Amikam Nachmani Israel, Turkey and Greece Uneasy Relations in the East Mediterranean 1987

ISRAEL, TURKEY AND GREECE

By the same author

GREAT POWER DISCORD IN PALESTINEThe Anglo-American Committee of Inquiryinto the Problems of European Jewry andPalestine 19451946 (1987)

ISRAEL, TURKEY ANDGREECE

Uneasy Relations in the EastMediterranean

AMIKAM NACHMANIThe Hebrew University of Jerusalem

FRANK CASS

First published 1987 in Great Britain byFRANK CASS & CO. LTD.

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Copyright 1987 Amikam Nachmani

British Library Cataloguing in Publication DataNachmani, Amikam

Israel, Turkey and Greece: uneasyrelations in the East Mediterranean.

1. Mediterranean RegionForeign relationsI. Title

327.091822 DE100

ISBN 0-203-98803-5 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-7146-3321-6 (Print Edition)

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataNachmani, Amikam.

Israel, Turkey, and Greece.1. IsraelForeign relationsTurkey.2. TurkeyForeign relationsIsrael.3. Sasson, Eliahu, 1902. 4. Israel

Foreign relationsGreece. 5. GreeceForeign relationsIsrael. I. Title.

DS119.8.T9N33 1987 327.560495 875144

ISBN 0 7146 3321 6

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproducedin any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording

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Contents

Introduction vii

A Window on the Middle East: Eliyahu Sasson and theIsraeli Legation in Turkey, 19491952

3

Treading the Tightrope: Israeli-Turkish Relations, 19481958

45

So Near and Yet So Far: Greco-Israeli Relations 89

Index 129

Introduction

The triangle described in this book hardly exists in reality. Tripartiterelations among Greece, Turkey and Israel, if discernible at all, revolvearound the crises which constantly beset the Middle East and the EastMediterranean. Even then, it is not a triangle per se: the three statesseldom pursue a common policy. What is perhaps the most usual featureof their interrelations is the ganging-up of two of the sides against thethird. This has been known to happen, for example, when Greece andTurkey pursue an anti-Israeli policy in the Israeli-Arab conflict or whenJerusalem inclines towards a pro-Turkish line in the Greco-TurkishCyprus conflict. One could say, in fact, that there are more bilateralrelations among the three countries than there is a tripartite EastMediterranean sub-system.

In theory, the three states have a lot in common in their pro-Westernglobal and regional political orientations. They also provide the uniquephenomenon of each being, either religiously and/or ethnically, aminority within the surrounding Arab world. Nonetheless, theseelements have not been sufficient to join the three in any kind ofcohesive programme of cooperation. Their differences remainuppermost.

This book describes the various bones of contention among the threein all possible spherespolitical, economic, religious, etc.as well asthe areas and periods of understanding among them. What emergesquite clearly is the fact that any show of unanimity among Ankara,Athens and Jerusalem was, in the past, likely to rest more on sometemporary community of interest than on any inherent belief in the needfor unanimity. The long-standing basic conflicts in the areabetweenGreece and Turkey over Cyprus and the Aegean and between Israel andthe Arab countrieshad a much more pervasive influence. The Greek orTurkish search for support for their respective positions among the Arabcountries produced an Arab demand for reciprocity, that is, a scaling

down of Greco-Israeli or Turkish-Israeli relations. This alone provedsufficient reason for the impossibility of achieving any durable accordsamong the three countries. In other words, the Israeli-Arab conflict andthe Cyprus problem will, unless resolved, prove a permanentimpediment not only to tripartite relations but to normal bilateralrelations as well. This is the most striking conclusion that one can drawfrom the material presented herein. No matter what small areas of co-operation developed, they were all ultimately dwarfedif not entirelydestroyedby the larger issues. This, alas, is the face of reality and, Ihave been forced to conclude, nothing could be more detrimental toJerusalem-Ankara-Athens accords than the continued failure to resolvethese conflicts.

While Greco-Turkish differences were a substantial element in theirrespective relations with Israel, the violence of the Israeli-Arab conflictwas, in fact, the basic motivation of Israels search for understanding onthe periphery of the Middle East rather than at its Arab core. Very earlyon, following the establishment of Israel in 1948 and the residualhostility between Israel and the Arab world, Jerusalem made approachesto Athens and Ankara. Yet Israels first minister to Ankara, EliyahuSasson, remained interested in the possibility of contact between Israeland the Arab countries and during his tenure in Ankara pursued possibleopenings in this direction. As a result, the Israeli Legation in Ankarabecame a treasure-trove of documentation on Israels early Middle Eastpolicies. Towards the end of his stay, however, Sasson becameconvinced that he was up against a blank wall and turned his majorefforts to the periphery. Thus, the first chapter, Window on the MiddleEast, dealing with Israels early foreign policy in the area, serves as agood introduction to the two following chapters on Turkish-Israeli andGreco-Israeli relations.*

Israels respective relations with Turkey and Greece, as described inthese two chapters, are strikingly similar in that emotions, sensitivitiesand distorted perceptions have played a decisive role in the making ofmutual policy in the three capitals. The Turks, for example, profoundlybelievedand Israel was not particularly anxious to undermine thatbeliefthat the Jewish lobby in the United States could help promoteTurkish interests there. (This situation, which served as a meetingground for Israel and Turkey in encouraging good relations between

* An abridged version of this chapter appeared in Studies in Zionism, vol. 6, no.2, 1985, pp. 26385.

viii

them wasto the detriment of Israeli-Greek relationsentirely absentin the case of the Greeks: they had their own active Greek lobby inWashington.) Similarly, insofar as its own image was concerned, Israel,itself, came to believe that it could offer its military services insupporting the pro-Western political and military alliances whichGreece and Turkey joined. Both Ankara and Athens, on the other hand,were absolutely convinced that there was a serious danger of aCommunist takeover in Israel! While there might have been somepresumptuousness in Israels conception of its military might, itsanxiety to win the sympathies of its peripheral neighbours andovercome their suspicions of a red menace was rooted in its desperateefforts to break out of the regional isolation which manacled it duringits first decade of life. Unfortunately, in the long run, the so-calledperiphery was not only shaken by reverberations of the Israeli-Arabconflict, but was riddled by serious and debilitating problems of itsown. Israeli-Arab relations, difficult as they are, are at least unburdenedby the Greco-Turkish dilemma.

There are, unavoidably, a number of repetitions in the book. It wasimpossible to elaborate on Greco-Israeli relations without discussing theCyprus problem, as it was impossible to discuss Turkish-Israelirelations without recourse to it. A similar difficulty arose with regard toTurkish-Israeli relations, since some of the material appears asbackground to the activity of the Israeli Legation in Ankara.

It should be pointed out that the Israel State Archives in Jerusalemprovides a wealth of extremely detailed primary sources vis--visIsraels foreign relationsa state of affairs of great assistance to theresearcher. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the archivalfacilities in the other two countries. The absence of access to suchprimary documentation in Ankara and Athens on relations between themduring the period under discussion helps explain the omission of achapter dealing exclusively with Greco-Turkish relations, a subjectwhich would have added a further dimension to the book.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude andindebtedness to the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations atthe Hebrew University of Jerusalem and to the Sally Berg Fellowshipfor the research grants which made this book possible. I am alsograteful to my editor, Ms.Chaya Amir, my translator Peretz Kidron, and

ix

St. Antonys College, OxfordThe Hebrew University of Jerusalem

November 1986

x

to the staff of the Israel State Archives, particularly YehoshuaFreundlich and Gilead Livneh for their assistance in assembling thematerial for the book.

Amikam Nachmani

A WINDOW ON THE MIDDLE EAST

A Window on the Middle East: EliyahuSasson and the Israeli Legation in

Turkey, 19491952

With regard to the security aspects of meetings with Arabson Cyprus [on which account the meetings were transferredto Ankara]: Cyprus has earned the reputation of being afocus for espionage and for contacts between Jews andArabs, and it is to be feared that a watch is kept over themovements of every Arab who reaches the island.1

At 10.10 this morning I received my first dancing lesson.Just that: at the age of 48, 1 am undertaking instruction indancing. I believed originallythat I could be a gooddiplomat without learning to dance. But I understand thatthere is no other choice. If I do not wish to become a recluse[but instead] make my way into the company of modernTurks, and of foreign diplomats I must learn three things:how to (a) dance (b) play bridge (c) relate anecdotes. Thesethree [attainments] will enable me to win the affections ofthe wives, and, through them, of the husbands. Onceagain: what wont a man do for the love of his country?2

The above quotations reflect the principal activities of the Israelilegation in Ankara, and of its minister, Eliyahu Sasson. The ministerssalon, renowned in Ankaras diplomatic circles, served as a primesource of information, as well as promoting the work of the legation; itwas conducted out of motives of pure, undiluted patriotism: MrsSasson has no call for concern, [the women] are not young, they are 5560, stout, and their main conversation is, in a nutshell, gossip.3Clandestine meetings with Arabsmessengers, collaborators andinformantscaused the Turkish capital to replace Cyprus as a principalsphere of operations for Israels intelligence community. Turkey is oneof the best sources of information on developments in the Middle East,

pronounced the Foreign Ministrys Director-General, Walter Eytan, andhe issued instructions for Israels contacts and influence in Turkey to beexpanded to the maximum.4 Turkeys importance to Israel in theserespects was a result not only of its geographical location and theassociated strategic value placed on Turkey in the emerging East/Westrivalry, but also of its proximity to the Arab world, which made it easierto develop undercover contacts at all levels.Reflecting Turkeys importance to Israeli diplomatic and intelligenceinterests at this time, the Ankara legation archives, for the period from1949 into the 1950s, offer unique opportunities for comprehendingIsraels Middle Eastern policies during the first years of statehood. Thisis largely due to the fact that Israels minister to Turkey was thenEliyahu Sasson, a colourful and articulate character who was a self-styled expert on Middle Eastern affairs. His diplomatic style was butone aspect of his unconventional approach to foreign policy (by Israelistandards of the time). His outspoken opinions on a wide variety ofsubjects, reflecting a pragmatic approach and an understanding of theneed frequently to review policy in the light of objectives andachievements, are preserved in great quantity in the records of thelegation (for he was also an indefatigable correspondent), together withthe letters of sympathizers and protagonists within the ForeignMinistry. Thus, just as Ankara provided Israel with a window on theMiddle East in those early days, so today these archives offer historiansan equally valuable insight into Israels attitudes to the Middle East atthat time.

Israeli-Turkish relations will not be discussed here. Sasson receivedunambiguous instructions that fostering bilateral relations was toreceive first priority and your expertise on Arab and Mideasternproblems comes second.5 However, this directive was not observed.Born in Damascus in 1902 and educated at Beiruts St. JosephsCollege, in 1919 Sasson settled in Palestine, where he served in theJewish Agencys Political Department as head of the Arab Section. InMay 1948, with the creation of Israels Foreign Ministry, he becamehead of its Middle East Department, thus gaining valuable experienceand knowledge of that area. He soon made his mark in Ankara as anarticulate expert on matters extending beyond Israeli-Turkish relationsto embrace the entire Arab Middle East. For as Sasson not so modestlyreflected on himself: he has that kind of reputation with the Turkishgovernment; Sasson has become a source [of information] for all theconsulates and embassies, and he advises the Turks on Middle Eastaffairs.6 In addition to its cultivation of Israeli-Turkish relations, the

4 ISRAEL, TURKEY AND GREECE

Ankara legation began to concern itself with Mideastern matters,gathering information about the countrys Arab neighbours. Thirtyyears later, the man who had been Israels military attach in Turkey atthat time affirmed that no place could have surpassed Ankara for thegathering of this vital information.7 This hitherto unknown aspect mayresolve the riddle surrounding the size of the legations staff:

I met the Brazilian ambassadorhe does not seem to have muchto do. He was startled to hear [of the size of the legation staff] andasked me jocularly whether I planned to conquer Turkey? In spiteof my explanations, he remained unconvinced, contending that hisentire embassy has no more than a couple of hours work a day.The boredom is killing them.8

Mere concern for fostering Israeli-Turkish relations, however, could notoffer a convincing explanation for the presence of four active Israelis inAnkara in view of the two bored Brazilians.

A.ZEROING-IN ON TURKEY

A number of factors appear to have heightened Turkeys importance forIsrael, generating intensive efforts to establish in Ankara an Israelilegation that included one of the four Israeli military attaches (the otherthree being accredited to London, Paris and Washington). Such was theurgency of establishing the legation that Eliyahu Sasson was removedfrom his post as chief negotiator with King Abdullah of Jordan toundertake the task. Talks with Abdullah would obviously sufferthereby, but an Israeli presence in Ankara was given priority.9

Besides the advantages of ties with a non-Arab Moslem state,Turkeys value to Israel was enhanced by its growing internationalimportance and its key geographical position in the Middle East. Duringthe latter part of 1949, Turkey launched a virtually simultaneous three-pronged driveto join NATO; to forge the Balkan alliance with Greeceand Yugoslavia; and to conclude a defence pact with Pakistan. Theseefforts soon bore fruit; by 1954, Turkey, alone of all the countries of theworld, could boast three international defence pacts. This unusual statusmade Ankara a prime political and military nerve-centre, of which factIsraeli policy-makers were not unaware. The absence of informationabout the activities in the region of foreign elements, about militarymovements and deployment in the vicinity of Turkey, [and the fact that]

A WINDOW ON THE MIDDLE EAST 5

Turkey could offer broad scope for overt intelligence workof whichwe presently take no advantage [with the result that] information ofimportance is lost, induced Israels policy-makers to urge the posting ofa military attach to the Ankara legation, for the purpose of gatheringinformation.10 That demand was soon vindicated: the United Statesenormous military investments in Turkey involved the most advancedtechnology, giving the Israelis a chance to acquire techniques previouslyunknown to them, such as the underground supply of fuel to militaryairfields; and within a short time, the technique was being used inIsrael.11 Or, to give another example, it was in Ankara of all places thatIsrael learned the standard vehicle and manpower complement of anEgyptian motorised battalion, after all other sources had failed to comeup with the information. Contacts established in Ankara enabled theIsraeli army to cooperate with its Greek counterpart in the formation ofsupply units based upon mules, the latter being in extensive use by theGreeks.12

Reports of these contacts and activities made it imperative to improvecommunications between the Ankara legation and Tel Aviv. The usualprocedure whereby cables were transmitted by way of London led to theloss of precious time, frequently rendering the information valueless.Similarly, information forwarded to the Ankara legation from Turkishborder regions was often stale on arrival, due to distances andcommunication difficulties within the country. With the aim ofovercoming these obstacles Israel planned to establish more efficientcommunication facilities in the Ankara legation (offering the samefacilities to the Turks in Tel Aviv) and made efforts to establishconsulates in provincial cities close to Turkeys borders with Iraq andSyria.

The Turkish authorities objected to these activities, considering theman infringement on their sovereignty. This drew angry comments inJerusalem about the Turks being highly sensitive on matters ofnational securitytheir national pride verges on obsession. (See belowfor an account of Turkish misgivings about Israels information-gathering operations.) However, the stress placed on receipt of up-to-date information highlights Ankaras value to Israel.13

Another important reason for Israels activities in Turkey was thelatters political position in the inter-bloc rivalries of the early 1950s.Turkey served as a linch pin of the pro-Western camp in the Middle East,in contrast with Israels official stance of non-alignment. Fostering linkswith Turkey allowed Israel to strengthen its ties with the West while notformally abandoning its non-alignment. However, at that time Ankara


was bitterly hostile to the Russians, and to anyone or anything notforthrightly anti-Soviet. In the Turkish view, Israels neutrality servedas camouflage for a deep-rooted communism. The fact that Israelsprisons housed no communists proved that Israel was inundated withcommunists whom the government was powerless to detain.14Similarly, the Turks regarded the right-wing Herut Partysdemonstrations against Israels receipt of German reparations asRussian handiwork, since the destabilization of any regime was seen asa Soviet endeavour.15

This touched upon one of the basic dilemmas of Israels foreignpolicy. The West appeared to be the sole likely source of arms forIsrael; hence when we come to demand military aid we must stress ourwillingness to take part in defence [of the West]. Such a declaration ofwillingness is no mere ruse; rather, it reflects our true position.16Conversely, Israel was unable to agree to the Turkish demand for apublic stance of opposition to the Communist states, because of theexistence in Eastern Europe of Jewish communities apparently heldhostage by the Soviet bloc.17 Caught between the need for anunderstanding with the West, and anxiety over the fate of East EuropeanJews, Israel sought a way out through expanding her involvement withTurkey. By stepping up activity in Turkey, Israel hoped to improve herties with the principal Western nations operating in that country,without being required to adopt an outspoken pro-Western stance. Butto our regret, this assumption of ours was not borne out, wrote MosheSharett, the Israeli Foreign Minister. Demanding that Israel declare itsalignment with the West, Ankara also displayed marked displeasureover such unwholesome Bolshevik manifestations as the presence inthe Knesset of the left-wing Mapam Party.18 Israels activity in Turkeyduring this period displayed a characteristic duality: theoretical non-alignment as against pro-Western practicereflecting the dilemmaunderlying Israeli foreign policy ever since the creation of the state.

Before depicting the operations of the Ankara legation, it should bepointed out further that the atmosphere in Moslem Turkey was notinitially hostile towards Israel. The Arab-Israeli conflict and thePalestinian problem presented no obstacles to Israels activities, sinceTurkey paid only lip service to the requirements of Moslem solidarity.19Furthermore, there were manifestations of disdain for the Arabs andglee over their downfall in the war against Israel. The contrast betweenArab weakness and the might of Israel evoked admiration for the latter,since Above all, they [the Turks] respect force and the more brutally itis expressed, the better they like, appreciate and understand it.20


B.A MIDDLE EAST LISTENING POST

The Israeli legation in Ankara, and minister Eliyahu Sasson inparticular, attracted Arab informants and messengers, who had a varietyof reasons for choosing Ankara as the first stage for their contacts withtheir Israeli counterparts. Trips to Turkey by Syrians, Iraqis, Lebaneseand Palestinians aroused no suspicion, since they were ostensibly thereto trade in grain and foodstuffs (Lebanese and Syrians) or onjournalistic assignments (Iraqis, Palestinians and Syrians). Many ofthose who established links with the legation had, before the creation ofIsrael, been in contact with the Jewish Agencys Arab department, orwith SHAI, the Haganas intelligence service, and with Eliyahu Sassonpersonally. (The Hagana was the Jewish underground in BritishMandated Palestine.) By renewing these ties, the Palestinians hoped torepossess their property in Israel in exchange for providing information.Syrians and Lebanese were willing to trade information ondevelopments in their own countries for a share of the clandestinecommerce still practised between Israel and its neighbours. Oneinformant, on learning that Israel had found various ways of purchasingconsiderable amounts of Syrian merchandise, expressed a wish to act asone of Israels commercial agents in Syria, also offering to provideinformation. He concluded his message with the request to assign thetown and the hotelwhere the meeting is to be held, as well as the dayand the hour. Likewise [] will await word from you regarding hisnext destinationIsrael, Cyprus, Egypt or Paris. If you have no furtherneed of his services, he requests to be permitted to return to Israel andoccupy himself with his private affairs.21 Other contacts offered toprovide information or services in return for payment, and EliyahuSasson kept money deposited in Switzerland to pay for his dealings withthem.22

Sasson was instructed to initiate contact with all of these individuals,and to gauge their usefulness to Israel. He was required to report on thevalue of their information, their degree of reliability, their fitness todisseminate pro-Israel propaganda, and their fees. The information theysupplied was motley, ranging from military, social or economic subjectsto reports (in part imaginary) of dissident movements and popular frontsin the process of formation within the Arab states for the purpose ofliberating their peoples from every conceivable element or establishmentsuch as the foreign yoke; democrats; Communists; feudalists; and


Islamic reaction. In return for Israeli assistance with money and arms,the rebels would reach an understanding with Israel.23

Being the first filter these individuals encountered, Sasson wasresponsible for assessing their usefulness and deciding whether tomaintain contact with them even if they had no information of value. Asa rule, he held that no one is deserving of being neglected by us, evenif he is at present unable to do anything to our advantage. We have yetto close our accounts with the Arab world and we do not know how orwhen we will settle themwhether peacefully or by warit isdesirable to keep him as a friend and save him for an hour of need.24 Onreceiving authorisation to keep up contacts, and when finances had beenarranged (each informant was expected to submit a receipt for moniespaid over)25 Sasson would to arrange for him to meet his controller. Onoccasion, the informant was brought to Israel, usually by a clandestinecrossing of the Israel-Lebanon border.26 However, the Israeliintelligence community was reluctant to meet Palestinian Arabinformants in Israel so as not to risk arousing their emotions or, even, insome cases, avoiding demands for payment for previous services or rentfor their property.27 The combination of prestige and self-interestinvolved in these covert operations emerges from the case of a high-ranking Egyptian who first made contact with Sasson, a subsequentmeeting being arranged in Paris. It was decided that the Egyptians fareto that destination would not be paid by Israel

as a matter of principle. It is precisely because we regard thematter with full earnestness that we insist on this condition. Ifthey consent to the conditions, success is more assured; if they donot consent to the conditions, the meeting was not worth holding.Were we to respond by holding the meeting unconditionally, itcould be misinterpreted by the Egyptians, and that isunwholesome from many aspects.28

Other contacts conducted from Ankara focused on more specificmatters, such as Israels links with the Lebanese Ketayeb Party and itsFalangist militia; the rescue of Iraqi Jews; and recruitment for service toIsrael of citizens of non-Arab countries, principally Americans andBritons.

Links with Lebanese Maronite leaders and Pierre Jemayels KetayebParty had begun well before the establishment of the State of Israel. Inthe early 1950s, the Lebanese renewed contacts, primarily by way ofTurkey, where the two men with whom they had formerly dealt now


served as Israels representatives: Eliyahu Sasson as minister to Ankara,and Tuvia Arazi as consul in Istanbul. Thirty-five years have elapsed inthe meantime, but the following text retains a topical flavour:

This evening [] returned overland to Beirut. Before hisdeparture, he spoke of a group of Lebanese Christian leadersdesirous of making peace with Israel, and of turning Lebanon intoa purely Christian country. It was this group which commissionedhim to journey to Arikara and discuss the matter with us. Theirplan is to seize power forcibly. For this purpose, they have noneed of any outside help, whether financial or military.However, they do require military aid in the sole event of aninvasion by Syria. The principal question he came to pose inAnkara is therefore: in case of need, would Israel be willing toconclude a collective security pact with the new Lebanesegovernment which will arise after the coup? In fact, the plan isattractive, especially since, for the time being, it binds us tonothing concrete. All that is required of us: to intervene and haltthe Syrian invasion, should it materialise. I am strenuously infavour of all links with the Ketayeb organisation. But I haveone request of you: in your talks with [the Ketayeb], appear not asmen prepared to undertake the task, but rather, as men prepared toassist any genuine force within the Lebanese Christian communitycapable of undertaking the task.29

Turkeys role as the focal point of American operations in the MiddleEast, and the consequent presence there of thousands of Americanswhose activities extended to Arab countries throughout the region,resulted in a select body of men in whom Israel displayed a livelyinterest. These men included representatives of large commercialcorporations, film companies, oil prospectors, etc.; they provedresponsive to the blandishments and the money offered by Israelirepresentatives.30 Unlike their Palestinian counterparts, they wereusually brought to Israel for their briefings.31

However, the high point of the clandestine activities depicted herewas contact with a group of Syrian plotters planning a coup in theircountry. They hoped for Israeli assistance, pinning high expectationsupon the aid of the Damascus-born Sasson. For a variety of reasons,Israel opted to abort the attempted coup, transmitting prior informationabout it to the Syrian representative on the Israel-Syria mixed armisticecommission.32


A further undertaking linked, though indirectly, with the Ankaralegation, was the complicated operation to elicit Iranian recognition ofIsrael. The effort involved lengthy and unsavoury negotiations about theprice in dollars of such recognition, and haggling over the size of thebribes demanded by Irans heads of state. Supervision of the efforts toachieve Iranian recognition was entrusted to the Mossad (Israelioverseas intelligence) in Iran, but Eliyahu Sasson was made prospectiveIsraeli ambassador to Teheran, in addition to his accreditation inAnkara. To facilitate Sassons task, we notified Meir [King Abdullah ofJordan. Meir being an anagram of Emir, the Kings previous title] ofthis appointment, and requested him to advise his friend the Shah toapprove the nomination. Meir rejoiced at the appointment, conveyed hiscongratulations, and promised to do as requested.33

How did the Ankara authorities view the activity of the Israelilegation? In contrast with the majority of foreign legations in Ankara,which virtually shut down from late April to late September, fleeing theintense heat of summer for the cooler climate of Istanbul, the Israelilegation continued to function normally, to the astonishment of theTurkish authorities. Ankaras proximity to Turkeys borders with Iraqand Syria, in which Israel displayed an intense interest, made itnecessary to work throughout the summer months. Predictably, theTurkish authorities viewed this activity with mistrust and reservation.Their suspicions made information gathering more difficult, not an easytask in Turkey under any circumstances:

[This is the] land of fear and of the secret police, where every manis considered a spy and everyone is considered an informer.Military zones to which access is forbidden spread far in alldirections. All a man needs do is travel half an hour from Istanbulto blunder unwittingly into a military zone, and as he strolls in allinnocence, he can be tried as a spy. The matter is doubly grave ininner Anatolia.34

The Turks, growing mistrustful of Israels purpose in despatching toAnkara persons with a wide-ranging grounding in

Arab affairs, gained additional confirmation of their suspicions fromthe United States ambassador to Ankara, George Wadsworth. Hewarned them that, in nominating Eliyahu Sasson as its representative inAnkara, Israel proved that it had certain pernicious intentions i.e. tointrigue against the Arabs and to trouble further the political atmosphereof the Middle East.35 The Turkish reaction, though belated, ultimately


descended upon Israels military attach. As the legation suggested: Itwould be preferable if our military attach, who is rapidly putting onweight from involuntary idleness and suffering therefrom (for hisdynamism is undiminished and he finds it difficult to accept theauthorities reluctance to appreciate this) could serve as military attachin Belgrade.36 Sassons own prestige and social standing (see below)protected him from personal sanctions. The restrictions were imposedon other members of the legation, but were delayed until after Sassonhad completed his term of duty in Ankara.

C.FISTS OR DIPLOMACY: ISRAELI-ARAB

RELATIONS

As has been said above, the Ankara legation archives, together withSassons correspondence with the Foreign Ministry, offer a uniquevantage point for comprehending Israels Middle Eastern policiesduring the early 1950s. These policies hinged upon the character ofIsraels relations with the Arabs following the termination of hostilitiesby the Rhodes armistice agreements of 1949. In addition, thesedocuments portray divergent Israeli positions on specific issues such asthe Arab refugees, links with national minorities in the region, thetreatment of Israels own Arab minority, Jewish communities in theArab countries, etc.

A question posed repeatedly after the end of hostilities related to theadvantage of striving for peace with the Arab states, and the likelihoodof its success. To those who thought peace could be achieved, theoutcome of the 1948 war rendered clear proof of Israels ability to attainits regional goals, and buttress its existence, by force of arms. The moreclearly the Arab states recognised Israels might, the less Israel wouldbe required to undertake diplomatic initiatives entailing concessions.Striving for peace was consequently perceived as unrealistic andunwise, and depicted in perjorative terms such as our excessive talk ofpeace or illusions and so on. By contrast, plans ofaction unencumbered by illusions of a peace agreement were a mark ofmaturity and perspicacity, more likely to gain endorsement bygovernment ministers.37 Efforts on the part of Israel to achieve peacewith the Arabs were liable to interpretation as a sign of desperationThe Arabs are convinced that we need peace as we need air tobreathetestifying to the gravity of Israels predicament.38 As Sassonwrote:


In truth, the situation is otherwise. If we could hold out threeyears without peace, simultaneously expanding and growingstronger, surely we have the endurance to persist in such asituation for years longer. That is something we should reiterate,to ourselves and to the Arabs, morning and night.39

Consequently, from Israels point of view, undertaking negotiationswith the Arabs appeared worthless, if not outright perilous. The Arabs,having failed in their campaign against Israel, were now displaying awillingness to put out peace feelers with the aim of regaining what theyhad lost in battle. Such, for example, is the explanation given for theinitiation of negotiations by King Abdullah of Jordan:

directly due to the outcome of the fighting, and the setbacks of theJordanian Arab armyand the desire of Jordans ruler to showthe Arab kings, Egypt in particular, that he can extract more fromthe Jews by peaceful means than could be extracted from themforcibly.40

Accordingly, it seemed logical for Israel to abort diplomatic contactsdirected towards an agreement with the Arabs. Indeed: For the pasttwo years, we have maintained no contacts with any Arab personalitieswho can be taken seriouslylinks with individuals and groups in thevarious Arab states have been neglected and severed, by us for the mostpart41

At the same time, there was growing advocacy for the end of Israelipropaganda calling for peace negotiations with the Arab states. Israelwould safeguard its borders, not by a peace agreement, but by theprovision of arms and guarantees by the Western powers; more sosince, as Sasson argued, whenever we speak of the feasibility of anagreement with the Arabs, we give the West a pretext for rejecting ourdemand for guarantees.42

The question of the need for peace led to the further question of whatchannels Israel should use in its relations with the Arab states. Shouldsuch relations be conducted through the army, or should they, howevertenuous or sporadic they proved, be placed upon a diplomatic footing?Sasson formulated the problem aptly in a letter sent to Foreign MinisterMoshe Sharett in July 1951. While deploring the failure of the ForeignMinistry bureaucracy to insist on its (the Ministrys) nomination tosupervise contacts with the Arab states, Sasson laid great stress on the


question of whether Israels relations with its neighbours should restupon a balance of force or on negotiation:

One of the gravest errorsis subjecting the mixed armisticecornmissions to the control of the army. You will agree with methat the commissions are the principal channel for our contactswith the Arabs, a channel which is, in effect, diplomatic ratherthan military. During the three years of their existence, thesecommissions, by their approach to the issues and their mode ofelucidating matters, have managed to convince the Arabs thatIsrael is extremist, wily and heavy-handed, as well as harbouringevil intentions and far-reaching objectives. Every Arab, howevermoderate and realistic, now regards us with mistrust, if not fear.None of us amongst Israels representatives in West or East,would undertake the post of staff officer for the mixed armisticecommissions with the confidence he could feel in undertakingvarious responsible tasks in the country to which he is accredited.By contrast, the military men undertake the post willingly, withouthesitation or second thoughts, relying exclusively upon their oneand only tool: force. Had we entrusted the Rhodes talks entirely tomilitary men, I am convinced that we would not, to this day, haveachieved the signing of the armistice agreements. Is this the wayto induce the Arabs to bow their heads to the decree of destinyand come to terms with us? We are all of us sensible of the fullextent of tension and hatred for Israel, and thirst for revenge,which permeate the Arab Middle East, but no proper attempt ismade to consider whether our own behaviour does not onoccasion pour oil on the flames. Without doubt, much can bedone, in England, the United States and other countries, tobuttress our position and thwart Arab plots, but there is alsoplenty to do at hometo blunt the Arabs thirst for revenge.[Action should be taken] to reorganise the mixed armisticecommissions so as to place their principal sphere of operationswithin the province of the Foreign Ministry, and lay greater stresson the diplomatic aspect.43

The mixed armistice commissions were not alone in serving as adebating ground about the refashioning of Arab-Israeli relations andconverting them from their foundation on force and covert operations toa firm base of overt diplomatic negotiations. The issue became moreurgent when an operative of the Mossad was nominated as Israels


representative in Teheran, in preference to a Foreign Ministryemployee.44 It should be noted that this was not the first attempt toaccomplish the switch from the darkness of clandestine work whichhad characterised the British Mandate period, to the daylight of asovereign state, even with regard to prosaic internal matters like keepingrecords, as befits the Foreign Ministry of a recognised state. Hence, in aletter to Sasson from Yaakov Shimoni, of the Foreign MinistrysMiddle East Department:

I requested [that you keep] a diary for continuity of records andpreservation of material for the future. The contacts youmaintained in the past with various Arab personalities in differentcountriesto this day, most of their substance, details and resultsare stored solely in the memory and heart [of someone or other]We always understood that refraining from keeping writtenrecords was a necessity during the Mandate times, but, havingbecome a state, we are entitled to keep precise recordsof whatwe do.45

Similarly, when information reached Israel of a plot being hatchedagainst the Lebanese government, it brought up the question of whetherthe armistice agreements marked the end of anti-Arab operations.Should Israel henceforth try to win the trust of Arab governments bywarning them of plots, and by withholding aid from the separatistsamongst their ethnic minorities? Or should the cloak-and-daggeroperations continue, driving a poisoned poniard into the back of Arabunity, on the assumption that Israeli interests would benefit frominstability in the Arab world?46 (On the issue of support for the regionsethnic minoritiesin this case, the Kurdsin 1948, the ForeignMinistry had already formulated an interesting doctrine which, whileshortlived, reflected ideas prevailing at the time: In principle, weconsider ourselves barred from disseminating propaganda, [inciting]revolt, or any other overly potent propaganda, because we have notyet burned all our bridges with the Arab majority in the East.)47

The question of whether Israels relations with its Arab neighboursshould be founded upon force or diplomacy extended back to the battlesof the war of 1948, when David Ben-Gurion had dismissed thefeasibility of diplomatic initiatives directed towards various Arabentities. He had viewed such initiatives with incisive scepticismverging on contemptone gets the impression that he wishes to resolvea majority of the issues by military means, in a manner which will make


any diplomatic negotiations or diplomatic actions valueless.48 Thetriumphant conclusion of hostilities had convinced Israel of the efficacyof forcible means in relation to its neighbours. From then on, even theIsraeli Foreign Ministrys Orientalists would dither about the usefulnessof attempts towards cooperation with the Arab states. The latter wouldnot be induced to come to terms with Israels existence by means ofdialogue, certainly not more than by the pursuit of a hardline policy.Even in the economic sphere, for example, the same view was heldregarding trade with the Arabs, which would merely

alleviate the economic crisis in the Arab states, channelling ourmoney to the Arab states, while simultaneously delaying peace.In my view, we must not allow the merchantwhether Syrian,Lebanese or Jordanianto breathe easily. Insofar as we can causehim distress, we are duty-bound to do so, thus inducing him toexert pressure upon his government to conclude peace with us.And insofar as we are capable, by disruptions in internationaltrade and financial markets, of inflicting distress on hisgovernment, we are duty-bound to do so, with the aim ofconvincing it that it cannot ignore us, and that it would profit bymaking peace with us at the earliest.49

However, inherent in a policy of force is the short-lived nature of itssuccesses, and Sasson soon queried its benefits:

The Prime Minister was of the opinion that, if we overcame ourenemies in battle, we would be able to dictate peace terms inDamascus. From my comprehension of the Arab mentality,even if we occupied Damascus we would not quickly achievepeace with the Arabs; the reason being that the Arab peoplegenerally attach great importance to their prestige.50

Misgivings as to the effectiveness of employing force led to the revivalof various diplomatic plans, but Ben-Gurion held firm to the view that,in spite of its military setbacks, the Arab world had not changedsufficiently, nor become less of a menace to Israel. In his opinion, it wasearly days for Israel to abandon the instrument of force in favour ofdiplomatic initiatives. On the contrary: addressing the ForeignMinistrys Research Department, Ben-Gurion criticised those whounderestimated the threat posed by the military might of the Arabstates, even as manifested during the 1948 war. (He even drew an


analogy between the Egyptian armys resistance in the Faluja pocketand the Jewish heroes of Tel Hai. [Tel Hais story bore almost mythicalfeatures, centring around the resistance of a few Jewish settlers in theGalilee panhandle to the raids of Arab villagers in the early 1920s.]As for the Arabs technological prowess and their ability to mastermodern weaponry, Ben-Gurion pointed to the proficiency of Arabdrivers who, he claimed, were less accident-prone than their Jewishcounterparts.51)

The growing reliance upon force was amply reinforced by the Arabworlds hostility towards Israel. The common view was that Wellmeet the Arabs only on the field of battle; accordingly, Israel placedlittle faith in active diplomatic intelligence designed to change the climateof opinion within the Arab states, in preparation for contacts with them.This attitude irritated an Arabist like Sasson:

It is incredible that a country like ours, in a state of cease-fire withall its neighbours, and surrounded on all sides by hostile Arabsawaiting their first opportunity to attack and annihilate ithas nowell-thought out plan of action vis--vis the Arabs; has nocontacts with Arab journalists; has neither the means nor theresources required for propaganda among the Arabs; has nospecial agency in the country, with operational branches abroad;has no more than one or two tenuous links with Arab leaders!Indeed, it is incredible that a state like ours has none of thesethings, which are indispensable and elementary, and that, fouryears after its establishment, it persists in determining its stancetowards the Arab world on the basis of what is published in theArab press, or broadcast by Arab radio stations, or what it learnsfrom the gentiles. In such a deplorable situation, little wonderthat we fall into errors in comprehending and assessing thesituation in the Arab world.52

The desirability of peace, and the question of employing force inpromoting Israeli interests, were interrelated issues, linked in their turnto a further, more theoretical dimension: the question as to the kind ofArab world Israel wished to see in its vicinity. Which held out the betterprospect: an Arab world which was advanced, prosperous, free andunited, or one underdeveloped and afflicted by division?53 The choice,particularly with regard to the exercise of Israels influence towardsunity or division, was not unambiguous. A strong Arab world, in whichIsrael played an integral part and in whose prosperity Israel shared, was


a precondition for Israels own welfare.54 Furthermore, the profounddivisions within the Arab world, particularly the rift between theHashemite bloc (Jordan and Iraq) and the Egyptian-Saudi bloc, did notaugur well:

This division provides a livelihood for the Mufti and his men,settling them back on their feet and elevating them into a factor[to be considered] in any discussion on terminating the Arab-Israeliconflict. This division overawes every Arab state wishingtocome to some understanding with us. That, in my view, is thesource of the strength of the Arab League. Were relations amongthe Arab states normal, opposition to a settlement with us wouldnot be so powerful.55

On the other hand, a united and developed Arab world would commandgreater strength which could be directed against Israel. It was thereforepreferable to see the Arabs divided and backward, since

in such a situation, we could possibly conduct our affairs withgreater ease, we would continue to stand out in the region as thestate most worthy of serious consideration, we might also retainthe upper hand in any eventual military conflict with thesestates.56

It was thus far from easy to reach a decision. Moreover, it was not reallypossible for Israel to encourage cohesiveness in the Arab world,whereas there were many ways of encouraging divisiveness or ofhampering development. For example, as Sasson pointed out, the Arabworld could be divided if Israel were to make far-reaching concessions[planned] to achieve, at the earliest date possible, an agreement with oneor more Arab states (Sasson appears to have been referring here to theSyrian proposal for a peace agreement, including the resettlement on itsterritory of 350,000 Palestinian refugees, in exchange for the ceding byIsrael of half of the Sea of Galilee). Another option open to Israel was tocast its vote in international organisations against Arab requests fordevelopment loans.57 The problem of where Israels best interests laywas finally resolved when a policy directive clearly placed securityconsiderations (and fears of enhancing the armed potential of the Arabstates) as a top priority.58 It was not a dramatic development, but theadoption of a policy which meant that military considerations prevailedin any discussion of Foreign Ministry ideas to foster progress and


development in the Arab world, was bound to weaken further theMinistrys influence within the government (see below).

These theoretical discussions led to a more philosophical debate aboutthe time factor and its influence on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thequestion as to whether time was on the side of Israel or of the Arabswas argued over by the Foreign Ministry staff during the winter andsummer of 1951. Opinions were divided. From Ankara, Sassonmaintained that the passage of time diminished Israels options forflexibility in its dealings with the Arabs: the Arabs were re-arming,which made it less likely that they would be willing to resolve theirconflict with Israel by diplomatic means. In contrast to Sassonsopinion, a Foreign Ministry research paper found that the passage of timewas making Israel stronger and enhancing its diplomatic bargainingpower.59 If time was indeed on Israels side, there could be no point inover-energetic attempts to reach an understanding with the Arab states,since such an understanding called for concessions which might perhapsbe avoided in the future. In a more specific contextcontacts with KingAbdullah and the conclusions to be drawn from themit was arguedvigorously that time was on Israels side. A memorandum entitled TheTime Factor in Israel-Jordan Relations depicted the progressively moreflexible positions Jordan adopted in the course of its dealings withIsrael. The writer concluded that Israel must not expedite these contactsnor enter into negotiations with any other Arab state. Israel should bideits time; the longer it waited, the more flexible Arab demands wouldbecome.60

D.THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND THE MIDDLEEAST: BEHOLD HOW WE STAND, MEAGRE

AND HOLLOW BEFORE THEE.

A further dimension, likewise featuring both theoretical and practicalaspects, concerned Israels perceptions of the Arab world, and theForeign Ministrys accommodation with those perceptions. Whorepresented the Arab world? Where were its principal nerve centres? Inattempting to comprehend Arab behaviour patterns, should Israel focuson the present rulers? Could one generalize about Arabs, or was it moreimportant to focus on detail and avoid the pitfalls of generalisation?Were Israeli Arabs a faithful reflection of the Arab world at large, orwas it erroneous to draw analogies from them to their Arab brethren?These questions and their ilk had been disturbing the Foreign Ministry


ever since its inception. The Ministry had to defend itself againstcharges that it

considers the Arab issue from observing matters in Jaffa,Nazareth and Shaffer Amer. We do not visit these places andwe have almost no contact [with them]. To the best of our ability,we endeavour to transcend the narrow viewpoint and to avoidbecoming provincial [in our outlook]. We do so by listening to theradio, reading newspapers, meeting arrivals from outside andprincipally [by studying material] sent to us from outside.61

This denial was followed by allegations that the Ministrys Mid- easternintelligence analyses tended to be too academic and theoretical. Instead,it should focus on detail: It is vital to aspire to an examination ofmatters, neither from a Western perspective nor from an Easternperspective; instead, matters must be examined from the perspective ofthis Eastern world.62 Likewise the Arabists on its staff wanted theMinistry to entrust Arab affairs to a separate geographical departmentfor the Middle East, similar to its other regional departments. Eventhough approved in principle, it was an uphill struggle, since adepartments manpower allotment was proportionate to the number ofcountries it dealt with, and the only country the Middle EastDepartment handled was Turkey. When Israel ultimately capitulated toAnkaras pressure for the transfer of the Turkish desk from the MiddleEast Department to its Western European counterpart, it made mattersall the worse for the conduct of regional Mideastern policy, and for theMinistrys Arabists. As Sasson argued from Ankara,

as long as our Foreign Ministry has no special department, dulyauthorised and possessing a clear programme for dealing withArab affairs; as long as everyonethe army, police, the PoliticalDepartment and othershas a finger in Arab affairs, and dozensof hands deal therein, without coordination or cooperation; aslong as we confine our work exclusively to King Abdullah; aslong as we are not thoroughly versed in the lights and shades ofthe Arab worldany course of action, however earnestlyundertaken, and any effort, however great, are doomed to failure,and that is enough to make one lose heart.63

With Arab affairs impinging upon every aspect of Israels existence,particularly in the sphere of national security, it was apparently out of


the question to grant the Foreign Ministry and its diplomatic viewpointpreference over other aspects.

Another issue affecting the Ministrys work in the Arab world alsopossessed its wider aspects. The Ministrys propaganda directed at theneighbouring countries reiterated the theme that Israel was notinterested in territorial expansion and that the armistice demarcationlines were final. However,

articles by the hundred are powerless to rid the minds of theEgyptians or other Arabs of this view [concerning territorialexpansion] as long as Knesset member Mr Menahem Begincontinues to expound it unreservedly.64

There were similar complaints from Foreign Ministry officials about thefreedom with which the left-wing Mapams Knesset members publiclycriticised the plight of Israels Arab minority, as the existence in theArab countries of Jewish minorities made the latter a possible target forArab reprisals.65 Similarly, despite the Ministrys efforts to encouragepapers like The Times of London or the New York Times to publish reportson Israels economic progress, Arab faith in the economic boycott ofIsrael could not be shaken as long as Israels opposition press persistedin reporting on economic difficulties.66 However, calls for curbs onfreedom of expression and appeals to the press to consent to suchrestrictions were considered in a wider context: could a relatively opensociety such as Israel hope to prevail in the confrontation with its Arabneighbours, when the means it employed were apparently underminedby its own democratic institutions while the adversary [does not]advocate similarly lofty and noble principles67 Consideration of thisissue never transcended its theoretical aspects, yet it does indicate thesometimes complex nature of Israeli policy-making processes.

A central issue which also influenced the status of the ForeignMinistry and its mode of operations was the Palestinian question. Therecan have been no other sphere where the Foreign Ministrysbureaucratic ineptitude was shown up so glaringly as in its treatment ofthe various aspects of this issue, including the refugee problem, and thequestion of contacts with Palestinian representatives. During the 1950s,Foreign Ministry officials deplored Israels faulty handling of therefugee problem, in view of its exploitation by the Arab world. Theyalso complained that the Ministry was left to deal with marginal,abstract aspects of the problem, rather than its roots. On occasion, theForeign Ministry was called upon to respond to various impractical


programmes with regard to the refugeeswhether the proposal for theirresettlement in Sinai or Libya,68 or the bizarre notion of despatching adelegation of prominent Israelis to the refugee camps, with a parallelvisit to Israel by representatives of the refugees. (What good will it dofor us?, asked Sasson. Is it that we will realise the refugees plight? Weknow it very well. Is it to cheer them up and to promise theirrepatriation? Its obvious that none of us thinks of it. Is it to advise themthat they should find permanent refuge in Arab countries? They dontneed such advice from us.69)

As it became progressively more obvious that the refugee problemconstituted the principal issue in the Arab-Israeli con flict, Sasson foundno difficulty, as early as 1951, in pointing out one of Israels gravestomissions:

It was not Egypt which discovered the refugee problem andconverted it into a bargaining counter; rather, we provided herwith the problem, allowing her to make free use of it. Weconsented to regard the Arab states as representatives of therefugees, but refusedand continue to do soto discuss asolution of the problem with the refugees themselves. Just as weinsisted that we shall not talk about the refugee problem outsidethe framework of an overall peace settlement, the Egyptians nowinsist likewise that the refugee problem is inseparable from anynegotiations.70

In his earliest days in office, Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett and hisMiddle East Department kept an open mind on forging contacts withArabs from the Arab portion of the Land of Israel (henceforth in briefPalestine) for the formation of an independent government of theirown, which would resist the occupation of the Arab portions of thecountry by the forces of the Arab states. It was foreseen that anindependent Palestinian state would rely upon Israeli help for thispurpose, making it dependent upon Israel.71 However, Foreign Ministryofficials proposals for contacts with the Palestinians evoked onlynegative responses, ranging from terms such as dissidents from whoma thousand and one matters have to be concealed (which provokedfurious counter-charges of deliberate obstructiveness by Elders ofZion),72 to an outright reluctance to hold any meeting with theseofficials, culminating in the definitive comment by Prime MinisterDavid Ben-Gurion:


I met with DBG [David Ben-Gurion], again telling him of ourthinking about attempts to put out feelers, about the advisabilityor not of establishing a Palestinian government dependent uponAbdullah or completely independent. I also told him of ourthinking about Syria and about the fact that most of its army, anda sizeable proportion of the heads of its administration are fromthe countrys ethnic minorities. To this, he replied tersely: Wewill not embark on any new adventures. The Arabs of the Land ofIsrael are left with just one role: flight. With that, he rose andterminated the conversation. I merely wished to share with youmy gratification over the encouragement we get here.73

In this matter, the Ministrys Middle East Department slid into a declinewhich made it hesitant about recommending any peace initiatives,whether Palestinian, Syrian or otherwise. The Departments head beganto grow sick of the technique of gatecrashing into places where I amnot invited; he submitted reports solely to discharge my duty to myconscience, to caution and sound the alarm as long as there is stilltime. The outcome:

You may take clear note that we exert absolutely no influencenot because of an absence of will or understanding on our part butbecause of the absence of an attentive earour status and ourcountenance recall what is said in the Yom Kippur prayer:Behold how we stand, meagre and hollow before Thee.74

In 1948 this situation led to a series of faits accomplis swiftly created byan Israeli army indifferent to the diplomatic directives of the ForeignMinistry which are becoming more anachronistic by the day.75 By the1950s this attitude had flowered into outright contempt for the ForeignMinistry, with supervision of the mixed armistice commissions beingentrusted to the army. This marked official preference for the exerciseof force rather than for negotiations.

The restriction to merely marginal matters of the Foreign MinistrysMiddle East operations was coupled with a misconceived view whichthe Ministry expressed with regard to Israels Arab minority. At firstglance it would appear that the Foreign Ministry was not required toinvolve itself in questions concerning Israeli inhabitantseven if theywere Arabs. Moreover, the Ministry actively avoided any involvementin issues concerning Israeli Arabs so as to avoid accusations that theirview of the Middle East was based on too narrow a perspective. From


the outset, the Ministry therefore deliberately restricted itself toattendance at a lone weekly meeting devoted to the problems of theArab minorityand even this only because, as a senior official in theMinistry said, I do not believe that the Ministry can do less.Furthermore, it was decreed that the Foreign Ministrys representativeswould attend these sessions in the status of observers, and there wereeven demands from the Ministry to make the meetings shorter.76Displaying a blend of glee and neardisgust, Foreign Ministry officialsrejoiced at not being required to deal with Israels Arabs since theMinistry of Minorities does not require our assistanceit is full tooverflowing with intimates and suchlike, and Minister Shitrit appearscontent with the Levantine atmosphere prevailing in his Ministry.77The Foreign Ministry thus progressively distanced itself frominvolvement in issues concerning Israels Arab population, and therebymissed opportunities to induce them to forge links with their brethren inneighbouring countries, or to recruit them as our Fifth Column beyondthe border, instead of vice versa.78 The naive and unwise practicewhich drew a distinction between the Ministrys concern with affairsoutside Israels borders and its absence from domestic problems led tothe vacuum being filled by persons lacking any diplomatic grounding(some local commander). Sadly, rather late in the day the Ministryrealised that there can be no separation between our domestic policiestowards the Arab minority within the country, and our diplomatic policytowards the Arab states in our proximity.79 That being the case, thehapless role of the Foreign Ministry in dealing with Arab problems intheir entirety was probably best highlighted in the following words:

On my return from Galilee, my impressions were painful Elias[Eliahu] Sasson [also] demands to know who is it that dictatessuch a policy. Do we indeed have to keep control of the Arabpopulation in the manner we [do]? Obviously, there exists alongstanding hatred and there is incitement from beyond theborder but the problem has never been thoroughly analysed norhave plans been made as they are for even the least significant ofeconomic or military projects.80

The debates and arguments within the Foreign Ministry hinged on thequestion of whether the establishment of the State of Israel wouldreshape the pattern of its relations with the Arab states, fromconfrontation to diplomatic dealings. The former seems to haveprevailed. In their attitude towards Israel, the Arabs appeared unready


for any dialogue other than an exchange of fire. As had beendemonstrated by the recent war, Israel gained more by employing forcethan by negotiations which would require a withdrawal to the 1947partition boundaries, forfeiting the Negev and allowing the refugees toreturn. Israels Foreign Ministry was staffed by men unwilling to fightfor their ideas, and when their views were rejected they consciouslyabandoned the field of decision-making. It would be no exaggeration tohold these factors responsible for making a tangible contribution tomore than thirty years of Arab-Israeli enmity.

E.SASSONS SALON: WHAT MORE CAN ONE DO

FOR ONES COUNTRY?

The Israeli legation in Ankara participated in the debate over thefundamental issues of Arab policy with which the Foreign Ministrywrestled during the early years of its existence. While Eliyahu Sasson wasentrusted with the handling of Israeli-Turkish relations, he remained(certainly in his own estimation, but also in that of many of hiscolleagues) the supreme authority on Arab affairs, even when notdirectly charged with their supervision. Much of the Ankara legationscorrespondence dealt with matters having little bearing on Israeli-Turkish relations. It is accordingly important to consider the characterof Sasson, opinions expressed about him and the nature of the salonover which he presided in Ankara.

We will start with the praise, which was not plentiful. True, Sassonssuccessor in Ankara was to note regretfully that, unlike in Sassons time,the legation was now virtually isolated from contact with Turkeyspublic figures and media personalities.81 A year after that observation,Israels Foreign Minister despatched Sasson to iron out differences withTurkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes (at the request of the latter)even though three years had elapsed since Sasson had left Ankara, andeven though Maurice [Maurice Fisher, Israels minister in Turkey] isflawless and upright, but Menderes has no common language with him.He can speak with Elias as though he were his own brother.82

The passage of time had only enhanced Sassons reputation, andduring the 1956 Sinai War, Moshe Sharett, now no longer ForeignMinister, noted in his diary:

I am eager to fly to Rome. I sense a need to talk now with EliasSassonI am convinced that no other source in Israel can provide


me with such a vivid picture of developments in the Arab statesafter Sinaias would Sasson, who scrutinises the Arab press andlistens day and night to the radio stations of Cairo, Damascus andBaghdad Elias Sassons mind is unequalled in its fine tuningand its capacity for penetrating the innermost political soul of this[Arab] world.83

However, these words of praise came belatedly, trailing far behind theharsh and brutal criticism which belittled his views on Arab issuessometimes on account of his Levantine originsand eventually led tohis being thrust to the very edge of Ministry circles. For example, whenSasson pointed out the futility of Israels Arab policies, criticising therefusal to meet with Arab representatives, the London embassy, havingreceived a copy of the letter, commented:

Nastiness, plain nastiness; was anything ever achieved by[Sassons] frenetic activity spanning an entire generation?; whatis the purpose of all this rumbustiousness?; none of his pastactivity changed anything; ethereal and plain vindictive, as usual;from a collegial viewpoint, to disseminate such a vilifyingdocument among our entire staff! In brief, characteristic.84

Earlier still, there was criticism of Sassons inconsistency, as expressedin a remark pencilled beside his observations: Who is worthy of a seatin the Sanhedrin? He who can defend both a point and its opposite in150 ways.85 Sassons transfer early in 1953, from Ankara to Rome,effectively cut his ties with the Foreign Ministrys Middle EastDepartment. His subsequent attempts to query Arab policies pursued bythe Ministry evoked unconcealed hostility, until the Foreign Ministerfinally directed him to stop meddling in Arab matters.86 Strangling inthis imbroglio, I pondered for the umpteenth time on the character ofthis man who is apparently incapable of existing outside of aquarrelsome atmosphere, Sharett recorded in his diary.87

Sassons progressive dislodgement from control of Middle Easternpolicy appears to have begun five years before when, while chiefnegotiator with Abdullah, he was withdrawn from contacts with theJordanian King and posted to Ankara. Officially, this move waspresented as a token of the importance attached by Israel to its relationswith Ankara, but a more accurate explanation appears to have been adesire to remove Sasson from the arena of action because he, more thanIsraels policy-makers, attached such great importance to contacts with


Arab leaders. (Ben Gurion felt disdain for Abdullah and for contactswith him; when referring to Abdullah he was in the habit of writingKing in inverted commas.)88

Sassons oriental origins were detrimental to his career in the ForeignMinistry. They were also, paradoxically, the subject of a complaint froman Arab statesman: in December 1949, when Hamid Franjiyeh wascandidate for President of Lebanon, he complained bitterly that he hadhoped to conduct dealings with Western Jews [who are gifted] with abroad vision, [but instead Israel] sent an Oriental element in the form ofSasson, and [Franjiyeh] was not particularly pleased therebyhe waseven disappointed.89 In a similar context, Sassons application toexchange his Ankara assignment for a posting to one of Israelsdelegations in Western Europe was rejected. The furthermost limit ofthe westward advance then granted him was Rome; his request to servein Berne was dismissed outright, the Foreign Minister writing on a noteof near-disgust: I rid [Sasson] of the naive notion that he, a Damascan,could hope to succeed in Berne. Just the capital for him! I enlightenedhim on the significance of not knowing German I added a hint abouthis culture not attaining the required standard.90 Previously, Sharetthad adopted a similar tone in referring to Sassons ingratiating manner,like a servant fawning on his master, as expressed in his relations withthe Turkish heads of state; in the same context, Sharett added: I wasdepressed all evening. There are times when I enthuse over the highquality of our people; but there are other times when I realise that theyare flawed from head to toe, and I see nothing but their handicaps andimperfections.91

Sassons communications with the Foreign Ministry were treated inthe same supercilious manner. Most of them remained unanswered, andhis consequent indignation was brushed off by the Director-General,Walter Eytan: Were I to answer all your letters, I would have to giveup my present post and dedicate myself completely to conducting acorrespondence with you.92 The Ministry was inundated with a floodof letters from Ankara,93 and, aside from expressions of amazement andcomplaints about the burden he imposed (Would that you had sufficientpatience to continue thusand that we had the patience and time to takeadvantage of it94), Sasson failed to elicit pertinent replies. Every fewmonths he would receive a polite request to cut down on hisoutpourings.95 A classical observation, revealing much about theForeign Minister and about Sasson himself, was made on an occasionwhen former British Defence Minister, Leslie Hore-Belisha, came tolunch with Sasson. Sasson wrote that Hore-Belisha had gracefully


deigned to dine with him, going on to report in detail on theconversation during the meal. Without referring to the substance of thereport, Sharett commented only on its preface: Why, if Hore-Belishahad the good fortune to lunch at the table of Israels minister to Ankara,does the report say that he deigned to accept the invitation?96 Sharettdealt in a similar way with the 60 or more pages of the Ankaralegations journal. Amongst eight brief comments, three touched uponthe technicalities of a tour made by the legations secretary and driver,and a fourth was a request to subtitle sections alphabetically rather thannumerically.97

It was not long before the Foreign Ministry began to bypass Sassonand to make direct contact with the Turkish authorities. A great deal ofinformation was transmitted directly to Turkeys Foreign Ministry andvarious other services, without Sassons knowledge. Visits to Turkey byIsraeli statesmen and military officers were kept from him; he learnedabout them either from the Turkish authorities, or, worse, from reportsin the local press. When he complained, the Israeli Foreign Ministrydismissed his resentment as unfounded and designed solely to castaspersions on the work of the section; or, alternatively, the blameshould be placed principally upon unavoidable delays in dispatch ofmail to Turkey.98 Having established the initial links with the Turkishauthorities and made Ankara into Israels lookout post on the MiddleEast, Sassons services were no longer required. Furthermore, muchIsraeli activity in Turkey hinged on covert and military matters havingnothing to do with Israels diplomatic representative there.

The gulf between Sasson and the Foreign Ministry was widenedfurther by criticism in Israel over his lavish life style, including thecocktail parties and the diplomatic salon over which he presided. Israelregarded such extravagances as unnecessarily frivolous and the ForeignMinistry made disparaging remarks about them before finallyforbidding them outright. For his part, however, Sasson regarded hisconduct as dictated by diplomatic necessity and nothing less thanpatriotic self-sacrifice. It is accordingly useful, therefore, to examinethis aspect of the activities of Israels legation in Ankara.

Sassons arrival in Ankara was to an empty railway station devoidof any friend and where everything was indifferent to the arrival ofIsraels first minister to Ankarathere was much snow, 26 degreesbelow zero.99 This was followed by a round of cocktail parties anddinners (an intensive campaign of invitations) justified as beingvitally necessary for extracting information from the diplomaticcommunity and Turkeys rulers. Such socialising became the main


focus of work at the legation, and new staff recruited for it wereexpected to be married so they can set up home and invite people overfor tea, drinks or a meal. Most of our work is done while eating ordrinking.100

These meals, in formal dress and generally held in Ankaras mostexpensive hotels and restaurants, were followed by dancing and long-drawn-out card games, usually the very fashionable card game,canasta. Sasson and the legation staff would entertain their guests withcard tricks and amusing anecdotes; and liqueurs, whisky and otherdrinks were served in their conventional order. Sassons descriptionswere lengthy and detailed, and were thus very self-revealing. Hisconcern was to keep the Foreign Ministry up to date with even thesmallest details:

[The guests] did not wait to be urged, showing no reserve.Everything was in abundance, and it whetted the appetite TheIsraeli wine attracted particular attention. Many chose it inpreference to whisky and other drinks. Similarly, the guests foundIsraeli cigarettesDubeks Strand Specialmore palatable thanTurkish or American cigarettes The plates were crammed withthe finest delicacies: fish, poultry, meat, sardines, salads, etc. Tenvarieties of each dish. All masterpieces. Numerous persons toldmethat Ankara had never seen such a party and with mycolleagues, I circulated among the guests, taking care of thosewho could not reach the table. There were three things for whicheveryone was grateful: the fine hospitality, the pleasantatmosphere, and the good, tasty food.101

This unstinting hospitality, generally including expensive Havanacigars, film shows and piano recitals, was improved upon by Sassonwith events such as the visit to Turkey of Tel Avivs Hapoel footballteam, which gave him an excuse for absenting himself from Ankara toescort the team, performing the ceremonial kick-off at its games andholding receptions for the heads of Turkish sports associations.102

In addition to his diplomatic salon, there appears to have been nosocial or diplomatic event in which Sasson did not play an active role,later despatching a detailed account to the Foreign Ministry in Israel.The dinners and cocktail parties were described in full, specifying thelist of participants, their dress (top hats, formal suits, evening gowns),the shape of the tables (square, round or horseshoe), their number andthe seating order; there were details about the wine and whether it was


drunk standing or seated, about the ornamentation of the cutlery, and ofcourse, about the food served, whether fat or lean, the sequence of thecourses and whether they included soup, fish, meat or poultry, not tomention the number of last courses and whether they comprised ice-cream, strawberries or seasonal fruits.103

In similar fashion, Sasson did not omit to attend other events to whichdiplomats were invited, such as horse races, high-society weddings(about which Sasson proffered details of the price of the brideswedding gown), receptions and so on. It certainly did not escape theattention of Foreign Ministry officials that, in addition to the Israelirepresentative, the guests at these functions invariably includeddiplomats from such lands as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Iran, India, Syriaand Lebanon. For some reason, representatives from Britain, Europeand the United States refrained from attending.104 Similarly, detaileddescriptions were provided of the legations contacts with otherdiplomats accredited in Ankara. The remark about the Norwegianminister was: He is attracted to his own sex (and probably attracts it tohimself). Be that as it may, the men of the Israeli legation were not putto the test either way. The Italian first secretary was depicted thus: Anemptyheaded swashbuckler, a kind of blend of movie star andprofessional pugilist. I expected him at any moment to strip off his shirtand show me the tattoo marks on his chest. His topics of conversation:women, cars, drink. By contrast, the Chilean minister embarrassed theentire diplomatic corps of Ankaraincluding Sasson, of course, whotook it as a shocking personal snubwhen he was caught smugglinggold.105

There was a veritable vendettapersonal and highly emotionalextending over two whole years, between Sasson and the United StatesAmbassador to Ankara, George Wadsworth. A trained Arabist who hadbeen the U.S. consul in the British Mandated city of Jerusalem and,subsequently, in Beirut, Wadsworth soon emerged as Sassons rival inexpertise about the Arab world and its interpretation to Ankarasdiplomatic community. Wadsworth despised Sasson, shunning hisdiplomatic salon (on one occasion, early on, he had protested vigorouslyabout the absence of champagne and about the Israeli documentaryfilms, which he pronounced idiotic). He refused to meet Sasson or toinvite him to functions put on by his embassy. This was a sensitivepoint with Sasson, who was in the habit of noting every event to whichhe was not invited, and of specifying the cause of the omission. Sometwo dozen letters of protest sent (sometimes daily) by Sasson on thissubject finally induced the Foreign Ministry to intervene with the State


Department in Washington and with United States ambassadors invarious capitals. Moshe Sharett, in a letter of unprecedented severity,ordered a reprisal campaign against Wadsworth for the swinishbehaviour of an enemy whose influence is malignant.106 TheAmerican ambassadors habitual drunkenness and his addiction towhisky were brought to Washingtons notice, and early in 1952 hisservice in Ankara was terminated. Israel naturally rejected any attemptto link it, or American Jews, with the ambassadors transfer, arguing:It is indeed a pity that [Turkish] papers cannot distinguish betweenInternational Jewry and Scotch whisky.107

As has been said before, Sasson considered his socialising in Ankaraa vital necessity and a patriotic self-sacrifice unavoidable under thecircumstances. In his reports on the cocktail parties and sumptuousmeals, with their enormous amounts of food and drink, he would alwaysadd a few words testifying to his suffering and invoking divineassistance to sustain him in the face of so much eating and drinking. Hewould summarise his ordeal with the aphorism: What more can one dofor ones country?108 When Sasson finally concluded his term of dutyin Ankara, he reaped the fruits of his widespread socialising. Massesof people came to bid him farewell at the railway station, in markedcontrast to the indifference on the platform three years previously.Indeed, there was an extreme contrast between the end and thebeginning.109 The personal cost of this socialising, however, wasequally extreme (see below).

Sasson was also adept at defending the lavish functions he put on forAnkaras diplomatic community. These were a heavy burden upon thelegations budget, but any reserve in giving the usual spectacularparties would prejudice Sassons standing with his fellow diplomats. Onthe one occasion in which Sasson did display reserve in his salon, theresponse of the diplomatic community was swift: I came to realise thatI was no longer being invited.110 Sassons sacrifices on the altar ofpatriotism extended to the burden of becoming acquainted with foreigndiplomats wives, most of whom had, regrettably, entered the sixthdecade of their lives. This socialising once led to an exchange of blows,an incident which led Israels head of protocol to recall the well-knownfact that slaps across the face as a rule transcend normal diplomaticcourtesies.111 The words of the legations secretary seem to offer anappropriate summary of this aspect of diplomatic life in Ankara, and ofthe lessons to be drawn:


One of the favourite past-times of a diplomat is to court the wifeof a colleague And whether you like it or not, one day you arecaught in the gearing[so] if you are ever posted to Ankara as adiplomat, dont forget to take your wife with you Dont drinktoo much at cocktail parties. Keep a close watch of your wife, andabove all, keep her busy all the time unless you want to get rid ofher.

It is revealing that the legation staff bothered to report this inevitablesocialising directly to the Foreign Minister.112 It did not improve theircareer prospects, and meant that their reports on more important matterswere taken less seriously.

Sassons requests to Israel for enormous amounts of wines and spirits;his application for a supplementary allocation to pay for two womenservants in the legation building (both of whom unfortunately guzzletwice or three times as much as any other person); his need of varioussets of clothing appropriate for morning and evening wear, and of aspecial grey top hat to replace his normal black headgear whenattending horse races,113 all hallmarks of the life-style conducted by theAnkara legation, made Sasson appear to be uncomfortable, contrastedas they were to the austere economic circumstances in Israel at the time:

We spent three hours togethereating, drinking, singing andconversing on various topics. Colleaguesdanced until they wereexhausted But when we recalled the austerity regime in forcein Israel, we were deeply grieved. The question is, can weassist in any wayby parcels, for example?114

Sassons willingness to help out with food parcels does not appear tohave impressed the Foreign Ministry, and reactions to his extravagantlife-style were not long in arriving. First of all, there was a cut in thefinancial allotment for cables and mailwhich constituted the principaltask of the minister to Ankara; the Foreign Ministry may have hopedthereby to reduce the deluge of letters with which Sasson engulfed it.The flow of communications did not dry up. Sassons response to thecutback was overwrought, complaining of the cruelty of theMinistrys secretary, and the stinginess of its bursar, concluding, asalways, with eyes metaphorically upturned and with words from thePsalms: Whence shall come my salvation?115 Subsequently, theMinistry stopped disseminating Sassons reports from Ankara, on thepretext that they were written in English. It should be noted that


numerous Israeli diplomats preferred to use English in their reports,which the Foreign Ministry nevertheless distributed.116 The ForeignMinistry began to disparage the style and substance of Sassonsreferences to himself, and to Israels might. Such talk was perceived asmegalomanic and arrogant. Both in writing and in speech, Sassonreferred to himself in the third person. As has been said before, heproclaimed that his expertise and his appearanceevoke respect, hisreputation is well-known; Sasson is acknowledged as an expert on theMiddle Eastthis man Sasson has become a source of information forall the consulates and embassies, and he advises the Turks on MiddleEast affairs.117 A similar turn of speech elicited a rebuke from Sharettover the exaggerated virtues Sasson attributed to the State of Israel:

I consider superfluous your words about the exceptional effortsIsrael accomplishes the impossible, you saywhich we makefor world peace after all, how much can [we] do?. Everyoneknows we are a small country, young and weak. No one awaitsour efforts to salvage world peace, since everyone knows that itdoes not depend upon us. If we do not proclaim that we are goingoverboard to prevent a new world war, no one will wonder at usnor blame us. But if we do make such proclamations, whilelacking any ability to implement our words, we shall appear toothers as braggarts!118

The worst finally happened when the Ministry demanded a return of thelegations allowance for representation and hospitality, and eventuallyforbade him to hold any more parties. Angry cables were exchangedbetween Ankara and the Ministry, Sasson declaring bluntly that, withregard to the repayment of the allowance, I do not accede to yourrequest I shall use it please be good enough to note same.119Regarding his parties, Sasson wrote:

The remark at the end of your lettershows the extent to whichyou are not in favour of such parties, even though I haverepeatedly explained that holding parties is a necessity for thebenefit of [my] work I hereby notify you that I am also waivingthe Independence Day dinnerthe ban you imposed on holdingpartiesin a city like Ankara strikes me as absurd.120

There were probably officials at the Foreign Ministry who regarded theforfeited dinner as Sassons first genuine patriotic sacrifice.


Undoubtedly, however, what were really sacrificed were the idealsemanating from Ankara, which, for instance, preferred diplomacy tofists. To paraphrase a few sources in the Foreign Ministry: it wasthought inconceivable to expect such ideas to appear in the reports of alegation which was constantly engaged in bacchanalias with Ankarashigh society. And when the reports were read, people had difficulty inseparating the wheat from the chaff.

* * *

On Friday, 20 July 1951, King Abdullah was assassinated in Jerusalem.The following day Sasson sent a cable to Israel announcing that he hadfailed in his task in Ankara, since he had been unable to accomplishanything in the sphere of Arab diplomacy. He blamed his failureprincipally upon the quality of the Arab diplomats in Turkey and theirbehaviour, for with persons of that sort there is of course nothing to bedone. In conclusion, Sasson requested a transfer to a West Europeancountry.121

Sassons disappointment with the results of his efforts in the Arabsphere was linked, no doubt, with Abdullahs assassination. The highpoint of Arab contacts conducted by Sasson (and, for that matter, byIsrael as a whole, right up to President Sadats visit to Jerusalem) wasthe accord with Abdullah. The Kings assassination shattered Sassonsfaith in contacts with Arabs, and also led him to re-evaluate the amountof support he had at home. Sasson was indignant at the failure of IsraelRadios Arab service to add the words the mercy of Allah be uponhim when reporting Abdullahs assassination. It is no secret that hewas a friend of ours, and our regret at his [death] is not entirelyartificial. And an insult like that on our part towards an Arab friendproves that we do not remain faithful to our loyal friends who departthis world.122 These last cables accurately summarised Sassons Arabactivities in Ankara. Diplomatically fruitless and with no support athome, they make the account of his service there a near-tragedy.

During the pre-state period, Sassons speciality lay in establishinglinks with the most important Arab leaders. The open borders betweenPalestine and the Arab states enabled him to journey to Arab capitals,where he appeared at his best. These were his finest hours. But theoutcome of the 1948 war delivered the death blow to such ties. The stateo

Amikam Nachmani Israel, Turkey and Greece Uneasy Relations in the East Mediterranean 1987

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Transcript of Amikam Nachmani Israel, Turkey and Greece Uneasy Relations in the East Mediterranean 1987