Ankersmit and Historical Representation- John Zammito

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Ankersmit and Historical RepresentationAuthor(s): John ZammitoSource: History and Theory, Vol. 44, No. 2 (May, 2005), pp. 155-181Published by: Blackwell Publishing for Wesleyan UniversityStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3590894 .

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HistoryndTheory4 (May2005),155-181 0 Wesleyan niversity005ISSN: 018-2656

ANKERSMIT AND HISTORICAL REPRESENTATIONI

JOHN ZAMMITO

Historicaldebateis a semanticquarrelnot about the exact

meaningof words,but aboutthepast. (HR:62)

ABSTRACT

In Historical RepresentationFrankAnkersmitseeks ajuste milieu between postmodern

theoryand historicalpractice.But he still insists that the meaning of a historicalrepre-sentation "is notfound, but madein andby [the] text."Thus"therewill be nothing,out-

side the text itself, thatcan governor check [theconceptualization]."Accordingly,"a(his-

torical)representationtself cannot be interpreted s one large(trueor false) description.I would nothesitate to say thatthis-and nothingelse-is the centralproblem n the phi-

losophy of history."On the other hand, he affirms that "a historicalrepresentation is

about'a certainpartof thepast," hat historicaldebate s a "semanticquarrelnot abouttheexact meaningof words,butabout the past."Everythinghingeson how to graspthis idea

of "aboutness."

I propose an alternativereadingof post-positivistphilosophyof science in hopes of

reachingthejuste milieu. The issue is whethercolligatoryconceptsin historyhavea more

radically constructedcharacterthan theoretical terms in natural-scientific heory, and

whether,as with the latter,they can make intersubjective laims to warrant.My view is

thatcolligatory concepts in historicalrepresentationsan be conceived to referin rough-

ly the same way thattheoretical erms do in natural-scientificheories.

All the problemsI find in Ankersmit'sapproachcome to the fore in his fruitful analo-

gy to portraitpainting.First,the personality heportrait vokes is notrestricted o the rep-

resentation,but is of the sitter.We are offered insightnot (merely)into paintingbut into

anactualcharacter.That s, there s a cognitive,not simplyanaesthetic,dimensionto rep-resentation. Historicalterms pick out something intersubjectivelyaffirmable n reality,and discriminations possible among rival versions.The questionis how to regard-to

explainandto evaluate-these underdetermined bjectsof consideration,not to precludethemby stipulation.

I. INTRODUCTION

"The time has come to find the juste milieu between the linguisticinnocence of

traditional historical theory and the hyperbole of some postmodern theorists,"

Frank Ankersmit announces in the opening pages of Historical Representation

1. Referencesto Ankersmit'stwo key works will be providedparentheticallyn the text as fol-

lows: F. R. Ankersmit,Historical Representation(Stanford:StanfordUniversity Press, 2001) as

"HR:p" nd F. R.Ankersmit,NarrativeLogic:A SemanticAnalysisof the Historian'sLanguage(The

Hague:MartinusNijhoff, 1983) as "NL:p."



156 JOHNZAMMITO

(HR:21). Bravo By now we have had well enough of extremists from either

wing. It is altogether o be welcomed that Ankersmithas moved away from the

extremepostmodernismwith which he was earlieraffiliated,and with which he

is often still lumped (by both camps).2I proposeto considercarefullyhis pro-

posals for ajuste milieuthatpracticinghistorianscould reasonablyshare.

The crucial move Ankersmitmakes in Historical Representations to expose

a conflation,perilous for the understandingof history,between the "linguistic

turn"in analytic philosophy, from Frege to Quine/Rorty,and the "linguistic"

claims of literary theory,which trace forward from Ferdinandde Saussure via

structuralism o Derrida,Foucault, and their postmodernepigoni. While both

trains of thoughtassert the centralityof language,what they mean by thatand

how they would apply it to historical practice diverge radically.Ankersmit

strongly asserts this "asymmetrybetween the claims of the linguistic turn and

those of literary theory" (HR:29). He argues that historians should willingly

acceptthe implicationsof the philosophical inguistic turnfor theirpractice,but

they "should be wary of introducing literary theory into historical theory"

(HR:21). This is because (some) literary theory has in fact flirted with a "lin-

guistic idealism"for which "referenceandmeaningarerarelymore than a set of

patheticand ill-considered obiterdicta,"and such theoryinvites historiansdis-

astrously"to cut throughall the ties between historical narrativeand what it is

about" HR:21).Ankersmitupholds, againstthis hyperbolicpostmodernism, he

"rationalityf the historical

discipline"HR:28).

Bythisdecisive discrimination,

I believe, he has advancedus substantially owardthe desired uste milieu.

But what is the "rationalityof the historical discipline,"as Ankersmit con-

ceives it, and does it tally with the self-conceptionof practitionersof the disci-

pline?Of course,one mighttake theview thatthe disciplineis notone: that t has

fragmentedso thoroughlythat any characterization f it as a whole, and espe-

cially one thatupholds ts "rationality,"an appearmerewhistlingin thedark.Or

one mighttake the morelong-standingview that historiansareincapableof the-

oretical self-reflection: that this is a discipline of the inveterately "naive."

Ankersmit s awareof these anxieties.Philosophically,

hesteps beyond

them-

andwe should,with him. He undertakes o understandwhat is involved in "the

historian'sattempt o give an acceptableaccount of partof the past"(NL:207).

The questionswe mustexploreare: what makes somethingan "account?"What

makes it "acceptable?"How does it relate to (partof) the actual past?To make

furtherheadway toward the juste milieu, I suggest, finding possible "transla-

tions" betweenthe differentconceptualschemes embracedby Ankersmitandby

practicinghistorians s critical. Once "indeterminacy"ardens nto "incommen-

surability,"dialogueis foreclosed and we fall back into hyperbolic stipulations.

Incommensurabilitys the dead end of the

"linguisticturn"-where Kuhn inter-

2. For Ankersmit'searlier,more strident one, see "HistoriographyndPostmodernism,"Historyand Theory28 (1989), 137-154,and his "Replyto ProfessorZagorin,"Historyand Theory29 (1990),275-296. On that earlierAnkersmit,see my essay, "Ankersmit'sPostmodernHistoriography:The

Hyperboleof 'Opacity,"'Historyand Theory37 (1998), 330-346. I thank Frank or manylong and

fruitfulconversationssince thatpublication hat have broughtus bothfar closerto ajuste milieu.



ANKERSMITAND HISTORICALREPRESENTATION 157

sects Foucault,and Rorty intersectsDerrida,in the hyperbolicpostmodernismthatAnkersmithas now foresworn.3

II.ANKERSMIT'STHEORYOF REPRESENTATION ND EPISTEMOLOGY

For Ankersmit,the issue essentially boils down to discriminating, n Richard

Rorty'swords,"whenwe areresponding o the compulsionof 'language'rather

thanthatof 'experience.'"'4WhileRortyfreightshis sentencewithironyvia scare

quotes around both language and experience,Ankersmit takes up these terms

without reservation,droppingthe scare quotes and employing the categories

throughouthis text.5He suggeststhat we thinkof the contrastas between"speak-

ing" and a (meta-)levelof "speakingaboutspeaking" HR:30).The firstdirects

attention oreality

andthe second, tolanguage-in Frege's

terms,to considera-

tions of referenceandconsiderationsof meaning,respectively.6Ankersmit detects a possibility largely neglected in this conventionalepiste-

mology. Conventionpresumesall problemsof semanticsand of epistemologycan be explored at the level of the sentence or statement(NL:58). Ankersmit

claims that sets of statements-texts or "narratios" r verbalrepresentations-have logical and epistemologicalpeculiaritiesthatdemandphilosophicalatten-

tion. For him, such sets takenas wholes expand ontology: they addnew things

("narrative ubstances")to the world. In a word, there are some things that

belongboth to

languageand to

reality,and historical

representationsre a

pri-maryinstance."Ahistoricalrepresentations a thing thatis made of language"

(HR:13). The pointAnkersmitwants to make,withoutfalling backinto the ana-

lytic/syntheticdichotomy,is that "languagecan be a truthmakerno less than

reality" HR:13). He is persuaded hat as one moves fromthe natural ciences to

thehumanities,"theindeterminacy f truthby this compulsionof experienceand

truthby the compulsion of language will increase to the extent that it will be

moredifficult to pin down with precisionwhich partof languagecorresponds o

what chunkof reality" HR:37).Inhistoricalrepresentations-includingnotonlyclassic

"colligatoryconcepts"ike

periodizationerms

(Renaissance,Enlighten-ment) but even theoreticalconcepts (for example, revolution,bourgeoisie, or

war) andterritorialerms(for example,Poland or Prussia)-"issues of meaningandissues of empiricalfact tend to become indistinguishable"HR:33-34). Still,

3. This is the conclusion of my investigation in A Nice Derangement of Epistemes: Post-

Positivism in theStudyof Science rom QuinetoLatour ChicagoandLondon:Universityof Chicago

Press,2004).4. RichardRorty,Philosophyand the Mirrorof Nature (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,

1979), 169, cited by Ankersmit,HR:32. His crucialpointof departure,here (HR:31),is Willardvan

OrmanQuine's 1950 essay on the two dogmasof empiricism,with its seminalcritiqueof the analyt-

ic/syntheticdistinctionand its

proclamationof "semanticascent." See

Quine,"Two

Dogmasof

Empiricism," n Quine, From a Logical Point of View,2nd rev. ed. (Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard

University Press, 1980), 20-46. See also my chapter on Quine and post-positivism in A Nice

Derangementof Epistemes,15-50.

5. It is always dangerous o miss Rorty'sironies,for he is, indeed,as hyperbolic(in Ankersmit's

sense) as any literarytheorist,thoughhis irony masks his hyperbole superbly.However,we must

leave Rortyto his insouciance andsimplyfollow Ankersmit'sconstructiveendeavor.

6. GottlobFrege, "OberSinn und Bedeutung,"Zeitschrift iir Philosophie undphilosophischeKritik 100 (1892), 25-50.



158 JOHNZAMMITO

he draws a conservativeconclusion: "theonly legitimateinferencepermittedbythe linguisticturn s thatin historytruthmay have its originsin the compulsionsof languageno less thanin those of experience" HR:34).

Ankersmit'sstrategy s to focus on "thetrajectory rom evidence to the text,"

on historicalwriting(an areaof inquiryneglected by historical heory,whichhas

traditionallyconcentratedon historicalresearch)."Getting o know the facts is

only a preliminary .. [the]realproblem s how to integrate he facts into a con-

sistent historical narrative" NL:8). Ankersmithighlightsthe historian'sconsti-

tutive role in interpretation; e wants us to be drawnto reflexivityabout this

interpretive ndeavor.This concern,he insists, is "asupplementrather han... a

replacement"of traditional concern with evidence in philosophy of history."Deconstructionistsat least the more sensible amongthem)recognizethat both

the compulsionof experienceand the compulsionof languagehave theirroles to

play in historicalunderstanding"HR:49). Postmodernists,on his view, never

questionthe relationbetween individualdescriptivestatementsas evidence and

the historicalrealityto which they determinately efer,but ratheronly "the rela-

tionshipbetween historical anguage(orthe text toutcourt)on the one hand and

pastrealityon the other" HR:51).While I think this is unduly generousto other

postmodernists, acceptit as a characterization f Ankersmit'sown view. Onthe

other hand, it seems ungenerousfor him to allege that "empiricists" myself

included)believe "thatnothing of any interesthappenson the trajectory rom

evidence to the text"(HR:51).Assuredly,

muchdoes. I would even enlist insup-portof his dramaticclaim that"there s more betweenlanguageandrealitythan

[conventional]epistemologyhas ever dreamed" HR:225).Yet I hold out that he

has stipulatedsuch restrictivenotions of epistemology,evidence, and truththat

he seems to be preempting,rather hanrefuting,the questionof warrantat the

level of representations.Ankersmitdrawsa starkdistinctionbetweenwhathe terms"description" nd

whathe terms"representation." escriptionhas to do exclusively with individ-

ual statementsof fact. In such statementsthe subjectterm refers in a rigoroussemantic sense to

something determinatelyreal, and the

predicationdenotes

propertiesof that object that, accordingly,are subjectto falsification (HR:12).For Ankersmit,this level of sententialstatements of fact exhausts entirelythe

domain of epistemology andthe categoryof "truth."Truth,he urges, is simplythe affirmationof a correspondencebetween singularlinguistic statementsand

states of affairs n the world,in a Tarskianmanner canonically,"'snow is white'

if andonly if snow is white").7He proposesthat we "defineepistemologyas the

philosophicalsubdisciplinethat investigatesthe relationshipbetween cognitive

language and reality"in just this restrictive sense. That is, "epistemologyties

words to things,whereasrepresentationies thingsto things"(HR:82).In contrast o description, n representation"therepresentedand its represen-

tation have the same ontological status . . . both belong to the inventoryof the

world."Since they are boththings,and"thingsdo notrefer,""representationso

not refer to objects in reality.""Narrative anguage, language that is used for

7. On Tarski,see his most prominentrecent exponent,Donald Davidson, "InDefense of Con-

ventionT," n Davidson,Inquiriesinto TruthandInterpretationOxford:Clarendon,1984), 65-75.




expressing a representation, s . . . opaque-as things are" (HR:13).8Accor-

dingly, "epistemologicalnotions such as reference, truth,and meaningwill not

enableus to understandhistoricalwriting"(HR:12). ForAnkersmit,representa-tion involves an entirelynew set of issues. He arguesthatrepresentationsmightbe compared o "propernames,"with all the perplexitiesphilosophershave rec-

ognized in fixing theirreference(HR:57-58). He takes this to signify that "the

exact meaningof such terms has always to be stipulated" HR:60). Statements

aboutpropernames(hencehistorical deas), forAnkersmit,merelyasserta "pro-attitude" owardthe definitionalcontentof the term,hence they offer an analyt-ic "speakingaboutspeaking" HR:47).Indeed,"representationslways bringus

to the level of 'speakingaboutspeaking' .. the level of metalanguage ixing the

relationshipbetween object-languageand the world ... in the same way as the

T-sentencesof Tarski"HR:291-292n).

Thus this isonly

a"compulsion

of lan-

guage," not one of experience. My impression,however, is that much philo-

sophical work on the "causal theory of reference" stresses precisely what

Ankersmitcalls "compulsionsof experience."9 ndeed, I will offer generallya

quitedifferentset of inferences frompost-positivism,with different mplicationsfor historicalpractice.

Ankersmitproposesa "doublegap"betweenrepresentation ndtherepresent-ed (HR:236-237).On the first level, a historicalrepresentations composedof a

set of statementsof fact (verfiabledescriptions).Each of these faces epistemo-

logical challengearisingfrom the occlusion of

"compulsionsof

experience"with

"compulsionsof language,"or,in morewidely usedlanguage,the "theory-laden-ness" of observations.10But, in addition,and of uniqueinterestand import,in

representationhere s an "ontological oraesthetic)gap,"a gapbetweentherep-

resentationas one thing, and the representedas another--or, rather, he gap is

precisely the question whether there is, ontologically speaking, a representedother than within or as the representation HR:237). At the sentential level,

"thingsexist independentlyof the statementswe can makeaboutthem" HR:83).

But "as soon as we give up the ontology of the single statement or the ontologyof

the set of statementswhose subjectterm no longerrefersto oneandthe same

entity in extralinguisticreality,coherenceis no longer guaranteedby the coher-

ence of thatobjectiveentity,butby whatevercoherenceandunitythe set of state-

mentsmay possess."That s, "its coherence s not ound,butmadein andby [the]

text"(HR:135). InNarrativeLogic,Ankersmitworksthrough ourphilosophical

conceptions of truthand concludes that none of them make any sense of the

notion of a "truthof the narratio" s a set of statements.He urges thatphiloso-

phy abandon he notionof truthat thatlevel (NL:77).Thereis no possible prin-

ciple of warrant or such representations:"thereare no translationrules which,

when carefully applied,can guarantee he objectivityof a narratio"NL:236).

8. My concern about"opacity"as a categoryinAnkersmit'soeuvrewas enunciated n my earlier

essay,"TheHyperboleof 'Opacity.'"9. On the causal theoryof reference,see the essays collected in Naming,Necessity,and Natural

Kinds,ed. StephenSchwartz(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress, 1977).10. See MaryHesse, "IsThere anIndependentObservationLanguage?"n Hesse,Revolutionsand

Reconstructionsn thePhilosophy of Science (Bloomington: ndianaUniversityPress,1980),63-100.



160 JOHN AMMITO

Ankersmit'scrucialstrategy s to work with a generic notion of representationto gleanfrom it philosophical everageon the specific problemof historicalrep-resentation:we should "see the historical text as a representationof the past in

much the same way that the work of art is a representation f what it depicts-

or, for thatmatter, n the way thatParliamentor Congressis a representation f

the electorate" HR:80).Ankersmitdevelops his theoryof representationbased

primarily upon artistic representations,particularlyvisual ones. He explicitly

acknowledges the influence of Arthur Danto in guiding his conceptualization

(HR:80).11Danto maintains hat a representationunctionsas a substitute or an

absentrepresented.Crucially, he characterof this substitution s left open;any-

thing might represent something else, and there is no requirementof resem-

blance, thatis, of sharedproperties.On the otherhand,"allrepresentation as to

satisfy certainrules, criteria,or standards or scale, coherence,and consistency

S. ." in orderto qualify as representation HR:144). Ankersmit'spoint is that

these are immanentfeaturesof representationand cannot be presumedto hold

isometricallyfor what is being represented.He proceeds to draw strong inferences from artistic representation or the

characterizationof historical writing. "Since the work of art belongs to the

domainof aesthetics,the same is true for all representations-and thus for his-

torical representation"HR:11). The criteriagoverningrepresentationsare pri-

mordially aesthetic-indeed, generally "aesthetics is prior to epistemology"

(HR:90).The aestheticrelationof therepresentation

o therepresented

onforms

to the linguistic trope of metaphor.Ankersmitwants us to recognize that we

never "see through"a metaphor as a transparentinguistic medium)but see in

termsof it (as anopaquething).That s, by "invitingus to see one thingfrom the

pointof view of another hing,metaphoreffects an organizationof knowledge"

(HR:138). A metaphor opens up the real by a juxtapositionwhich engenders

insight.12Ankersmit'sclaim for opacityhas a sense, here. Still, metaphor etains

a stubbornlyreferentialcomponent.Unless we canjuxtaposethe metaphor o its

target,and not simply to other metaphors, t is unclearhow insight into that of

whichit is ametaphor

anoccur,orhow itmight

now beappraised.

Of this I will

have more to say below.

III.HISTORICALEPRESENTATIONND"ABOUTNESS"

[T]hinkof notions ike "Gothicism,"theRenaissance,"the IndustrialRevolution."Thereareno "things"hat hesenamesrefer o and hataregivento us in thewaythattablesandchairsaregivento us. It is onlythanks o historical epresentationhat hese

"identities"ancome ntobeingatall;there s not,first,a thing hatwehappenocomeacross n thepastand hatwe havecalled"theRenaissance"nd hat,next,we followon

itscomplexpath hrough paceand ime.(HR:312n)Though istoricalepresentationsrebuiltupof truedescriptions,(historical)epresen-tation tselfcannot e interpretedsonelarge trueorfalse)description.wouldnothes-

11. Thekey workis ArthurDanto'sTheTransfigurationf theCommonplace:A PhilosophyofArt

(Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress, 1981).12. In Kenneth Burke's formulation,a "perspectiveby incongruity"(Burke,Permanence and

Change[Indianapolis:Bobbs Merrill,1965], PartII:Perspective by Incongruity).




itate o saythat his-and nothing lse-is the central roblemn thephilosophyf his-

tory. HR:281)

Ankersmit nsists that this is for him the "all decisive issue, which truly is the

sine quanon of all narrativist hilosophyof history. .. For the last fifteenyears,I have vainly triedagainandagainto get this message acrossin my writingson

historical (and political) theory" (HR:313n). Thus Historical Representation

serves as a plea to reconsiderNarrativeLogic, and that is what this essay will

attempt.Ankersmit'sdemand o be understood s certainlyunexceptionable;hefailure

of his argument o win convertsamongpracticinghistorians,however,suggeststhat there may be problemswith his position. Ankersmitadvances the strong

claim thatfor historicalrepresentation o determinateactualityexists independ-

ently of ourconceptualization.Fromthevantageof post-positivistepistemology,with its acknowledgmentof the "theory-ladenness" f observation,and of the

linguistic constructionof experience,his claim seems quite plausible.'13Still, it

cannot be madetotal, suchthatrealityhas no elementof constraintor resistance

with which to constitute a dialecticalpole in the constructionof experience.In

Ankersmit's own words that he uses to object to hyperbolicpostmodernism:

"Languagewouldthen no longer merelybe a potentialsourceof truth rreducible

to what reality shows to be the case, but would now startto interferewith the

compulsionof experience.It wouldbeginto dictatewhatexperiencemayormay

not discern in reality"(HR:71).To be sure,no one would wish to claim thatthe concept"Renaissance" efers

to a "thing"of the same orderas a table or a chair.But thathardlyexhauststhe

possibilities of theoreticaland historicalreference(except, perhaps,by stipula-

tion). In a strictly epistemological sense, we can conceive no object--eventables and chairs, in my view-independently of our language scheme (for

example, should a stool count as a chair?). Cognitively, we have no way of

determining withnecessity)whatany suchobjectmightbe apartfrom ourcon-

ceptualization,thoughthis by no means need imply skepticismaboutactuality

in general.14"Givenness"seems a misleadingformulation,even in the case oftables and chairs, since it suggests there is no constructive nterventionof per-

ceptionor languagein the constitutionof these objects.'5Whatappearsat issue

here is whatQuinehas termed"ontologicalrelativity," hatis, the ultimatearbi-

trarinessof languageschemesrelativeto actuality, he "loosenessof fit" of lan-

guages to the world.16Quinehas arguedthatwe can elect any scheme, but we

cannot do without one, and we are always already working from within a

"home"(default)language.To fall into some ultimateskepticismon thatcount

13. See Hesse, Revolutions and Reconstructions;John Greenwood, "Two Dogmas of Neo-Empiricism:The 'Theory Informity'of Observationand the Quine-DuhemThesis,"Philosophyof

Science 57 (1970), 553-559.

14.Willardvan OrmanQuine, "OntologicalRelativity,"in Quine, Ontological Relativityand

OtherEssays (New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress, 1969),26-68; DonaldDavidson,"OntheVery

Ideaof a ConceptualScheme," n Davidson,Inquiriesinto Truth nd Interpretation,183-198.

15. WilfridSellars,Science and Metaphysics(New York:Humanities,1968).

16. Quine,"OntologicalRelativity."



162 JOHNZAMMITO

seems to Quine silly.17But he finds it equally silly to thinkthere are many (if

any) "natural inds"out there.18Humancognitionhas alwaysbeen aboutorgan-

izing knowledge throughforms of language,and this is as true for naturalsci-

ence as for historical nquiry.Moreover,Quineholdsthatthe evolutionof human

knowledgehas led us increasinglyto privilegeour schemes over any such natu-

ral kinds.19

Ankersmitcharacterizeshis as the evacuationof significancefrom the subject

positionin propositionsandthe assignmentof semanticsignificanceincreasing-

ly to predications(NL:152). He argues for the "historicity"of what he calls

"intensional ypification," hatis, the impositionof typingschemesuponexperi-

ence, indicating hat this is both"always already" here when we explicitly nter-

pret (thatis, generatetheoryout of and within natural language) and also that

languageshave manifestlyaltered over times and cultures(NL:167-168). In line

with the post-positivisttheoryof language,Ankersmitobservesthat "the(types

of) individualthings we discernin realityare not simply given to us along with

reality itself: types form togetheran intricate,constructed,relationalnetwork"

(NL:162). We must always alreadyfind ourselves in such a typification:"types

of normal things can only be recognized in reality after historicization of the

world has takenplace and an intensionaltypification. . . has been successful"

(NL:167). The question "how and why certain (types of) individuals are dis-

cernedin preferenceto others"awakensus to the ultimatearbitrariness f lan-

guageschemes: "intensional

ypificationcan

alwaysbe

questioned"NL:165).20

Ankersmitpointsto the contingentlycontextualandchangingcharacterof these

emergents,that is, to their essential historicity.21 would urge that these argu-

ments have theirplace in a naturalizedepistemology robustenough to accom-

modate,not exclude, historicalconceptualization.Of course,it would still be churlishto recognizeno difference in the accessi-

bility of tables and chairs as contrastedwith that of a Renaissance-or of anti-

matter.These (relative) esoterica are, nevertheless, intersubjectivelydenotable

features of actuality-of the world and not just our representations.22The

entrenchment f terms inlanguage

works from the mosteveryday objects

to the

most esoteric, though certainly, as we theorize that movement, the relation

17. "Todisavow theverycoreof commonsense, to requireevidencefor thatwhich boththephysi-cist and the man in the streetacceptas platitudinous,s no laudableperfectionism;t is a pompousconfusion"(Quine, The Ways of Paradox and OtherEssays rev. ed. [Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard

UniversityPress, 1976, 229-230).18. Quine, "NaturalKinds,"in Ontological Relativityand OtherEssays, 114-138; see also Ian

Hacking,"NaturalKinds," n Perspectiveson Quine,ed. RobertBarrettandRoger Gibson(London:

Blackwell, 1990), 129-141.

19. Quine,Pursuitof Truth rev. ed. (Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress, 1992); Quine,FromStimulus o Science (Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress, 1995).

20. "The assertionthatrealityshould containtypes of things ... [is] contingentuponwhat reali-

ty happensto be like as well as uponthe pragmatical onsiderations hat induce us to recognize cer-

tain intensionaltypes . . . in preference o others" NL:133).21. "Foucault'sbook [Lesmots et les choses] demonstrateshat the way in which we order hings

or individualities s not at all as obvious as we like to think .... [it is] 'neitherdeterminedby an a

priori and necessaryconcatenation,nor imposed on us by immediately perceptiblecontents .

(NL:161n).22. JohnMcDowell,Mindand World Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress, 1998).




between whatAnkersmitcalls the "compulsionsof language"andthe "compul-sions of experience"becomes morecomplexand the weightof conceptualizationmoreprominent.23 herealissue is not whatexists somehow apart romourcon-

ceptualization,but ratherwhether what we constitutedialectically out of lan-

guage andactualitycan make intersubjective laims to warrant.Thus,the ques-tion is not whetherthereis a contrastwith tables andchairs,but ratherwhether

the conceptualization f colligatoryconceptsin historyhasa moreradicallycon-

structedcharacter han theoretical terms in natural-scientific heory, and, still

morefundamentally,whether,as withthe latter, ome claimto theactualityof the

referent,specifically at the colligatorylevel, can be made andwarranted.24t is

the view of most historians hat it not only can, butmust,be.

Ankersmitwishes to show us that this is naive. "I know we feel a strongintu-

itive resistanceto the assertionthat[representations]

o not refer. . . However,

... no identifiableobjectscorrespond o most of the termswe use for discussingthe past"(NL:175). Of those who believe a historicalidea can refer to reality,"we should then ask exactly what past the text refers to,"Ankersmitproclaims

(HR:40). Differenthistories, he observes, invoke widely divergent"chunksof

reality."Hence he disputesfundamentally hatsuch colligatoryconceptsas "the

Renaissance" n historicalnarrativeshave the capacityfor "exclusivelypickingout some historicalobject or partof the past" (HR:40). It makes no sense to

speak of the warrantof such notions: "Wecannot misdescribethe Renaissance

(becausethere is no such

thing)"(NL:219).That is where the problemremainsfor achieving thejuste milieu. Must all

determinacyand coherencebe consigned to the representationand not also to

that which is represented?Ankersmitappearsquite uncompromising: t "must

not be conceived as being part of historicalreality"(HR:135). Hence it may

occasion less wonder that now twenty years of argumenthave not sufficed to

inducehistorians o acceptAnkersmit'sposition.But of course thatmay still be

a fault of our inertia or incomprehension.To reach a juste milieu, then, will

requirea much more rigorousreflection on what Ankersmitterms "thelogical

differencesbetweendescriptionanddepiction" HR:223).

Thetask hastwoparts.

First,we must see whatAnkersmitadvancesas the distinctivetraitsof historical

representationshat, n his view, makethemineligible for reference.Then,as he

argues,the burdenof proof falls to those of us who do wish to introduce ssues

of warrantat the level of representationo offer an alternative"epistemology"

adequate o the task. "Theempiricistshadbettermakeclearhow the manytheo-

retical and practical differences between history and the sciences can be

explainedwithout eopardizing heirempiricism" HR:49).As I will tryto elab-

oratebelow, post-positivistphilosophyof naturalscience offers more resources

of commonality for philosophy of history than the starkdifferenceAnkersmitposits. I will propose an alternativereadingof philosophysince the "linguistic

turn" n hopes of reachingthejuste milieu.

23. See NaturalizingEpistemology,ed. HilaryKornblith Cambridge,Mass.: MITPress, 1985);

PhilipKitcher,"TheNaturalistsReturn,"PhilosophicalReview 101 (1992), 53-114.

24. In NarrativeLogic,Ankersmitrejectsbothprospects;I affirmboth.



164 JOHNZAMMITO

But let us begin with what we can immediatelyaffirmin Ankersmit'spropos-

als. We can agree that "historicalrepresentationof the past essentially is an

attempt o discerna unityin manifold historicalfacts . .. to reduce the manifold

past to a coherentunity"(HR:270).We canjoin in Ankersmit'srhetoricalques-

tion: "what are historical narratives other than organizationsof knowledge,

organizationsnto a coherentandmeaningfulwhole[?]"(HR:19).ForAnkersmit,

the most importantdevice for this organizationof knowledge in history is the

tropeof metaphor:"historicalrepresentations metaphorical"n that "theutter-

ance invites us to see one thing ... in terms of another hing"(HR:14).25Given

that,we can agreefurther hat "a rationaldiscussionaboutthe relative meritsof

differentmetaphors s possible"(HR:14). "Scope, explanatorypower, compre-

hensiveness,and so on are what we should consider f we wish to understand he

rationalityof historicaldebate" HR:55).We can agree,too, thathistoriansnever

approach he past withoutthe mediation of manypriorencounterswith histori-

cal reconstructions, nd that much of the endeavorof historicalpractice s to sit-

uate new work in the tradition of discourse that has gone before, which

Ankersmit erms"intertextuality."But for most historians, he notion that the "historical dea" is entirelyfictive,

ontologicallyrestricted o the representation nd withoutany claim to actuality

in the past, goes too far.Poland, however unstable its borders,however inter-

ruptedby partition, s not just our metaphor: t has actuallyexisted and we can

knowthat.Bourgeoisiemay

be harder,and Renaissanceharder till, but theprac-ticing historian's ntuitionneeds to be takenextremely seriously.One shouldbe

uneasyto assert both the "rationality" f a disciplineand thatit has been delud-

ed in its practicefor centuries.Ankersmit nvites us to consider whatit is histo-

rians make.Whatare their accounts?Aretheymirrors,maps,models,metaphors:

what sort of thingarethey?For Ankersmit his (onto)logicalconsideration akes

precedenceover two others,which are of far moreimmediate nterestto practic-

ing historians,namely: first, how does one do it (methodology), and, second,

how does one judge that it has been done well (epistemology)?Ankersmitcalls

these latterquestions

mattersof "narrativeragmatics"

s distinctfrom the "nar-

rative logic" he himself pursues (NL:145).26He believes that his projectwill

enable historiansto grasp theoreticallywhat they are already doing in practice,

althoughhe admits that "logical characteristics . . found in every intelligible

sample of narrativehistoriography . . cannot show us how to distinguishbetween good and bad historiography,"much less how to construct such

accounts (NL:145).27That will need to be considered,in due course, when we

appraiseexactly what Ankersmitmeansby the "rationality"f the historicaldis-

cipline.We can, however,agreethatrepresentations annot be reducedto refer-

ence. "Theyare governed by rules that are not mere reflections of regularities25. "Metaphoreffects an organizationof knowledge"(HR:138); "metaphorsorganizeknowl-

edge" (HR:18).26. He proposes strictlyto "reason rom a logical andnot from an epistemologicalpointof view"

(NL:155).27. "Thetranscendental arrativist ules do not pretend o guide the historian n solving the prob-

lem of how to 'translate' he pastinto a narratio,but . .. only determine he logical structureof nar-

rative accounts of the past"(NL:84).




existing in the pastbutwhich have a standingof theirown"(NL:2).This is right;the issue is notreduction o referencebut its inclusionin the conceptof a histor-

ical representation.t is rightas well to seek to characterizethese intrinsic(for-

mal-aesthetic)"rules"-and not just "logically"but also, if possible, method-

ologically andepistemologically.Ankersmitoffers a very persuasiveaccountof the developmentof historical

writingto set the terms of his intervention.The decisive breakthrougho the sort

of disciplinaryhistory still preponderantlyn practice came with the passagefromEnlightenmenthistoriographyo historism(HR:123-131).Ankersmit den-

tifies this with a shift in the conceptualizationof the object of historicalinquiry

from a substance, something that persisted while its propertieschanged in

responseto externalcausal interventions the Enlightenmentmodel), to a "his-

toricizationof substance,"n which"'substantial'that

s, internalor self-caused]

changewas seen as the true domainof historicalresearch" HR:131). Historical

developmentbecame the key to conceptualunderstanding,and this "historical

idea" (a continuoussubstance-in-change)became the crowningconcept of his-

torism.28Thus, in place of a definition,historismargued"thenatureof a thing

lies in its history"(HR:123). This is a most lucid descriptionof what historism

undertookandwhat historicalpracticestill largely presumes:"noone can write

historyas it is doneby 90%of living historianswithoutbeing a historist" NL:3).

YetAnkersmitpronounces he historistaccountof historical deas "anunsatis-

factory solution, theoretically."He demands:"is the historicalidea

partof the

inventoryof the past itself, or is the historical dea, as the termsuggestsalready,

merelya constructionby the historian?"HR:135). Historismcommitted tself to

theformer,but"narrativists elieve thatthehistoriandoes not reflecta coherence

or Zusammenhang n the past itself, but only gives coherence to the past"

(HR:135). "We can no longer trust thatwhat the subject-termn the constative

statementrefersto will 'substantially' emain he sameobjectduringa processof

historical change" (HR:131). Indeed, "the more we emphasize the difference

between the individualphases of an entity's history,the less plausibleit will be

togo on consideringit one and the same thing"(HR:132). Bluntly,

"ifchangeinvolves substances,no answer can be given to the questionof what changes"

(HR:22).And "therewill be nothing,outside the text itself, thatcan govern or

check [theconceptualization]"HR:129).

Ankersmittakes pridein having "stripped historism]of all its metaphysical

accretions" HR:136).29He embraceswhat he aptly termsthe "epistemological

28. Ankersmitgives a very clearelaborationof the elementsof theircore conceptionof the "his-

torical Idea" at HR:134.

29. That is, he repudiates he "metaphysical"ndeavorof historistsof the nineteenthcenturyto

offer a notion of "entelechy" hat postulated"some mysteriouspropertyof things in the past that

causes these thingsto take on in due time the appearanceshey actuallyhad in the past"(NL:132).

They postulateda potential n the originof a "historical dea"foreach andevery mutationover the

course of its development.This "Leibnizian" lement made no sense, accordingto Ankersmit,as a

view of actuality,but it made eminentsense as a theoryof conceptualizationor "writing."Hence he

characterizeshis whole project as to "translate raditionalhistorism from a theory on historical

objects into a theoryof historicalwriting" NL:124).



166 JOHNZAMMITO

asceticism" of instrumentalism, ominalism,or anti-realism.30 nkersmitspeci-fies his claim: "the contours of reality, though not reality itself, can only be

explained if they are representedby a representation"HR:45). Thus, "things

(that are represented) . . . have no contours in the absence of the representation

that has been proposedfor them"(HR:83).His most importantpointis: "there s

no coherence ying in thepast itself.. . but ... coherence atthe level of language

[must] decide how we conceive of the past" (HR:23). In Narrative Logic,Ankersmitwrote: "thepastis only constituted n the narratio.Thestructure f the

narratio s a structureent to orpressedon thepastand not the reflection of a kin-

dred structureobjectively present n the past itself'; thus,"objects n the past so

often mentionedby historians,objects such as intellectual, social or politicalmovements and even nationsor social groups,have no statusin the past itself

independentof the narratio:hey springfrom and arejustified solely by the nar-

ratio" (NL:86-87). In short, colligatory concepts are "mere instrumentsfor

organizingor giving form to our knowledge of the past"but "without(them-

selves) referring o the pastor describing t" (NL:97).Thatis why Ankersmit,at

least in NarrativeLogic, rejectedanyeffort to assimilatehistorical nquiry o that

of the "exact sciences."31 As he statedbluntly:"what is mere heuristics in the

exact sciences, is the whole of historiography"NL:91).Ankersmit nsists there

are no "translationules" that allow ostensible"patterns"f the past itself to be

"projected"nto a literaryrepresentation:mapsand models makepoor analogiesbecausethere is no determinateandverifiable

correspondenceat the level of the

whole (NL:80).Ankersmit s not simply makingan epistemologicalpoint about

the uncertaintyor imprecisionof ourconceptions;he is assertingan ontologicalone: "thepastis a meaningless myriadof facts, states andevents, an amorphouschaos of data thatsuccessfullyresist 'conscious apprehension'by the historian"

(NL:83).

On the otherhand,he affirms that"ahistoricalrepresentationis about'a cer-

tainpartof the past,"that historicaldebate,as the epigraphof this essay crucial-

ly states,is a "semanticquarrelnot aboutthe exact meaningof words,but about

thepast"(HR:13, 62). Everythinghinges

on how tograsp

this idea of "about-

ness." Ankersmit insists we must "avoid reducing 'aboutness' to reference"

(HR:13). So what is "aboutness"and how do we achieve it and appraiseit?

Ankersmitwrites:"'beingabout' s essentiallyunstableand unfixed because it is

30. Indeed,perhaps he whole disputethatforestalls thedesiredjustemilieumaybe anotherwran-

gle of realismversus anti-realism:f so, my view is that such ontological disputationsarecharming

philosophicalexercises but of virtuallyno significancefor empirical nquiry.I believe ArthurFine's

"naturalontological attitude"(Fine, A Shaky Game: Einstein, Realism and the QuantumTheory

[Chicago:Universityof Chicago Press, 1986]) has as muchplace in empiricalhistory(quamethod-

ology andepistemology) as in naturalscience.

31. Ankersmit writes: "I am awarethat recent developmentsin the philosophyof the exact sci-ences seem to indicatethat the differencesbetweenhistoriography nd the exact sciences are small-

er than I have just suggested"(NL:89),yet "everyattempt o see similaritiesbetweenthe exact sci-

ences and historiographyshould be mistrusted" NL:174). "Narrativeknowledge must be distin-

guishedfromscientificknowledge"(NL:112). "There s a looseness in historical discussion thathas

no parallelin the exact sciences" (NL:90). Withoutwishing to erase all differences,I believe the

recentdevelopments n the philosophyof science need to be takenin a far more constructiveway in

reformulating he philosophyof history.




differentlydefinedby the descriptionscontainedby the text of each representa-

tion"(HR:41).Thus,the decisive featurewould appear o be the degreeof open-

ness or contingency a representationentails over against the actuality it is

"about"-its "indeterminacy,"o use the termthatAnkersmitprefersfor its link-

age with powerfulthemes in philosophysince the linguisticturn.32

Yet again,he assertsrepeatedly hat the cruxof historicaldebate,of historical

rationality,revolves around "what chunk of language (that is, what historical

text) represents best or corresponds best to some chunk of past reality"

(HR:42).33This implies correspondence o something(a "chunk")n reality,but

Ankersmit nsists it is "aninsufficientconditionfor fixing reference"(HR:41).

He holds out that all evidentialquestionsremainat the level of the individual

statement even though he concedes grudginglythat there might be "a kind of

slidingscale between

descriptionand

representation"HR:42)."If all

speakerswill relate the same(set of) word(s)to the sameaspectof reality, henthe aspects

in question will coagulate into the 'thing' that we can 'refer' to. . ... So here

'being about'will shade into 'reference'"(HR:46). This does happen,he con-

cedes, andit has assumedsome authority n "the courseof historicaldebateas it

graduallyevolved in the historyof historicalwriting"(HR:61). That is, "those

narrativecomponentsthatcontinuallyrecurin narratioson or arounda certain

historicaltopic will eventuallygive way to intensionaltypifications" NL:239).

But, whereasAnkersmit sees this as merelystipulative,I take this entrench-

ment ofconceptual

terms to be constitutiveof the evolution oflanguage

and

knowledge, andspecificallyof the disciplinarydiscourseof history,preciselyin

the measure that it denotes intersubjectivelywhat in the actuality of the past

should be taken into consideration.If historical language invents, I hold-as

even HaydenWhiteconcedes-that it discloses just "asmuch."34 ut such com-

mon denotation nvolves only what is uninteresting,Ankersmitreplies.35"It is

not the overlap,but the difference n meaningthat does all of the work"in his-

torical debateand historicaltheory (HR:62). That is why it is senseless, in his

view, to assess the plausibilityof an isolatedinterpretation; themerits(or short-

comings) of what a representation xpresses on what it 'is about'will be code-

terminedby otherrepresentations f a partof the past"(HR:16).Thus,"the more

accountsof the past we have, . . . the closer we may come to historicaltruth"

(HR:15).It is not clear,however,whatthe category"historical ruth" an signi-

fy for him, since he generallyrestricts ruth o the sentential evel. He elaborates

as follows: "Theproliferationof accountsof the pastwill contribute o a perfec-

tion of the criteriawe may applyto each of themin order o establishtheirplau-

32. See Quine,"Three ndeterminacies,"n Perspectiveson Quine, 1-16.

33. And "whichchunkofreality

bestcorresponds

with which chunkoflanguage"

HR:54).

34. HaydenWhite's qualification-"historical narratives .. are verbalfictions, the contentsof

which areas much nventedas ound" (my emphasis)-is crucialforanyreconciliationbetween "nar-

rativist"philosophyof historyand one grounded n historicalpractice.(White,"TheHistoricalText

as LiteraryArtifact,"n White,Tropicsof Discourse:Essays in CulturalCriticism[Baltimore:Johns

HopkinsUniversityPress, 1978], 82).35. The discussions of "blackboxing"in science studiessuggest thatthereis muchmore to this

entrenchment that is philosophically interestingthan Ankersmitpostulated. See Bruno Latour,

Science in Action (Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress, 1987).



168 JOHNZAMMITO

sibilities.No theories or accountsof the past are eliminated n the process (and,

indeed, each containspartof the truth)butthe criteria areperfectedfor how to

understand he past"(HR:15).Accordingly,"thelogic of historical debatewill

stimulatean endlessproliferation f differentmetaphorical iewpoints" HR:24).

Moreover,since "theset of accounts that we do have is only a sampleof all pos-sible accounts,"closureis inconceivable (HR:16). Indeterminacy nd prolifera-tion seem distinctive features of historicalinterpretation,n contrastto the con-

vergence and cumulation that Ankersmitascribesto naturalscience. Historical

debateis "not a matterof continuous'narrowingdown' of previousoptions [asin natural cience] ... but,on the contrary,s an 'explosion'of possiblepointsof

view" (HR:16). Forhim, the perplexityfor historicaltheoryis simplythis:"how

is it possible thaton the one handwe know so much about the past [at the level

of statementsof fact], whereason the otherhistoricalwriting[as whole interpre-

tation] is 'a discussion without end' . . .?" (HR:50).

Strikingly,Ankersmittells us that"'beingabout'gives us the 'logical space'within which historical thinkingand historical discussion are possible; where

'reference' takes the place of 'being about,' historical understandingwithers

away and science takes over" (HR:41). "All these subtlebut necessarydistinc-

tions are wholly lost when one brutallyand bluntly brings together (with the

empiricists)description and'reference')andrepresentationand 'beingabout')"

(HR:47).This rhetoricseems as impassionedas it is drastic.It evokes a longingfor the

autonomyof

historyand invests that

autonomyin the aesthetic irre-

ducibility("indeterminacy")f historical nterpretationsndof historicaldebate.

I do not believe historyor natural cience arewell-servedby sucha formulation.

Recentphilosophyof science suggests that theremay well be more common to

both endeavorsthanthe drastic differencesuggestedby terms like "wither[ing]

away"and"brutal[ity]." hereis an overreaction o "science"here that is a kind

of "hangover" rom scientism. Ankermisthas relatedin an interview how his

movement fromnatural-scientificraining nto the studyof historyleft him with

anineradicable ense of the differenceandalleged inferiorityof historicalknowl-

edgefrom the

vantageof

positivism.36Like

JtirgenHabermas and others who

have undertaken o defend humanistic nquiry,Ankersmitseems to have carried

over too much of the now-debunkedpositivist image of naturalscience which

demeanedhumanistic nsight.37He writes of the philosopherswho workedout

the "receivedview" of science thattheypresumed hatthelogic thatheld (as they

36. Interview with Ankersmit in Eva Domanska, Encounters: Philosophy of History afterPostmodernism Charlottesville/London: niversityof VirginiaPress, 1998), 67-99.

37. CharlesTaylorhas given us an unforgettablemage of the ironythathas befallenthe defend-

ers ofinterpretation

with thecollapse

ofpositivism:"Old-guardDiltheyans,

theirshouldershunched

from years-longresistanceagainstthe encroachingpressureof positivistnaturalscience, suddenly

pitchforwardon theirfaces as all oppositionceases to the reign of universalhermeneutics."Taylor,

"Understandingn HumanScience,"Review of Metaphysics34 [1980], 26). Withoutsimply pre-

tendingthat all differencehas been annulled,as RichardRortywould have it, the real opportunitybefore us is to workthrougha "naturalizedpistemology"that would with rigorand discrimination

affirm what is commonto empirical nquiry n an erabeyondfoundationalismandpositivism.




saw it) in the "exactsciences"representedhe only logic.38Even as he has strug-

gled againstthatarrogance, suspectthatAnkersmit's houghthas been contam-

inatedby its insinuations.

But maybeI have failedto understandAnkersmit'sdistinctionbetween histor-

ical "Bildung"and (natural-scientific)"knowledge."He writes:"Thediscipline

of historyaims ateducation,orBildung,rather hanatknowledge"(HR:15). But

it is not at all transparentwhat he meansby this.Ankersmitsuggests that"when

introducingor using [colligatoryconcepts]in an unexpectedandnovel way,his-

torians will ask themselves whether the new use may make us awareof some-

thing of the past that we had not noticed before"(HR:61). This openness (an

ideal not always honored n actualpractice)shouldindeedbe centralto our cre-

ative productionandour criticalappraisal. But does he reallymeanthat natural

scientists behavedifferently?)

He contends that historicaldebate aims at "the

productionof new and alternativerepresentations, ather hanat achievingtruth

by a carefulanalysisof what was rightandwrongin those previousrepresenta-

tions."Thatis, the discipline puts a clear "premiumon a proliferationof repre-

sentations" HR:16). My view, however,is that historiansregularlydo both,and

proliferation which is not quite so promiscuousas Ankersmitenvisions) is trig-

gered precisely by discontentswith "what was right and wrong"in previous

interpretations.Moreover,some interpretations,Ankersmitnotwithstanding,do

get discardedas inept.At stakehere,yet again, is a cognitiverelationto the dis-

puted ("chunk"of

the) past itself,not

simply disseminating"intertextuality."Perhapswe can make progresshere by a distinctionof modalityof knowledge.

In their empiricalaccounts, practicinghistoriansmake no claim to necessary

knowledge, but they do propose and demandcontingentand fallible "approxi-

mations" to what actually happened,and they are commonly prepared o find

thingswrongwith interpretations.39

Now, Ankersmit s adamant hat he is not questioningthe actualityof the past

"independentlyromthe historian'srepresentations f it" (HR:241).It makesno

sense to doubtthe existence of pastrealityas a whole (HR:313n).But anydeter-

minationof a partof thatpastcan be madeonly byvirtueof its historical

repre-sentation."Therepresented omes intobeingin a certainsense only thanks o the

representation"HR:237). It makes more sense to think of representations,he

urges, as proposals abouthow a "chunkof language"might correspondwith a

"chunkof reality"(HR:92, 41-42). Manysuchproposalscan be madeavailable.

38. "Philosophersike Popper, Hempel, Mandelbaum, M.] White, Danto and manyothersbor-

rowedthe model from formallogic ('modusponens')and the philosophyof the exact sciences, con-

vinced as theyarethatformallogic and the reasoning n the exact sciences arethe sole depositorsof

the rules for valid argument"NL:41).39.

RaymondMartinhas

suggestedthat

philosophyof

historymight fruitfullyset out from this

fact about historicalpracticethat somehow historiansdo feel entitledto judge some interpretations

simply wrong. (Martin,"Objectivityand Meaning in HistoricalStudies,"History and Theory32

[1993], 25-50). ImreLakatos foundthis a similarlycrucialissue for carrying orwardPopper'sphi-

losophy of science in the new contextof historicizedepistemology:"if we wantto reconcile fallibil-

ism with (non-justificationist) ationality,we mustfind a way to eliminatesome theories." Lakatos,

"Falsificationand the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," n Criticism and the

Growthof Knowledge,ed. LakatosandA. Musgrave[Cambridge,Eng.:CambridgeUniversityPress,

1970], 108).



170 JOHNZAMMITO

But "proposalscan be neither true nor false in the way statementscan be so"

(HR:92). "None of these proposalsfor how best to represent he pastcould ever

bejustifiedby anappealto some specific generalrule forhow languageand real-

ity are to be related" HR:89).That s, "thereare no independent tandards n the

basis of which the linkbetweentherepresentedandits representationan bejus-

tified, explainedor verified"(HR:88).Or,again,"there s no a priorischeme in

terms of which the representational uccess of individual narrativerepresenta-tions can be established" HR:96).This repeated (negative) stresson a general

rule, on independent tandards,on an a priori scheme, suggests thatAnkersmit

can conceive of epistemologicalcanons only as drivenby formal-universalog-ical laws, somethingakin to Hempel's notorious"covering aw."40n Narrative

Logic he called them "translation ules" (NL:80-81). To be sure, we require

somethingdifferent to characterize he inductive,a posteriori characterof his-

torical debate. I suggest, however, that what actually takes place in historical

controversy s consistent with the idea of evolving conceptualizationsand eval-

uations along the lines of "naturalized pistemology";hence, Ankersmit s too

restrictive n assigning epistemological rigor exclusively to the a priori.41With reference to disputes among representations,Ankersmitclearlybelieves

this a posteriori,contingent,andfallible character f our criteria"does not in the

least exclude the possibility of rationallydiscussing the merits of proposals"

(HR:92).The key, he urges,is thatproposalsmust be comparedwith one anoth-

er, andnot with the past itself (NL:68). The more such proposals,the richer the

comparison, he more elaborate aposteriori)criteria orappraisal,and hence the

more effective the historicaldebate. Much of this is perfectlyreasonable,yet I

suggestthat t does notprecludebutin factelicits renewedcomparisonwith actu-

ality."Back to the sources"was once and remainsthe constitutivecalling of our

discipline.Ankersmit'sargumentdoes not, in my view, eliminatequestionscon-

cerningrelationsbetween representedandrepresentation-for example, of pri-

orityor causality.A substitute s, by definition,not the original.Some difference,

some "gap,"mustbe bothregisteredandbridged.42Of course,the functionalsub-

stitutionmay

be sogood

that we are atpains

to discover this difference(thinkof

a forged masterpieceor a counterfeitbill). In the case of historythe absence of

the original may make the substituteeven harder o discriminate.Yet, logically,there must be a difference that makes a differencehere, and, to assess it there

must be some possibility for juxtapositionwith the original, not simply with

otherrepresentations.ForAnkersmit,however,such an originalcannot be found

except in the representations.He allows thatwe mightcompare ndividuallythe

members of sets of determinate tatementsof fact provided by rival interpreta-

tions againstthe evidence derived from the past itself. However,shouldwe pre-

fer one set overanother,

thispreference

would begrounded

in the(aesthetic)

40. CarlHempel,"The Functionof GeneralLaws in History,"Journalof Philosophy39 (1942),35-48.

41. On"bootstrap"ationalityandnaturalized pistemology,see, e.g., ThomasNickles, "Scientific

Discovery and the Futureof Philosophyof Science,"in Scientific Discovery, Logic, and Rationality,ed. Thomas Nickles (Dordrecht:Reidel, 1980), 1-59.

42. Ankersmitacknowledgesthis,but works it in a differentdirection(HR:237).




coherence andcomprehensivenessof the representation, ot in thatof some actu-

al patternin the past itself. Yet a first representationmust have dialectically

engaged that actuality,constructing t within the constraints t imposed, and I

submit all subsequentrepresentations, n disputing that one, do and should

appraise t as well againstactuality.Ankersmitemphasizes the internal(aesthetic) articulationof representation,

itsform. It is through ormthat "a chaotic mass of dataaboutthe past is organ-ized into a recognizablewhole"(HR:72).Thus,"forms n reality ... do not log-

ically and temporallyantedaterepresentation.... [R]epresentationprojectsits

own formson reality"(HR:73).But this imputeschaos to reality,not our cogni-tive limitations. Ankersmit'selaboration makes this even more problematic:

"Representationmakesrealityunfold itself into [an] infinityof different ayers;and

realityitself

meekly adaptsitself

accordingly" HR:44).I find this infinite

malleabilityof actuality mplausiblefor historyas an empirical nquiry.As pure

possibility andimaginativefreedom,artistic representationmay well play such

beautifulgames, but historical representation eeks to assert actuality,and the

actual exertsconstraint.Some forms the worldwill notputon. This reasserts he

old distinction,which cannotbe relinquished,betweenhistoryand fiction.

In any case, I am very perplexed by what follows in Ankersmit'sexposition:

"representationoes not (or rather, houldnot) addanythingto reality,not even

to ourknowledgeof it ... [though] t addsall thatwe need for ourbeing able to

find ourway

around n the world"(HR:73). Literally,

this is inconsistentwith

Ankersmit'sclaim thata representations another hing,hence an addition o the

ontological inventory.But my concernlies elsewhere.I am baffledby this dras-

tic restriction of the significance of form, and still more by the denial that it

enhancesour knowledge. Ankersmit wants the "skin of the form"to be "infi-

nitely thin,"adding"nothing o what is withinit" (HR:72).The organizationof

knowledgedoes not seem to count, forAnkersmit,as a form of knowledgeof its

own.43I suspect this difference derives from Ankersmit'ssententialtheory of

truth, hence a restrictive sense of knowledge. "Historicalknowledge is not

knowledgein the

proper senseof the

word;it is better characterizedas an

arrangementof knowledge"(NL:250). Wereone to speakinsteadof insight,he

might find such "organization f knowledge"at the level of the representation

meaningful.But thatspeaksprecisely to the issues thatremainto be settled for

the sake of thejuste milieu.

At leastAnkersmitprovidesa morethoroughgoingaccountof what he means

by the phrase"beingable to find ourway around n the world."In his discussion

of JoirnRiisen'stheoryof historyhe writes:"Historicalknowledgeessentiallyis

practical knowledge, in the sense that it may, or rathershould, help us in our

effort to find our way aboutin sociohistoricalreality ..." (HR:279).Riisenhasalertedus to "theneed of both the human ndividualandhumansociety to situ-

ate themselvesin the flow of time in orderto be capableof meaningfulactionat

all"(HR:263).Such Orientierungsbediirfnisseignify a crucialrole forhistory n

human ife thatRiusendentifies with the political.This explains,in Ankersmit's

43. I offered this objectionin my "Hyperboleof 'Opacity"'essay, 336.



172 JOHNZAMMITO

view, why "politicshas been the domain where modem historicalwritingand

historical consciousness originated"(HR:265). Things not turningout--unin-tended consequences-constitute the grippingconcernin such (political) need

for orientation,andhistory helps us to see how it may be negotiated."Onlyhis-

toricalrepresentationwill give us the kind of languagerequired or relating n a

meaningful way action and its unintended consequences" (HR:272). Thus

Ankersmitconcludes that such "specific interests"are constitutiveof historical

knowledge(HR:278).The stressis clearlyon "somethingon the side of the sub-

ject, somethingon the side of the historian-and not somethingon the side of the

object," yet "thesespecific interests are partand parcelof all historicalknowl-

edge" (HR:271, 278). Without his interest,I would say, historical nquiry s not

instituted;withoutthe discoveryof (unintended)actualities,historical nsight is

not constituted. This "practical"dea may well have a key place in the juste

milieu, but we requirefurther adumbrationof "aboutness,"of intersubjective

denotation, n this practical-historicalBildung.

IV.IDENTITYAND PORTRAITS

I believe we canget our clearest sense of thepossibilityof ajuste milieu between

Ankersmit's heoryof historicalrepresentation nd the conventionsof historical

practiceif we consider his discussions of identityand of portrait painting. The

power of Danto's theoryfor Ankersmitresides in the way in which it highlightsthe relation between representation nd identity(HR:230). "Theidentityof the

representedonly comes into being thanksto and at the same time as its repre-sentation"(HR:228). As with the notion of the "historicalidea," Ankersmit

insists that"being dependentuponrepresentation, dentityis not somethingthat

is somehowpresentforever andalways in the thingto be represented,n the waythat a thing may have a certaincolor or weight"(HR:228).

How can we construethis? It would appearthat, for Ankersmit, dentitycan

only be conceived retrospectively, hatis, upon a re-encounterwith a thing pro-

vokingthe questionof its sameness/difference.That would be the

experienceof

a literal representation.Still, consideration of identity would appearto me to

makeno senseunless, first,one has reasonto believe theentity pre-existed(onto-

logically), and, second, its characterwas determinate/determinablenough that

the questionof sameness/differencecould be raisedrationally.Ankersmitnotes

that Dantohimself assignedidentity"exclusivelyto thingsin (represented) eal-

ity-hence, not to representation,"ut he holds that this was a misunderstandingon Danto'spart(HR:230-231).ForAnkersmit, t equivocatesbetween the state-

ment level and the level of representation s a whole-the key error, n his judg-

ment,of all

theoryof

representationitherto.

To makehis case he offers a telling contrastbetween the idea of identityand

the ascription"being dentical,"as in Leibniz's famousidentityof indiscemrnibles.Thereappears o be a confusion of issues,Ankersmitsuggests,between what the

principleof the identityof indiscemrnibless after,namelya determinate ompar-

ison of two things in terms of the homology of each of theirproperties, hatis,




"being dentical,"andwhat the issue of identityseems to concern,thatis, "iden-

tity throughchange."Thatis, "there s a use of the word 'identity'that is com-

patible with being different on different occasions" (HR:232). "Identity maysometimesallow space for a dramaticamount of change.Think of the different

phasesof an individual rombirth o death,or of the historyof Poland'sborders"

(HR:226).WhatAnkersmitargues s thatidentityin this second sense cannotbe

reduced o "being dentical" n the first."Beingidentical"postulatesnotonly the

identityof the thing, but the "identityof (sets of) statementsaboutthings (i.e.,sets of true descriptionsof things)" (HR:234). All philosophicalendeavorsto

resolve the issue of identitythroughchangeby seeking"alwaysto identifysome

set of criteria(continuitythroughspace andtime, for example),"fail (HR:234).The very enterprise,Ankersmitprotests, is "a typical philosopher'sdelusion"

(HR:235).Identity,

in a word, is not aproperty,

but ratherthatproblematic"thing,"a substance-in-change.

Ankersmitbelieves thathe is makinga pointnot about theactuality of an indi-

vidualentitybutratherabout the indeterminacyof the representationof identitythatallows fordifference n properties.The "indeterminacyn 'identity' hatdoes

nothave its counterpartn 'beingidentical"'constitutes he essentialcharacter f

representation andits specific merit,as well) (HR:230).Thatis, "the ndetermi-

nacy of therelationshipbetweenwords andthingsis not a defectbut the supremevirtueof all representational se of language"(HR:88).Whatis this "virtue?"

suggestthat it allows the

actualityof an indeterminate

objectin time

(a "sub-stance-in-change") o be made intersubjectivelydiscriminable.That is what I

thinkAnkersmitreallyshouldmean whenhe urges:"Above all one shouldavoid

confusing 'indeterminacy'with 'arbitrariness[,l"'as in hyperbolic postmod-

ernism(HR:48).ButAnkersmitconcludes thatthe locus of identitycannot be in

the represented tself. Just as with his "epistemologicallyascetic"judgmentof

the "historicaldea,"he deniesanyontological actuality o identityapart romits

representation.The issue of empiricalknowledge of actual individualswas a crucialphilo-

sophicalpointof contestationbetween Leibniz and his immediatesuccessors

inGermanphilosophy,most notably Kant.44Kant insisted upon space-time intu-

ition as an indispensablyreal featurein cognition, wherebya determinateunityas actuality became evident.45This revised away from the idealism of the

Leibnizianformulations,stressingboth that existence is not a propertyand that

individualexistentscould still be objects of a human mode of cognition which

worked with ineluctablygeneral concepts.46Even Ankersmitacknowledgesthat

with the case of an individual iving creaturewe routinelyassertintersubjective-

ly the identityof the creature rombirththroughmaturity o death,despitemas-

sive changes in its properties.Thatis, thereare groundsin both the philosophi-cal tradition hatAnkersmit s drawing upon and in the natureof his own con-

44. See AnselmModel,MetaphysikundreflektierendeUrteilskraftbei Kant(Frankfurt m Main:

Athendium, 987).45. ImmanuelKant, Critique of Pure Reason, transl. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St.

Martin's,1965),A51/B75.46. Kant,"Amphibolyof Conceptsof Reflection,"Critiqueof PureReason,A260-292/B316-349.



174 JOHNZAMMITO

ceptual usage to believe that the concept of identitycan have a referential,not

merely an aesthetic, aspect.We can affirmintersubjectively,albeit fallibly, the

actualityof such substances-in-change."Thethings in our universemay change

drasticallywithoutceasing to be the things they are,"Ankersmitacknowledges

(NL:142).Butwhatabout"colligatory oncepts?""Themistakemadeby the his-

torists was thatthey located 'subjectsin change'in realityitself... [believing,for example]thatGermanyor Germancultureshouldexist in the ways thattrees,

animalsor even humanbeings exist"(NL:123). Is this simplycrudehypostasis?Ankersmiturges that a "way of seeing" is not a partof the reality it envisions

(NL:221). Historianshave confused the terminologyof theirways of seeing the

pastfor elements of the pastitself. "Mannerism"s simplya heuristic; he artists,

thepaintings,and the stylisticcharacteristicshat "Mannerism"dentifiedbelongto the actualhistoricalpast,but the ascriptionof the conceptionof "Mannerism"

makes not a bit of difference in that actuality,but only in its apprehension

(NL:175). But historiansbelieve the patterns hey identifywith colligatorycon-

cepts are intersubjectivelydenotable in the actuality,not simply in theirrepre-sentations: hatwe see actualitydifferently,not simply see differentrepresenta-tions of it. It is this philosophical possibility thatpracticinghistorians still tacit-

ly embrace in their colligatory concepts and that I am tryingto defend againstAnkersmit's oreclosure.

When Ankersmit waxes impatient with the reception of his argumenthe

resorts to an aggressive analogy:"a historicaltheoryinsensitive to this dimen-

sion of the writingof historyandintimatingthat all theoreticalproblemsabout

historicalwritingcan ultimatelybe rephrasedas problemsabouttruth s as help-less and defective as an aestheticsarguingthatphotographicaccuracy s all we

need" (HR:44). Since he chargesme personallywith such philistinism,I must

protestthat he is creatinga straw manhere. Ankersmit'sharshrhetoricalprotestthat "empiricists"are "like those philistines equating artistic merit to photo-

graphic precision" simply does not meet the thrust of my query whether

Ankersmit'sanalogybetweenpaintingandhistoricalwritingdoes not underesti-

mate somedisanalogies

(HR:82).47Thesedisanalogies might

have materialbear-

ing on questionsof the warrantof historicalrepresentation, espiteAnkersmit's

claim thathe has sufficientlyrebuttedmy concern on this score.48Let us takeuphis favorite-and quiteappropriate-analogy, portraitpainting.

Ankersmit'smain claim is quite straightforwardnd incontestable:"if a per-son is paintedby differentpainters,we will get as many differentpaintingsor

representationsof the sitter as there were painters" HR:43). Indeed,were the

same painter o undertakemore thanone painting,we wouldget still more. Who

would argue?Nor wouldI disagreethatthe objectof portraitpainting s to offer

apenetrating nsight

into the characterorpersonality

of thesitter,

which is

Ankersmit'scorollaryto the first claim. The issue is, what is (merely) "subjec-

47. See my "Hyperboleof 'Opacity,"'341.

48. See the claim at HR:292n.




tive,"and what is potentiallyobjective,aboutsuchportraiture?49heheartof his

crucialanalogyof portraitureo historycomes with the next step:"personalitys

just as little an objective given as the natureof the Renaissance";personality s

"afeatureas elusive andasimpossible

toaccurately

define as those featuresof

historicalreality that the historian of the labor movement attemptsto narrate"

(NL:43, 84).

What wouldit mean, then,to sayone portraits betterthan another?One could

make this an entirelyaesthetic question,referring o painterliness,but here the

issue is representation,"aboutness."One might arguethat the insightofferedis

not specific but universal,along the lines Aristotle famously used to privilege

poetryover history.50Thus, a portraitcould be meaningful,even if we have no

otherknowledgeof the vanished historical ndividual,not simply as an exercise

in thetechnique

ofpainterlyportraiture,

butessentially

as aninsight

into an

aspectof being human(character r personality n general).Yetof suchinsights

into the conditionhumaine,Ankersmithimself rightlyobserves,"onemay well

doubt thatthese truths if truths heyare)have muchin commonwiththe kind of

truth n which thehistorian s interested" HR:282).So we are drivenback to the

issue of "aboutness."

Ankersmitalleges that "empiricists"would expect portraitpaintings to be

judged solely in terms of photographicaccuracy(HR:43). This is presumably

because "empiricists"cannot, in his view, get past "precisionand accuracy"

(HR:87, 89). Yetthere arestrongreasonsto rejectthe

appropriatenessf mechan-

ical reproductionas a construalof the "precisionand determinacy" ought in

eitherhistoryor science. Interpretationeeks insight,not replication.Ankersmit

himself makes thecase vividly in his critiqueof Ranke's dea of wie es eigentlich

gewesen andCollingwood's theoryof re-enactmentas ideals for historical nter-

pretation(HR:244). Not copying, but understanding,s the goal. Here he finds

the analogyto paintingvery powerful.Thatis, painting"will drawour attention

to the trajectory rom the worlditself to representation"HR:85).We areforced

to recognize the idiosyncratic "coding"of the painteron the way to his or her

insight(oreven as his orherinsight),in contrast o the invisible"coding"of

pho-tography-invisible becausemechanicallyuniform.

Surelythere s somethingrightabout hat:mediation s crucial.Butwhatabout

Ankersmit's claim that in painting "we are faced with a movement from an

(intersubjective) urface down into ever deeper layers of reality"(HR:43)?All

thathe claims to be availableto the artist or a portraitare"physical eatures"of

the sitterthatphotographywould pick out. Not only is such givenness of "sur-

face"physicalfeaturesa dubious dea(see WilfridSellars),buteven moreimpor-

tant is the questionwhether"deeper ayers"arereally beyondthe reach of inter-

subjectivity.Ankersmit'sdebts to the "surfacedazzle" of logical positivism

49. In NarrativeLogic, Ankersmitaddressesanalogousconsiderationsregardingcaricature. He

notes: "We admirea caricaturebecause it strikinglycharacterizes he original physiognomythatwe

arefamiliarwith."Yet "ifwe wereto know a face only fromcaricatureswe would be in no position

to judge which one is the best"(NL:14-15).50. Aristotle,Poetics, ?9: 1451b, in Basic Worksof Aristotle,ed. RichardMcKeon (New York:

RandomHouse, 1941), 1463-1464.



176 JOHN ZAMMITO

prove too obtrusivehere.51His claim thatonly the surface evel is "intersubjec-

tively given" is not consonant at all with post-positivismafter the "linguisticturn"and with morerecentphilosophyof science. Even moreproblematic s his

denial of the possibilityof intersubjectivityn penetratingdeeper nto reality.He

writes:"as soon as we have thus entered nto the deeperlevels of reality,there s

no obvious (andintersubjectivelygiven) mark where we should stop"(HR:43);

"as soon as we want to look more deeply into reality, it becomes opaque"

(HR:44).At the same time, he himself suggests that thereis a maximumof pen-etrationorinsight, beyondwhichthings get more muddled-a pointof enormous

significance,were it allowed to have an objective component(HR:43). Swiftly,

however,he assimilates t to his widerview: "this s a constraint hat has its only

origin and scope of action at the level of representation: eality itself does not

provideus with criteriafor this kind of representative onsistency,nor for how

to apply them"(HR:43).Therefore,he denies "that he represented s intersub-

jectively given in exactly the same way to us all if only we care to look in the

rightdirection" HR:43-44).

If "given"signifies obviousor unelicited,perhaps hatmightbe plausible,but

in some sense we must jointly be able to "look in the right direction"-in the

sense of orientingourintersubjectivediscernment"to the rightdepth"-and see

essentiallythe same thing.Unless we can identify intersubjectivelywhat we are

tryingto see, comparisonandevaluation arewithoutany mooring. Very simply,Ankersmit akes the view that"ghostly depths" Hooker)cannotbe actual, or-

to be "precise and accurate"-cannot be intersubjectivelyconstrued.All the

problemsI find in Ankersmit'sapproacharereplicatedhere.First,the personal-

ity the portraitevokes is not restricted o the representation,but is of the sitter.

We areofferedinsightnot (merely)intopaintingbut into an actual character.(InFaulkner's irstnovel, Mosquitos,for example,the climax comes withtheinsightthat a portrait n sculptureprovides about an enigma in the main figure of the

novel.) The invitationto "see things" n a differentway would bepointless were

the insight not at least potentially intersubjective.The question is how to

regard-to explainandto evaluate-these underdetermined

bjectsof consider-

ation, not to precludethis by stipulation.In the sphereof historicalrepresenta-tion itself, I submit,only this allows for rationaldisputation.

V.CONCLUSION:POST-POSITIVISM ND THEJUSTEMILIEU

How do we get to ajuste milieu?MaybeAnkersmit'srigid notion of "truth"s

getting in our way here. We need to think of the sophisticateddiscourse about

"underdeterminationf theories" n the philosophyof science.52The premiseof

51. CliffordHooker,"SurfaceDazzle, GhostlyDepths:An Expositionand CriticalEvaluationofvanFraassen'sVindicationof EmpiricismagainstRealism," n Imagesof Science:Essayson Realism

and Empiricism,ed. P. M. Churchland ndCliffordHooker(Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press,

1985), 153-196.

52. On the underdetermination f theory,see Quine,"OnEmpiricallyEquivalentSystems of the

World,"Erkenntnis9 (1975), 313-328; Larry Laudan, "Demystifying Underdetermination,"n

Scientific Theories,ed. C. Savage (Minneapolis:Universityof Minnesota Press, 1990), 267-297;

Larry Laudan and JarrettLeplin, "EmpiricalEquivalence and Underdetermination,"ournal of

Philosophy 88 (1991), 449-492; and Carl Hoefer andArthurRosenberg, "EmpiricalEquivalence,UnderdeterminationndSystemsof the World,"Philosophy of Science 61 (1994), 592-607.




such philosophical discussions is that any numberof theories might equally

incorporate ll the availableevidence,all the sentential-level"statements f fact"

or "truedescriptions" hatare so centralto Ankersmit'snotion of epistemology.In fact, thereis substantialconsensus among philosophersof science that there

can be no experimental epistemological)verificationat the sentential evel: this

is the importof the famous DuhemThesis.53 nstead, t is only for largerunitsof

theorythatwarrant s to be sought,as Quineargued n his seminalessay on the

underdeterminationof theory.54Yet scientists (and even philosophers) still

believe theycandiscriminatecognitivelyamongtheories.55 hey adducea whole

set of additional criteria for theory-choice beyond observation statements.56

Ankersmitdoes, as well, for historicalrepresentationsHR:55).The two criteria

he suggests deserve centralplace are: scope and boldness (HR:55, 96-97). He

notes closeparallels

withPopper's theory

of scientificdevelopment

(HR:97,

NL:245). ButAnkersmit nsists these are aesthetic and internalto the represen-

tation. The philosophersof science believe these are theoretical, that is, they

offer some intersubjectivelynegotiablecognitivegrasp of the "chunkof reality"

in question.My argument s thatthis extendedsense of epistemology,central to

post-positivistphilosophyof science, offers a betterframework or understand-

ing historicalrepresentationhan Ankersmit'scategorialrejectionof any cogni-tive aspectto whole representations.

Ankersmithimself suggestsa "historian'smetaphorhasa function n historical

writinganalogousto thatof theories n the sciences"

(HR:139).Inhis view, "sci-

entifictheoriescannotproperlybe saidto be 'true,'but 'plausible,'or 'better han

rivaltheories,'or,atmost,to 'approximatehetruth'.. ."(HR:97).This raisestwo

issues. First, n natural cience, as I havejust argued, heories as wholes claim to

be notonly representationalinAnkersmit's ense)butwarrantable,r at leastnot

yet falsified, thoughfalsifiable. Second, natural-scientificheorycontains theo-

reticaltermswith which no single observation entencecorrelates or testing,yet

these theoretical ermsaretakento refer to essentialelementsin the functioning

of the world-arguably as "real"as directlyobservableentities like tables and

chairs.Indeed,theoretically, ables and chairs

are takento bequite derivatively

"real,"notwithstandingheirprominence n oureverydayperceptualexperience.

My view is thatcolligatoryconcepts (in historicalrepresentations) an be con-

ceived to refer, n this epistemologicalsense, in roughlythe sameway thattheo-

retical termsdo in natural-scientific heories.57That is, thereis a cognitive, not

53. See my discussionof the Duhem Thesis inA Nice Derangementof Epistemes,17-25, andthe

literature here cited.

54. Quine, "OnEmpiricallyEquivalent Systems of the World."See also: A. Genova, "Quine's

Dilemma of Underdetermination," ialectica 42 (1988), 283-293; and Roger Gibson, "Moreon

Quine'sDilemma of Underdetermination,"ialectica 45 (1991), 59-68.

55. LaudanandLeplin,"EmpiricalEquivalenceandUnderdetermination."

56. For discussions of other constraintson theory preference,see Thomas Kuhn, "Objectivity,Value Judgmentand Theory Choice," in Kuhn, The Essential Tension(Chicago: University of

Chicago Press, 1977), 320-339; Laudan,"DemystifyingUnderdetermination";nd Helen Longino,

"CognitiveandNon-CognitiveValues n Science:Rethinking heDichotomy,"n Feminism,Science,

and the Philosophyof Science,ed. LynnNelson andJackNelson (Dordrecht:Kluwer, 1996), 39-58.

57. In Narrative Logic, Ankersmitstronglyrejected this analogy: "I am convinced that every

philosopherof historyor of science will dismissout of handan identificationof 'narrativeubstances'



178 JOHNZAMMITO

simply an aesthetic,dimensionto representation.The termspick out something

intersubjectivelydiscriminablein reality, though not directly observable like

tablesand chairs. For example,an electron is no moreimmediatelyaccessibleto

perceptionthan the Spanish Inquisition.Each must be inferredfrom actualevi-

dence.Yet neither s utterly ndeterminable.Notably,the determinacyof the the-

oretical term"electron"has been no more stableover time than the determinacy

of the colligatoryconcept "SpanishInquisition."Yet in each instance,discrimi-

nation is possible amongrival versions,and some can be deemedinadequate n

light of the contingent, allible,butbest currentexplanations.This is not to deny that language complicatesreferenceof theoretical terms

andthe theories that containthem,or,concomitantly,of colligatoryconceptsand

the historicalrepresentationshat contain them. It is to arguethatepistemologi-

cally these relations aremore on a par thanAnkersmitconcedes. One can cer-

tainlyagreethat "there s, thus, something peculiarly'idealist' aboutrepresenta-

tion ... [H]ow we decide to conceptualizerealityon the level of representation

(of reality)determineswhat we will find on the level of the represented i.e., on

that of realityitself)" (HR:45).Ankersmitmaintains"realitywill remaina chaos

as long as no such decision has been made and no level of representationhas

been singledout"(HR:45).This is true notonly of historical nterpretation ut of

natural-scientificheory.Yet I would suggestthat this truthshould be takenepis-

temologically(ratiocognoscendi),notontologically(ratioessendi).The chaos is

cognitive;we are not entitledto take it as immanent n reality.On the contrary,

there is a constraintor resistance manifestedby reality:not any representation

will fit.58The order that a representation-or theoryor model-imposes is not

entirely arbitrary.Hence, there can be no creationout of whole cloth "as,admit-

tedly, some extremist deconstructivistsor narrativists rein the habitof saying"

(HR:45). Representationmust, at the very least, "be about,"and Ankersmit is

willing to defend this againstextremepostmodernism:"Nowit is not easy to see

with theoreticalconcepts"(NL:103). "All attempts o eliminate the notion of [narrative ubstances]

by equating t with the notion of theoreticalconceptshave to be rejected" NL:112). "Narrative ub-stances arealwaysrelatedto quite specific historicalsituations .. [whereas]theoreticalconcepts ..

[have] applicabilityto an indefinitenumber of historical situations" NL:109). Most extensively:"Theoretical onceptsdo indeedreferto, ordenote,certain'things,'oraspectsof 'things'which exist

in empiricallyobservablerealityeven when 'no overtprocedures or applyingthose terms to exper-

imentally dentifiable nstancesof the terms' arepresent; narrative ubstances]however,do not refer

to identifiable'things,'or aspectsof themin historicalreality.Theyhave a purely 'expository'func-

tion .... Theoreticalconceptscorrelatethings with words even thoughthose things owe theirvery'existence' to the words we use to refer to them; [narrative ubstances] unctiononly at the level of

words ... their sole function is to tie individual statementsof a narratioogether" NL:112).I do not

proposeto "eliminate"historicalrepresentations y "equating"hem withtheoreticalconcepts.I pro-

pose simplyto analogize the epistemological situationof these respectivenotions.I also recognize a

significantdifference(all analogiesentaildisanalogies)in the singularityof reference n a historical

representation, s contrastedwiththeindefinite extension of a theoreticalconcept.The issue thatsep-aratesAnkersmit'sview from mine remains the questionof whetherthereis any referentialelement

in a historicalrepresentation, ndthathas been the thrustof the entireessay.58. See the discussion on constraintor resistance in naturebetween Peter Galison and Andrew

Pickering, with commentariesby others, in Scientific Practice: Theories and Stories of Doing

Physics, ed. JedBuchwald(Chicago: Universityof ChicagoPress, 1995), andmy commentary n A

Nice Derangementof Epistemes,225-231.




what the reasonsare for the common contemporarywisdom that all representa-tion mustfail. It seems to be an article of faithin circlesof, predominantly,iter-

arytheoristsrather hanthe result of a sustainedand carefulphilosophicalanaly-sis" (HR:273).

In NarrativeLogic, casting about for an alternative o the categoriesof truth

and falsity for narrative ubstances,Ankersmitconsideredthe categoriesobjec-

tivityand subjectivity(NL:77). While these may seem desperatelyproblematic

alternatives, would like to recur to them.Ankersmit nsists, for the sake of his

commitmentto the "rationality" f disciplinaryhistory,that his narrative ogic"doesnot in the least compel us to decide thathistoriography xpressesnothingbut thewhimorthemoralandaestheticvalues [that s, the "subjectivity"] f indi-

vidualhistorians" NL:93).We need to explore why that shouldbe the case. The

key featureof Ankersmit'snarrativeogic

is that when we ask, "what s the his-

toricalstateof affairsthatcorresponds o a narratio?"we discoverthat"wehave

no standardshere,"and that"there s a curious lack of fixity in the correspon-dence betweenthe narratioand the past representedn it" (NL:71). On the other

hand,this historicalrepresentation"allow[s one] to make sense of an otherwise

intractable artof thepast"by offeringa "pointof view."This distinctivevantagenot only serves as "theguidingprinciple n the constructionof the narratio" ut

is also proposedas its "cognitivecore"(NL:98).ForAnkersmit,"'pointsof view'

do not expresswhatrealityis like but which of its aspectsshouldbe considered

oremphasized

or anoptimalunderstanding

f thepast" NL:193).59

"Wedecide

to look at the historicalpastfrom a certainpointof view,"Ankersmitargues.He

cites in evidence the historianNorman Hampson'savowal: "one must finally

impose a personalpatternon the rich anarchyof evidence" (NL:193).60At the

sametime,Ankersmitrecognizes,"inits own particularway the narratio ttemptsto explainthe past"(NL:232). Thatis, no matterhow subjectivethe inspirationfor its construction,or originaland uniquethe viewpoint, the accountproposedaims at objectivity,at intersubjective cceptability.

We need to work out the relation of "narrativepragmatics"and "narrative

logic"more

determinatelyo take a stand on Ankersmit'snotion of the rational-

ity of historicalpractice.A robusthistoricism does not requirea priori guaran-tees. It can tolerateuncertaintyandindeterminacy;what it cannot tolerate s the

claim that "allnarratiosare incommensurable"-at least not as a matterof nar-

rativepragmatics (NL:208). That a measure of correspondencewith historical

reality is possible suffices to make it methodologically and epistemologically

necessary for the rationalityof historical debate. That, I would argue, is what

objectivity signifies: intersubjectiveacceptability, not certainty,not complete

determinacy.It is this that gives substance to Ankersmit'sclaim, on behalf of

"narrative ragmatics"andhistoricalrationality, hatfrom his view of narrativelogic "itdoes not follow thatarguments annotor should not be adducedto jus-

tify what identities or [narrative ubstances]one wishes to discern in historical

59. "Thenarrativemeaningof a narratio s a proposalas to whatpossible statementswe should

select for structuring urideas on certainhistoricaltopics"(NL:223).60. Ankersmitcites fromNormanHampson,TheEnlightenmentHarmondsworth, ng.: Penguin,

1968), in NL:194n.



180 JOHNZAMMITO

reality"(NL:194). What sorts of argumentswould these be? How would they

justify?And whatwould this have to do with historicalreality?He writes that"an

investigationof what makes [a historian]say [one representations better than

another]orjustifies his saying it is beyondthe narrativeogician's competence"

(NL:225). Indeed,"whatthe exact natureof the narrative ubstanceproposed n

a particularnarratios, is a problemfor the historianbut not for the philosopher

of history"(NL:104). Even for historians"agreementas to what exactly is the

(narrative ubstance)proposedby a certainhistorian n his narratiomay be hard

to attain" NL:103). Certainly t is insufficientthat the statementscontained n it

be accurateor the sentences logically and grammaticallycogent. "Tellingthe

(scientific) truthand avoidingclashes with formallogic is not sufficientto pro-

vide the readerwith a consistent narrative" NL:199). Likewise, "being[gram-

matically] intelligible or understandables only a preliminary equirement. ."

(NL:203). Instead,he observes, "theremay very well be rules for assessing the

relative meritsof individualcompletenarratives"NL:207).And "itmay be that

the intuitionsby which historians are guided when constructinga narrativeare

not so different rom the criteria or decidinguponits relativemerits" NL:207).

Thatopens the way for naturalized pistemologyin the philosophyof history.

Learningfrom earlierpractice, extending tentativelythe motifs of earliersuc-

cesses by analogy,constitutes a "bootstrap" ationalitywithout the need of any

foundationalist,a priori principle.On that basis disciplines and theirempirical

knowledgehave generallyarisenandorganized hemselves.Thishistoricallyand

logically iterativeprocess is at least as viable a representationof the course of

historicaldebateas of the historyof scientific theories(andbehindboth, of nat-

ural languages and their categories).61There is a further,crucial component:

objectivity s alwaysthe achievementof a communityof inquiry,neverof an iso-

latedinterpreter.62t the sametime, it is the very individualityof perspectiveof

the inquirer-idiosyncrasy or "subjectivity"-that inspires and informs the

account thatis proposedto the community.Personalcreativityandrisk form the

indispensably"subjective" lement in the dialectic of subjectivityandobjectivi-

tythat constitutesthe narrative

pragmaticsof

history.To returnto our

startingpoint:what we mustunderstand s "the historian'sattempt o give an acceptableaccount of partof the past"(NL:207). Historicalpracticeis "a collective enter-

prise,"asAnkersmitrecognizes(NL:241).I wouldonly hold outagainsthim that

even physicsmustbe. This is a featureof all empirical nquiryaccording o a nat-

uralizedepistemology.Let us come to termswithAnkersmit's inal proposalfor ajuste milieu, then.

He writes:

The threecentralnotionsof philosophy f language-reference,meaning, nd truth-

have o be redefinedn ordero cometo anadequate nderstandingf the nature f rep-resentation. eferencehould ereplaced y"aboutness.".. Meaning astobereplacedby "intertextuality" . . [since] meaning only reveals itself in a comparisonwith other

texts. . . . And this necessity has its consequences for the notion of truth . . . [It must

become] elative lausibility.HR:284)

61. Nickles, "ScientificDiscoveryand the Futureof Philosophyof Science."

62. Helen Longino, Science as Social Knowledge:Valuesand Objectivity n Scientific Inquiry

(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1990).




All this is acceptable; t is just not enough.As I have tried to show, "aboutness"

remainstoo opento do thephilosophicalwork Ankersmitseeks from it. We need

to achieve a moresophisticatednotion of intersubjectivedentificationof thecol-

ligatoryconceptshistoriansemploy-a looser,more inductive,naturalized pis-

temology.Identity,substance-in-change,hehistorical dea:all these lay claimto

an empiricallycompelling "aboutness" hat demandsmore philosophicalspeci-fication. Similarly,"intertextuality"s a vital partof meaning-constitution ut it

does not exhaustit; somejuxtapositionof the text or metaphor o the represent-ed target s ultimatelystill in play.And plausibility-along with manyothercri-

teria-should certainlysupplementa notion of truth-and a fortiori the restric-

tive (sentential)notion of truth that Ankersmit is both using and contesting.

"Fertilityandnot truth[in thatrestrictivesense] is our criterion or decidingon

the relativemerit of narratios"NL:223). But that haslong

since been theposi-tion of the philosophyof science with regardto "underdetermination"-and,

would add,of the "rationality"f historicalpractice,which stressescontingency,

fallibility,and arguments o the best explanation.Ironically,one must conclude

that the "epistemologicalasceticism" that Ankersmithas adoptedis too strin-

gent-a holdoverfrom positivism that does not do full justice to the post-posi-tivist naturalism hatsucceeded the linguisticturn.

Rice University

Houston,Texas

Ankersmit and Historical Representation- John Zammito

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