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The British battalion of the international brigadesand the Spanish civil war, 1936–39

Dr Matthew Hughes

To cite this article: Dr Matthew Hughes (1998) The British battalion of the internationalbrigades and the Spanish civil war, 1936–39, The RUSI Journal, 143:2, 59-74, DOI:10.1080/03071849808446252

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/03071849808446252

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MILITARY HISTORY

THE BRITISH BATTALION OF THEINTERNATIONAL BRIGADES AND THE

SPANISH CIVIL WAR, 1936-39

In 1995 the film Land and Free-dom brought the Spanish CivilWar to life on screen while offer-ing a view of the war as being apopular revolution crushed byunfettered Stalinism in the formof a regular Republican army.However, Dr Hughes here arguesthat the lack of unity and disci-pline within the Republicancamp was just as much to blamefor Franco's victory as thestrength of Franco's forces. In

'fact, Franco took advantage ofthe lack of organisation in theRepublican. ranks and experi-enced little difficulty in outflank-ing the militia units defendingthe road to Madrid. Dr Hugheschallenges the view that badly-disciplined, poorly-equipped, ill-led popular militias stood anychance against Franco's Moroc-can regulars and Spanish For-eign Legion. The BritishBattalion and the other foreignsupporters for the Republicancause performed prodigious featsof bravery in these trying con-ditions, and the InternationalBrigades as a whole were a greathelp to the Republic. But this wasnot enough since the Republicwas disjointed and unable to pulltogether at the critical moments

DR MATTHEW HUGHES

Ken Loach's 1995 film Land and Freedom broke new ground in bringingthe Spanish Civil War on to the screen. It also gives a very particularview of the conflict in Spain from 1936-39. The film follows closelyGeorge Orwell's experiences in Spain in the Republican militia of the

Partido Obrero de Unification Marxista (POUM—United Marxist Workers'Party) as outlined in his Homage to Catalonia (1938).1 At the film's end there is amemorable scene where well-disciplined, smartly-uniformed Communist troopsbrutally disarm the populist militia force. The militia members plead with thefaceless New Model Army of the Spanish Republic but to no avail. Loach offersthe vision of a popular revolution crushed by unfettered Stalinism in the form ofa regular Republican army. The 'regular' forces only appear on the screen tobully hapless militia members. Loach prefers to focus on the personal experi-ences of an English working-class man, David Can, in the POUM militia on thequiet, peripheral Aragon front. Reviews of Loach's film, both by historians andex-Brigaders, make this point, although with different degrees of vigour.2 PaulPreston encapsulated the feelings of many Republican veterans who felt 'dimin-ished by the political and personal self-indulgence on the Aragon front of theattractive boys and girls of the POUM1.3

Dr Matthew Hughes is a lecturer inmodern history at Nene College,Northampton.

Reality behind the vision

The reality was that groups likethe POUM obstructed Republicanvictory. General Franco stifledNationalist opposition in his zonefrom groups such as the Carlists andthe Falange to present a solid front.By contrast, the Republic failed touse its considerable resources to fulleffect. POUM-type units were part ofthe problem. The time that theRepublic took to establish itselfallowed Franco the breathing spaceto organise his forces. Franco's mar-tial background, coupled with thefailure to capture Madrid in 1936,made him realise the significance ofregular forces in what would be adrawn-out war of attrition. JamesAlbrighton, a 19 year old British vol-unteer in the Muerte es Maestro Cen-turia, summed up the differencebetween the two sides when he notedin his diary how Anarchist militia-men told to carry out an order'refused and instead of being sent tothe guard house (now I come tothink of it, we have no guard room). . . held a discussion, and in the endvoted to see if they should obey thecabo [corporal]'.4 One Catalan Anar-chist militiaman, who subsequentlyserved in the French Foreign Legion

and the British Army, admitted thathis unit would have done better con-sidering what he learnt during theSecond World War.5 WilliamAlexander, one of the commandersof the British battalion, wrote in1937 to his sister how in Catalonia,where anarchism was strongest:'When the anarchists start doingthings—and by that I mean fight-ing—they will . . . realise the needfor unity of command, discipline andeffort.'6 The worry of being in theline next to an Anarchist unit wasremarked on by one veteran of thewar: 'Nobody in Madrid felt easywith an anarchist formation on hisflank.'7 Technical branches of theRepublican forces such as the navywere particularly badly served byradicalism. Sailors' Soviets kept run-down ships languishing in port and asuperior Republican navy con-tributed little to the war effort.8

Many in the Republican zone,including the middle classes andarmy officers accustomed to disci-pline, looked to the Communists topresent a tough, united exterior. LEOCharlton, a former British air attachein America, summarised the prob-lems inherent in the untrained mili-tia system in a report which looked atthe situation in 1936: 'The Militia

© RUSI Journal April 1998 59

1 MILITARY HISTORYwhich attempted to stem the rebelonrush in the plains of Toledo, andin Estremadura, was not a disciplinedarmy. Lacking officers, and withouttraining, they comported themselveswith heroism, it is true, but a spirit ofindividualism permeated their rankswhich does not count for very muchin a modern army.'9 Tom Wintring-ham, one of the British Battalioncommanders, in his account of thewar, English Captain, again pointed tofundamental inadequacies in themilitia where they failed to zigzagtheir trenches to prevent fire beingdirected down the length of thetrench.10 As a result of this lack ofbasic field craft Nationalist planeseasily routed militia columns by straf-ing these simple trenches from theair. Franco's 'Army of Africa' had lit-tle difficulty outflanking and routingthe militia units defending the roadto Madrid. This was the context ofthe emotionally charged scene ofuniformed, conscript soldiers disarm-ing the idealistic POUM volunteersin Loach's film.

The Soviet Union had her set ofpriorities in Spain and the evolutionof a conventional Republican armywas used by the Soviets as a means tousurp power. The Republic was facedwith something of a Hobson's choice:either leave the militia system intactand lose the war, or build a Soviet-trained army that might win thewar but could be used for controlafterwards. Burnett Bolloten's argu-ment that by May 1937 the Soviet-dominated Communists controlledRepublican Spain is convincing.11

Franco always claimed he was fight-ing international communism;assuming Bolloten's detailed argu-ment to be correct, Franco was fight-ing a democracy in July 1936, but bylate 1937 he was indeed confrontedby the Comintern. For this reason,when it was first published in 1961,the undemocratic and censoriousFrancoist regime, not usually knownfor its promotion of foreign books,seized upon and advanced Bolloten'swork.

The International Brigadesas 'shock troops'

This article is not primarily con-cerned with the political machina-tions of the Spanish Civil War.Rather, it seeks to challenge the viewportrayed in Land and Freedom thatbadly-disciplined, poorly-equipped,

60

ill-led popular militias stood anychance of success against Franco'sMoroccan regulars and Spanish For-eign Legion (or Tercio) troops.12 Ifthe Republic were to defeat theNationalist rebels, did they need thediscipline of a modern army? LeonTrotsky's organisation of the RedArmy in the Russian Civil War,1918-22, with Tsarist officers re-employed and old-style discipline

After over twoyears' fighting inSpain theInternational .Brigades werewithdrawn inNovember 1938 ina Mast desperateeffort' by theRepublic to gaininternationalgoodwill and forceFranco to expel hisItalian and Germanforces.

re-imposed provides a historical par-allel. The irony is that the POUMwas portrayed by its opponents as aTrotskyist front organisation.

The International Brigades pro-vide an exemplar of the change thatoccurred in the Republic from 1936as it attempted to form a convention-al army. Foreign volunteers eager tofight fascism arrived in Spain soonafter the military uprising in July1936. By October 1936 there weresufficient numbers in the Republicanzone to form International Brigades,whose battalions, or 'legions ofbabel', were based loosely aroundcommon language.13 By late 1936there was a British company, by Janu-ary 1937 there were sufficient Eng-lish-speaking soldiers to form aBritish battalion. Figures for the

' International Brigades vary accord-ing to the author's political stand-point, but 35-40000 Brigaders as a

total for the whole war is broadlyaccurate.14 Nationalist claims of125 000 'red hooligans' with theRepublic should be ignored.1^ Nomore than 20000 volunteers servedin the International Brigade at anyone time.16 That the Republicanforces by April 1937 exceeded350000 in total puts the Interna-tional Brigades' contribution in pro-portion: a maximum of eight brigadesin the Republican Army were pri-marily international.17 By September1938 there were only 12 000 volun-teers left in Spain and the Brigadeshad been leavened with Spanishconscripts. In total, 10 000 Brigadersdied in Spain.18

The Brigades were used as defen-sive and offensive 'shock' troops atcritical moments in the fighting;Until the Republic organised andtrained regular mixed brigades (withfour infantry battalions), the Inter-national Brigades were among theirbest troops. POUM-type units weregarrisoned on inactive sectors of thefront while the InternationalBrigades acted as the Republic'smobile reserve, moving betweenemergencies. After over two yean'fighting in Spain the InternationalBrigades were withdrawn in Novem-ber 1938 in a 'last desperate effort' bythe Republic to gain internationalgoodwill and force Franco to expelhis Italian and German forces.19 Inthis the Republic failed, the non-sense of non-intervention meantthat in 1939 Franco emerged tri-umphant and Franco's German allytook its lessons from the Spanishcockpit into the Second World War.It is not apparent what Benito Mus-solini learnt from the poor showingof his army fighting for Franco as itcollapsed at battles like Guadalajarain March 1937.20 Perhaps Mussolini,like the Austro-Hungarian FieldMarshal of the First World War Con-rad von Hotzendorf, deserved a bet-ter army: one capable of defeatingopponents more substantial thanAbyssinian tribesmen. He never gotit. Then again, perhaps his armydeserved a better leader. They nevergot one.

The British battalion

Britain sent some 2500 volun-teers to Spain,- most of whom foughtin the British battalion, 1200 werewounded and 526 were killed: 'anextraordinarily high proportion', and

one reflecting the intensity of thebattles in which the British wereinvolved.21 The British fought as aunit in four key actions of the war:the battles of Jarama (February1937), Brunete (July 1937), Teruel(January-February 1938) and Ebro(July-August 1938). This article willexamine the development of theInternational Brigades with particu-lar emphasis on the British battalionin the overall context of a changingRepublican Army. Stress will beplaced on the evolution of a 'conven-tional' army as a necessary means ofdefeating the Nationalists.

British volunteers arriving inSpain were a mixed group of Com-munists and non-Communists. TheCommunist Party organised the jour-ney to Spain for party members;others made their own way tothe border, including WinstonChurchill's nephew, Esmond Romil-ly, who described his experiences inSpain in BoadiUa (1937), and theauthor Laurie Lee whose adventuresin Spain are colourfully outlined in AMoment of War (1991). There wereundoubtedly some dilettantes androgues among those who boughttheir tickets for a 'weekend' in Paris,but the idea that unemployed menfrom the Embankment in Londonwere press-ganged into going toSpain has never been proved: 'I left agood comfortable home to come outhere . . . we were not compelled tofight, but on the contrary, are eagerto get to grips with the fascists. Thebest friend I have here is my machinegun, and the more fascists it kills themore I love it.'22 C Day Lewis'sinscription on the Brigades' Londonmemorial that 'They went becausetheir open eyes could see no otherway', reflected the personal decisionmade by Brigaders. The British Gov-ernment obstructed the passage ofvolunteers as part of its disinterestedpolicy to the war in Spain. The For-eign Office sent invoices to all themen taken prisoner by the National-ists during the war for the cost oftheir subsequent repatriation; Spe-cial Branch officers at Newhaven didtheir best to stop men getting acrossthe Channel.

The British battalion was com-prised of men who had made thedecision to go to Spain. They weremotivated and this was to give themconsiderable elan in battle. By con-trast, Italians fighting for Franco andtaken prisoner at Guadalajara told

their captors that they had been oth-erwise unemployed in Italy and 'hadno idea where they were going untilthey arrived in Spain.'23 One Britishparty member explained his decisionto go to Spain with the lines: 'Myshort period of University life wasuseful. But in a world of wars andrevolutions new tasks are on theagenda: Let us see that they are car-ried out.'21* This idealism was not

. . . the idea thatunemployed menfrom theEmbankment inLondon werepress-ganged intogoing to Spainhas never beenproved . . .

atypical and reflected a genuine feel-ing of revulsion at fascism amongvolunteers for the InternationalBrigades.

Volunteers from countries such asFrance and Germany had experienceof peacetime conscription besidesideological fervour. Among theBritish, however, some had fought inthe First World War, some hadtrained in the OTC (Officers' Train-ing Corps), or had served in the regu-lar British Forces or Territorials.'Many of our men had experience inthe last war and others came fromcountries where they had militarytraining' remembered the British vol-unteer John Johnstone.25 RichardBennett went out to Spain with thepoet John Cornford, and wrote howas an ex-OTC member he was the'military expert' of his group as hewas a good shot and could 'demon-strate the use of the Mills handgrenades and the Lewis machinegun'.26 There were Irishmen such asFrank Ryan, who had fought with theIrish Republican Army (IRA), andBritish volunteers such as GeorgeNathan, who had been a Jewish offi-cer in the Brigade of Guards, andwho had been attached to the 'Blackand Tans' during the Irish War ofIndependence.2^ Nathan was said tohave taken part, as a member of the

MILITARY HISTORY 2Z2'Dublin Castle Murder Gang', in theassassination of the Mayor and ex-Mayor of Limerick.28 Common causewas to unite an otherwise disparategroup of individuals.

The battle of Jarama in February1937 was the British battalion'sbaptism of fire. The Nationalistsattacked south of Madrid to cut theMadrid-Valencia highway and encir-cle the capital. The British, as part ofthe 15th International Brigade, weresent, along with regular Republicanunits, to hold the line. Peter Kemp,one of the few from Britain whofought with Franco, was highlyimpressed by the British performanceat Jarama.29 The British battalionfought 'very well indeed' and writingfrom the opposing side Kemp remem-bered how bitter the Nationalistswere of the International Brigades forprolonging the war.30 Frank Thomas,in Franco's Spanish Foreign Legionand at Jarama, recalled how theBritish Brigaders presented his unitwith more 'solid opposition' than hewas accustomed to: 'One night inparticular they made a bayonetcharge against us at dusk . . . momen-tarily the Bandera [battalion] gaveway'.31 Morale and motivation in theInternational Brigades in these earlybattles were vital..

The lack of training andequipment

The British battalion had beenhastily put together for Jarama, andso by the end of 12 February, of anoriginal complement of 600, only225 were left in the line. This hastewas not the only reason for the heavycasualties suffered by the British bat-talion at Jarama. The losses reflectedtheir lack of training and the gener-ally inchoate state of the RepublicanArmy. Recruits were lucky to havefired three to five rounds of liveammunition on the firing ranges

• before going into battle: 'withoutweapons [,] training at Madrigueras[the British base near Albacete] wasrudimentary; a route march each dayto harden us. Then cases of gunsarrived . . . we were dismayed at theirage—made in Steyr, Austria, anddate stamped 1886! There was noammunition so we couldn't practisefiring.'32 The issue of modern Sovietrifles to the British before Jarama toreplace the dated rifles providedsome compensation, but training wasstill rudimentary and Soviet supplies

61

EZ3 MILITARY HISTORY

erratic.33 The British were notunique in that 75 per cent of themhad 'never held a loaded weapon intheir hands before' going in to battleat Jarama.34 One recruit who hadserved in the British Army got a'good laugh out of the training',adding that most men learnt on thebattlefield.35 In 1988 John Hender-son remembered that he fired tenrounds on the practice range and'that was the sum total of the militaryexperience of just about everybody'.The news came through about theNationalist breakthrough at Jaramaand 'then we were in the lorries andup in the line.'36 A Spanish recruitwho posed a question about bombtrajectories during a training lecturegiven by Fred Copeman, the Britishbattalion commander (and ex-sea-man dismissed the Royal Navy forinvolvement in the Invergordonmutiny in 1931), was told in reply: 'Idon't know mate, I'm a sailormyself.'37 Copeman, who had alsobeen a boxing champion, settled dis-agreements over discipline at Jaramain unorthodox fashion, 'by hittingout at his opponent.'38 Training didundoubtedly improve, but as late as1938 a British recruit was still com-plaining that 'he wasn't a trained sol-dier' and that he learnt soldiering 'byactually doing it in action.'39

From the above it is hardly sur-prising that the British battalion wasunsatisfactory when it came to imi-tating a conventional army. Therewas the recurring problem of soldiersnot receiving and even ignoringorders. This made command andcontrol in battle erratic. Jim Brewer,in the British anti-tank battery, waspresent at an incident where theyrefused to withdraw their Soviet-sup-plied 37mm anti-tank gun, arguingthat they were not in any real danger.Malcolm Dunbar, the battery com-mander, sent Frank Proctor of thebattery headquarters to the recalci-trant gun armed with a pistol. Proc-tor was forced to threaten the batterycrew: 'If you don't give your wordthat you will withdraw at once, I amcommanded to shoot you. I wastrained in the Royal Artillery and Iwill bloody well carry out that order.'As Brewer recalled: 'Frank was veryconvincing and we gave in'.40

Lessons from history missedAt Jarama difficulties also arose

because of the disjointed structure of

62

the Republican forces. GermanBrigaders doubted if the Republicanhigh command had read any 'text-books on warfare published since theend of the Crimean War.'41 The Ger-mans might have been right consid-ering the Spanish experience ofmodem war. One Brigade veteranfelt that the anachronistic Spanishattitude was because the 'twentieth-century Spaniard had grown up witha vision of war which seemed to be

Thecorrespondence ofthe BritishBrigaders conveyshow the volunteersfelt that they wereon a mission to haltthe evils offascism.

derived from the Medieval epic ofthe Cid and the contemporary bull-fight; war was a sort of corrida whichseparated the machos from the cow-ards.'42 In 1898 Spain had beenrapidly defeated in the Spanish-American War and consequently lostwhat little remained of her Americanand Pacific empire. The Spanishthen tried to build another empire,on a smaller scale, in northernMorocco, only to have the Rifiansrout them in 1921 at the battle ofAnnul. The war in Morocco high-lighted all that was wrong with theeffete Spanish Army: corruption andinefficiency dogged the army'sattempt to claw back the ground lostto the Rifians; only French interven-tion in 1925 made possible the defeatof Abd-el-Krim's Rifs and thecreation of a Spanish Morocco.43

The Moroccan War did, however,lead to the formation of the SpanishForeign Legion which Franco com-manded in the 1920s. Conquest inMorocco also allowed the recruit-ment of poverty-stricken tribesmeninto the Spanish Army as Regulates.These Moroccans, along with theLegion, were Spain's most experi-

' enced troops and would form thenucleus of Franco's force until hecould equip and train a new army.44

Franco represented the Catholic andultra-conservative trend in Spainand so his use of 'Moors' for his recori'quista was incongruous. Both sideswere willing to use what outsideassistance was available. As with theInternational Brigades, Franco'sMoroccan troops were badly mauledas they were used up in the firstmonths of bitter fighting.'

Jarama highlighted the basic defi-ciencies in the forces that remainedloyal to the Republic. Much neededto be done if the Republic were to goon to the offensive to win the war.For instance, support on the flanks,crucial to prevent infiltration, disap-peared as units left the field on theirown initiative. Soldiers were left tofight individual unsupported actions.This had been a difficulty on theCordoba front in 1936 when unitsthat had successfully advanced thenwithdrew as they were left exposedby the inaction of the neighbouringformations.45 The fierce resistance ofthe British at Jarama fortunately 'pre-vented the enemy discovering thatthe front was completely open on theleft, without Republican troops atall.'46 As Alexander noted in hischapter on Jarama:

'The [British] Battalion was sur-rounded on three sides, open toheavy fire from rifles, machine-gunsand artillery, and to infiltration.Then without orders Overton with-drew his company to the 'SunkenRoad', leaving Fry's No. 2 Machine-Gun Company without support orflank protection.'47

The confusion of battle was com-pounded by language and translationdifficulties. The diverse languagesused 'posed a serious problem, espe-cially when orders had to be translat-ed several times during the thick ofthe fighting.'48

Three factors emerge from thebattle of Jarama that explain theNationalists' defeat and throw lighton a changing Republican Army:firstly, the high morale among thevolunteers of the InternationalBrigades; secondly, Nationalistexhaustion and a general overestima-tion of Franco's strength; finally, theevolution of a modern army in theRepublican zone.

Experiences from the frontThe resolve of the British unit

allowed Brigaders to hold on in

trying circumstances. High moraleplus a modicum of military trainingsaved the day. The battalion's espritde corps was a product of its members'conviction that what they weredoing was right. This sense of havinga real purpose explains how theBrigaders could resist Franco'sMoroccan veterans. The correspon-dence of the British Brigaders con-veys how the volunteers felt thatthey were on a mission to halt theevils of fascism. William Gilmour,out in Spain with the InternationalBrigade, appears to be an unassumingvolunteer to judge by his photo-graph.49 His letters home, however,belie his pacific appearance and pro-vide a good example of the deter-mined mood of the volunteers: 'Wehave by now learned to grin and bearour disapointments [sic], with theassistance of our hatred for Fascism,it is not hard to do.'50 Gilmour's mis-sives have the tone of propagandapamphlets: 'I have grown to hate warin all its gruesome ghastliness butthat hatred of war is much super-seded by my hatred of fascism.'51

When Gilmour is granted three days'leave in Madrid his ardour does notwane: 'It has been a great tonic to myanti-fascism and by the time Ireturned to the trenches my hatredfor Fascism has grown a hundredtimes greater.'52 While it is true thatsoldiers on leave in Madrid did go infor more prosaic pursuits, Gilmourcaptures something of the spirit ofSpain.

Gilmour was not an isolatedexample. Another Brigader wrotehome: 'Well? I ask you! Can we let allthis go to Franco and his backers inorder that it be used to beat down theworking classes of all Europe . . . TheSpanish people say NO! Only overtheir dead bodies'.53 The politicalelement to life in the lines was pro-nounced: 'The atmosphere was verypolitical, even without all the lettersand discussions the lads were allpolitical.'54 John Peet, who hadserved in the Grenadier Guardsbefore Spain, and who later edited apro-East German journal in theGDR, wrote to his mother about hisdecision to go to Spain with thelines: 'I am not returning to Prague,but going to Spain, to do what Ithink is the right thing. I know youand father do not agree with me onthis, but I regard the fight in Spain asvital for the whole future of civilisa-tion.'55 For Edwin Greening, out in

Spain to fight the enemy, 'it was allpolitical.'56 The volunteer status andpolitical motivation of the Britishvolunteers went a long way to over-coming other shortcomings. There isno reason to suppose that the Britishbattalion was unique: larger contin-gents from countries such as Franceand Germany were also in Spainwith a purpose. Later in the war theinflux of young Spanish Republicanconscripts 'meant a very noticeable

High morale in theInternationalBrigades, plus amore realisticassessment ofNationalistcapabilities, goessome way toexplaining thesuccess of theRepublican forcesduring the war.

decline in enthusiasm and moralegenerally.'57

The British battalion was alsofortunate in that within its ranksexceptional leaders emerged. Thisleadership was to prove vital. Cope-man, the ex-sailor, rallied whatremained of the British battalion atJarama, and Albrighton noted in hisdiary that under a 'less able man' theMoroccans would have brokenthrough their lines. Copeman madehis men hold their fire until the lastmoment and the 'result was devastat-ing, the Moors fell by their hundredsand the remainder broke ranks andfled.'58 A disillusioned Brigader whosupplied an account of his experi-ences for a pro-Franco pamphlet stillpraised Nathan's leadership inbattle.59 Brewer, of the anti-tank bat-tery, was struck by this process of nat-ural selection: Copeman and Nathanwere 'outstanding . . . These chapswere born leaders', Dunbar was'superb . . . by any standards anexceptional soldier', while Sam Wildwas a 'born commander'.60

It was also the case that the

MILITARY HISTORY

Nationalist forces' capabilities andstrength were inflated. The presenceof German and Italian troops withthe Nationalists rather exaggeratesthe readiness and efficiency of Fran-co's forces. In fact, Franco's conscriptarmy was invariably run-down andnot much better equipped than itsopponents. • German units like theCondor Legion were the exception.The reality of life in the Nationalistlines is described by George Orwellin a section of Homage to Catalonia.Orwell had been part of an attackthat had captured a Nationaliststrong point and describing theNationalist positions Orwell summedup the suffering and reality of theconflict for both sides: 'It was impos-sible not to be struck by the bare mis-ery of the Fascist dug-outs. The litterof spare clothes, books, food, pettypersonal belongings that you saw inour own dug-outs was completelyabsent; these poor unpaid conscriptsseemed to own nothing except blan-kets and a • few soggy hunks ofbread.'61 Attacking in the summer of1938 at the Ebro, one British vol-unteer approaching the town ofGandesa came across abandonedNationalist camps, and his memoryof the plight of the Nationalist troopssupports Orwell's view: 'I was veryforcibly struck by the similarity of thefield conditions of the two opposingforces. Franco's soldiers too had beencamping out, obviously for a consid-erable period, without any propershelter . . . the prisoners we saw wereprobably more uniformly attired thanwe were, but looked just as raggedand lousy.'62 Thomas, serving inFranco's Foreign Legion, received lit-tle training and the Tercio was Fran-co's best unit. Thomas joined the 6thBandera after 'undergoing rapid andrudimentary training.'63 In EoinO'Duffy's Irish volunteer unit withFranco, rifles were also of a poorquality until, as with the Interna-tional Brigades, decent rifles arrived,in this case from Germany.64 SeamusMackee, also with O'Duffy'sBlueshirt unit, was kitted out in ashabby uniform when he went toSpain to fight for Franco: 'A more ill-equipped, slovenly gang it would behard to imagine.'65 The food supplyin the Nationalist zone was poor and,like the International Brigade, rifleswere outdated and live firing practicerare. The experience of Irishmen outin Spain fighting for Franco echoedthat of the Brigaders: 'I saw men

63

MILITARY HISTORY

trained for five days and given guns.They didn't even know which end ofthe rifle was which'.66

Prolonging the war

High morale in the InternationalBrigades, plus a more realistic assess-ment of Nationalist capabilities, goessome way to explaining the success ofthe Republican forces during the war.Soviet involvement, and the conse-quent development of a convention-al army, completes the picture. AsHugh Thomas noted, this Sovietcommitment, even in the early bat-tles like Jarama, was crucial:

'It is easy to dwell on the exploits ofthe members of the InternationalBrigades in this and other battlessince their achievements are amplychronicled, since many men werecourageous and since the fact of theirpresence was so unusual. But militari-ly more important at the Jarama werethe Russian aircraft and tanks, whichheld the ground and controlled theair. Russian direction of the republi-can artillery was also important.'67

A Swiss volunteer rememberedthat Soviet involvement permeatedthrough the Republican forces: 'Achaque brigade et a chaque division a eteadjoint un Russe avec le grade de con-seiller miUtaire . . . 11 y avail en outredes Russes dans routes les armes spe-tiales, Vaviation, les tanks, les armes dedefense anti-tanks etc.'68

The problem for the Republicwas that while they developed some-thing of a modern army capable oftaking the offensive, as it would do atBrunete, Teruel and Ebro, their armywas unable to turn local break-throughs into strategic success. Thewar became a guerre d'usure whichFranco, with his superior supply trainfrom the Axis powers, would eventu-ally win assuming Britain and Franceremained uncommitted. The attri-tional nature of the Spanish war,coupled to the poor state of thearmies involved, made a rapid anddecisive outcome unlikely. Each sidehad sufficient strength to prevent abreakthrough, yet each side was notstrong enough to deal the knockoutblow. As a consequence the wardragged on for three years.

After Jarama the attritionalnature of the Spanish war becameapparent. In March 1937 Francoresumed his attempt to take Madridby encirclement. This resulted in the

64

battle of Guadalajara north-east ofthe capital. At Guadalajara Italiantroops with the Nationalists spear-headed an attack that had some ini-tial success. The offensive, however,was blunted and turned back, againthe Republic emerged victorious in adefensive engagement. The Britishbattalion did not take part in thisaction, but the improved quality ofthe Republican forces was evident,

The problem for theRepublic was thatwhile theydevelopedsomething of amodern armycapable of takingthe offensive, as itwould do atBrunete, Teruel andEbro, their armywas unable toturn localbreakthroughs intostrategic success.

and other International Brigadeunits were involved in defeating theItalians:

'Officers and men of four brigades,three Spanish, one International,involved in the capture of Brihuega[at Guadalajara] had obeyed orders,operated coherently, and shown pro-fessional knowledge of tactics downto platoon and section level. Theywere an army and not autonomouslyminded collections of anarchist,communist or socialist militia.'69

But when the first real Republi-can offensive of the war began atBrunete in July 1937 the attack wascontained by the Nationalists. Thebattle of Brunete ground to a halt, ashad the previous Nationalist offen-sives, and only a small penetrationwas realised. Like the Western Frontduring the Great War, both sides inSpain had trouble exploiting local

successes. A relatively primitive mili-tary structure and exiguous materielin the Republican zone obviatedagainst deep pushes into the Nation-alist zone.

Improvement in theRepublican troops

There were undoubtedly im-provements in the Republican forces.Peet, for example, who had served inthe British Army, commented on theimproved discipline after Brunete:'The contrast between this army andthe British Army is astonishing. Theofficers are real comrades of the menand although discipline . . . is not asgood as it should be, people whohave been out here a long time saythat things have improved collosally[sic] in that respect.'70 Again, withSoviet advisers war planning was alsoenhanced, but the execution ofbattles was still a haphazard business.In April 1937, a British Brigaderwrote in his diary an extract thatsummarised the difference betweenexpectation and reality when it cameto battle in the Spanish Civil Wan

'This was the theory—i.e. that themomentum of the attack should passfrom the left flank right along theline. It could have been effective ifcarried out. Actually, artillery startedon time: planes half hour late: twoattacking battalions on left flank noteven in their own trenches till 8.30-9.00. Tanks late. Did not go over toptill 9.30 . . . Ammo supplies sent upstrayed to wrong part of the sector. . . Absolutely no momentum orsupport now . . . there was none ofthat scientific accuracy and organisa-tion.'71

The improved capabilities andprofessionalism of the Republicanside were evident by early 1938 butonly in comparison to the chaos of1936. Soldiers were now beingtaught the basic drills necessary tofight a modern war. Nat Abramson, aBritish Brigader, commented on thetraining instilled in the InternationalBrigades on the eve of the Ebrooffensive:

'AVION has just come over. I amwriting these lines lying very stillwith my head covered by my . . . coat.It blends very well with the surround-ings. None of us are allowed to lookup when they appear, nor must therebe any movements; in fact, when

sitting around or resting we are wellspread out and cover as much groundas to make any bombing not too dan-gerous or effective.'72

This care taken to disperse andconceal troops can be favourablycompared to the militias' inability tocarry through such measures. Prepar-ing to cross the Ebro, John Peet, inSpain since 1937, recalled how'Training tightened up considerablyfrom the early weeks of July 1938 inpreparation for the difficult opera-tion of crossing the Ebro River.'73

Improvements not enough

The International Brigades wereheavily involved in the battle of theEbro, and the inherent possibilitiesafter the initial push into theNationalist lines were obvious toBritish Brigaders: 'we had this vaststretch of country all to ourselves andif we had sufficient transport wecould have gone on to Saragossa andreally caused consternation . . . ifwe'd had mobility . . . we could haveexploited it.'74 A breakthrough wasachieved at the Ebro in July 1938 fol-lowing an impressive river crossingby the Republicans, but there was afailure of exploitation. Herein liesthe problem. By the Ebro offensive,the Republic was losing the war ofattrition: support from abroad wasflagging; the International Brigadeswere filling up with young Spanishconscripts; the Republic's stock ofwar equipment was diminishing; theRepublic was losing the psychologi-cal war. The problems for the Repub-lic could not be solved at this latestage by improved training and plan-ning for battle. War weariness hadset in and in the austere Nationalistzone Franco had prepared his side fora long struggle.

The British battalion performedprodigious feats of bravery and theInternational Brigades as a wholewere a great help to the Republic.However, these exertions came tonothing because the Republic wasdisjointed. No amount of improvedtraining was going to alter the factthat Franco had a focused aim andused his army to achieve his objec-tive. The British stood and fought atJarama, and then took the war to theenemy at Brunete, Teruel and Ebro,but the creation of a tough, conven-tional army could not mask the moreprofound flaws within the Republi-can camp.

Defeated by internal strife

On a visit to Spain in the 1970safter Franco died, a British doctor,who as a medical student had gone toSpain to tend the Republicanwounded, recalled the fractiousnature of life behind the lines in the1930s that was still apparent in the1970s: 'The one depressing feature ofthe visit was evidence that the divi-sion among the political left whichwas so fatal during the civil war, hadcontinued. One man excused himselffrom arranging an introductionbecause of political differences (pre-sumably socialist-communist).'75

The differences, conspicuous manyyears after the Spanish Civil War,had damned the Republic. TheInternational Brigades failed becausetheir efforts were consumed in anenvironment of recrimination. If,however, the Popular Front had beenunited in its aim to assert its mandate(with help from the democracies ofEurope) the presence of the Interna-tional Brigades could have been deci-sive. The Republican side spent toomuch time fighting internal enemies.The International Brigades improvedimmensely during the war, as did thePopular Army, but the problems forthe Republic were more profound.The Republic was disunited andunable to pull together even whenthere was an obvious commonenemy. In Spain the development ofa conventional army was crucial as afirst step to winning the war. It was,however, not enough, and a lack ofunity was to seal the fate of theRepublic.

In this context the idea that thePOUM could have had their popularrevolution with the Nationalistenemy so close must appeal to doctri-naire ideologues. The advance ofFranco from Spanish Morocco need-ed to be countered before radicalsocial change could be counte-nanced. The battles upon which theSpanish Civil War were decided werefought by the International Brigadesand the regular Republican Army. AtJarama, Guadalajara, Brunete, Terueland the Ebro these units battled itout with Franco's Nationalist forces.While Rome burnt, the militias inCatalonia, upon which Loach's Landand Freedom indulgently focused,were deciding the war in their ownfashion, by talking, holding meetingsand encouraging the peasants tohave a revolution. •

MILITARY HISTORY SE2

Notes1. For militia system, see GeorgeOrwell, 'Notes on the Spanish Militia' inCollected Essays, Journalism & Essays,(Penguin, 1971), vol. 1.2. Hugh Thomas, The Daily Telegraph,29 September 1995 and Bill Alexander,The Morning Star, 7 October 1995.3. Paul Preston, 'Viva la revolutíon',New Statesman and Society, 16 February1996, p. 21.4. International Brigade MemorialArchive (hereafter IBA), Marx Memori-al Library London, Box 50/A1/12,Albrighton papers, diary, 15 October1936.5. Oral recording, Imperial War Muse-um (hereafter IWM), Jaime Mas Horns,10627/5.6. IBA/50/Alexander papers, Alexan-der to sister, 19 September 1937.7. Bernard Knox, 'RememberingMadrid', New York Review of Books, 6November 1980, p. 35.8. IBA/5/4, 'The Naval Side of theWar', W V Emanuel (n.d.). Also in Blod-gett collection, W857, Queen MaryWestfield College, London (hereafterQMW).9. Blodgett collection, QMW, LEOCharlton, 'The Military Situation inSpain', p. 9.10. Tom Wintringham, English Captain,(London, Faber & Faber, 1939) p. 132.11. Bolloten, The Grand Camouflage:the Communist Conspiracy in the SpanishCivil War, (London, Hollis & Carter,1961). Revised in 1980 as The SpanishRevolution: The Left and the Struggle forPower During the Civil WOT.12. For an Englishman who fought inFranco's Terrio see Peter Pemp, MineWere of Trouble, (London, Cassell, 1957).Kemp's oral record held at the IWM(9769/3).13. Hence the title of Verle Johnston's,Legions of Babel: The International Brigadesin the Spanish Civil War, (PennsylvaniaUniversity Press, 1967).14. Stanley Payne, The Spanish Revolu-tion, (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson,1970), pp. 327-8.15. M W Jackson, The Army ofStrangers: The International Brigades in theSpanish Civil War, p. 105 in IBA/19/D/27.16. Raymond Carr, The SpanishTragedy: The Civil War in Perspective,(London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson,1993), p. 144. Hugh Thomas' seminal,The Spanish Civil War, (London, Penguin,1986) p. 982 gives 18 000 for total.17. Payne, Spanish Revolution, pp. 327-31; Ken Bradley & Mike Chappell, Inter-national Brigades in Spain, 1936-39,(London, Osprey, 1994), p. 6.18. Carr, Spanish Tragedy, p. 144.19. Jill Edwards, The British Governmentand the Spanish Civil War 1936-39, (Lon-don, Macmillan, 1979), pp. 175-80.20. See Brian R Sullivan, 'The ItalianSoldier in Combat, June 1940-September

65

MILITARY HISTORY

1943: Myths, Realities and Explanation'in Paul Eddison & Angus Calder (eds),Time to Kill: The Soldier's Experience ofWar in the West, (London, Pimlico,1997).21. Quote oral recording IWM, lecture,Alisdair Hennessy on Spain, 13160/3.For statistics Colin Williams et al, Memo-rials of the Spanish Civil War, (Stroud, Sut-ton 1996) p. x (also Thomas, Civil War,p. 983).22. IBA/50/Gilmour papers, Gilmourto 'comrade' in Britain, 5 April 1937.23. In Blodgett collection, QMW,W734, 'My Impressions of Spain',Duchess of Atholl, April/May 1937.24- IBA/50/Guest papers, 'Reasons formy decision: A note found amongGuest's papers, 1938.25. IBA/50/Johnstone papers, 'What isthe International Brigade' n.d., p.2.26. IBA/50/Bennett papers, letter, Ben-nett to J Fyrth, 12 December 1985.27. For Ryan see IBA/28/G/3, 'State-ment made re Frank Ryan, InternationalBrigade by American comrade, prisonerwith Ryan in Spain'; S Cronin, FrankRyan: The Search for the Republic, (Dublin1980).28. See Richard Bennett, New States'man, 24 March 1961, (also 31 March and7 April).29. For Irish volunteers with Franco seeRobert Stradling, 'Franco's Irish Volun-

teers', History Today, Vol. 45(3), March1995, pp. 40-47.30. Kemp, IWM, 9769/3.31. Rob Stradling, Cardiff and the Span'ish Civil War, (Cardiff, Butetown ArtsCentre, 1996), p. 97.32. Quote IBA/50/Levine papers,'Cheetham to Cordova', p. 33; Ibid, p. 34& IBA/50/Thompson papers, 'Sojourn inSpain' [1985], p. 4 for live firing.33. IBA/50/Levine papers, 'Cheetham',p. 40; also Bill Alexander, British Volun-teers for Liberty: Spain, 1936-39, (Lon-don, Lawrence & Wisehart 1986), pp.76-77.34. Thomas, Civil War, p. 592.35. South Wales Miners' Library, Uni-versity of Swansea (hereafter SWML),AUD/3: O'Donoghue.36. IBA/A-12/Henderson papers, inter-view, 1988, p. 4.37. IBA/50/Horne papers, autobiog-raphy, p. 43.38. IBA/50/Levine papers, 'Cheetham',p. 41.39. SWML, AUD/1: Greening; alsoGreening in AUD/15.40. IBA/A-12/Brewer papers, letter,Brewer to Alexander, 3 December 1979.41. IBA/50/Al/Albrighton papers, diary,6 November 1936.42. Knox, 'Remembering Madrid', p. 40.43. For Rifs see David Woolman, Rebelsin the Rif: Abd-el-Krim and the Rif Rebel-

lion, (London, OUP, 1969).44. IWM(14736/1), George Joffé,'Moroccan Participation in the SpanishCivil War'.45. IBA/50/O'Riordan papers, 'Irelandand the anti-fascist struggle' n.d., p. 12.46. Alexander, Volunteers, p. 97.47. Alexander, Volunteers, p. 98.48. Johnston, Babel, p. 60.49. Plate, IBA BoxA-2: fileA/38.50. IBA/50/Gilmour papers, letter tocomrade, 5 May 1937.51. Ibid.52. Ibid, 14 May 1937.53. IBA/A-12/Abramson papers, Abram-son to Harry and Minnie, 27 March1938, p. 2.54. IBA/A-12/Kerr papers, interview[1988], p. 2.55. IBA/A-12/Peet papers, Peet tomother, 'somewhere in France' n.d.56. SWML, AUD/15: Greening.57. IBA/A-12/Peet papers, File Pe/3,Notes on Spain entitled 'Nuts and Boltsof Spanish War'.58. IBA/50/A1/12, Albrighton papers,diary, 20 February 1937.59. Blodgett collection, QMW, W958,'In Spain with the InternationalBrigades. A Personal Narrative', pp. 44-45.60. SWML, AUD/2: Brewer; alsoAUD/3: O'Donoghue on Copeman.

Continued on page 74

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66

MILITARY HISTORY

42nd, 44th, 50th and 51st Divisions, andtravelled with them to France to com-mand III Corps. 48th Division trainedseparately, moving to France under com-mand of I Corps.14. Army Council meeting, 29 March1940. Quoted in Drewienkiewicz, op tit,p. 43.15. Caddick-Adams, By God TheyCan Fight!, 143rd Brigade, 1995, pp. 163-177.16. Drewienkiewicz, op tit, p. 48.17. War Diary of 48th (South Midland)Division (GS), for December 1939, PRORef. WO 166/578.18. War Diary of 48th (South Midland)Division (GS), for March 1940, PRORef. WO 167/244.

19. Interview with ex-Pte NormanFowler, 15/5/95.20. Interviews with ex-Capt. RonJones, 27/1/95; ex-Cpl Colin Hughes,9/8/94; ex-Ptes Jack Hall and WilfTroughton & ex-Sgt. John Joyce, 6/9/94;ex-Pte Bill Buckingham, 12/4/97; MajDennis Dodd, 24/8/95.21. For example, Rustyforce, Polforce,Petreforce, Macforce or Frankforce. SeeChapter 2, by Brian Bond on Lord Gort,in John Keegan (ed), Churchill's Generals,(Weidenfeld StNicholson, 1991).22. Bartholomew Report, conclusions,July 1940, PRO Ref WO 106/1741.23. In August 1919, Lloyd George'sCabinet imposed stringent limits ondefence expenditure, and laid down that

future plans be based on the assumptionthat there would be no major war withinten years, and that no expeditionaryforces would be needed. In the aftermathof a terrible war, with the German Armydefeated and dismembered, and theImperial Navy scuppered at Scapa Row,this was not an unreasonable suppositionto make. The ten-year rule was laterextended on a daily basis, from 1928.That it remained Government policyuntil 1932, long after the war clouds hadstarted to gather, implies a lack of realismthat crept in along the way.24. Bond, 'The Territorial Army inPeace and War', article in History Today,op tit, p. 164.

Continued from page 66

61. Orwell, Homage to Catalonia, (Lon-don, Penguin 1968), p. 92.62. IBA/A-12/Peet papers, File Pe/3,'Nuts and Bolts of Spanish War'.63. Stradling, Cardiff, p. 95.64. See Geraghty, IWM, 14893/3 forpoor rifles. O'Duffy's support for Franco isdescribed in his Crusade in Spain, (Lon-don, 1938).65. Blodgett collection, QMW,W1011, Mackee, I Was a Franco Soldier,p. 17.

66. Blodgett collection, QMW,W1223, 'Deserter from Irish battalion [inFranco's army] tells of exploits as rebeldeserter' n.d.67. Thomas, Civil War, p. 593.68. IBA/A- I/B/4, 'Revelation, par ErnestZund, Membre d la Brigade intemaaonale"Dimitrof" n.d.' Zund's account is dis-cussed in 'The International Brigade' by'Wayfarer' c.1939-40, Blodgett collec-tion, QMW.69. George Hills, The Battle for Madrid,(London, Vantage, 1976) p. 134.70. IBA/A-12/Peet papers, Peet to

mother, 29 September 1937.71. IBA/D-4/Crook papers, diary, April1937, p. 53.72. IBA/A-12/Abramson papers,Abramson to Harry and Minnie, 27March 1938, p. 5.73. IBA/A-12/Peet papers, 'Nuts andBolts of Spanish War'.74. SWML, AUD/2, Brewer.75. A L Cochrane, 'FortyYears Back: ARetrospective Survey', British MedicalJournal, 22-29 December 1979, p. 1663.

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