004 and released on13 April, 2005 by the Information Office of theState Council of the PRC, clearly consolidates allthe above stated provisions on the freedom of rightto information. The paper claims that, “Citizens’freedom of information, of speech and of the pressis protected by law.”11

public information and access togovernment held information

The right of access to information, especially infor-mation held by public bodies, is easily deduced fromthe expression “to seek [and] receive … informa-tion” as contained in article 19 of both the Univer-sal Declaration of Human Rights and the Interna-tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.12 Thepreamble to the Johannesburg Principles clearlystates, “…if people are to be able to monitor the con-duct of their government and to participate fully in ademocratic society, that they have access to govern-ment held information.”13 In Tibet, this right of ac-

cess to government held information is to be as-sessed with more special focus.

Right of access to information is the key to unlockdoors and make information held by governmentand public authorities available to the general pub-lic, which will contribute not only to public de-bate, but also provide the context for better informedpublic debate on the choices facing them. Easier andgreater access to official information can create anatmosphere of greater transparency, greater account-ability14 and greater engagement between the citi-zens and the state and the Chinese government hasrecognized the same.15

The right of access to information held by govern-ment must be the “Rule” rather than the exception.16

Greater transparency can be practically ensured onlywhen the citizens’ right of requesting access to in-formation retained by government is properly pro-tected and promoted by state legislation. A Right inLaw, to know and ask, their government, local au-thorities, local schools, hospitals and police forces,for information about a whole range of issues andpolicies that matter the interests of the general pub-lic, must be made enforceable. People across thecountry must have free access to wide ranging in-formation about the functioning and policies of theirgovernment and related public authorities, abouttheir local environment, their local communities andservices, and about developmental issues. In contem-porary society, because of the social and political roleof information, the right of everyone to receive in-formation and ideas has to be carefully protected.17

In his report, the UN Special Rapporteur on theRight to freedom of Speech and Expression stated:“Under laws, on the right to access information,”bodies performing public function, “should designatean office or officer to handle requests for informa-tion. In smaller institutions, an officer can be suffi-cient who might have other duties, while in larger

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bodies, a department might be dedicated to pro-moting transparency and providing information. Inaddition, all bodies performing public functionsshould publish an annual report and a financial ac-count of their activities, and make them easily avail-able to the public even in the absence of any infor-mation requests.”18

The White Paper on human rights released in April2005 claims that China undertook a lot of activi-ties, which “greatly increased the transparency ofgovernment work, and helped citizens become bet-ter informed about administrative affairs” and fur-ther promoted the “protection of citizens’ rights toinformation, supervision and participation in pub-lic affairs.”19

However, the situation inside Tibet is different. Ti-betans inside Tibet have no means of requesting ac-cess to government held information, and there areno proper administrative or judicial proceduresthrough which agencies can be ordered to discloseinformation under their possession or control. Aformer Tibetan Teacher from Lhasa, the capital cityof Tibet, (on condition to remain unnamed) firmlystated,

In Tibet, an individual’s attempt to access officialinformation or question government’s policies orparticipate openly in public affairs or opposingthe Party policy or not following the Party line,faces more discouraging obstructions. Those whoare in Government service prefer staying awayfrom sensitive public affairs either to avoidunnecessary official harassment or, from fear ofloosing their jobs. It is self evident that denialof information rights and freedom of opinionand expression has resulted in Tibetans’ lack ofcontrol over the right to active, free andmeaningful participation in planning decision-making activities and policies. In fact, thegeneral Tibetans are not aware of their ownrights in Tibet.20

In Tibet, considering its political situation, TCHRDfeels that, the freedom of right of access to infor-mation in practice can lead to de-mystifying com-plex and sometimes little understood Governmentpolicies, such as Cultural Revolution or, more re-cently, the strict imposition of the much criticisedand the ongoing “patriotic education”21 or, the“strike-hard”22 campaign policies, arbitrarily ex-tended to hammer “splittist” forces in monastic andother educational institutions. The regular and ar-bitrary imposition of these campaigns laden withChinese government propagandas have been creat-ing more doubts, suspicion and fear in the minds ofthe Tibetan people and widespread speculationamong the international human rights organisationsagainst the Chinese Government.

The Chinese Government should set an example tothe rest of the public sectors in pursuit of greateropenness and lead the way in making the informa-tion it releases available to the widest possible audi-ence and making Tibetans in Tibet aware of theirrights. A good government is an open government.It’s the government that should ensure that freedomof information disclosures at the local, regional andnational level contribute and enhance the quality andcompleteness of public debate, which in turn leadsto mutually acceptable solution between citizens andthe government. Access to information is a citizen’sright and that the procedures for accessing informa-tion should be simple, rapid and free or low cost.23

The government should constantly share informa-tion with the public wherever the public interest isat stake. Principle 13 of the Johannesburg Principlesstates that in all laws and decisions concerning theright to obtain information “the public interest inknowing the information shall be a primary consider-ation.”24

However, the Chinese authorities explain away thedenial of any information disclosure by invoking“State Secrets,” “national security,” “public interest,”

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“social order” as constant reasons. According to thenew internet news regulations introduced in Sep-tember 2005, an update of those in effect since2000, the Chinese Government aims to restrict dis-tribution of any uncensored version of a news eventand commentary. The restrictions include all newsrelated to “politics, economics, military affairs, for-eign affairs, and social and public affairs, as well as…fast-breaking social events such as a coal mine disas-ter, an official demotion, a strike, or an organizedprotest against environmental degradation.”25 Fur-ther, the new regulation is to ensure that even newsreports are “serving socialism,” “upholding the in-terests of the state,” and “correctly guiding publicopinion.”26

On the other hand, China’s Constitution asserts that,“Citizens of the People’s Republic of China havethe right to criticize and make suggestions to anystate organ or functionary.”27 And, moreover,throughout China’s white paper on human rightsreleased in April 200528 and its first white paper on“political democracy” released on 19 October,2005,29 the Chinese Government claims, withouthesitation, that the Government actively listens andlearns from the public: their interests, their prob-lems and their requests and, redresses their issues.

When citizens’ right to public information is guar-anteed by law, citizens not only have the right torequest for information, they can also hold publicauthorities to account for their decisions and actionsthat matter to individuals and communities. Whenmore and more information passes through thehands of political rivals, police, judiciary, media andthe people, it opens all the official departments acrossthe country to strict public scrutiny. In its DraftResolution 2005, the Commission on HumanRights stresses on the importance of full respect forthe fundamental importance of “access to informa-tion, to democratic participation, to accountabilityand to combating corruption.”30

But, inside Tibet, TCHRD has consistently notedthrough past experiences and, testimonies confirmedby former political prisoners and Tibetan refugees,which show that there is a distinct absence of anyofficial accountability or provision for appeal againstwhat are often or in most cases arbitrary, unfair,harsh, or discriminatory in nature. For instance, inalmost every case of custodial death of Tibetan po-litical prisoners, in the highly restricted Chinese de-tention centers in Tibet, leaves the concerned offi-cials with little or no accountability at all. Com-menting on the lack of reliable data on the extent ofthe use of the death penalty, the UN High Com-missioner for Human Rights at the end of her visitto China in September 2005, said “transparency iscritical for informed public debate on the issue”.31

The long standing issue of the Panchen Lama andthe denial of access to reliable information by theChinese Central Government on his whereaboutsand safety, even under strong international pressure,is a glaring testimony that there are many unre-ported incidences that continue to occur inside Ti-bet, but remain completely inaccessible. Even insimple cases of arbitrary arrests or imprisonment ofTibetan political prisoners, information leading tothe reasons and grounds of their arrests includingtheir safety and whereabouts, sometimes, due to lackof direct access to and difficulty in getting first handinformation, either remains unreported or by thetime they become available to the outside world areunfit to be reported as news due to lapse in time.Many of these political prisoners, who later manageto escape into exile, keep reporting incidences whereinformation of their whereabouts remained unavail-able even to their own family members for over aprolonged period of detention.

The very recent case of one Dolkar Tsering (namechanged), aged 39, a resident of Lhasa, clearly showshow the family members are deprived of the rightto be informed. Dolkar was arrested in October

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2002 after an unsuccessful attempt to flee Tibet.After undergoing repeated interrogation sessions andpreliminary prison sentences in different detentioncentres in Tibet, Dolkar was subsequently sentencedto a final prison term of about one year and fivemonths in the Lhasa Drapchi prison before she wasfinally released on 30 March, 2005. At the end,managing to get out of Tibet in 2005, Dolkar hasonly this to say:

Upon completion of my sentence, on 30th March2005, I was released. During my days at prison,my husband, cut off from any information ofwhat had happened to me, had marriedanother woman. Therefore, I had no home togo back and instead, I went to my native place.After staying there for over two months, I fledto Nepal via Lhasa. Since I can’t return to Tibetwithout putting my life in danger, I have noother choice but to stay in India and start anew life.32

The absence of right to public information in prac-tice has, thus, given the Chinese Central Govern-ment and the public authorities to exercise wide dis-cretionary power to arbitrarily suppress and silencethe Tibetan people’s most basic freedoms.

The right of access to official information in prac-tice can empower Tibetans with dignity and value,and without fear of intimidation, to acquire andavail information held by government and to coun-teract false information and propaganda or to ques-tion undesired or harsh Chinese governmental poli-cies in Tibet. It is through timely and correct infor-mation that the Chinese government can create betterpublic awareness and avoid public misconceptionamong the Tibetan people. And, in doing so, Tibet-ans do not only become aware of their rights, butare better placed to exercise their rights and, to par-ticipate fully in and supervise the work of the gov-ernment.

free flow of information andcontrol over media

The UN General Assembly, in its very first sessionin 1946 recognised that:

Freedom of information requires as anindispensable element, the willingness and thecapacity to employ its privileges without abuse.It requires as a basic discipline the moralobligation to seek the facts without prejudiceand to spread knowledge without maliciousintent…

Although Chinese citizens enjoy freedom of speech,freedom of press and of broadcasting under its Con-stitution, in practice, the government continues tosuppress freedom of information in a manner thatdirectly contravenes not only the Universal Declara-tion of Human Rights and the International Cov-enant on Civil and Political Rights, but also theChinese Constitution.33

Thus, TCHRD has observed that Chinese authori-ties employ three tools to hinder free flow of infor-mation and suppress freedom of expression inTibet:

1. Administrative and technology prior restraints,2. Monitoring, jamming and blocking of

communications, and3. Selective enforcement of broad and vague

national security laws.

The later parts of this report section, and the testi-monies collected by TCHRD, through individualinterviews and from international sources, willclearly highlight the instances where Chinese au-thorities make extensive use of each of these toolsto suppress free expression and to maintain com-plete control over China’s media and free flow ofinformation in Tibet.

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abuse of local journalist

According to an annual index published by Report-ers Without Borders (RSF), China was once againamong the countries with the poorest record on pressfreedom.34 Of the world’s 104 imprisoned journal-ists as of January 1, 2005, 46 were in Asia, includ-ing a world-leading 27 in China, one of them facesthe death penalty for divulging state secrets, statedReporters Without Borders in its 2005 Asia AnnualReport.35

The group said that a limited amount of mediaprivatization in China had done little to alter thebasic realities of reporting there. “The government’spropaganda department monitors the media, whichwere forbidden to mention dozens of sensitive subjectsin the past year,”36 the statement said. The groupfurther observed:

Journalists there simply relay governmentpropaganda. Anyone out of step is harshly dealtwith. A word too many, a commentary thatdeviates from the official line or a wrongly-spelled name and the author may be thrownin prison or draw the wrath of those in power.37

As such, Chinese and Tibetan journalists are forcedto comply with state directive and every year thegovernment gives them lists of subjects to be cov-ered as a priority. As regards religion, only articlesabout officially approved religious expression arepermitted.38 In China, and in reality, even local jour-nalists who report on topics that meet “with theGovernment’s or local authorities’ disapproval sufferharassment, detention and imprisonment”, says Su-san W. O’ Sullivan, senior advisor for Asia in theU.S. State Department’s Bureau of Democracy,Human Rights and Labour.39

In Tibet, an independent media either does not ex-ist or journalists are persecuted and censored on a

daily basis. Freedom of information and the safetyof journalist are not guaranteed there. As a measureof administrative prior restraint, only those withgovernment authorisation may legally gather newsor engage in publishing. Individuals, who publishcriticisms of the Communist party or the CentralGovernment, or publish writings based on self-ob-servation, independent research and true accounts,but which contradict the government’s claims orpolicies, are often accused and convicted on groundsof containing “serious political mistakes” or “sub-versive elements” and are often forced to admit theirmistakes or are detained and imprisoned.

banned publications

In Tibet, the Chinese government continues to bana large number of publications, printed materialphotocopies and distribution of audiovisual mate-rials that come from abroad and advocate Tibetanindependence. The materials also include locally-pro-duced independent journals, any writing dealingwith political matters and expressing human rightsconcerns or even simple notices expressing one’spersonal opinion. The official media regularly carryreminders of the ban. China’s Publicity Department(previously known as Central Propaganda Depart-ment) and the Security Ministry have the job ofenforcing these measures.

A resolution passed during the Tibet AutonomousRegion (TAR) Branch of the Central CommunistParty’s (CCP) Third Work Forum in July 1994,explicitly deals with this ban:

Some people bring from abroad publishedcounterrevolutionary materials and materialssuch as cassettes and tapes and then they recordthem or make copies of them in great numbersfor distribution. The Public Security Bureau,the Commercial and Cultural Departments,

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etc. should check up on these things seriouslyand confiscate them as soon as they appearwithout any hesitation… Those who make, putup, or distribute counterrevolutionarypublications and those who shoutcounterrevolutionary slogans should be punishedseverely and in a timely manner according tothe relevant stipulations in the law.40

The Chinese authorities are deliberately vague in theirdefinition of such counterrevolutionary materials sothat publications such as lectures by the Dalai Lama,materials produced by the Dharamsala-based TibetanGovernment-in-Exile, and anything at all critical ofthe Chinese government and its occupation of Ti-bet or even human rights documents and pamphletssometimes fall under this ban.

In October 2004, Chinese authorities decreed that,“Xizang Biji” (Notes On Tibet), a book on Tibetanculture by a Chinese-language poet, Woeser (Ch.Wei Se) with favourable and sympathetic referencestowards the Dalai Lama, contained “political errors”and subsequently banned it. Because of the ban onher book, Woeser has since been removed from herposition in the “TAR” Literature Association andthe housing assigned to her has been confiscated andwas further deprived of her income, medical insur-ance, and retirement pension, and restricted fromapplying for a passport to leave the country.41

Woeser is a Tibetan woman author writing in Chi-nese. Born in Lhasa in 1966, she grew up in theTibetan region of Sichuan Province. She graduatedfrom the Department of Chinese Language and Lit-erature at the Southwest Minorities College in 1988.After working as a reporter for Ganzi (Kardze inTibetan) Daily, in 1990 she was transferred to Lhasato work as an editor with Tibetan Literature (XizangWenxue), an official journal of the Literature Asso-ciation of the Tibet Autonomous Region (XizangWenlian). She has so far published “Tibet Above”

(Xizang Supreme), “Map of Burgundy Red”(Xianghongsede Ditu), and “Notes on Tibet” (XizangBiji). It is “Notes on Tibet” that has caused hertroubles.

“Notes on Tibet” is an anthology of Woeser’s prosewriting, which was first, published in 2003, byHuacheng Publishing House in Guangzhou,Guangdong Province. While the book becamepopular, and soon went into a second print run, itbegan to attract the attention of the censors. At first,the United Front Department of the Chinese Com-munist Party considered the book to have made “se-rious political mistakes.” This accusation was fol-lowed by the demand from those in charge of ideo-logical work in Tibet to examine the book. At thesame time, its sale in TAR was banned. Finally, theBureau of Journalism and Publication, GuangdongProvince, was ordered to completely ban the book.42

So, in spite of not being thrown into prison, Woeserhas been deprived of everything that can be takenaway from her. An ex-official and teacher fromLhasa, who cannot be identified, testified to thepossibility of ulterior motives for her punishment:

When I was a government official, Woeserworked nearby. In addition to being a writer,she was also concerned with the preservationand promotion of Tibetan culture. When aChinese well-known professional swimmer,Zhang Jian, wanted to swim across Lake NamTso in “TAR”, she successfully campaignedagainst it. She was also involved in a campaignto stop a singer who wanted to descend from ahelicopter onto the roof of the Potala and holda concert there…

After Woeser wrote her book, she was told toadmit her mistakes and apologize for harmingthe reputation of the publishing house anddisgracing the government. She refused.43

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In fact, China’s continuing crackdown on press free-dom and the right to information in Tibet concen-trates above all on those who try to publish, distrib-ute or read the exiled Dalai Lama’s writings.44

-On 21 December 2001, Phuntsok Tsering, a 24-year-old monk from Lhatse region in “TAR”, wasarrested for simply having a teaching book of theDalai Lama in his possession. He is still under de-tention.45

-On 28 August, 2005, Sonam Gyalpo was arrestedand led away by the Chinese secret service agency(Ch. Ang Jang Jue) on discovering incriminatingmaterials” such as four video tapes containing teach-ings of Dalai Lama, few political literatures and pic-tures of Dalai Lama in his house. Whereabouts ofSonam Gyalpo is still unknown.46

Principle 24 of the Johannesburg Principles statesthat:

A person, media outlet, political or otherorganization may not be subject to suchsanctions, restraints or penalties for a security-related crime involving freedom of expressionor information that are disproportionate to theseriousness of the actual crime.47

TCHRD has, however, reported numerous cases ofTibetans in Tibet receiving highly disproportionatepenalties for such expressions. For example, on 15January, 2005 Tashi Gyaltsen, 41, a monk fromDrakar Trezong Monastery was arrested for his roleon the editorial board of the monastery’s journal.The authorities deemed the content of the journalto be politically sensitive, and thus banned it frompublication and sentenced Tashi Gyaltsen, alongwith four other editorial board members, to threeyears of re-education through labour.48

In July 2005, TCHRD was informed of the case ofJigme Gyatso, 26, a monk from Bamu Village,

Machu County, Gansu Province. In 2001, whenJigme was returning to Tibet after studying in Indiawith his brother Lungtok and another man namedTenam, police searched the men and found suchmaterials as speeches made by the Dalai Lama and aTibetan translation of the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights. Jigme testified to the consequencesthey faced for possessing these banned materials:

For three days without any food, three of uswere interrogated and beaten severely. Thepolice demanded to know who told us to carrythe books and the purpose of carrying them intoTibet. When we replied that we had broughtthem on our own for reading purposes, theyslapped and booted us. After three days, we wereled to Lhasa and thrown into the Public SecurityBureau Detention Centre. We were separatedinto different cells and interrogations followedfor the next 16 days. Three times a day, wewere put under interrogation and each timewhen the official was not satisfied with myanswer, he would beat me and electrocute meuntil I fell unconscious. My brother and Tenamreceived similar treatment.49

For the mere crime of possessing such harmlessmaterials, these men subsequently received prisonsentences ranging from two to fours years in Drapchiprison. Jigme has since been released and has escapedinto exile.

In addition to these cases, TCHRD has reportednumerous arrests of Tibetans for merely expressingtheir opinion by posting pro-independence notices,including the following cases:

-In April 2005, Chung Tsering, a monk from PangsaMonastery, was arrested for posting pro-indepen-dence notices on government office buildings. Heis currently detained at Lhasa City PSB DetentionCentre.50

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-In mid-May 2005, Jigme Dasang, 22, a monk fromKumbum Monastery in Qinghai Province, alleg-edly posted notices around the monastery criticiz-ing government policies. He has since been detainedin Kumbum County PSB Detention Centre oncharges of engaging in separatist activities.51

-On 14 May, 2005 Yonten Dolma, 22, TamdinTsomo, 23, and Choekyi Dolma, 23, nuns fromGendun Tengeyling Nunnery, together with DargayGyatso, 25, Jampa Samdup, 27, and Lobsang, 25,monks from Labrang Tashikyil Monastery, were allarrested for posting pro-independence notices in sev-eral counties around Gansu Province. While two ofthe nuns are being held in Gannan “TAP” Deten-tion Centre, the whereabouts of the other four in-dividuals are unknown.52

The UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expres-sion and opinion has stated that governments should“ensure that the exercise of the freedom of opinionand expression through media is open and acces-sible to various actors of the civil society, local com-munities and minorities, vulnerable groups, in ad-dition to economic and political groups.”53 And thesame was further urged in the 61st Session of theUNCHR.54

Yet, the Chinese Government consistently prohib-its the free flow of information by banning materi-als or publications containing personal opinion ordealing with any matter they consider to be politi-cally sensitive, especially those that originate fromoutside Tibet. The Chinese Government, as a mea-sure of controlling publishing in China, even rationsout ISBNs (International Standard Book Number)to official publishing, which limits complete free-dom over publishing.55

censorship and regulation ofnews on internet

In his 2005 report to the UN Commission onHuman Rights, the Special Rapporteur on the rightto freedom of opinion and expression urged gov-ernments to “adopt laws and regulations allowingpeople to communicate freely over the Internet andto remove all present obstacles to the free flow ofinformation.”56 The Chinese Government has notonly ignored this demand, but in fact has imple-mented new and strict policies to ensure their abso-lute and full control over the use and exchange ofinformation through the Internet.

On 25 September, 2005, the Ministry of Informa-tion Industry, together with the State Council, is-sued the Rules on the Administration of InternetNews Information Services.57 According to the state-owned news agency Xinhua, this new policy, anupdate to the Internet regulations issued in 2000,permits only “healthy and civilized news,” and only“information that is beneficial to the improvementof the quality of the nation, beneficial to economicdevelopment and conducive to social progress” 58 isallowed to be reported on the Internet, while “thespreading of any news with content that is againstnational security and public interest” is strictly pro-hibited.59 These new rules require that all websites,discussion groups, and even personal emails containonly officially approved news and commentary, andthat anyone wishing to distribute such informationfirst register as a news organization.

The definition of what constitutes news is so vagueand overarching that essentially anything written ina discussion group, chat room or personal websitemust comply to these regulations. This allows thegovernment to prevent the distribution of any un-censored or sensitive material over the Internet, andseverely curtails the freedom of expression and in-formation of Internet users, as well as their abilityto access and impart information.

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In order to ensure compliance with this policy, andto further restrict the free flow of information overthe Internet, the Chinese Government applies meth-ods such as filtering, blocking, and monitoring ofInternet use. In filtering the content of informationexchanged over the Internet, any items containingpolitically sensitive phrases such as Tibet indepen-dence, Dalai Lama, human rights, etc. are blocked.60

The major search engines such as Google and Ya-hoo aid China in its censorship efforts. While Googleclaims to be “the only major search engine that doesnot censor any web pages,”61 in fact, it has also ac-knowledged that it excludes sites banned by theChinese Government in its search results. And Ya-hoo has not only agreed to censor its search enginesand discussion forums, but recently also providedinformation to the Chinese Government that ledto the arrest of a Chinese journalist Shi Tao, whohas been accused of committing seditious onlineactivity by using his Yahoo email account to sendinformation about a Communist Party meeting toa New York-based website.62 Recently, Microsoft hasalso agreed to filter out content containing sensitivephrases from its Chinese blog services.63

Chinese authorities also restrict access to informa-tion over the Internet by banning websites contain-ing content that does not follow regulations, therebyblocking access to these sites. It has been reportedthat China blocks access to over 250,000 websites,discussion forums, and blogs. In order to find theseoffensive sites, the government employs 30,000human monitors to scan websites, search engine re-sults, chat sites, and personal emails.64 China prefersto keep these efforts at censorship hidden, so thatwhen an Internet user attempts to access a bannedsite, they are either rerouted to an acceptable site, orsimply receive a notice that the address is invalid.65

On 30 March, 2005, the Tibetan cultural websitewww.tibetcul.com was shut down by the Lanzhou

Public Security Bureau’s Internet AdministrationDepartment for simply posting articles on “sensi-tive topics.” While the ban was lifted shortly afterdue to international pressure, the website’s writerand editor-in-chief Tsewang Norbu was reportedmissing.66

Tsewang, a monk from Serthar Institute, Kardze“TAP” in Sichuan Province who studied in Lhasacommented on the lack of access to internationalnews websites such as CNN and BBC:

The government doesn’t care about peoplehaving access to general international news, butthey ban international news websites so thatwe wont have access to occasional newsspecifically on Tibet and the Dalai Lama. It’seasier to block entire websites rather thanfiltering the news every day.67

Even with all these efforts to censor informationover the Internet, the Chinese government also findsit necessary to strictly monitor Internet usage, par-ticularly at Internet cafés. A teacher and an ex-offi-cial from Lhasa who recently escaped into exile re-ported the following:

Internet cafés are heavily monitored. We arerequired to present an official registration cardthat we have to seek from the authorities.Usually, I go late at night when there is lessmonitoring, and when I am searching for topicsdealing with sensitive matters, I changecomputers every 10 minutes to avoid detection.68

This has been further confirmed by internationalsources, which also note that Internet café ownersare required to log users and monitor what websitesthey access, especially when access to banned websitesis attempted.69 In this way, the Chinese authoritiesstrictly monitor who accesses what. The ChineseGovernment recognizes the powerful ability of the

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Internet as a source of information and thus “appar-ently think that keeping more than 100 millionInternet users in the dark is better than allowing thepeaceful exchange of opinions or expressions ofgrievances,” said Brad Adams, Asia Director of Hu-man Rights Watch.70

In addition to restricting free access to sensitive in-formation on internet, they also use the Internet asa tool for imparting state propaganda. According tothe International NGO Reporters Without Borders,online news sites that are permitted, such aswww.xinhuanet.com and www.chinadaily.com, areentirely controlled by the Communist Party. Thegovernment also sets up its own websites on Tibet,such as www.tibetinfor.com and www.tibetology.com, which provide government propagandafor its distorted views of the region.71 Clearly, Chinauses every means possible to restrict the right to in-formation of Internet users.

newspaper and television

Although international bodies and NGOs, such asthe United Nations, Reporters Without Borders andArticle 19 implore the necessity of independentmedia, it is no secret that China’s media is ownedand strictly controlled by the government. TheXinhua News Agency, China’s official provider ofthe news, the head of which has the rank of a min-ister and appointed directly by the Chinese Com-munist party (CCP), has been called the “linchpinof control of the Chinese media”72 as well as “themouthpiece of the Party”73 and even brazenly toutsitself as “the official news agency of the Commu-nist Party and the Government of China.”74 Withthe control of news-providing media, such as news-papers and televised news broadcasts, the ChineseGovernment is able to stifle the media and the rightof the public to know what is going on both do-mestically and internationally.

Chinese authorities manage to do this through thePublicity Department. In addition to systematicmonitoring of the press, this government unit is-sues directives to media editors, telling them whatis permissible and prohibited to publish. The edi-tors are then responsible for ensuring that their jour-nalists comply with such directives. The presence ofparty members in all key management posts in theTibetan media further prevents any possibility ofeditorial freedom and hinders the complete inde-pendence of media. Articles are subject to lengthyvetting procedure before they are published.75 Thisin turn helps more flow of information throughthe hands of Government officials.

A Chinese journalist explains this process in detail:

New events are ever-changing and often happenwithout warning so it is impractical for eachdetail to be first vetted by the propagandadepartment. When incidents happen, editorsand reporters are still encouraged to conductinterviews and take photographs but decisionson if and how to report are made later by theeditorial departments. Although theinformation collected may not be publiclyreported, officials may actually need theinformation for their own purposes… Newscensorship is for the public. Officials still needto know the facts.76

If editors fail to ensure compliance with PublicityDepartment directives, they may lose their positionor have their publication or program shut down;journalists who fail to comply are often criticizedand even detained.77 China currently has over 40imprisoned journalists accused of such ‘crimes’, thehighest number in the world.78 In early 2005, whena local television station in Tibet inadvertentlyshowed footage of a man in Nepal with a Tibetanflag behind him, the station suffered a huge crack-down from Chinese officials, whereby station man-

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agers were forced to acknowledge their mistakes andstaff had to undergo re-education sessions.79

On 16 January 2005, Tashi Gyaltsen, LobsangDhargay, Thoe Samden, Tsultrim Phelgay andJampel Gyatso all five from Drakar Trezong Mon-astery were arrested for publishing a newspaper con-taining poems and articles of political nature. Theyare now in a labour camp in Qinghai, near Xining,in northwestern China, serving sentences of two tothree years of re-education through work.80

As a result of this censorship, the so-called news ismainly filled with the Party propaganda and misin-formation. For example, in an article published byXinhua on 1 June 2005, it was reported that “DalaiLama has become more and more unpopular insouthwest China’s Tibetan Autonomous Regionsince what he wants is to split the region from China,regardless of its robust development momentum andsound ethnic relations” and that “The Tibetans holda clear-cut stand in their fight” against Western forcesthat support the Dalai Lama’s attempts to split theMotherland.81 In addition to these improbabilities,the article boasted of the Party’s accomplishmentsin Tibet: “With financial and policy support fromthe central government, Tibet’s economy has beengrowing with a rapid speed in the past decade.” Thearticle then goes on to list a plethora of supportingstatistics, numbers that are often doctored and ma-nipulated for propaganda purposes. Further, thisarticle serves as a means for propagating Party policyand replying to those who criticize it, when it states“The Chinese government’s policies toward theDalai Lama on the Tibet issue will never change innature as far as the Dalai Lama’s nature of splittingTibet remains unchanged.”

Recently received testimony reported to TCHRDby a teacher and an ex-official from Lhasa, who pre-fers to remain unnamed attests to this manipula-tion and censorship of the news:

On TV, there are very few programs in Tibetan.Most are Chinese programs dubbed intoTibetan, containing political messages andcriticism of Tibetan culture. Sure, there are newsbroadcasts in Tibetan, but most people don’t carefor them. When TV comes on, people and evenTibetans in government services in their privateconversations say, ‘Oh, it’s time for the lie-news’because they know it’s mostly about thegovernment and government activities and thatthe facts are distorted in any real news. This isbecause journalists are required to get approvalbefore writing on politically sensitive matters,but in Tibet everything is considered a politicallysensitive matter, so it is difficult to reportanything.82

In addition, Reporters Without Borders reportedthat the systematic use of the Chinese language inthe media poses another major obstacle to Tibetanaccess to information.83 The group said that theQinghai TV has a very limited slot, from 5 p.m. to6:30 p.m., for Tibetan-language programmes and a15-minute daily news bulletin in Tibetan is broad-cast at 5 p.m. while the Chinese-language newsprogramme goes out at 7 p.m., a peak viewing time.The group further reported that the production oforiginal Tibetan-language programmes is virtuallynon-existent and between 80 and 90 per cent of theprogrammes broadcast in Tibetan on Qinghai TVare dubbed versions of Chinese-languageprogrammes.84 Although, this is expected to changein 2006, as Qinghai TV has approved to increase itsTibetan language broadcasts to 12 hours a day, noth-ing can be assured of its contents.

radio jamming

Perhaps the best means of accessing information inTibet, particularly in rural areas, is by radio. As theVoice of Tibet (VOT) website states, “In Tibet,

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where much of the population is illiterate and poor,the power of radio is particularly obvious. Radiobroadcasting is the main medium for mass infor-mation and education.”85 Radio is so important thatthe Chinese Government boasts of emphasizing pro-grams that increase radio coverage so that accordingto official statistics, over 94% of the country’s popu-lation has radio coverage.86

Yet, the government is constructing the ‘Great Wallof the airwaves’ by blocking access to non-state con-trolled radio stations originating from independentsources, such as VOT, Voice of America (VOA),and Radio Free Asia (RFA) which all broadcastTibetan-language programs into Tibet87 and, mostrecently, jamming of San Francisco based radio“Sound-of-Hope” which can no longer be heard atall.88

Chinese authorities employ two methods to restrictaccess to these radio stations. First, Reporters With-out Borders has observed the distribution of newradio sets in the Kardze region of Sichuan Provincethat are supposedly of better quality than older ones,but in actuality are preset, locked on to a fixed band-width and thus prevent users from tuning into in-ternational stations.89 Second, and more prevalent,a technique called jamming is practiced, wherebybroadcasts from these stations are drowned out bymusic, official radio broadcasts, or static.

In order to jam prohibited radio broadcasts andmaintain the monopoly of state radio broadcasts,the Chinese Government has deployed huge re-sources to construct numerous jamming towersthroughout Tibet. Radio Free Asia, which broad-casts on 10 different frequencies in an attempt toget round the censorship, but they are all systemati-cally jammed by diffused noise or music says Re-porters Without Borders.90

Tsewang, a monk from Serthar Institute in SichuanProvince, testified to the infringement of the rightto access information via radio in Tibet:

When I was living at Serthar Institute in 2001,there was a tower built about 20 km away at acost of 4,00,000 Yuan. I also heard that earlierthis year, construction began on a second towerfive km away at a cost of 10,00,000 Yuan. Theytold us these towers were built to improvetransmission and reception, but actually theyare used for jamming. When I was at Serthar, Ipurchased a new radio but I couldn’t access theindependent stations. So, I returned it back andtried two other radios but, still couldn’t get anyreception of these stations…In May 2005, whenI was studying in Lhasa, I was in my room nearSera Monastery listening to VOA on the radiowhen suddenly several police entered my room,snatched away my radio, told me I wasn’tallowed to listen to VOA, and ordered me topay a fine. I asked for my radio back anddemanded to know why I wasn’t allowed tolisten. Having no proper explanation, they gaveback my radio and left.91

With the help of French military manufacturer com-pany, Thalès, ALLISS aerials are now set up in dif-ferent corners of the country by the Chinese Gov-ernment to improve its jamming capabilities, whichcan now effectively block short-wave broadcasts byforeign radio stations. Such aerials were installedabove all in the far northwestern city of Karshi, NgariCounty, “TAR”, which are used to jam internationalradio signals. Similarly, in very recent time, the au-thorities installed new jamming towers in Pemba(in the Chamdo region) and since then residentshave been unable to get Voice of America.92

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restrictions on internationalmonitoring bodies andforeigners

China not only controls the exchange of informa-tion domestically, but has also stretched its censor-ship net wide over the international community aswell by restricting foreign journalists from freelyaccessing information in Tibet and by giving inter-national human rights monitors a limited scope toclosely examine human rights situation inside Ti-bet. The restrictions also prevail over tourists ex-changing information with local Tibetans and onthe freedom of speech and expression in other coun-tries when it relates to Tibet.

Foreign journalists are constantly prevented fromadequately gaining access to information inside Ti-bet. According to Reporters Without Borders, Chinarefuses to give visa to foreign journalists and, espe-cially those interested in and supportive of Tibet werenot made welcome in China. They are gravely con-cerned of the real situation of Tibet being highlightedto the outside world.

Highlighting a typical situation, in October 2005,Chinese Government refused to issue tourist visasto two French journalists Jean-Claude Buhrer, LeMonde’s former correspondent at the UN in Geneva,and Claude B. Levenson, a specialist on Tibet dueto their previous investigations regarding humanrights in Tibet. They applied for their visas at theChinese embassy in Bangkok for a trip to Chengdu,the capital city of Sichuan Province. The reason forthe denial of visa was stated as their “activities” asjournalists.93 In 2003, Buhrer wrote a survey forReporters Without Borders on the malfunctioningof the UN Human Rights Commission, whichChinese diplomats often manage to manipulate inorder to cover up human rights violations in China.

As Buhrer later stated;

The mere fact of being a journalist and havingwritten about human rights in Tibet is clearlya sufficient reason to be refused a visa.94

In rare cases, where foreign journalists are permittedinside China, they face extreme difficulty not onlyin Tibet but in the PRC as well. Those foreign jour-nalists, who were able to secure visas to visit, wereeither forced to follow a strict set of rules directedby local authorities or had to face the hostility ofthe local authorities.

The case of the recent situation in Taishi village,Guangdong Province, illustrates this difficulty: whena Malaysian and a French journalist went to investi-gate reports of uprisings in the village calling for theresignation of corrupt village leaders, they were at-tacked by local thugs reportedly hired by local au-thorities. They also found that locals were bannedfrom speaking with journalists, and local journal-ists were not allowed to report on the situation ei-ther.95 Soon after, a reporter from the Guardian alsoattempted to enter Taishi but was stopped outsideof the town and to his dismay watched his Chinesecompanion being beaten to a pulp by local thugsbefore he himself was detained, questioned, andsubsequently removed from the area.96 Clearly,China does not want foreign journalists witnessingwhat it tries so hard to deny to the rest of the world.

China especially does not want foreigners witness-ing evidence of human rights abuses in the country.So, it restricts international human rights monitorsfrom accessing information to avoid allegations ofsuch abuses. This is especially evident in the case ofthe Panchen Lama, whom the international com-munity has been pressing China for informationabout since his detention in 1995. Groups, such asthe UN, Amnesty International and the InternationalCampaign for Tibet, and even governmental bodies

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have repeatedly called for China to grant access tothe boy and his family, or at the very least provideinformation about his whereabouts and well being.In response, the Chinese authorities deny that he isin fact missing, while at the same time arguing thataccess to him is prevented for his own safety, andthat “too much interference creates too many prob-lems.”97 After his request for access to the PanchenLama was once again denied in September 2005,the Chair of the UN Committee for the Rights ofthe Child responded, “In view of the refusal of theauthorities to allow such an independent visit, itwould seem that something is wrong.”98 WhenChina continues to deny access to information toforeign bodies, it sends a clear message to the rest ofthe world that the authorities have something tohide.

Tourists who travel to Tibet are also restricted fromexchanging information with locals; for fear thatthey will obtain evidence of human rights abuses inthe region. Tourists are a vital source of informationon the situation in Tibet as they are able to providefirst hand accounts of the situation inside Tibet, thusverifying the need to support the Tibetan cause andfurther heightening the pressure on China to rectifythe situation. A Western student who studied inLhasa in 2004, explains these restrictions:

As soon as we arrived in the city, we met withuniversity officials, who handed us each a list ofrules, which we were told to follow for our ownsafety. These rules stated, among otherrestrictions, that we were to limit our interactionwith locals, and that we were forbidden fromvisiting their homes or engaging in discussionon sensitive matters. We were later also told bystaff to watch what we wrote in our emails andeven what we said on the telephone, and toplay it safe by assuming our interaction withTibetans would always be watched.99

Further, Tsewang, a monk from Serthar Institute,explained what happened to him when he attemptedto engage in a simple conversation with a foreignerin Tibet:

In February 2005, when I was studying Englishat the Tibetan Academy of Social Sciences inLhasa, I met a foreigner in the Barkhor anddecided to practice my English. All I did wasask him, ‘May I speak with you?’ and wassuddenly taken away to a secluded area by apolice officer. I was questioned for a while andthen fined 300 Yuan before he let me go.100

In addition, the Chinese Government goes as far asto restrict the right to information even in othercountries when the information pertains to Tibet.In 2004, due to pressure from the Chinese embassy,several films about Tibet were excluded from theThird Eye Asian Film Festival in India.101 Again, inOctober 2005, during a football game betweenGermany and China in Hamburg, Tibetans and theirsupporters were barred from displaying Tibetan flags,due to pressure from Chinese authorities.102 As,Tenzin Tsundue, the General Secretary of Friendsof Tibet based in India, explains, “If we in the out-side world…succumb [to] the Chinese pressure,there is no hope for the millions in China and Tibetwho are brutally oppressed.”103

monitoring mobile phonetext messages

Although very little information has been availableregarding monitoring of mobile phone text mes-sages in Tibet, TCHRD remains concerned aboutthe recent developments in China.

Now, with 330 million people in China owningmobile phones, news of violence sometimes spreadquickly across the country even if public officialsmake attempts to prevent it. So, it is clear that with

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the old regulations focused more on news sites,people in China now prefer using SMS to organizethemselves, to pass news around or to rally crowdsof protesters.104 Xiao Qiang, Director of the ChinaInternet Project at University of California, Berke-ley, said cell phones were successfully used to orga-nize anti-Japanese protests in April 2005. Thoughprotesters were supporting the government line,Xiao said, the use of the technology served as a wake-up call to its potential threat to government con-trol.105

In fact, the state-run China Daily even cites SMStext messages, a fast and efficient communicationsmeans available to anyone with a mobile phone, tofall within the ambit of the new Internet Regula-tions issued in September 2005.106 Besides, the Min-istry of Public Security has also announced plans toroll out a software program developed by VenusInformation Technology, a local company, that willmonitor cell phone text messages in China.107

TCHRD is seriously concerned that, in a place likeTibet, where in many areas, fax machines and e-mailsremain uncommon or unavailable and, telephones,TVs and newspaper are yet to become part ofeveryday life, monitoring electronic communicationposes few challenges for Chinese public securityagencies.

right to information versusnational security

The rights contained in the Universal Declarationof Human Rights (UDHR) including right to in-formation, are subject only to reasonable and mini-mum limitations and such limitations are to be pre-scribed by law.108 Similar limitation on the groundof national security, but to be specifically prescribedby law is also laid down in the ICCPR.109

Under the Johannesburg Principles guaranteeingfreedom of information including the right to ob-tain information from public authorities, “no re-strictions on the grounds of national security are tobe placed unless the government can demonstratethat the restriction is prescribed by law and is neces-sary in a democratic society to protect a legitimatenational security interest. The burden of demon-strating the validity of the restriction rests with thegovernment.”110 As such, the limitations on theground of national security are to be drawn narrowlyand with precision and are to be specifically pre-scribed by law so as to place minimal limitation onthe exercise of right to information.

However, in China and more so in politically sensi-tive regions like Tibet and Xinjiang, the governmentuses national security laws having the widest pos-sible implications, wherever necessary, to restrict ac-cess to and dissemination of news and information.Besides, the Chinese Government, through Infor-mation Office of the State Council and Ministry ofInformation Industry, releases strict, but vague regu-lations from time to time, to have effective controlover the right to acquire and disseminate informa-tion in the name of national security.

The 1997 amendments to China’s Criminal Codetransforming counterrevolutionary crimes intocrimes against national security have prompted newtrends in political prosecutions.111 Articles 103 and105 of the China’s Criminal Code impose harshpenalties on those who incite “the breakdown ofnational unity” and the “subversion of state author-ity” or “stealing state secrets.” China’s current Na-tional Security Law has divided the former counterrevolutionary crimes into three main categories:

- damaging state power (separatism, subversion,theft of state secrets);

- defection, turning traitor;- espionage, assisting the enemy.112

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At the end of 2001, Sonam Ngodup, 29 year-old,from Sichuan Province, was sentenced to seven years’imprisonment term by Kardze People’s Intermedi-ate Court for merely engaging in political activitiesand putting up pro-independence posters in KardzeCounty and other prominent places. The chargesframed against him were of “inciting masses throughanti-government propaganda” and “endangeringState security.” If his prison term is not extended,Sonam will be released in 2007.113

Nyima Tsering, for example, a former monk whotaught Tibetan language and Buddhist philosophyat Gyantse in “TAR” region, was arrested in 2002for distributing pro-independence documents. Hewas sentenced in June 2003 to five years in prisonfor threatening state security. Nyima is currentlyserving his sentence in Drapchi Prison in Lhasa.114

Furthermore, Reporters Without Borders states that,in Tibet, where all the news medias are controlledby the Chinese Communist Party or state bodies, itis an uphill struggle for Tibetans to get access tonon-governmental information. There are only a fewunderground publications produced by Tibetans,above all monks.115

In recent times, list of Tibetans detained for StateSecurity crimes are not many, this is not because ofa lack of arrests of Tibetans for political reasons, butbecause details of arrests and trials are not made avail-able.116 However, from the limited informationemanating out of Tibet, TCHRD continues to re-ceive number of new cases of detainees inside Tibetevery year, but because of the closed and secret trialnature of the Chinese Court proceedings, thegrounds for their convictions and charges framedagainst them could not be ascertained. It can be safelyassumed that a significant number of these arrestswere on allegations of state security crimes such asseparatists.117

Although freedom of information has been guaran-teed under the Chinese Constitution and law of thePRC on Regional Autonomy yet, Chinese citizensin general and Tibetans in particular are little awareof these rights. Besides, the Chinese Governmentmakes little effort to create awareness of these rightsto the general people. The government is fearful thatdisseminating information on these rights will leadto civil and political unrest in the country.

In his report, the UN Special Rapporteur on theRight to Freedom of Opinion and Expression stated,“All information held by public bodies shall be pub-licly available unless it is subject to a legitimate ex-emption, and all bodies performing public functions,including governmental, legislative and judicial bod-ies, should be obliged to respond to requests forinformation.”118

The Chinese authorities, however, constantly explainaway the denial of any information disclosure byinvoking “national security,” the “public interest,”“State Secrets,” “social order” ever-shifting terms leftpurposefully undefined.119 “China’s leaders claim tobe modernisers and that they are leading the coun-try towards greater freedom and democracy,” saidBrad Adams, Asia Director of Human Rights Watch.“Yet, they still remain afraid of their own citizensand the healthy diversity of news and views, whichdefines a modern society,”120 In China, even “on-line dissidents who post items critical of the gov-ernment, or those expressing opinions in chat rooms,are regularly arrested and charged under vaguelyworded state security laws.”121

conclusion

Today, more and more countries are making firmand lasting commitment towards the policy of open-ness and transparency by adopting consolidatednational statutory laws on the Right to Freedom of

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Information. Approximately 60 countries aroundthe world now have laws establishing mechanismsfor the public to request and receive Governmentheld information.122

“The Freedom of Information Act”123 and the“Right to Information Act, 2005”, which respec-tively came into force as on 1 January, 2005 in UKand on 12 October, 2005 in India124 are the mostrecent examples guaranteeing its citizens right ofaccess to information and dissemination of infor-mation, especially the information held by govern-ment and public authorities, to make them freelyand widely available for public knowledge.

The “Need-To-Know” culture of the olden days isthus left far behind and the “Right To Know” inlaw is now increasingly put into practice and pro-tected, which confirms that this right is here to stayand urges the need to be further promoted andimplemented by other remaining countries.Although China declares that law protects its citi-zens’ right to information and asserts that “there isno news censorship in China”125 but, in reality, theindividuals, especially the journalists, are systemati-cally controlled from exercising this right.

If a law can be drafted by PRC to protect its “Na-tional security,” then, why can it not also be draftedto protect “public interest” and/ or “public safety”by guaranteeing citizens right of free access to infor-mation, which is in the best interest of its citizens?

China is rapidly pursuing a more open economicapproach to the outside world and openly propa-gates that it has set up and improved “an openinformation system and other related systems toensure that the citizens enjoy full democratic rightsto information, supervision and participation in pub-lic affairs.”126 On practical grounds, China stillretains and practices the very old and repressive cul-ture of closed-door secrecy by controlling both the

free flow of information reaching Tibet from theoutside as well as the information flowing out ofTibet. It is here that TCHRD finds direct access toreliable information on human rights situation in-side Tibet has never become easier if not worse. It isat this time, when the world is becoming more com-mitted to move towards a shared vision of buildinga truly inclusive people-centred, development-ori-ented global information society,127 the Chinesegovernment should learn that only free exchange ofinformation can act as the route to a stronger, moretransparent and open connection between citizensand the state.

Since 1991, the Chinese Government has oftenreleased White Paper documents to announce itsstated position on and progress made in humanrights including the freedom of information. How-ever, the timing and the release of white paper, with-out independent means to check its accuracy andcredibility, is seen by TCHRD as a deliberately ma-nipulated official propaganda of the PRC designedto ward off international criticism against its hu-man rights violations and abuses. It’s an empty re-port without accountability. In releasing white pa-per, the Chinese Government doesn’t provideenough space and scope for strict scrutiny or a pro-cedure for verifying the accuracy of its claims byInternational Agencies, governmental bodies, inde-pendent NGOs or human rights watch bodies toclosely monitor the reports as per the internationalstandards.

In his report, the United Nations Special Rappor-teur on the right to freedom of opinion and expres-sion, Mr. Ambeyi Ligabo, is of the view that:

Any declaration on the right to informationexcluding exhaustive references to that right...isan empty exercise of international relations.128

76


Notes

1 E/CN.4/2004/622 “Dalai Lama’s 70th birthday - Passing years bring no let-up in

harsh curbs on press freedom”, Reporters Without Borders, 5July, 2005, available at http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=14312&var_recherche=tibet

3 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 59(1), 1946;http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/033/10/IMG/NR003310.pdf?OpenELEMENT

4 UN Doc.E/CN.4/1996/39 (1996)5 See Article 19 of both the instruments.6 Draft Resolution-2005 on Freedom of Opinion and

Expression, 15 April 2005 at the 61st Session of the UNCHR,para 1, available at E/CN.4/2005/L.52, which states that,“The rights regarding the right of everyone to hold opinionswithout interference, as well as the right to freedom ofexpression, including the freedom to seek, receive and impartinformation and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, eitherorally, in writing or in print, in the form of art or through anyother media of their choice, and the intrinsically linked rightsto freedom of thought, conscience and religion, peacefulassembly and association and the right to take part in theconduct of public affairs.”

7 Article 13, CRC, which contains the right “to seek, receiveand impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless offrontiers.”

8 Article 35 of the Constitution of People’s Republic of China9 Article 22 of the PRC Constitution.10 Article 38 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on

Regional Autonomy11 “China’s Progress in Human Rights in 2004,” Xinhua, April

13, 2005, Beijing. Full text available at http://www.chinadai ly.com.cn/engl i sh/doc/2005-04/13/content_433828.htm

12 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to Freedom ofOpinion and Expression, Mr. Ambeyi Ligabo, at the 61st sessionof the UNCHR; 17 December, 2004, available at UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/64. Para 39

13 UN Doc.E/CN.4/1996/39 (1996)14 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to Freedom of

Opinion and Expression, Mr. Ambeyi Ligabo, at the 61st sessionof the UNCHR, 17 December, 2004. Refer UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/64, Para 37

15 “White Paper on Political Democracy,” Xinhua, 19 October2005. Beijing. See Part IX (3) “Making decisions in a scientificand democratic manner” Para 2;http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/200510/19/content_486206_4.htm

16 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom ofOpinion and Expression, Mr. Abid Hussain, at the 54th Sessionof the UNCHR, 28 January, 1998; UN Doc E/CN.4/1998,Para.12

17 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedomand Opinion and Expression, Mr. Abid Hussain, at the 51st

Session of the UNCHR, 14 December, 1994; UN Doc E/CN.4/1995/32, Para 5

18 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom ofOpinion and Expression, Mr. Ambeyi Ligabo at the 61st Sessionof the UNCHR, 17 December, 2004, available at UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/64, Para 40

19 “China’s Progress in Human Rights in 2004”, Xinhua, 13April 2005, Beijing

20 TCHRD Interview, Tibetan Reception Centre, Dharamsla,27 October 2005.

21 “Love your religion, love your country”, Human Rights Update,TCHRD, Vol.10, No.7, p.1

22 “China launches summer 2005 ‘Strike Hard’ Campaign”,Human Rights Update, Vol.10, No7, TCHRD, 2005, p.1

23 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to Freedom ofOpinion and Expression, Mr. Ambeyi Ligabo, at the 61st sessionof the UNCHR, 17 December 2004, available at UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/64,E/CN.4/2005/64. Para 44.

24 UN Doc.E/CN.4/1996/39 (1996)25 “China: End Censorship of Internet,” Human Rights Watch,

28 September, 2005, available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/09/28/china11798_txt.htm

26 Ibid.27 See article 41 of the PRC Constitution.28 Available at http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20050418/

index.htm, and also at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-04/13/content_433828.htm

29 “Building of Political Democracy in China,” Xinhua, 19October, 2005, Beijing, available at http://www.china.com.cn/english/features/book/145877.htm; Also see “China issues 1st

white paper on democracy,” available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-10/19/content_486206.htm

30 Draft Resolution-2005 (Agenda Item 11) on Freedom ofOpinion and Expression, at the 61st Session of the UNCHR,15 April 2005 available at E/CN.4/2005/L.52.

31 UN Press Release, 2 September 2005, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/54AF64AF3083ABB7C12570700036E932?opendocument

32 Testified to TCHRD on 28 July 2005. For more Information,please refer: “Telephone directory and the pictures of theDalai Lama lead to imprisonment for a woman fleeing Tibet”,Human Rights Update, Vol.10, No.7, TCHRD, 2005, p.5

33 See Arts. 19, 19 and 35, respectively.34 “Worldwide Press Freedom Index 2005” Reporters Without

Borders, 20 October 2005, available at http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/CM_2005_As_Eng.pdf

35 “2005 Asia Annual Report”, Reporters Without Borders,available at http://www.rsf.org/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=512

Information

77

36 “Worldwide Press Freedom Index 2005” Reporters WithoutBorders, 20 October 2005, available at http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/CM_2005_As_Eng.pdf

37 Ibid.38 “Dalai Lama’s 70th birthday-Passing years bring no let up in

harsh curbs on press freedom”, Reporters Without Borders, 5July, 2005: http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article =14312&var_recherche=tibet

39 Jehangir Pocha, “China’s Press Crackdown,” In These Times,12 September, 2005, available at http://www.inthesetimes.com/site/main/print/2304/

40 As quoted in “Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of Law,”International Commission of Jurists, December 1997, p.268.

41 “Secrets of Tibet: New Poem by Oser.” Tibet InformationNetwork, 09 February 2005. Also Refer http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=14312&var_recherche=tibet

42 For more information, please refer, “Tibet Facing Imperialismof Two Kinds: An Analysis of the Woeser Incident”, WorldTibet Network News, 20 December 2004.

43 TCHRD Interview: 27 October, 2005.44 “Dalai Lama’s 70th birthday - Passing years bring no let-up in

harsh curbs on press freedom”, RSF, 5 July, 2005, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=14312&var_recherche =tibet

45 Ibid.46 “Tibetan arrested prior to the 40th founding anniversary of

the “TAR”, whereabouts unknown”, Human Rights Update,Vol.10, No.9, TCHRD, 2005, p.3

47 “The Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedomof Expression and Access to Information, Freedom of Expressionand Access to Information.” U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/39(1996)

48 “Monk sentenced to three years for ‘re-education throughlabour’ for political journal.” Human Rights Update, Vol.10,No.3, TCHRD, 2005, p.3

49 “Tibetans arrested at the Nepal-Tibet border serveimprisonment terms for possessing ‘incriminating’ materials.”Human Rights Update, Vol.10, No.7, TCHRD, 2005, p.4.

50 “Monk arrested for posting pro-independence pamphlet ongovernment building.” Human Rights Update, Vol.10, No.5,TCHRD, 2005, p.1.

51 “Kumbum Monastery monk arrested for alleged pro-independence postings.” Human Rights Update, Vol.10, No.5,TCHRD, 2005, p.2.

52 “Six Tibetans arrested for pro-independence postings.” HumanRights Update, Vol.10, No.7, TCHRD, 2005, p.2.

53 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom ofopinion and expression, 2004, Mr. Ambeyi Ligabo at the 60thSession of the UNCHR, available at UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/62; Para. 85

54 Report of the Special Rapporteur, on the Right to Freedom ofOpinion and Expression, Mr. Ambeyi Ligabo at the 61st Sessionof the UNCHR, 17 December, 2004 available at UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/64, Para 67

55 “Underground publishing,” The Journal of Human Rights inChina, No.3, 2005, HRIC, p36-37.

56 Report of the Special Rapporteur, on the Right to Freedom ofOpinion and Expression, Mr. Ambeyi Ligabo, 61st session ofthe UNCHR, 17 December, 2004, available at UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/64, Para 68

57 “Xinhua: the world’s biggest propaganda agency.” www.rsf.org/article/php3?id_article=15141. Also see “China: EndCensorship of Internet…” www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/09/28/china11798_txt.htm.

58 Ibid.59 “Chinese Government Cracks Down on Internet Free

Speech.”, available at www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/features/july-dec05/china_10-19.html.

60 “White Paper of distorted facts and figures.” WTN NewsUpdate, 03 March 2005.

61 ice.citizenlab.org/?p=6762 www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/features/july-dec05/china_10-

19.html. Also refer “China: End Censorship of Internet. NewRegulations a Major Step Backward” at http://www.hri.ca/alerts/viewAlert.asp?ID=1211

63 Anick Jesdanun, “New bans show China’s concerns about tech,”The Globe and Mail, 3 October 2005. www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20051003. gtchinaoct3/BNStory/Technology/?query=education

64 Jehangir Pocha, “China’s Press Crackdown,” In These Times,12 September, 2005, available at www.inthesetimes.com/site/main/article/2304/

65 “China’s Censorship May ‘Break Internet’” WTN News Update,14 April 2005. Also visit: www.rsf.org/article/php3?id_article=10749

66 “Tibetan culture website briefly closed, editor-in-chiefdisappears.” Human Rights Update, Vol.10, No.3, TCHRD,2005, p.1

67 TCHRD Interview, Tibetan Reception Centre, Dharamsala,27 October 2005

68 TCHRD Interview, 27 October 2005. (The subject prefersnot to be named in order to protect his family who still lives inTibet.)

69 “Chinese Government Cracks Down on Internet Free Speech”www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/features/july-dec05/china_10-19.html; “China’s censorship may ‘Break’ Internet”, WTNNews Update, 14 April, 2005; “Tibetan culture website brieflyclosed, editor-in-chief disappears,” Human Rights Update,Vo.10, No.3, TCHRD, 2005, p.1.

70 http://www.hri.ca/alerts/viewAlert.asp?ID=121171 (www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=10749) “China’s

Censorship May ‘Break’ Internet.” WTN News Update, 14April 2005

72 “Xinhua: the world’s biggest propaganda agency.” www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=15141

73 Peng Xiaoming, “Commentary on the System of Chinese NewsCensorship,” Epoch Times, 2 August 2004, atEnglish.epochtimes.com/news/4-8-2/22681.htm

74 www.china.org.cn75 “Dalai Lama’s 70th birthday - Passing years bring no let-up in

harsh curbs on press freedom”, 5 July, 2005, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=14312&var_recherche=tibet

78


76 “Commentary on the System of Chinese News Censorship,”Epoch Times, 2 August 2004, available atwww.English.epochtimes. com/news/4-8-2/22681.htm

77 Ibid., “Press Freedom—or not—in Asia.” www.rfa.org/english/news/in_depth/2004/11/08/china_propaganda/

78 “Commentary on the System of Chinese News Censorship,”Epoch Times, 2 August, 2004

79 “White Paper of distorted facts and figures.” WTN NewsUpdate, 03 March 2005

80 “Dalai Lama’s 70th birthday- Passing years bring no let-up inharsh curbs on press freedom”, at http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=14312&var_recherche=tibet

81 “Dalai Lama Unpopular Among Tibetans,” Xinhua, 1 June,2005; china.org.cn/English/2005/Jun/130633.htm

82 TCHRD Interview, Tibetan Reception Centre, Dharamsala,27 October 2005

83 Reporters Without Borders at http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=14312&var_recherche=tibet

84 Ibid.85 www.vot.org86 “Building of Political Democracy in China,” Xinhua, 19

October 2005, Beijing, available at http://www.china.com.cn/english/features/book/145877.htm

87 “Another Foreign Radio Station Falls Victim to ‘Great Wall ofthe Airwaves’.” Reporters Without Borders, 18 August 2005athttp://www.ifex.org/en/content/view/full/68713

88 “Another foreign radio station falls victim to ‘Great Wall ofthe airwaves’,” 17 August 2005;http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=14716

89 “Dalai Lama’s 70th birthday- Passing years bring no let-up inharsh curbs on press freedom”, 5 July, 2005; http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=14312&var_recherche=tibet

90 Ibid.91 TCHRD Interview, Tibetan Reception Centre, Dharamsala,

27 October 200592 Reporters Without Borders available at http://www.rsf.org/

article.php3?id_article=14312&var_recherche=tibet93 http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=1530394 Ibid. Also refer WTN News (WTN News),

15 October 200595 (RSF 15231)96 “Benjamin Joffe-Walt in Taishi, southern China”, The

Guardian,10 October 2005, also available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/china/story/0,7369,1588595,00.html

97 “CRC Chair Asks China to Receive an Independent Body toVisit Panchen Lama”, WTN News Update, 20 September 2005

98 “UN demands access to Tibet’s Panchen Lama,” WTN NewsUpdate, 22 September 2005

99 TCHRD Interview, 11 November, 2005100 TCHRD Interview, 27 October, 2005101 “Media On Friends of Tibet (INDIA)”, Friends of Tibet, India

(FOT)102 “China also censors in Germany …(TYAE),” WTN, 13

October, 2005

103 FOT104 Jehangir Pocha, “China’s Press Crackdown,” In These Times,

12 September, 2005, available at www.inthesetimes.com/site/main/article/2304/ Also refer “New bans show China’sconcerns about tech,” Associated Press and Canadian Press, 3October 2005

105 Anick Jesdanun, “New Bans Show China’s concerns abouttech”, Associated Press and Canadian Press, 3 October 2005,available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM. 20051003.gtchinaoct3/BNStory/Technology/?query= education

106 Ibid.107 Jehangir Pocha, “China’s Press Crackdown,” In These Times,

12 September 2005, available at www.inthesetimes.com/site/main/article/2304/

108 The rights contained in the UDHR are subject only to “suchlimitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose ofsecuring due recognition and respect for the rights and freedomsof others and of meeting the just requirements of morality,public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.”Art. 29 (2), Universal Declaration of Human Rights

109 See article 19(3)110 Principle 1 (d) and also Principle 11 of the Johannesburg

Principles: UN Doc.E/CN.4/1996/39 (1996)111 “Reviewing a quarter century of political crime,” The Journal

of Human Rights in China, No.2, 2003, HRIC, p.54112 Ibid.113 “Seven Years Term for posting pro-independence posters”,

Human Rights Update, Vol.10, No.7, TCHRD, 2005, p.3.114 “Dalai Lama’s 70th birthday - Passing years bring no let-up in

harsh curbs on press freedom”, Reporters Without Borders, 5July, 2005: http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=14312&var_recherche=tibet

115 Ibid.116 The Journal of Human Rights in China, No.2, 2003, HRIC,

p.88-104.117 Ibid.118 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to Freedom of

Opinion and Expression,” Mr. Ambeyi Ligabo at the 61st sessionof the UNCHR, 17 December 2004, available at UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/64, Para 39.

119 “China: End Censorship of Internet”, Human Rights Watch,28 September, 2005; www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/09/28/china11798_txt.htm

120 Ibid.121 “New Bans Show China’s concerns about tech”, Associated

Press and Canadian Press, 3 October 2005122 Report of the Special Rapporteur, Ambeyi Ligabo on the right

to Freedom of Opinion and Expression at the 61st Session ofthe UNCHR, 17 December, 2004; UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/64, Para 37 and 38

123 http://www.foi.gov.uk124 The RTI Act, 2005, available at http://lawmin.nic.in/

Right_To_Information_Act.pdf125 “Human Rights in China,” in Beijing Review, 4 November,

Information

79

1991. (The first ‘White Paper’ on human rights issued byChina.)

126 “White Paper on Political Democracy”, Xinhua, 19 October2005, Beijing (See Part VII: “Respecting and SafeguardingHuman Rights,” Para. 5), available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-10/19/content_486206_4.htm

127 “The Geneva Declaration of principles and Plan of Action.”Principle A (1): World summit on the Information Society,December 2003. Visit www.itu.int/wsis

128 60th Session of the Commission on Human Rights, 15 Marchto 23 April 2004: UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/62. Para 33.

80


Handbooks issued during the “patriotic education” campaign in the monastic institutions

Religion

81

introduction

The year 2005 has been characterized by a dramaticrise of religious repression in Tibet. Increased Partyscrutiny and control on religious practices and be-lief have been carried out on Tibetans although reli-gious freedom continued to be formally guaranteedunder China’s national laws as well as internationallaws. The Tibetan people’s freedom of religion hasbeen trampled upon by means of a thoroughly tar-geted and intensified “patriotic re-education” cam-paign2, which is but a campaign against separatismand the Dalai Lama, Tibet’s leader in exile. The ter-minology “patriotic re-education” is just an embel-lishing description of “forceful political brainwash-ing in religious institutions”, as closer examinationreveals.3

The status of religion in Tibet, formerly known asthe spiritual golden roof of the world, is highly alert-ing. “The level of religious repression is high” de-duces the US State Department’s 2005 Annual In-ternational Report on Religious Freedom from ob-servations made during its investigative mission toTibet.4 It is, of course, well-known that ever sincethe 1959 occupation of Tibet and the Cultural Revo-lution5, thereafter freedom of religion has neveragain returned to the region to its full extent exceptfor a brief period of cultural revival in the mid eight-ies.6 Apart from the cultural genocide7, the Tibetanpeople had to endure in the past, the practice of

their main8 religion, Tibetan Buddhism, seems tobe an itching thorn in the ruling Party’s eye.9

As a matter of fact, Tibetan Buddhism itself has longbeen interpreted by Beijing’s government as a threatto “split the Chinese motherland”.10 Tibetan Bud-dhism with its overwhelming population of loyalpractitioners in Tibet, with its influential religiousleaders, monasteries and nunneries, being, thus, theorganizing principle of Tibetan society, is labelledby the party as a contradiction to the atheist com-munist ideology.11 Genuine religious practice of Ti-betan Buddhism and its religious head the DalaiLama12 fall therefore easy prey to being perceived asexpression of Tibetan nationalism and a vehicle forpolitical dissent by the Chinese authorities.

The Dalai Lama has been for years the prominenttarget of a diligently conducted “anti-Dalai Lama”campaign13 in which Chinese officials systematicallypressure Tibetans to denounce their spiritual leaderas head of “splittism”. The campaign is psychologi-cally thoroughly planned as every expression of reli-gious loyalty toward the Dalai Lama is being for-bidden or harshly suppressed, apparently in the hopeto eradicate within Tibetans their genuine religiousworship towards the Dalai Lama. Measures imposedunder the “anti-Dalai Lama” campaign include a banon celebrating the Dalai Lama’s birthday as well asthe possession of pictures of or books written bythe Dalai Lama.

RELIGION“Those who have religious knowledge will slowly die out, religious affairs are stagnating, knowledge is not being passed on, there is worry

about there being no training for new people, and so we see the elimination of Buddhism, which was flourishing in Tibet and whichtransmitted teachings and enlightenment. This is something which I and more the 90% of Tibetans cannot endure.”1

— The Tenth Panchen Lama in his 70,000 Character Petition

82


Another highly concerning issue of religious sup-pression is the violent intrusion of Chinese authori-ties in the issue of choosing reincarnations withinthe Tibetan Buddhist tradition. The attempts of theChinese Government to exert control over issuesthat are of sole religious relevance have been suc-cessful to the point that the whereabouts of thePanchen Lama, who had been chosen following re-ligious rites, remains unknown, while the Beijing-sanctioned 11th Panchen Lama is being promoted asthe real Panchen.

Because of tight Party bans on outgoing informa-tion, only few reports on religious repression findtheir way into the international media. Often, thelack of background information available about thedeeper motives of Chinese measures leaves the worldcommunity ignorant about the dimensions and thedepth of religious suppression taking place in Tibet.Still, the limited information that emanates out ofTibet speaks volume about demand and suppres-sion of religious freedom in Tibet as noted withconcern by governments and human rights moni-toring agencies around the globe.14 It is usually over-seen that the Chinese Party’s goal is to overcomethe historic phenomena of religion as such.15

The Congressional-Executive Commission onChina (CECC) points out that

The Party demands that Tibetan Buddhistspromote patriotism toward China andrepudiate the Dalai Lama, the religion’s spiritualleader. The intensity of religious repressionagainst Tibetans varies across regions ... Sichuanauthorities sometimes impute terrorist motivesto Tibetan monks who travel to India withoutpermission.16

In its 2005 Annual Report, the U.S. Commissionon International Religious Freedom (USCIRF)17

lists China again among its so-called “CPCs” or“Countries of Particular Concern” due to their en-

gaging in or tolerating “systematic and egregious vio-lations of religious freedom” and judges China’s at-titude towards religion as follows:

In China, the government continues to beresponsible for pervasive and severe violations ofreligious freedom and related human rights.Every religious community in China is subjectto restrictions, discriminations, and state control.The most serious religious freedom violations areexperienced by Tibetan Buddhists, UighurMuslims, Roman Catholics, house church andunregistered Protestants, and spiritual groupssuch as the Falun Gong.18

Due to the complex measures exerted in many ways19

by Party officials through the arbitrary interpreta-tion20 of their legislation, certain traditions of Ti-betan Buddhist religion are in danger of completedegeneration. To give an example, in the light ofthe spiritual significance that the Dalai Lama holdsin Tibetan Buddhist religious practices, the prohi-bition of his photos and publications are a graveviolation of religious freedom. Monks and nuns,who during “patriotic re-education” campaigns areforced to spit on their spiritual leaders’ picture,often undergo a subsequent massive mental traumawith severe consequences on their general health state.The intrinsic violence that is part of some measuresof religious repression becomes evident only afterunderstanding the degree of high value attached tocertain beliefs within their cultural and religiouscontext.

At the October 2004 Workshop meeting held inLhasa, Tibet’s capital, Chinese authorities laid downprinciples that have resulted in a wave of increasedcontrol, to curtail Tibetan nationalism21 which, ac-cording to official sources, is apparently misunder-stood to “infiltrating” genuine Tibetan Buddhisttraditions and institutions, which therefore becomea target of political persecution themselves.

Religion

83

During the October 2004 Meeting, the head of theCommittee for Patriotic Education in Lhasa,Lobsang Gyurmey, emphasized:

Patriotic Education should be implemented tothe fullest in the monasteries and nunneries andto prevent separatist activities. Precautionarymeasures should also be taken to stop theinfiltration of literatures from the splittist groupbased in exile.22

According to Lobsang Gyurmey, the committee’smain objective was to promote a new fervour ofpatriotism. The participating officials work at themonasteries for a period of one or two years to pro-mote and carry out an intensified “patriotic re-edu-cation” campaign against separatism. The past prac-tice of “patriotic re-education” has clearly shown thatthe argument of “patriotism” is being used to jus-tify repressive measures taken against Tibetan Bud-dhist practices that are viewed by Chinese Commu-nist Party officials to endanger a stronger influenceof Party ideology over religious beliefs.

The continued misinterpretation or politically mo-tivated underestimation of international humanrights’ law23 by Chinese Party officials and the re-sulting cases of mysterious death, torture, impris-onment or expulsion among Tibetan Buddhistmonks and nuns as well as of important religiousfigures24 are of particular concern.25 Systematic reli-gious repression by Chinese adopted measures,26 inparticular political indoctrination in monasteries,continues to manipulate and eventually eradicate thevery grounds of Tibetan Buddhist beliefs.

TCHRD considers the politically motivated and theintensification27 of “patriotic re-education” cam-paigns28 in Tibet’s remaining29 monasteries and nun-neries as the most concerning Chinese infraction ofTibetan people’s human rights in 2005. This well-organized enforcement of indoctrination campaign

has culminated in one reported mysterious death30

and the unlawful detention of five monks31 whoresisted denouncing the Dalai Lama as required bythe campaign. The violent crackdown32 on a silent,non-violent mass protest of the monks in DrepungMonastery happened to coincide with a rare visit toChina, Tibet and Xinjiang by Manfred Nowak, theU.N. envoy on torture.33

Amnesty International (AI) who over recent yearshas been extremely active in order to save Tibetanprisoners of conscience from ill-treatment, states in2005 about “TAR” and other ethnic Tibetan areasthat not only “freedom of religion, expression andassociation continued to be severely restricted” butalso “arbitrary arrests and unfair trials continued.”As of December 2005, TCHRD holds record that132 Tibetan prisoners of conscience, 91 of themTibetan Buddhist monks and nuns, remain inprison.”34

AI says contacts between the Chinese authorities andrepresentatives of the Tibetan government in exiledid exist, showing even some signs of progress which“however failed to result in any significant policychanges leading to improved protection for the ba-sic human rights of Tibetans.”35

The persecution, intimidation and long-term de-tention of Tibetan Buddhist leaders and scholarswhose whereabouts and state of health sometimesremain unknown after their official release, tend tocome as a cruel side-effect of official concern overthe potential of important religious leaders in influ-encing the masses into political activism. The con-tinued incorporation of political contents to theGeshe Lharampa36 degree examination can be seenas a consequence of a political attitude that aims attightly controlling and arbitrarily reshaping religioustraditions, challenge authority along the socialist lineand to uphold national stability:

84


We must enhance the knowledge of the monksand nuns about patriotism and law. TibetanBuddhism must self-reform ... they must adaptthemselves to suit the development andstabilization of Tibet ... Religious tenets andpractices which do not comply with a socialistsociety should be changed.37

A real danger that appears to threaten the culturalpatrimony of humanity, is the possible long-termeffect of Chinese policies to literally empty TibetanBuddhist monastic institutions of the essence of theirreligious teachings, practices and traditions.38 Thedanger is that Tibetan monasteries in Tibet, deprivedof the necessary number of qualified teaching schol-ars, might end up being repurposed to serve Chi-nese economy as lucrative tourist attractions, asmuseums filled with religious objects whose innerpurpose has been eradicated. Meanwhile, monks andnuns are forcefully instructed by Chinese officialsto pretend happiness towards visiting foreigners39

as if freedom of thought, conscience, religion andbelief were not a dream yet to come true in Tibet.

The continued and now intensified labelling of someTibetan Buddhist religious practices and beliefs as“splittist” and “anti-patriotic” is a very common andpractical argument for the People’s Republic ofChina (PRC) to justify methods of religious repres-sion as “security measures” on behalf of the state.40

Events in 200541 are sad evidence that freedom ofreligion would be now, more than ever, a top prior-ity to deal with in Tibetan-Chinese negotiations.42

International conventions on religious freedom areeasily set aside because the Party’s current policy ispragmatic in nature and more than anything elsedesigned to keep religious influence at bay. Only adialogue could help the Government to overcomeits outdated interpretation of religion and developflexibility to deal with religious issues from the per-spective of respect for human rights.

international commitments anddomestic legislations

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is bound byinternational commitments and domestic legislationsto respect the freedom of thought, conscience, reli-gion and belief. Freedom of Religion43 is an inter-nationally recognized human right that the PRC hasofficially agreed to respect as a basic right of its citi-zens.

Sometimes referred to as the “heart of human rights”,freedom of religion is incorporated into interna-tional law being the preservation of its values ofconcern to the entire world community. As en-shrined in Articles 1, 2 and 1844 of the UnitedNation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights(UDHR) and the Article 1 of the Declaration onthe Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance andDiscrimination Based on Religion or Belief,45 theright to freedom of thought, conscience and reli-gion, the freedom of choice of one’s religion andthe right to exercise one’s religion freely and pub-licly, are firmly established as everyone’s right.

Given that Tibetan society is characterized by theinseparability of religion and culture, the Tibetanpeople’s freedom of religion is also protected underArticle 15 of the International Covenant on Eco-nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) whichrecognizes the right of everyone “to take part in cul-tural life”.46 ICESCR has been signed and ratifiedby the PRC in October 1997 and in March 200147

respectively.

The fact that religious freedom is guaranteed in theChinese Constitution is evidenced by Article 36 ofits 1982 Constitution which states

Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoyfreedom of belief. No state organ, publicorganization or individual may compel citizens

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to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion;nor may they discriminate against citizens whobelieve in, or do not believe in, any religion.The state protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of religion to engage inactivities that disrupt public order, impair thehealth of citizens or interfere with theeducational system of the state ...

This guarantee is, however, easily put in questionevery time when it becomes subject to the State’sinterpretation: the phrasing adds vaguely that onlyso-called “normal religious activities” are permis-sible.48 To this date international reports observe “in-creased government restrictions on Chinese citizenswho worship in state-controlled venues or write forstate-controlled publications. Citizens who challengestate controls on religion, speech, or assembly con-tinue to face severe government repression.”49

In addition, there are several articles in PRC’s legalcodes50 that formally protect religious freedom inPRC by explicitly prohibiting religious discrimina-tion against believers or non-believers. As a matterof fact, 95% of Tibetans are Tibetan Buddhist prac-titioners or see themselves as adhering to TibetanBuddhism:

Tibetan Buddhism is not simply the “religion”of the Tibetan people. Over the centuries,Tibetan national and cultural identity becameindistinguishable from religious identity to theextent that Buddhism regulated the life of allTibetans. Monasteries and nunneries wereplaces of learning where students studied notonly for their own practice but also to impartknowledge to the community.51

Yet, on 1 March 2005, the PRC’s State Councilimplemented new religious affairs regulations thatsupersede the Government’s 1994 regulations tomanage religious sites and to consolidate controls

on freedom of religious belief and expression. Theprovisions’ aim is, according to the regulations’ pre-amble, “to protect freedom of religious belief, main-tain harmony between different religions and soci-ety, and regulate religious affairs throughout thecountry.”52 The Commission of International Reli-gious Freedom (USCIRF)53 concluded:

…Though the Chinese Government issued anew Ordinance on Religion in March 2005,its provisions in fact restrict rather than protectreligious freedom, offering Party leaders moreextensive control over all religious groups andtheir activities.54

Previously, on 17 January 2005, “TAR” Vice Chair-man Jagra Lobsang Tenzin told a meeting of“TAR”officials that the regulations55 provided “alegal weapon to resist foreign forces’ taking advan-tage of religion to infiltrate our country.”56 This re-mark is symptomatic of a situation57 where officialsuspicion over alleged interlinks between TibetanBuddhism and Tibetan nationalism become all tooapparent and the regulation only helps to limit andcontrol religion.

international reactions

On the one hand the year 2005 stands out forheightened restriction on religion when in early July2005, reports of intensification of surveillance onformer Tibetan political prisoners reached the Ti-betan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy(TCHRD):

… Tibetans who fall under suspicion of engagingin political activism, in addition former politicalprisoners, are rounded up either for detentionor interrogation. In some cases, they are orderedto leave Lhasa for the duration of the month,whilst in other cases, their families were ordered

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to take responsibility for preventing them fromengaging in any political activities. The alreadydifficult life of the former political prisoners hasbecome even more miserable with round-the-clock surveillance and restrictions on theirmovement.58

On the other hand the year 2005 has also beenmarked by global appeals to Chinese authorities toput an end to religious repression of Tibetan Bud-dhism. On 8 September 2005, the European Parlia-ment adopted a resolution with 78 votes in favourto 5 against with 1 abstention on breaches of hu-man rights in China, in particular in regards withfreedom of religion. A press statement from the Eu-ropean Parliament urged Chinese authorities “to al-low access for the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Free-dom of Religion or Belief to the Panchen Lamadesignated by the Dalai Lama.” The Parliament calledon the Commission and the Council to remind theChinese authorities that a genuine partnership couldonly develop when shared human right’s values werefully respected and put into practice.

Later, in September 2005, on the occasion of theJoint Statement of the Eighth EU-China Summitheld in Beijing, the EU put again efforts to makesome progress in the Human Rights Dialogue withChina.

On 9 November 2005, USCIRF (U.S. Commis-sion on International Religious Freedom) ChairMichael Cromartie, in his presentation on the occa-sion of USCIRF’s release of recommendations59 tothe U.S. government for “Policy Focus on China,”singled out the danger of the Chinese Party’s prac-tice of putting religion under State control and re-quiring politics in a religious environment whenexactly these measures were the most likely to be-tray the right to religious freedom:

The Commission continues to find that theChinese Government systematically violates theright to freedom of thought, conscience, andreligion or belief, contravening both the ChineseConstitution and international human rightsnorms ... Moreover, there is a fundamentalmisapprehension on the part of Chinese officialsabout what freedom of religion or belief meansunder international instruments. They havemistaken—cynically or inadvertently—theproliferation of state-sanctioned and state-controlled religious expression with theguarantee of the individual right of freedom orreligion or belief. The growth of religioussentiment within the spaces sanctioned bygovernment does not constitute freedom ofthought, conscience, and religion or belief.60

The official reactions from Beijing, however, came,not surprisingly, and in the usual manner of propa-ganda, in a praising tone about the improved hu-man rights situation in China.61 But meanwhile themost recent human rights abuses in Tibet, the vio-lent curfew placed on Lhasa’s Drepung Monastery,had at last become a news known to the world: themonastery with an approximate of thousand inhab-itants62 had been hermetically sealed by SpecialForces and no one has been allowed to enter or leaveits buildings between end of November and De-cember.63 On 15 December 2005, the EU Parlia-ment had grown already so concerned about China’scontinued disregard of international law that it hadadopted a resolution only in regards with the hu-man rights situation in Tibet and Hongkong. Thenext day, the EU-Commissioner for External Rela-tions Benita Ferrero-Waldner released a statementon behalf of the EU-Commission that points outprimarily a deep concern about China’s relations withTibet:

…As regards the situation in Tibet, the EU hasput Tibet very high on its agenda with China.It has, in particular, mainly focused its attention

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on the preservation of the cultural, religious andlinguistic identity of the Tibetan people. Thepresent situation in the region, which we followvery closely, raises indeed grave concern,especially with respect to the exercise of religiousfreedom. We are worried to see that the localauthorities have imposed a strict frameworksetting the limits of this exercise and we deplorethe recent cases of detention of monks and inparticular the blockade of the monastery ofDrepung in Lhasa…64

a brief historic overview

The institutionalization of religious control in Ti-bet has been systematically undertaken since 199465

when a range of Communist Party and governmentstructures were harshly but effectively introducedto make religious practices more acceptable to Chi-nese leadership. Looking back over the last decades,different phases of intensity66 in Chinese policy onreligion in the “TAR” can be distinguished. Thesephases range from a relatively liberal dealing withreligious affairs, including even a period of culturalrevival and religious liberalization, over an utmosttight interpretation of Party policies on religiouscontrol to a total crackdown on religion by prohib-iting religious practices of certain faiths.

After the systematic material destruction carried outon monastic institutions, after the killing of thou-sands of Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns as wellas lay people in the previous decades, the ChineseParty has moved its focus towards an unbloody butyet more dangerous measure of religious repression:the sophisticated manipulation and forceful indoc-trination of the Tibetans’ new generation. To un-derstand why the Chinese authorities have come totake this latest, dramatic step, it is indispensable topass review on their past policies and the effects theyhad on the practice of Tibetan Buddhism.

From 1950 onwards religion underwent strict con-trols conducted by state-run associations.67 UponChina’s consolidation in Tibet, monasteries, whichwere recognized as the resident society’s thresholdof knowledge and order, became a main target ofpolitical crackdown. Already before the start of theCultural Revolution in 1966 more than 2,000monasteries68 of Tibet’s monasteries had been de-stroyed. According to official sources69, from115,600 monks and nuns only some 16,900 re-mained in the areas affected by religious repression.

During the Cultural Revolution itself (1966-76)religious activity was no more controlled but cat-egorically banned. As one informant stated, “Dur-ing the Cultural Revolution there did not exist anyteachings of Buddha”.70 Entire libraries with reli-gious scriptures, some of them unique, were sys-tematically burned, sacred objects destroyed. Monks,nuns and lay Tibetan Buddhist practitioners had toendure nameless hardships, many of them were im-prisoned, tortured and killed.71

After 1977, a phase of leniency re-admitted religiousactivities to some limited extent, particularly in 1979with the opening up policy of Deng Xiaoping. Eventhe Panchen Lama, jailed in summer of 1967 forpresenting a criticism of Party policies in Tibet toMao Zedong, was released from detention in 1977.The highly revered Jokhang Temple in Lhasa wasre-opened to the public in 1979. In the followingyear, Hu Yaobang initiated with new policies ofliberalisation era and allocated money for the recon-struction of some monasteries.72 The year 1986meant to many Tibetans a new mile stone in theirhopes for a re-establishment of their religious free-dom because for the first time in 20 years they wereagain allowed to celebrate Monlam Chenmo, the“Great Prayer” festival. What they soon would findout, however, was that the Party officials would beomnipresent with their surveillance cameras andobservers in festivals and high religious feasts in or-

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der to supervise who attended them and therefore,following the Party logics, was bound to be a per-son with a potential “separatist” attitude towards theChinese motherland.

Thus, despite this period of moderate tolerance(1977-86), the conditions for religious practice werenot those of religious freedom.73 Peaceful demon-strations by monks from several major monasteriesresulted in the major 1987 security crackdown. Sub-sequently, Tibetan Buddhist practices became a tar-get of the governments’ intensified observation, con-trol and curtail. Between December 1989 and April1990, more than 200 monks and nuns were expelledfrom their monasteries.74

The Chinese Government sought to undertake strictmeasures targeted at breaking what they interpretedas joint Tibetan resistance under the cover of reli-gion. But China’s outspoken move to actively sup-pressing and restricting further religious growthrather than to suppress it, came on the Third WorkForum in Tibet held in 1994.75 The four steps thatthe Third Forum called to be taken in religious in-stitutions reveal that there really was never an inten-tion to let Tibetan Buddhist institutions enjoy reli-gious freedom:76

1. vetting the political position of each member ofevery Democratic Management Committeeand appointing only pro-Chinese monks to thosecommittees

2. enforcing a ban on the construction of anyreligious buildings except with official permission

3. enforcing limits set some years earlier on thenumbers of monks or nuns allowed in eachinstitution

4. obliging each monk and nun to give declarationsof their absolute support for the leadership ofthe Communist Party and the integrity of the“Motherland”.

On the basis of the Work Forum’s decisions77, re-strictions on the size of monastic institutes wereimmediately put into practice. One example is thedestruction at Yachen Gar in 2001 where every fallmonks and nuns used to enter a strict three-monthretreat of contemplation. The destruction of theirhomes by intruding “work teams” disrupted thescholars’ practice and left them without place to go.Another drastic example is the partial destructionof the Serthar Institute in 2001 where the impactof the regional authorities’ forceful demolition ofresidential quarters and expulsion of religious prac-titioners was very similar to the destruction causedelsewhere during the Cultural Revolution. High-level officials from Beijing, including some fromthe United Front Work Unit oversaw furthermorethe reduction of the monastery’s population. Fromthe approximate total of 3,000 nuns at Serthar In-stitute the majority was expelled. Likewise, fromthe prior approximately 8,000 resident monks, aceiling of 1,400 was imposed.78

Beijing, on the basis of its professed Party principleson social materialism, had just no tool at hand toexplain itself the phenomena of Tibetan Buddhismcontinuing to flourish on the basis of religion and afew religious leaders who had become an exampleof virtuous conduct to their students:79 What was itabout Tibetan Buddhism that could possibly makeit so popular even after years of severe controls? Whywas it that despite the new framework for manage-ment of monasteries and other regulations, the loy-alty to the Dalai Lama was not yet extinguished norhad the integral role of Tibetan Buddhism in Ti-betan society been tempered sufficiently? Why hadthe Chinese Party’s attempts to discredit the DalaiLama, the Tibetan Buddhists’ religious head, as“splittist” not yet resulted in any visible success? Mostapparently authorities feared then and continue tofear that the political influence of the Party mightbe in danger if religion has this unexplainable po-tential to attract so many followers.80 For this sole

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reason, as the fear of religion seemed more impor-tant in people’s lives than politics, the severe crack-down on the most populated and active monaster-ies in Tibet seemed inevitable… and was swiftly car-ried out, leaving behind material destruction anddeep human despair.81

The personal agony caused by the destruction oftheir living space and realm of religious practice re-sulted in the suicide of many monks and nuns, aseye-witnesses report.82 In an interview conducted byTIN (Tibetan Information Network), a nun re-members the worst day of her life:

They told me I must go back to my home andnot to another nunnery. I told them I didn’twant to leave. Then two armed policemenentered my wood hut and threw my Buddhastatue on the floor. They dragged me out of thehut and one of the policemen tossed my dailyrecitation book into the wood stove.83

The levels of religious repression have taken on newaspects which are difficult to distinguish from theoutside. The main methods that the Chinese Gov-ernment has employed to control religion success-fully are, thus, “patriotic re-education” and a thor-ough legal management of religious affairs. In fact,for the past years the so-called “legal” managementof religious affairs tends to be composed by a com-bination of propaganda, re-education, administra-tive regulation, punishment and implementation ofincreasingly sophisticated security measures.84 With-out an in-depth understanding of their functioningthat is skilfully targeted at indoctrinating and chang-ing the mind and beliefs of people, the gravity ofreligious repression in China is likely to be underes-timated in its gravity.

new aspects of crackdownon religion

It is of utmost relevance to note that ever since theearly nineties and in particular since the 1994 ThirdWork Forum and the 2001 Fourth Tibet WorkForum, the Chinese Government has purposely en-forced85 and in 2005 has intensified86 a legal man-agement of religious affairs87 that in its practice in-tervenes in the free unfolding of Tibetan Buddhistreligious traditions:

... in Tibet ... official control of religion is tighterthan in predominantly ethnic Chinese areas.In the “TAR” and in areas in provinces withconcentrated Tibetan populations, thegovernment limits the number of monasteries,the total number of monks, and the number atany given monastery; vets all applicants wishingto join a monastery or nunnery; interferes withthe independent selection of the monasticleadership at all monasteries; prohibits theperformance of traditional rites; conductsongoing re-education campaigns; limits largereligious assemblies; periodically sends workteams to monasteries to check on adherence toall rules; and as Human Rights Watch has beentold, “appoints paid informants in the monasteryas well as villages near to the monastery to keepan eye on monks.” There is a permanent policepresence in the larger monasteries. As is wellknown, the police will search for contraband,such as photos of the Dalai Lama or tapes of hisspeeches…88

There is only a subtle line of perceivable distinctionbetween the outer manifestations of religious activi-ties which are mostly allowed and the Party’s in-creased suppression of traditional religious practices.The Chinese Government has given proof of re-sourcefulness and inventiveness in pretending to theoutside an apparent reality of religious freedom that,on the inside, is meanwhile skilfully curtailed in itsessence.

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Pictures of Tibetans celebrating religious feasts inTibet or twirling their prayer wheels should not blindthe public awareness of the very systematic and well-thought out impediments that are being institution-alized thereby denying the Tibetan monks and nunsto continue their religious practices as prescribed bytradition, e.g. the Communist Party’s emphasis oneconomic welfare of the monastery and the addi-tion of political beliefs to religious vows in place ofrigorous study and practice. Therefore, from theoutside it might seem to an observer that Tibetansin Tibet continue, as they have always done, to pray,prostrate, participate in festivals, twirl their prayerwheels and undertake pilgrimages orcircumambulations around sacred sites.89

But the main issue of concern is the irreconcilablecontradiction between the official assertions andTibetan Buddhist traditional religious practices suchas the observance of religious traditions and thetransmission of religious teachings. These are lessvisible to the outside but constitute the essence oftraditional religious values:

Monasteries must often receive official permissionbefore certain types of teachings, initiation, orceremonies are performed and the authorities areparticularly wary of any religious event that islikely to attract a mass gathering. Monks andnuns are also restricted or forbidden fromperforming a variety of traditional rituals inpeople’s home and in other places outside of themonastery. As with other aspects of religious policy,in some areas the restrictions are minimal andin others they are scrupulously enforced.90

Beijing is aware that directly banning religion wasnot the solution. Instead, the government passednew laws that seem to give proof of a serious con-cern over religious affairs. Precisely these laws helpthe government put restrictions on Tibetan Bud-dhist core beliefs by facilitating the widespread es-

tablishment of administrative hindrances91 to thetransmission of original teachings. Such hindrancesare, for example, the immense difficulties monksand nuns have to go through before they can even-tually obtain official admission to a monastery; forreceiving the official “registration card” they are ac-tually required to denounce their loyalty to the DalaiLama which to genuine religious practitioners ofTibetan Buddhism would be equal to giving up theloyalty to their root-Guru.

De facto it is the Chinese Communist Party whodetermines what Buddhism is supposed to be tothe Tibetans: “inappropriate beliefs” are forcefullyreplaced by “patriotic” and therefore “normal” ones.According to the Party’s dichotomy “inappropriatebeliefs” are all those that in some way or the othercould be understood as “unpatriotic” or incongru-ent with what is propagated as truth by the Party,such as the official version about the historic rea-sons why Tibet has always been a legitimate terri-tory of China. Similarly, “appropriate” Tibetan Bud-dhism excludes “worshipping the Dalai Lama” who,according to tradition, is the spiritual head of Ti-betan Buddhists and occupies the role of being re-vered as the reincarnation of the Buddha of Com-passion.

Nevertheless, in August 2002, in a frequent attemptto undermine the religious authority of the institu-tion of the Dalai Lama, Guo Jinglong, “TAR” Party-Secretary told Reuters:

In China, there is no such thing as politicaldifferences due to religious beliefs. The populationhere believes in religion but that does not meanthey must believe in the Dalai Lama.92

In January 2005, the former Chinese Premier ZhuRongji stressed the good management of religiousaffairs by saying that

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…it is in the interest of the country’s reform anddevelopment that people enjoy the freedom ofreligious belief should be well implemented andreligious affairs should be handled according tolaw. The Chinese religious circle’s fine traditionof loving the country and serving society shouldbe further encouraged to reinforce the unity ofthe nation.93

The Premier called on governments at all levels

to support the work related to religious affairsand help all religious believers in overcomingdifficulties in their daily life so that they cancontribute to the development and prosperityof the country.94

This statement might seem inoffensive but exem-plifies the implication that religious activities areexpected to embrace political loyalty to the prin-ciples of a socialist society as well as love for the moth-erland.95 The January 2005 article “Religions adaptto socialist society in China”96 puts this aim of theParty in evidence. In it, China’s Xinhua News Agencyreports about the progress97 with policies of reli-gious freedom in Lhasa:

The activities of both monks and nuns shouldbe in line with the country’s political system andthe law, said Nyada, a member of political andconsultative committee of Nagqu county.98

The bottom line that the religious communities’activities need to be congruent with the Commu-nist principles is, however, a threatening indicatorof the PRC’s constant iron hand on the admissionor suppression of certain religious practices. Byirony, the PRC’s crackdown on religion in “TAR”canmost easily be managed by the liberal interpretationof laws99 and always be justified by going back toChina’s dictate that “Buddhism must conform tosocialism and not the other way round.”

In contrast to the news proclaimed by Xinhua NewsAgency, official measures100 on religion seem to bepurposefully designed to limit the freedom of reli-gion and, more than that, to actually wiping outthe roots of genuine religious beliefs in Tibet. Thecrackdown on religion in Tibet occurs, thus, in twomanners: Firstly, through the “Anti-Dalai Lama”campaign, involving bans and restrictions on any-thing related to the Dalai Lama, lashing out on reli-gious practitioners,101 all of which has received somecoverage by world media102 and enrages the interna-tional community’s moral sentiment. Secondly, theChinese officials have pursued, camouflaged as ad-ministrative support units and helpful educationalteams, a politics of fitting the traditional scheduleof life and teaching in Tibetan Buddhist monaster-ies to Party requirements.103 This latter, “silent” man-ner of crackdown on religion runs the risk of re-maining invisible to the broad public104 and under-estimated in its destructive long-term results.105

At the October 2004 Workshop Meeting clearlystated, “patriotic re-education” versus traditional re-ligious education has become a top priority in theParties’ programme.106

Accounts about the forceful carrying out of “Loveyour Religion, Love your Country” re-educationsessions in Sera Monastery, one of the three greatmonasteries in Lhasa, in summer 2005 speak theirown language:

On 10 July 2005, officials from the LhasaReligious Bureau began the campaign. Ourmonastic inhabitants have been hampered bythe current campaign. Many monks returnedto their native hometown when the notice forthe conduct of the campaign reached themonastery. We were grouped into two and issuedsix different books to study. The officialsconducted four sessions per week, puttingquestions to monks at random regarding thetexts. The current campaign will last for three

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months, at end of which an examination willbe conducted to test the monks’ allegiance tothe state....A few days prior to the birthday of the DalaiLama on 6 July 2005, PSB officers were placedat the monastery main gate to maintain 24-hour surveillance to monitor us for any politicalactivities. On 6 July, no one was allowed to gooutside the monastery. Even the monks whohad been previously registered to perform prayersin private homes were not allowed to leave themonastery grounds.107

traditional religious educationin Tibetan buddhism

His Holiness the Dalai Lama believes that thesurvival of the Tibetan culture is dependent onthe continuity and the continued integrity ofthe Tibetan monastic tradition ... Tibet’s highestcultural and spiritual attainments and the onesthe Tibetans are most proud of were realisedand nurtured in the lonely and desolate cavesand hermitages of Tibet and in its bustlingmonastic universities. Traditional Tibet livedand continues to live in its monasteries....108

As mentioned in the Chapter on Education109, theinstruction and education of youngsters110 has beena major focus in Tibetan society for centuries. Ac-cording to tradition, it used to be the pride of eachfamily to have at least one member from each gen-eration receive high scholarly education in a monas-tic institution and eventually dedicate the rest of hisor her life to the pursuit of religious practice. InTibetan culture literacy in the Tibetan language,higher education and religious practice are, thus,interconnected. Even the knowledge of sciences,such as Tibetan medicine and astrology, used to beinstructed and studied in monasteries and alwayswithin the context of religious scriptures.111

Moreover, the monastic community, being the spiri-tual as well as the intellectual backbone of society,has had since its beginnings the eminent functionof counselling lay people in all aspects of their life.It should, therefore, be acknowledged that anychange in the rules of the monastic communities’functioning is necessarily destined to draw conse-quences in the life and functioning of the lay com-munity. In this sense, though the official measuresof religious repression seem to target chiefly themonasteries and nunneries, direct shortcomings ofthe imposed restrictions concern the Tibetan laysociety as much as the monastic community.112

If Tibetan Buddhist religious belief and practices areto be kept alive according to tradition, it will bevital to maintain the integrity of the monastic com-munity. The standard and authenticity of its educa-tion will be essential to pass on to the new genera-tions the teachings of wisdom as they were taughtand practiced for centuries. But the ability of themonasteries to produce the same quality of monk-scholars as before clearly depends on first on theextent of religious freedom available and on beingable to rely on fully qualified teachers of the tradi-tional lineages113 of Tibetan Buddhism who wouldbe able to instruct the new generation of monasticstudents from an early age onwards.

The question over whether monasteries can trainyoung monks and nuns, as tradition requires (fromages as early as two years old in the case of recog-nized re-incarnate Lamas), has been much contested.Fact is that the kind of high-level skills that monas-tic education is able to produce in students, dependson an intensive training starting at an early age.114

The very problem that monks and nuns face inTibet is precisely the difficulty of accessing religiouseducation freely and fully in the monasteries. DMCs(Democratic Management Committees)115 continu-ously interfere in either the free in-depths study of

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religious texts or the participation of the monasticcommunity in the all important text transmissionsor spiritual empowerments. DMC’s, the commit-tee of “loyal” monks, described as having usurpedthe traditional role of monastic abbot because theyoversee the curriculum and activities in themonastery.

Yet, the worst impediment to the continuity ofteachings is the forceful removal of renownedscholars from their monasteries. Such removal inthe form of house arrest or formal detention leadsto an interruption of the tutorship between thesewould-be scholars and their teachers (or “Lamas”)at a time when it would be highly vital for them toreceive teachings on a wider range of texts as well asqualified advice on their personal meditative prac-tices.116 A study117 on the Monastery Labrang tellsabout this progressive loss of monastic discipline andtraditions:

…Despite these persistent endeavour to restorethe monastery both materially and spiritually,several old monks who lived in the monasterybefore 1958 have voiced their criticism of thediscipline and the level of education. Themonastery lost a number of educated monksduring the two waves of destruction and thecontinuity of transmission of teachings fromteacher to pupil, which is of high importance inthe Tibetan Buddhist tradition, was notmaintained. There is now only a small numberof highly qualified monks.118

It is well-known that the practical know-how oncontemplative practices is of utmost importance inTibetan Buddhism. However, what needs to bepointed out here is that the most highly regardedteachings are being transmitted, by tradition, fromteacher to student, not in a written form but by so-called oral transmission. The value of the oral trans-mission of teachings resides in the pride that knowl-edge has been passed on to vastly trained practitio-

ners in an unbroken lineage that can be traced backto the Buddha himself.

Chinese rule in Tibet has led to massive hin-drances119 in maintaining the unbroken chains oftransmission:

…Chinese authorities have interfered withscholarly studies of Buddhism and thetransmission of Buddhist practices to anupcoming generation of students and would-bescholars and monks. Most critically, in manyareas there are few, if any, master scholars andteachers, and there are restrictions on invitingmonks from other areas to give teachings. In atleast two areas, monks cannot go on pilgrimagesoutside their own region for longer than fivedays. As one monk reported, “The monastery ishelpless, as it is the order from higherauthorities.” University and public schoolstudents have told Human Rights Watch thatthey have been barred from observing ritualsand holidays, and in some cases threatened withexpulsion.120

The life of monks and nuns121 in Tibetan Buddhistmonasteries follows a set of strict rules that empha-size not only long prayer sessions or meditation.Above all the monastic community engages in thestudy, logic, debate and memorizing of complexdoctrinal treaties that require a proper and intensivemental preparation, such as an exceptional capacityfor concentration and sharp analysis.

… After their much heated debate sessions onBuddhist philosophy, they find their way to theterrace or the corridors of the buildings, wherethey sit and memorize huge chunks of Buddhistteachings, from thick Tibetan Buddhisttexts…122

It is safe to state that Tibetan monks and nuns arethe intellectual elite of their society. Their missionis to let lay people benefit from the spiritual knowl-

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edge they gain from scholarly studies andmeditational insights.123 Practitioners need longhours to listen and study the fundamentals of Bud-dhism and assimilate its philosophy to their ethicalconduct in daily life. The reason for monks and nunsto seclude from the secular and business-orientedsociety is their goal to achieve a detachment frommundane affairs for being able to more fully fusewith the spiritual aspects of their chosen path.

In 2005, the Chinese Communist Party accused themonastic communities for being a “drain on re-sources in society”, forcing them to seek self-suffi-ciency by re-orientating their functioning accordingto materialistic criteria.124

In Tibet, as in many Asian societies, there existsa symbiotic relationship between the laycommunity and religious community; the laycommunity offering financial support and themonastic community offering spiritual guidance.The Chinese Communist Party views thetraditional position of monasteries in Tibetansociety as parasitic and exploitative ... Partypolicy on religion emphasizes the need formonasteries ... to be economically self-sufficient.125

The PRC authorities put emphasis on economicwelfare of the monastery and the addition of politi-cal beliefs to religious vows and rigorous study andpractice. In other words, monks who would usu-ally spend their time engaging in the various disci-plines of the Tibetan Buddhist tradition are nowobliged to give priority to productive skills (such asfarming or providing services such as wood-blockmaking, type-setting, medical care, handicrafts, run-ning a guest-house and restaurant, making incense,running shops, being tourist guides or dedicatingthemselves to gardening)126 that allow their monas-tery to run independently from donations.127

Seen from the perspective of the Chinese Govern-ment, those monasteries where such enforcementshave been carried out, have turned, indeed, into cost-efficient institutions128 that are less of a financial “bur-den” on the state. From the Tibetan Buddhists’ andhuman rights’ perspective, however, this situation isa worrying case example of political intrusion in re-ligion. In many ways it looks as if the Party is get-ting closer to its proposed aim to pioneering a newbrand of socialist monks.129

the “patriotic re-education”campaign

There has been a paradigmatic shift of increasingreligious repression in Tibet in the recent months.Beijing authorities’ suspicion of alleged interlinksbetween Tibetan Buddhism and Tibetannationalism is clearly evidenced by officialattempts to control religion through “patrioticre-education” campaign130 and arrests, tortureand imprisonment. Under the “patrioticeducation” campaign in the various monasteriesin Tibet this year, arrests and expulsions of clergyhave been reported consistently.131

The objective to instruct Tibetan monks and nunsin Chinese party ideology and in China’s interpreta-tion of Chinese history and denunciation of theDalai Lama found its culmination in the launchingof the “patriotic re-education” campaign in 1996.132

As Chen Kuiyuan, the then “TAR” Party Secretarymentioned on 23 July 1996, “The main battlefieldof our struggles against the Dalai clique is in thespiritual field.”133 The increased control over mon-asteries as well as continued crackdowns on the ex-pressed allegiance to the Dalai Lama have been ex-perienced by some Tibetans as being like a “SecondCultural Revolution”, of which “patriotic re-educa-tion” is the most concerning practice.

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Meanwhile the larger international audience did notseem to notice that “patriotic re-education” was nota legitimate move by Chinese authorities but in-stead a channel for what is known as China’s ut-most violent134 Strike Hard” campaign. Both cam-paigns were launched in 1996 and research135 showsthat they are complementary to each other. TheChinese argument is that monasteries and nunner-ies in Tibet have been for years “bastions of politicaldissidence” and that the attitude of monks and nunsneeded “correction” through “re-education”. Thosewho would resist “re-education” would consequentlybe dealt with harshly on the basis of the “StrikeHard” campaign.136

An article in Tibet Daily137 specifies the methodol-ogy of the “patriotic re-education” campaign whoseaim is to remove the “Dalai’s cloak layer by layer”:138

1. Establish a mechanism and clearly define theresponsibilities of each of the leading group forpatriotic education and the religious affairsmanagement group.

2. Provide sufficient staff and conduct training atdifferent levels.

3. Take a clear cut stand and pay attention topolicy, such as removing child monks.139

4. Combine education for monks and nuns witheducation for laymen.

5. Contrast new with old; demonstrate typicalexamples of old peasants, herders and monksand nuns subjected to the Dalai‘s rule andsuppression in old Tibet.

6. Conduct activities such as literary and artperformances to enhance the educational effect.

7. Make verbal and written denunciations (of theDalai Lama).

8. Provide guidance for different categories,advance in depth step by step.140

The enforcement level of “patriotic re-education”varied among regions within Tibet but official docu-

ments and refugee testimonies suggest that theimplemented policies have been very similarthroughout all Tibetan populated regions.141 Theconsistency with which the Chinese authorities dealwith the influence of the Dalai Lama points at thefear the Party apparently has over the unity of Ti-betans through Tibetan Buddhism and the impactof the monastic tradition on their society.

The Party is well aware that it is “difficult to changepeople’s mind in a short space of time”142 and setstherefore its hopes on the long-term effects of con-stant repetitions of lies143 to bring them into exist-ence as a new reality. “Patriotic re-education” is basedon making believe and loyally adhere to a prefixedfive-point requirement. The acceptance of the fiveprinciples listed by the political pledge is essentialfor being able to receive a red-card144 and its privi-leges. The principles that the Chinese party expectsthe monks and nuns to agree are:

1. Opposition to separatism2. Unity of Tibet and China3. Recognition of the Chinese-appointedPanchen Lama as the true Panchen Lama4. Denial that Tibet was or should beindependent5. Agreement that the Dalai Lama isdestroying the unity of the Motherland 145

Of these required points the PRC particularly caresabout the adherence to two un-truths that it tries toconvert, under threats and beatings, into a truth thatthe feared Tibetan should finally start to believe in.Any admission to a monastery, the pursuit of stud-ies and any kind of permission146 that goes in thedirection to consuming one’s religious freedom, isbound to the repetition of two new mantras147,firstly, the applicants’ stressed allegiance to the Stateand secondly, the denunciation of the Dalai Lama.Lessons of “patriotic re-education” campaign extendusually for many hours with only a few five-minute

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breaks and sometimes go on from a few days onlyto several months; religious teachings are, of course,suspended for the time being. The lessons on pa-triotism consist in the reading and explaining of aseries of political texts148 that give the Party’s lengthyreasons of why the Dalai Lama149 is a “chief villain”,who “must be publicly exposed and criticized…stripping away his cloak of being a “religiousleader”.150 The long hours of indoctrination are usu-ally followed by severely conducted question-answersessions in which officials investigate if monks andnuns have properly assimilated the lessons. Studentswho are unable to give satisfactory answers or whoare simply unable to reply well enough in the Chi-nese language,151 face discrimination in front of theircommunity and risk being expelled from the mon-astery.152

Besides, the implementation of “patriotic re-educa-tion” needs also to be understood as a reaction tothe controversy between the Chinese Governmentand the Dalai Lama in exile over the identificationof the eleventh reincarnation of the PanchenLama.153 Tibetan Buddhists had not accepted theChinese choice of the XIth Panchen Lama, GyaltsenNorbu, which has led to ongoing tensions betweenthe monastic communities and the state. MeanwhileGedhun Choekyi Nyima, the Panchen Lama rec-ognized by the Dalai Lama remains missing for thelast ten years, since 1997. The government there-fore found that it was time to counteract these ten-sions by first forcing Tibetan Buddhist monks andnuns to accept the Chinese chosen Panchen Lamaand then indoctrinating them about the state au-thority to make this choice.In the already mentioned Third Tibet Work Forumin 1994, Chinese leaders began for the first time toplace new restrictions on religious institutions thatwere supervised by the Democratic ManagementCommittee (DMC) and “work team” units whichwere installed on the premises of monasteries or payvisit often. Suddenly, the monks and nuns had a

controlling, indoctrinating and harshly castigatingpolitical entity integrated to the very place wherethey were meant to pursue their religious studies.The “work teams” became a constant threat to themonks and nuns, creating an atmosphere of suspi-cion and anxiety. As some Tibetan officials and mem-bers of the monastery, out of ignorance or lured bymaterialistic promises, changed to the Chinese partyside, nobody could fully trust anybody anymore.154

Denouncing one’s neighbour if he or she did notpractice in conformity with the regulations laid downby the Democratic Management Committee(DMC) became a patriotic duty in monasteries.Since then the serious study of Buddhist philoso-phy is characterized by political intrusion and cur-tailment.

Practitioners have to conform to live with the con-stant threat to end up in a Chinese prison wheremaltreatment and torture are known to be the or-der of the day.155 Accounts of those who have sur-vived lengthy prison sentences for acts in defence oftheir religious freedom are testimonies of shatteredlives: the years in prison are bereft of essential reli-gious study and practice. Moreover, after their re-lease from prison, which usually leaves inmatesmentally and physically broken, monks and nunsare not readmitted to monasteries and become un-employable outcasts of society because of theirprison history.156

According to interviews conducted by TCHRD, thepressure exerted by authorities in monasteries leadssometimes to desperate tensions among the religiouspractitioners themselves.157 As authorities use tothreaten harshly with the closure of monasteries ifthe resident monks or nuns refrain from denounc-ing the Dalai Lama and pledging their loyalty to themotherland, old monks who are more afraid of be-ing expelled from the monastery supplicate theirfellow younger monks to just obey the authoritiesfor the sake of maintaining the monastery function-

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ing. To eventually crack the unity of the monaster-ies by expelling those who are showing the smallestsigns of resistance is another important goal of “pa-triotic re-education” next to bringing about a last-ing change of attitude in religious practitioners interms of patriotic fidelity.

However, the change that so far has been broughtabout is the institutionalization of psychic stressmechanisms under forceful and sometimes life-threatening circumstances.158 Thus, monastic insti-tutions, originally set up for providing religious prac-titioners with a conducive environment for medita-tion on religious contents and for achieving innerpeace, are being forcefully re-functioned to servingthe Party as a production machinery of loyal politi-cal followers.159

The requirement of accepting Tibet as an inalienablepart of China is the basic message of the “patriotic re-education” campaign and is known under the expres-sion “Love your country, love your religion.” Evidently,the political suggestion underlying the slogan is thatbeing a good monk or nun depends on one’s loyaltyto the state. No slogan could summarize in a betterway the basic obstacle to religious freedom in Tibet.On the one hand the Chinese Party sees religion prin-cipally always as related with politics. On the otherhand, a free and genuine practice of Tibetan Buddhistreligion necessarily excludes the involvement of politi-cal issues with religious matters. There is no space inTibetan Buddhist meditations for loving one’s coun-try or pledging loyalty to it.

Freedom of religion for Tibetan Buddhists wouldmean that government authorities cease not onlywith their controls and restrictions in Tibetan Bud-dhist institutes but most importantly cease mixingup a party’s ideological messages with religious tra-ditions. Any attempts, the violent destructive onesas well as the nearly unperceivable ones that operatethrough indoctrination and manipulation, any at-

tempts to assimilate politics and religion into a po-litical version of religion are a gross downfall againsta people’s right to freedom of their religion.160

An excellent example for the clash of interests be-tween Chinese authorities and a Tibetan Buddhistreligious institution is the Labrang Monastery in thePRC’s Gansu Province. After two waves of destruc-tion inflicted by Chinese officials on this influentialmonastery, there have been attempts in recent yearsto push forward a revitalisation process of the mo-nastic life which is, by the way, one of the maintourist attractions of the area.

As mentioned earlier, economic interests are of pri-mordial relevancy to Chinese authorities. Therevitalisation of the Labrang Monastery was notundertaken to establish religious freedom in the firstplace as since the beginning of the revitalisation pro-cess, permanent supervising DMCs were put in placeto dim down the possible political impact of themonastery towards encouraging the pro-indepen-dence movement. Labrang Monastery was notspared from falling under the control of the DMCand becoming subjected to “patriotic re-education”.The conflicting interests over a greater degree ofrevitalisation are a reflection of a general problemthat permeates the Tibetan Buddhist-CommunistChinese relations. It seems that a merely traditionalreligious institution is not acceptable to the Chi-nese side as long as political supervision is missing,while Tibetans, rightly, reject such intrusion:

…on the one hand the desire of the Chineseauthorities administratively to control theinternal life of the monastery; and on the otherhand the endeavour of the Tibetan monks andlay people to proceed further with the revival ofthe monastery with the aim of re-establishing itin its traditional role, which encompassed notonly religious authority but political and economicpower as well. These two trends are contradictory:

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the alternative of a limited revival is unacceptablefor Tibetans as the vision of the gradualresurrection of the traditional role of themonastery, represented by Jamyang Yhepa andGungthang [the reincarnate founder of themonastery and the second highest reincarnationof Labrang; both recognized by TibetanBuddhists], which would result in the creationof parallel administrative structures independentof the Chinese state, is for the Chinese.161

recent events

Following the October 2004 Workshop Meetingin Lhasa162 the practice of “patriotic re-education”has become notably harsher. Throughout the year2005, recent arrivals who fled Tibet reported toTCHRD about the campaign being conducted inTalung Monastery, Phenpo Gyabdrak Nunnery,Shugseb Nunnery and Sera Monastery located in“TAR”. Authorities are now more vigilant and re-quire full-hearted loyalty pledges to the motherlandand disapproval of the Dalai Lama. Being superfi-cially conforming with the Party’s professed truthsby mere words is, thus, not enough anymore.

In 2005, Chinese officials expanded their controlsover the practitioner’s inner world of thoughts andemotions. Testimonies from 2005163 speak of forcedessay writing about the students’ “personal emotionsabout receiving patriotic re-education classes”. Thepsychic pressure exerted on the students leaves themin dilemma over whether to resist the campaign orrisk losing personal freedom and every tiny possi-bility they are having in their present situation tocontinue their religious education. If they decide toshow conformity with the principles and require-ment of the campaign, they risk remaining trauma-tized as a consequence of their remorse about hav-ing betrayed their innermost religious beliefs andconvictions.

International attention was turned to the “patrioticre-education” practice for the first time since longwhen in the beginning of October 2005, Chineseofficials started an intensive “re-education” campaignin Lhasa’s Drepung Monastery164. While in recentyears there had been proven evidence of several deathcases165 in direct relation with “patriotic re-educa-tion”, one monk’s mysterious death in Drepungseemed to finally make a difference. The EU Parlia-ment adopted a new resolution on human rights inTibet, expressing first of all its deep concern aboutthe ongoing practice of “patriotic re-education”. Ina 14 point document166 regarding Tibet, the EU de-mands China among other things to clarify the cir-cumstances of Ngawang Jangchub’s death167 whichhad become first known through a TCHRD pressrelease:

…“work team” officials arrived in themonastery in the beginning of October 2005 toconduct the campaign. As stipulated by theguidelines of the campaign, the monks in themonastery were required to condemn the DalaiLama as a “splittist” and to pledge their loyaltyto the Chinese government. Some of the monksrefused to be “educated” and an argumenterupted between them and the officials. It isreported that during the argument, Ngawangflatly refused to condemn the Dalai Lamacalling him “the saviour for the present and thenext life”. He told the officials that he had noregrets, even if he was to be expelled from themonastery. Ngawang further refuted theChinese officials’ claim of Tibet being a part ofChine; he reportedly said, “Tibet has never beena part of China historically and I dismiss yourclaim over Tibet”. In response, the officialsverbally abused him and threatened him withdire consequences. Following the argument,Ngawang furiously returned to his quarter anddid not come for the next day’s session. Whenthe other monks went to check on him, theyfound him dead in his room. The exact cause of

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his death is unknown although the monksspeculate suicide due to extreme psychologicaltrauma.168

Instead of providing clarification on the case, Chi-nese officials seemed to impose a news blackout andcontinued without interruption the “patriotic re-education” campaign in Drepung Monastery. On23 November 2005, during a re-education class fivemonks stood up against “work team” officials, likeNgawang had done, and refused to sign a documentdenouncing their spiritual leader and pledge theiradherence to China: Ngawang Namdrol fromTsotod Township, Phenpo Lhundrup County, LhasaMunicipality, “TAR”; Ngawang Thupten a.k.a.Shogbu Metok from Lhasa Inner City, Lhasa Mu-nicipality; “TAR”, Ngawang Phelgey from RinpungCounty, Shigatse Prefecture, “TAR”; and PhuntsokThupwang from Gongkar County, Lhoka Prefec-ture, “TAR”; were immediately expelled from themonastery’s premises and handed over to the localPSB (Public Security Bureau).169

Meanwhile about 400 resident monks in DrepungMonastery joined together in a silent, non-violentmass protest170 which has been described as one ofthe biggest in a decade despite a climate of severerestrictions and repressions in the Chinese occupiedTibet.171 The “TAR” authorities immediately im-posed a crackdown and curfew. By coincidence, theswift crackdown on the monks’ peaceful protest tookplace days after Beijing’s President, Hu Jintao, gaveassurances of improving human rights to PresidentGeorge W. Bush, during the latter’s visit to PRCfrom 19 to 21 November 2005. The crackdown inDrepung led to a wave of protest actions at ChineseMissions and embassies all over the world, count-ing the one in New York with mass attendance byactivists.172 Appeals of international human rightsorganisations as well as of the EU Parliament haveso far failed to learn the whereabouts and well-be-ing of the detained monks.

In a statement Tsuiltrim Dorjee, the General Secre-tary of the TYC (Tibetan Youth Congress)173, thelargest Tibetan non-governmental organisation inexile, demanded the complete withdrawal of “patri-otic re-education” practices in Tibet and warning that“further suppression of the Tibetan people’s basichuman rights will result in violent upheaval withinthe Tibetan community.” The TYC demanded thereinstatement of the monks and nuns who had facedexpulsion due to the campaign policies and expressedits particular concern over the recent deputation ofZhang Qingli, former vice-governor of Xinjiang anda close aide of President Hu Jintao, in Tibet as thenew Chief of “TAR”. Mentioning that TYC hasreceived reports174 about protests at Gharig Nun-nery near Sera Monastery, similar to those inDrepung, because “patriotic re-education” was be-ing carried out so harshly, Tsuiltrim Dorjee said:

We fear that preparations are underway forstronger implementation of brutal communistpolicies in Tibet that have largely succeeded inreducing the other ethnic minorities in Chinainto unthreatening, frightened and disillusionedpeople.175

In the wake of these events the question remains ifBeijing is planning to continue making emptypromises of religious freedom till the goals of “pa-triotic re-education” are achieved. These goals arecontrary to the right to freedom of religion as wellas the minority rights that Tibetan Buddhists are—theoretically—protected in China’s Constitution andthe Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law. Knowing thatin the time span from January 1996 to August2004176 under the concept of Chinese operated “pa-triotic education” campaigns the forceful and some-times violent expulsion of a total of 11,383 clergywas counted, “patriotic re-education” has still notbeen halted.

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the democratic managementcommittees (DMCs)

For the “patriotic re-education” to function and toachieve its goal, the PRC relies on the DemocraticManagement Committees which are actually themain incarnation of institutionalized religious con-trol in Tibet. As a matter of fact, DMCs virtuallyall consist of monks elected in monasteries or a State-approved lay person. Evidently, DMC officials needto conform with the Chinese patriotic approach tothe management of institutions and therefore manyof them are Chinese though there are also a numberof Tibetans who have been given the role to super-vise the functioning of monasteries in allegiance tothe State ideology.

The legal management of religious affairs had beenproposed for the first time in 1990 during a Stand-ing Committee meeting of the National People’sCongress.177 Before that time monasteries used tobe visited by so-called “work teams” who would exerttheir control on them and supervise the monasticinstitutions’ activities. But since 1994178 when thestate decided on a paradigmatic shift in tighteningcontrol on Tibet, DMCs started in part to substi-tute the flexible and only visiting “work teams” andin 1996 were again enforced in their function dueto their utility within the “patriotic re-education”campaign.

DMCs are permanently installed control units inmonasteries, they are the fix government’s eyes andhands in religious institutions. Basically, DMCs arecommittees responsible to regulate the overall man-agement and to supervise religious affairs in monas-teries and nunneries such as study schedule and con-tents, administration, finances, production and se-curity. According to a statement of an official of theTibetan Regional Nationalities Affairs Commissionin 1994, the “DMCs have been set up in all templesand monasteries so that monks and nuns can man-age religious and other affairs on their own.”179

All important religious practices understand the con-trol of DMCs, especially in larger institutions whoseinfluence on society at large is feared: vigilance,searches and raids are common measures to controlpractices such as performing rituals, transmittingteachings, religious worship and going on retreats.DMCs as well as “work teams” are work units whosepurpose is to spy and to promote mistrust amongthe spiritual communities. They create a constantatmosphere of fear while the reason for their opera-tions is officially to “protect the habits of the Tibetanpeople and all lamaseries.”180 According to refugeetestimonies181 essential duties of religious natureneed to receive official approval through the pass-ing of various procedures of admission. Work re-ports about the monasteries’ activities and patrioticprogress are being handed in to the monastic assem-blies periodically, usually every six months.

DMCs have proved very effective in carrying out“patriotic re-education” because they have the abil-ity to constantly oversee monks’ and nuns’ progresstowards becoming more “patriotic”. The DMCs’ in-stitutionalized religious control resides on the onehand, in expelling practitioners who do not complywith the regular political education sessions and onthe other hand, in appraising the loyalty of thosewho give in to their repressive methods and end updenouncing the Dalai Lama and accepting the unityof Tibet with China. DMCs are also responsible forimposing official limits on the number of monksand nuns in religious institutions, such as the 18-year age limit on the admission of novices. Alreadyin 1995 this practice, which led to many monaster-ies emptying out, has been severely criticized by Mr.Abdelfattah Amor, the then United Nations Spe-cial Rapporteur on Religion182 who asked China tointroduce a legislation guaranteeing the right of re-ligious belief to minors.

The continued successful propagation of Party ide-ologies through the implementation of political

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education classes in monasteries has been, thus, pro-liferated through the work of the DMCs. Reportssuggest that DMCs are also involved in overseeingthe rentability of monastic institutions by adoptingmeasures that will increase their economic income.A monk from Sera Monastery recalls about the roleof DMCs:

The traditional head of the monastery wassidelined by this committee and had onlynominal power.…even the smallest decisions,like spending a few hundred yuan, cannot bemade before consulting the committee. Overallit seems that the Chinese had hijacked themonastery to serve their own purpose of makinga lot of money from tourists, and carrying outpropaganda work. The main purpose of themonastery was neglected. …Since 1996 a newcurriculum was prescribed by the authorities.Any one found skipping the studies is liable tobe expelled from the monastery. Monks weresupposed to attend the lecture session every day,although now this strict schedule has beenrelaxed and monks have to attend classes aboutonce in a month. As the classes on patriotism,monks are taught what to say to the foreignand overseas Chinese tourists who visit themonastery. Interaction beween tourists andmonks are strictly monitored by the DMC…183

the anti-dalai lama campaign

Sometimes tourists come here and bring photosof the Dalai Lama. I tell them not to bringsuch images. Not because I don’t want to seeHis Holiness, but we have him in our hearts. Itell the tourists, if you really want to make adifference, try to help us preserve our spiritualheritage.184

The Dalai Lama, being the only religious as well assecular leader of Tibetans enjoys great popularity allover the world owing to his vast knowledge185 andexemplary approach towards confronting the fateof his country which he hopes to resolve by a con-structive dialogue with Chinese authorities based ona respect for human rights and the Gandhian prin-ciple of non-violence. Despite this positive outlookand approach, Chinese authorities have for years re-fused to enter in dialogue with the Dalai Lamawhom they obstinately call the “head of splittists”and an “enemy of China”. The move towards a poli-tics that sets all cards on discrediting the leader ofTibet whose land has been overtaken came duringthe late eighties when China saw itself compelled tosuppress pro-independence movements in Tibet fol-lowing a brief period of revival of religious affairs.It is true that the personality of the Dalai Lama rep-resents a unifying symbol for the Tibetan peopleand Chinese authorities have taken this fact as a goodreason to try to strip it out of Tibetans’ hearts andsubstituting it with an imposed loyalty to the uni-fied Chinese motherland.

The Dalai Lama is feared by the Chinese Govern-ment for his ability to “internationalize” the Tibetissue which China views as a domestic affair. Onevery one of his trips outside India, the ChineseGovernment keeps a close look at his agenda andexpress its disapproval at every given opportunity.Until the period of relative liberalization had begunat the end of the ’70s, the religious authority of theDalai Lama used to be more or less accepted until atthe Third Forum decisions where the Dalai Lamawas accused of violating Buddhist doctrine and us-ing religion to encourage social tensions. The DalaiLama, thus, became the culprit for any dissent orunrest that had been incited by Chinese policies in-side Tibet, portraying him to the West as the ring-leader of anti-Chinese activities. Tibet supportgroups use to be referred to by Chinese officials as“Dalai clique”.186

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But the Dalai Lama is more than a religious or secu-lar leader to Tibetans and followers of Tibetan Bud-dhism. According to Tibetan Buddhism, the rein-carnations of the Dalai Lama are considered to bethe embodiments of Avalokitesvara, the Buddha ofCompassion. This Buddha is venerated by count-less Buddhists in the whole world, not only by Ti-betan Buddhists but also by Mongolians and in theRussian Republics. In their spiritual practices TibetanBuddhists establish a very near, personal relation-ship with the Buddha of Compassion and their prin-cipal teacher187 who, for many of them, is the DalaiLama. Thus, it is natural for many Tibetan Bud-dhist practitioners to follow the Dalai Lama’s schol-arly commentaries on Buddhist treaties and to studyhis writings to obtain spiritual advice and to gain adeeper insight into the complex topics of Buddhistphilosophy. Moreover, there are other esoteric prac-tices that place a lot of emphasis on searching a con-nection with one’s main teacher.

Therefore the Chinese authorities’ harsh requirementthat monks and nuns denounce who is their mainteacher is a deeper violation of religious rights thanit might seem at first sight. While there are no po-litical implications with these religious beliefs andpractices, the Chinese Government is trying to con-vince Tibetans that their adherence to the Dalai Lamaas a spiritual leader is equal to becoming severelyguilty of disloyalty to China. In this way, mattersthat would be of sole religious importance have be-come tangled up with the Chinese Party’s politicsthat is ready to blindly follow a path of violenceagainst any opposition of the official version of what“patriotism” is meant to be and of what “appropri-ate” Buddhist practices are supposed to be like.

The Chinese Government seems to equate religiousinfluence with political influence, in particular, incase of the Tibetan people who profess so much faithtowards one person. Communist ideology hingeson the support of the people in order to maintain

the Chinese Communist Party’s power. Therefore,the Tibetans’ display of loyalty to the Dalai Lama ismisinterpreted as having political connotation and,hence, as a constant threat to the unity and stabilityof PRC. The places for carrying out “anti-separat-ist” policies are therefore preferably the monastic in-stitutions.

The Party’s main objective seems to play down therole of the Dalai Lama and, consequently, of anyhigh religious Lamas188. It has also been making ef-forts to control the recognition of important rein-carnations as can be seen in the case of the PanchenLama189 whose Tibetan reincarnation, according toTibetan Buddhist religious rites properly chosen, hasbeen substituted by a politically appointed ChinesePanchen Lama who understands directly to Partyofficials. And there are seemingly plans for a futuresystematic control of all important reincarnationswithin Tibetan Buddhism:

Just two days ago, on July 19, 2005, theChairman of the “TAR”, Qiangba Puncog,stated that Beijing will choose the next DalaiLama, a critical example of blatant interferencewith religious belief and practice.190

Given the key role of the Dalai Lama and severalhigh ranking and much estimated Tibetan Lamas inthe Tibetan Buddhist tradition, it has been difficultfor Chinese authorities to win over the heart of theTibetan people. In order to ensure the legitimacy ofChinese rule in Tibet, forceful measures have beenundertaken to change people’s minds that includeprohibition on the possession of the Dalai Lamaphotographs and the banned Tibetan national flagwhich referring to the Dalai Lama reads: “The leaderof Tibet, the land of snows, the great protector, trea-sure-of-all, may he live to the end of the universe.”

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In Tibetan areas, numerous official controlscontinue to limit the practice of TibetanBuddhism. Authorities often characterizereligion as backward and its practice as a burdenon society. Chinese authorities argue that theDalai Lama is a hostile political figure, not alegitimate religious leader, and that programscounteracting veneration of him do not violatereligious freedom. Chinese authorities attemptsystematically to repress Tibetan devotion to theDalai Lama, with little success. Police confiscateprinted, audio, and video material featuringthe Dalai Lama’s religious teachings andspeeches, and those possessing such materialsometimes face abusive treatment, includingbeating and detention.191

Not only pictures of the Dalai Lama are prohibitedin “TAR” and other regions of Tibet but also thevery popular festivities for his birthday on 6 Julyhave been a target of authorities’ curtailment foryears,192 arguing that the Dalai Lama’s birthday cel-ebrations are essentially a political tool of the DalaiLama and that the festivities could adversely affectsocial stability. Authorities went even so far to say,that Tibetan people themselves had wanted to seethe celebrations stopped.193 This affirmation standsin a strong contrast to the Tibetans’ religious andpersonal wish that the ban on the Dalai Lama’s birth-day celebrations may be lifted:194

...The reason why we want to outlaw thetrunglha yarsol195 activities [Birthday celebrationof the Dalai Lama] is because primarily theyare an illegal activity to make power for the headof the splittist group, the Dalai. … Secondly,all kinds of problems happened during the timeof trunglha yarsol196 activity and incidents causedby them have offended the constitution and lawof the country, severely affected the masses’normal production, life, work and studying order,affected the unity of the nationalities and so its

social harm is significant. Thirdly, the numerouscadres and masses… are strongly demandingthat the government take measures to punishand ban it.197

Evidence on how dangerous it can be for Tibetansto just carry with them some pictures or books bythe Dalai Lama for their personal use has been givenin several refugees’ accounts. In 2005, TCHRD re-ceived a report198 by Jigme Gyamtso199, a youngTibetan monk originally from Bhashing Monastery,located in Machu County, Amdo Kensu Province.After a stay for further studies in South India’s SeraMonastery, he wanted to return with his brother, amonk, to their home village in Tibet. They had allthe necessary documentation including visas for re-entry to Tibet. After reaching Dram at the Nepal-Tibet border, they decided to travel in a rented ve-hicle together with another monk from Chamdo,Ten-nam, who was returning to Tibet, too.

“After a stop for fuel, our papers were inspected andfound in order. But it seems the vehicle’s driver in-formed the PSB officials that we were exile return-ees. Within minutes we had to stop and five PSBofficials equipped with pistols surrounded us. Whilesearching our luggage they found several pictures ofthe Dalai Lama and some books written by himwere confiscated. In July 2001, the three of us werekept in a room for three days and shocked with vari-ous electric cattle prods till we were unconscious.We were beaten with belts and wooden planks whileofficials interrogated us for the purpose of carryingthese books and which institution was behind it.”200

The three monks were charged for having the in-tention of inciting anti-state elements among themasses and other crimes that they had not commit-ted. In the detention centre they were tortured andfed with left over foods. They received differentlengths of prison terms which they had to serve atDrapchi Prison in Lhasa, known for its particularlycruel methods of torture.201 Even in prison “patri-

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otic re-education” was being carried out. The memo-rization of Party’s books on politics and history be-came vital for the monks’ survival:

There, we were given books about patrioticeducation which we had to memorize. If wefailed to memorize the books, we would not begiven food. The diet was poor and the wintervery cold, which caused severe ulcer problems.As a remedy we were given outdatedmedicines.202

Jigme Gyamtso and his brother Tsedor were releasedon 3 July 2005 and Ten Nam was set free on 18July 2005. Jigme Gyamtso was not allowed to re-turn to his monastery and is restricted to join anyinstitutions and government organizations. Afterstaying in his hometown and studying English forfour months, he managed to escape to India and isplanning to join a monastery in exile.

politicization of the geshelharampa degree

It can be positively noted for the year 2005 that theGeshe Lharampa exam continued to be admittedafter its resumption in July 2004. (The exam wasbanned twice in the past).203 A ban on such an im-portant exam means removing every possibility toensure a high level of erudition among the scholarsof future generations.

The scholarly tradition based on the institution ofthe Geshe Lharampa exam is of high importance tothe Gelugpa School.204 This school was founded byTibet’s greatest scholar saint Tsongapa and putsemphasis on logical debate and the high learnednessof its teachers. The title Geshe means “learned man”or “scholar” and Lharamapa is a distinctive indica-tion for the most profound or the highest level oferudition. In order to obtain the highest academic

religious honor or Geshe Lharampa title, the appli-cants must participate in a detailed and strenuoustesting on all canons of Tibetan Buddhism. Theexam is being held in the presence of a large assem-bly of religious scholars who enter into a dialecticaldebate with the applicant.

But the practice of the resumed Geshe Lharamapaexam as conducted under the surveillance of Chi-nese authorities has been subject to some changesthat prove to be significant in their repercussion onthe original meaning of Geshe Lharampa. Due to apolicy introduced by Chinese authorities, applicantsfor the degree have to study six books on politicalthoughts known as “Love Your Country, Love YourReligion” which are taught in the “patriotic re-edu-cation” campaign. Moreover, a total of 77 mem-bers of the PRC’s Committee for the Confermentof the Degree for the Highest Buddhist Studies wereformed205 to join the examination assembly which,by tradition, would be constituted by a prestigiouscongregation of only highly learned religious schol-ars. Such criteria of political texts deny their reli-gious convictions and have nothing to do at all withthe Buddhist cannons that the exam is all about.The traditional institution of the Geshe Lharampaexamination used to be the sacred thread of GelukpaBuddhism that ensured the continued quality ofboth, teachings and teachers. It remains question-able what benefit there would be for the traditionas long as political requirements are being arbitrarilyintegrated to the religious examination.

Already in 2004, soon after the re-introduction ofthe Geshe Lharampa exam, a monk who was inter-viewed by TCHRD explained that candidates werenot selected anymore on “the basis of their academicmerit but on the basis of their allegiance to the au-thorities’ directives.”206 In 2005 withdrawals tookplace not yet from the Chinese side over the politi-cal adaptations as imposed on the exam.

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While it is certainly an important progress that theGeshe Lharampa examination has been re-admittedby the Chinese Government, there would be an ur-gent need to remind it of respecting article 6 of theUnited Nations Declaration on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Intolerance and of DiscriminationBased on Religion or Belief which guarantees thefreedom to train, appoint, elect or designate by suc-cession appropriate leaders called for by the require-ments and standards by any religion or belief. Con-sidering the introduction of the political contentsto the examination and the choice of politically ap-pointed examiners it seems evident that political biaswill be the main parameter for evaluating the quali-fication of Geshe Lharampa candidates: qualifica-tion itself depends on the applicants’ pronouncedreadiness to display exemplary patriotism and loy-alty to the Party’s principles. The best way to “re-form” the current state of the examination wouldbe to fully restore the right to religious freedom.

persecution of importantreligious leaders

Despite insistent appeals from the United Nations,concerned governments and well-known interna-tional bodies, the PRC has refused to enter into se-rious dialogue on the whereabouts of several reli-gious leaders who have been missing, in some casesfor several years.

Apparently, the Chinese authorities are greatly con-cerned about the role played by some Tibetan Bud-dhist lamas and the popularity they enjoy amongtheir followers. The targeted playing down of theseLama’s influence goes hand in hand with the Party’spolicies of curbing “splittist” activities. Evidently,the unlawful imprisonment207 or disappearance ofTibetan Buddhist leaders originates from the allegedlinks between religious influence and political in-fluence.208 The case of Trulku Tenzin Delek, Bangri

Tsamtrul Rinpoche, Geshe Sonam Phuntsok,Chadrel Rinpoche clearly illustrates Beijing’s fearover their potential influence to instigate the massesinto political activism.209 For this same reason theBeijing Government goes to great length in the rec-ognition process of reincarnations.

gedhun choekyi nyimathe 11th panchen lama

The classic example of an official attempt to politi-cize a very fundamental religious procedure that isessential to choosing future religious leaders, is thecase of the 11th Panchen Lama Gendun ChoekyiNyima. On 17 May 1995, he was taken into “safecustody” soon after his recognition by the Dalai Lamaand remains missing ever since. In contradiction toreligiously established processes that need to be ob-served in the procedure of finding a reincarnationand its recognition, a boy called Gyaltsen Norbu,the son of exemplary “patriotic” parents, was politi-cally appointed and subsequently enthroned210 as thePanchen Lama by Chinese authorities.

The ongoing detention of the real 11th PanchenLama, Gendun Choekyi Nyima, has been a tremen-dous intrusion into the traditional role and func-tioning of the Panchen Lama in the Tibetan Bud-dhism. This is not only a severe case of deprivingGendun Choekyi Nyima of the proper religiouseducation or of taking away a child’s personal andreligious freedom. More than that, it adversely af-fects the continuation of the original lineage of theoriginal Panchen Lama.

The institution of the Panchen Lama was establishedin the 17th century with the Tibetan Buddhist scholarLobsang Choekyi Gyaltsen whose importance wasacknowledged by the 5th Dalai Lama by conferringon him the title of “Panchen”211 meaning “GreatScholar”. The 10th Panchen Lama, Choekyi

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Gyaltsen, born in 1938, had been one of the fore-most critics of Chinese Communist policies withinTibet. In his official capacities, he undertook manytours throughout the PRC and observed the livingconditions of the Tibetans under Chinese rule. Inhis 1962 Petition212 to Mao Zedong, for which hewas held in house arrest afterwards, he analysed theseobservations213 affirming his deep concerns for thesurvival of Tibetan culture and religion.

After the 10th Panchen Lama turned out to be oneof the most influential leaders of Tibetan Buddhismand the most outspoken critics of religious repres-sion, it comes not as a surprise that Chinese authori-ties opted to determine and educate their ownPanchen Lama. Due to general concern amongstTibetans about the disappearance of the originalPanchen Lama, reports about Gyaltsen Norbu hadnot been abundant in the last years though therehad been many attempts by Chinese officials toaccustom the public to slowly accepting the “patri-otic” and politically correct Panchen Lama as thereal one. For example, pictures of Gedhun ChoekyiNyima were forbidden in Chinese controlled mon-asteries and exchanged by those of Gyaltsen Norbuwhose religious veneration forms part of a politicalcampaign to establish him in his role as a religiousleader approved by the Communist Party.

In 2005, Chinese media reports about GyaltsenNorbu have become for the first time more elo-quent about his activities. According to Xinhua, theboy, now aged 16, has “grown up from a child tothe leader of Tibetan Buddhism” which was beingcelebrated in several Chinese organized religiousevents, including “head-touching” ceremonies thatwere reportedly attended by “thousands of worship-ping Tibetans”.214 According to Tibetan sourcesthemselves215 Tibetan people have been offeredfinancial rewards by Chinese officials to attendreligious services held by Gyaltsen Norbu and toapproach him with devotion in order to generateacceptance of the Chinese appointed Panchen Lama.

Following these logics, the authorities have actuallypassed to underline the importance of religious lead-ers even more and to officially insist that religiousfreedom is fully respected everywhere in Tibet. On18 July 2005 “TAR” Chairman Jampa Puntsok re-marked at a press conference on the sidelines of theTibetan Culture Week that Tibet now has “over1,700 religious venues and more than 460,000 reg-istered monks and nuns, and important religiousfestivals and activities are regularly held. Each yearthe capital Lhasa alone receives nearly 1 millionBuddhist pilgrims.”216 Jampa Phuntsok was quotedlater by Asiannews/SCMP217 as saying about therecognition of the next Dalai Lama: “If the spiritualleader ... dies in exile, Beijing will follow TibetanBuddhist precedent to choose his reincarnation.”

No remark could be more revealing about the ea-gerness of the Chinese Government to take totalcontrol of Tibetan Buddhist religion by reservingthe right to choose its religious leader, the DalaiLama, all by itself. Meanwhile the unsuccessful in-ternational interventions with Chinese authoritiesabout the whereabouts of the original Panchen LamaGedhun Choekyi Nyima have culminated in thesad anniversary of an entire decade since his disap-pearance.

In the face of these events it becomes clear that theCommunist Party of the PRC is adapting its man-agement of religious affairs to the now accepted needof the population—Tibetan and Chinese—to em-brace spiritual values and to follow religious figures.The Chinese Government seems to have learned itslesson that a total ban on religion would not onlybe unacceptable to the international community butalso lead to an upheaval within its own people.Therefore, taking over the control of the recogni-tion of religious leaders and converting certain reli-gious activities into “patriotic” ones, has become ahandy approach towards manipulating religion inreturn for an increased political power. Religion is,

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thus, not something that the Chinese Party aims atovercoming immediately, as its Marxian principleswould suggest, but religion, at present, seems to havebecome the joker card for making politics more at-tractive to the broad public.

Given the centrality of the Panchen Lama’s rolein Tibetan Buddhism and Tibetan culture, notto mention his status as a minor, China’s failureto address meaningfully the inquiries of UNhuman rights mechanisms, including that fromCRC and other international actors regardingthis case is striking.218

At the same time the politically appointed PanchenLama has been vastly promoted by Chinese authori-ties with China’s state-run Xinhua News Agencyquoting the Beijing-approved “living Buddha” aspraising China’s religious policies, which have at-tracted criticism from many international rightsgroups as well as the Bush administration:

I’ve been to many places in the past decade andwitnessed the ample freedom enjoyed byindividuals and religious organizations alike.Living Budhhas like myself are able to performreligious rituals under the wing of the ChineseConstitution and other laws.219

expulsion and non-admission inmonastic institutions

A major obstacle to freedom of religion in Tibet isthe practice of expelling monks and nuns frommonasteries or of not admitting them to continuetheir religious training. While the torture of monksand nuns for so-called “splittist” activities withoutcomparison the most cruel severe violation of reli-gious freedom. The widespread, intentional admin-istrative reduction of the monastic population inmonasteries gives much reason for concern in the

long run. Tibet’s religious culture used to live inpopulated monasteries which were attended byfloods of eager practitioners. These days the eager-ness of young monks and nuns to commit to a spiri-tual life in monastic institutions has not diminishedbut is literally made impossible by several measuresthat the Chinese authorities have adopted withinthe complex framework of “patriotic re-education”,the “legal management of religious affairs”, theDMCs and the “anti-Dalai Lama” campaign.

It is therefore no wonder that many Tibetan monksand nuns are compelled into fleeing accross thetreacherous Himalaya mountains to come intoexile. Starvation, death in crevasse, frostbite, arrestand maltreatment by the border security patrol arethe risks that they undertake in hopes to greater free-dom in exile where religious studies can be under-taken in an atmosphere of freedom. Unfortunately,many of those who after a period of intense studiesin exile, face definite expulsion from their religiouscommunity or non-admittance into theirmonastery when they seek to rejoin their homemonastery.

Lobsang Tenzin and Thupten Nyima, who arrivedin Nepal in March 2005, reported the control andinterference by government officials in their mon-astery:

In Lhasa Ramoche Monastery, two officials havebeen permanently residing in the monasteryunder instructions from the Lhasa ReligiousBureau. Although the monks of the monasteryelect their heads, they have no control over theactivities of the monastery. The governmentappointed officials call meetings in the monasteryand conduct “love your religion, love yourcountry” political education sessions in themonastery.220

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They also report that monks who seek a first timeadmission to a monastery are admitted only on thegrounds of “political correctness” or a show of“patriotic sentiments”:

New monks are recruited on the basis ofexamination. However, instead of examiningthe monks on the basis of their spiritualknowledge, they are examined for their politicalideology. The questions are designed to test thenew monks’ allegiance to the Communist Partyof China. Anyone who fails to pass the allegiancetest is not given admission in the monastery.221

Sonam Gyatso222, 27, a monk at Thashar Monas-tery in Samdo Township, Tsolho “TAR”, QinghaiProvince, reported on official ceiling placed on themonastic population, the imposed control, expul-sion and restriction on foreign students in his mon-astery:

On 1 June 2004, Rinpoche passed away at theage of 77. Around two months later, a meetingwas called comprising of eight heads from themonastery and eight government officials fromthe county and township government offices. Thegovernment officials demanded a cut down onthe monastery population from 600 monks to400 and expulsion of monks below 18 years ofage. Against all reasonings by the monasteryheads, the ceiling was put into effect and themonks were either expelled or transferred toother monasteries. The authorities also made alimited stay period for the foreign students ofRinpoche from Hongkong, Taiwan, Japan, TheUS, England and China, who could earlier staymuch longer peacefully studying the Buddhisttexts.223

buddhism growing amidstrestrictions

What could possibly be the reason for the silent butmassive use of measures aimed at forcefully“patriotizing” Tibetan Buddhism in accordance withthe political interests of the Chinese CommunistParty? Perhaps because Party ideology has not man-aged to fill the people´s hearts fully.

Recent years have witnessed a rising interest for reli-gion among the PRC’s population. There seem tobe indications that religion is getting more impor-tant to the mainstream Chinese citizen than poli-tics. The Chinese Communist Party has taken well-thought measures to counteract this phenomena byusing religion as a political tool to gain more powerand control over people. By coincidence, TibetanBuddhism which at first might have been perceivedjust as the religion of the ethnic minority of Tibet-ans living in the PRC is one of the religions that theChinese population has turned to with particularinterest. Thus, the Party’s attempt of religious con-trol has to do with the key role that this religion hasbeen taking on despite all repressing regulationsthroughout the PRC:

In the past few years there has been a dramaticdevelopment of newfound interest in Tibet,Tibetan culture and Tibetan Buddhism amongordinary Chinese. The politically motivatedofficial position that Tibetan culture wasbackward is being challenged by the growingappreciation among ordinary Chinese of thedeeper aspect of Tibetan Buddhism and thepositive role that it is playing in the developmentof the society. Books on Buddhism by the DalaiLama as well as other Tibetan Lamas have beentranslated into Chinese and are reportedly hotfavourites not just in Chinese-speaking areasoutside of China, but also in different provincesof China.224

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While outside observers judge that Communism isvirtually dead inside China, the Chinese populationseems to turn away from a political ideology thatdoes not convince them to religious traditions thatpromise to add a spiritual dimension and depth topeople’s lives. Likewise, the Chinese Governmentseems to re-discover the virtue of cultivating theteachings of cultivating its sage Confucius’ teach-ings225 whose wisdom was considered “dirtier thanmud” during the Communist revolution. But inSeptember 2005 hundreds of top Communist cadrefrom across the nation celebrated with pomp andpageantry the 2556th birth anniversary of Confuciusunder the blast of television coverage:

What is going on? The Communist Party ofChina appears to have taken a consideredpolitical decision to restore Confucius to histraditional place of pride at the centre of Chineseworldview. As it copes with growing economicinequalities and social tensions, the CPC believesConfucius might offer the right social andpolitical medicine...

The Chinese republicans—both nationalists andCommunists—at the turn of the 21st centurybelieved rejection of Confucius was critical forthe building of a new nation based on “scienceand democracy”. When he launched theCultural Revolution in the mid-1960s, MaoZedong personally renewed political attacks onConfucianism as the bad social weed that mustbe eliminated....

But precisely at the moment when China seemsto have successfully modernised and is poised toemerge as powerful nation on the world stage,the party-state in Beijing badly needs Confuciusto re-bind society on traditional values. Historyhas its own ways of wreaking revenge on allsocial engineers.”226

It is very telling of the growing influence of religionand the increasing difficulties to keep the Commu-nist Party in power that it is trying to build up itsown leaders for religious matters, such as its approvedPanchen Lama, or for Chinese philosophy such asConfucius. Yet, a trend among mainstream Chineseand Taiwanese nationals has manifested towards fol-lowing teachings on Buddhist philosophy taught bythe Dalai Lama who, according to governmentsources is nothing but a “national enemy”:

There is a growing number of Chinese-speakersattending the teachings by the Dalai Lama,whether in India or in other parts of the world.More significantly, Chinese devotees have beenrequesting teachings to be given to theircommunity by the Dalai Lama.227

According to the organizing Norbulingka Insti-tute228 the January 2006 Kalachakra Initiation229 inAmaravati, South India, has drawn an unprecedentednumber of practitioners and interested people fromall over the world to attend the event. From theover 200,000 registered participants, an estimated10,000 Tibetans have undertaken the financial bur-den and political risk to leave Tibet to be present atthe religious ceremony and philosophical commen-tary given by the Dalai Lama on the Kalachakrateachings.

an essential problem toreligious freedom

The Dalai Lama has said that he does not seekindependence and aims for a solution based onTibetan autonomy within China. But China’sleaders do not seem to recognize the benefits ofmoving forward in the dialogue with the DalaiLama or his envoys.230

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Judging from newspaper reports the diplomatic re-lations between the Chinese Government and theDalai Lama over the past years continued to bemarked by a pattern that seems to have become char-acteristic for their relationship. The Dalai Lama putsin many of his speeches in evidence that he is not, asChinese officials try to insist, pursuing “indepen-dence” from China. Yet, the Chinese Governmentseems to heed these repetitive affirmations. Is theChinese Government perhaps fearing that every ef-fort put into the “Anti-Dalai Lama” campaign231 inwhich the Dalai Lama is represented as China’s en-emy, would vanish as soon as it recognizes the NobelPeace laureate as a valid partner for moving on in adialogue on human rights?

Over the years, the Chinese policies have intensivelytargeted the Tibetan issue within China but seemedto be talking its way out from openly presenting itsperspectives on Tibet. Throughout 2005 many gov-ernments, including the United States and the high-est EU-representatives urged, so far232 in vain, theChinese Government to meet the Dalai Lama andto move the current contact with his envoys to sub-stantive discussions in particular in regards with al-lowing religious and political freedom for Tibet-ans:233

The United States hopes that there will beimproved relations with the Dalai Lama’srepresentatives so that Tibetans can clearlypursue their cultural interests”, Secretary of StateCondoleezza Rice told reporters at the end ofher talks with China’s top leadership, includingPresident Hu Jintao. China has ruled out talkswith the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader, DalaiLama, unless he renounces his quest for Tibetanindependence and publicly states that Tibet andTaiwan are inalienable part of Chineseterritory....If Dalai sincerely hopes to improve the relationswith China, he should face up to the reality ina comprehensive and objective way, truly give

up his proposition of Tibet independence, andstop all actions of secession. He should alsopublicly declare that Tibet is an inalienable partof China and that the government of thePeople’s Republic of China is the only legalgovernment that represents China”, the ChineseForeign Ministry had said in a statement on15 March, 2005.”The government will listen to what he saysand more importantly observe what he does”,the statement said in response to the DalaiLama’s latest conciliatory statements on March10.234

Interestingly, the Dalai Lama has never denied thatthe PRC is the only legal government that repre-sents China but China repeats unilaterally its sameconditions for commencing a dialogue as if therewas never a reaction from side of the Dalai Lama.In November 2005, the Envoy of His Holiness theDalai Lama, Kelsang Gyaltsen, tried to shed lighton the apparent difficulties in establishing a dialoguewith China. Speaking at the Fourth World Parlia-mentarians’ Convention on Tibet in Edinburgh235

he looked back on the years after the Dalai Lama’sescape from Chinese military forces in 1959 in or-der to explain to an international audience aboutsome drawbacks but most importantly about theseeming recent advances in the dialogue with Chi-nese delegations:

Our first direct contact with the Chineseleadership after our escape from Tibet in 1959was established in late 1978. Before going intoexile His Holiness the Dalai Lama has triedhis best for more than eight years to work out apeaceful co-existence with the Chinese leadersas well as with the Chinese Generals of thePeople’s Liberation troops in Tibet. When Chinaemerged from the turmoil of the CulturalRevolution and Deng Xiaoping signalled awillingness to have direct contact, His Holinessresponded positively without any hesitation.

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Right from the beginning of the Sino-Tibetanconflict, His Holiness was determined to pursuethe path of non-violence and to seek a resolutionof the conflict through dialogue.236

However, over many years, there appeared to be alack of political will on the part of the Chinese lead-ership to respond to the numerous initiatives of theDalai Lama, leading to the end of every formal con-tact in August 1993. Subsequently the TibetanGovernment-in-exile tried to explore informal chan-nels of communication to the Beijing leadershipwhich resulted in a few rounds of meetings withprivate personas and semi-officials. Without anyobvious reasons even these channels were suddenlyshut down in autumn 1998. Despite this and nu-merous other setbacks, continued efforts throughinformal channels managed to pave the way to afirst face-to-face meeting outside of China withChinese officials who were overseeing policies onTibet. The talks resulted in the entry permission fora Tibetan delegation to China and the Tibetan capi-tal Lhasa in September 2002237 and subsequent vis-its in 2003 and 2004.

On 30 June, 2005, the Tibetan and Chinese delega-tion met again outside of China, this time at theEmbassy of the PRC in Berne, Switzerland. Accord-ing to Kelsang Gyaltsen the discussions were “con-crete and substantive, and held in a cordial, frankand business-like atmosphere:”238

The Tibetan side had the opportunity to respondin detail point by point to the criticism,objections and allegations made by the Chineseside during the last round of discussions inBeijing. We also put forward some proposals thatwill help build trust and confidence and movethe ongoing process to a new level of engagementaimed at bringing about substantive negotiationsto achieve a mutually acceptable solution to theTibetan issue. We reiterated our commitment

to continue making every effort to create a betterenvironment. At the same time we urged theChinese side to join in this effort, andhighlighted the absence of such gestures fromtheir side.239

While both sides had a positive assessment of theprocess that they hope to become an “establishedpractice”, the Tibetan side stresses that there is a greatneed to take “tangible steps to build mutual trustand confidence”240, especially in view of the enor-mous gap existing between the positive outlook ofthe talks and the present reality of religious repres-sion in Tibet:

What is presently most disturbing and of greatconcern to us is that there have been no positivechanges inside Tibet since the opening of directcontact with the Chinese leadership. On thecontrary repression inside Tibet has increasedrecently. Nor has Beijing reciprocated theconfidence building measures undertaken by theTibetan leadership in exile after our first visit.We must face the fact that so far there has beenno indication of any change in China’s harshpolicies in Tibet nor have there been any clearsigns that the Chinese leadership is genuinelyinterested in beginning an honest dialogue.241

Meanwhile the U.S. State Department states regret-fully in its 2005 report242 about China that the gov-ernment continued its suspension of the officialU.S.-China Human Rights Dialogue, which hadincluded religious freedom as a major agenda item.The latest Dialogue session took place in December2002, at which the Government committed to in-vite the U.S. Commission on International Reli-gious Freedom (USCIRF) and the U.N. SpecialRapporteur on Religious Intolerance to visit thecountry. In January 2005, USCIRF members vis-ited Hong Kong, a visit, as the U.S. State Depart-ment remarks, “authorities from the country pub-licly criticized.” Furthermore it states:

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U.S. officials in Washington and Beijingcontinued to protest individual incidents ofabuse. On numerous occasions, the Departmentof State, the Embassy, and the four Consulatesin the country protested government actions tocurb freedom of religion and freedom ofconscience, including the arrests of Falun Gongfollowers, Tibetan Buddhists, Uighur Muslimsin Xinjiang, and Catholic and Protestant clergyand believers. The Embassy routinely raisedreported cases of detention and abuse of religiouspractitioners with the Ministry of Foreign Affairsand the State Administration of ReligiousAffairs, except from March through November2004, during which the Governmentunilaterally implemented a policy of refusing todiscuss such cases with Embassy officials inresponse to U.S. sponsorship of a resolution onChinese human rights at the March 2004 sessionof the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.243

In its Annual Report for 2005, the CongressionalExecutive Commission on China (CECC) stressed,as was reiterated by the EU representatives at theend of the year that “dialogue” was the key that thefuture fate of Tibetans depended only on dialogue.The development of the rule of law in the PRCcould be encouraged to orientate itself on interna-tional human rights standards:

The future of Tibetans and their religion,language, and culture depends on fair andequitable decisions about future policies that canonly be achieved through dialogue. The DalaiLama is essential to this dialogue. To help theparties build on visits and dialogue held in2003, 2004, and 2005, the President and theCongress should urge the Chinese governmentto move the current dialogue toward deeper,substantive discussions with the Dalai Lama orhis representatives, and encourage direct contactbetween the Dalai Lama and the Chineseleadership.

Moreover, Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE), theCommission’s Chairman, evaluated the present at-titude of the Chinese government saying

China’s leaders will not achieve their long termgoal of social stability and continued economicdevelopment without building a future thatincludes human rights for all Chinese citizens.China’s development will impact all of Asia, andthe world. Respect for human rights must bepart of that future.244

Adopting a similar tone, the European Parliamentvoiced its critics of the EU-China human rights dia-logue, stating there was “disappointment at the lackof substantial results as regards this dialogue” andcalling for a “thorough assessment of its effective-ness”.245 The Parliament called on the Commissionand the Council to make clear to the Chinese au-thorities that a genuine partnership could only de-velop when shared values were fully respected andput into practice and that Chinese authorities shouldfinally “allow access for the UN Special Rapporteuron Freedom of Religion or Belief to the PanchenLama designated by the Dalai Lama.”246

While the picture of the situation remains nebulousdue to the continued holding in custody of thePanchen Lama,247 the incarceration and torture ofimportant Tibetan Buddhist scholars and religiousleaders, the intensification of “patriotic re-education”and the “Anti-Dalai Lama” campaign in Tibet, thecrackdown on a non-violent protest of Lhasa’sDrepung monks in the beginning of December andmany other violations of religious freedom againstthe Tibetan people, there is a silver line on the hori-zon for a dialogue to bring positive fruits if, andonly if, a strong international concern for Tibet con-tinues to back the peaceful resolve of Tibet’s issue.

In general terms it must be admitted that there arecertainly signs that the Chinese Government is real-

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izing the importance to observe international hu-man rights law, including religious freedom, anddemocracy. In 2005 the first white paper on democ-racy has been issued by the PRC.248 Although atpresent the reality in China is not the one of a de-mocracy the white paper must be taken as a signthat the government is beginning to consider de-mocracy which leaves the outlook that, over time, adevelopment towards respecting the human rightsof people is bound to take place.

The Dalai Lama’s high-profile 10-day visit to theUnited States seemed to mark a new step towards apossibility of strengthening international support forthe human rights of Tibetan people. A strong signin favour of religious freedom in Tibet and the Ti-betan human rights’ cause as such was surprisinglymade by U.S. president during his official stay inBeijing which coincidently followed his talks withthe Dalai Lama at the White House:249

Mr Bush said that he had urged China’s leadersto hear for themselves that the Dalai Lama,living in exile since an abortive 1959 uprisingagainst Chinese rule, had no desire for anindependent Tibet: “I talked about the DalaiLama. I thought it would be wise for theChinese Government to invite the Dalai Lama,so he can tell them exactly what he told me inthe White House the other day, that he has nodesire for an independent Tibet.250

Flexibility, far-sightedness and a vision to bridgedifferences will be needed on both sides, Tibetanand Chinese, to find a viable solution to overcomethe present reality of religious repression in Tibet bymeans of a dialogue that does not get stuck in emptypromises before it is too late. As thorough investi-gation suggests it soon could be too late really torevive original Tibetan Buddhist traditions that areendangered251 to disappear and it has often been al-ready, in the past, been too late before liberty could

be restored to prisoners who were held in condi-tions of severe ill-treatment for the mere crime ofbelieving in their faith and engaging in traditionalreligious practices.252

The fact that the mere appeal for establishing a dia-logue with the Dalai Lama can be easily misunder-stood by Chinese officials became evident when,according to information provided by a source toRadio Free Asia, a group of monks and nuns fromthe Labrang Tashikyel monastery253 in Kanlho Ti-betan Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu Province,were arrested on 22 December 2005 for putting upa poster urging the Chinese leadership to initiatedialogue with His Holiness the Dalai Lama:

Family members suspect that the arrested nunsand monks were detained in a jail in Kanlho.When their family members requested the localofficials’ permission to visit their relatives inprison, it was denied”, said the source, whodeclined to be identified because of fear ofretaliation ...

However, the officials offered to hand over moneyfrom the family to the prisoners.254

It should never be too late to re-consider to givehuman treatment and to restore freedom of reli-gion to the Tibetan people without making this free-dom dependant on their adherence to a party’s ide-ology. As the Envoy of the Dalai Lama, KelsangGyaltsen, pointed out

It is a delicate process, requiring both quietdiplomacy and some very public gestures andinitiatives.255

During this delicate process which requires both anactive dialogue on human rights and respect for theprinciples of religious worship which are character-istic for Tibetan Buddhism, the Dalai Lama him-self actually stands out in his key function as a reli-

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gious leader capable of unifying the Tibetans as aharmonous and peaceful society.

In Tibetan circles, at times voices have become loudcalling for fighting against the weary Chinese op-pression. Yet, these voices have only been pacifieddue to the Dalai Lama’s continued calls upon Tibet-ans to maintain an orientation of non-violence andcompassion. The Dalai Lama has therefore provento be, in reality, all the contrary to what ChineseGovernment officials call him: He is not the “headof the splittists” but so far he has been at all times areligious leader who remained loyal to his spiritualcredo of compassion and the so-called Middle-WayApproach, which seeks to resolve all matters, evenpolitical ones, in a peaceful, non-violent way.256

As a matter of fact, the Dalai Lama faces increasingcriticism from his own people over his peaceful pushfor more autonomy instead of fighting China forfull independence:

Criticism about my approach, not seekingseparation, is growing, increasing and myresponse to them is to be patient.257

The young generation of Tibetans look around, toIsrael or Palestine or the Middle East, and seem totake reason in believing that violence can bring aboutdesired changes. They are also looking at thecountry’s own warrior past, strongly contrasting,thus, the Dalai Lama’s peaceful approach that seeksdialogue with Chinese officials.

For Tibetans as such, violence is something wecannot normally think of. But we have again ayouth section which is not so much influencedby the Buddhist philosophy. They are very muchattracted by the movements which are goingon all over the world — mostly violence-infestedmovements and people see they are achievingresults.258

Coincidently, the Dalai Lama, on his visit to theNew York city, was presented in an symbolic actwith the key to New York by the city’s Mayor,Michael Bloomberg, on 25 November 2005, whodescribed the Tibetan religious leader as a “moralbeacon to millions around the world, with a clearand constant voice for human rights”.259

conclusion

An evaluation of the situation of the right to reli-gious freedom in Tibet in the year 2005 necessarilyleads to the conclusion that the level of religiousrepression has reached a subtle stage of manipula-tion that endangers the continuation of the very es-sence of Tibetan Buddhist traditions.260

In a December 2005 interview with Reuters, theDalai Lama remarked that the Chinese appointedPanchen Lama “obviously has to speak what his su-periors want”, indicating that, in contradiction withthe Chinese Panchen Lama’s statements about a freereligious culture in Tibet, human rights abuses arestill the norm in Tibet.

The 70-year old Nobel Laureate said he was sad-dened by reports that monks had been killed andtortured by Chinese authorities for refusing to de-nounce him as a “separator” bent on damaging Chinaand also stressing the traumatising repercussion ofthe enforced “patriotic re-education” campaign:

I had stressed if they have to denounce me thenplease denounce me—no problem. Their safetyis more important. Just please denounce me.261

It remains to be hoped that the genuine interest andgrowing influence of Tibetan Buddhism which isspreading in mainland China and the Western hemi-sphere will be able to restore in time religious free-dom to the original holders of the line, the Tibetan

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scholars and practitioners living in Tibet. For such achange to take place, the PRC will inevitably haveto react to the insistent calls of the internationalcommunity to enter a constructive dialogue withthe Dalai Lama and with governments of other coun-tries.

An encouraging assurance that could perhaps begiven to the Chinese Government towards takingthis step is the insight that more freedom for peopleto follow their spiritual interests would result in areligious population who is less likely to commitviolence and crimes. Speaking in similar terms atthe inauguration function of the Dolma Ling Nun-nery on 8 December 2005 in Dharamsala, the DalaiLama emphasized the importance of religion express-ing his hope that the Tibetan issue could be resolvedon the very basis of non-violence that is a principleprofessed by Tibetan Buddhism and other worldreligions:

The number of people embracing Buddhism andChristianity in China and Russia, which fordecades forced people to think that religion wasa poison, is on the rise ... Buddhism can reallyhelp us embibe a sense of non-violence andcompassionate mind thus making us morecapable of resolving our issue amicably.262

.......................................

Notes

1. A Poisoned Arrow - The Secret Report of the 10th Panchen Lama,Tibet Information Network, London 1997.

2. For details consult, “The “Patriotic re-education” campaign,”in the chapter on Religion of this report, Human RightsSituation in Tibet: Annual Report 2005, TCHRD.

3. “Chinese Authorities Step Up Anti-Separatist Campaign inTibetan Region,” Radio Free Asia, 2005. Available at http://www.rfa.org/english/news/politics/2005/10/13/china_tibet

4. “US State Department’s International Report on ReligiousFreedom 2005” states about China that “the government’s respectfor freedom of religion and freedom of conscience remained poor....”and continues to say that the “preservation and development ofthe Tibetan people’s unique religious, cultural, and linguisticheritage and the protection of their fundamental human rights is ofconcern.” Available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51509.htm

5. For details, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CulturalRevolution and “A Chronology of Tibet’s History,” http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tibet/etc/cron.html

6. There is a prevalent underestimation of the fact that the Party’sfear of the continued, to them unexplainable flourishing ofBuddhism interpreted as a threat to the Party’s rule andnational stability itself. Regarding bans on information flowconsult the chapter on Information of this report.

7. Maura Moynihan, “Genocide in Tibet,” The Washington Post,25 January 1998, see www.refugeesinternational.org/content/article/detail/1112/ and “The Dalai Lama condemns culturalgenocide in Tibet,” Reuters, 9 October 2003. Available atwww.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2003/10/9_2.htmltibet.ca/en

8. More than 95% of Tibetans are Tibetan Buddhists and thereis a small minority of Tibetan Muslims.

9. When the Sky fell to Earth, International Campaign for Tibet,2004.In 2001, the Chinese Government did not refrain fromspending major sums for the demolition of several particularlysuccessful monastic institutions where Tibetan Buddhismflourished and attracted up to 40,000 students during importantprayer festivals. According to reports received by ICT on thedestruction of Larung Gar Monastery, also called SertharInstitute, “several hundred Chinese and Tibetan migrant workershad been brought into the valley ... were reportedly paid 250 Yuanfor each dwelling destroyed.” The housings destroyed went intothe thousands.

10. Already before the launch of the “Strike Hard campaign” in“TAR’s” monasteries in 1996, Chinese religious authoritieswarned “those who make use of religion to interfere withadministrative, judicial, martial, educational and other socialaffairs, especially those who take advantage of religious reasons tosplit the country, must be severely cracked down upon according to

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law.” See Closing the Doors, Religious Repression in Tibet,TCHRD, 2000, p.1

11. “Approximately 615 Tibetan Buddhist religious figures heldpositions in local People’s Congresses and committees of theChinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.Nevertheless, the Government continued to insist thatCommunist Party members and senior employees adhere tothe Party’s code of atheism, and routine political training forcadres continued to promote atheism. Government officialsconfirmed that some Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB) officerswere members of the Communist Party and that religiousbelief was incompatible with Party membership. Thisprohibition notwithstanding, some lower level RAB officialspracticed Buddhism.” See chapter “China”, Section II., Statusof Religious Freedom, Restrictions on Religious Freedom,U.S. State Department’s International Report on Religious Freedom2005. Available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51509.htm

12. The Dalai Lama is the religious head of Tibetan Buddhism.13. Consult more details in “The “Anti-Dalai Lama” Campaign”

in the Chapter on Religion of this report, Human RightsSituation in Tibet: Annual Report 2005, TCHRD.

14. Over the past years many governments have asked the PRC toabide by their human rights’ conventions that they ratifiedand to change their practice towards respecting the religiousrights of Tibetan Buddhists and other religious minorities inChina. Yet, there has been a constant denial from officialgovernment sources of any repression. Due to the importanceof economic interests that rule relationships with China, dueto the partial dependency of some economies on inexpensiveimports coming from China, discussions on human rights’issues regularly prove inefficient in their outcome.

15. When the Sky fell to Earth, International Campaign for Tibet,2004, pp.5-13.

16. “Freedom of Religion,” Annual Report 2005, Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC), concludes as wellthat “the religious environment for Tibetan Buddhism has notimproved in the past year,” 11 October 2005. Visit www.cecc.gov

17. United States Commission on International ReligiousFreedom, www.uscirft.gov

18. Annual Report of the United States Commission on InternationalReligious Freedom, May 2005, p.28 Visit www.uscirft.gov

19. View “patriotic re-education” in the Chapter on Religion ofthis report, 2005 Annual Report on the Human RightsSituation in Tibet, TCHRD.

20. More details in “International conventions and domesticlegislations” in the Chapter on Religion of this report.

21. It is true that Tibetan nationalistic sentiments in exile arebeing fed and strengthened precisely by seeing harsh restrictionsof human rights painfully experienced by Tibetans living underChinese rule to date. Contrary to these nationalistic sentiments,the Dalai Lama, himself wrongly labelled by the ChineseCommunist Party as the “head of the splittists,” has long givenup to seek “independence” from China. Instead, he is hopingto obtain a status of true autonomy in Tibet which wouldallow to establish it as a “zone of peace or Ahimsa” as exposed

in his “Five Point Peace Plan for Tibet,” contained in hisaddress to the United States Congressional Human RightsCaucus, delivered in Washington, D.C., on 21 September1987.

22. Officials from the United Front Work Department, ReligiousBureau and State Law Enforcement bodies attended theworkshop. The participants decided to implement the contentsof the workshop in two or three monasteries at the end of theyear 2004 as a trial. It was decided that a successfulimplementation would lead to city wide implementation inthe next couple of years beginning from 2005 which has beenso throughout the year 2005. This information was publishedby the Lhasa Evening Daily, 1 November 2004. Further detailsin Human Rights Update, TCHRD, October 2004, availableat http://www.tchrd.org/publications/hr_updates/2004/hr200410.html

23. Given the fact that the Chinese Party puts every emphasis ona providing good livelihood to its population, other humanrights such as the right to free access to information or theright to religious freedom seem to be constantly relegated tothe sphere of circumstances that are regarded as unessentialfor the welfare of a socialist society.

24. See “Persecution of well-known Religious Leaders” in thischapter, Human Rights Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2005,TCHRD.

25. Since 1999, the U.S. State Department has designated Chinaa “Country of Particular Concern” under the InternationalReligious Freedom Act for “particularly severe violations of religiousfreedom,” www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51509.htm

26. Please consult “Institutionalized Religious Control” in theChapter of Religion of this report, Human Rights Situation inTibet: Annual Report 2005, TCHRD.

27. See www.tchrd.org/press/2005/nb20051013.html28. “Through the conduct of Patriotic Education in the monasteries in

recent years, since the roots of the Dalai clique have been shakenand the ideological and social foundations of splittism weakened,the challenges to state security and disturbances caused by law-breaking monks and nuns have been effectively stopped, haphazardmonastery construction and monastic recruitment and emboldeningof illegal religious activities have completely overturned, and notonly has the regular discipline of normal religious activity beenmade better than before, but responsibility for it has been ensured.”excerpt from “TAR” Patriotic Education for Monasteries,Propaganda Book no. 4, Handbook for Education in (Party)Policy on Religion, issued in May 2002 and since in use for“political re-education”.

29. At present there are no reliable sources accessible about theexact number of the remaining monasteries.

30. The case of Ngawang Jangchub, 28 years old. Press Release,TCHRD, 8 November 2005, available at www.tchrd.org/press/2005/pr20051108.html

31. Press Release, TCHRD, 30 November 2005, available atwww.tchrd.org/press/2005/pr20051129.html Also visitwww.reuters.com

32. See www.tchrd.org/press/20051130.html; Also Human RightsSituation in Tibet: Annual Report 2005, TCHRD

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33. “Challenges at the End of Visit to China,” Beijing, 2 December2005, http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/677C1943FAA14D67C12570CB0034966D?open document.See also TCHRD’s memorandum to the U.N. SpecialRapporteur on Torture visiting Tibet and China, available athttp://www.tchrd.org/press/2005/nb20051111.html

34. TCHRD counted by the end of December 2005 a total of133 prisoners of conscience, 91 of who belong to monasteriesand thus are 68% of the detained prisoners of conscience. Seefor comparative counts the chapter on China, AmnestyInternational Human Rights Report 2005,www.amnestyinternational.org Amnesty International speaksof “over hundred” prisoners of conscience without indicatingan exact number, see http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/china/document.do?id=ar&yr=2005 According to TCHRDrecords there are 133 Tibetan prisoners of conscience as ofend of December 2005.

35. Ibid.36. Read further details in “The Politicization of the Geshe

Lharampa Degree” in the Chapter on Religion of HumanRights Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2005, TCHRD.

37. A Golden Bridge Leading to a New Era, Tibet AutonomousRegion Party, 1994.

38. “China loots the Potala again, Tibetan appeal to world to stopChina from emptying Tibet of its religious wealth,” PressRelease, Department of Information and InternationalRelations, Dharamsala, 21 April 2001. Visit www.tibet.net

39. “Travellers’ account of Tibet experience,” Human RightsUpdate, TCHRD, July 2002. Visit www.tchrd.org

40. Ever since the War on Terror started with the U.S. led invasionof Iraq, China has increasingly referred to “splittism” or latelyeven so-called “terrorism” being the motive behind certainTibetan Buddhist religious beliefs and practices, such as theveneration of the Dalai Lama, who for Tibetan monks andnuns is the spiritual head of Tibetan Buddhism and whomthey base their spiritual practice on. Political aspects of whetherthe Dalai Lama is “the head of the splittists” as the Partyconstantly repeats, are not issues of concern for genuinereligious practitioners. Evidently, the Party’s approach toreligion is to always see it in connection with politics whichleads to the constant confusion of spiritual practices with“terrorist” motivated acts and the subsequent repression ofsuch practices.

41. Human Rights Update, TCHRD, archive section for the year2005, visit www.tchrd.org

42. Consult more details in “An Essential Problem to ReligiousFreedom” in the Chapter on Religion of this report, HumanRights Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2005, TCHRD.

43. “The Government strictly controlled access to and informationabout Tibetan areas, particularly the “TAR”, and it was difficultto determine accurately the scope of religious freedomviolations…,” Chapter “China”, Section II, Status of ReligiousFreedom, “Abuses of Religious Freedom,” U.S. StateDepartment’s International Report on Religious Freedom 2005.Available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51509.htm

44. Article 18: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscienceand religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion orbelief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others andin public or private to manifest his religion or belief in teaching,practice, worship and observance.”

45. Article 1: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought,conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have areligion or whatever belief of his choice, and freedom, eitherindividually or in community with others and in public or private,to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practiceand teaching.”

46. ICESCR, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm

47. ICESCR was ratified by China on 27 March 2001; see 2002HRW Report available at www.hrw.org/reports/2002/chinalbr02/chinalbr0802.htm

48. Annual Report 2003, CECC, pp.28-29.“…the state’s requirement that religion be congruent with patriotismhas led to widespread repression of religion. In Tibetan and Uighurareas where separatist sentiment often is interwoven with religiousconviction, state repression of religion is particularly harsh. Chineseauthorities do not clearly distinguish between the peaceful expressionof separatist sentiment and terrorism, creating additional pressureson religious practices that do not embrace Chinese nationalism…”

49. “Executive Summary,” Annual Report 2005, CECC, 2005,available at www.cecc.gov

50. Such as the Criminal Law, the General Principles of the CivilCode, the Law on Regional Autonomy for China’s NationalMinorities, the Military Service Law, the Law on CompulsoryEducation, the Electoral Law for the National People’sCongress, Local People’s Congresses and the OrganisationLaw of Village Committees

51. Closing the Doors: Religious Repression in Tibet, TCHRD, 2000,p.1.

52. “Ostensibly designed to protect believers, the regulations strengthenrequirements for any group hoping to register as a legal religiousinstitution. Once approved, institutions must submit to increasedscrutiny and must open their membership rolls to civil authorities.Requirements are vaguely worded, allowing authoritiesextraordinary leeway to shut institutions, levy fines, dismiss personnel,and censor texts,” comments Human Rights Watch, the newreligious affairs regulations in an open letter ofrecommendations to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights,9 November 2005. Available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/03/10/china10296.htm

53. Annual Report of the United States Commission on InternationalReligious Freedom, May 2005. Available at www.uscirf.gov

54. Ibid. p.2855. Chapter “China”, Introduction, U.S. State Department’s Annual

International Report on Religious Freedom 2005, available athttp://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51509.htm:“Some saw the new regulations as reflecting a more tolerantatmosphere and establishing legally protected rights for religiousgroups to engage in activities such as publishing, education, andsocial work. Others criticized the regulations as merely codifyingpast practice and questioned whether they would enhance religiousfreedom.”

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56. “According to a Chinese Government website,” as cited in theU.S. State Department’s Annual International Report on ReligiousFreedom 2005, Chapter “China”, Section II. Status of ReligiousFreedom, Legal/Policy Framework.In this context read When the Sky fell to Earth, ICT, 2004:“The Chinese Communist Party sees religious belief as one of itsmost significant problems in Tibet, largely due to the ties betweenTibetan Buddhism and Tibetan identity. The Party has beenconfounded by its failure to draw Tibetans away from its failure todraw Tibetans away from their religious beliefs, and particularlytheir loyalty to the Dalai Lama. As well as posing an ideologicalproblem for the Party, their concerns over religious belief in Tibetare also political and strategic. The Party’s fear of a Tibetan desirefor separation from China and instability in the PRC’s borderregions has increased its sensitivity to any perceived infiltration fromoutside ‘hostile’ anti-China forces.”

57. Chinese Government White Papers available in English athttp://www.china.org.cn/e-white/

58. “China launches Summer 2005 “Strike Hard” Campaign,”Press Release, TCHRD, available at http://www.tchrd.org/publications/hr_updates/2005/hr200507.html#summer

59. The findings in “Policy Focus on China” are the result of theCommission’s August 2005 official two-week delegation toChina. The issuing of the recommendations for U.S. policywas especially timely in light of President George W. Bush’sNovember 14 meeting in Beijing with Chinese President HuJintao. The Commission questioned the unique situation inTibet and, raising specific cases of concern with lawenforcement officials, was allowed to meet with recentlyreleased Tibetan Buddhist nun Phuntsog Nyidron during itsvisit to Lhasa. According to USCIRF, Chinese authorities hadto be pressed to restore her freedom of movement so that shecould get needed medical attention outside of China. Moredetails are available at www.uscirf.gov

60. Ibid.61. Consult the “Chinese White Papers: First White Paper on

Democracy,” issued in 2005, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-10/19/content_3648177.htm Forprevious White Papers see http://chineseculture.about.com/library/china/whitepaper/blswhitepaper.htm. Also see “Chinadenies U.N. Torture Reports,” 6 December 2005, available athttp://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,1280,-5460270,00.html

62. Counting as inhabitants both, monks, nuns and lay people.63. Coverage of the crackdown on Drepung Monastery on 25

November 2005 could be found in nearly all main independenttortured or, eventually, released. The exact details were stillunknown by the closure of the present edition of HumanRights Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2005, TCHRD, at theend of December 2005.

64. http://www.eu.int/comm/index_en.htm65. It is hard to pinpoint when and how Party practices of religious

repression came into existence. The development of theDemocratic Management Committee, for example, seems tohave resulted from the Party’s renewed commitment to obtain“from each monk or nun a written or oral declaration that they

would not support the political position and claims of the DalaiLama or his followers,” at the Third Tibet Work Forum held inBeijing, in 1994. According to TCHRD report “Closing theDoors: Religious Repression in Tibet,” DMCs reportedly beganto be very active as tool of religious repression already in theeighties.

66. A Season to Purge: Religious Repression in Tibet, Washington,International Campaign for Tibet, 1996.

67. Religion was officially endorsed by the 1954 Constitution andalso in “17-point Agreement” of 1951 between Beijing andTibet.

68. This number equals about 80% of central Tibet’s monasticinstitutions. The approximate numbers given here are beingindicated by sources such as the Tibetan government andWhen the Sky fell to Earth, ICT, 2004. A complete count andreliable percentage is extremely difficult to find access to atthis time.

69. “TAR” Vice-Chairman Buchung Tsering, 1987.70. Martin Slobodník, “Destruction and Revival: The Fate of the

Tibetan Buddhist Monastery Labrang in the People’s Republicof China,” Religion, State & Society, Vol.32, No.1, KestonInstitute, March 2004.

71. Official figures state that by 1978, all but eight monasterieshad been erased. By then only 970 monks and nuns remainedin the “TAR”.

72. The period between 1983 and 1987 was one of rapid growthfor monasteries and nunneries. Garu Nunnery, for example,increased from 20 nuns in 1985 to about 130 by 1987. Forfurther details consult When the Sky fell to Earth, ICT, 2004.

73. China’s basic religious policy was set out in a key policy paper,Document 19. It was enshrined in the Constitution in 1982and its full title is “The basic viewpoint and policy on thereligious question during our country’s Socialist period.”Consult for a comprehensive translation of Document 19,“Religion in China Today: Policy and Practice,” Donald E.MacInnis (trans.), Orbis Books, 1989.

74. When the Sky fell to Earth, ICT, 2004, pp.64-73.75. The documents of the Third Work Forum are a proof of the

Party’s concern if not fear of Tibetan Buddhism’s popularity.The Forum’s guidelines highlight the need of heighteningcontrols and eventual eliminating of Tibetan Buddhist practicesfor the suspected link between monasteries and politicalactivism, between religion and the pro-independencemovement. For details consult A Season to Purge: ReligiousRepression in Tibet, Washington, International Campaign forTibet, 1996.

76. Cutting Off The Serpent’s Head: Tightening Control in Tibet,1994-1995, TIN and Human Rights Watch Asia, March 1996,p.29.

77. The policies and guidelines formulated at the Third TibetWork Forum were endorsed at the Forth Tibet Work Forumheld in 2001.

78. The details given are based on investigations carried out byInternational Campaign for Tibet, available atwww.savetibet.com and www.tchrd.org/publications/annual_reports/2002/

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79. Khenpo Jigme Phuntsok from Serthar Institute enjoyed a lotof popularity among his followers who sometimes were Chinesestudents interested in the practice of Tibetan Buddhism andwho came from far away places in order to listen to histeachings. Khenpo Jigme suffered from the pressure put onhim by Party’s officials to send his students away from themonastery. He soon fell ill and was barred from the monastery.Destruction of Serthar Institute: A Special Report, TCHRD,published in December 2001 together with a documentaryfilm. Available at www.tchrd.org for both.

80. “Religion is growing but Communist Party membership isnot, so authorities have reason to be afraid,” according to“China cracks down on growing faiths,” Boston Globe, 2 March2002.

81. Khenpo Jigme was allowed to come back to the monasteryand teach the faintly reduced community under the gunpointof control units that had been sent to keep the place undercontrol.

82. This fact is highly worrying as it shows that religious repressionmust not be directly involved in killing but may eventuallysucceed in causing trauma to a degree that religiouspractitioners, out of hopelessness and inner depression, proceedto inflict serious harm to themselves. “Destruction ofMonasteries and Persecution of Religious Leaders,” When theSky fell to Earth, ICT, 2004, pp.63–79.

83. “Serthar teacher now in Chengdu, new information onexpulsions of nuns at Buddhist institute,” TIN News Update, 8November 2001, available at www.ciolek.com

84. See the China country report on “Human Rights Practices2003,” U.S. State Department, 25 February 2004 and theU.S. Annual Report on International Religious Freedom for 2003,available at http://www.state.gov

85. According to reports on decisions taken during the October2004 Workshop Meeting held in Lhasa.

86. View the news updates at www.tchrd.org87. Testimony on “Freedom of Thought, Conscience, Religion,

and Belief” before the House Committee on InternationalRelations, presented by Mickey Spiegel, Senior Researcher,Human Rights Watch, 21 July 2005, available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/07/25/china11426.htm

88 Ibid.89. “Taxing faith: taxation on religious practices,” Closing the

Doors, Religious Repression in Tibet, TCHRD, 2000, pp.58-59;and “Restrictions on Pilgrimage,” When the Sky fell to Earth,ICT, 2004, pp.59–60.

90. When the Sky fell to Earth, ICT, 2004, p.21.91. See “Democratic Management Committees” in the Chapter

on Religion in this report, Human Rights Situation in Tibet:Annual Report 2005, TCHRD.

92. “China thwarts Buddhist Lama’s India visit,” Human RightsUpdate, TCHRD, November 2002, available at www.tchrd.org

93. www.peopledaily.com, 12 January 2005.94. Ibid. Note the adverse effects on Tibetan people’s human

rights’ situation through the Party’s policies for ensuring“prosperity of the country,” Chapter on Development, HumanRights Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2005, TCHRD.

95. The requirement to incorporate such profoundly politicalsentiments to religion is virtually incompatible with a continuedgenuine practice of Tibetan Buddhist traditions. “Love for theChinese motherland” is one of the key issues in “patriotic re-education,” requiring monks and nuns to vow that “Tibet is alegitimate part of China” which includes denouncing beliefsthat are laid down by religious tradition, such as the role ofthe Dalai Lama who is practically the root-Guru of TibetanBuddhists.

96. www.xinhua.net, 13 January 2005.97. “Religions are adapting to China’s socialist society and gaining

vitality, the first meeting of the eighth political consultativeconference committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region washeld on Thursday. China followed a policy of freedom ofreligious belief, which accommodated the situation of Tibet,said Zhukang Tubdankezhub, a member of the eighth ChinesePeople’s Political Consultative Conference NationalCommittee. The policy offered an opportunity for the growthof Tibetan Buddhism while temples could open their doors toanyone, said Zhukang. Lamas, who were well read in religiousdoctrine, played an important role in Tibetan Buddhism.Monks, who could speak English and Chinese or usecomputers, were also vital, he added. China’s religious beliefpolicy ensured the basic rights of religious adherents andprotected Tibetan Buddhism’s growth, according toparticipants at the meeting,” www.xinhua.net, 13 January 2005.

98. Ibid.99. Article 251 (formerly Article 147) of the Criminal Law of the

PRC states that “serious cases in which any government employeeillegally deprives citizens of their rights to religious belief andinfringes upon ethnic customs and practices, may result in custodyor a sentence of two years in prison”. To this date there has notbeen any report on government employees being held forabusing this provision.

100. HRW Report 2005 on Tibet states “The Chinese government’seffort to eliminate support for Tibetan independence severely limitsTibetans’ core human rights. Regulations limit the number ofmonks and nuns and impose secular control over the administration,activities, finances, and personnel of all monasteries. Personaltestimonies tell of arbitrary detention, torture and ill treatment,and of judicial processes that fail to meet international standards.”Available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/03/10/china10296.htm

101. Consult TCHRD reports on expulsion, persecution, tortureand killing in Tibet, available at www.tchrd.org

102. www.tibetdaily.com, consult updated reports on the humanrights situation in Tibet by an independent daily.

103. For example, only “politically correct” Lamas are givenpermission to teach; only monks and nuns who pledged loyaltyto Chinese unity are allowed to officially register with theirmonastery; age-limits to admission and limits on the numberof residents in monasteries have led to a drastic reduction ofmonks and nun living in monasteries.

104. The information flow about events in Tibet are subjected tosevere Party control. Reports on abuses of religious freedomin particular tend to find little attention by the international

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media. See Chapter on Information, Human Rights Situationin Tibet: Annual Report 2005, TCHRD.

105. View details about the core importance in Tibetan Buddhismof unbroken lineage-holding through reading transmissionfrom the teacher’s mouth to the disciple’s ear. When the Sky fellto Earth, ICT, 2004, p.21.

106. Human Rights Update, TCHRD, October 2004, available atwww.tchrd.org

107. “Love Your Religion, Love Your Country” political campaignin Sera Monastery,” Human Rights Update, TCHRD, July2005, available at http://www.tchrd.org/publications/hr_updates/2005/hr200507.html#Sera

108. Thubten Jinpa, the translator of the Dalai Lama, in aninterview in 2005 on the occasion of the release of a book oneducation in Tibet, available at www.phayul.com

109. See chapter on Education, Human Rights Situation in Tibet:Annual Report 2005, TCHRD.

110. By tradition, parents would hand over their sons and daughtersto a monastic institution as a major offering from their part,requesting both, that the monastery may take care of the childas well as that the child may become a blessing to the family inreturn for the good instruction it would receive.

111. Before Chinese rule came to Tibet, by tradition, educationwas linked to receiving general knowledge and religiouseducation in a monastery. There were only a few exceptions ofsecular schools that did not understand a monastic institutions.These were lay schools that had been set up by aristocraticTibetan families and counted with few students only. Allsciences are, by tradition, intrinsically connected with theTibetan Buddhist explanation of how things exist and aretherefore bound to their religious context.

112. Lay people who usually would be in contact with their regionalmonastery are often discouraged to do so, school children arecharged fines for wearing the traditional Tibetan protectionstrings and are barred from entering monastery premises. Suchseemingly minor prohibitions can, however, have a majorimpact on the lay society’s behaviour in the long run. Thesemeasures of religious suppression are evidently aimed tointroduce a trend towards atheism and materialism in Tibetansociety that is bound to threaten the cultivation of its religiousheritage.

113. Tibetan Buddhism divides up into four major schools orlineages: Nyingmapa, Kagyupa, Sakyapa, Gelukpa. The twomost prominent figures are the Dalai Lama and the PanchenLama. The continuity of most Tibetan Buddhist traditionsand sacred text interpretations relies, by tradition, on a firmbond between teacher and the disciple. Consult Mapping theTibetan World, Kotan Publishing, 2000.

114. In every case, the non-recognition of the right to religiouseducation and belief for young people under the age of 18 iscontrary to the United Nations Declaration on the Eliminationof All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based onReligion or Belief Declaration and article 14 of the Conventionon the Rights of the Child (CRC) which states: “States Partiesshall respect the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscienceand religion.” The RC has been ratified by China on 2 March

1992. See chapter on Religion of this report, Human RightsSituation in Tibet: Annual Report 2005, TCHRD, 2005, p.5.

115. View “Democratic Management Committees” in the chapteron Religion of this report, Human Rights Situation in Tibet:Annual Report 2005, TCHRD.

116. Guru is the Sanskrit term for a teacher, Lama the Tibetanterm. Note the high importance given in Tibetan Buddhismto being able to rely on a personal teacher who acts as both, avirtuous example to follow as well as a very close, belovedtutor in all matters concerning the disciple’s spiritualdevelopment and the very scholarly aspects of religious textstudy. It is said that without a personal, qualified teacher nospiritual attainments can be achieved. Therefore, the arbitrarydetention of qualified teachers from the old generation isexceptionally harmful to ensuring the transmission of theirknowledge to their young disciples. In Tibetan Buddhism apersonal Guru or Lama is not easily exchangeable as priestsare in Christianity, for example.

117. Martin Slobodník, “Destruction and Revival: The Fate of theTibetan Buddhist Monastery Labrang in the People’s Republicof China, Religion, State & Society, Vol.32, No.1, KestonInstitute, March 2004.

118. Ibid.119. In an ICT interview 2003 an elderly monk from central Tibet

told: “Sometimes there are the texts and students but no teacherwho can teach it. Then there are times when a teacher comes whohave the texts, but there are no students. And then sometimes, wehave both the students and teachers present but the text was destroyedin the past (during the Cultural Revolution).”

120. Testimony on “Freedom of Thought, Conscience, Religion,and Belief” before the House Committee on InternationalRelations, presented by Mickey Spiegel, Senior Researcher,Human Rights Watch, 21 July 2005, available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/07/25/china11426.htm

121. For an experiential report see “A day in the life of a monk,”available at www.timesoftibet.com/authors/90/Tenzin-Pema

122. Ibid.123. This does not mean that the monastic community would not

be familiar with mundane tasks that are different to theirprime occupations which are related with their religiouspractice. In every case, economic pursuit, “money-making” orcreating a surplus of wealth for their monastery is not aprimordial concern that monks and nuns would usually needto have.

124. Consult for details the Chapter on Development of this report,Human Rights Situation in Tibet: Annual Report 2005, TCHRD.

125. “Financial Management of Monasteries,” When the Sky fell toEarth, ICT, 2004, p.58.

126. When the Sky fell to Earth, ICT, 2004, pp.58-59.127. Note that offering donations to the monasteries used to be a

deeply rooted tradition that is now losing ground due tointimidating threats of Chinese officials against the laypopulation. The purpose of making offerings to monks andnuns was to reciprocate the benefits lay people received fromthe services of the monastic communities. The Chinese officials’frequent prohibitions on lay people to seek counsel with

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monasteries as well as the requirement that monasteriesfunction self-sufficiently has contributed to creating anunnatural gap between the former symbiosis of the monasticcommunity and the lay community. Interestingly, in certainregions there has been a slightly opposite trend, namely Chineseofficials ask Tibetan monks to go out “gathering alms,”considering it a “productive labour activity” —contradictinga tradition according to which monks and nuns would neverbeg or go out with the sole purpose of obtaining donations.

128. The importance of economic development to the Chinesestate and the multiple implications to this importance shouldnever be underestimated, even or in particular when lookingat the right to religious freedom in the “TAR”: “The ChineseCommunist Party has always emphasized that there is an importantlink between atheism and economic development ... there is a beliefthat economic development will counter the influence of religionand therefore promote atheism.” When the Sky fell to Earth, ICT,2004, p.55.

129. As a matter of fact, “pioneering the new brand of socialist monks”is a quote from the concluding statements in an officialdocument called “Study Material for the Propagation ofPatriotic Education in Tibetan Buddhism,” United Front ofthe Party Central Executive Committee of Gansu Provinceunder the auspices of the Religious Affairs Bureau of the GansuProvince, issued in January 1998.

130. In the early nineties, the PRC set up a DMC to managemonasteries and nunneries inside Tibet. “Patriotic re-education” is purposely designed to control Tibetan religiouspractices and to impose nationalistic sentiment by, amongother things, instructing and examining all Tibetan monksand nuns on State ideologies and requiring them to pledgetheir loyalty to the Chinese Government while forcing themto denounce their spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, as a “hostileseparatist” or “splittist”.

131. More information available at www.tchrd.org132. “China’s Strike Hard (Ch. Yanda) Campaign is in grave

contravention of international human rights instruments. Duringthe campaign, the state law enforcement agencies are givenextraordinary power to arbitrarily arrest, detain, interrogate, ransackhouses and issue illegal threats and warnings to people undersuspicion. The campaign’s nature in dealing with issues by strikinghard, fast, and severely leaves many fundamental human rightsviolated.” according to “China launches 2005 Summer “StrikeHard” Campaign,” Human Rights Update, TCHRD, availableat www.tchrd.org

133. When the Sky fell to Earth, ICT, 2004.134. Torture under “Strike Hard” Campaign: China’s crackdown on

Political Dissidence, Special Report, Chapter 4, TCHRD, 2005,pp.41-46. Can be downloaded from www.tchrd.org

135. “Strike Hard” Campaign: China’s crackdown on PoliticalDissidence, TCHRD, 2005, p.23

136. Ibid. For more details on the “Strike Hard”campaign.137. Dated 28 November 1997.138. Translation and reference taken from “The aims of Patriotic

Education,” When the Sky fell to Earth, ICT, 2004, p.48.139. This is an infraction of article 14 of the Convention on the

Rights of the Child which states “States Parties shall respect theright of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.”

140. As can be observed, the methodology of “patriotic re-education” is diligently based on psychology’s findings aboutin depth mind-changing by relying on the power of repetitionand the use of visual, auditive and motoric elements foraccelerating the learning process of the mind about adetermined topic.

141. Tibetan regions from the “TAR” to the Tibetan areas of Sichuan,Qinghai, Yunnan and Gansu. In recent years religiousrestrictions have been extended to isolated regions of Tibetoutside the “TAR”. Even remote hermitages have becomesubject of authorities’ control and intolerance of the rights toreligious freedom of Tibetan Buddhist practitioners.

142. Cited statement of a “TAR” official in John Gittings, “CulturalClash in land on the roof of the world,” The Guardian, 8February 2002.

143. So far, the accusation of the Dalai Lama being the “head ofsplittists” has proven to lack every evidence. If there was truthto it, governments other than the Chinese would have raisedtheir voices to join in this accusation. But most importantly,the political position that the Dalai Lama has adopted foryears is that of seeking “autonomy” and not “independence”for Tibet, an autonomy in which the human rights of theTibetan people would be respected. In speeches that go backas far as the Nobel Lecture on 11 December 1989, the DalaiLama has asked for a dialogue with China on the establishmentof a “zone of Ahimsa” and in his March 10th Speech in 1995proposed a referendum of the Tibetan people to decide ontheir fate by themselves, making clear that he does not holdon to “independence” despite the confusion deception amongmany Tibetans about his position: “Many Tibetans have voicedunprecedented criticism of my suggestion that we should compromiseon the issue of total independence. Moreover, the failure of theChinese government to respond positively to my conciliatory proposalshas deepened the sense of impatience and frustration among mypeople ... However, as long as I lead our freedom struggle, therewill be no deviation from the path of non-violence.” Likewise, itcan safely be stated that the Chinese version of Tibet’s historyis favourably distorted to the benefit of China. Even thoughmost governments accept in the meantime the status of Tibetbeing part of China, the ways and arguments of how thisstatus was achieved do not absolve China from the crimescommitted against humanity.

144. Holders of the red ID-card are considered as “permanent” or“official” monks or nuns of the monastery and enjoy morepriviledges. Monks and nuns are issued red-cards for theirassent to the “re-education” principles and the card allowsthem unrestricted travel within Tibet/China. They are seen bythe Chinese authorities as having “great belief and love fortheir country and religion”. See more details in “Closing theDoors, Religious Repression in Tibet,” TCHRD, 2000, p.10

145. “Closing the Doors: Religious Repression in Tibet,” TCHRD,2000, p.9.

146. Ibid. pp.9-11.147. Mantras are phrases that are being repeated many times in

order to bring about a change in the mind.

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148. According to recent interviews conducted by TCHRD, thereare currently six “re-education” manuals in use. They are printedby the “TAR” Monastic Patriotic Education Committee andare collectively called Explanation and Commentaries for thePropagation of Patriotic Education in Monasteries Throughoutthe “TAR”: Brief Explanation and Proclamation of Tibet’s History,Brief Explanation and Proclamation of Crushing the Separatists,Brief Explanation and Proclamation of Religious Policy, BriefExplanation of Legal Knowledge, Brief Explanation ofContemporary Policies, Brief Explanation on Ethics for the Masses.

149. “What kind of person is the Dalai? The Dalai is the main leader ofthe splittists who conspire for Tibet Independence, a tool used byinternational anti-China forces to promote hostility, the chiefinspiration for those causing unrest within Tibetan society, and allthose who obstruct the re-establishment of discipline in theregulations of Buddhist (monasteries) in Tibet.” Excerpt from abooklet used for “patriotic re-education,” translation providedin When the Sky fell to Earth, ICT, 2004.

150. Statements of Chinese authorities’ official anti-Dalai Lamastand, Fourth Session of the Sixth Regional People’s Congress,24 May, 1996.

151. The implicit requirement of Chinese officials that Tibetansneed to be fluent in the Chinese language is in contradictionwith the rights of Minorities: “States Parties shall respect theright of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.”UN Declaration on the Eliminiation of All Forms of Intoleranceand of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief Declarationand article 14 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child(CRC).

152. The expulsion of monks and nuns who fail to accept thetruths predicated in the “patriotic re-education” campaignforces many monks and nuns to go into exile to India. Asstandards of religious instruction are falling in Tibet, they seekbetter education in exile. After their return to Tibet, theycome easily under suspicion of having ties either with theTibetan Government in Exile or the “Dalai clique”.

153. Gendun Choekyi Nyima, the Panchen Lama recognized bythe Dalai Lama, one of the highest ranking Tibetan Buddhistleaders, has been missing since 1995 when Chinese authoritiestook him into custody. At the time he was six years old andshould have undertaken his religious studies. Despiteinternational pressure, Chinese authorities do not reveal neitherthe Panchen Lama’s nor his families’ whereabouts but claimthat Gendun Choekyi Nyima is still alive.

154. TCHRD Interview, Dharamsala, 2004.155. “Strike Hard” Campaign: China’s crackdown on Political

Dissidence, Special Report, TCHRD, 2004.156. www.amnestyinternational.org157. TCHRD Interview, Dharamsala, December 2005.158. When the Sky fell to Earth, ICT, 2004.159. There are no statistics so far about the number of Tibetan

Buddhist monks and nuns who converted to convinced Partymembers. It must be supposed that most monks and nunshave so far either resisted accepting the principles proposedby “patriotic re-education” (and taken the consequences forit) or they have seemingly conformed to these principles in the

hopes to regain some free space for their religious practices.There is no doubt, however, that the imposed politicalatmosphere in monasteries has completely changed the outlookfor a genuine pursuit of religious studies and meditation.

160. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html

161. Martin Slobodník, “Conclusion,” “Destruction and Revival:The Fate of the Tibetan Buddhist Monastery Labrang in thePeople’s Republic of China,” Religion, State & Society, Vol.32,No.1, March 2004.

162. Human Rights Update, TCHRD, October 2004, detailsavailable at www.tchrd.org

163. TCHRD Interview, Dharamsala, Summer 2005.164. “China recommences “patriotic education” campaign in Tibet’s

monastic institutions,” Press Release, TCHRD, 13 October2005, available at http://www.tchrd.org/press/2005/nb20051013.html

165. For number of reported deaths due to “patriotic re-education”consult previous Annual Reports and Executive Summaries,TCHRD, available at www.tchrd.org See Tibet, Crackdownon Humanity, TCHRD, 2000.

166. The EU-Parliament passed its resolution on the human rightssituation in Tibet and Hongkong on 15 December 2005. Thedocuments’ points regarding Tibet are 14, regarding Hongkong4 points.

167. The monk’s exact name and provenience are: NgawangJangchub a.k.a. Aku Ril Ril, hailing from Lhakhang Village,Phodo Twonship, Phenpo Lundurup County, LhasaMunicipality, “TAR” (Tibet Autonomous Region).

168. “A young monk dies under mysterious circumstances followingthe “patriotic education” campaign in Drepung monastery,”Press Release, TCHRD, 8 November 2005. See http://www.tchrd.org/press/2005/pr20051108.html

169. Details as known by the closure of edition at the end ofDecember 2005: Appeals of international human rightsorganisations as well of the EU Parliament have not yet beensuccessful to learn about the monks’ whereabouts and state ofhealth.

170. Following the arrests, on 25 November, more than 400 monkssat on a peaceful protest in the front courtyard of DrepungMonastery. The protesters refused to follow the authorities’directives to denounce the Dalai Lama and to accept “Tibetas a part of China”. They also called for the release of the fivearrested monks. Visit www.tibetoffice.org

171. Press Release Archive, TCHRD, www.tchrd.org172. http://www.phayul.com/news/173. Very much in contrast to the Dalai Lama himself, TYC demands

for Tibet complete independence from PRC.174. According to information received by TYC there has been a

non-violent protest carried out by about 120 nuns.175. http://www.tibetanyouthcongress.org and

www.tibetanyouthcongress.us176. TCHRD, latest count as of end of 2005.177. Former President Jiang Zemin and the then Premier Li Peng

came up with the proposal of a legal management of religiousaffairs.

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178. As an outcome of the Third Tibet Work Forum held in Beijing,a paradigmatic shift took place that established for the firsttime an official relationship between monastic institutionsand pro-independence movements in Tibet. Hence, the roleof the DMC’s implementation in Tibet was given greaterimportance than before.

179. Statement by Zhou Dunyou as quoted in “Rights groups slamclaim of religious freedom in Tibet,” UPI, Beijing, 7 October1994.

180. When the Sky fell to Earth, ICT, 2004, p.81.181. Testimonies received by TCHRD in interviews over the years

as well as by When the Sky fell to Earth, ICT, 2004, pp.55-61.182. “Report on China,” United Nations Special Rapporteur on

Religion, Geneva 1995.183. When the Sky fell to Earth, ICT, 2004, p.56.184. ICT interview with Senior Rinpoche from the “TAR”, Winter

2002.185. “…the rigorous intellectual training that the Dalai Lama

received in his student years appears to have left a lastingimpact both on his personality and his thought. Despite hisextensive exposure to modernity and contemporary westernthought, his appreciation of the scholastic tradition of Tibetremains deeply rooted in the ancient teachings of the Buddha.”Thubten Jinpa, the translator of the Dalai Lama, in aninterview in 2005.

186. “The main political struggle in Tibet – The Anti-Dalai LamaCampaign,” When the Sky fell to Earth, ICT, 2004, pp.15-19

187. Principal teacher or root-Guru.188. “China Blacklists Tibetan Lamas Recognized by the Dalai

Lama,” RFA, 25 November 2005, available at http://www.rfa.org/english/news/social/2005/11/09/tibet_lamas/

189. In connection with the recognition of the Tibetan PanchenLama who is kept in hiding by Chinese authorities, severalLamas have been taken into custody because they consulted,as prescribed by the Tibetan Buddhist tradition, with theDalai Lama. Chadrel Rinpoche, head of the search team forthe Eleventh Panchen Lama, has been kept under house arrest,even after his official release from a six-year long prisonsentence.

190. Testimony on “Freedom of Thought, Conscience, Religion,and Belief” before the House Committee on InternationalRelations, presented by Mickey Spiegel, Senior Researcher,Human Rights Watch, 21 July 2005, available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/07/25/china11426.htm

191. Annual Report, CECC, 2003, p.28192. The first crackdowns started in the eighties. From the nineties

onwards the Dalai Lama’s Birthday celebrations were firstallowed to take place under close monitoring, discouragingthe performance of the usual rites and burning of incense.Finally the celebrations were banned in 2002.

193. In contrast to this denunciation by Chinese authorities, aletter from Tibet was received on the Dalai Lama’s birthdaywhereby 99% of Tibetans pledge their support to his approachon his birthday.

194. Birthdays are not usually celebrated by Tibetans. There is onlyone exception and that is the Dalai Lama’s birthday which is

celebrated as if it was the birthday of all Tibetans. Thecurtailment on these celebrations is therefore particularlyharsh.

195. Celebrations of the Dalai Lama’s Birthday on 6 July.196. Ibid.197. “A Reader for Advocating Science and Technology and Doing

Away with Superstitions,” Propaganda Department of theCentral Committee of the “TAR” Communist Party. Obtainedby ICT in August 2002. Cited as in When the Sky fell to Earth,ICT, 2004, p.18-19.

198. TCHRD Interview, Summer 2005.199. Jigme Gyamtso, Kalsang Jigme (lay name), aged 26, and his

brother Lungtok, Tsedor (lay name), aged 32, from BarmaVillage, Nyima Township, Machu County, Amdo KensuProvince.

200. Ibid.201. Kuxing: Torture in Tibet, Special Report, TCHRD, 2006.202. TCHRD Interview, Summer 2005.203. The announcement was made on the Xinhua website

www.xinhua.net.204. Also known as Yellow Hat school, the Dalai Lama is a monk

within the Gelugpa School and simultaneously its head.205. On 20 August 2004.206. TCHRD Interview, Kathmandu Tibetan Refuge Reception

Center, 24 July 2004.207. Usually, the unlawful imprisonment of important religious

scholars is based on arbitrary detention which has been definedby the UN Working Group as “Cases of deprivation of freedomwhen the facts giving rise to the prosecution or convictionconcern the exercise of the rights and freedoms protected bycertain articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rightsand the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”ICCPR has been signed by PRC on 5 October 1998.

208. For more details please consult the Chapter on Civil Libertiesof this report, 2005 Annual Report on the Human Rights Situationin Tibet, TCHRD.

209 Details on the case of Trulku Tenzin Delek, Bangri TsamtrulRinpoche, Chadrel Rinpoche, Geshe Sonam Phuntsok can befound in Civil and Political Liberties of this report.

210. The enthronement of the Chinese appointed Panchen Lamatook place on 8 December 1995, about half a year after thedisappearance of the Panchen Lama who had been recognizedby Buddhist Lamas in consultation with the Dalai Lama andin accordance with the pre-established religious rites andrequirements.

211. “Panchen” is the contraction of the Tibetan expression“Pandita Chenpo”.

212. Known as “70,000-Character Petition”.213. Referred mainly to the period 1959-61.214. “China promotes its Panchen Lama as new Tibetan leader,”

21 December 2005, available at http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=11483&t=0

215. “Tough Panchen task for Qinghai’s Buddhist leaders,” TibetanReview, February 2005, p.5.

216. “Regional chairman briefs on religion, ecology in Tibet,”available at http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=10243&t=1

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217. “Panchen Rinpoche’s case raised at the 57th Session of the UNSub-commission on Promotion and Protection of HumanRights,” states http://www.phayul.com/news/tools/print.aspx?id=10297&t=1

218. Ibid.219. Quote according to www.xinhuanet.com220. More information available at www.tchrd.org221. “Monks expelled over voicing their opinion on admission

policy,” available at www.tchrd.org222. TCHRD Interview, Kathmandu Tibetan Reception Center,

May 2005.223. “Monks expelled upon passing of the monastery’s chief,”

available at www.tchrd.org224. “Lhasa PSB lifts monk from Sera Monastery for detention,”

available at www.tchrd.org225. Confucius lived from 551-479 BC.226. C. Raja Mohan, “The Confucian Party of China,” The Indian

Express, 19 December 2005, p.9. Also available atwww.expressindia.com

227. According to the fourth issue of Liaowang Xizang, theChinese-language journal published by the InternationalCampaign for Tibet.

228. The Institute promotes the traditional arts and literary studiesof Tibet, and comprises a Centre for Arts, an Academy ofTibetan Culture and a Literary and Cultural Research Centre.www.norbulingka.org

229. The teachings on Kalachakra have been first given by thehistoric Buddha and enjoy a great popularity among TibetanBuddhist practitioners due to being said to promote peace inthe world. See http://www.kalachakra2006.com

230. Annual Report 2005, CECC, 2005, www.cecc.gov231. Consult for more details “The Anti-Dalai Lama campaign” in

the Chapter on Religion in this report, 2005 Annual Report onthe Human Rights Situation in Tibet, TCHRD.

235. By the closure of this edition, there have not been any newsabout China accepting to resume talks with the Dalai Lama.

233. It has been, rightly, stated by many governments andinternational monitoring agencies that Chinese nationals are,as much as any ethnic minorities living in Chinese territory,deeply affected by the Chinese government’s lack of respectfor religious freedom and basic human rights in general.

234. “Allow Religious Freedom in Tibet,” 22 March 2005, availableat www.rediff.com

235. 22 November 2005.236. Ibid.237. It was the first time since 1980 that representatives of the

Dalai Lama have been able to visit Lhasa.238. www.tibet.net239. Ibid.240. Ibid.241. Ibid.242. “U.S. State Department’s International Report on Religious

Freedom 2005,” available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51509.htm

243. Ibid.

244. Annual Report 2005, CECC, 2005, available at www.cecc.gov245. European Parliament, 13 September 2005, available at

www.europarl.eu.int246. Ibid.247. “Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, the 11th Panchen Lama: Still

disappeared,” available at http://www.tchrd.org/press/2005/nb20050425.html

248. “China issues 1st white paper on democracy,” Xinhuanet, 19October 2005, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-10/19/content_3645611.htm

249. The U.S. president had invited the Dalai Lama for talks at theWhite House which were not commented in detail during afollowing press conference. No official photo of the meetingwas published on the government’s webpage. MeanwhileChina’s criticism of the Dalai Lama’s reception at the WhiteHouse was harsh because the visit had not been suspendeddespite Chinese disapproval of the encounter between theU.S. President and the Tibetan spiritual leader. Consult thearticle “China firmly opposes Dalai Lama’s US visit”: “TheDalai Lama is not merely a religious figure but a political exile indisguise, who has been engaged in activities to split China andundermine ethnic solidarity.” http://www.tibetoffice.org/en/index.php?url_channel_id=1&url_publish_channel_id=1522&url_s \ubchannel_id=1522&well_id=2

250. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/03-1881338,00.html251. View “The Politicization of the Geshe Lharampa Degree” in

this report, 2005 Annual Report on the Human Rights Situationin Tibet, TCHRD.

252. Kuxing: Torture in Tibet, Special Report, TCHRD 2006.Consult also with www.amnestyinternational.org

253. The monks and nuns arrested were Thargyal from the Arikarea, Jamyang Samdup from Drakmar, a monk named Sherab,and Chokyi Dolma, a nun from Gomang township.

254. “China Arrests Tibetan Monks, Nuns for Dalai Lama Poster,”Radio Free Asia (RFA), 22 December 2004, available atwww.rfa.org

255. 22 November 2005, www.tibet.net256. An ample definition and a short history of the Middle-Way

Approach, which is analogue to the 17-Point Agreement, areavailable at http://www.tibet.net/en/diir/sino/std/imwa.html

257. “Dalai Lama rejects Tibetan Buddhist praise of China,”Reuters, Terry Friel, 29 December 2005. See http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=11518&article=Dalai+Lama+rejects+Tibetan+Buddhist+praise+of+China&t=1&c=1

258. Ibid.259. Karen Matthews, “Dalai Lama: Hopeful signs in China of

interest in Tibetan culture,” Associated Press, 27 September2005. See http://www.tibet.com/NewsRoom/hhcolumbiauni1.htm

260. Religious repression as in the case of the “patriotic re-education” campaign is leading to a successful infiltration ofpolitical ideology in Tibetan Buddhist practices leads at timesto the annihilation of some fundamental beliefs such as thedenial of the validity of the recognition process of religiousleaders according to Tibetan Buddhist tradition; the denial of

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the Dalai Lama being the religious head of Tibetan Buddhists;the destruction of the original criteria for scholarly achievementin Tibetan Buddhism as established by tradition etc.

261. “Dalai Lama rejects Tibetan Buddhist praise of China,” Reuters,Terry Friel, 29 December 2005. See http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=11518&article =Dalai+Lama+rejects+Tibetan+Buddhist+praise+of+China&t=1&c=1

262. “Buddhism is All We Have – Dalai Lama,” 8 December 2005,available at http://www.phayul.com/news/tools/print.aspx?id=11386&1=0

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China has recently completed the railway line linking Beijing-Golmud-Lhasa for the first time in history.The railway line is said to be operational by early 2007. Many experts have described the railway line as

a political strategy rather than actual strategy to bring development to the Tibetan people.

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introduction

On 1 September 2005, People’s Republic of China(PRC) marked the 40th anniversary of founding“Tibet Autonomous Region” (“TAR”), which wascelebrated in a grand fashion in front of the PotalaPalace. While the event was to commemorate theachievements and development that PRC hasbrought to Tibet, it came across to the internationalcommunity as China’s affirmation of its controlover Tibet. Alison Reynolds of Free Tibet Campaigncommented on the 40th founding anniversary,

China’s celebration of 40 years of the TibetAutonomous Region is yet another propagandaextravaganza, Whatever new measures Chinacomes up with to enhance Tibet’s so called‘autonomy’, or however much money Chinaspends in Tibet, the Tibetan people will not besatisfied until there is political change whichwill give them genuine control of their ownaffairs.

In short, the slogan of China’s rule over Tibet in thelast five decades has been progress and moderniza-tion of Tibet. It is also the truth that China has beenspending billions of yuan every year in Tibet butunfortunately the development still eludes the Ti-betan people of rural and nomadic regions of Tibet.For instance, the central government has invested6.42 billion yuan in 24 projects covering agricul-

ture, industry, communication, road, school, energyand public health at “TAR” 40th founding anniver-sary. All these massive investments were part of de-velopmental projects under the Western Develop-ment Strategy launched in 1999 by former Presi-dent Jiang Zemin. Jampa Phuntsok, the “TAR”Chairman said that in 2004, over 16.6 billion yuan(US$ 2 billion) was invested in building hard infra-structure in the “TAR” alone.

The year 2005 was also a year of developmentalmilestones for Tibet. The year fulfilled the dreamsof the visionary founder of modern China, Dr. SunYat Sun’s 19212 blue print of linking China and Tibetby a railroad. His blue print was far more ambi-tious and daring than the railway lines currently con-structed in Tibet. The year ended with the material-ization of one of the complex engineering feats ofChina and ushers in a new revolutionary proposalof development blue prints in the daring 11th Five-Year plan beginning in the spring 2006. The con-tent of the draft does reflect a ‘rhetorical shift’ offocus from coastal economy to the ravines of ruraland western regions of China.

China’s first ever White Paper, China’s Peaceful De-velopment Road3 released on 27 December 2005emphasized that China’s rise to economic superpowerstatus hinges on mutual benefit and common de-velopment with other countries.

DEVELOPMENT “Cultural imperialism is first of all presented as an egoistic pride, the kind of pride that has, collectively or individually, consciously or

unconsciously, permeated every aspect of life. On the way from Lhasa’s Gongkar Airport, at the headquarters of Qushui County (Chushurin Tibetan) stands the “Taizhou Plaza”, a “helping Tibet project (yuan Zang xiangmu)” that shows typical characteristics of cultural

imperialism. The plaza is huge and is a result of swallowing up acres of good farming land. Besides being a showcase for the builder’s greatwealth and crude taste, it is hard to explain the necessity of the plaza’s existence. It features a pavilion, stone bridge and artificial creek.

All of these area part of the Han-style landscape design and do not merge well with the local surroundings.”

Wang’s critique “Tibet Facing Imperialism of Two Kinds” 1

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From the available case studies, this chapter looksinto the state of education and health sector in Ti-bet and how rights based and needs-based develop-ment is guaranteed or violated in any form andmanner. This report investigates if Tibetans are theowners and masters of development from planningtill implementation phase in Tibet. Taking ‘devel-opment as a fundamental right’, the chapter looksinto the development process in Tibet in the lastfew years to verify if the current developmental pro-gram in Tibet actually violates the rights of Tibetanpeople to be developed.

The second half of the chapter studies China’s cur-rent development strategy and why the strategy failsto deliver China’s own stated goals and objectives.The chapter studies the two economic systems ofthe traditional of economy of rural Tibetans andurban economy and highlights how the lack of link-ages between these two economies is hurting thegenuine development of ordinary Tibetans. It alsoargues why China’s phenomenal economic experi-ment and growth has not and would not work inthe case of Tibet and why urban model of economyhas resulted in exclusionary growth and social ex-clusion. It argues which group of people in the soci-ety actually benefit from the development projects,economic policies and strategy placed in Tibet.

The chapter studies a growth trend in the traditionalrural background of Tibetan society and that of in-dustrial and urban areas. Much of the focus is givento inflow and outflow of capital investment andsubsidy from the central government and argues whyit failed to trickle down to benefit the intended tar-gets groups of society. The chapter asks: is China’sdevelopment model of heavy infrastructure and re-source extraction enclaves is a suitable and appro-priate way to alleviate rural poverty and people whoare at the bottom of social ladder? Is there anotherway to the development of rural Tibetans? This chap-ter attempts to look at the other way of the devel-opment of rural Tibetans.

development: conceptsand rights

‘Development’ is a term that encompasses manyattributes of individual, community, culture, nationand state. “Development” is suggestive of somethingpositive, keeping the welfare of human beings atthe base or human beings as a yardstick of measure-ment. The underlying motives of ‘development’ inthe long history of human evolution have been tobring comfort and happiness. The scientific andmaterial advancements are not an end in itself butthey are to provide the prime needs of a man i.e.comfort, protection and happiness.

The Right to Development was proposed in the early1970s as a human right belonging to peoples andindividuals and given official definition in the Dec-laration on the Right to Development in 1986adopted by the UN General Assembly. The Decla-ration centres on the right of individuals to nationaldevelopment policies that improve their well-beingequitably and with their full participation.

Right to development is not only a fundamentalright that Tibetans have under international law butalso an obligation that the Chinese Governmentmust fulfill under the International Covenant onEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-crimination Against Women (CEDAW), InternationalConvention on the Elimination of All Forms of RacialDiscrimination (ICERD) and the Convention on theRights of the Child (CRC) all of which have beensigned and ratified by China.

Article 1 of the ICESCR states unequivocally that:All peoples have the right of self-determination.By virtue of that right they freely determinetheir political status and freely pursue theireconomic, social and cultural development.”

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Article 1 of the Declaration on the Right to Devel-opment states that:

The right to development is an inalienablehuman right by virtue of which every humanperson and all peoples are entitled to participatein, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social,cultural and political development, in whichall human rights and fundamental freedomscan be fully realized.”

Article 2 of the same Declaration clearly states that:The human person is the central subject ofdevelopment and should be the activeparticipant and beneficiary of the right todevelopment.”

development in Tibet: rhetoricand reality

The ‘development’ in the past Tibet concentratedmore on the spiritual development than the mate-rial development. The economy of Tibetans waslargely subsistence based on agriculture and animalhusbandry. The livelihood and economic pattern ofTibetans centered on moderate and harmoniousutilisation of natural resources suited to the uniqueand fragile environment of Tibet for centuries. Theentire Tibetan way of life, tradition, culture andheritage developed on these backgrounds.

Keeping these underlying factors at the background,it is clear that an ideal approach in developing Tibetshould not be merely producing urban centres andignoring rural countryside. Modernity is a welcomechange and to reject material prosperity and devel-opment blindly is also a historical error. However,the best option of development should promote andpropel the heritage and culture and traditional as-pect of Tibetan society. Material development mustgo hand in hand with unique physical, geographicand demographic characteristics of Tibet.

Philosophers, economists and political leaders havelong emphasized human well-being as the purpose,the end goal of development. Development is aboutmuch more than the rise or fall of national incomes.It is about creating an environment in which peoplecan develop their full potential and lead productive,creative lives in accord with their needs and inter-ests. Development is thus about expanding thechoices people have to lead lives that they value. Andit is thus about much more than economic growth,which is only a means —if a very important one —of enlarging people ’s choices4.

Nobel prize winning economist Amartya Sen in hisbook Development as Freedom argues:

Development requires the removal of the majorsources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny,poor economic opportunities as well as systematicsocial deprivation. Neglect of public facilities aswell as intolerance or over activity of repressivestates.5

The right to participation in policy making is a rightof the Tibetans which is guaranteed under interna-tional law and which the Chinese are under an obli-gation, due to their commitments in internationallaw, to protect.

The abject exclusion of the Tibetans in the infra-structure developments and the dominant role ofmigrant Chinese as evidenced by official statisticsdemonstrate inequity and ethnic favoritism. Therewas no fair and transparent mechanism. The testi-monies of the new arrivals from Tibet consistentlyexpress a wide range of social and economic exclu-sion of Tibetan people whether it is intentional orunintentional. In such circumstances, Tibetans havelost total ownership of development. This is a clas-sic case of an absence of ‘self-determination’ of peopleon whose behalf development was supposed to havebeen introduced and this in turn results in the de-nial of the right to development.

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The key issue that lies at the heart of the developingTibet is the ‘right to self-determination’ or a devel-opment that is pushed forward and pressed by verypeople who are supposed to be the recipient or thetarget of benefits. In other words, the developmentmust have ‘socialist characteristics’, keeping the in-terest of people on the top. Ideally developmentshould be a phenomenon ‘determined’ by the peoplethrough popular democratic consensus. No devel-opment is legitimate and legal without consultingthe beneficiaries and that development cannot beimposed and thrown upon people for developmentsake. The right to development also means decen-tralization of power where all sections of society haveequal rights and participation in decision-makingprocess.

The biggest shortcoming of developing Tibet hasbeen the absence of participation by the Tibetanpeople, be it from running their own local affairs,handling decisions to plan and craft developmentstrategies and policies with full freedom and author-ity. Not only is this officialdom and high-handed-ness but on practical grounds it is quite unlikely forleaders in Beijing to have first hand knowledge andinsight into situations on the ground. Only negli-gible cases of ‘spin off ’ benefits go to Tibetans, thattoo to Tibetans thronged in urban centers who havemore comparative advantages compared with theirkinsmen in rural countryside where 80% of Tibetanpopulation live. It is true to admit that Tibetans arelacking and backward in the field of scientific andengineering fields of modern world. However itwould be a sound development policy to accom-modate and let rural Tibetans play a crucial role indeciding any developmental projects that have af-fected their livelihood, by bringing the consensusof rural Tibetans together.

ownership of development

It is to be noted that China has been a great successin creating vibrant urban centres and bringing infra-structure face-lift changes to Tibet. Not so surpris-ingly many visitors to Tibet are shocked as the pic-ture of Tibet they read in books hardly match thefacts on the ground. Lhasa City for example is thebest illustration of an image of old Tibet that ishardly visible anymore today. Modern buildings,stretch of shopping malls, bars, broad boulevards,discotheques, hotels and traffic. However, the pic-ture of modern Lhasa City as well as in all townsand cities in Tibet can be very deceptive as these aremeant to stand as a proof of China’s claims of ‘de-velopment’ in Tibet after fifty years of their rule.The truth is that the development of Tibet cannotbe gauged from the superficial image that is so vis-ible to the eyes.

The true yardstick to measure development is theownership of development from the first stage offormulating policy decision, to implementation andfinally the reaping of benefits from development.In these processes, the interest and benefit of Ti-betan people should be kept at the centre and noton periphery. China’s development over the pastyears has failed to benefit Tibetans as it excludes theagrarian Tibetan community where more than 80%of Tibetan people are concentrated.

Underdevelopment of Tibetan community in ruralareas persists, although every year central governmentpour billions of yuan to Tibet. Perhaps in the lastdecade Tibet has been the largest per capita recipientof subsidy and fund from the central governmentcompared to any regions in China. On “TAR”’s 20th

anniversary 500 million yuan was spent for 43projects, on “TAR”’s 30th anniversary 4.6 billionyuan was spent for 62 projects and on “TAR”’s 40th

anniversary 6.42 billion yuan was spent for 24projects. The “TAR” Chairman Jampa Phuntsok said

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that in 2004 over 16.6 billion yuan (US$ 2 billion)yuan was invested in building infrastructure. Mostof the funds came from central government underthe “Western Development Progam.”

However the monetary and political focus has beenoriented towards the urban sector. This indicates theabsence of ‘human face’ to a planned economicpolicy. One of the most viable and reliable meansto uncover what obstructs the development of Ti-betan people is to study the nature of three sectorsof Tibetan economy i.e. primary, secondary and thetertiary.

In the case of land and housing rights, China’s con-stitution provides, “land is owned by the State…canbe requestioned for public purposes.” However Tibetanpeople in Tibet today faces ownership crisis of theirancestral lands and housing rights through forcedeviction, displacement, confiscation of private prop-erties and the practice of population transfer orswamping in Tibet.

development in three sectorsof Tibet

The true form of development promoted by socialscientist for Tibetans is ‘human capital formation’and implementation of the ‘right to development’and right to self-determination of Tibetan people.It is only on these grounds that true developmentof Tibetans in Tibet can be accessed and examined.In order to assess the development for Tibetans, welook at the three sectors of Tibetan economy i.e.Primary , Secondary and Tertiary sectors. The mon-etary investments and infrastructure projects in Ti-bet do not present the true picture of growth. Per-haps the answer lies in breaking down the entire eco-nomic activity of Tibet into primary, secondary andtertiary sectors.

comparison amongthree sectors:6

The sectoral breakdown of Gross Domestic Prod-uct (GDP) in “TAR”, Qinghai and the entire Chinareflects unfair growth and how the entire GDP pic-ture of Tibet also reflects the false growth figure.

The GDP of Tibet in 1998 was 9.118 billion yuan,10.561 billion yuan in 1999, 11.746 billion yuanin 2000 and 13.873 billion yuan in 2001. Thereforethe GDP growth of entire Tibet reflects is 10% annu-ally.

The GDP of primary sector was 3.131 in1998, 3.419 billion yuan in 1999, 3.632 billion yuanin 2000 and 3.747 billion yuan in 2001. This showsthe growth in primary sector was roughly 2% yearly.

In the secondary sector the GDP was 20.24%in 1998, 24% in 1999, 27.21% in 2000 and32.18% in 2001.

Here, the growth was 4% annually in the secondarysector with growth picking up from 2000 onwards,indicating the sector enjoy growth due to economicboom in coastal China. In comparison, the growthin the secondary sector was two times more com-pared to primary sector which has only 2% annualgrowth. This brought into picture that 87% ofagrarian Tibetan community in primary sector’sgrowth was half of the growth enjoyed by the sec-ondary sector, which is overwhelmingly non-Tibet-ans or migrant workers.

In the tertiary sector the GDP was 39.63%in 1998, 47.42% in 1999, 53.93% in 2000 and69.08% in 2001.

In this sector the growth was 6% annually, highestof the three sectors. It is the middle class Tibetanswho has a robust share in tertiary sector in areas ofadministration and clerical works. The 6% annualgrowth demonstrates the overriding political em-phasis and weight.

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Based on this statistics, it projects the picture thatGDP growth in Tibet as well as in China was 10%.However ,distributing the growth among the threesectors, the larger share was predominant in urbanenclaves or core growth regions. While in the pri-mary sector where majority of Tibetan populationlive, the meagre growth experienced is 2% growth.Only 13% of Tibetan population living in urbanenclaves enjoys the benefit of growth. Again withinthe urban enclaves, 90% of Chinese origins live inurban centres. Chinese migrants and handful of Ti-betan urbanites in this closer study shows the eco-nomic prosperity while 87% Tibetans have been vir-tually left out of prosperity and growth.

Similarly in the Qinghai region, the growth projec-tion shows a different picture where the secondarysector dominates but again closer study reveals thesame growth trend of benefits and prosperity toChinese migrants and exclusion of Qinghai nomadsand semi nomads.

The GDP of entire Qinghai was 220.16million yuan in 1998, 238.39 million yuan in 1999,263.59 million yuan in 2000 and 300.95 millionyuan in 2001.

Based on these figures, the GDP growth was 12.2%annually in Qinghai region. Judging it from theoverall picture there was a growth but it reveals adifferent picture on a closer look. In the primarysector where most Tibetans are associated, the GDPgrowth was 41.63% in 1998, 40.54% in 1999,38.53% in 2000 and 42.79% in 2001.

The annual growth was 1.16%, which is slightlylower than “TAR.” This lower growth could be be-cause of the “TAR” being the favourite destinationof central funding because of the political sensitiv-ity attached to the region. In Qinghai the Chinesemigrants are mostly concentrated in secondary sec-tor unlike the tertiary sector in “TAR”.

The secondary sector shows the handsome

growth of 88.42% in 1998, 97.88% in 1999, 114%in 2000 and 132.18% in 2001.

This is 16.5 % growth. This growth also could havebeen due to closer proximity to China and its othereconomic and logistics advantages. Taking 16.5%as a growth projection would exaggerate the devel-opment to Tibetan people involved in secondarysector which is very minute compared to the com-positions of non-Tibetans in this sector, they are thelargest players. The growth in tertiary sector waslower than secondary, however high by the entireChina’s growth standard.

The GDP in tertiary sector was 90.11% in1998, 99.97% in 1999, 111.06 in 2000 and125.98% in 2001.

The growth rate in the region is 13.3% annually. Inthe Qinghai region for the Tibetans to compete intertiary sector, they need both competitive and com-parative advantages to compete with the Chinesecounterparts in the secondary sector.

In Qinghai region, Tibetan population is largely re-stricted in rural nomadic background and hence theplayers in this sector are predominantly Chinesemigrants. In the secondary sector, Chinese shopowners, entrepreneurs, skilled workers and semi-skilled workers working in the large constructionsprojects, mining and industry in the Qinghai beltoccupy this sector. Actual trickle down growth forordinary Tibetans is entirely nullified by the mas-sive role of secondary and tertiary sector.

In a nutshell the government expenditure in “TAR”,Qinghai and entire China in 2001 give us a clearpicture of China’s preference and emphasis on in-frastructure and fixed asset growth over human capi-tal formation.

In the year 2001, the investment in infrastructuredevelopment in China was roughly 12.5%, while

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in “TAR” it was massive 33% and relatively highfigure of 26% in Qinghai. This illustrate that theinvestment in infrastructure development in “TAR”was three times more than China, and the invest-ment in infrastructure development in Qinghai wastwo times more than China. In this regard, the in-vestors from China in state projects, migrants work-ers both skilled and semi-skilled, businessmen andcontractors from the western regions of China ben-efited most from the massive infrastructure in “TAR”and Qinghai considering that majority of the agrar-ian Tibetan population have no direct and indirectrole in this investment sector.

Out of the overall government investment in Chinain year 2001, the “TAR” has the highest percentageof 13% and 8% in both China and Qinghai. Thestatistics show that China has the highest expendi-ture in education of 15% while “TAR” has the low-est of 8% and Qinghai region relatively higher rateof 10%. This is to affirm and illustrate what manyinternational experts and social scientist argues forthe social and human development of Tibetanpeople. In health sector, all the three regions haverelatively low rates of 4% in China, 3% in “TAR”and 4% in Qinghai. Again the “TAR” scores thelowest investment in health sector from the threeregions.

Amongst all the regions of China, Tibet lacks be-hind in terms of human development in Tibet to-day remains one of the poorest regions in China.Take education, in 2001 China has illiteracy rate of9.1% with 22.9% below the 14 years age. Withthis high ratio of illiteracy how many of Tibetansare involved in secondary sector which is thoroughlya skill based sector of economy. In “TAR”, the illit-eracy rate was staggering 47.3% that is five timeshigher than national average with 31.2% of chil-dren below the age of 14 are illiterate. In other words,every three in ten children in Tibet below the age of14 don’t know how to read and write. Qinghai re-

gion has slightly lower illiteracy rate of 25.4% whencompared to “TAR”, which is almost three timeshigher than the national average and almost half thesize of illiteracy rate in “TAR” with 26.9% of chil-dren below the age of 14. Sichuan region has 9.9%of illiteracy rate, which is far lower than “TAR” andnegligibly higher than the national average. The re-gion has 22.6% of children below the age of 14,which remains a worrying concern. It means thatout of 100 hundred illiterate people in the region,the 22% of them are children below the age of 14.This throws the future status of literacy in a bleakscenario. This is the overall picture of level of edu-cation and illiteracy in the Tibetan areas of Tibet.

The most disturbing tale of poverty in “TAR” andrural Tibet is chiefly because of apathy and exclusiveinterest of China’s leaders, while agriculture com-prises the background of economy of rural Tibetansin “TAR”, in stark contrast it has the lowest invest-ment of 2% with China and Qinghai little higherof 2.5%. The President of World Bank said on 18October 2005 that China has 150 million peopleliving in acute poverty.

Putting Tibetans behind was the chief factor for thelack of development and progress in Tibet. In orderfor leaders in Beijing to achieve meaning results, theyneed to rethink their agriculture policies. This sec-tor desperately needs a human face in the pace ofdevelopments.

the primary sector

The primary sector forms the basic subsistenceeconomy of Tibetans involving the first level eco-nomic activities such as agriculture and animal hus-bandry. Since over 80% Tibetan population lives inrural region the primary sector of economy formsthe backbone of Tibetan economy till today. There-fore, “TAR” is the most agrarian region of Tibetfollowed by Qinghai.

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The economic growth in entire China is dividedinto three growth rates i.e. ‘fast growth’ in the coastalChinese cities where it has experienced phenomenaleconomic growth for a decade stretch. The interiorand non “TAR” region of Tibet where secondarysector of economy is strong and therefore, it is cat-egorized under ‘moderate growth’. However in“TAR”, where currently two forms of economy isfunctional, that is traditional agrarian and ruraleconomy and the urban model economy with bothheading in two opposite directions.

By and large, the livelihood pattern in rural parts ofTibet as indicated from the testimonies is still verymuch the same as that of the livelihood pattern thatexisted during the pre-1959 Tibet. The yields fromthe farm provide them with staple diet and grainsthroughout the year and animal husbandry providesthem with animal dairies. In this way the Tibetanpeople subsist on basic self-sufficient economy.Much of the daily needs are being derived from ani-mal products such as milk, butter, wool, hide andmost importantly the ready supply of meat. So farall the investment and subsidies in “TAR” is prima-rily concentrated in the urban enclave with massiveinfrastructure development and investments withlittle focus and emphasis on the traditional economyof Tibetans. Hence Andrew Fischer described it as‘highly polarized growth’7.

In the primary sector the ‘trickle down of benefits’for Tibetans is as remote and minute since economicpolicy is focused on creation of urban enclaves andmuch of the resource is being spent for administra-tion, maintaining security and large presence of mili-tary forces in “TAR”. The core of the central fundsare being consumed by administrative and securityrequirements leaving little to trickle down to ordi-nary Tibetans.

The key reason why traditional Tibetan economyremained on the periphery for long seems to have

been the nature of economy in the first place. Thenature of traditional Tibetan economy is subsistence,based on agriculture, which normally does not gen-erate surpluses of income and profit. It is true inother parts of the world, even the rich and devel-oped countries, for instance European Union givehigh subsidies for its farming community. It natu-rally would not attract private investors and migrantChinese entrepreneurs because of the absence ofcomparative and competitive advantages in thissector.

The core objective of China’s economic plans in Tibetseems to be a rapid and fast track creation of urbanenclaves and industrial regions so as to achieve a greateconomic take-off as it has experienced in the coastalChina. However the Chinese planners seems to haveover looked the fundamental factors that clicked theeconomic take off in the coastal regions of China.There are (a) Huge untapped market, (b) Absenceof bureaucratic interferences, (c) Supply of cheaplabour, (d) Ready availability of cheap raw materi-als, (e) intensive farm production, (f ) rural town-ship enterprises adding value to farm products.

If the absence of the above favourable reasons havekept away the private investors, the eyes and ears ofChina’s economic planners from Tibet, then theonly valid argument would be the Chinese leadershave neglected the real needs and interest of Tibetanfarmers and nomads whether it is deliberately orunintentionally. Or it must be creating some kindof strategic demographic shaping of Tibetan politi-cal issue in Beijing’s favour since the current eco-nomic blueprint in Tibet has tremendous potentialto attract and drive in floods of migrant workersand immigrants from China. If leadership in Beijingwants to disprove the criticism of this kind, thenthey should rethink and re-priorize the economicpolicies currently placed in Tibet. There is no thirdway or third perspective to explain the economicpolicy and development strategy in Tibet.

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The regular inflow of floating Chinese migrantworkers in Tibet seems to depict that China hastaken a short cut road in the infrastructure and hu-man development of Tibet, by relying solely onmanpower and expertise straight away importedfrom China than recruiting and training Tibetanslocally. Tibet has to be considered as an exceptionregion with its unique ethnic and ethnographic char-acteristics. Therefore, the focus should be on long-term development and genuine growth for Tibet-ans. Ben Hillman’s review of Andrew Fischer in ‘FarEastern Economic Review’, December 2005 has it,

More controversially, Mr. Fischer denies thatpoverty in Tibet is entirely a result of ecologicalfactors (altitude, harsh climate, low soil fertility)on the high plateau. He argues thatimpoverishment emerges from the very processof state-led modernization as Tibetans becomeless able to participate in the economicopportunities available. The solution he proffersis a sensible one-the state should completelyrepriorize its development strategies in the regionand invest more in people, especially in basicsocial services such as education and health care.He also advocates a different strategy foreconomic growth, one that supports localeconomy activity, locally owned and controlledbusinesses and local capital accumulation.

However, it seems that better days lay ahead for thefarming community in the rural areas of China andTibet as according to the United Nations Develop-ment Progam (UNDP) report the Chinese Gov-ernment is going to take some bold and positivesteps for the Chinese farmers such as abolishing theagriculture tax and relaxing the Hukou or residentialpermit which was long described as ‘peasant apart-heid’. As Khalid Malik says,

The Government is already taking concrete stepsto address these human development inequities.

By the end of this year, it will have completelyabolished agriculture taxes across the country.To improve literacy rates in rural communities,the government is promoting compulsoryeducation for the rural poor through renovationof primary and middle schools and providingfree textbooks for 24 million students and poorfamilies.8

the secondary sector

The secondary sector is the backbone of Chineseeconomy in all the different provinces of China andthe 21st century China is described as the world fac-tory or manufacturing unit. In terms of income andwealth, this sector contributes far more to the na-tional GDP than the primary and tertiary sectors.In the case of Tibet, the secondary sector is far stron-ger in non-“TAR” regions, such as Qinghai andSichuan region. Qinghai region has more industrialunits and productive core regions than “TAR.” Whilein “TAR” the tertiary sector is dominant in terms ofconsuming income or a sector that enjoy lion’s shareof central funding and subsidy while on the fronteconomic activity, primary sector is the largest sec-tor with over 80% of Tibetan agrarian populationat the background. The absence of dominant roleof primary and tertiary sector in the non-“TAR” re-gions such as Qinghai and Gansu, naturally allowssecondary sector to loom large.

According to the official statistics9, the labour sharesin 2001 showing 71.8 % of labour forces are con-centrated in the primary sector, this could be arguedas “TAR” being the most agrarian provinces in theentire China. In sharp contrast to the trend in entireChina where secondary sector is the highest con-tributor of income, in “TAR” the labour shares inthis sector is as low as 6.5% which is roughly tentimes lower than the primary sector. The labourshares of 6.5% are certainly a grim tale provided

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that it is the secondary sector, the manufacturingsector where China’s wealth stands and incidentallythe largest contributor of GDP in China. Over 90%of Chinese population in “TAR” lives in urban cen-ters including military personnel, police forces, tech-nicians, businessmen, prostitutes and also skilled andsemi skilled work force represent a total chunk ofpopulation in “TAR”. On the other hand, the labourshare in tertiary sector is 21.7%, which is quite arobust figure. This because of high presence of ser-vice sector in the “TAR” such as administration con-stituting the largest component of tertiary sector,followed by booming tourism industry and prosti-tution, retailing, banking and transport. etc.

Similarly, in Qinghai, the labour share is 60% inprimary sector where Tibetan farmers and nomadscome under this category. The labour shares in sec-ondary sector were 13.0% twice more than “TAR”’s6.5% of labour shares. Qinghai has some of themost productive industries and petro chemical fac-tories; some of them were profitable compared toother unproductive production units. Due to region’sproximity to China, that the labour in these facto-ries comes from Chinese migrant workers. In thecase of tertiary sector in Qinghai, again the regionover more than 80% of Tibetan population are in-volved in the agriculture and animal husbandry. Thelabour force for the secondary sector in Qinghaicomes from towns and cities where ethnic Chinesewho were settled there long time back and also con-stituting the floating migrant workers.

It would be very interesting to understand why Ti-betans are most excluded in this secondary sectorwhere it is the largest contributor of income andwealth in China. This fact explains the strangestepisode of development and economic reality inTibet today. The following statistic perhaps shedssome light on the ownership of labour share ratiosof Tibetans in “TAR” and Qinghai region in all thethree sectors of economy. It would be interesting to

know about the labour concentration of Tibetans.This cast China’s development process in a dubiousshadow as going by the available statistics.

The concern now is how much from that meagre6.5% of labour shares are Tibetan work forces oremployees. This perhaps could explain the real gainof job opportunities and employment prospects forTibetans and take a direct participation in thedevelopment projects and processes. According toAndrew Fischer, out of provinces investors tend toinvest in Mainland China and local investors tendto invest locally. Perhaps the biggest setback of thispoor show of labour shares in secondary sector isthat if this trend continues China would neverproduce skilled and semi skilled Tibetan work forcesin the foreseeable future. As the UNDP report of2005 supports the argument and expressed similarconcern,

The authors (people who drafted the UNDPreport) highlights that improving theeducational level of farmers plays an importantrole in raising their skills levels and ultimatelytheir incomes. To make the curriculum and theeducation system more relevant to the demandsof the labour market, the study recommendsthe establishment of community universities forvocational training to disadvantage groups andenterprise training.

It is understandable that China’s urbanization inTibet will continue to gain momentum and back-ing but at least in the Tibetan part of the processesskill and expertise stay in Tibet and subsequentlybenefits local economy is of primary concern andan effort needed to retain it. In order to empowerTibetans, a serious and sincere effort is needed fromthe Chinese Government in investing funds in so-cial services such as education and training Tibetansin scientific know how techniques and other voca-tional training.

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the tertiary sector

The demographic and geographic divide of Tibetansociety is such that in the case of tertiary sector, it ispredominantly concentrated in urban enclaves. LhasaCity is a classic example of this scenario. The threemost vibrant tertiary activities in the Lhasa city arebooming tourism industry, fast flourishing prosti-tution, ever expanding administration units, trans-port, retail, banking and finance. Among the threeservice groups, administrations compose the largestshare.

Of all the three sectors, it is the tertiary sector thatgenerates most income and wealth in terms of sala-ries and other incentives in the administrative urbanenclaves such as Lhasa City. In urban enclaves, theadministrative works absorbed a large chunk offunds meant for “TAR” i.e. constructing and reno-vating office buildings, staff, cadres, electricity, wa-ter and other security purposes. Although the pack-age of fund and money that comes from centralgovernment may appear huge but then the moneysimply evaporates when it goes down the adminis-trative apparatus and functioning. In terms of eco-nomic productiveness, it is simply a great drain ofmoney and resources because they don’t generateprofit and income. This could be one of prominentreason why the billions of yuan from Beijing fail totrickle down to the needy and actual targets of thedevelopment. However, the middle class Tibetansin the urban areas does get benefit in the adminis-trative service of the tertiary sector. But then thatportion of Tibetan middle class working in admin-istration constitutes a negligible number and at thesame time they represent quite high proportion ofthe Tibetan population in the urban centre.

This scenario alone reflects the worrying economicdivide first between rural hinterlands and urban en-claves. Secondly, the Chinese migrants live mostlyin urban enclaves. According to Fischer, the figure

of Chinese population living in Lhasa City betweenmonths of September to April 2000 was 160,000including all military and migrants Chinese. In thisrespect almost 90% of Chinese migrants live in ur-ban enclave and it is this portion of the populationthat benefits most from these three service sectors.For instance, Chinese migrant entrepreneurs ownmost of the hotels, bars and shops; most of the sexworkers in Lhasa were Sichuanese Chinese. Themost booming part of economy in Tibet is largelydominated by Chinese and urban elites.

In the last decade, the tertiary sector has enjoyedhoneymoon status in receiving the central fund, overthe years the percentage has jumped by leaps andbounds. In “TAR”, there was a huge increase in fundsfrom 1998 to moderate increase in 1999 and to 5%increases in 2000. In Qinghai, the increment wasfrom 12% to massive 17.5% between year 2000and 2001. Under the Western Development Progamthe agriculture has a slow growth rate of 5% per-cent a year.

In the tertiary sector too the trickle down of benefitis staggeringly low and meager, out of multi bil-lions of yuan that is pumped in Tibet every year,only a meager 6.5% of labour shares involves in sec-ondary sector, that too a sector completely domi-nated by Chinese migrant skilled workers, profes-sionals, businessmen, investors, hotels and shops inthe Lhasa city.

At the macro level the concentration of wealth waschiefly in the secondary and tertiary sectors wherenon Tibetans, chiefly Han and other ethnic Chinesehave upper hand dominance in generating incomeand wealth. Contrary to China’s claims, the inflowof funds concentrated in the hands of non-Tibetansdirectly and indirectly. The Tibetans are not the ben-eficiaries of subsidies.

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The United Nation’s top staffer in China KhalidMalik10, commented at the release of the China’sHuman Development Report 2005 that,

China’s wealth gap between urban and ruralcommunities is among the highest in the world,but according to a UNDP report released today,the government is coming to grips with thewidening disparities that threaten the country’sstability. China’s Human Development Report2005 is the first comprehensive study to offer aset of bold and practical policy recommendationsto improve conditions for the rural poor, andbolster education, health care and the socialsecurity system.11

who constitutes the urbanpopulation?

According to Andrew Fischer the urbanization ofTibet is based on the migration of Chinese migrantsand the new urban enclaves in Tibet mushroomingaround the core resources and mining regions ofTibet. It is predominantly the case in Qinghai re-gion of Tibet where many towns have emergedaround the resources rich areas in the last severaldecades. It is noteworthy to see few portion of thepopulation in urban areas are Tibetans.

Tibetan agrarians and the semi-nomadic people oc-cupy the traditional belt of the Tibetan economythat is agriculture sector. Therefore there is little logicto envisage waves of Chinese migrants trying to fillthe already saturated agrarian economy of traditionalTibet. The most ideal role the Chinese migrantscould play is to fill the untapped labour market underthe high profile infrastructure investments andprojects.

The secondary and tertiary sectors of Tibetaneconomy have become a monopoly of Han and Hui

Chinese Muslim in all the towns and cities of Tibet.In Lhasa City for instance, half of the population isHan alone excluding the Hu Muslims who settledmuch ahead of Han Chinese. Much of the phenom-enon of settling of Chinese migrants were due tothe shortsightedness of local leaders since they con-sider the inflow of skilled and semi skilled migrantsas success rather than a threat to the local populace.However, there seems to have been a pattern in theinflow of migrants to Tibet where the seasonalmonths between May and September, the popula-tion of migrants tend to increase dramatically andthen return back to Mainland China during thewinter months. According to Chinese official sta-tistics there were around 160,000 Chinese but tosome NGO workers and researchers, the popula-tion of Chinese migrants in “TAR” is estimated tobe 900,000 in 2003.

In the past twenty five years the Chinese Govern-ment has succeeded in lifting 250 million peoplefrom the clutches of poverty, a phenomenal recordby any world history, however it was during thesame period that inequality in the per capita incomeof citizens has doubled. According to the UNDPreport of 2005, the dwellers in China earned onaverage $1000 a year while in hinterlands and peopleon the margins of western regions earns $300, whichis three times lesser compared to income earned byurbanites. Moreover, an urban citizen in China livesfive years longer than farmers in rural regions ac-cording to experts. The prospects and greatness ofChina’s great economic achievements will be under-mined if picture of huge income disparity and sharpcontrast in the quality of life remains neglected andnot being addressed.

The inflow of investment, wealth and subsidies fromthe first phase of issuing, awarding contracts, gener-ating incomes and reinvestments all circulated withina web of business merchandise located out of Ti-betan provinces. There is enormous growth in ur-

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ban enclaves and these are all controlled and ownedby ethnic Chinese. For Tibetans the developmentand growth exist in ceremonial awarding or releas-ing of funds in the propaganda newspapers and docu-ments, not in their hands. The most significant partsof large construction projects are contracted out ofprovincial companies depriving local Tibetans of op-portunities which otherwise could be theirs. So natu-rally these out of province companies use high in-put of outside finance, material resources and labourbe it skilled or unskilled. Andrew Fischer believesthat this practice of funding coming from the out-side of the Tibetan areas can be seen as a strategy tonurture and promote regional and national construc-tion companies. Much of the subsidy announcedby central government goes to these out of prov-ince companies for their complex engineeringprojects rather than funding and helping to nurturethe locally owned business and expertise.

Andrew Fischer points out,

Thus begs the question; why could the localcommunity not set up and operate the minethemselves, thereby benefiting from profitableopportunity and directing profits towards furthercommunity development? Such a venture couldhave been organized a county owned,cooperative, or even private operation, allowinglocal Tibetans to build up the expertise andconfidence of bringing such economic projects tofruition. Locals described three constraints tosuch an outcome: lack of capital; lack of expertise,experience and education; lack of connectionsand networking (Ch. Guanxi).12

isolated case studies

The basic purpose of development is to enlargepeople’s choices. In principle, these choices canbe infinite and can change over time. People

often value achievements that do not show upat all, or not immediately, in income or growthfigures: greater access to knowledge, betternutrition and health services, more securelivelihoods, security against crime and physicalviolence, satisfying leisure hours, political andcultural freedoms and sense of participation incommunity activities. The objective ofdevelopment is to create an enablingenvironment for people to enjoy long, healthyand creative lives. --- Mahbub ul Haq13

case study- 1:

iron dragon runs roughshodover Tibetans.1414141414

Tibetan farmers along the route of China’s Qinghai-Tibet railway are appealing against eviction fromtheir homes and the paltry compensation offeredby the infrastructure project worth US$ 3.1 billion.

A resident of Dongkar county told TCHRD that,said representatives of local families had already triedto petition the authorities regarding the planned re-locations. “The Tibetan farmers went to differentdepartments, including the Tibetan AutonomousRegion government, to appeal but nothing reallyhelps”, told an elderly woman from the affected area.She said that a local Communist Party secretary whohad tried to speak out on behalf of his communityhad been stripped of his post. “So nobody dares tospeak out”, she said. Local residents said that whilethe authorities had promised to relocate them, theywould still have no means of making a living in thenew location.

All this is what they call the great westerndevelopment plan. We are victims of thesedevelopments. The rail track which is a majorpart of development as explained by the

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Chinese falls through my house and farmland”,the woman said. She said authorities hadpromised to build new houses of brick or stoneelsewhere for the farmers, but that only somehad been completed. “Our only source of incomeis land. Those who work in offices or other jobshave a steady monthly income, but we don’t.Now when our land is taken for the constructionof railways, we have nothing to live on. It issaid that we will be compensated about 3,500Yuan [US$422] and given a 50,000 Yuanloan, but nothing is definite.

Rui Xia in her article “The Iron Rooster in the landof snows” writes of the potential long-term dangerand threats of railway track on Tibetan people, cul-ture and its fragile alpine ecology.

But this is not the whole story, either. As inother areas of western China, one of the mainobjectives of the Qingzang rail link is improvingaccess to some of the natural resources buriedunder the frozen land. Tibetan uranium,especially, is important for China’s future nuclearprograms. Oil, gold, and other minerals will beloaded on the rail cars to be shipped east to thebooming coastal economy. It seems that, yetagain, investments in the west mainlycontribute to the already flourishing east, leavingmillions of local residents in wretched povertywith an ever-slimmer chance of improvement.15

economic exclusion of Tibetans

It is indeed quite ironical that the Chinea invadedTibet in 1950 with the promise of “freeing the serfs”and leading and guiding them into an era of progressand modernization. Although much of their claimsare credible but in rural areas and remote regionsthere seems to have been a shortage of efforts inreaching out the broad enmasse Tibetans in ruralTibet. In relative terms in the rural communities,

the economic policies in the last few decades haveled to dramatic increase in poverty and inequality inTibet between the rural Tibet and urban Tibet. An-drew Martin Fischer in his book, ‘State Growth andSocial Exclusion in Tibet: Challenges of Recent Eco-nomic Growth’ uses Chinese government statisticsto show how the polarizing dynamics of Beijing’scurrent drive to develop the Western regions ofChina, including Tibet, combined with the increas-ing influx of Chinese migrants into urban Tibetanareas, is leading to increasing exclusion of the indig-enous Tibetan population in the development oftheir land16.

‘Polarisation means that whatever small gains aremade in the rural economy or in education; thehurdles to access the dynamic sectors of theeconomy, concentrated in the urban areas and con-trolled by out-of-province companies or local Ti-betan elites, may nonetheless become ever higherfor rural migrants and the urban poor. In this man-ner, social exclusion can be understood as the darkside of current growth in the Tibetan areas. Povertythus is not merely an issue of remote communitiesstill trapped in some form of “ecological” destitu-tion, but rather, it is a dynamic integral to the veryprocesses of modernization within the Tibetan ar-eas, processes that are essentially determined by thestate.’17

This migration of Chinese into Tibetan areas is notabout ‘general population swamping’, but about‘short-term swamping of urban employment’.Where low-skill opportunities do exist within Ti-betan cities and towns, Tibetan rural migrants andthe urban poor are met by competition from Chi-nese migrants who possess, on average, much higherlevels of education and skills. The disadvantage ofless-educated Tibetans is compounded by lack offluency in Chinese and lack of connections withlarger regional commercial networks, which can becritical competitive factors in the lower-skill areas

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of the economy that are booming, such as services,commerce and tourism. These competitive factorsare compounded by the fact that most of the largeand medium-sized construction projects in the Ti-betan areas are contracted to out-of-province Chi-nese companies that mostly hire non-Tibetans.

The only option ahead to benefit both Tibetans,and ultimately the economy in Tibetan areas, is topursue a much more proactive, affirmative and pref-erential policy towards Tibetans, particularly withregard to the rural and urban poor, encompassingeducation, training, employment and business, andcombined with a variety of locally oriented infra-structure and service developments. Two larger policyinitiatives would address the challenges of both ex-clusion and growth in the Tibetan areas. The firstwould involve a massive expansion of social services,primarily in education and health care, but also invarious forms of social security. The other wouldinvolve a re-orientation of economic strategy to-wards local integration and ownership. These ini-tiatives could lead to an overall shift towards‘Tibetanising’ development.

Some local cadres and scholars, both Tibetan andChinese, together with national and internationalNGOs, are already promoting such ways forward.The question remains as Fischer18 states, ‘whetherthese efforts will be overwhelmed by the general trendof polarization in the regional economy, which ispushing rapidly towards a form of exclusionarygrowth that is simply not observed elsewhere inChina’.

In Tibet, Chinese migrants monopolise the incen-tives and benefits of the job opportunities and thentake all the income and wealth back to their homesin China, hence the income and the money doesnot generate the local economy. Even most of theneeds and products of their daily lives are providedby shops owned by Chinese shopkeepers and the

job markets of Tibetans falls to Chinese. After cer-tain years of working in China when those who havegrown rich migrant workers leave Tibet, the vacuumleft is replaced by fresh inflow of Chinese migrantworkers. This circle works in clockwise manner leav-ing no opportunity for the Tibetans workers to ob-tain experiences and enlarge their job scopes. Moreso, Tibet has become somewhat like a laboratoryfor Chinese workers to obtain professional experi-ences that will never stay in Tibet but move intocore regions of coastal area where it is more profit-able. In the long-term perspective this trend blocksthe emerging future Tibetans professionals or skilledworkers because of lack of space to grow and evolve.The explanation is that Tibetans are not trained andskilled workers, the chief reason is their lack of train-ing and professional expertise that can be acquiredthrough sound education in modern education thatthe Chinese Government is quite reluctant to do sogoing by providing low expenditure spending oneducation.

Quite strangely, the demographics of Chinese mi-grants tend to produce ‘subsidy parallelism’ (coined).According to this trend, the more there is inflow ofcentral funding and subsidies, the more Chinesemigrants tend to flock around in that particular re-gion looking at the prospects of incentives and ben-efits. The law of migration reveals higher subsidywith higher inflow of ethnic Chinese migrants, lowersubsidy with lower inflow of ethnic Chinese mi-grants.

For instance, the Qinghai-Tibet railway involves aconsortium of state-owned construction and engi-neering companies from around the country, manyfrom coastal areas. A single state-owned companyfrom Chengdu has constructed almost all of thenumerous bridges along the railway. ‘This use ofpublic development funds by Beijing or the prov-inces is therefore comparable to the US strategy ofusing lucrative defense contracts to subsidize many

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US businesses, such as in information technologyand aeronautics,’ writes Fischer19. ‘This logic is alsosimilar to the contracting of US funds for the re-construction of Iraq to US companies. The countryor region is constructed (or reconstructed), in oneway or another, however shoddily and almost de-spite the local population, but in the process own-ership in the economy is transferred to foreigners(in the case of the US in Iraq) or to non-Tibetanoutsiders (in the case of the “TAR” in China).’20

the practice of populationtransfer

In international law, population transfer is defineas”the moving of peoples [as] a consequence of po-litical and or economic processes in which the stategovernment or state authorized agencies participate.”Also in the Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Con-vention provides that “the occupying powers shall notdeport or transfer part of its own civilian populationinto the territory it occupies.” In recent times popula-tion transfer is seen as a tool to consolidate politicalcontrol over occupied ethnic minority regions inorder to achieve intended goal of linguistic, racialand cultural assimilation. Therefore the latest defi-nition of Geneva Convention, population transferincludes circumstances such as:

Demographic manipulation preceding orconsequent upon the formation of new Statesas part of the consolidation or integration ofstatehood, accompanied by measures aimed ateither balancing population density or at ethnichomogenization, or separatist apartheidtendencies; Transfer purportedly fordevelopment of other public purposes; theimplantation of settlers.

In this respect, the definition aptly suits the presentChinese practice of population transfer into Tibet.

For several thousand years, Tibetan people lived inharmony with their harsh and ecologically fragileplateau region with respect and moderate utiliza-tion of natural resources. The climate and geographiclandscape of Tibet could be an explanation for thesmall population of Tibet, dependent on their an-cestral farmlands for cultivation and keeping ani-mal livestock for meat and dairies.

Though PRC ratified the (ICSCER) in 2001 andthe Constitution of China promises the people withthe provision of economic, social and cultural rightsbut in reality the implementation of law is still a farcry from reality. For the Tibetans the real challengescome from the official interpretation of constitu-tional laws, where the said law is interpreted accord-ing to the interest and benefits favouring the ethnicHan Chinese and the guideline policies of the Com-munist Government.

The first waves of population transfer of ethnicChinese took place during the radical period of Maoera of 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. The most of Qinghaiand Gansu areas were populated during those eras.In those eras, the population consisted of commu-nist cadres who were supposed to develop Tibet andhelp the ‘Xizang’ brothers. The late reformer HuYaobang suggested to demobilize the communistcadres inside Tibet so as to make Tibetans the mas-ters of their own affairs in Tibet. The second waveof population transfer took place in mid 1980s dur-ing the reformed era of patriarch Deng Xiaopingwhere the impoverished western provinces of Chinalooked more west (Tibet) because commercial in-centives and benefits were given to the migrants toencourage their migration. Hence the transfer wasnot ‘voluntary’ in nature in a sense being directlyspearheaded and carried out by the government.Chinese scholar Wang Lixiong described migrantswho came in latter waves as ‘opportunist treasureseekers’.

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Migrant workers mainly the Hui Muslims and HanSichuanese involved in the construction of highwaysand railway lines. Leave aside the benefits of thesehuge infrastructure investments that are believed tobenefit Tibetans, the more so on the practicalgrounds the job opportunities and prospect of con-trolling contracts goes to Chinese. Therefore, Ti-betans are deprived of both immediate benefits aswell as long-term benefits of such developmentalprojects.

It was in the middle of 1980s that the large move-ment of ethnic Chinese began and which received agreat deal of impetus and endorsement from thegovernment in early 1990s. There are various rea-sons for the large exodus of Chinese into Tibet. Themost obvious ones was the population explosion inChina where it was felt by the Communist echelonsto lure them to resettle in the western regions likeTibet). Another prominent reason was the successof assimilation of ethnic Han Chinese in Xinjiangregion in jeopardizing the cultural and linguisticidentity of Uighurs who in the past rose up for sepa-rate independent country. The pro-independencemovements in Tibet further confirmed the Com-munist Government’s fear of Tibet breaking awayfrom their political stranglehold, in the Commu-nist jargon, “breaking up from the great familymotherland China.” In order to counter the ethnicuniqueness and identity of Tibet, the large-scalemobilization of population transfer took place un-der the cover of “Western DevelopmentProgramme” which still continues in full swing.

In the case of land and housing rights, where consti-tution says ‘land is owned by the State… can berequestioned for public purposes’. In the name of sup-posed development of Tibet, lands are arbitrarilytaken away from Tibetan commoners On the onehand the Chinese Government speaks about Tibet’sunique characteristics while the processes of devel-opment goes contrary to Tibet’s unique characteris-

tics. The developments of infrastructure such as high-ways, railway track and dams and water reservoirshave nothing to do with Tibetans since more than80% of them are nomads and peasants. So far, thedeprivation of Tibetan people’s fundamental landand housing rights, displacement and impoverish-ment take place in the name of development. China’squest for infrastructure developments in Tibet onlyserves the strategic political requirement of China,be it transporting the natural resources to China, tohasten the pace of population transfer or to materi-alize the sinicization of Tibet. The real developmentof Tibetan plateau is not based on a human centricdevelopment, of improvements in livelihoods,health care, education and housing sector by takinginto consideration the Tibet’s unique cultural, eco-logical and ethnographic characteristics.

The last decade witnessed extensive demolition oftraditional Tibetan buildings and construction ofnew Chinese apartment blocks on the demolishedcite. Not only did the Tibetans lose their ownershipof house and property, they were also not compen-sated and resettled properly. Even if Tibetans are tolive in the newly constructed buildings they have topay the rents. This phenomena is now not restrictedalone in Lhasa area but also prevalent in other partsof the ethnographic Tibet. Apart from wider posi-tive developments and improvement in the field ofinfrastructure there are negative impacts of theChina’s much claimed development and modern-ization of Tibet on the other side of the bank

According to demographic movements, much ofthe non-Tibetans settlers in Qinghai, Gansu andSichuan are largely permanent and settled however,in the case of “TAR” much of demographicmovements has been ‘floating population’, they comeand go.

The practice of population transfer naturally exertedpressure on the ancestral lands owned by Tibetan

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people as economic and infrastructure developmentstem in. With the overwhelming number of townsand cities flooded with ethnic Chinese grapping awayof economic opportunities, the authorities resortedto measures accommodating the population pres-sure on land and therefore, the land and propertiesof native Tibetans are being transformed into urbanconstructions. In the process the exercise amountsto legal inconsistencies in tackling the Tibetanpeople’s ancestral land and housing rights.

It is to be noted that the case studies that supportthe arguments are only from the testimonials takenfrom new refugees coming from Tibet and not fromany field research undertaken in Tibet. The disen-franchisement of Tibetan people’s land and housingrights stem from two fundamental principles, Ti-betan people’s deprivation of their fundamental rightto self-determination and the loss of total say overtheir economic and cultural affairs.

forced eviction anddisplacement

The People’s Republic of China has a reputation ofa large-scale displacement of people in many of itsdam projects. China has instituted new regulationsand compensation policies for the affected and dis-placed people, but so far the compensations wereseverely inadequate and, worse still, produced thou-sands of homeless people with ever increasing fig-ures of migrant workers mushrooming in big cities.In the case of ongoing construction of railway trackin Tibet, it is still not clear how many people areaffected, forcedly evicted, displaced, inadequatelyresettled and environmental and ecological damagesthat can directly affect the nomads and farmers inlong run.

The article 11 of ICESCRThe States Parties to present Covenant recognize

the right of everyone to an adequate standardof living for himself and his family, includingadequate food, clothing and housing, and to thecontinuous improvement of living conditions.The States Parties will take appropriate stepsto ensure the international co-operation basedon free consent.

Tibet is still an inaccessible area for independent re-searchers and foreign non-governmental organiza-tions to carry out investigative study. According tothe limited information TCHRD received fromtestimonies of new arrivals from Tibet, there arepotential areas of human rights violations concern-ing the illegal relocation of people without any ad-equate compensation and resettlement schemes.Particularly the deprivation of land and housingrights of Tibetan people are of great concern. In thecase of Tibet, the displacement take place for twomajor reasons, firstly the resettlement of Han eth-nic Chinese into Tibet and secondly to facilitate thedisplacement of Tibetans in the name of develop-ment.

In China’s White Paper on Human Rights releasedon 13 May 2005, it was declared that the policy ofdevelopment was people centric and putting peoplefirst. The White Paper also promised that “Docu-ment No.1, known as Opinions on Several Policies toPromote Increase of Farmers’ Incomes, which explic-itly stated that China must adhere to the strategy ofcomprehensive development of urban and rural areasand the principle of “giving more, taking less, and be-ing flexible”, and that it is a basic task to realize…”However in Tibet, this enshrined policy in WhitePaper is an alien concept in the actual implementa-tion and application.

The Article 17 of UDHR states that, (1) “Everyonehas the right to own property alone as well as in asso-ciation with others.” (2) “No one shall be arbitrarilydeprived of his property.”

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Lobsang Tashi, 20, told TCHRD,The Government didn’t do anything for them besidesgiving them compensation money. Therefore, most ofthe evicted families had to seek refuge in the homes oftheir relatives. All families who were evicted face anuncertain future the Government had also taken awaytheir farms and vegetable gardens on which their live-lihoods depended. Adding insult to injury was theorder by higher authorities not to construct their housein the manner and style of traditional Tibetan housesbut with square stones, sand and cement.21

Another case related to the forceful confiscation ofland took place in Dongmo Gang region in relatingto the construction of railway track.

Out of 40 householders in Dongmo Gang area 30householders lost their land to the Government. Thefamilies, which lost their lands, explained that thelands thus confiscated were ancient ancestral propertyand that the meager compensation money they hadreceived from the government was of little use to themin the long run explains Lobsang Tashi.

Another case of eviction is evidence d by the testi-mony of Tenzin22,

There were about 500 farming families in ChanzaCounty, Malho region, Tsongon Prefecture. They weredirected by the higher authorities to move to Shasangarea after the construction of Shawo Gag hydroelec-tric dam was finally completed in April 2004. TheChinese authorities did not inform the local inhabit-ants about the necessary safety procedures regardingthe dam. The dam was located between Chanza andYartse County and is about 10 km from ChanzaCounty. In no time the water level of the dam’s reser-voir rose and started encroaching on the farmlandsand houses. It has been several months since the evic-tion of local Tibetans to Shasang area took place, butstill there are many families who live without shelter.There are many who have taken shelter in the homes

of their relatives, while many in make shift tents pro-vided by the Government. They are paid 3000 Yuanper month as a stipend to sustain themselves. How-ever, those who stay in the homes of relatives have notbeen given a single penny though they have lost theirancestral property in the aftermath of the dam con-struction. Much to their dismay, the people realizedthat the government’s promises of providing housing,food and other facilities proved to be empty promises.The Government had based the monthly stipend toTibetans on their daily expenses prior to the displace-ment and beyond that they did not show any interestin their welfare.

A dispute erupted among the displaced Tibetans overthe ownership of land and water after the completionof the dam. The dispute has been going on for the lastfew months and is fast snowballing into a major dis-pute. However, the higher authorities were notpaying any attention or taking any step to settle thedispute. The Tsongon region houses some of Tibet’sbiggest hydro electric dams that were constructed de-cades ago but the Tibetans living in the vicinity of thebasin were still deprived of electricity in their homes.The electricity generated from the dams were light-ing the homes of Chinese villages in the MainlandChina. There still may be many Tibetan villages with-out any supply of electricity.

In the recently released White Paper on humanrights, the PRC claimed, “The government hasadopted measures to improve the farmers’ cultural,scientific and technological qualities, enhance theirability to increase their incomes, and improve theirproduction and living condition.” However, on theground reality, the Tibetan people are seriously de-prived of their land and housing rights. The affairsof their land and housing are governed and decidedarbitrarily by the higher Chinese authorities. Tibet-ans have no say over uses of their farms but insteadthey must conform to the wishes of CommunistParty leaders and their interpretation of laws.

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Since from ancient times the Tibetans depended ontheir traditional crop such as barley and wheat.However in recent times Chinese authorities wereimposing on the local Tibetan farmers in certain re-gions of Tibet to grow pasture and trees on limitedarable land, which is a deprivation of local Tibetans’source of survival and sustenance and is a seriousviolation of economic, social and cultural of theTibetan people. Due to this and other local factorsTibetans were facing the brunt of poverty and eco-nomic hardships under the “grand-to-green” policy.

The White Paper on human rights also claimed thatthe PRC is protecting the legitimate rights offarmers,

The government attaches great importance tothe protection of the farmers’ legitimate rightsand interests. In 2004, the governmentexamined compensation for and settlement offarmers whose collectively owned lands hadbeen requisitioned, and paid defaultedcompensation for land requisition totaling 14.77billion Yuan.

The ground realities faced by Tibetan farmers tell adifferent picture. The four new arrivals23,

Around spring 2000, the four villages of Tsering, Sachu,Laying and Deda (Bawa County) were chosen toimplement this policy. Chinese authorities summonedrespective village heads and common people for ameeting in which they were instructed to convert thefarmlands (on which the Tibetans had traditionallygrown wheat and Barley) into pastures. The affectedvillages are Tsering, Sachu, Laying and Deda in BawaCounty in Sichuan Province. They were told thatthey were misusing their lands by growing barley andwheat on them as it not only makes the soil infertilebut it posed the threat of floods to the Mainland China.Moreover, the authorities also ordered village leadersto further intensify their efforts to stop Tibetan peoplefrom cultivating wheat and barley. The village heads

were also informed that they would be held responsiblefor the success or failure of the above policy. They furtherclarified that since the Chinese Government was theowner of the land the people would have to obey tothe directives issued by the Government, failing whichthey would be punished.

The authorities promised the people that the ChineseGovernment would grant 200 Gyama (100 KG) ofrice every year to compensate them. After two months,the directive was also enforced in other villages. TheChinese Government gave six bags of grass seeds toeach family and forced them to cultivate the seeds ontheir lands. Only 2% of the total land owned byfarmers was left to them. At present most farmerscultivate radish, spinach and potatoes in this left overportion of their land. Those lands that were confiscatedwere forcibly planted with pine, eucalyptus and othertrees. However, the authorities did not make anyarrangements to have the plantations looked after.

As a result these people had to spend a lot of money inbuying ‘tsampa’ (barley flour) from the market, as thetsampa available at the market was very expensive.Moreover, the grant of the 200 Gyama (100Kg) ricewas arbitrary and without taking into considerationthe number of people in a family. For instance, in thecase of Mr. Tsultrim, they had four members in hisfamily and hence faced a great difficulty in sustainingfor a year on 100 KG of rice for a year.

The Chinese Government imposed an extra conditionthat the families must send their children to schoolfailing which they would be denied a share of theirrice by the Government. The interviewee PemaNgodup couldn’t go to school for a month and becauseof that his family was deprived of 50 Gyama (25 kg)of rice. The Tibetan people in the Bawa County havingbeen left with no other source of income collect ‘YartsaGumbu’ (caterpillar fungus used in medicinepreparation) during the summer, which fetched themsome money when sold in the market. It is with this

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income that they bought their clothes and other things.The deprivation of farmers’ right to self-determina-tion is another example of how China violates theTibetan people’s fundamental human rights. TheArticle 1 (2) of the ICSECR, which provides, “Allpeople may, for their own ends, freely dispose of theirnatural wealth and resource without prejudice to anyobligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual ben-efit, and international law. In no case may a peoplebe deprived of its own means of subsistence”.

education

In 2004, China produced their first magazine onHuman Rights titled Putting People First. The maga-zine hailed the developmental projects and improv-ing human rights condition in Tibet. The improv-ing state of education received praise and emphasisbut the claims of magazine (mouthpiece of Com-munist regime) stand stark contrast to the actualstate of education in Tibet.

In the White Paper on human rights claimed aboutthe progress and availability of education for Tibet-ans children,

“Education in ethnic-minority areas hasadvanced with great strides. The ethnicautonomous areas are key targets for the state’splans to basically make nine-year compulsoryeducation universal and basically eliminateilliteracy among the young and middle-agedpopulation”.

According to UNDP 2005 report, half the popula-tion in Tibet can actually read and write while over97 percent of Chinese people living in Beijing,Shanghai or Tianjin are literate. In the entire nationallevel, illiteracy rate for women is more than doublethat of men. In Tibet, less than 1.5 percent of Ti-

betan children go to junior high schools while inBeijing, Shanghai or Tianjin more than 60 percentof children go to junior high schools. In light ofthis, the need of spending in education is highly criti-cal if China really wants to bring development in-side Tibet.

In China today, Tibet remains one of the poorestregions with the lowest literacy rate. So far after theestablishment of the People’s Republic of China,development oriented, progressive and open-mindededucation has never been imparted in Tibet. Educa-tion in Tibet remained a sole repertoire for Com-munist regime to promote and impart ideologicaleducation to produce generation loyal to Commu-nist China, with a special intended goal of achiev-ing cultural sinicization and racial integrity with theethnic Han Chinese. One of the chief areas of edu-cation is history, where distorted version of Tibetanhistory is taught. Other branches of subjects areheavily loaded with socialist ideology and backward-ness of Tibetan race. A true education of real progressand human development is not being taught inschools for Tibetans. The kind of education pre-vails in Mainland China and one in Tibet has a seaof difference in terms of quality, contents and de-spite objectives.

In the post opening up of China as well as after theadvent of capitalist market economy in China, theTibetans are facing increasing frequency ofunaffordable tuition fee and the lack of proper in-frastructure and schools in the Tibetan inhabitedareas. Though the Chinese constitution stipulatesthat the primary education is free of cost. However,this seems not to be on the day-to-day livelihoodsof Tibetan commoners. The obvious effects of suchproblems are witnessed by flow of young refugeesto exile India to receive education. Their testimo-nies revealed the poor state of education in Tibetand the obstacles they faced in getting education.

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The seventeen-year-old Migmar Dolma from ToeTingri testifies the condition of education in hervillage.

My younger brother was also studying in theCounty school and we had to prepare meals forhim too. The school charged 350 Yuan per termand the expenses of a student for two termswould go up to 700 Yuan. Even with that feethe school did not provide lunch for the students.We are not the only ones who are strugglingwith poverty. In our Sungma Drongtsong villagethere are about forty families and almost all ofthem have difficulties and problems in theirday-to-day life. 24

Most men landed jobs as construction labourers,and most women were forced to work inNangma bars, discotheques and brothels. Theyearned their money by sleeping with theircustomers. Most of the parents in our villagehave a very low morale in sending their childrento Chinese Government schools. In the first casethe tuition fees are expensive and unaffordableby the local Tibetans, secondly the low marketvalue of Tibetan language and thirdly theextreme difficulty in finding jobs even afterfinishing the education. In today’s worldeducation alone is not enough, one needs to havemoney and muscle besides connection in the highplaces to get a job. Moreover the chances ofTibetan youth getting spoilt are very high. Theyhave no jobs at home and not getting any jobsat cities and towns, so they roam in streets, steal,involving in streets fights. Since parents knewabout these social problems they prefer not tosend their children to schools.25

It is necessary as well as mandatory for Tibetan stu-dents to integrate with the ethnic Chinese by takingup Mandarin as the official language or a mediumof instruction while Han ethnic Chinese in turn donot study Tibetan language. This goes against the

principles of the rights of the minority nationalitiesenshrined in Chinese constitution. Tsering Dorjee,31, a teacher from Rebkong Amdo petitioned againstsuch discriminatory practices in the school but endedup as a vain effort. He soon left the teaching job atMiddle Nationality School. Tsering Dorjee explains,

Though majority of the students were Tibetanthe medium of instruction was Mandarin. TheTibetan students were thus put into a lot ofdifficulties in putting extra efforts to learnMandarin. English was taught at school butonly for an hour daily. Tibetan was also taughtbut the Chinese students had the option ofstudying English during that time. Thispractically forced the Tibetan students to choosebetween their mother tongue and English whilea third language Mandarin was compulsory forthem. I realized that this policy of thegovernment was highly discriminative andbiased against both the Tibetan language andthe Tibetan students. I complained to the bodyin charge of the school affairs that the timedevoted to English and Tibetan was not enough.Even the students petitioned the authorities butour entreaties fell on deaf ears. I was hurt bythis unjust policy but more so on my helplessnessand resigned from the job.26

In September 1998 I joined TsongonNationality Editorial Board and studied therefor two years. After the completion of my courseI worked as an English teacher at Tsekhod countypublic school, which is meant only for thechildren of Chinese officials. I taught there fora year. After this I left my job so that I couldcontinue my studies on English at Trojangnationality school in Beijing. The tuition feesthere were high and hostels unaffordable formost. Therefore most students preferred to stayoutside by renting houses. I remained a studentof the school for three years during which I took

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four and half months of tuitions in English.However I had to quit the school before thecompletion of my studies as my family could nolonger afford to support me.27

An expert from Beijing also expressed similar viewon minorities’ nationalities and their languages,28

But in recent years the education in Tibet faces an-other challenge and this time the challenge is moresubtle and threatening. The challenges to their lin-guistic identity which is not crafted by Chinese au-thorities but a direct result of fast changing facets ofsociety and globalization of market economy in allparts of China. Although Tibet is remote yet she isnot exception to this threat. The demands of eco-nomic prosperity and importance of Mandarin lan-guage in day to day life is taking its toll on the sur-vival of the languages in many of the minority na-tionalities in China today. As Paul mooney re-ported,29

The education for common masses was non-exis-tent in the past Tibet. However, there was religiouseducation, which was only for Buddhist monks andnuns. For the ordinary masses even the traditionaleducation was not prevalent. In the feudal Tibet,the education was exclusively reserved for the sonsof aristocrats who would later take up administra-tive work like their fathers did in their lifetime. Tse

healthcare and aids

China’s White Paper on human rights released in2005 claimed, “China attaches great importance tothe health conditions of the people. The national publicmedical care network has been strengthened further”.

However, it seems that investment in rural areas arestill low and deficient. As UNDP reports of 2005highlights a need for more spending in sufficientpreventive health care, health education, planned

immunization and quick and effective responsesagainst the outbreak of epidemics like SARS andBird Flu diseases. In rural areas by 2004, only 15%of rural residents had medical insurance in 2004,where as half of urban population in China ben-efited from full insurance.

One of the most important pressing issue Tibetansface today is an urgent need to improve the healthcare of the Tibetan people particularly those Tibet-ans living in the remote regions and farming com-munities. There has been general tendency of a ne-glect and apathy for the health care needs of the Ti-betan people. Leave aside educating or promotinghealth related awareness such as one of HIV/Aidsamong the Tibetans, as of now even clinics are notavailable in the remote farming regions of Tibet.

It has been the case for many Tibetans that they haveto travel long distance to reach a hospital. The testi-mony of 35-years-old Bhuti is an example of thestate of health care in Tibet. Bhuti from Toe PhuringCounty testifies,

When I was 19, I contracted jaundice,fortunately our Tibetan doctor Rinchen latreated to jaundiceo some extent. I did all kindsof medication but with little effect. Then I wentto Government hospital, where the doctor toldme to stay at the hospital. I stayed there for amonth, but then it was too expensive to affordbedding charges at the hospital. I manage toget a recommendation letter from our Tibetandoctor Rinchen la to get free medical treatment.Unfortunately, the Chinese doctor didn’t lookat the letter and then I approached the mostsenior doctor in the hospital. The doctor declinedthe free medical treatment and said that if theywere to help all the poor people with freemedication then there are so many people tolook after. At that moment, I burst into tearsand wept bitterly. He then told me if I couldn’t

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afford bedding charges then I could rent a houseoutside. I rented a small room outside whoseowner was a Tibetan. I told him about myproblems and he allowed me to stay there atfree of cost. Since I am from a village I facedmany language and other problems. In total Ispent 1000 Yuan on all the medical expenses.After the medication I returned to home andstayed for a year. Unfortunately, the doctor hadnot given me a proper treatment last time, dueto which the illness relapsed again. When I wentagain to the hospital there was a new doctor inplace. He did some checking on my body andprescribed me a medicine for a month withouttelling me anything. It cost me around 600Yuan. He tested my blood and prescribed pillsfor a month, in total I spend 1300 Yuan. TheChinese doctor only prescribed pills and didn’ttell me anything about the disease andsymptoms. I wanted to press the doctor to tellme about my illness but then I don’t knowmandarin language. What else I could do? ThenI consulted a Tibetan doctor. I stayed in thathospital for a month where I received gooddiagnosis and treatment. The Tibetan doctorafter having known that I came from a pooreconomic background only charged me 60Yuan.

Once when I was helping my neighbor inrenovating the house, one of the beams fell onmy back and caused serious internal injuries.After that accident my pain relapsed again. Ispent around 10,0000 Yuan for the treatment.My relatives and friend helped me with thetreatment but I didn’t receive a single pennyfrom the Chinese Government. One truth Iwant to convey to the world is that the ChineseGovernment’s claim that they are looking andhelping the poor Tibetan people, is just afictitious lie in the broad day light. 30

In the 1960s Mao’s ‘barefoot doctors’ visited thehinterlands of China to look after the health care ofPeople. It was also the case in Tibet. That was onlymeans of health care in rural villages. Barefoot doc-tors were functioning as late as mid 1980s in fewrural hinterlands of Tibet. Though China has madegreat economic strides but still then health care forTibetans were deficient and lacking in the remoterural areas of Tibet. The health care infrastructurehas still not reached the Tibetan areas and there werealmost no trained Tibetan doctors. The equity ofopportunities among all nationalities seems to be apolitical euphemism. The lack of trained Tibetandoctors was a major cause for the rural health carecrisis.

Over the years, China has its strange battle againstAIDS pandemic. Melinda Liu a noted journalistwriting for Newsweek Magazine made a compre-hensive study of AIDS in China in 2004. In herarticle “The Blood Ties That Bind” Newsweek 2004has in it some of the alarming findings and howAIDS could wreak havoc in China if it continues toremain hidden under the carpet. At present, neitherthe Government nor any organization has any ac-tual statistic of people infected with AIDS in China.During the September 2002 press conference theGovernment revised the AIDS figure from previ-ous 850,000 to 1 million but many experts doubtedthe official figure. According to the United NationsTheme Group on HIV/Aids in China says that ifthe government does not take drastic steps to con-trol AIDS epidemic, the infection rate could leap to10,000 by 2010. U.N. health officials believe thatChina may have 6 millions people infected withAIDS.

Melinda Liu writes, “As of 2000, the most recent yearfor which figures are available, 51 percent of all knownHIV cases in China were in Yunnan, where the epi-demic first appeared and where 52 of China’s minor-ity groups are represented. An additional 37 percent

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of the cases were on the Central Asian frontier in theXinjinag Uighur autonomous region, where 62 per-cent of the population is non-Han…In both provincesepidemic has found perfect breeding conditions: anabundances of poverty, illiteracy, intravenous drugs andprostitution. China’s population is 91 percent Han,but according to UNAIDS, most HIV cases have beenamong the non-han minorities, including the Uighursof Xinjiang and the hill tribes of Yunnan.”31

The explosion of AIDS in Yunnan province andXinjiang Uighurs autonomous region was due toHeroin drag and drugs. In Yunnan province drugscome from Burma which were far more availableand cheaper than the ones found in the country. InXinjiang heroin comes from Afghanistan. The twoof the countries where poppies are growing andfrom where through borderland streets, drugs anddiseases are bred and transmitted across differentregions. Going by the histories of Xingjiang andYunnan regions, AIDS wouldn’t be that far away toreach and breed in Tibet since it has all the favourableconditions existing in these two minority regions.

Prostitution as an entertaining industry does not existin pre 1959 Tibet and to extend before the Dengreform period in Tibet. Liberalization and popula-tion transfer and inflow of migrants have contrib-uted the emergence of entertainment industry inTibet. Andrew Fischer argued that the massive pres-ence of military personnel and male migrant work-ers have led to a massive demand for commercialsex workers in Tibet. The Tibetan Bulletin32 argues,

“Despite a string of laws and regulations madeto prevent it, prostitution flourishes in Tibet.Karaoke bars, gambling halls and discos all legalunder the policy of economic reform provide abreeding ground for this booming trade.”33

For some years it was believed that sex workers inTibet were Chinese origins particularly from the

western hinterland regions of China but in recenttimes young Tibetan girls are also being dragged intothe booming and profitable entertainment sector.

Young Tibetan girls some as young as 13 or 14are also forced into this trade because ofwidespread acute poverty in the rural areas.Many move on to cities in search of a better life,but due to lack of education and Chineselanguage skills, they don’t fetch decent jobs toeke out living. The only employmentopportunity they find open to them is in theentertainment business “karaoke bars, gamblinghalls and discos” which eventually mires themin the world of prostitution.34

According to Melbourne based Macfarlane BurnetCentre, “…a large number of Chinese who indulgedin commercial sex hails from those areas of China whereAIDS is already widespread. They found that Lhasain particular has a rapidly growing sex industry withno public information, poor management and super-vision of Sexually Transmitted Disease and limitedavailability of condom. “Our fear is that unless appro-priate strategies are taken, Aids could blow out in Ti-bet in much the same way it has done in other devel-oping countries”, said Dr. Alison Morgan, liaison of-ficer of the task force, in the report.”

It is not difficult to envisage that AIDS could wreakpotential threat and dangers to Tibetans given loweducation and awareness programs on AIDS andprecautionary methods. In addition parts of Tibethas high illiteracy and rural poverty, which presentsideal ground for breeding AIDS epidemic unlesssome real efforts to control the disease is initiatedfrom the central government. The health in Tibet isstill basic and not in positions to deal with diseaselike AIDS. Tibetan people have every right to achieveand enjoy this kind of human development andawareness that is one of crucial areas of concern forChinese leaders.

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conclusion

Looking back at the 10th Five-Year Plan, the mostprominent achievement was the completion of rail-way track linking Beijing and Lhasa for the first timein history. The Dalai Lama remarked on the railwaytrack in Tibet,

Tibetans have reason to be afraid: A rail linkfrom China could swamp their dwindlingnumbers with Chinese ... My death would bea serious setback.35

The “Western Development Progam” had notbrought any significant positive changes and im-provements to the large section of Tibetan peoplewho are nomads and farmers. The review of the 10th

Five-Year Plan is underway and the progress reportof the 10th Five-Year Plan due on early 2006.

Strangely, on Xizang TV interviews and reports aredone in the remote rural areas of farming and no-madic regions of Tibet. The TV report focus onhow the “Creation of new socialist village commu-nity” has brought positive developments to the livesof rural Tibetan people. Ironically, Beijing quietlyaccepts that the construction of the railway has nopositive impact directly on the nomads and farmersand therefore to save the face of the 10th Five-YearPlan the TV propaganda of “The creation of newsocialist village community” appears to be launched.The rhetoric of the campaign was issued in 2003but now it seems that the rhetoric is the core focusof the 11th Five-Year Plan.

While on other hand a picture of development inTibet from limited testimonies of new arrivals fromTibet presents another version of development. Al-though this portion of people represents a negligiblegroup of people coming from Tibet but alarminglyalmost 100 percent of them came from rural back-grounds. This is an indication that rural areas of Ti-

bet remained underdeveloped compared to eco-nomic prosperity experiencing in the urban enclaves.

What is lacking in China’s development approach isa skillful means to deliver the fund and resourcesright in the hand of intended targets. If the invest-ment in infrastructure is given top priority then it isalso crucial and essential that a decent and consider-able priority in terms of spending and investmentbe equally poured in the rural areas for schools,health care, social security and promotion of ruraleconomy. In this context, China’s development strat-egy or policy needs to have a ‘human face’ and theoverriding emphasis should keep the interest andthe need of Tibetan people in the rural areas. Forthe last decade so much has been spent on urbanenclaves, perhaps now it is the turn of the rural areasand farming communities to receive equal attentionand support in economic matters.

Looking at development over many years, it seemsthat Chinese leaders have lacked their faith and trustin Tibetans in running their own affairs, be it ineconomy and grassroots matters. Chinese leadershiphas not utilised the potential talents and manpowerof Tibetan people. Perhaps the best way to developTibet is to hand over the decision-making powerand ownership back to Tibetans at least at thegrassroots level.

The 11th Five-Year plan draft carries the spirit of theThird Plenum meeting of 2003, which called for“putting people first” (Ch. yiren weiben). It seemsthat the 11th Five-Year plan has a heavy influence ofWen Jiabao’s slogan of ‘scientific ‘developmentalistview point’ in his long speech on 21 February 2004.He is largely believed to be pro-rural mass leader ofHu’s China. The ‘scientific developmentalist viewpoint’ raised two critical questions such as whatgovernment must do to ensure long-term economicgrowth will be sustainable and what must be doneto distribute wealth equally across broad sections of

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society. On the other hand the famous call of HuJintao for ‘creation of new socialist village commu-nity’ and a ‘harmonious society’ at the core heart ofthe 11th Five-Year plan. The rural policies are to stresson the new dictum of “extracting less, putting moreback in, and enlivening”. It also stressed nine-yearcompulsory education and revitalizing cooperativehealth system. On the positive note the 11th Five-Year plan for rural Tibetans of Tibet has its prom-ises in the spirit of the draft, as Barry Naughton inhis article ‘ The New Common Economic Progam:China’s Eleventh Five Year Plan and What It Means’has it,

‘The need to protect farmers’ land rights makestwo important appearances. First, farmers mustbe protected against the unfair exploitation oftheir land for development schemes supportedby local officials (who, it is left unsaid, may begetting rich off them). Second, the right offarmers to transfer use-rights to their lands mustbe ensured. This latter is designed to allowfarmers greater freedom in selling or leasing theirland in order to leave agriculture together.36

2005 marks the end of Tenth-Year plan and accord-ing to some sources the blue print of the 11th Five-Year plan carries policies that favours poor and un-derdeveloped regions of China. The equity in in-come distribution and to reduce the gap betweenthe rich and poor appears to the spirit of the 11th

Five-Year plan. If it is true then this will definitelybring positive changes and development in rural ar-eas of Tibet. There is some ominous sign of thischange of policy as the new “TAR” Party SecretaryZhang Qingli was shown in Xizang Television visit-ing the homes of rural households, listening to theirproblems and giving monetary help to families.Could these gestures be a new twist in economicpolicies that would kick-start after the announce-ment of 11th Five-Year plan in 2006 during the an-

nual meeting of National People’s Congress (NPC)in Beijing?

In last decade China was tremendously successful inattaining great economic development and stridesin the coastal and urban centres. The favourablepolices for urbanites and coastal entrepreneurs havecatapulted modern China in the forefront of eco-nomic power in the global arena. The challenge nowremain: can the Chinese leaders repeat the Midas’swonder for their poor kinsmen in rural country-side, interior hinterlands and on the margins to meetthe economic prosperity and boom enjoyed by theirkinsmen in the coastal regions? This is perhaps thegreatest challenge as well as the greatest contribu-tion of Communist Party in the 21st century China.The 11th Five-Year plan has in it the virtues to real-ize this goal, the question now is: can the Chineseleaders implement the spirit of the 11th Five-Yearproposals? Only then the rural and nomadic Tibet-ans can tread the roads of development and pros-perity in the long run.

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Notes

1. Her book Notes on Tibet (Ch. Xizang biji) was bestseller untilit was banned due to her treatments of sensitive issues of Tibetand praises for the Dalai Lama. The book was since beenbanned.

2. Sun Yat Sun, Development of China, 19213. China Through A Lens, www.china.org.cn 12/27/20054. http://hdr.undp.org/hd/5. Amartya Sen, Development As Freedom, Oxford University

Press, New Delhi, 1999, p.36. The statistics used in this chapter is referred from Andrew

Fischer, “Urban Fault Lines in Shangri-la”, DevelopmentDESTIN, June 2004 and Tibet Statistical Year Book, ChinaStatistics Press, 2001

7. Ibid.8. www.undp.org.cn9. Source: 2002 CSY, table 5-3, Andrew Fischer10. UNDP Resident Representative/ UN Resident Coordinator

in China11. www.undp.org.cn12. Andrew Fischer, Economic Dimension of Autonomy and the right

to Development in Tibet. 13. Team Leader from 1990 to 1995 of the “Human Development

Report” published by the UNDP.14. Asia Times Online, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/

GE12Ad01.html15. www.atimes.com16. “Official Chinese statistics show dramatic increases in

inequality in Tibet” http://www.savetibet.org/news/newsitem.php?id=760 June 14th, 2005

17. Andrew Martin Fischer, State Growth and Social Exclusion inTibet: Challenges of Recent Economic Growth, Nordic Instituteof Asian Studies Press, 2005.

18. Ibid.19. Ibid.20. Ibid.21. Testimony: TCHRD Interview22. Ibid.23. Tibet, Sherab Wangchen, 28, monk, Pema Ngodup, 10,

student, Tsultrim Dorjee, 30, farmer, Tsering Passang, 23, monktogether testified this testimony, TCHRD interview

24. Testimony: TCHRD Interview25. Ibid.26. Ibid.27. Ibid.28. Teng Xing an anthropologist at Beijing’s Institute of Ethnic

Education Studies summed up his views on the linguisticidentity crisis suffered by the minority nationalities, “Minoritylanguages and cultures are of no use in a market society. Minoritymay want to sustain their culture, but it is very difficult. In 10 to

20 years, minority languages in China will become languages onlyfound in museums. This is the reality.In the face of globalization, most minority parents aren’t sentimentalabout holding onto their native language. Chen Mingxiang, headof the education and human-development department at BeijingUniversity, says almost all the minority parents she interviews wanttheir children to be fluent in Mandarin. “Parents are more concernedabout survival”, says Chen. “And they can’t really see how theirchildren can survive if they don’t learn Mandarin as a way of life”

29. Paul Mooney writes in his article “Keeping Language Alive,”“The country’s ethnic minorities face a difficult decision. Whilelearning Mandarin may ensure their children’s future, it could costthem their cultural heritage” ... “On a recent afternoon deep inTibet’s mighty Kham Mountains, a tall monk in burgundy andsaffron robes stood before a dozen of students huddled together ina makeshift outdoor classroom. The lama then did something youdon’t see every often in China nowadays. He turned to roughblackboard, while his students fingered dog-eared textbooks, andbegan to write in Tibetan. “I want to teach the children ourlanguage”, the monk, Lobsang Choeden, would explain later. “Idon’t want them to lose their culture”. He might already be toolate. After 50 years of assimilation in a country run by communistmandarins, to most locals Lobsang’s Tibetan script is as foreign as aShakespeare’s sonnet.”

30. Testimony: TCHRD Interview31. Melinda Liu, “The Blood Ties That Bind,” Newsweek (Special

Issue), 2004, p.60, Para 2 and 332. Tibetan Bulletin, The official Journal of Central Tibetan

Administration, May-June edition, Vol.9, No.3 has discussedthe negative impacts of development boom in Tibet,particularly the flourishing sex industry. Also available at http://www.tibet.net/tibbul/2005/0506/environment. html,

33. Ibid.34. Ibid.35. Interview to The Economist, 31 Dec 200536. China Leadership Monitor No.16 Barry Naughton

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Tibetan schoolchildren are made to salute the Chinese flag as the Chinese national anthem plays intheir elementary school.

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introduction

The year 2005 marked the beginning of the UnitedNations Decade of Education for Sustainable De-velopment (2005-2014). Under that banner, theUnited Nations Educational, Scientific and CulturalOrganization (UNESCO) stated that,

Quality education is a prerequisite for educationfor sustainable development… Qualityeducation is locally relevant and culturallyappropriate; [it] is informed by the past (e.g.indigenous and traditional knowledge), isrelevant to the present, and prepares individualsfor the future… [It] should equip all people tobe fully participating members of their owncommunities and also citizens of the world.1

Meanwhile, in Tibet, 2005 was just one more yearwhere education was used to denigrate Tibetanculture, to indoctrinate students, to assimilate apeople, and to deny Tibetans any participation intheir own development. It is of concerns that, in adecade when such great concepts are being elabo-rated, the assimilation of a culture through its edu-cational system, what will inevitably lead to itsannihilation, is tolerated.

After fleeing into exile in 1959, the Dalai Lamaimmediately started working on the establishmentof a broad-based educational system combiningmodern education with preservation of traditional

Tibetan culture because he realized that, “The Ti-betan children are the seeds of our future Tibet.”2

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) also under-stood that the Tibetan children are the seeds of itsfuture Tibet.

In spite of its international obligations and in viola-tion of its own laws, since the invasion of Tibet in1949, China has been conducting an educationpolicy aimed at indoctrinating Tibetan students withcommunist ideologies and ultimately at totally as-similating Tibetans in order to secure the unity ofthe motherland. The education policies towards theTibetans have more than once radically changed ori-entation. Some changes that appeared positive werenever implemented due to a lack of funds that wasmost likely the result of a lack of will. However,since the political unrest of the late 1980s, Tibetanculture is seen as a threat to the territorial integrityof China; thereupon education in Tibet has openlybeen used as a tool of indoctrination aimed at elimi-nating that menace.

The year 2005 has witnessed no significant progressin the field of education in Tibet. On the contrary,Beijing has reasserted the indoctrination goal of edu-cation by strengthening the ideological content ofthe curriculum and has conducted the largest indoc-trination campaign since Mao’s death. The indoc-trination process goes hand in hand with the denialof Tibetan history and the denigration of Tibetanculture and religion through the education system

EDUCATION“The investment in children and mothers today will be the guarantor of the

well-being and productivity of future generations. Indeed, children are our most accurate measure of development.”– Carol Bellamy, UNICEF Executive Director, Dublin, October 1997

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to create the perfect conditions for the total assimi-lation of the Tibetan people.

No measures have been taken to preserve the Ti-betan language that is becoming useless since theChinese language dominates the economical andadministrative spheres in Tibet, thereby sideliningthe use and significance of the Tibetan language.“Patriotic education” campaigns and severe crack-down on religious education have left at least onemonk dead and have led to the largest peaceful pro-test since the political unrest of the late 1980s.

In spite of Beijing’s claims of increased investmentsin education in Tibet, it is still seriously underfunded, particularly in rural areas where 87 percentof the Tibetan population lives. This can be seen bythe lack of schools, which creates widespread dis-tance problems, and by the terrible condition of theschooling facilities that exist. The quality of teach-ing is also very low, in part because of the absence offinancial incentives for teachers. Rural schools mustcharge fees to make up for the deficient funding;consequently, parents must pay exorbitant amountsto provide their children with inadequate education.Those fees are a huge drain on poor rural families’incomes, who can often afford to educate only onechild. Thus, education is still unavailable and inac-cessible to the vast majority of Tibetans despite thehigh official enrollment figures presented by Beijing.

On top of failing to provide an adequate educationto Tibetan children, in 2005 China increased its ef-fort to prevent them from getting a quality broad-based education in exile. Beijing has taken opportu-nity of the uncertain political situation in Nepal toincrease its leverage in Kathmandu in order to gainthe collaboration of the Nepalese authorities in curb-ing the flow of refugees. Border patrols have alsobeen increased along the Tibet-Nepal border to stopthe exodus of refugees.

In short, Tibetan children are denied any way to getan all-round education in accordance with their be-liefs. In the beginning of a decade where qualityeducation is widely promoted, they are refused abroad-based education that would give them toolsto participate in the development process occurringin their own country. They are simply left out andare relegated to the status of second-class citizens,increasingly diluted in an ever-growing Chinesepopulation.

Beijing has still to understand that the improvementof education in Tibet does not merely require in-creased funding; it requires a complete change oforientation based on a recognition of the worth ofTibetan culture and on a sincere desire to accordTibetans the basic right of self-determination asguaranteed in the international laws or a meaning-ful autonomy as provided by China’s Regional Na-tional Autonomy Law, instead of aiming at makingthem dependent on China.

PRC’s obligations

The People’s Republic of China is bound by vari-ous international treaties and covenants it has signedand ratified, and by national laws it has adopted sinceits formation in 1949, to provide a sound educa-tion to all its citizens.

international commitments

Various international treaties bind China to providea quality education to its citizens. By being a per-manent member of the United Nations, China isobligated to respect the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights (UDHR) and the Declaration onthe Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Eth-nic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. China hasfurthermore signed the International Covenant on

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Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which it hasstill to ratify. It has ratified the Convention on theRights of the Child (CRC) in 1992 and the Inter-national Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cul-tural Rights (ICESCR) in 2001.

All these treaties and covenants stipulate that everyhuman being, without discrimination of any kind,has a right to education. Education shall be aimedat the full development of the human personality.Parents also have the recognized right to choose edu-cation for their children in accordance with theirown beliefs and convictions. This education shouldbe free and compulsory at least in the primary stageand further education shall be encouraged and madeavailable to all on the basis of merit.3 The CRC andICESCR further state that States Parties shall en-courage the development of different forms of sec-ondary education and make them available to all byevery appropriate measure.4 The CRC finally addsthat states parties shall “take measures to encourageregular attendance at schools and the reduction ofdrop-out rates [and] take all appropriate measuresto ensure that school discipline is administered in amanner consistent with the child’s human dignity.”5

Moreover, these treaties have provisions for freedomof movement within one’s country, for freedom toquit and return to one’s country and provisionsagainst torture and degrading treatment towards anyhuman being.6 The ICCPR and CRC also containprovisions stating that persons belonging to minori-ties shall not be denied the right to practice theirown culture and speak their native language.7

Finally, under the Declaration on the Rights of Per-sons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious andLinguistic Minorities, China should protect the ex-istence of the Tibetan minority and should provideTibetans with an opportunity to learn their mothertongue. China should also promote the knowledgeof Tibetan history, tradition, and culture.8

domestic legislations

Some of the principles expressed by these interna-tional treaties are reflected in the Constitution ofChina and in its laws. China’s Constitution of 1982recognizes education as a right and as a duty thatshould be aimed at the all-round development ofchildren. It also asserts that the state makes primaryeducation compulsory and universal, and that sec-ondary, vocational, and higher education are beingdeveloped.9 China’s Education Law of 1995 addsthat all citizens shall enjoy equal opportunities ineducation and defines compulsory education as be-ing nine years. It states that measures must be takento ensure that school-age children can attend school.It also stipulates that in a school where a minorityethnic group forms the majority, the minority lan-guage can be used for instruction.10

China’s Compulsory Education Law adds that com-pulsory education shall be free, that a system ofgrants shall be established for poor students, andthat conditions must be created so that all school-age children can attend school. It also stipulates thatschools must be established at such locations thatstudents can attend school near their home, and thatappropriate facilities for education must exist in bothurban and rural areas.11

China’s Higher Education Law, adopted in 1998,affirms that the State supports the development ofhigher education in minorities’ areas with the goalof training specialists among them and that it takesmeasures to permit minority students and poor stu-dents to receive higher education.12

Lastly, China’s law on Regional National Autonomystipulates that self-government of national autono-mous areas shall decide on the plan for education,on the curriculum and on the language used in edu-cation and should use textbooks in their native lan-guage.13

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flaws in chinese laws

However, as mentioned by the former United Na-tions Special Rapporteur on Education, Ms. KatarinaTomaševski, after her mission to China in 2003,“China’s law does not yet conform to the interna-tional legal framework defining the right to educa-tion.”14 Some internationally recognized rights thatshould be reflected in China’s laws are still absent.For example, the right of parents to choose an edu-cation for their children according to their convic-tions and the right to impart education are not rec-ognized. Religious education is still prohibited bylaw15. Moreover, the notion of all-round educationtakes a totally different sense in Chinese laws. TheEducation Law mentions that education must servethe socialist modernization drive by training build-ers and successors for the socialist cause, and thatthe State conducts education in patriotism, collec-tivism, socialism, and stresses the importance ofnational unity.16 The Compulsory Education Lawadds that the quality of education must be improvedto achieve all-round development to create buildersof socialism, and that teachers must be dedicated tothe cause of socialist education.17 The Higher Edu-cation Law stipulates that teachers must have a soundideology and that students must “diligently studyMarxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought andDeng Xiaoping Theory” and must have sound ide-ology.18 Finally, the law on Regional National Au-tonomy stipulates that the self-governments of au-tonomous regions must promote the virtues of lovefor the motherland and for socialism and conducteducation in patriotism and communism.19

Besides, the provision of the Education Law thatspecifies that the native language of an ethnic groupcan be used if that group constitutes the majority inthe school offers no protection to Tibetans in faceof the intensive population transfer presently occur-ring in Tibet. As soon as the Tibetans stop being themajority in a school, the Tibetan medium of in-

struction can lawfully be eliminated. In addition,Chinese laws on education permit school factories20

in which children may be forced to perform manuallabor during their class hours. Fees can also be col-lected by schools to cover various expenses, makingfree compulsory education far from being free forthe poorest citizens, a category in which most ruralTibetans can be found. Finally, Chinese laws alsostipulate that local authorities are responsible forcompulsory education and that they should encour-age individuals to make donations to pay for educa-tion21, which creates various problems that will bepresented later.

The implementation of the education policies inTibet is even further from the internationally rec-ognized rights regarding education since China isknown for not even applying the laws it gives itselfand not respecting the Constitution it is based on.Liu Kang, Professor of Chinese Cultural Studies andDirector of the Program in Chinese Media andCommunication Studies at Duke University, de-scribed China’s constitution as “a joke in China be-cause by and large they just ignore it.”22

brief history of educationin Tibet

To understand the current status of education inTibet, it is necessary to look at the different stages itwent through. The education system in Tibet canbe traced as far back as the seventh century, when anofficial system of religious education initially ap-peared. Later, in the mid-ninth century, the firstmonasteries were founded, introducing an institu-tionalized form of education. From that point on,most of the education in Tibet was religious; therewere only two non-monastic government-runschools in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet. Secular edu-cation was based on private tutoring, had no centralcurriculum, and was mostly reserved for the elite.

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The teaching tradition was passed from generationto generation. After the British invasion of Tibet in1904, the 13th Dalai Lama tried to establish new layschools but it failed due to resistance from the clergyand the traditional elite.23

This was the picture in Tibet when China invadedin 1949. Soon after the invasion, China forced Tibet’sofficials to sign the 17-Point Agreement, recogniz-ing Tibet as an inalienable part of China. Even thisagreement, imposed by the threat of arms on Tibet,had provisions for the respect of its culture and reli-gion, and for the improvement of education.24

However, both sides revoked that treaty in 1959,after interference by the Chinese government cre-ated unrest in Tibet and the flight of the Dalai Lamainto exile in India.

Under Chinese rule, education policies in Tibetswung between two extremes: “quality” or “expert”,which emphasizes academic and technical education,and “quantity” or “red”, which prioritizes ideologi-cal education of the masses. During the early 1950s,the quality approach was prominent. The idea wasto use education to create local experts who wouldhelp the development of Tibet. During Mao’s GreatLeap Forward of 1958-1959, the quantity approachdominated. Mao thought that massive indoctrina-tion would create ‘the socialist constructors’ ofChina. The Lhasa uprising of 1959 was a confirma-tion to Mao that ideological indoctrination wasnecessary for the unity of the motherland. How-ever, in the early 1960s, Mao’s influence brieflywaned and the quality approach promoted by DengXiaoping reemerged. But Mao quickly secured hispower and implemented his Cultural Revolution(1966-1976), one of the darkest periods of Tibetanhistory. All culture-specific education was abolished;the children from elite families were sent to workin the fields, while mass indoctrination of peasants,workers and soldiers was the priority.

After Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping was re-habilitated and re-implemented his quality approach,which he thought was needed to create experts thatwould lead China’s economic development. But thequality approach, which seems better at first view,also had its drawbacks for Tibet. Since the goal wasto quickly create experts to bring China to the levelof developed countries, emphasis was put on devel-oping further the already advanced regions. This tac-tic favored developed provinces over underdevelopedprovinces, urban education over rural education, eliteover mass education and higher over basic educa-tion; Tibet and the Tibetan people were far frombeing primary targets for these reforms in educa-tion.25

Nonetheless, during the decade following Mao’sdeath, recognition was given to minorities, includ-ing Tibetans, and they were encouraged to preserveand develop their own culture and language. TheFirst and Second Work Forum on Tibet, respectivelyheld in 1980 and 1984, promoted the improvementof conditions in the “Tibet Autonomous Region”(“TAR”) and the improvement of education. As aresult, Tibetan-medium primary education wasimplemented, and later plans were made to expandTibetan-medium education to the secondary levelbut were never put into practice. However, after thepolitical upheaval in Lhasa in 1987, 1988, and 1989,the climate changed. Tibetan culture came to be seenas nationalist and associated with separatist tenden-cies. “Patriotic re-education” campaigns have beenconducted in the “TAR” since 1996.

The Third Work Forum on Tibet, held in 1994,reversed the policies of the two previous work fo-rums. It was soon followed by the Fifth Confer-ence on Education, where allegiance to the mother-land became the main goal of education; accord-ingly, the curriculum was modified to emphasizeloyalty and stability.26 During this conference, ChenKuiyuan, then “TAR” Party Secretary, said:

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the success of our education does not lie in theNo.of diplomas issued… It lies, in the finalanalysis, in whether our graduating studentsare opposed to or turn their hearts to the Dalaiclique and in whether they are loyal to or donot care about our great motherland and thegreat socialist cause.27

current scenario

No major shift in policies has occurred since theThird Work Forum on Tibet; education in Tibet isstill seen as a tool of indoctrination, to be used againsta potentially threatening minority, in order to se-cure the unity of the motherland. Tibetan cultureand language are seen as a threat to national unity;consequently, Tibetan language is barely taught inschool and Tibetan history is not only absent fromthe curriculum, but totally denied. The goal of suchpractices is of eventually entirely assimilating Tibet-ans. Despite this immoral goal, education still re-mains unavailable and inaccessible to most Tibet-ans.

Beijing’s claimed success of its current educationpolicy in Tibet can be demonstrated with a few fig-ures. According to the most recent statistics avail-able at the moment of writing, the illiteracy rate inthe “TAR” is rising despite Beijing’s alleged increasedspending on education in rural areas. The illiteracyrate in the “TAR” rose to an alarming 54.9% in2003, a 10% increase over 2002.28 It is nearly sixtimes the national average. “In the job market, Ti-betans compete with Han migrants who graduatefrom universities at more than triple the rate of Ti-betans, and from senior middle school at five timesthe Tibetan rate.”29

Besides, “Tibetan employment in the public sector,the fastest-growing and highest-paying part of theeconomy, is falling.”30 The domination of the Chi-

nese language only marginalizes Tibetans and fur-ther deprives them of any participation in the eco-nomic life of Tibet. Because of this, “even a poorChinese migrant, with no particular skills, wouldbe significantly more advantaged in the urban labourmarket due to his or her fluency in Chinese.”31 Thecompletion of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway will onlymake the matter worse and further marginalize Ti-betans by bringing a huge influx of Chinese migrants.

education or indoctrination?

Beijing has two education policies: regular educa-tion (zhenggui jiaoyu) for the Han majority, whichaims at technically training the personnel requiredfor China’s rapid economic development, and mi-nority education (minzu jiaoyu) for the ethnic mi-norities, which consists of inculcating allegiance tothe motherland.32

In 2005, Beijing was dedicated more than ever topursue its policy of using education for propagandaand for securing allegiance to the motherland. In aspeech made in January 2005, Zhou Ji, ChineseMinister of Education, congratulated his officialsfor the achievements of 2004 in effectively strength-ening ideological education. He also declared that,one of the major areas in which his department willconcentrate in 2005 is to “strengthen and improveideology and ethnic education for primary and sec-ondary school students and ideology and politicaleducation for college students.”33 Furthermore, inJanuary 2005, China launched its greatest mass-in-doctrination campaign since the Cultural Revolu-tion. The campaign called “advanced education” aimsat inculcating Communist ideology to 69 millioncommunist members in Maoist-style ‘study sessions’and ‘self-criticisms.’34 “The campaign also extendsto universities, where compulsory classes on ideol-ogy and morals will be required for all first-year stu-dents.”35

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Despite the claim by Beijing that “Organs of self-government of autonomous areas determine theeducational plan, the establishment of schools,school system, the forms by which schools are run,curricula, language of teaching and method of en-rollment”36, various reports published or presentedduring 2005 by renowned organizations illustrate avery different situation. The Congressional-Execu-tive Commission on China (CECC) stated in its2005 annual report that, “in practice the centralgovernment strictly controls the content of teach-ing materials in minority classes to ensure ‘the properunderstanding of nationality relations and advancedsocialist thinking.’”37 In its report submitted to theUnited Nations in February 2005, the US-basedTibet Justice Center mentioned that “[b]eyond thecore subjects… much of the curriculum aims toindoctrinate Tibetan children in China’s version ofsocialism and in the idea that Tibet is an integralpart of China.”38

Refugee Tenzin Yangzom, 18 years old, fromLingnup Village in the “TAR”, gave a glimpse ofhow the education system in Tibet promotes theall-round development of the child. She said thatduring her three-year-only primary schooling,

the textbooks used were composed by Mao. Wewere studying them chapter by chapter. Apartfrom these books, we were only learning reading,writing and basic mathematics.39

Refugee Tashi Gyamtso, 20 years old, from Amdo,added,

even when teaching us Tibetan languagegrammar, the teachers were using sentences tomake us love China. We were constantlybrainwashed to love China as the motherlandof Tibet.40

Moreover, since the 1990s, “patriotic education”campaigns have been introduced in Tibet. Theystarted in the monasteries but soon extended to layschools. Under the campaign, schoolchildren aged7 to 13 are told that Tibetan Buddhism is a “back-ward behavior and obstacle to progress.”41 Tibetanstudents must also renounce the Dalai Lama, pledgeallegiance to the motherland, assist in Chinese flagraising and lowering ceremonies, and sing China’snational anthem. These “patriotic education” cam-paigns are still active. Anu, an ex-political prisonerwho managed to get a job as Chinese languageteacher in a private school because of family con-nections, told TCHRD,

In October 2004, the government authoritiesissued a directive to conduct “patriotic education”classes in the schools in Lhasa. The head of theschool told me [to] take the classes on “patrioticeducation” and handed me a booklet from thegovernment as a guide. The booklet containedchapters on “criticizing the Dalai separatistclique” etc… instead of preaching patriotism tothe state, I began to tell the students about myexperience in detention in the late 1980s andthe torture inflicted on Tibetan prisoners inprisons.42

The indoctrination process has reached a frighten-ing point where people from a community spy oneach other. Anu continued,

The students upon return to their home in theevening had told their families about thelecture. My friends informed [me] that the PSBofficers were looking for me and the followingday, I fled to Shigatse where I stayed at a friend’shouse undercover for a few months. On 19February 2005, I began my journey into exileleaving my wife and children behind.43

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assimilation through education

The use of education for indoctrination goes be-yond creating loyalty to the motherland; it aims atassimilating the Tibetan people and eliminating itsdistinct culture. The revival of nationalism and reli-gious activity, as soon as the oppression of the Cul-tural Revolution was relaxed, convinced the Chi-nese authorities that the generation of Tibetans thathad known independence could not be won over.Its deep-rooted allegiance to the Dalai Lama, its faithin its one-and-a-half-millennium-old religion, andits belief in the worth of its own culture were justtoo strong. Thus, Beijing’s only hope for assimila-tion has been residing in gaining the ‘hearts andmind’ of the next generation, by making them Chi-nese instead of Tibetans.

The policy adopted by China to secure the unity ofthe motherland is to get rid of any distinctivenessamong its people. Since paranoia seems to be a ma-jor trait of communist governments, what wouldbe safer for a paranoid central government than 1.3billion people who deeply believe they are Chinese?Accordingly, the minority education policy goesmuch further than inculcating socialist and com-munist ideology; Beijing is making an “increasinglyblunt effort to assimilate Tibetan children throughthe educational system.”44

How can a Party that destroyed its own culture inthe name of a new ideology respect the culture of aminority it considers backward? Tibetan culture isseen by China as an impediment to development.Yang Wanli, a Chinese scholar wrote, “If a moun-tain has a mountain spirit, then reclaiming and cul-tivating or excavating minerals are not permitted onit; if a lake is a holy lake, then building or movingearth are not possible.”45 Furthermore, since theunrest of the late 1980s, Tibetan culture is perceivedas ‘splittist’, what has fostered Beijing’s determina-tion of making it a thing of the past.

As mentioned by the former Special Rapporteur onEducation, if a majority does not recognize the worthof a minority culture, its education policy can onlybe seen as assimilationist.46 And for China, the onlyvalue of Tibetan culture is to bring fresh touristdollars, which is probably not the sense of worthmeant by the Special Rapporteur.

In the aim of assimilating the next generation, Ti-betan history and culture are not only absent fromthe curriculum; they are formally denied and deni-grated. Tibetan students reported that they learned“about Chinese culture, history and politics. Tibetanhistory, by contrast, received at best a few token ref-erences. For the most part… school teachers andstaff ignored, denigrated, prohibited and at timespunished references to Tibetan culture.”47 In Febru-ary 2005, the Tibet Justice Center reported to theUnited Nations Committee on the Rights of theChild that,

Primary schools generally respect and celebrateChinese holidays. But Tibetan holidays areignored, and celebrating them is discouragedand even banned… A boy from Kham reportedthat if students wore traditional Tibetan garbto school, they and their parents would bearrested, and a girl from central Tibet reportedthat she had been harassed by school authoritiesfor doing so. In at least one primary school inLhasa, teachers beat students for singing Tibetansongs.48

This formal denigration of Tibetan culture gener-ates a sense of Chinese supremacy and an inferioritycomplex among many Tibetans. This superior/in-ferior relation in turn breeds racism. A number ofyoung refugees have complained about the discrimi-natory attitude of their Chinese classmates. For ex-ample, refugee Gyalpo Dhondup, 23 years old, toldTCHRD,

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There is a feeling of hatred between Chineseand Tibetan students, and the Chinese studentslook down on Tibetan students’ way of life. 49

Since the invasion of their country, Tibetans are notan independent people anymore; they are a minor-ity diluted in the most populous state of the world.“To ensure these populations’ right to education,efforts must be made to devise solutions that willenhance inclusive education while respecting diver-sity and intercultural sensitivity.”50 On the contrary,on top of denying Tibetan students their history andculture, Beijing aims at total assimilation by send-ing the best primary school students to study inmainland China, where they are further brainwashedto become Chinese. “Since 1990, almost half thenew intake of Tibetan secondary students each yearhas been sent to be educated in China.”51

Yeshi Tenzin, a 28-year-old former school principalfrom Tenkhar Village, Driru County said on thissubject,

the Chinese Government has a policy of sendingthe best students of primary schools to Beijingfor further studies. This only makes the mattersworse by changing the habits of those Tibetanstudents precisely as the Chinese are. For thatreason, those children are called ‘second Chinese’upon their return from Chinese schools. Thispolicy on education of the Chinese governmentonly aims at the extinction of the distincttradition and language of the Tibetan people.52

Indeed, some of these ‘second Chinese’ will later beimplementing Chinese assimilationist policies ontheir own people. No wonder why ProfessorDungkar Lobsang Trinley, one of the leading Ti-betan scholars, recognized by China as a nationaltreasure, worried, “Tibetans are in danger of beingassimilated. We have reached this point.”53

Tibetan language endangered

Every language possesses the subtle nuances for de-scribing the reality of its particular people. It is of-ten the most important element of a culture; theone by which a culture is defined, propagated, andpreserved. Therefore, the best way to destroy a cul-ture is to destroy its language first.

The language policy to be used in education in Ti-bet has been a highly disputed subject, especially inthe 1980s, when two schools of thought developed.The first one advocated extending teaching in theTibetan medium, which was already used in pri-mary schools, to secondary schools and higher edu-cation, whereas the second favored the introductionof Chinese in primary schools. In the 1980s, underthe first approach, plans were adopted to introduceTibetan-medium education in secondary schools,and tests were made in the 1990s. But despite evi-dent success, it was never implemented.54 The ma-jor reasons are, that after the turmoil of the late1980s, the Tibetan language became associated withnationalism and separatism, what undermined anyefforts aimed at its preservation, and also that Chinaconsiders “the teaching of Tibetan in schools [as] adrain on government resources.”55 In 1997, the sec-ond approach won the battle when Chinese wasmade mandatory, as a second language, in primaryschools.56 This kind of practice has been decried bythe newly appointed United Nations Special Rap-porteur on Education, Vernor Muñoz Villalobos,who wrote, “Homogeneity in education is an im-possible undertaking. Pressure to entrench the useof one language for all peoples, for example, is asign of intolerance.”57

The current situation in Tibet varies from region toregion since the policies decided by Beijing are of-ten implemented with local flavors. However, themain pattern in rural areas is that children make theirprimary schooling mostly in Tibetan medium and

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learn Chinese as a second language from grade one.But according to refugees, the teaching of the Ti-betan language is of very poor quality. Much moreemphasis is put on the Chinese language but theteaching methods are maladapted to the Tibetan stu-dents for whom Chinese is a second language. Refu-gee Choedak, 17 years old, told TCHRD, “Apartfrom two periods in a week to teach three subjects,the entire school schedule is dedicated to teachingChinese language.”58 Refugee Gyalpo Dhondupadded, “Even though we have many Chinese classes,the basics are never taught.”59

In urban areas, where both Chinese and Tibetan pri-mary education are available, parents are faced withthe heartbreaking decision of sending their childrento a Tibetan school, where they will at least learnthe only element of their culture that is still taught,or to a Chinese school that will offer them oppor-tunities. Parents must choose between past and fu-ture for their children.

For the few Tibetans who complete their primaryschooling and enter secondary schools, the transi-tion is a shock. Secondary and further education arein Chinese medium only. Tibetans must thereuponcompete against native Chinese speakers for entranceand for grades. To be statistically considered literatein Chinese, one must know 1500 characters, buteven with 2000 characters, one cannot even read anewspaper.60 Since Chinese is such a hard languageto master, Tibetan children are left behind. Thosewho enter secondary schools cannot understand thecourse’ content due to the language barrier. Theyare considered retarded and ridiculed by their Chi-nese classmates, and they lose any interest in school.A refugee from Amdo said,

I couldn’t understand Chinese well enough tolearn another subject through it, so I had tokeep asking the teacher for help again and again.Many of the Tibetans in the class were like me,

and when we didn’t understand the teacher,the other Chinese students would laugh andcall us ‘stupid Tibetans’ and ‘dirty Tibetans’.Pretty soon we gave up asking for help, and justsat there, waiting to fail.61

Refugee Tenzin Norbu, 14 years old, from Lhasa,told TCHRD,

The medium of instruction was Tibetan up tograde three and after it became Chinese. It wastoo difficult to learn through Chinese medium,so I lost interest in studying and my grades wentdown. I was unable to study in Chinesemedium. I dropped school in grade four for thatreason.62

Furthermore, the intensive population transfer prac-tices of China made fluency in Chinese Mandarin aprerequisite for most jobs. In today’s Tibet, despiteofficial recognition of the Tibetan language underthe Regional Ethnic Minority Law and various otherlaws and regulations, “[t]he existing real workinglanguage in Tibet is Chinese, for government, forbusiness, and for day-to-day activities.”63 The Ti-betan language has become useless in a Chinese-dominated economic and social life. “In the citiesand county headquarters there are serious cases ofpeople being unable to speak Tibetan, although boththeir parents are Tibetans.”64 The situation of writ-ten Tibetan is even worse. Refugee Yeshi Tenzinsummed up the situation,

Our local language is becoming useless in ourown country. For example, in primary andsecondary schools [in his region], all subjects aretaught in Chinese language. Therefore, childrenmust put more emphasis on learning Chinesein order to obtain better grades during exams.They do not gain anything from working hardon studying the Tibetan language.65

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Moreover, to this day, the Tibetan language is stillseen as a major source of nationalism. It is consid-ered unpatriotic to study it and to work at its pres-ervation. The Chinese contempt of the Tibetan lan-guage is reflected in the fact that even Tibetan pris-oners are denied the use of their language in jail;they are told that, “Tibetan is redundant and that itis not spoken or recognized by anyone in theworld.”66

The language policy adopted in education goes handin hand with the denial of Tibetan culture and his-tory in the education curriculum. By settling moreand more Han Chinese in Tibet and by making theirlanguage the economic and social language, Beijinghas relegated the Tibetan language to a tongue ofthe past that has no use in present-day Tibet. This isa major threat to Tibetan culture:

You don’t have to burn books to destroy a culture.Just get people to stop reading them.

-Ray Bradbury

rural areas forgotten

Despite the shameful goals of indoctrination andassimilation given to education in Tibet, it is stillunavailable to most Tibetans. According to CECC,87 percent of Tibetans live in rural areas67, yetChina’s investments in education are concentratedin urban areas where most Chinese migrants settle.68

Without proper education, rural Tibetans are con-demned to lag behind, without any tool to partici-pate in their own development.

Even though Beijing claims that, in 2004, the fund-ing of compulsory education in all rural areas ofChina was increased by more than 70% to 10 bil-lion Yuan, compared to 5.8 billion Yuan for 200369,lack of funding is still a major source of problemsin rural areas. Rural education harshly suffers from

under funding because it has been downshifted tolocal communities; therefore, very few schools areestablished in the countryside. Students must travelfor long periods of time to reach the nearest school.Refugee Tenzin Yangzom said,

The students from the villages of Yomto,Khagsar, Yoesha, Shingti, and Lingsha had tocome to my school for grades 4 to 6 since theschools in those villages offered only grades 1 to3. To reach the school, many had to walk overthe mountains for one day.70

This problem was, in some areas, addressed by es-tablishing boarding schools. However, according tovarious refugee testimonies, in these boardingschools nothing is provided; the children must bringtheir food for the whole week, and sometimes theymust also carry supplies necessary for the schooloperation. In some cases, they even have to pay rentfor the room. Refugee Tsomo Thar, 23 years old,explained,

The school provides hostel facilities for thosewhose homes are far away but the students haveto pay 45 Yuan each term. Moreover, the mealsand edibles have to be brought from theirrespective homes… In winter days, studentsthemselves have to bring the fire wood from theirown home for the purpose of producing fire inthe classroom to keep them warm.71

Refugee Choedak told TCHRD that his middleschool,

being a boarding school, … charges 365 Yuanper semester… Each student is required to bringin 200 Gyama (1 Gyama equals to halfkilogram) of grain to the school… Despite thatthe food in the school is very terrible. The riceporridge in the morning is filled with rat excretaand the other meals in the day are no better.72

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The lack of capital in rural areas is clearly visiblewhen looking at the school facilities. Where schoolfacilities are available, they are most of the time invery poor conditions. In 2005, Beijing claimed that,“So far, 4 billion yuan has already been used to re-pair or rebuild dilapidated buildings of primary andmiddle schools in the countryside, of which 57 per-cent has been used in western China and other areaswhere ethnic minorities live in compact communi-ties.”73 However, all rural refugees who talked abouteducation during their interviews with TCHRDcomplained that the schools they went to in Tibetwere in terrible conditions. The most commonlyreported problems were leaking ceilings, lack of chairor tables, broken furniture, scarcity or absence ofwater and electricity, and classrooms maladapted toharsh Tibetan winters. Yeshi Tenzin, a former schoolprincipal, who tried to improve conditions in hisschool but finally despaired and fled into exile, re-ported,

I applied many times to the concernedauthorities for the improvement of the schoolingfacilities. But it failed every time; the authoritiesgave lack of funds as the reason for refusal. Allthe schools in the nine different townships ofDriru County had the same problems.74

Beyond not providing basic education for the ruralTibetans, China is attacking the resourceful Tibet-ans who have tried to improve the lot of their peopleby establishing private and monastic-affiliatedschools. The Tibet Justice Center reported that,“China has been closing some of the monastic-af-filiated and private Tibetan schools that exist, eventhough they are often the only feasible alternativesto distant and poorly funded government educa-tional facilities.”75 China is also taking over the ad-ministration of Tibetan schools to put them in linewith its policies. Refugee Tsomo Thar reported,

The secondary school I went to has been set upby His Holiness the Tenth Panchen Lama. It

was confiscated by the Chinese authoritiesfollowing his death. It used to be free, but sincethe Chinese take over, despite the fact that manyforeigners sponsor the school, students have topay 360 yuan per semester. At the time of theTenth Panchen Lama it was a Tibetan-onlyschool but Han Chinese, Muslim Chinese andSalar [minority group] are now admitted. Myparents told me that the quality of educationhas dramatically deteriorated.76

On top of the lack of funding, rural areas cruellysuffer from a shortage of qualified teachers, whichresults in poor quality education offering no hopefor the future of rural students. The teaching pro-fession in China has a very low status, and can bevery dangerous especially in Tibet where some teach-ers have been accused of letting ‘splittism’ enter theclassroom. During the Cultural Revolution, andother anti-intellectual periods, teachers were seen asuseless to the economy and were attacked by theCommunist Party. In Tibet, their status has neverbeen fully restored; teaching is unpopular as a pro-fession because of its low economic and social sta-tus, because of its political vulnerability, but mostof all, because of the possibility for urban-educatedteachers to be sent to remote rural areas.77 It hasbeen said that, “Both Tibetan and Chinese wouldrather take a letter to the ends of the earth than be-come a teacher.”78 UNESCO reported that, “Evenafter adjustment by purchasing power, real averageteacher salaries in China are only one-tenth of theaverage for OECD79 countries.”80 This lack of quali-fied educators inevitably results in a poor qualityeducation. Refugee accounts confirm the low qual-ity of education in rural areas. For example, YeshiTenzin reported that in his school only three out ofeleven teachers had a degree,81 and refugee SonamNgodup, 29 years old, told TCHRD that, “his par-ents pulled him out of the school since he was notlearning much… in a school that lacked teachersand facilities.”82

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The low quality of education combined with a cur-riculum totally disconnected from the day-to-dayreality of rural children offers them no hope for thefuture. Most of them will never have a chance tocomplete their primary schooling. Those who dowill have even less chance to enter secondary schools,which are almost exclusively located in cities. In fact,in 2000, “Tibetans living in “TAR” cities were 19times more likely to reach senior middle school thanTibetans living in rural areas.”83 Refugee TenzinYangzom, 18 years old, told TCHRD why shedropped school after grade 3,

First, because there was a lot of work to be doneat home since we are farmers. Second, I didn’tsee any hope in the future after completingprimary school. Not a single student of my schoolever studied further than grade 6.84

Thus, the compulsory education policy of Beijing,instead of empowering rural children, further de-prives them of any knowledge usable to improvetheir lives. Tenzin Yangzom added,

the compulsory education by being of such a badquality and offering no prospects for the future,instead of empowering us, only prevents us fromlearning needed farming skills.85

education overpriced

Education in Tibet, especially in rural areas, isunaffordable for most Tibetans. The problem againoriginates in Beijing’s insufficient spending on edu-cation, which “is below the international average ofdeveloping countries.”86 China, unlike most coun-tries, does not specify in law the percentage of itsGNP that should be invested in education. In 2004,the then Special Rapporteur on Education, KatarinaTomaševski recommended that Beijing increase itsspending on education from 3 to 6 percent of China’s

Gross National Product (GNP), since it is recog-nized that the cost of public education is the majorreason for non-attendance and drop out, and China’sinternational obligations and pledges include freeeducation and elimination of financial obstacles.87

As mentioned above, according to Chinese laws andinternational standards, compulsory educationshould be free. However, Chinese laws permitschools to collect various fees, and encourage indi-viduals to make ‘voluntary’ donations and perform‘voluntary’ labor.

In cities, where most of Beijing’s meager spendingon compulsory education is concentrated, and whereurban dwellers earn on average three times morethan rural citizens, the fees levied by schools are of-ten lower and can be afforded by most parents. Thus,the main problem in cities arises after completionof compulsory education, where places are limited,making connections and corruption necessary tosecure a child’s entrance. A critique of Beijing poli-cies reported that, “a growing number of highschools and universities were lowering standards forwealthier students whose parents could make cashpayments for admission, leaving less room for poorstudents to be admitted on merit.”88 Further edu-cation in urban Tibet is then only available to chil-dren from wealthy families who have connectionswith the Party. In cities, parents must bribe the offi-cials to secure an adequate education for their chil-dren, but in rural areas, Tibetans do not have thatluxury.

The lack of funding combined with the legal provi-sion allowing schools to collect various fees makecompulsory education out of reach for most ruralTibetans. Rural areas of Tibet are the poorest re-gions of China; entire families often survive on onlya few hundred dollars a year.89 Despite this extremepoverty, rural Tibetans must pay various school feesthat are totally out of their reach. Many refugeesinterviewed by TCHRD, mentioned school fees as

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the reason for their drop out or non-attendance ofschool. Tsomo Thar reported,

I am the only child of my family who got anopportunity to go to school. In primary school,we had to pay school fees of 70 Yuan per semester.After three years of primary education, I wentto secondary school. The fees were 360 Yuanper semester and we had to pay for our uniformsand for meals. The school was boarding studentswho were living far away but they had to pay45 Yuan per semester and bring their food fromhome. We also had to bring firewood in winter.90

Refugee Tsekyid, a 17 years old girl from the “TAR”,stated,

my parents pulled me out of school after threeyears for they cannot afford the fees. The annualfees for compulsory primary education was 520Yuan and there were a lot of other miscellaneousmoney collection like 10 or 15 Yuan duringschool ceremonies and five Yuan towardsclassroom furniture maintenance etc.91

Some schools have found creative ways to extractmore out of poor farmer families who do not havemoney. Refugee Tashi Gyamtso told TCHRD,

The school charged no monetary fees but everychild had to give between 800 and 900 YartsaGumbu [a caterpillar fungi used for traditionalmedicine] every year to be admitted in school…It is very rare; in one day, one person can pluckonly between five and ten. Consequently, thewhole families of every student had to work forthe entire one-month school-break to be able tosend one child to school… At that time, oneYartsa Gumbu was worth around 1.5 Yuan,but now it is worth between seven and eightYuan and the students must still provide thesame number of Yartsa Gumbu to pay for theirschooling. Moreover, nowadays the Chinese

settlers are also plucking Yartsa Gumbu and itis getting rare, making it more and more difficultfor Tibetan students to pick up enough to payfor their schooling. Fights over it are commonand a few years ago three Tibetans were killedby the Chinese.92

Because of these fees, most families can only affordto send one child to school, and his or her educa-tion becomes a huge drain on family resources, of-ten forcing families to change their lifestyle and be-come migrant workers or to sacrifice their otherchildren’s future. Refugee Migmar Dolma, 17 yearsold, told TCHRD,

Apart from my youngest brother, all of us threechildren didn’t get any education. When hereached middle school, the school fees made ourlives very difficult. In order to generate moreincome for the family, most of the young peoplein my village venture into urban areas likeLhasa, Shigatse and Dram. The boys work asconstruction labors, the girls in Nangma bars,brothels and karaoke bars. When I reached eightyears old, my parents sent me to Lhasa to livewith a distant relative. I worked in their groceryshop in exchange for food but I had no salary.When I reached 13, I started dancing at theNangma bar.93

Some 14 school fees are authorized by Beijing andcan be legally levied by schools. In addition, manyschools charge illegal fees to supplement their in-sufficient funding. In a White Paper—once againonly aimed at addressing international criticism—entitled China’s Progress in Human Rights, releasedin April 2005, Beijing claimed that, “Eighty-threepercent of the school-age children in Xinjiang, Ti-bet, Ningxia and Qinghai get free textbooks. In theagricultural and pastoral areas of Tibet, school-agechildren not only are exempted from school feesbut also are provided with free meals and accom-

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modation.”94 However, a few months later, Beijinglaunched a nationwide inspection of illegal chargesin schools. A similar campaign carried on in 2003“discovered 21.4 billion Yuan (US$2.6 billion) ofillegal charges in more than 12,000 cases”95 More-over, Zhang Baoqing, vice-minister of education,recognized the central government’s insufficientfunding of rural education; “Because of inadequateinput for compulsory education in the rural area,local governments should help pay a large amountof education costs… So some governments shift theburden to the schools, which have no way out butto collect fees from students.”96

In such circumstances, China’s compulsory educa-tion policy is impossible to implement since “edu-cation cannot be made compulsory unless it isfree.”97 Therefore, the policy is implemented cha-otically by local authorities. In Tibet, the compul-sory education policy created paradoxical situationwhere families, who are too poor to send their chil-dren to school, are fined amounts equivalent tomany years of school fees. Tsomo Thar reported thatin her township, families are fined 1500 Yuan peryear (the average per-capita annual income of ruralTibetans) if they do not have at least one child inschool.98 Similarly, refugee Tenzin Yangzom said,“those who were not enrolled in school were finedheavily.”99

Some unscrupulous schools have supplemented theirdeficient funding by taking advantage of the legalprovisions stipulating that school factories can beestablished. CECC reported that, “Chinese laborlaw and policy fails to distinguish between the ille-gal use of ‘child labor’ and permissible ‘work-study’programs, allowing unscrupulous public school ad-ministrators to use students as low-wage labor. Pri-vate schools are also complicit in using child la-bor.”100 In addition to factory-style work, Tibetanstudents have to perform school operation relatedwork. “In some cases, poor Tibetan families that

cannot afford the fees can still send their children toschool, but the children must perform physical la-bor, such as cleaning toilets, as the price of admis-sion.”101

On top of all these fees, goods that must be broughtfrom home, and forced labor, Tibetan children andTibetan parents who wish their children to studymust perform ‘voluntary’ labor to build or main-tain the schools. Tsomo Thar reported that,

if any furniture was broken in the school, theschool authorities did not take the responsibilityof repairing them. The students themselves hadto collect the money required and to repair it.102

While all these obstacles make compulsory educa-tion hardly obtainable, higher education is totallyout of reach for nearly all Tibetans. The price offour years university, 28,000 Yuan,103 is what anaverage Tibetan farmer earns in 18 years. Chinaclaimed that by the end of 2003, there were 10490students in institutions of higher learning in Tibet.104

But how many were Tibetans? It has long been re-ported that the lower university admission criteriagranted to China’s minorities have attracted a hugenumber of Han Chinese students who fail to passentrance exams in mainland China to the “TAR”.The entrance exams in Chinese language give thema clear advantage over their Tibetan competitors.China also has a quota system to favor entrance forminority students, but in the “TAR”, Han Chinesestudents residing in the “TAR” can be enrolled un-der that quota.105 It has been reported that, “the in-stitutions of higher learning are in part used to trainChinese cadres to work in Tibet.”106

With such a picture, it is hard to understand howthe United Nations can have congratulated Chinain 2005 for its progress in achieving free and com-pulsory education. The reality in China is totallydifferent from the official statistics.

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crackdown on religiouseducation

The Chinese authorities perceive Tibetan Buddhism,which is a major element of Tibetan culture, as adangerous source of nationalism and separatism. Theprotests of the late 1980s started in monasteries, andever since, monks and nuns have regularly criticizedBeijing’s policies in Tibet in various creative waysthat have attracted international attention and criti-cism on the Chinese occupation of Tibet. For ex-ample, the singing nuns’ CD and the torture instru-ments smuggled out by Palden Gyatso have trav-eled all around the world raising awareness aboutthe situation.

Beijing responded to the threats posed by TibetanBuddhism with harsh measures. The Third WorkForum on Tibet, held in 1994, imposed limits onthe number of monks in each monastery and in-creased the governmental control of religion.107

Since then, “patriotic education” campaigns haverepeatedly been conducted in the various monaster-ies and nunneries in Tibet. Under these campaigns,monks and nuns are indoctrinated with commu-nist ideas, and they must denounce the Dalai Lamaas separatist and recognize that Tibet is part of China.Monks and nuns are regularly expelled from theirmonasteries and nunneries, and even detained andtortured, for refusing to participate in these “patri-otic education” sessions.

The latest “patriotic education” campaign in Tibetleft one monk dead and created the largest peacefulprotest since the demonstrations of 1989. The cam-paign, which started in early October 2005, led toheated arguments between Ngawang Jangchub andthe PSB officials responsible for the campaign inthe Drepung Monastery in Lhasa. NgawangJangchub was found dead in his room the nextmorning. The cause of his death is still unknown,but murder or suicide seems to be the most plau-

sible answers.108 The next month, during the same“patriotic education” campaign, five monks categori-cally refused to sign a document denouncing theDalai Lama as separatist and recognizing Tibet aspart of China. They were expelled from the DrepungMonastery and detained in the PSB Detention Cen-ters of their respective places of origins. The nextday, the four hundred monks of the monastery satin a silent protest to oppose the campaign and askfor the release of their fellow monks. The Chineseauthorities responded by a violent crackdown andsealed the monastery.109

These recent events confirm the Special Rapporteuron Education’s claims that there is no tolerance ofreligion in China.110 This intolerance is resulting inever lowering standards of monastic education.“Obtaining a complete religious education remainsextremely difficult or impossible in Tibet.”111 Howcan an atheist party that compel all its members torenounce any religious activity and belief, and thatconsider religion as a backward vestige fated to dis-appear, meet its international obligations regardingreligious freedom?

education in exile, a differentpicture

The Tibetan community in exile “has been remark-ably successful in preserving its language, culture,education system and religious institutions.”112

There have indeed been some language preservationproblems, but one must remember that the Tibet-ans in exile are diluted in dominant cultures. Forexample, in India, where more than 70 percent ofTibetan refugees settle, they represent less than 0.01percent of the country’s population and are scatteredin small settlements all over that huge country. Andsince they do not have a country anymore, they mustrespect the curriculum of the country that gener-ously gave them asylum in order to obtain recog-

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nized diplomas. Their livelihood also depends ontheir ability to integrate into those dominant cul-tures. It is their exile status and their disconnectionfrom their people and land that makes language pres-ervation a challenge, not an imposed planned desireof annihilating their culture. The education systemin exile is in no way comparable to what is currentlyhappening in Tibet; it strives at providing an all-round education as recognized by the internationalstandards.

The Education Department of the Tibetan govern-ment-in-exile is responsible for the coordination ofa system of 80 Tibetan schools spread across India,Nepal, and Bhutan, which accommodate over 27000 Tibetan students. Although the Tibetan schoolsmust comply with the education regulations of theirhost country and their students pass the same boardexaminations, a special emphasis is put on the pres-ervation of Tibetan culture.

Various measures have been taken to ensure a high-quality modern education that preserves the distinc-tive Tibetan culture. On top of the standard cur-riculum, Tibetan history, non-violence and democ-racy are taught by Tibetan teachers. All schools havetraditional dance and music teachers trained at theTibetan Institute of Performing Arts, and someschools even have spiritual teachers. The Tibetanfestivals are observed, sustainable art or craft havebeen made compulsory in school, and many text-books have been translated into Tibetan. The Edu-cation Department also organizes in-service teachertraining on a regular basis, so that teachers alwaysstay up to date with their subject and the latest teach-ing techniques.113

In addition, a new education policy has been adoptedin 2004 by the Education Department and is pres-ently under trial in one school in Dharamsala. Thatnew policy puts more emphasis on the traditionalsystem of education, on the Tibetan language, and

on the Dialectic system, in the aim of preservingthe unique Tibetan culture. For example, the Ti-betan language will be the only language used andtaught in school until grade three, in order to makesure that the children really develop Tibetan as theirmother tongue. From fourth grade on, English willbe taught as a second language since higher studiesin the host countries are conducted in English. Athird language, generally the language of the adop-tion country will also be taught for three years.114

In the exile Tibetan community, education up tograde 12 is compulsory and free. The only fees thestudents have to pay are a part of the books, andfood. Schools for poorer children, orphans, and refu-gees, namely Tibetan Children’s Village (TCV) andTibetan Homes Foundation (THF), are boardingschools and are totally free. They are financed prin-cipally by individual and organizational donations.They provide everything the students need: books,lodging, food, clothes, etc. Moreover, the Educa-tion Department and various schools provide schol-arships, on the basis of merit, for Tibetan studentsto pursue higher education. Besides, special schoolshave been set up to accommodate the special needsof older refugees who have never been given a chanceto study in Tibet. In this highly developed educa-tion system, all refugees under 30 years of age whowish to study are directed to schools speciallyadapted to their needs.

Due to that unique structure, “about 75% of theschool-age (6-17 years old) Tibetans in exile receiveschool education within the Tibetan school network.15% attend non-Tibetan schools. The remainingmay be enrolled in various monastic institutions.”115

Furthermore, the government of India has reservedseats for Tibetan students in various high-end pro-fessions like medicine and engineering.116 The lit-eracy rate among the Tibetan community in Indiahas been brought up to 74.4 percent, compared toa national average of 65 percent.

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education, a major reasonfor exile

With such a different picture, it is no surprise that,each year, at the great embarrassment of the Chi-nese authorities, thousands of young Tibetans at-tempt the perilous journey over the Himalayas insearch of a better education. In 2005, despite all themeasures taken by Beijing to prevent Tibetans fromfleeing into exile, which will be explained in the nextparagraphs, thousands of refugees made it toDharamsala, India. Most of them, approximately75 percent, fled for a better education, either lay orreligious.

The exodus of such a number of Tibetans is a greathumiliation for a Chinese government that tries toshow the world that the Tibetan people is satisfiedand enjoys great freedom under a Chinese rule thathas brought grand development. In 2005, Beijingattempted to curb the flow of refugees by variousmeans in order to improve its image and to preventinformation from reaching the outside world.

First, China has exerted increased pressures on apolitically unstable Nepal, through which nearlyevery Tibetan refugee transit, in order to obtain itscooperation in restraining the flow of refugees. Atthe beginning of the year, the Nepalese governmentshuttered the Tibetan Refugee Welfare Office inKathmandu, Nepal. “The Refugee Welfare Office,which began operation after the Dalai Lama fledinto exile in India in 1959, has helped to ensure thesafety and well-being of tens of thousands of Tibet-ans crossing in Nepal, many of them on the way toIndia… [It] has been a critical safety net for tens ofthousands of persecuted Tibetans.”117 On 29 Sep-tember 2005, the European Parliament called “firmlyonce again on the Nepalese Government to re-es-tablish the Tibetan Refugee Welfare Office(TRWO) in Kathmandu and to allow the represen-tative office of the Dalai Lama to resume opera-

tions in providing relief services to Tibetan refugeesas an implementing partner of the UNHCR.”118

Furthermore, there are numbers of Tibetan refugeeswho, upon reaching Nepal, are deported back toChina instead of being escorted to Kathmanduwhere the UN High Commissioner for Refugeescan take them in charge. In September and October2005, two Tibetan refugees, Norbu Tsering andSonam Tsering were arrested in Nepal and imposedan exorbitant money penalty by the Nepalese Im-migration Department. They were both sentencedto three years in jail for failing to pay the amount.They are now facing deportation.119 In November2005, 18 Tibetan refugees received a similar treat-ment. “Despite attempts from the United Nations’Commission on Refugees and the Tibetan Recep-tion Center to release the refugees the authoritiesdid not release the Tibetans.”120 It has been reportedthat “China appreciates supports from Nepal on is-sues of Taiwan, Tibet and human rights,” and that“The Nepalese authorities’… harsh new restrictionson refugees fleeing Tibet for Nepal are widelythought to be a direct result of China’s increasedleverage in Kathmandu.”121

Second, China has increased its border patrol. It hasset up local army camps at the border area ofZongkar village, Kyirong. It has also stationed bor-der security staff at Gon, Shak, and Tsalung villages.These patrols are promised lucrative rewards for cap-turing Tibetans fleeing into exile.122 In August, aChinese border patrol opened fire on a group of 51fleeing Tibetans. Only three managed to escape thefiring and reach Kathmandu. The whereabouts ofthe remaining 48 escapees remains unknown butthe worst is to be envisaged.123

Third, China has discouraged families from send-ing their children to get an education in exile. Since1994, it has prohibited Tibetans cadres and govern-ment employees from sending their children to

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study in school run by the Tibetan government-in-exile. Those who fail to comply with the direc-tive are either denied promotion or downgraded.That policy has been reasserted in 2000 and parentshave since then been threatened of freeze in promo-tion and salary, expulsion from job, and even can-cellation of the residential permits of their chil-dren.124 Heavy fines have also been imposed onfamilies whose children are studying in exile.TCHRD have received many reports of parents whohave been fined after sending their children in exile.For example, a family was fined 6000 Yuan for send-ing its three children to study in India. PSB officialsalso threatened villagers from the Shigatse Prefec-ture of prison sentences if they send their childrento study in exile.125

Finally, Beijing makes it very hard for those whohave studied in exile to find decent work after re-turning to Tibet. In 1994, during an annual meet-ing of the “TAR” Communist Party Committee,the attitude to adopt with returning refugees wasclearly expressed, “Those graduates from schools ofthe Dalai clique who have come to work in Tibetshould be controlled strictly; they should not be al-lowed to work in the Party or the government or inother important departments.”126 Many returneesare arrested and detained for several months to beinterrogated on what they have seen in exile. Uponrelease, they are under close supervision and deniedany important job. A Canadian who studied in Ti-bet University in Lhasa for two months reportedthat a Tibetan driver she had for a tour told her hehad studied in exile and was denied any job as a tourguide even if he spoke perfect English. The best hecould find was driver, where he was under constantsurveillance by a Chinese guide.127

On top of all those difficulties added by China, thejourney into exile itself is a very perilous one. Refu-gees, often young children, must cross theHimalayas, the highest mountain chain in the world,

on foot. Due to increased border surveillance, mostrefugees are now attempting the crossing duringwinter, when the frequent snowfalls will cover theirfootsteps and when the cold temperature will makepatrolling more difficult. But those extreme condi-tions make the journey even more risky. Starvation,death in crevasses, and frostbites are common. InFebruary 2005, Tenzin Gelek, 13 years old, reachedthe Tibetan Refugee Reception Center inKathmandu after crossing the Himalayas with agroup of 27 refugees. He told TCHRD,

Since there weren’t many opportunities in Tibetand most youngsters get spoilt, my father decidedthat I should go to a good Tibetan school in exile.My father said that he has great hope in meand told me to study hard in India. He founda guide and paid him 2000 Yuan to take mebeyond the Himalayas to Nepal… My shoesworn out in the middle of the journey and Icontinued to walk in my worn out shoes for Ididn’t had a spare. When we reached Samdo(Nepal border area)… [m]y feet especially hadbecome numb with frostbite and infection. Dueto the infection, I had very high fever. The elderstook turn to carry me on their back andmanaged to reach the TRRC in Kathmandu.Upon reaching the TRRC… [t]he doctordiagnosed the infection to be fatal if my feet arenot amputated immediately. So accordingly myfeet were amputated.128

Tenzin Gelek reached Dharamsala in June and joineda school where he wishes to fulfill his father’s dreams.

conclusion

It is clear that when Tibet was ‘peacefully’ invadedby China, advance in education, as in other sectors,was much needed. But not at the dire cost imposedby China. China’s laws on education do not yet

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conform to international standards, but the localimplementation is even much farther from anyrespect of basic human rights. China is known notto respect the laws it gave itself and the constitutionit is based on.

Beijing’s education policies swung between quan-tity, or mass indoctrination and quality, whichstressed academic and technical education. However,none has been beneficial to Tibetans; the first wasdirectly aiming at destroying their culture, whereasthey were not in the category targeted by the sec-ond. Anyhow, the unity of the motherland has al-ways been the ultimate goal of education in Tibet,only the degree varied. Since the unrest of the late1980s, Tibetan culture and language are seen as na-tionalist and separatist, and increasing efforts havebeen made to indoctrinate and assimilate Tibetans,through their education system, so that they do notthreaten the territorial integrity of China. The in-doctrination worked so well that it created a situa-tion where Tibetan students tell their parents aboutwhat their teachers said in class who in turn denouncethem to the authorities. In the aim of making Ti-betans Chinese, Tibetan history and culture are notonly not taught; they are formally denied and deni-grated. Furthermore, in a Chinese dominated eco-nomic and social life, the Tibetan language has be-come useless. Tibetan children learn Chinese fromgrade one and must be fluent to enter secondaryand higher education where the medium of instruc-tion is exclusively Chinese. Fluency in Chinese isalso necessary for any job opportunity.

Despite the horrible goal of assimilation, educationis still highly under funded and underdeveloped inTibet, especially in rural areas. Insufficient fundingby the central government forces schools to chargea variety of legal and illegal fees that make compul-sory education out of reach of most Tibetans. Highereducation costs are simply prohibitive. The lack offunding also resulted in a poor quality education;

the curriculum is taught by untrained and underes-timated teachers, in inadequate and often danger-ous facilities.

In such a context, a large number of Tibetans preferto leave their family and ancestral land behind andto flee into exile in India where a dynamic commu-nity-in-exile has set up an extensive network ofschools aimed at preserving Tibetan culture whilegiving the students the tools to actively participatein the modern world. That important flow of ex-iles makes Beijing lose face towards the internationalcommunity. Furthermore, their testimonies are oneof the most important sources of information onwhat is really going on in Tibet, since everything isso tightly control there. Consequently, various mea-sures have been adopted to curb that flow of refu-gees. Beijing wants to seal Tibet and let Tibetan cul-ture die.

Developed countries and international organizationsmust not fall into traps like the one laid down byPremier Wen Jiabao during the Fifth High LevelGroup Meeting on Education for All, held in Beijingin November 2005, where he solicited help fromdeveloped countries “without additional prerequi-sites.”129 On the contrary, any help given to Chinain the field of education must be closely monitoredto ensure it is not used to commit human rightsabuses against its minorities.

China failed to attain its Tenth Five-Year Plan’s tar-get of making nine-year compulsory education uni-versal in the country and eliminating illiteracy. Butno matter how much money will be spent on edu-cation, as long as the goal of education will be as-similation, and as long as the worth of Tibetan cul-ture will not be recognized, the education in Tibetwill never meet any international standard. If thecurrent education policy and practice is maintainedin Tibet, the only Tibetans left will be outsideTibet.

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Notes

1 UNESCO, Education for Sustainable Development, http://portal. unesco.org/education/en/ev.php-URL_ID=27542&URL_ DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html, 22November 2005

2 “Education in Exile: Building Our Future through Education”(A Message by the Dalai Lama), Department of EducationCTA, Dharamsala, p.1.

3 UDHR, Article 26, ICCPR, Article 18, CRC, Articles 28 and29, and ICESCR, Article 13. See Appendices 7, 8 & 9

4 See CRC, Article 28, and ICESCR, Article 13.5 CRC, Article 28.6 See UDHR, Articles 5, 13, and 14, ICCPR, Articles 7 and 12,

and CRC, Articles 10 and 37.7 See ICCPR, Article 27 and CRC, Article 30.8 See Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National

or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, Articles 1 and4.

9 See China’s Constitution, Articles 19 and 46.10 See Education Law of the People’s Republic of China, 1995,

Articles 9, 12, and 18.11 See Compulsory Education Law of the People’s Republic of

China, 1986, Articles 9, 10, and 15.12 See Higher Education Law of the People’s Republic of China,

1998, Articles 8 and 9.13 See Regional National Autonomy Law of the People’s Republic

of China, 1984, Article 36.14 Katarina Tomaševski (Former UN Special Rapporteur on

Education), The Right to Education: Addendum Mission toChina, UN Document No.E/CN.4/2004/45/Add.1, 21November 2003, p.2.

15 Ibid., p.2.16 See Education Law of the People’s Republic of China, 1995,

Articles 5 and 6.17 See Compulsory Education Law of the People’s Republic of

China, 1986, Articles 3 and 14.18 See Higher Education Law of the People’s Republic of China,

1998, Articles 46 and 53.19 See Regional National Autonomy Law, Article 53.20 See Education Law, Article 58.21 See Education Law, Article 59 and 60.22 Anick Jesdanun, “New bans show China’s concerns about tech,”

The Globe and Mail, 3 October 2005.23 Catriona Bass, Education in Tibet: Policy and Practice since 1950,

Zed books Ltd., London, 1998, pp.1-2.24 17-Point Agreement, Article 6.25 Education in Tibet: Policy and Practice since 1950, Zed books

Ltd., London, 1998, Chapters 1-3.26 Ibid., Chapter 3.27 Chen Kuiyuan, “Speech on Education in Tibet,” Fifth Regional

Meeting on Education in the TAR, 26 October 1994.

28 “Illiteracy and education levels worsen in the TAR despitedevelopment drive,” Tibet Information Network, 27September 2005.

29 Annual Report 2005, Congressional-Executive Commission onChina (CECC), p.108.

30 Ibid., p.109.31 Andrew Fischer, Poverty by Design: The Economics of

Discrimination in Tibet (Montreal: Canada Tibet Committee,2002), p.16.

32 Catriona Bass, op cit, p.10.33 “Speech by Zhou Ji, Minister of Education,” Press conference

sponsored by the State Council Information Office, 27 January2005. Available at http://www.china.org.cn/e-news/2005-01-27.htm, 22 November 2005.

34 Geoffrey York, “69 million Communists urged to toe the line,”The Globe and Mail, 13 July 2005.

35 Ibid.36 Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China (China’s White

Paper), Section III.37 Annual Report 2005, CECC, p.18.38 Violence, Discrimination and Neglect Towards Tibetan Children,

Tibet Justice Center, February 2005, p.22.39 TCHRD Interview, 13 October 2005.40 TCHRD Interview, 24 November 2005.41 Anti-religion campaign targets Tibetan schoolchildren, Tibet

Information Network, 21 February 2001. 42 Human Rights Update, TCHRD, Vol.10, No.6, 2005, p.5.43 Ibid.44 Annual Report 2005, CECC, p.4. 45 Yang Wanli, “The Countermeasure and Particularity of

Research on Teaching Materials,” Tibet Studies, Vol.58, No 1,1996.

46 Katarina Tomaševski , op cit, p.15.47 A Generation in Peril – The Lives of Tibetan Children Under

Chinese Rule, International Committee of Lawyers for Tibet,US, March 2001, p.60.

48 Violence, Discrimination and Neglect Towards Tibetan Children,Tibet Justice Center, pp.22-23.

49 TCHRD Interview, 12 March 2005.50 Vernor Muñoz Villalobos (UN Special Rapporteur on

Education), The Right to Education, UN Document E/CN.4/2005/50, 17 December 2004, p.19.

51 Catriona Bass, op cit, p.153.52 TCHRD Interview, 2005.53 Central Tibet Administration, China’s Current Policy in Tibet:

Life-and-death Struggle to Crush an Ancient Civilization,Chapter 2 – Education’s Policy of Intend. Available at http://www.tibet.com/Eco/cover.html, 22 November 2005.

54 Catriona Bass, op cit, pp.237-241.55 Zhou Yongkang, Communist Party secretary for Sichuan

province, Reported by Tsering Shakya in “Solving the TibetanProblem,” Time of Asia, Vol.156, No.2, 17 July 2000.

56 State of Education in Tibet, TCHRD, 2004, p.83.57 Vernor Muñoz Villalobos, The Right to Education, UN

Document E/CN.4/2005/50, 17 December 2004, p.14.58 Human Rights Update, Vol.10, No.6, TCHRD, 2005, p.2.

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59 TCHRD Interview, 12 March 2005.60 David Moser, Why Chinese Is So Damn Hard?, University of

Michigan, Center for Chinese Studies.61 Racial Discrimination in Tibet, TCHRD, 2000.62 TCHRD Interview, 24 November 2005.63 State of Education in Tibet, TCHRD, p.79.64 China’s Current Policy in Tibet: Life-and-death Struggle to Crush

an Ancient Civilization, Central Tibet Administration,Chapter 2

65 TCHRD Interview, 2005.66 Human Rights Update, Vol.10, No.5, TCHRD, 2005, p.6.67 Annual Report 2005, CECC, p.105.68 Violence, Discrimination and Neglect Towards Tibetan Children,

Tibet Justice Center, p.2.69 China’s Progress In Human Rights in 2004, April 2005.70 TCHRD Interview, 13 October 2005.71 TCHRD Interview, 30 July 2005.72 Human Rights Update, Vol.10, No.6, TCHRD, 2005, p.2.73 Progress in Human Rights in 2004, p.15.74 TCHRD Interview, 2005.75 Violence, Discrimination and Neglect Towards Tibetan Children,

Tibet Justice Center, p.21.76 TCHRD Interview, 30 July 2005.77 Catriona Bass, op cit, pp.209-216.78 “Debate on education,” a TV program on Lhasa TV, 30 July

1988, in Catriona Bass, op cit, p.209.79 OECD stands for Organisation for Economic Co-operation

and Development.80 EFA Global Monitoring Report 2005, UNESCO, Chapter 4,

p.24.81 TCHRD Interview, 2005.82 Human Rights Update, Vol.10, No.7, TCHRD, 2005, p.3.83 Annual Report 2005, CECC, p.113.84 TCHRD Interview, 13 October 13 2005.85 Ibid.86 “China Plans to Cut School Fees for Its Poorest Rural

Students,” New York Times, 13 March 2005.87 Katarina Tomaševski, op cit, p.2.88 “China Plans to Cut School Fees for Its Poorest Rural

Students,” New York Times, 13 March 2005.89 China’s Tibet 2004 reported that the annual per-capita net

income of rural Tibetans in the TAR in 2002 was 1521 Yuan.(China’s Tibet 2004, p.87.)

90 TCHRD Interview, 30 July 2005.91 Human Rights Update, Vol.10, No.5, TCHRD, 2005, p.4.92 TCHRD Interview, 24 November 2005.93 Human Rights Update, Vol.10, No.2, TCHRD, 2005, p.4.94 China’s Progress in Human Rights in 2004.95 “Billions Charged in Illegal School Fees,” China Daily, 17

December 2003.96 “Inspection to target arbitrary school fees,” China Daily, 21

September 2005.97 Katarina Tomaševski, op cit, p.9.98 TCHRD Interview, 30 July 2005.99 TCHRD Interview, 13 October 2005.100 Annual Report 2005, CECC, p.43.

101 Tibet Justice Center, Violence, Discrimination and NeglectTowards Tibetan Children, p.18.

102 TCHRD Interview, 30 July 2005.103 “China mother hang herself over child’s school fees,” Lateline

News, 22 September 2005.104 “China’s Tibet: Facts and Figures 2004,” Beijing Review, New

Star Publisher, Beijing, 2004, p.159.105 Catriona Bass, op cit, p.191.106 Andrew Fischer, op cit, p.16.107 International Campaign for Tibet, When the Sky Fell to Earth:

The New Crackdown in Buddhism in Tibet (Washington: USA,2004), p.10.

108 TCHRD Press Release, A young monk dies under mysteriouscircumstances following the “patriotic education” campaign inDrepung monastery, 8 November 2005.

109 TCHRD Press Release, Mass silent protest in Tibet’s DrepungMonastery following China’s continued implementation of “patrioticeducation”, 29 November 2005.

110 Katarina Tomaševski, op cit, p.15.111 International Campaign for Tibet, When the Sky Fell to Earth:

The New Crackdown in Buddhism in Tibet (Washington: USA,2004), p.1.

112 Peter Hadekel, “School is exiles’ tool of survival,” The Gazette,Montreal, Canada, 20 March 2005.

113 TCHRD Interview with Tsering Phuntsok, Education Officerof the Education Department, 12 October 2005.

114 Basic Education Policy for Tibetans in Exile, Department ofEducation CTA, Dharamsala, 2004.

115 Education in Exile: Building Our Future through Education,Department of Education CTA, Dharamsala, 1998, p.7.

116 Ibid., p.9.117 Nepal: Tibetan Refugee Center Shuttered, Human Rights Watch,

28 January 2005.118 European Parliament, Human Rights in Nepal, Tunisia and

Vojvodina, 29 September 2005. Available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/news/expert/infopress_page/015-727-269-9-39-902-20050926IPR00726-26-09-2005-2005—false/default_en.htm, 2 December 2005.

119 Human Rights Update, Vol.10, No.9, TCHRD, 2005, p.4.120 “18 Tibetans Jailed in Nepal,” visit www.phayul.com, 30

November 2005.121 “China Thanks Nepal for Support on Tibet,” Tibet News, 21

October 2005.122 Human Rights Update, Vol.10, No.8, TCHRD, 2005, p.4.123 Human Rights Update, Vol.10, No.9, TCHRD, 2005, p.1.124 State of Education in Tibet, TCHRD, pp.72-73.125 TCHRD Interview, 25 April 2004.126 TCHRD Press Release, 25 August 2000. Available at http://

tchrd/press/2000/pr20000825.html.127 TCHRD Interview, 11 November 2005.128 Human Rights Update, Vol.10, No.6, TCHRD, 2005, pp.1-2.129 Speech during the Fifth High Level Group Meeting on

Education for All, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, 28 November2005.

Appendices

179

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noM

neh

dnes

TgoS

79/

80/

81

raep

pasiD

gna

hsagN

-aY

goS

72

0-2

0?

TE

Dp

ud

noh

Dg

nawag

Nn

wonk

nU

M0

4g

nosteT

rakarD

yretsano

M2

00

2/5/

8g

niliX

sry3

ytn

uoC

ahc

bah

C

69

0-4

9?

TE

Dye

ngn

uJg

nawag

NA/

NM

72

ytisrevin

Ute

biT

49/

10/

31

omar

To

woP

sry9

gn

uhs

maD

asah

L

41

0-5

0T

ED

lord

maN

gna

wagN

nwo

nkn

UM

63

yretsano

Mg

nu

perD

50/

11/

32

pu

dn

uh

Lo

pne

hP

ytn

uoC

71

0-5

0T

ED

eygleh

Pg

nawag

Nn

wonk

nU

M2

3yretsa

noM

gn

uper

D5

0/1

1/3

2,yt

nuo

Cg

nu

pni

Restagi

hS

66

1-9

8T

ED

gn

uhcl

uh

Pg

nawag

Nu

nA

M4

3yretsa

noM

gn

uper

D9

8/4

0/6

1i

hcpar

Dsry

91

nehce

Dg

nuleo

T

Lis

t of

Kn

ow

n P

oli

tica

l P

riso

ner

s

182


DR

HC

TD

RH

CT

DR

HC

TD

RH

CT

DR

HC

TS

UT

ATS

SU

TA

TSS

UT

ATS

SU

TA

TSS

UT

ATS

EM

AN

EM

AN

EM

AN

EM

AN

EM

AN

EM

AN

YA

LE

MA

NY

AL

EM

AN

YA

LE

MA

NY

AL

EM

AN

YA

LX

ES

XE

SX

ES

XE

SX

ES

EG

AE

GA

EG

AE

GA

EG

AN

OIT

AILI

FF

AN

OIT

AILI

FF

AN

OIT

AILI

FF

AN

OIT

AILI

FF

AN

OIT

AILI

FF

AT

SE

RR

AT

SE

RR

AT

SE

RR

AT

SE

RR

AT

SE

RR

AN

OSI

RP

NO

SIR

PN

OSI

RP

NO

SIR

PN

OSI

RP

MR

ET

MR

ET

MR

ET

MR

ET

MR

ET

NIGI

RO

NIGI

RO

NIGI

RO

NIGI

RO

NIGI

RO

460-19T

ED

gnas

neT

gna

wagN

apneP

M12

yretsano

Mg

nuperD

19/90/41ihcpar

Dsry

51o

mgnaS

gnuleo

Tobay

K

510-50T

ED

opgniy

Ng

nawg

Nn

wonk

nU

M13

yretsano

Mg

nuperD

50/11/32pud

nuhL

opneh

Pyt

nuoC

610-50T

ED

netpuhT

gna

wgN

koteM

apkuhSM

82yretsa

noM

gnuper

D50/11/32

lapicini

Masah

L

340-99?

TE

Dnodoh

Ca

miyN

A/N

F03

loohcSfo

ffatS99/80/03

ihcparD

sry01

asahL

900-40T

ED

nizne

Ta

miyN

A/N

M02

40/90/41?

CD

goSyt

nuoC

goS

310-20?

TE

Dg

niresT

amiy

NM

22yretsa

noM

gnuper

D20/70/00

astuG

sry3

apmah

Dasah

L

520-20T

ED

gnires

Ta

miyN

nwo

nkn

UM

56rehcae

T2002/21/6

ihcparD

sry5

ytnuo

Cestg

nayG

331-98T

ED

gnasaP

A/N

M12

A/N

9891/3/8ihcpar

Dsry

51asah

L

641-69T

ED

eygesT

gnasaP

gnires

Tg

nasaPM

83yretsa

noM

nedaG

6991/5/7ihcpar

Dsry

21g

nidlayG

ordleM

811-79T

ED

iynos

Tg

nassaPM

3279/00/00

ihcparD

sry71

nehceD

gnuleo

Tasah

L,ytnuo

C

551-69T

ED

pudnoh

Dkost

nuhP

ordkaB

gnires

TM

82yretsa

noM

nedaG

6991/5/7ihcpar

Dsry

01ihsur

Dasah

L

290-49?

TE

Dkohcgi

Rkost

nuhP

ramgi

MM

23yretsa

noM

gnagihsa

T49/50/13

ihcparD

sry01

gnahtey

Nluhsuh

C

810-50T

ED

gna

wuhT

kostnuh

Pn

wonk

nU

M03

yretsano

Mg

nuperD

50/11/32rakg

noG

akohL,yt

nuoC

110-40?

TE

Dg

niresT

kostnuh

Pn

wonk

nU

M42

yretsano

Mg

nilyagrahD

40/21/12C

Diray

NestagihS

estahL

360-79T

ED

udgna

Wkost

nuhP

nwo

nkn

UM

92yretsa

noM

nedaG

7991/2/7ihcpar

Dsry

41ihsur

Destka

T

410-00T

ED

purdehK

yeSn

wonk

nU

M72

yretsano

Mnehd

nesT

goS00/30/91

ihcparD

efilg

nahsangoY

goS

010-50T

ED

barehSn

wonk

nU

M52

yretsano

Mg

narbaL

50/50/02P

AT

olosT

CD

,ytnuo

Ced

nuhT

PA

Tolos

T

320-20T

ED

barehSn

wonk

nU

M24

yretsano

mg

nasT

20/11/00

gnili

Xsry

5.yt

nuoC

nania

Hiahg

niQ

010-30T

ED

rahtehSn

wonk

nU

M53

yretsano

Mra

mgnah

K30/10/00

CD

abagN

sry21

ytnuo

Cg

nahtraM

910-50T

ED

manoS

nwo

nkn

UM

34rekat

eraC

alatoP50/8/12

?astuG

RA

T

571-29T

ED

eejroD

mano S

A/N

M32

A/N

29/60/03ihcpar

Dsry

31rahsa

DordleM

310-50T

ED

oplayG

manoS

nwo

nkn

UM

34sse

nisuB

50/80/82?

astuG

erutceferP

akohL

RA

T

Lis

t of

Kn

ow

n P

oli

tica

l P

riso

ner

s

Appendices

183

DR

HC

TD

RH

CT

DR

HC

TD

RH

CT

DR

HC

TS

UT

ATS

SU

TA

TSS

UT

ATS

SU

TA

TSS

UT

ATS

EM

AN

EM

AN

EM

AN

EM

AN

EM

AN

EM

AN

YA

LE

MA

NY

AL

EM

AN

YA

LE

MA

NY

AL

EM

AN

YA

LX

ESX

ESX

ESX

ESX

ESE

GA

EG

AE

GA

EG

AE

GA

NOI

TAI

LIF

FA

NOI

TAI

LIF

FA

NOI

TAI

LIF

FA

NOI

TAI

LIF

FA

NOI

TAI

LIF

FA

TS

ER

RA

TS

ER

RA

TS

ER

RA

TS

ER

RA

TS

ER

RA

NO

SIR

PN

OSI

RP

NO

SIR

PN

OSI

RP

NO

SIR

PM

RE

TM

RE

TM

RE

TM

RE

TM

RE

TNI

GIR

ONI

GIR

ONI

GIR

ONI

GIR

ONI

GIR

O

230-10T

ED

ostayG

manoSM

43yretsano

Maygba

R10/50/00

CD

nehcaM

5.ytnuo

Cnehca

Miahgni

Q,kolo

G

720/10T

ED

pudogN

manoSopreS

M52

yretsanoM

ezraK

10/40/00nosirP

apagN

sry7

ezraK

010-40?

TE

Dpurdiy

NmanoS

A/N

M81

40/90/41?

CD

goSytnuo

CgoS

120-40?

TE

Dkostnuh

PmanoS

iuG

estgniM

M03

40/21/32C

Dezdra

Kytnuo

Codestra

D

530-10T

ED

nidma

TA/

NM

361002/3/9

ihcparD

sry6

rablaPod

mahC

931-69T

ED

ubroN

gnasaT

nwonkn

UM

12yretsano

Mneda

G6991/5/7

ihcparD

sry01

gnugirD

ordleM

100-50T

ED

nestlayG

ihsaT

M82

yretsanoM

gnosterT

rakaD

50/10/41gnili

Xsry3

gnahtrokes

TP

AT

olosT

,ytnuoC

540-10T

ED

ostayG

ihsaT

M73

1002/5/5gnili

Xsry

21kolo

God

mA

ytnuoC

nehcaM

320-20T

ED

laygpoT

ihsaT

M05

ratnepraC

20/80/00ihcpar

Dsry

6,ytnuo

Cgnir

magN

estagihS

240-10T

ED

yagrahD

apneT

A/N

M02

1002ihcpar

Dsry

5kolo

God

mA

100-99?

TE

Dnizne

Tn

wonknU

M42

yretsanoM

itriK

99/10/00nosirP

apagN

sry5

ytnuoC

abagN

600-79T

ED

eejroD

nizneT

nwonkn

UM

32yretsano

MnetbahS

79/00/00ihcpar

Dsry

31uhcga

N

961-69T

ED

keleG

nizneT

apnePM

32yretsano

Mneda

G6991/5/9

ihcparD

sry21

awah

Co

maL

estkaT

410-10T

ED

pudehK

nizneT

nwonkn

UM

yretsanoM

gnupmas

T10/70/81

CD

odmah

Cefi

Lytnuo

Cnehcgne

T

232-69T

ED

eudnusT

yelnihT

ostayG

M52

yretsanoM

gnitaR

69/21/72ihcpa r

Dsry

8og-gnah

Topneh

P

200-50T

ED

nednaSeoh

Tn

wonknU

M23

yretsanoM

gnosterT

rakaD

50/10/41gnili

Xsry2

gnahtrokes

TP

AT

olosT,ytnuo

C

610-10T

ED

iakbahT

netpuhT

nwonkn

UM

yretsanoM

gnupmas

T10/70/81

CD

odmah

Cefi

Lytnuo

Cnehcgne

T

250-29T

ED

ihseYnetpuh

Tn

wonknU

M2 4

A/N

2991/7/6ihcpar

Dsry

51rahsa

Dordle

M

700-40T

ED

nedpoT

nwonkn

UM

yretsanoM

urkahC

roheT

40/80/12C

Dezdra

Kytnuo

Cezdra

K

810-20T

ED

keleD

nizneTuklur

Tihsa

T-agN-h

AM

45yretsano

Mgnahti

L2002/4/7

gnodnauhC

efiL

PA

Tezra

K,gnahtiL

250-79T

ED

lapesT

nwonkn

UM

46yrets ano

Ma

wreS79/00/00

ihcparD

sry61

eohsaPod

mahC

210-50T

ED

pudnohD

gniresT

nwonkn

UM

33yretsano

MareS

50/70/00astu

Gpudnuh

Lopneh

Pytnuo

C

Lis

t of

Kn

ow

n P

oli

tica

l P

riso

ner

s

184


DR

HC

TS

UT

ATS

EM

AN

EM

AN

YA

LX

ESE

GA

NOI

TAI

LIF

FA

TSE

RR

AN

OSIR

PM

RE

TNI

GIR

O

020-20?

TE

Deejro

Dgnires

TM

24re

mraF20/01/71

CDezra

Ksry

3,ytnuo

Cezra

KnauhciS

210-00T

ED

nogahL

gniresT

A/N

M04

A/N

00/30/91ihcpar

Dsr y

51gnahsalkaY

goS

900-20?

TE

Da

miyN

gniresT

nwonkn

UM

62re

mraF20/01/71

CDezra

Ksry

3ezra

KnauhciS,ytnuo

C

710-20?

TE

Dudgna

Wgnire s

TM

32yretsano

Mgnuper

D20/70/00

astuG

sry3,ytnuo

Cluhsuh

Casah

L

810-00T

ED

ostayG

netesT

A/N

M0

A/N

10/70/00ihcpar

Dsry

8od

mA

97-00T

ED

gn awes

TA/

NM

030002

ihcparD

sry6

odm

A

210-30T

ED

lehpkosT

nwonkn

UM

13yretsano

Mra

mgnahK

30/10/00C

Dabag

Nsry

21ytnuo

Cgnahtra

M

920-10T

ED

yag rahD

mirtlusT

M0

yretsanoM

aygbaR

10/50/00C

Dnehca

Msry

5,ytnuo

Cnehca

Miahgni

Q,kolo

G

500-50T

ED

eyglehP

mirtlusT

nwonkn

UM

83yret sano

Mgnoster

Traka

D50/10/41

gniliX

sry2gnaht

rokesT

PA

Tolos

T,ytnuoC

810-40T

ED

ostmay

Geudnus

Tn

wonknU

M32

itriK

omah

Lgnas tka

Tyretsano

M40/60/00

?C

Dapag

NP

AT

,ytnuoC

yegozD

nauhciS

470-59?

TE

Dihsa

Tneyg

UA/

NM

35A/

N59/80/82

ihcparD

sry9

eohsaPod

mahC

310-30T

ED

leseoV

nwonkn

UM

03yretsano

Mra

mgnahK

30/10/00C

Dabag

Nsry

8ytnuo

Cgnahtra

M

400-10T

ED

upeaYn

wonknU

M42

yretsanoM

ezraK

10/40 /00A/

Nsry

5od

mahD

ezraK

87-00?

TE

Dkardeoh

CihseY

nwonkn

UM

0300/01/0

ihcparD

sry5

asahL

820-20T

ED

eejroD

ihseYn

wonknU

M52

knoM

20/10/00ihc par

Dsry

4kolo

G,odm

A

841-39T

ED

apniJihseY

pudnaSa

mePM

02yretsano

MgnilbargnuS

79/60/82ihcpar

Dsry

11rakgno

Gakoh

L

631-69T

ED

layg baR

ihseYordgah

BM

82yretsano

Mneda

G6991/5/7

ihcparD

sry51

amay

Gordle

Mgnahkir

T

700-00T

ED

nizneT

ihseYn

wonknU

M23

yretsanoM

nehd esT

goS00/30/71

ihcparD

sry51

imgnorgoS,goS

620-20?

TE

Dmirtlus

TihseY

nwonkn

UM

52yretsano

Mye

mbaR

akohL

20/20/00masir

TnosirP

sry3

rakgnoG

akohL

ytnuoC

071-69T

ED

oplayG

netnoYubro

Nnizne

TM

82yretsano

Mneda

G6991/5/01

ihcparD

sry21

rakgnugordleM

110-30T

ED

apeoZ

nwonkn

UM

33yretsano

Mra

mgnahK

30/10/00C

Dabag

Nsry

21ytnuo

Cgnahtra

M

Lis

t of

Kn

ow

n P

oli

tica

l P

riso

ner

s

Appendices

185

SU

TA

TS

SU

TA

TS

SU

TA

TS

SU

TA

TS

SU

TA

TS

EM

AN

EM

AN

EM

AN

EM

AN

EM

AN

EM

AN

YA

LE

MA

NY

AL

EM

AN

YA

LE

MA

NY

AL

EM

AN

YA

LX

ES

XE

SX

ES

XE

SX

ES

EG

AE

GA

EG

AE

GA

EG

AN

OIT

AILI

FF

AN

OIT

AILI

FF

AN

OIT

AILI

FF

AN

OIT

AILI

FF

AN

OIT

AILI

FF

AT

SE

RR

AT

SE

RR

AT

SE

RR

AT

SE

RR

AT

SE

RR

AN

OSI

RP

NO

SIR

PN

OSI

RP

NO

SIR

PN

OSI

RP

MR

ET

MR

ET

MR

ET

MR

ET

MR

ET

NIGI

RO

NIGI

RO

NIGI

RO

NIGI

RO

NIGI

RO

TE

Da

mlo

Dye

keo

hC

nw

on

kn

UF

42

yretsan

oM

gnar

baL

50/

50/

02

PA

Tol

osT

CD

,ytn

uo

Ce

dn

uh

TP

AT

olos

T

TE

Dg

niresT

gn

uh

Cn

wo

nk

nU

M8

2yretsa

no

Mas

gna

P5

0/4

0/0

0ast

uG

RA

Tra

kg

no

gor

deM

TE

Dey

grah

Dn

wo

nk

nU

M5

2yretsa

no

Mg

narba

L5

0/5

0/0

2P

AT

olos

TC

Dol

osT

,gir

Ao

dm

AP

AT

TE

Dostay

Gle

hp

maJn

wo

nk

nU

M6

2yretsa

no

Mg

noster

Tra

kaD

50/

10/

41

gnili

Xsry

3g

naht

ro

kesT

PA

Tol

osT,yt

nu

oC

TE

Dp

dma

Sg

naymaJ

nw

on

kn

UM

32

yretsan

oM

gnar

baL

50/

50/

02

PA

Tol

osT

CD

iah

gni

Q,PA

Tol

osT

TE

Dg

nasah

De

mgiJ

nw

on

kn

UM

22

yretsan

oM

mu

hb

uK

50/

50/

00

-g

no

hzg

no

HC

Dia

hg

niQ,P

AT

olos

T

TE

Dey

gyrah

Dg

nasb

oL

nw

on

kn

UM

73

yretsan

oM

gn

osterT

raka

D5

0/1

0/4

1g

niliX

sry2

gna

htr

okes

TP

AT

olos

T,ytn

uo

C

TE

Dl

ord

maN

gna

wag

Nn

wo

nk

nU

M6

3yretsa

no

Mg

nu

perD

50/

11/

32

pu

dn

uh

Lo

pne

hP

ytn

uo

C

TE

Dey

gleh

Pg

nawa

gN

nw

on

kn

UM

23

yretsan

oM

gn

uper

D5

0/1

1/3

2,yt

nu

oC

gn

up

niR

estagi

hS

TE

Do

pg

niyN

gna

wg

Nn

wo

nk

nU

M1

3yretsa

no

Mg

nu

perD

50/

11/

32

pu

dn

uh

Lo

pne

hP

ytn

uo

C

TE

Dnet

pu

hT

gna

wg

Nk

oteM

ap

ku

hS

M8

2yretsa

no

Mg

nu

perD

50/

11/

32

lapici

niM

asah

L

TE

Dg

naw

uh

Tk

ostn

uh

Pn

wo

nk

nU

M0

3yretsa

no

Mg

nu

perD

50/

11/

32

rak

gn

oG

ak

oh

L,ytn

uo

C

TE

Dbare

hS

nw

on

kn

UM

52

yretsan

oM

gnar

baL

50/

50/

02

PA

Tol

osT

CD

,ytn

uo

Ce

dn

uh

TP

AT

olos

T

TE

Dma

no

Sn

wo

nk

nU

M3

4re

katera

Calat

oP

50/

8/1

2?ast

uG

RA

T

TE

Do

playG

man

oS

nw

on

kn

UM

34

ssenis

uB

50/

80/

82

?ast

uG

erutcefer

Pa

ko

hL

RA

T

TE

Dnestlay

Gi

hsaT

M8

2yretsa

no

Mg

noster

Tra

kaD

50/

10/

41

gnili

Xsry

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186


APPENDIX: 4

LIST OF KNOWN PRISONS AND DETENTION CENTRES IN TIBET

“Tibet Autonomous Region” Prison or Drapchi Prison is the largestand the most notorious prison located in the north-east outskirts ofLhasa, Tibet’s capital. Believed to have been constructed in 1960, anddirectly administered by the “TAR” Law Enforcement Department, thereare nine units in the prison. The 3rd and 5

th units hold female and malepolitical prisoners respectively while rests of the units house non-politi-cal prisoners. Due to overcrowding, the southern gate of Drapchi Prison was reportedly demolished andexpansion work commenced in April 1998. Prisoners are mainly assigned to work at the vegetable farm,house constructions, tailoring, carpet weaving and mechanical repairs.

“TAR” Public Security Bureau (PSB) Detention Centre or SangyipPrison is situated in the northern district of Lhasa City. It is believed tohave been constructed in 1983. Sangyip has the capacity to holdapproximately 70 inmates in its three cellblocks with 12 cells in eachblock. Those suspected of more serious political crimes, includingorganising protest or collecting politically sensitive information, are interrogated in this prison. Any prisonersfrom the “TAR” jurisdiction and with shorter prison terms are detained here, while long-term prisoners aretransferred to other major prisons in “TAR”.

Lhasa City PSB Detention Centre or Gutsa Prison is located threekm east of Lhasa, near the Kyichu River. Gutsa’s main section holdsprisoners who are “under investigation” or awaiting sentences. Mostof its inmates have not been formally charged or given administrativesentences and many of them are reportedly forced to do manual laboursuch as breaking boulders. While Gutsa is predominantly for prison-ers who are awaiting sentences, approximately one percent of prison-ers are believed to be held here even after sentencing, generally for periods of up to one year.

“TAR re-education-through-labour camp” or Trisam Prison isunder the jurisdiction of “TAR” Law Enforcement Departmentand situated 10 km west of Lhasa near the Toelung County Bridge.Trisam was opened in or around February 1992 and has sincereceived many of the political prisoners from Sangyip, Outriduand Gutsa. Trisam has three units: the first for male politicalprisoners, the second for male criminals and the third for womenprisoners, both political and criminal. At least eight cells at Trisam are reportedly used for solitary confinement.It acts as an “administrative detention centre” for juveniles and prisoners whose term does not exceed threeyears. Inmates at Trisam are known to perform hard labour.

Appendices

187

Powo Tramo is formerly referred to as the “TAR” No.2 Prison. Itis situated near the town of Tramo in Pome County, NyingtriPrefecture (Ch. Linzhi), 500 km east of Lhasa. It is administeredby the “TAR” authorities and is built for prisoners who have beensentenced to 10 years or more. It is one of the largest prisons in the“TAR” with facilities for solitary confinement. Most prisoners hereare subjected to hard labour such as felling trees and farm labour.

Lhasa Prison (formerly known as Outridu) may be theinstitution that the Chinese authorities described to the EuropeanUnion’s Traoika as Lhasa Municipal Prison, during their visit inMay 1998. It acts as a part of the “TAR” Law EnforcementDepartment. Solitary confinement cells used to punish prisonershave a space of six by three feet with no windows. Chineseauthorities have already expanded the capacity of Lhasa Prisonby building several new prison cells. There are currently fourcellblocks. Lhasa Prison holds detainees who have been formally sentenced to less than five years. Most ofthem are subjected to hard labour such as breaking boulders and working on the prison’s vegetable farm.

Tibetan Military Detention Centre is administered by the PLA and has existed since 1959. Around 1992it was moved to the Tsalgungthang area about 11 kilometres east of Lhasa. Some political prisoners areknown to have been held there in 1999, but due to the expansion programme undertaken in other prisonsit is uncertain whether more political detainees have subsequently been brought there. The centre now holdsmilitary prisoners.

Prefecture Detention Centres (PDC) are located at the admin-istrative headquarters of each prefecture. There are six regions inthe “TAR” besides Lhasa Municipality: Shigatse, Nagchu, Ngari,Lhoka, Kongpo-Nyingtri and Chamdo. These have “administra-tive detention” centres and kanshuo suo (detention centres for pris-oners, who have not yet been sentenced). In addition, there areprisons at the county level, which are generally for prisoners whohave not yet been sentenced. The Chinese authorities reported tothe visiting EU delegation in 1998 that each region and a number of counties have a local detention centre.

Zethang “Reform-through-labour facility” is a new facility (laojiao), which began functioning on 15 January1998 with the first detainees being six Drayab monks. This “reform through re-education” complex is inZethang village, 10 kilometres east of Chamdo. It is under the direct administration of the Law EnforcementDepartment in Chamdo Prefecture. The accused, who are given prison terms by the respective provinces(administrative sentences), are transferred to this new facility. There are 30 rooms in the compound, whichcan each accommodate six prisoners. The facility has 30 prison staff.

188


Maowan Prison (Ch. Aba Jlan Yu), is located in Maowan QiangAutonomous County in Ngaba “Tibet Autonomous Prefecture”,Sichuan. This prison accommodates prisoners from Ngaba andKardze regions and is one of the largest prisons in Sichuan Prov-ince. Those who are sentenced to long-terms are incarcerated here,including political prisoners. There are detention centres and pris-ons in every county and prefecture in the Tibetan regions ofSichuan, Qinghai, Gansu and Yunnan provinces.

Chamdo Detention Centre or Chamdo Prison is located inChamdo County, “TAR”. It was constructed in 1960 and isbelieved to be one of the largest prisons in “TAR”. The prisonhas been expanded and the number of criminal prisoners heldhere has increased. Prisoners serving short sentences ranging fromone year to five years are held here.

Shigatse Nyari Detention Centre is located about seven kmnorth-west of Shigatse in the Nyari Valley, Shigatse County,“TAR”. Both political and criminal prisoners are held here. Manyof the political prisoners are Tibetans who have visited India.They are detained for several months on their return to Tibet,accused of bringing political documents or tapes from India orNepal. In 1997, Nyari Detention Centre consisted of fivecellblocks, each of which held a different category of prisonersand had 10 cells. Prisoners are assigned to work in vegetablefields and to perform general farm labour. There are approximately 30 mu of fields and in addition there isa fruit farm on which the prisoners are made to work.

Appendices

189

APPENDIX 5

Table Listing Relevant International Human Rights Instruments Signedand/or Ratified by the People’s Republic of China

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190


APPENDIX 6

GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

“TAP” “Tibet Autonomous Prefecture” (Tib. Bod rang skyong khul); There are 10 ofthese administrative areas (below the level of a province or region) createdoutside “TAR” by the Chinese authorities, located in northern and easternTibet (in the Tibetan provinces of Kham and Amdo)

“TAR” “Tibet Autonomous Region” (Tib. Bod rang kyong lljongs, Ch. xizang Zizique);Formally created by China in 1965, this area of central and western Tibet,covering the area of west of the Yangtse River and south of the KunlunMountains, is the only area recognized by China as being “Tibet”

Barkhor (Tib) The old Tibetan quarter and market area around the Jokhang Temple inLhasa. In Tibetan it literally means the “middle circuit” or centralcircumambulation

Cadre (Tib. le che pa, Ch. gan bu) Technically applies to staff of the ChineseGovernment administration; also referred to those working on official projectsor in state enterprises

CAT United Nations Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman orDegrading Treatment or Punishment

CCP (Ch. Zhon Guo Gong Chan Dang) Chinese Communist Party; founded inJuly 1921

CEDAW United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms ofDiscrimination Against Women

Circumambulation A religious ritual circling clockwise around a holy place in order to accumulatemerit

County (Tib. dzong, Ch. xian) The Middle level administrative unit equivalent todistrict

CPL Criminal Procedure Law; the revised CPL came into effect on 1 January1997

CPPCC Chinese People’s Political Consultative CongressCultural Revolution (Tib. rigs-nas-gsar-brje); The campaign initiated in 1966 by Mao Zedong in

order to regain control of the Communist Party by ordering the youth to“bombard the headquarters” (purge opponents within the Party) and toeradicate the “four olds” (old ideas, old culture, old customs and old habits).The Chinese authorities no describe it as “Ten Bad Years”, referring to theentire period of 1966 to 1979.

Appendices

191

Detention Centre (Tib. lta srung khang, Ch. kanshoushuo) Place where prisoners are held withoutcharge prior to sentencing

DMC (Tib. u-yon lhan khang, Ch. we yuan hi) Democratic ManagementCommittee; Administrative organs established in 1962 in religiousinstitutions in Tibet and reconstructed under the 1996 “patriotic re-education”campaign

Drapchi prison Officially known as “Tibet Autonomous Region” PrisonEndangering State Security Charge introduced in the revised CPL to replace “counter-revolutionary”Floating population (Ch. liudong renkou) Term used to refer to Chinese migrants who are

unregistered permanent and temporary residents in TibetGeshe (Tib) Spiritual title and doctorate; monk or lama who has completed the highest

course in metaphysics and other academic monastic studies in the Gelugpaschool

Guanxi (Ch) Literally, “connection”; colloquially a connection to officialdom to acquirepreferential treatment

Gyama (Tib) Unit of measurement equivalent to 500 gramsGyama (Tib) Unit of measurement equivalent to 500 gramsHukou (Ch) Household Registration cardICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political RightsICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural RightsKhenpo (Tib) Literally abbot. In Nyingma and Kagyu tradition of Tibetan Buddhism,

Khenpo is analogous to the Geshe degreeLama (Tib) The Tibetan term for a respected religious teacher, equivalent to the Sanskrit

term guru. A lama is not necessarily a monk, although monasticism is preferredfor all lamas in the Gelugpa School. Chinese politicians use the term incorrectlyto refer to any monk

Mu (Tib) A measure of land equal to 67 square metersNPC National People’s CongressPAP People’s Armed PolicePatriotic re-education Initiated in 1996 in Tibet’s monasteries and nunneries, “patriotic re-education”

campaign was designed to purge the influence of the Dalai Lama, toindoctrinate the monks and nuns with political ideology and to crackdownon dissent activities.

Potala Palace Official winter residence of the Dalai Lama in LhasaPRC People’s Republic of ChinaPrefecture (Tib. sa khul, Ch. diqu) The administrative area below the level of province

or region and above the level of a countyProcuracy (Tib. zhib chu, Ch. jian chayan) A Chinese judicial agency responsible for

investigating and prosecuting criminal cases. It also handles complaints againstpolice, prison officials and other branches of the administration

Prostrate Buddhist practice of lying face down before any sacred body

192


PSB (Tib. schi de chus, Ch. Gong An Ju) Public Security Bureau, local level policeforce responsible for detaining and arresting suspects and for pre-trial custody

Re-education Indoctrination of Chinese Communist ideology and national unity; carriedout extensively in religious institutions and labour camps in Tibet

Rukhag (Tib) One small unit within a prison, village, school, or military etcSaga Dawa (Tib) The month of Buddha’s birth, Enlightenment and DeathSplittism (Tib. Khadral ringlugs) Party term for the movement for Tibetan

independence or any nationalist sentimentsStrike Hard (Tib. dungdek tsanen, Ch. yanda) A PRC campaign targeted at crushing

corruption and crime. Within Tibet, Chinese authorities are aiming thecampaign at “splittists”

Tsampa (Tib) Roasted barley flourTsongkhul (Tib) Detention AreaTsuglhakhang (Tib) Central Cathedral in LhasaUNWGAD United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary DetentionWork Team (Tib. las don ru khag, Ch. gongzuo dui) Specially formed units of government

personnel sent to conduct “patriotic re-education” in an institution or localityYartsa Gunbu (Tib) A Tibetan medicinal plant (Botanical name cordyceps sinensis)Yuan (Ch) Chinese currency (8 Yuan is equivalent to 1 dollar.)

Appendices

193

Article 1: All Human Being are born free and equalin dignity and rights. They are endowed with rea-son and conscience and should act towards one an-other in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 2: Everyone is entitled to all the rights andfreedoms set forth in this Declaration, without dis-tinction of any kind, such as, race, color, sex, lan-guage, religion, political or other opinion, nationalor social origin, property, birth or other status.

Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on thebasis of the political, jurisdictional or internationalstatus of the country or territory to which a personbelongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sover-eignty.

Article 3: Everyone has the right to life, liberty andsecurity of person.

Article 4: No one shall be held in slavery or servi-tude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibitedin all their forms.

Article 5: No one shall be subjected to torture or tocruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-ment.Article 6:Everyone has the right to recognition ev-erywhere as a person before the law.

Article 7: All are equal before law and are entitledwithout any discrimination to equal protection ofthe law. All are entitled to equal protection againstany discrimination in violation of this Declarationand against any incitement in such discrimination.

Article 8:Everyone has the right to an effective rem-edy by the competent national tribunals for actsviolating the fundamentals rights granted him bythe constitution or by law.

Article 9: No one shall be subjected to arbitrary ar-rest, detention or exile.

Article 10: Everyone is entitled in full equality to afair and public hearing by an independent and im-partial tribunal, in the determination of his rightsand obligations and of any criminal charge againsthim.

Article 11:Everyone charged with a penal offencehas the right to be presumed innocent until provedguilty according to law in a public trail at which hehas had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.

No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence onaccount of any act or omission, which did not con-stitute a penal offence, under national or interna-tional law, at the time when it was committed. Norshall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one thatwas applicable at the time the penal offence wascommitted. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposedthan the one that was applicable at the time the pe-nal offence was committed.

Article 12: No one shall be subjected to arbitraryinterference with his privacy, family, home or cor-respondence, nor to attacks upon his honour andreputation. Everyone has the right to the protectionof the law against such interference or attacks.

Article 13: Everyone has the right to freedom ofmovement and residence within the borders of eachstate.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

APPENDIX 7

194


Everyone has the right to leave any country, includ-ing his own, and to return to his country.

Article 14: Everyone has the right to seek and toenjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.

The right may not be invoked in the case of pros-ecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimesor from acts contrary to the purposes and principlesof the United Nations.

Article 15: Everyone has the right to a nationality.No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his national-ity nor denied the right to change his nationality.

Article 16: Men and women of full age, withoutany limitation due to race, nationality or religion,have the right to marry and to found a family. Theyare entitled to equals rights as to marriage, duringmarriage and at its dissolutions.

Marriage shall be entered into only with the freeand full consent of the intending spouses.

The family is the natural and fundamental groupunit of society and is entitled to protection by soci-ety and the state.

Article 17: Everyone has the right to own propertyalone as well as in association with others.

No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

Article 18: Everyone has the right to freedom ofthought, conscience and religion; this right includesfreedom to change its religion or belief and free-dom, either alone or in community with others andin public or private, to manifest his religion or be-lief in teaching, practice, workshop and observance.

Article 19: Everyone has the right to freedom ofopinion and expression; this right includes freedom

to hold opinions without interference and to seek,receive and impart information and ideas throughany media and regardless of frontiers.

Article 20: Everyone has the right to freedom ofpeaceful assembly and association.No one may be compelled to belong to an associa-tion.

Article 21: Everyone has the right to take part inthe government of his country, directly or throughfreely chosen representatives.

Everyone has the right to equal access to public ser-vices in his country.

The will of the people shall be the basis of the au-thority of government; this will shall be expressedin periodic and genuine elections which shall be byUniversal and equal suffrage and shall by held bythe secret vote or by equivalent free voting proce-dures.

Article 22: Everyone, as a member of society hasthe right to social security and is entitled to realiza-tion, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organizationand resources of each state, of the economic, socialand cultural rights indispensable of his dignity andthe free development of his personality.

Article 23:Everyone has the right to work, to freechoice of employment, to just and favorable condi-tions of work and to protection against unemploy-ment.

Everyone, without any discrimination, has the rightto equal pay for equal work.

Everyone who works has the right to just and fa-vorable remuneration ensuring for himself and hisfamily an existence worthy of human dignity, and

Appendices

195

supplemented, if necessary, by other means of so-cial protection.

Everyone has the right to form and to join tradeunions for the protection of his interests.

Article 24: Everyone has the right to rest and lei-sure, including reasonable limitation of workinghours and periodic holidays with pay.

Article 25: Everyone has the right to a standard ofliving adequate for the health and well being forhimself and of his family, including food, clothing,housing and medical care and necessary social ser-vices, and the right to security in the event of un-employment, sickness, disability, widowhood, oldage or other lack of livelihood in circumstances be-yond his control.

Motherhood and childhood are entitled to specialcare and assistance. All children, whether born in orout of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protec-tion.

Article 26: Everyone has the right to education.Education shall be free, at least in the elementaryand fundamental stages. Elementary education shallbe compulsory. Technical and professional educa-tion shall be made generally available and highereducation shall be equally accessible to all on thebasis of merit.

Education shall be directed to the full developmentof the human personality and to the strengtheningof respect for human rights and fundamental free-doms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance andfriendship among all nations, racial or religiousgroups, and shall further the activities of the UnitedNations for the maintenance of peace.

Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of edu-cation that shall be given to their children.

Article 27: Everyone has the right freely to partici-pate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoythe arts and to share in scientific advancement andits benefits.Everyone has the right to the protection of the moraland material interests resulting from any scientific,literary or artistic production of which he is the au-thor.

Article 28:Everyone is entitled to a social and inter-national order in which the rights and freedoms setforth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

Article 29: Everyone has duties to the communityin which alone the free and full development of hispersonality is possible.

In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyoneshall be subject only to such limitations as are deter-mined by law solely for the purpose of securing duerecognition and respect for the rights and freedomsof others and of meeting the just requirements ofmorality, public order and the general welfare in ademocratic society.These rights and freedoms may in no case be exer-cised contrary to the purposes and principles of theUnited Nations.

Article 30: Nothing in this Declaration may be in-terpreted as implying for any state, group or personany right to engage in any activity or to performany act aimed at the destruction of any of the rightsand freedoms set forth herein.

196


PART I

Article I1. All peoples have the right of self-determination.By virtue of that right they freely determine theirpolitical status and freely pursue their economic,social and cultural development.

2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dis-pose of their natural wealth and resources withoutprejudice to any obligations arising out of interna-tional economic co-operation, based upon the prin-ciple of mutual benefit, and international law. Inno case may a people be deprived of its own meansof subsistence.

3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, in-cluding those having responsibility for the adminis-tration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territo-ries, shall promote the realization of the right ofself-determination, and shall respect that right, inconformity with the provisions of the Charter ofthe United Nations.

PART II

Article 21. Each State Party to the present Covenant under-takes to respect and to ensure to all individuals withinits territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rightsrecognized in the present Covenant, without dis-tinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, lan-guage, religion, political or other opinion, nationalor social origin, property, birth or other status.

2. Where not already provided for by existing legis-lative or other measures, each State Party to thepresent Covenant undertakes to take the necessarysteps, in accordance with its constitutional processesand with the provisions of the present Covenant, to

adopt such legislative or other measures as may benecessary to give effect to the rights recognized inthe present Covenant.

3. Each State Party to the present Covenant under-takes:(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or free-doms as herein recognized are violated shall have aneffective remedy, notwithstanding that the violationhas been committed by persons acting in an officialcapacity;

(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a rem-edy shall have his right thereto determined by com-petent judicial, administrative or legislative authori-ties, or by any other competent authority providedfor by the legal system of the State, and to developthe possibilities of judicial remedy;

(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shallenforce such remedies when granted.

Article 3The States Parties to the present Covenant under-take to ensure the equal right of men and womento the enjoyment of all civil and political rights setforth in the present Covenant.

Article 41. In time of public emergency which threatens thelife of the nation and the existence of which is offi-cially proclaimed, the States Parties to the presentCovenant may take measures derogating from theirobligations under the present Covenant to the ex-tent strictly required by the exigencies of the situa-tion, provided that such measures are not inconsis-tent with their other obligations under internationallaw and do not involve discrimination solely on theground of race, colour, sex, language, religion orsocial origin.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

APPENDIX 8

Appendices

197

2. No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs Iand 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made under thisprovision.3. Any State Party to the present Covenant availingitself of the right of derogation shall immediatelyinform the other States Parties to the present Cov-enant, through the intermediary of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, of the provisionsfrom which it has derogated and of the reasons bywhich it was actuated. A further communicationshall be made, through the same intermediary, onthe date on which it terminates such derogation.

Article 51. Nothing in the present Covenant may be inter-preted as implying for any State, group or personany right to engage in any activity or perform anyact aimed at the destruction of any of the rights andfreedoms recognized herein or at their limitation toa greater extent than is provided for in the presentCovenant.

2. There shall be no restriction upon or derogationfrom any of the fundamental human rights recog-nized or existing in any State Party to the presentCovenant pursuant to law, conventions, regulationsor custom on the pretext that the present Covenantdoes not recognize such rights or that it recognizesthem to a lesser extent.

PART III

Article 61. Every human being has the inherent right to life.This right shall be protected by law. No one shallbe arbitrarily deprived of his life.

2. In countries which have not abolished the deathpenalty, sentence of death may be imposed only forthe most serious crimes in accordance with the lawin force at the time of the commission of the crimeand not contrary to the provisions of the presentCovenant and to the Convention on the Preven-tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to afinal judgement rendered by a competent court.

3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime ofgenocide, it is understood that nothing in this ar-ticle shall authorize any State Party to the presentCovenant to derogate in any way from any obliga-tion assumed under the provisions of the Conven-tion on the Prevention and Punishment of theCrime of Genocide.

4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right toseek pardon or commutation of the sentence. Am-nesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence ofdeath may be granted in all cases.

5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimescommitted by persons below eighteen years of ageand shall not be carried out on pregnant women.

6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delayor to prevent the abolition of capital punishmentby any State Party to the present Covenant.

Article 7No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Inparticular, no one shall be subjected without his freeconsent to medical or scientific experimentation.

Article 81. No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and theslave-trade in all their forms shall be prohibited.

2. No one shall be held in servitude.3. (a) No one shall be required to perform forced orcompulsory labour;

(b) Paragraph 3 (a) shall not be held to preclude, incountries where imprisonment with hard labour maybe imposed as a punishment for a crime, the perfor-mance of hard labour in pursuance of a sentence tosuch punishment by a competent court;(c) For the purpose of this paragraph the term“forced or compulsory labour” shall not include:(i) Any work or service, not referred to in subpara-graph (b), normally required of a person who is under

198


detention in consequence of a lawful order of acourt, or of a person during conditional release fromsuch detention;(ii) Any service of a military character and, in coun-tries where conscientious objection is recognized, anynational service required by law of conscientiousobjectors;(iii) Any service exacted in cases of emergency orcalamity threatening the life or well-being of thecommunity;(iv) Any work or service which forms part of nor-mal civil obligations.

Article 91. Everyone has the right to liberty and security ofperson. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrestor detention. No one shall be deprived of his lib-erty except on such grounds and in accordance withsuch procedure as are established by law.

2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at thetime of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shallbe promptly informed of any charges against him.

3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal chargeshall be brought promptly before a judge or otherofficer authorized by law to exercise judicial powerand shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable timeor to release. It shall not be the general rule thatpersons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody,but release may be subject to guarantees to appearfor trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceed-ings, and, should occasion arise, for execution ofthe judgement.

4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest ordetention shall be entitled to take proceedings be-fore a court, in order that court may decide withoutdelay on the lawfulness of his detention and orderhis release if the detention is not lawful.

5. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful ar-rest or detention shall have an enforceable right tocompensation.

Article 101. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treatedwith humanity and with respect for the inherentdignity of the human person.

2. (a) Accused persons shall, save in exceptional cir-cumstances, be segregated from convicted personsand shall be subject to separate treatment appropri-ate to their status as unconvicted persons;(b) Accused juvenile persons shall be separated fromadults and brought as speedily as possible for adju-dication.

3. The penitentiary system shall comprise treatmentof prisoners the essential aim of which shall be theirreformation and social rehabilitation. Juvenile of-fenders shall be segregated from adults and be ac-corded treatment appropriate to their age and legalstatus.

Article 11No one shall be imprisoned merely on the groundof inability to fulfil a contractual obligation.

Article 121. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a Stateshall, within that territory, have the right to libertyof movement and freedom to choose his residence.

2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, in-cluding his own.

3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subjectto any restrictions except those which are providedby law, are necessary to protect national security,public order (ordre public), public health or moralsor the rights and freedoms of others, and are consis-tent with the other rights recognized in the presentCovenant.

4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the rightto enter his own country.

Article 13An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party tothe present Covenant may be expelled therefromonly in pursuance of a decision reached in accor-

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dance with law and shall, except where compellingreasons of national security otherwise require, beallowed to submit the reasons against his expulsionand to have his case reviewed by, and be representedfor the purpose before, the competent authority ora person or persons especially designated by the com-petent authority.

Article 141. All persons shall be equal before the courts andtribunals. In the determination of any criminalcharge against him, or of his rights and obligationsin a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fairand public hearing by a competent, independent andimpartial tribunal established by law. The press andthe public may be excluded from all or part of atrial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre pub-lic) or national security in a democratic society, orwhen the interest of the private lives of the partiesso requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in theopinion of the court in special circumstances wherepublicity would prejudice the interests of justice;but any judgement rendered in a criminal case or ina suit at law shall be made public except where theinterest of juvenile persons otherwise requires or theproceedings concern matrimonial disputes or theguardianship of children.

2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shallhave the right to be presumed innocent until provedguilty according to law.

3. In the determination of any criminal charge againsthim, everyone shall be entitled to the followingminimum guarantees, in full equality:(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a lan-guage which he understands of the nature and causeof the charge against him;(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the prepa-ration of his defence and to communicate with coun-sel of his own choosing;(c) To be tried without undue delay;(d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend him-self in person or through legal assistance of his own

choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legalassistance, of this right; and to have legal assistanceassigned to him, in any case where the interests ofjustice so require, and without payment by him inany such case if he does not have sufficient means topay for it;(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnessesagainst him and to obtain the attendance and ex-amination of witnesses on his behalf under the sameconditions as witnesses against him;(f ) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if hecannot understand or speak the language used incourt;(g) Not to be compelled to testify against himselfor to confess guilt.

4. In the case of juvenile persons, the procedure shallbe such as will take account of their age and thedesirability of promoting their rehabilitation.

5. Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the rightto his conviction and sentence being reviewed by ahigher tribunal according to law.

6. When a person has by a final decision been con-victed of a criminal offence and when subsequentlyhis conviction has been reversed or he has been par-doned on the ground that a new or newly discov-ered fact shows conclusively that there has been amiscarriage of justice, the person who has sufferedpunishment as a result of such conviction shall becompensated according to law, unless it is provedthat the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in timeis wholly or partly attributable to him.

7. No one shall be liable to be tried or punishedagain for an offence for which he has already beenfinally convicted or acquitted in accordance with thelaw and penal procedure of each country.

Article 151. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal of-fence on account of any act or omission which didnot constitute a criminal offence, under national orinternational law, at the time when it was commit-

200


ted. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed thanthe one that was applicable at the time when thecriminal offence was committed. If, subsequent tothe commission of the offence, provision is madeby law for the imposition of the lighter penalty, theoffender shall benefit thereby.

2. Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trialand punishment of any person for any act or omis-sion which, at the time when it was committed,was criminal according to the general principles oflaw recognized by the community of nations.

Article 16Everyone shall have the right to recognition every-where as a person before the law.

Article 171. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlaw-ful interference with his privacy, family, home orcorrespondence, nor to unlawful attacks on hishonour and reputation.

2. Everyone has the right to the protection of thelaw against such interference or attacks.

Article 181. Everyone shall have the right to freedom ofthought, conscience and religion. This right shallinclude freedom to have or to adopt a religion orbelief of his choice, and freedom, either individu-ally or in community with others and in public orprivate, to manifest his religion or belief in wor-ship, observance, practice and teaching.

2. No one shall be subject to coercion which wouldimpair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion orbelief of his choice.

3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs maybe subject only to such limitations as are prescribedby law and are necessary to protect public safety,order, health, or morals or the fundamental rightsand freedoms of others.

4. The States Parties to the present Covenant un-dertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and,

when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the reli-gious and moral education of their children in con-formity with their own convictions.

Article 191. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinionswithout interference.

2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of ex-pression; this right shall include freedom to seek,receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds,regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or inprint, in the form of art, or through any other me-dia of his choice.

3. The exercise of the rights provided for in para-graph 2 of this article carries with it special dutiesand responsibilities. It may therefore be subject tocertain restrictions, but these shall only be such asare provided by law and are necessary:(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;(b) For the protection of national security or ofpublic order (ordre public), or of public health ormorals.

Article 201. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited bylaw.

2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious ha-tred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.

Article 21The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized.No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of thisright other than those imposed in conformity withthe law and which are necessary in a democratic so-ciety in the interests of national security or publicsafety, public order (ordre public), the protectionof public health or morals or the protection of therights and freedoms of others.

Article 221. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of asso-ciation with others, including the right to form and

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join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise ofthis right other than those which are prescribed bylaw and which are necessary in a democratic societyin the interests of national security or public safety,public order (ordre public), the protection of pub-lic health or morals or the protection of the rightsand freedoms of others. This article shall not pre-vent the imposition of lawful restrictions on mem-bers of the armed forces and of the police in theirexercise of this right.

3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States Par-ties to the International Labour Organisation Con-vention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Associa-tion and Protection of the Right to Organize to takelegislative measures which would prejudice, or toapply the law in such a manner as to prejudice, theguarantees provided for in that Convention.

Article 231. The family is the natural and fundamental groupunit of society and is entitled to protection by soci-ety and the State.

2. The right of men and women of marriageableage to marry and to found a family shall be recog-nized.

3. No marriage shall be entered into without thefree and full consent of the intending spouses.4. States Parties to the present Covenant shall takeappropriate steps to ensure equality of rights andresponsibilities of spouses as to marriage, duringmarriage and at its dissolution. In the case of disso-lution, provision shall be made for the necessaryprotection of any children.

Article 241. Every child shall have, without any discrimina-tion as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, na-tional or social origin, property or birth, the rightto such measures of protection as are required byhis status as a minor, on the part of his family, soci-ety and the State.

2. Every child shall be registered immediately afterbirth and shall have a name.

3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.

Article 25Every citizen shall have the right and the opportu-nity, without any of the distinctions mentioned inarticle 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, di-rectly or through freely chosen representatives;(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodicelections which shall be by universal and equal suf-frage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeingthe free expression of the will of the electors;(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, topublic service in his country.

Article 26All persons are equal before the law and are entitledwithout any discrimination to the equal protectionof the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit anydiscrimination and guarantee to all persons equaland effective protection against discrimination onany ground such as race, colour, sex, language, reli-gion, political or other opinion, national or socialorigin, property, birth or other status.

Article 27In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguis-tic minorities exist, persons belonging to such mi-norities shall not be denied the right, in commu-nity with the other members of their group, to en-joy their own culture, to profess and practise theirown religion, or to use their own language.

PART IV

Article 281. There shall be established a Human Rights Com-mittee (hereafter referred to in the present Covenantas the Committee). It shall consist of eighteen mem-bers and shall carry out the functions hereinafterprovided.

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2. The Committee shall be composed of nationalsof the States Parties to the present Covenant whoshall be persons of high moral character and recog-nized competence in the field of human rights, con-sideration being given to the usefulness of the par-ticipation of some persons having legal experience.

3. The members of the Committee shall be electedand shall serve in their personal capacity.

Article 291. The members of the Committee shall be electedby secret ballot from a list of persons possessing thequalifications prescribed in article 28 and nominatedfor the purpose by the States Parties to the presentCovenant.

2. Each State Party to the present Covenant maynominate not more than two persons. These per-sons shall be nationals of the nominating State.

3. A person shall be eligible for renomination.

Article 301. The initial election shall be held no later than sixmonths after the date of the entry into force of thepresent Covenant.

2. At least four months before the date of each elec-tion to the Committee, other than an election tofill a vacancy declared in accordance with article 34,the Secretary-General of the United Nations shalladdress a written invitation to the States Parties tothe present Covenant to submit their nominationsfor membership of the Committee within threemonths.

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shallprepare a list in alphabetical order of all the personsthus nominated, with an indication of the StatesParties which have nominated them, and shall sub-mit it to the States Parties to the present Covenantno later than one month before the date of eachelection.

4. Elections of the members of the Committee shallbe held at a meeting of the States Parties to the

present Covenant convened by the Secretary Gen-eral of the United Nations at the Headquarters ofthe United Nations. At that meeting, for which twothirds of the States Parties to the present Covenantshall constitute a quorum, the persons elected tothe Committee shall be those nominees who ob-tain the largest number of votes and an absolutemajority of the votes of the representatives of StatesParties present and voting.Article 311. The Committee may not include more than onenational of the same State.

2. In the election of the Committee, considerationshall be given to equitable geographical distributionof membership and to the representation of the dif-ferent forms of civilization and of the principal le-gal systems.

Article 321. The members of the Committee shall be electedfor a term of four years. They shall be eligible forre-election if renominated. However, the terms ofnine of the members elected at the first election shallexpire at the end of two years; immediately afterthe first election, the names of these nine membersshall be chosen by lot by the Chairman of the meet-ing referred to in article 30, paragraph 4.

2. Elections at the expiry of office shall be held inaccordance with the preceding articles of this partof the present Covenant.

Article 331. If, in the unanimous opinion of the other mem-bers, a member of the Committee has ceased to carryout his functions for any cause other than absenceof a temporary character, the Chairman of the Com-mittee shall notify the Secretary-General of theUnited Nations, who shall then declare the seat ofthat member to be vacant.

2. In the event of the death or the resignation of amember of the Committee, the Chairman shallimmediately notify the Secretary-General of the

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United Nations, who shall declare the seat vacantfrom the date of death or the date on which theresignation takes effect.

Article 341. When a vacancy is declared in accordance witharticle 33 and if the term of office of the memberto be replaced does not expire within six months ofthe declaration of the vacancy, the Secretary-Gen-eral of the United Nations shall notify each of theStates Parties to the present Covenant, which maywithin two months submit nominations in accor-dance with article 29 for the purpose of filling thevacancy.

2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shallprepare a list in alphabetical order of the personsthus nominated and shall submit it to the StatesParties to the present Covenant. The election to fillthe vacancy shall then take place in accordance withthe relevant provisions of this part of the presentCovenant.

3. A member of the Committee elected to fill avacancy declared in accordance with article 33 shallhold office for the remainder of the term of themember who vacated the seat on the Committeeunder the provisions of that article.

Article 35The members of the Committee shall, with theapproval of the General Assembly of the UnitedNations, receive emoluments from United Nationsresources on such terms and conditions as the Gen-eral Assembly may decide, having regard to the im-portance of the Committee’s responsibilities.

Article 36The Secretary-General of the United Nations shallprovide the necessary staff and facilities for the ef-fective performance of the functions of the Com-mittee under the present Covenant.

Article 371. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shallconvene the initial meeting of the Committee atthe Headquarters of the United Nations.

2. After its initial meeting, the Committee shall meetat such times as shall be provided in its rules of pro-cedure.

3. The Committee shall normally meet at the Head-quarters of the United Nations or at the UnitedNations Office at Geneva.

Article 38Every member of the Committee shall, before tak-ing up his duties, make a solemn declaration in opencommittee that he will perform his functions im-partially and conscientiously.

Article 391. The Committee shall elect its officers for a termof two years. They may be re-elected.

2. The Committee shall establish its own rules ofprocedure, but these rules shall provide, inter alia,that:(a) Twelve members shall constitute a quorum;(b) Decisions of the Committee shall be made by amajority vote of the members present.

Article 401. The States Parties to the present Covenant un-dertake to submit reports on the measures they haveadopted which give effect to the rights recognizedherein and on the progress made in the enjoymentof those rights:(a) Within one year of the entry into force of thepresent Covenant for the States Parties concerned;(b) Thereafter whenever the Committee so requests.

2. All reports shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmitthem to the Committee for consideration. Reportsshall indicate the factors and difficulties, if any, af-fecting the implementation of the present Covenant.

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3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations may,after consultation with the Committee, transmit tothe specialized agencies concerned copies of such partsof the reports as may fall within their field of com-petence.

4. The Committee shall study the reports submit-ted by the States Parties to the present Covenant. Itshall transmit its reports, and such general commentsas it may consider appropriate, to the States Parties.The Committee may also transmit to the Economicand Social Council these comments along with thecopies of the reports it has received from States Par-ties to the present Covenant.

5. The States Parties to the present Covenant maysubmit to the Committee observations on any com-ments that may be made in accordance with para-graph 4 of this article.

Article 411. A State Party to the present Covenant may at anytime declare under this article that it recognizes thecompetence of the Committee to receive and con-sider communications to the effect that a State Partyclaims that another State Party is not fulfilling itsobligations under the present Covenant. Commu-nications under this article may be received and con-sidered only if submitted by a State Party which hasmade a declaration recognizing in regard to itselfthe competence of the Committee. No communi-cation shall be received by the Committee if it con-cerns a State Party which has not made such a decla-ration. Communications received under this articleshall be dealt with in accordance with the followingprocedure:(a) If a State Party to the present Covenant consid-ers that another State Party is not giving effect tothe provisions of the present Covenant, it may, bywritten communication, bring the matter to theattention of that State Party. Within three monthsafter the receipt of the communication the receiv-ing State shall afford the State which sent the com-munication an explanation, or any other statement

in writing clarifying the matter which should in-clude, to the extent possible and pertinent, refer-ence to domestic procedures and remedies taken,pending, or available in the matter;(b) If the matter is not adjusted to the satisfactionof both States Parties concerned within six monthsafter the receipt by the receiving State of the initialcommunication, either State shall have the right torefer the matter to the Committee, by notice givento the Committee and to the other State;(c) The Committee shall deal with a matter referredto it only after it has ascertained that all availabledomestic remedies have been invoked and exhaustedin the matter, in conformity with the generally rec-ognized principles of international law. This shallnot be the rule where the application of the rem-edies is unreasonably prolonged;(d) The Committee shall hold closed meetings whenexamining communications under this article;(e) Subject to the provisions of subparagraph (c),the Committee shall make available its good officesto the States Parties concerned with a view to afriendly solution of the matter on the basis of re-spect for human rights and fundamental freedomsas recognized in the present Covenant;(f ) In any matter referred to it, the Committee maycall upon the States Parties concerned, referred to insubparagraph (b), to supply any relevant informa-tion;(g) The States Parties concerned, referred to in sub-paragraph (b), shall have the right to be representedwhen the matter is being considered in the Com-mittee and to make submissions orally and/or inwriting;(h) The Committee shall, within twelve monthsafter the date of receipt of notice under subpara-graph (b), submit a report:(i) If a solution within the terms of subparagraph(e) is reached, the Committee shall confine its re-port to a brief statement of the facts and of the so-lution reached;(ii) If a solution within the terms of subparagraph

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(e) is not reached, the Committee shall confine itsreport to a brief statement of the facts; the writtensubmissions and record of the oral submissions madeby the States Parties concerned shall be attached tothe report. In every matter, the report shall be com-municated to the States Parties concerned.

2. The provisions of this article shall come into forcewhen ten States Parties to the present Covenant havemade declarations under paragraph I of this article.Such declarations shall be deposited by the StatesParties with the Secretary-General of the UnitedNations, who shall transmit copies thereof to theother States Parties. A declaration may be withdrawnat any time by notification to the Secretary-Gen-eral. Such a withdrawal shall not prejudice the con-sideration of any matter which is the subject of acommunication already transmitted under this ar-ticle; no further communication by any State Partyshall be received after the notification of withdrawalof the declaration has been received by the Secre-tary-General, unless the State Party concerned hasmade a new declaration.

Article 421. (a) If a matter referred to the Committee in ac-cordance with article 41 is not resolved to the satis-faction of the States Parties concerned, the Com-mittee may, with the prior consent of the StatesParties concerned, appoint an ad hoc ConciliationCommission (hereinafter referred to as the Com-mission). The good offices of the Commission shallbe made available to the States Parties concernedwith a view to an amicable solution of the matteron the basis of respect for the present Covenant;(b) The Commission shall consist of five personsacceptable to the States Parties concerned. If theStates Parties concerned fail to reach agreementwithin three months on all or part of the composi-tion of the Commission, the members of the Com-mission concerning whom no agreement has beenreached shall be elected by secret ballot by a two-thirds majority vote of the Committee from among

its members.

2. The members of the Commission shall serve intheir personal capacity. They shall not be nationalsof the States Parties concerned, or of a State notParty to the present Covenant, or of a State Partywhich has not made a declaration under article 41.

3. The Commission shall elect its own Chairmanand adopt its own rules of procedure.

4. The meetings of the Commission shall normallybe held at the Headquarters of the United Nationsor at the United Nations Office at Geneva. How-ever, they may be held at such other convenientplaces as the Commission may determine in con-sultation with the Secretary-General of the UnitedNations and the States Parties concerned.

5. The secretariat provided in accordance with ar-ticle 36 shall also service the commissions appointedunder this article.

6. The information received and collated by theCommittee shall be made available to the Com-mission and the Commission may call upon theStates Parties concerned to supply any other relevantinformation.

7. When the Commission has fully considered thematter, but in any event not later than twelve monthsafter having been seized of the matter, it shall sub-mit to the Chairman of the Committee a report forcommunication to the States Parties concerned:(a) If the Commission is unable to complete its con-sideration of the matter within twelve months, itshall confine its report to a brief statement of thestatus of its consideration of the matter;(b) If an amicable solution to the matter on tie basisof respect for human rights as recognized in thepresent Covenant is reached, the Commission shallconfine its report to a brief statement of the factsand of the solution reached;(c) If a solution within the terms of subparagraph(b) is not reached, the Commission’s report shallembody its findings on all questions of fact relevant

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to the issues between the States Parties concerned,and its views on the possibilities of an amicable so-lution of the matter. This report shall also containthe written submissions and a record of the oral sub-missions made by the States Parties concerned;(d) If the Commission’s report is submitted undersubparagraph (c), the States Parties concerned shall,within three months of the receipt of the report,notify the Chairman of the Committee whether ornot they accept the contents of the report of theCommission.

8. The provisions of this article are without preju-dice to the responsibilities of the Committee underArticle 41.

9. The States Parties concerned shall share equallyall the expenses of the members of the Commis-sion in accordance with estimates to be provided bythe Secretary-General of the United Nations.

10. The Secretary-General of the United Nationsshall be empowered to pay the expenses of the mem-bers of the Commission, if necessary, before reim-bursement by the States Parties concerned, in accor-dance with paragraph 9 of this article.

Article 43The members of the Committee, and of the ad hocconciliation commissions which may be appointedunder article 42, shall be entitled to the facilities,privileges and immunities of experts on mission forthe United Nations as laid down in the relevant sec-tions of the Convention on the Privileges and Im-munities of the United Nations.

Article 44The provisions for the implementation of thepresent Covenant shall apply without prejudice tothe procedures prescribed in the field of human rightsby or under the constituent instruments and theconventions of the United Nations and of the spe-cialized agencies and shall not prevent the StatesParties to the present Covenant from having recourseto other procedures for settling a dispute in accor-

dance with general or special international agreementsin force between them.

Article 45The Committee shall submit to the General As-sembly of the United Nations, through the Eco-nomic and Social Council, an annual report on itsactivities.

PART V

Article 46.Nothing in the present Covenant shall be inter-preted as impairing the provisions of the Charter ofthe United Nations and of the constitutions of thespecialized agencies which define the respective re-sponsibilities of the various organs of the UnitedNations and of the specialized agencies in regard tothe matters dealt with in the present Covenant.

Article 47Nothing in the present Covenant shall be inter-preted as impairing the inherent right of all peoplesto enjoy and utilize fully and freely their naturalwealth and resources.

PART VI

Article 481. The present Covenant is open for signature byany State Member of the United Nations or mem-ber of any of its specialized agencies, by any StateParty to the Statute of the International Court ofJustice, and by any other State which has been in-vited by the General Assembly of the United Na-tions to become a Party to the present Covenant.

2. The present Covenant is subject to ratification.Instruments of ratification shall be deposited withthe Secretary-General of the United Nations.

3. The present Covenant shall be open to accessionby any State referred to in paragraph 1 of this ar-ticle.

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4. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of aninstrument of accession with the Secretary-Generalof the United Nations.

5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shallinform all States which have signed this Covenantor acceded to it of the deposit of each instrument ofratification or accession.

Article 491. The present Covenant shall enter into force threemonths after the date of the deposit with the Secre-tary-General of the United Nations of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or instrument of ac-cession.

2. For each State ratifying the present Covenant oracceding to it after the deposit of the thirty-fifthinstrument of ratification or instrument of acces-sion, the present Covenant shall enter into force threemonths after the date of the deposit of its own in-strument of ratification or instrument of accession.

Article 50The provisions of the present Covenant shall ex-tend to all parts of federal States without any limi-tations or exceptions.

Article 511. Any State Party to the present Covenant maypropose an amendment and file it with the Secre-tary-General of the United Nations. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon com-municate any proposed amendments to the StatesParties to the present Covenant with a request thatthey notify him whether they favour a conferenceof States Parties for the purpose of considering andvoting upon the proposals. In the event that at leastone third of the States Parties favours such a confer-ence, the Secretary-General shall convene the con-ference under the auspices of the United Nations.Any amendment adopted by a majority of the StatesParties present and voting at the conference shall besubmitted to the General Assembly of the UnitedNations for approval.

2. Amendments shall come into force when theyhave been approved by the General Assembly of theUnited Nations and accepted by a two-thirds ma-jority of the States Parties to the present Covenantin accordance with their respective constitutionalprocesses. 3. When amendments come into force,they shall be binding on those States Parties whichhave accepted them, other States Parties still beingbound by the provisions of the present Covenantand any earlier amendment which they have ac-cepted.

Article 52Irrespective of the notifications made under article48, paragraph 5, the Secretary-General of the UnitedNations shall inform all States referred to in para-graph I of the same article of the following particu-lars:(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions under ar-ticle 48;(b) The date of the entry into force of the presentCovenant under article 49 and the date of the entryinto force of any amendments under article 51.

Article 531. The present Covenant, of which the Chinese,English, French, Russian and Spanish texts areequally authentic, shall be deposited in the archivesof the United Nations.2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shalltransmit certified copies of the present Covenant toall States referred to in article 48.

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PART I

Article 11. All peoples have the right of self-determination.By virtue of that right they freely determine theirpolitical status and freely pursue their economic,social and cultural development.

2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dis-pose of their natural wealth and resources withoutprejudice to any obligations arising out of interna-tional economic co-operation, based upon the prin-ciple of mutual benefit, and international law. Inno case may a people be deprived of its own meansof subsistence.

3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, in-cluding those having responsibility for the adminis-tration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territo-ries, shall promote the realization of the right ofself-determination, and shall respect that right, inconformity with the provisions of the Charter ofthe United Nations.

PART II

Article 21. Each State Party to the present Covenant under-takes to take steps, individually and through inter-national assistance and co-operation, especially eco-nomic and technical, to the maximum of its avail-able resources, with a view to achieving progressivelythe full realization of the rights recognized in thepresent Covenant by all appropriate means, includ-ing particularly the adoption of legislative measures.

2. The States Parties to the present Covenant un-dertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated inthe present Covenant will be exercised without dis-crimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, lan-guage, religion, political or other opinion, national

or social origin, property, birth or other status.

3. Developing countries, with due regard to humanrights and their national economy, may determineto what extent they would guarantee the economicrights recognized in the present Covenant to non-nationals.

Article 3The States Parties to the present Covenant under-take to ensure the equal right of men and womento the enjoyment of all economic, social and cul-tural rights set forth in the present Covenant.

Article 4The States Parties to the present Covenant recog-nize that, in the enjoyment of those rights providedby the State in conformity with the present Cov-enant, the State may subject such rights only to suchlimitations as are determined by law only in so faras this may be compatible with the nature of theserights and solely for the purpose of promoting thegeneral welfare in a democratic society.

Article 51. Nothing in the present Covenant may be inter-preted as implying for any State, group or personany right to engage in any activity or to performany act aimed at the destruction of any of the rightsor freedoms recognized herein, or at their limita-tion to a greater extent than is provided for in thepresent Covenant.

2. No restriction upon or derogation from any ofthe fundamental human rights recognized or exist-ing in any country in virtue of law, conventions,regulations or custom shall be admitted on the pre-text that the present Covenant does not recognizesuch rights or that it recognizes them to a lesser ex-tent.

APPENDIX 9

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

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PART III

Article 61. The States Parties to the present Covenant recog-nize the right to work, which includes the right ofeveryone to the opportunity to gain his living bywork which he freely chooses or accepts, and willtake appropriate steps to safeguard this right.

2. The steps to be taken by a State Party to thepresent Covenant to achieve the full realization ofthis right shall include technical and vocational guid-ance and training programmes, policies and tech-niques to achieve steady economic, social and cul-tural development and full and productive employ-ment under conditions safeguarding fundamentalpolitical and economic freedoms to the individual.

Article 7The States Parties to the present Covenant recog-nize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of justand favourable conditions of work which ensure, inparticular:

(a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as aminimum, with:(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work ofequal value without distinction of any kind, in par-ticular women being guaranteed conditions of worknot inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equalpay for equal work;(ii) A decent living for themselves and their familiesin accordance with the provisions of the presentCovenant;

(b) Safe and healthy working conditions;

(c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promotedin his employment to an appropriate higher level,subject to no considerations other than those of se-niority and competence;

(d) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of work-ing hours and periodic holidays with pay, as well asremuneration for public holidays

Article 81. The States Parties to the present Covenant un-dertake to ensure:(a) The right of everyone to form trade unions andjoin the trade union of his choice, subject only tothe rules of the organization concerned, for the pro-motion and protection of his economic and socialinterests. No restrictions may be placed on the exer-cise of this right other than those prescribed by lawand which are necessary in a democratic society inthe interests of national security or public order orfor the protection of the rights and freedoms of oth-ers;(b) The right of trade unions to establish nationalfederations or confederations and the right of thelatter to form or join international trade-union or-ganizations;(c) The right of trade unions to function freely sub-ject to no limitations other than those prescribedby law and which are necessary in a democratic soci-ety in the interests of national security or public or-der or for the protection of the rights and freedomsof others;(d) The right to strike, provided that it is exercisedin conformity with the laws of the particular coun-try.

2. This article shall not prevent the imposition oflawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights bymembers of the armed forces or of the police or ofthe administration of the State.

3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States Par-ties to the International Labour Organisation Con-vention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Associa-tion and Protection of the Right to Organize to takelegislative measures which would prejudice, or ap-ply the law in such a manner as would prejudice,the guarantees provided for in that Convention.

Article 9The States Parties to the present Covenant recog-nize the right of everyone to social security, includ-ing social insurance.

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Article 10The States Parties to the present Covenant recog-nize that:1. The widest possible protection and assistanceshould be accorded to the family, which is the natu-ral and fundamental group unit of society, particu-larly for its establishment and while it is responsiblefor the care and education of dependent children.Marriage must be entered into with the free con-sent of the intending spouses.

2. Special protection should be accorded to moth-ers during a reasonable period before and after child-birth. During such period working mothers shouldbe accorded paid leave or leave with adequate socialsecurity benefits.

3. Special measures of protection and assistanceshould be taken on behalf of all children and youngpersons without any discrimination for reasons ofparentage or other conditions. Children and youngpersons should be protected from economic andsocial exploitation. Their employment in workharmful to their morals or health or dangerous tolife or likely to hamper their normal developmentshould be punishable by law. States should also setage limits below which the paid employment ofchild labour should be prohibited and punishableby law.

Article 11 1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recog-nize the right of everyone to an adequate standardof living for himself and his family, including ad-equate food, clothing and housing, and to the con-tinuous improvement of living conditions. TheStates Parties will take appropriate steps to ensurethe realization of this right, recognizing to this ef-fect the essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent.

2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, rec-ognizing the fundamental right of everyone to befree from hunger, shall take, individually andthrough international co-operation, the measures,

including specific programmes, which are needed:(a) To improve methods of production, conserva-tion and distribution of food by making full use oftechnical and scientific knowledge, by disseminat-ing knowledge of the principles of nutrition and bydeveloping or reforming agrarian systems in such away as to achieve the most efficient developmentand utilization of natural resources;(b) Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and food-exporting countries, to ensurean equitable distribution of world food supplies inrelation to need.

Article 121. The States Parties to the present Covenant recog-nize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of thehighest attainable standard of physical and mentalhealth.

2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to thepresent Covenant to achieve the full realization ofthis right shall include those necessary for:(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the healthy de-velopment of the child;(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmen-tal and industrial hygiene;(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epi-demic, endemic, occupational and other diseases;(d) The creation of conditions which would assureto all medical service and medical attention in theevent of sickness.

Article 13 1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recog-nize the right of everyone to education. They agreethat education shall be directed to the full develop-ment of the human personality and the sense of itsdignity, and shall strengthen the respect for humanrights and fundamental freedoms. They furtheragree that education shall enable all persons to par-ticipate effectively in a free society, promote under-standing, tolerance and friendship among all nations

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and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, and furtherthe activities of the United Nations for the mainte-nance of peace.

2. The States Parties to the present Covenant recog-nize that, with a view to achieving the full realiza-tion of this right:(a) Primary education shall be compulsory and avail-able free to all;(b) Secondary education in its different forms, in-cluding technical and vocational secondary educa-tion, shall be made generally available and accessibleto all by every appropriate means, and in particularby the progressive introduction of free education;(c) Higher education shall be made equally acces-sible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appro-priate means, and in particular by the progressiveintroduction of free education;(d) Fundamental education shall be encouraged orintensified as far as possible for those persons whohave not received or completed the whole period oftheir primary education;(e) The development of a system of schools at alllevels shall be actively pursued, an adequate fellow-ship system shall be established, and the materialconditions of teaching staff shall be continuouslyimproved.

3. The States Parties to the present Covenant un-dertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and,when applicable, legal guardians to choose for theirchildren schools, other than those established by thepublic authorities, which conform to such mini-mum educational standards as may be laid down orapproved by the State and to ensure the religiousand moral education of their children in conformitywith their own convictions.

4. No part of this article shall be construed so as tointerfere with the liberty of individuals and bodiesto establish and direct educational institutions, sub-ject always to the observance of the principles setforth in paragraph I of this article and to the re-quirement that the education given in such institu-

tions shall conform to such minimum standards asmay be laid down by the State.

Article 14 Each State Party to the present Covenant which, atthe time of becoming a Party, has not been able tosecure in its metropolitan territory or other territo-ries under its jurisdiction compulsory primary edu-cation, free of charge, undertakes, within two years,to work out and adopt a detailed plan of action forthe progressive implementation, within a reasonablenumber of years, to be fixed in the plan, of the prin-ciple of compulsory education free of charge for all.

Article 151. The States Parties to the present Covenant recog-nize the right of everyone:(a) To take part in cultural life;(b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress andits applications;(c) To benefit from the protection of the moral andmaterial interests resulting from any scientific, liter-ary or artistic production of which he is the author.

2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to thepresent Covenant to achieve the full realization ofthis right shall include those necessary for the con-servation, the development and the diffusion of sci-ence and culture.

3. The States Parties to the present Covenant un-dertake to respect the freedom indispensable for sci-entific research and creative activity.

4. The States Parties to the present Covenant recog-nize the benefits to be derived from the encourage-ment and development of international contacts andco-operation in the scientific and cultural fields.

PART IV

Article 161. The States Parties to the present Covenant un-dertake to submit in conformity with this part ofthe Covenant reports on the measures which they

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have adopted and the progress made in achievingthe observance of the rights recognized herein.

2. (a) All reports shall be submitted to the Secre-tary-General of the United Nations, who shall trans-mit copies to the Economic and Social Council forconsideration in accordance with the provisions ofthe present Covenant;(b) The Secretary-General of the United Nationsshall also transmit to the specialized agencies copiesof the reports, or any relevant parts therefrom, fromStates Parties to the present Covenant which are alsomembers of these specialized agencies in so far asthese reports, or parts therefrom, relate to any mat-ters which fall within the responsibilities of the saidagencies in accordance with their constitutional in-struments.

Article 171. The States Parties to the present Covenant shallfurnish their reports in stages, in accordance with aprogramme to be established by the Economic andSocial Council within one year of the entry intoforce of the present Covenant after consultation withthe States Parties and the specialized agencies con-cerned.

2. Reports may indicate factors and difficulties af-fecting the degree of fulfilment of obligations un-der the present Covenant.

3. Where relevant information has previously beenfurnished to the United Nations or to any special-ized agency by any State Party to the present Cov-enant, it will not be necessary to reproduce that in-formation, but a precise reference to the informa-tion so furnished will suffice.

Article 18Pursuant to its responsibilities under the Charter ofthe United Nations in the field of human rights andfundamental freedoms, the Economic and SocialCouncil may make arrangements with the special-ized agencies in respect of their reporting to it onthe progress made in achieving the observance of

the provisions of the present Covenant falling withinthe scope of their activities. These reports may in-clude particulars of decisions and recommendationson such implementation adopted by their compe-tent organs.

Article 19The Economic and Social Council may transmit tothe Commission on Human Rights for study andgeneral recommendation or, as appropriate, for in-formation the reports concerning human rights sub-mitted by States in accordance with articles 16 and17, and those concerning human rights submittedby the specialized agencies in accordance with ar-ticle 18.

Article 20The States Parties to the present Covenant and thespecialized agencies concerned may submit com-ments to the Economic and Social Council on anygeneral recommendation under article 19 or refer-ence to such general recommendation in any reportof the Commission on Human Rights or any docu-mentation referred to therein.

Article 21The Economic and Social Council may submit fromtime to time to the General Assembly reports withrecommendations of a general nature and a sum-mary of the information received from the StatesParties to the present Covenant and the specializedagencies on the measures taken and the progress madein achieving general observance of the rights recog-nized in the present Covenant.

Article 22The Economic and Social Council may bring tothe attention of other organs of the United Nations,their subsidiary organs and specialized agencies con-cerned with furnishing technical assistance any mat-ters arising out of the reports referred to in this partof the present Covenant which may assist such bodiesin deciding, each within its field of competence, onthe advisability of international measures likely to

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contribute to the effective progressive implementa-tion of the present Covenant.

Article 23The States Parties to the present Covenant agree thatinternational action for the achievement of the rightsrecognized in the present Covenant includes suchmethods as the conclusion of conventions, the adop-tion of recommendations, the furnishing of techni-cal assistance and the holding of regional meetingsand technical meetings for the purpose of consulta-tion and study organized in conjunction with theGovernments concerned.

Article 24Nothing in the present Covenant shall be inter-preted as impairing the provisions of the Charter ofthe United Nations and of the constitutions of thespecialized agencies which define the respective re-sponsibilities of the various organs of the UnitedNations and of the specialized agencies in regard tothe matters dealt with in the present Covenant.

Article 25Nothing in the present Covenant shall be inter-preted as impairing the inherent right of all peoplesto enjoy and utilize fully and freely their naturalwealth and resources.

PART V

Article 261. The present Covenant is open for signature byany State Member of the United Nations or mem-ber of any of its specialized agencies, by any StateParty to the Statute of the International Court ofJustice, and by any other State which has been in-vited by the General Assembly of the United Na-tions to become a party to the present Covenant.

2. The present Covenant is subject to ratification.Instruments of ratification shall be deposited withthe Secretary-General of the United Nations.3. The present Covenant shall be open to accession

by any State referred to in paragraph 1 of this ar-ticle.

4. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of aninstrument of accession with the Secretary-Generalof the United Nations.

5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shallinform all States which have signed the presentCovenant or acceded to it of the deposit of eachinstrument of ratification or accession.

Article 271. The present Covenant shall enter into force threemonths after the date of the deposit with the Secre-tary-General of the United Nations of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or instrument of ac-cession.

2. For each State ratifying the present Covenant oracceding to it after the deposit of the thirty-fifthinstrument of ratification or instrument of acces-sion, the present Covenant shall enter into force threemonths after the date of the deposit of its own in-strument of ratification or instrument of accession.

Article 28The provisions of the present Covenant shall ex-tend to all parts of federal States without any limi-tations or exceptions.

Article 291. Any State Party to the present Covenant maypropose an amendment and file it with the Secre-tary-General of the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall thereupon communicate any proposedamendments to the States Parties to the presentCovenant with a request that they notify him whetherthey favour a conference of States Parties for thepurpose of considering and voting upon the pro-posals. In the event that at least one third of theStates Parties favours such a conference, the Secre-tary-General shall convene the conference under theauspices of the United Nations. Any amendmentadopted by a majority of the States Parties present

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and voting at the conference shall be submitted tothe General Assembly of the United Nations forapproval.

2. Amendments shall come into force when theyhave been approved by the General Assembly of theUnited Nations and accepted by a two-thirds ma-jority of the States Parties to the present Covenantin accordance with their respective constitutionalprocesses.

3. When amendments come into force they shall bebinding on those States Parties which have acceptedthem, other States Parties still being bound by theprovisions of the present Covenant and any earlieramendment which they have accepted.

Article 30Irrespective of the notifications made under article26, paragraph 5, the Secretary-General of the UnitedNations shall inform all States referred to in para-graph I of the same article of the following particu-lars:(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions under ar-ticle 26;(b) The date of the entry into force of the presentCovenant under article 27 and the date of the entryinto force of any amendments under article 29.

Article 311. The present Covenant, of which the Chinese,English, French, Russian and Spanish texts areequally authentic, shall be deposited in the archivesof the United Nations.

2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shalltransmit certified copies of the present Covenant toall States referred to in article 26.

Annual Report - TCHRD - 2005

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