Modern Conservatism: The Problem of DefinitionAuthor(s): David Y. AllenReviewed work(s):Source: The Review of Politics, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Oct., 1981), pp. 582-603Published by: Cambridge University Press for the University of Notre Dame du lac on behalf of Review ofPoliticsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1406909 .Accessed: 10/03/2012 13:53

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Modern Conservatism: The Problem of Definition

David Y. Allen

In the more than fifty years since the publication of Carl Mannheim's classic essay "Conservative Thought," a sizable body of literature has come into being concerning the nature of modern European and American conservatism. In this article I propose to review and assess some of the more significant pieces of this literature, to indicate my own views on the nature of conservative

thought, and to map out some areas I think students of conser- vatism might want to explore further. Such a study of the problem of defining conservatism is, I believe, a worthwhile enterprise, not only because of the intrinsic historical importance of modern con- servatism, but also because of the light which our understanding of conservative thought may shed on the development of political theory as a whole during the last two centuries.

The concept of conservatism has always been a controversial one. The term conservative came into general use only in the decades after 1818, and consequently such critical figures as Burke and De Maistre did not describe themselves as conser- vatives. Moreover, many conservative thinkers-and some historians of conservatism - have denied that there is such a thing as a conservative "ideology," and have argued that it makes no sense to use the term conservative to describe a European or Euro- American political movement.2 Although I will argue that such an ideology does indeed exist, there can be no doubt that it is a tenuous one. As will be seen, the variety of thinkers who have been at one time or another designated conservatives is quite astonishing. Given the heterogeneity among allegedly conser-

1 Conservatism came to describe a political ideology only after Chateaubriand started publishing Le Conservateur in 1818. The use of the term became general in Western Europe in the 1830's and 1840's. Paul Herre, ed., Politisches Handworterbuch (Leipzig, 1923), I: 1021.

2 I am using the term ideology to describe a more or less coherent political theory, which embodies cultural values, and which takes a sufficiently broad view of society to comprehend it as a whole and to see existing society as one of a number of alternative ways of structuring political and social life. Among those who have questioned the validity of using the concept conservatism to describe a Euro-American ideology are: Martin Greif- fenhagen, Das Dilemma des Konservatismus in Deutschland (Munich, 1971); Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind, 3rd ed. (Chicago, 1960), pp. 2-6; Golo Mann, "Was ist Konservativ?" Der Monat, 6 (1953-54), 183-88.

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vative thinkers, it is not surprising that a considerable proportion of the literature on conservative thought consists of anthologies with introductory essays, or of loosely connected sketches of in- dividual thinkers.3 Another consequence of this heterogeneity is that many of the best studies of conservative thought are narrow in focus, dealing with a single thinker or a small number of closely related thinkers, usually within the context of a particular coun- try.

A relatively small number of writers have undertaken the task of attempting to describe conservatism as a political and intellec- tual movement. In discussing the attempts of these scholars to deal with conservatism, I have divided their efforts for purposes of classification and explanation into four artificially pure categories (or ideal types). These are the "commonsense" approach, the sociohistorical approach, the "unit ideas" approach, and the "con- figurationist" approach. Each will be considered in turn.

The commonsense approach to defining conservatism takes as its point of departure the literal meaning of the word. A conser- vative is, for those who advocate this position, a person who seeks to conserve values and institutions, a defender of the status quo. Reasonable though such a definition appears, it will be seen that it entails serious problems. It is now generally recognized that, since at least the time of Burke, conservatives have been willing to accommodate and even promote some forms of change, if only to strengthen the overall framework of society. Almost all scholars who have dealt with conservative thought have recognized that conservatives as a group have been concerned with more than maintaining existing conditions. Nonetheless, many if not most writers on conservatism continue to define conservatism primarily in terms of a basic attitude towards change. Conservative politics is generally contrasted with reformist politics, and it is still not unusual to see conservatism assigned a fixed place on a scale which runs from "left" to "right"-from reactionary, through con- servative, to liberal, to radical.4 In the course of this essay, I will

3 For example: Peter Viereck, Conservatism from John Adams to Churchill (Princeton, 1956); Robert Schuettinger, The Conservative Tradition in European Thought (New York, 1971); Hans Barth, Der Konservative Gedanke (Stuttgart, 1958); R. J. White, The Conservative Tradition (London, 1950).

4 The most important writer to make this position the cornerstone of his definition of conservatism is probably Clinton Rossiter in Conservatism in America (New York, 1955). This position is defended and further references are given by Samuel Huntington, "Con- servatism as an Ideology," American Political Science Review, 51 (1957), 454-73.

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argue that this commonsense approach has actually been a hin- drance to our understanding of conservative thought, that it is unable to explain many of the positions actually advocated by conservatives, and that it often obscures important relationships between conservatism and other political ideologies.

In a field which has been dominated by historians of ideas, the sociohistorical approach has found few exponents. The most im- portant writer to follow the sociohistorical path in attempting to define conservatism remains Carl Mannheim, who is also the earliest author who will be discussed in this essay. Although Mannheim was strongly influenced by the configurationist school of intellectual history, which will be dealt with below, it is not un- fair to consider him as the primary exponent of the sociohistorical

approach to defining conservative thought, for he explains the

positions adopted by individual conservatives almost entirely in terms of their social, political and economic situation.

The cornerstone of Mannheim's analysis of conservative thought is his assertion that "the key to the understanding of changes in ideas is to be found in the changing social background, mainly in the fate of social groups or classes which are 'carriers' of these styles of thought."5 For Mannheim, the creative imagination of the individual plays little role in determining a thinker's ideas or outlook. Mannheim even went so far as to assert that "the fate of the group is apparently [!] reflected in even the smallest change in the development of a style of thought."6 Mannheim accepts the thesis of Marx and his followers that conservatives are essentially spokesmen for a ruling class on the defensive, and he elaborates on this thesis by analyzing conservative thought in various coun- tries through referring to the different situations of the ruling classes in those countries. In the case of early nineteenth-century Germany, Mannheim goes into great detail and distinguishes be- tween such groups as "feudal" conservatives, who spoke for the rural aristocracy, and "bureaucratic" conservatives, who reflected the viewpoint of officialdom. Mannheim also modifies and broadens the Marxist hypothesis concerning the economic origins of conservatism. Borrowing from Weber's studies of the impor- tance of rationalism for the West, Mannheim defines conser- vatism as much in terms of antirationalism as of anticapitalism.

5 "Conservative Thought," in Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology, ed. Paul Kec- skemeti (New York, 1953), p. 74. This is a revision of"Das konservative Denken," Archiv

fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 57 (1927), 68-142, 470-95. 6 "Conservative Thought," p. 77.

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Mannheim, like Weber, sees the growth of rationalism as a key to

understanding the development of Western culture in a variety of areas- including aspects of religion and philosophy, the growth of

bureaucracy and, of course, the rise of modern capitalism. Elaborating on these ideas, Mannheim produces an array of observations which make his essay, in my judgment, still the most

important single work on conservative theory. Although Mannheim's approach to conservative thought has

yielded many insights, it leaves basic questions unanswered and a number of problems unsolved. Mannheim is particularly weak in

dealing with problems of motivation and causation. Mannheim is

generally correct-at least in dealing with early nineteenth- century conservatism-in asserting that modern conservative

thought is anticapitalistic, antirationalistic (as he defines ra-

tionalism) and proaristocratic. Mannheim is not so successful, however, in demonstrating that these attitudes can be explained largely through reference to class and economic interests. If con- servatives were essentially spokesmen for the aristocracy, why is it that so many of the leading conservative theoreticians (including Burke, Adam Miller, Carlyle, and Friedrich Julius Stahl) came from middle- or lower-middle-class backgrounds? Mannheim's answer is that these were "socially unattached intelligentsia," who, in effect, sold themselves for a living.7 This is a surprisingly crude explanation, especially coming from one who saw these same "socially unattached intelligentsia" as potentially, at least, the only group in society capable of rising above class interests.8

The evidence that Mannheim brings forth to support this assertion is flimsy. In the case of Adam Muller, Mannheim writes: "we do not wish to linger on the much-discussed fact that Gentz encouraged Muller in his letter to write a refutation of Buchholz's book [an attack on aristocratic privileges] and prom- ised him an 'exceedingly pleasant existence' as the reward. For us that fact is important only because it shows clearly that the alliance between romantic and feudalistic thought was causally determined by real social relationships."9 In spite of Mannheim's talk about causal determination "by real social relationships," all he has done here is substitute assertion and insinuation for causal explanation. A single sentence written by another person hardly

7 Ibid., p. 125 ff. 8 Ibid., p. 128; cf. Ideology and Utopia (New York, 1967), pp. 153-64. 9 "Conservative Thought," p. 133.

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constitutes proof of Muller's motivation, much less that of conser- vatives as a group. A careful and impartial examination of the life of Muller-or of any other major conservative thinker-simply does not bear out Mannheim's imputation of intellectual prostitu- tion. To the best of my knowledge, no author of a large-scale biography of an important conservative intellectual had ever maintained this thesis about his subject -an indication that such generalizations are possible only for those who lack detailed knowledge of the lives and motivations of flesh and blood conser- vatives. As in many other aspects of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, he has here skirted the difficult problem of intellectual causation, and has substituted assertion for proof.10 It remains to be seen whether other authors following this approach can make out a more convincing case for causal determination "by real social relationships.""

Most other writers who have approached the subject of con- servative thought have done so largely from the viewpoint of in- tellectual history. The majority of the historians of ideas who have dealt with conservative thought have attempted to construct an ideal type of conservative thought, and their efforts will be dealt with shortly. A somewhat different path has, however, been followed by at least two important writers on the subject, namely the unit ideas method associated with the school of Arthur 0. Lovejoy. The essence of this approach is the tracing of isolated key ideas through time, more or less disregarding the political and social contexts in which they appeared and their relationships with other ideas. Given the nominalistic and dissecting character of this method, as well as its tendency to isolate thought from society, it is not, I think, well adapted for the study of a complex of socially linked ideas, such as conservative thought. This general approach has nonetheless been pursued in somewhat

10 For a critique of the epistemological problems raised by Mannheim's sociology of knowledge and in particular of his treatment of the problem of causation, see Frank E. Hartung, "Problems of the Sociology of Knowledge," in James E. Curtis and John W. Petras, eds., The Sociology of Knowledge: A Reader (New York, 1970), pp. 686-705.

1 There has been something of a revival of interest in the sociohistorical approach to conservatism, as witness Hans-Gerd Schumann's article, "The Problem of Conservatism: Some Notes on Methodology," Journal of Contemporary History, 13 (1978), 803-17. Schumann criticizes even Mannheim for his failure "to shake off the methodology of the historian of ideas" (p. 6). A number of monographs published recently have attempted to apply the methods of social history to the study of conservative ideas. One of the best of these is Hans-Jiirgen Puhle's Agrarsische Interessenpolitik und preussicher Konservatismus im wilhelminischen Reich, 1893-1914 (Hannover, 1966), which will be discussed below.

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modified form with rather interesting results by M. Morton Auer- bach in The Conservative Illusion. 2 Auerbach's novel thesis is that "the transcendent value of conservative ideology is the Platonic idea of harmony."13 Auerbach sees this idea as the core element in a complex of values which include the "aristocratic" ideal of

"nonrepressive self-control" and the demand for a society in which economic needs and competition are minimized and harmony is achieved by "the maximizing of affection through a 'community' integrated by tradition and institutions handed down from the

past."14 For Auerbach, all subsequent conservative thought is a modification of this basic idea to meet changing historical condi- tions: "the difference between Plato's conservatism and Burke's consisted of the difference in their historical environment, although their fundamental values were identical."'5 This defini- tion allows Auerbach to classify an astonishing array of thinkers as conservatives, including Cicero, Saint Augustine, John of

Salisbury, Saint Thomas More, Edmund Burke, John C. Calhoun, Clinton Rossiter, and Russell Kirk. Auerbach's work is

essentially an attack on conservatism, and he attempts to demonstrate the inapplicability of conservative ideology to political reality, especially in an industrial society.

Auerbach's unusual perspective has led him to some in-

teresting insights into the nature of conservative thought. He is

right, I believe, in pointing to strong affinities between modern conservatives and many ancient and medieval authors. The ideals he singles out as characteristic of conservatism do, in fact, form an

important component of modern conservative thought. In spite of these insights, however, Auerbach's work is not acceptable as a

history of conservative ideas. The affinities between modern con- servatives and such writers as Plato and John of Salisbury are overridden by vast differences in content, context, and intention. A writer like Saint Thomas More can be considered a predecessor of modern socialism as easily as a forerunner of modern conser- vatism. Moreover, in the modern period there are nonconser- vative writers (including Rousseau and some nineteenth-century utopian socialists) who have subscribed to much the same ideal of Platonic harmony. By focusing on only a single aspect of conser-

12 New York, 1959. 13 Ibid., p. 6. 14 Ibid., pp. 8 and 1. 15 Ibid., p. 17.

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vative thought, Auerbach does an injustice to the complexity and

subtlety of the major conservative thinkers-to the point of

caricaturing their ideas. A second attempt to define conservatism using a key idea is

Noel O'Sullivan's recently published Conservatism.16 For O'Sullivan, the essence of conservatism is "a philosophy of im-

perfection, committed to the idea of limits, and directed towards the defense of a limited style of politics"-a definition which is

basically a variation of the commonsense thesis.17 Although his book is in some ways very different from that of Auerbach, O'Sullivan's general approach is open to many of the same objec- tions. True, a willingness to live with imperfection and an atten- dant political caution-like commitment to the Platonic idea of

harmony-is generally more characteristic of conservative thinkers than those of other schools. However, the idea of living with imperfection is by no means unique to conservatives, and we will see that some conservatives, on close examination, appear disconcertingly utopian in their thinking. Worse, the idea of com- mitment to a limited style of politics is such a vague and plastic notion as to make it virtually useless for purposes of definition. O'Sullivan is aware of many of the problems involved in his posi- tion, and makes strenuous efforts to defend his definition against criticisms of the sort I have just made. In spite of these efforts, O'Sullivan faces a hopeless task in using his definition to show that, say, Joseph De Maistre is more of a conservative than John Stuart Mill.

Notwithstanding his commitment to a thesis which is at best partially true, O'Sullivan's book is more successful than Auer- bach's as an introduction to conservative ideas. The very plastici- ty of O'Sullivan's definition enables him (unlike Auerbach) to give an account of the ideas of individual conservatives without pro- crustean distortions of his victims' positions. O'Sullivan's actual treatment of conservative thought is rather conventional, and, although he does not provide dramatic new insights (as Auerbach sometimes does), he does not fall into spectacular errors. O'Sullivan affirms the now widely accepted thesis that modern conservatism as a political ideology dates from the era of the French Revolution. This restriction to a limited time period makes his grouping of thinkers more defensible than that of Auer-

16 New York, 1976. 17 Ibid., pp. 11-12.

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bach. Also, O'Sullivan's attitude towards conservatism, which is both more detached and more sympathetic than Auerbach's -seems to have helped him to a fairer assessment of conservative ideas. O'Sullivan's observations on individual con- servative thinkers are often quite worth reading-particularly, oddly enough, when he is writing on figures whose status as con- servatives is questionable, such as Benjamin Constant (usually considered a liberal) or Thomas Carlyle (concerning whose political affiliations there is no scholarly consensus).

The most frequently used approach to conservative thought is that the configurationist school of intellectual history, which has been most consciously and fully developed by German historicists like Dilthey and Meinecke. This approach involves seeking out

"patterns" or "constellations" of ideas. The writers who have taken this approach have constructed their configurations either by us-

ing an ideal type of conservative thought or by using a single writer (almost always Burke) as a model. This approach has been followed, either consciously or unconsciously, by most historians who have dealt with conservative thought - including, to some ex- tent, even Auerbach and Mannheim. The elaborateness of this

approach varies greatly from writer to writer. Its simplist form is

exemplified by Russel Kirk, who lists six "canons of conservative

thought" at the beginning of his book, and, without developing them much further, proceeds into a series of sketches of individual thinkers.18 Other writers, such as Martin Greiffenhagen, whose work will be dealt with shortly, have constructed quite elaborate models. In some cases, historians following this approach have at-

tempted to describe the changes and modulations in the ideas they have outlined by tracing their development through a succession of conservative thinkers. The configurationist approach to conser- vative thought raises serious epistemological problems. Patterns of ideas are notoriously difficult to grasp and communicate: one man's pattern is another man's chaos. The advocates of particular patterns have difficulty refuting charges that their selection of materials is arbitrary and subjective. For the configurationist technique to work, the ideas at hand must be configurable, and there is a serious question concerning just how configurable con- servative thought actually is-even if one leaves aside such premodern thinkers as Plato and John of Salisbury, as I believe it is necessary to do. The configurationist who works with conser-

18 The Conservative Mind, pp. 7-8.

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vative thought is constantly faced with a dilemma: if he makes his model sufficiently detailed to describe adequately the thought of a single thinker, it will not be applicable to many thinkers generally acknowledged to be conservatives. If, on the other hand, he draws up a model to describe conservatism as a whole, he is going to be confronted with numerous exceptions and open to the reproach that his model is so vague and nonspecific as to have little if any explanatory value. Problems of this sort make most understand- able the predilection of historians of conservatism for anthologies and biographical studies, in which such difficulties can be ig- nored.

Both the problems and the possibilities of the configurationist approach to the history of conservative thought are, I think, well illustrated by Martin Greiffenhagen's Das Dilemma des Konser- vatismus in Deutschland. 19 Greiffenhagen's book constitutes the most ambitious attempt yet to produce a typology of conservative ideas, athough its scope is restricted to nineteenth- and twentieth- century German conservatism. Greiffenhagen himself states that, except for a few passages, his book is written "in the tradition of German Geistesgeschichte"-in other words, in what I have been calling the configurationist style of intellectual history.20 In com- parison with a writer like Meinecke, however, Greiffenhagen is much more inclined toward model building than toward narrative or developmental analysis. Greiffenhagen is frankly and openly unhistorical in his treatment of what he calls the "basic structures" of German conservative thought.21 He claims that there are "specific intellectual themes" (gewisse Denkansatze) which are largely "of a theological nature," which appear repeatedly among German conservatives of the last two centuries and define the character of German conservatism.22 Greiffenhagen then states:

Our interest in a philosophical theory of conservatism explains the rather loose manner in which we draw on illustrative examples-a method which the historian is bound to abhor. If it is correct that there are certain constant themes in German conservative thought, it must be possible to cite Adam Miiller and Friedrich Julius Stahl, Franz von Baader and Arthur Moeller Van den Bruck, Hans Freyer

19 For a perceptive brief critique of Greiffenhagen's book see Paula Sutter Fichtner, "German Conservatism," Review of Politics, 36 (1974), 339-42.

20 Greiffenhagen, Dilemma, p. 16. 21 Ibid., p. 12. 22 Ibid., p. 15.

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and Arnold Gehlen as evidence of these "basic struc- tures" -regardless of their temporal separation and numerous other differences. On occasion we will intentionally exaggerate the similarities in order to emphasize what is common to this basic posi- tion. We will tolerate patiently the reproach of historical frivolity. A systematic depiction in our sense cannot be combined with one which differentiates historically.23

Greiffenhagen's model of German conservative thought is quite detailed. There is not sufficient space here to reproduce it in its

entirety, but its main elements can be summarized briefly. They include: opposition to the sort of rationalism which is characteristic of the Enlightenment and a tendency to substitute

"dynamic" forms of thought for "static" reason; rejection of natural law in favor of historical law; dislike of capitalism, mass society, individualism, and "atomization"; idealization of marriage and the family; commitment to the homeland; admiration of the

nobility and the monarchy; a preference for rural life over urban life; alienation from existing society; an emphasis on the values of honor, service, faithfulness, and self-sacrifice; a tendency to

glorify war as a "vitalizing" institution; an "organic" conception of the state and society; a belief in authoritarian as opposed to democratic institutions; a characteristically German "positive" idea of freedom.

There is something endearing about the openness with which

Greiffenhagen confesses his sins against the canons of historical method, and the eccentricities of his work should not be allowed to obscure his accomplishments. Greiffenhagen's model of conser- vative thought, although it has flaws anbd builds on the work of Mannheim and others, is both thoughtful and thought-provoking. I believe he has convincingly demonstrated the apparently paradoxical thesis that early nineteenth-century German conser- vatism was in some respects a revoluntionary ideology, charged with discontent concerning existing conditions, and looking for- ward to a drastic reconstruction of society (albeit on a model which was partially based on an idealized vision of the Middle Ages).24 Greiffenhagen also performs a valuable service by point- ing to the many frequently overlooked similarities in tone and content between these early nineteenth-century romantic conser- vatives and the radical conservatives of the twentieth century.

23 Ibid. 24 Ibid., pp. 223-45.

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Greiffenhagen's professedly one-sided exaggeration of certain themes has made it easy for him to draw attention to facets of con- servative thought overlooked by most scholars.

Greiffenhagen's model nonetheless presents an unnecessarily distorted picture of German conservatism. These distortions go further than Greiffenhagen recognizes, and many of them could have been avoided. One reason for these flaws is that Greif- fenhagen's model is too detailed and narrowly based to allow for wide applicability. Although Greiffenhagen does not say so, he seems to have derived his model from a single thinker, Adam Miiller, whom he frequently cites, and whose thought conforms most closely to his model. Some other early nineteenth-century German conservatives, such as Eichendorff and Friedrich Schlegel, fit his model reasonably well, but depart from it in significant respects. Other political theorists of the period-I am thinking particularly of Novalis and Hegel, both of whom Greif- fenhagen cites as conservatives-fit very awkwardly indeed into this model. Greiffenhagen's concentration on a static model also leads him to ignore completely important changes which took place in German conservatism during the nineteenth century, which saw, among other things, the development of Realpolitik out of the romantic conservatism of the early nineteenth century. Consequently, Greiffenhagen fails to see the relationships be- tween Bismarck and earlier conservatives, and overlooks impor- tant aspects of the thought of such major conservative thinkers as Friedrich Julius Stahl and Hermann Wagener. Similarly, Greif- fenhagen fails to give adequate consideration to the very real dif- ferences between romantic conservatism and the radical conser- vatism which appeared at the end of the nineteenth century. The main reasons for these flaws in Greiffenhagen's work are those he admits: his concentration on an abstract ideal type at the expense of what individual conservatives actually thought and did, and his failure to make his model sufficiently developmental to give con- sideration to the many political, social, and economic forces which helped shape the growth of German conservatism. These weaknesses could have been largely avoided if Greiffenhagen had, say, provided a shorter sketch of romantic conservatism at the beginning of his work, and then shown how this configuration shifted in two or three subsequent periods.

Having completed this survey of a number of attempts to

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define or describe conservatism, I will now present my own views on the nature and usefulness of conservatism as a historical con-

cept. To begin, it seems clear to me that by now a number of

generalizations which can be traced back at least as far as Mannheim have won general acceptance among scholars. These include the distinction between a preideological traditionalism and modern conservatism, and the designation of the era of the French Revolution as the watershed between the two stages (although it will be seen that the origins of ideological conser- vatism have been pushed back somewhat beyond the Revolution itself). Also generally accepted is the recognition that close ties ex- ist between conservative thought and the economic and political interests of the aristocracy. It is now also a commonplace that there are important differences between national groupings of conservatives, based in part on the different social settings of the

ruling classes in various countries. It further appears-at least to me-that writers like Greif-

fenhagen have shown that modern conservatism can be suc-

cessfully described in terms of a configuration of ideas. Concern- ing the content and range of such a configuration, there is con- siderable room for disagreement, but I believe that many of the ideas presented by Greiffenhagen as characteristic of German conservatism can, with some modifications, be extended to a wide range of European conservative thinkers. A list of ideas shared by most modern conservatives would include: an abhorrence of violent revolution; a dislike of a priori theorizing about forms of

government, which frequently takes the form of imprecations against the Enlightenment, philosophes, and "rationalism in politics"; a tendency to link the affairs of church and state; a suspicion of industrialism and an aversion to laissez-faire economics; antiurbanism; a commitment to monarchy and aristocracy (in countries where they existed), or at the very least a strong advocacy of social hierarchy and a "natural aristocracy"; and a tendency to place a high value on such "aristocratic" virtues as temperance, self-sacrifice, and noblesse oblige. It is important to note that these ideas form a true configuration: a conservative does not hold just one or two of these ideas, but most or all of them. Any one of these ideas can be found in many nonconser- vative thinkers: it is the way in which these elements are com- bined and balanced which characterizes conservatives. Further-

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more, these ideas are interlinked and support each other. Thus, the churches are seen as the natural allies of monarchy and

aristocracy; all of these institutions are seen, in turn, as barriers

against the evils of revolution, against threatening economic forces, and against subversive political ideas. At the same time, the aristocratic virtues are seen as nurtured by the institutions which they also uphold. Not all nineteenth-century writers who have been commonly described as conservatives can be fitted into this model: Hegel and Metternich, for different reasons, I would exclude. Novalis and Tocqueville fit the pattern, but only with

major reservations. Bismarck is another borderline case, although I am also inclined to include him. In considering this model, it is

important to keep in mind that such abstractions are meant to serve primarily as bases for comparison and further research. In the form outlined above, this model applies in its entirety to a

relatively small group of early nineteenth-century conservatives. Because of the small size of this group, I am inclined to use the restrictive term romantic conservatism to describe this ideal type. In spite of the narrow scope of this model, I hope to show that it can be used as a basis of comparison to deepen our understanding of a much wider range of thinkers.

Why did this configuration come into being at this particular time? In attempting to answer this question, there is, I believe, a good deal of room for uniting the findings of social and intellec- tual history. Here it is possible to go considerably beyond Mann- heim's rather simplistic explanation of reaction by social classes threatened by the French Revolution. A number of authors have successfully traced the origins of modern conservatism back several decades prior to the revolution, and have found its roots in such developments as aristocratic opposition to monarchical ab- solutism, intellectual reaction against the ideas of contemporary philosophes, resistance to the slowly mounting pressures arising from the growth of commercial capitalism and associated middle- class demands for such reforms as "careers open to the talented," and reaction against a miscellany of other reform movements in- cluding women's rights and freemasonry.25 In thus deepening our

25 There has been considerable controversy, especially among students of German conservatism, as to whether modern conservatism had emerged in outline prior to the French Revolution and Burke's Reflections. See, for example, Fritz Valjavec, Die Entstehung der politischen Stromungen in Deutschland, 1770-1815 (Munich, 1951); Claus Epstein, The Genesis of German Conservatism (Princeton, 1966); Walter Bussmann, "Ein Beitrag zum euroaischen Konservatismus in der ersten Halfte des 19. Jahrhunderts," in Wolfgang Hartmann, ed., Festschrift Klaus Lankheit: zum 20, Mai 1973 (Cologne, 1973), p. 38.

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knowledge of the origins of conservatism, these writers have shown that the beginnings of modern conservatism are more com- plex-and also more deeply rooted in religious and philosophical controversies- than Mannheim believed. There can be no doubt, I think, that the French Revolution and, somewhat later, the in- dustrial revolution, played a significant role in accelerating the development and spread of this already crystallizing ideology. The shock of these great events doubtless did bring home to a variety of monarchical, aristocratic, ecclesiastical, and intellectual groups the severity of the threat to their beliefs and interests, and encouraged them to develop a more systematic and aggressive defense of them.

In addition to these broader historical causes, conservatism took the shape it did because conservatives were able to draw on a common heritage of ideas. Conservatives are directly or indirectly indebted to a variety of famous classical and medieval thinkers, including Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Saint Thomas. This is one reason why writers like Auerbach have attempted to trace conser- vative thought back to figures like Plato and John of Salisbury. Modern conservatives have drawn heavily on a set of shared assumptions common to most major political theorists prior to the time of Hobbes and Locke. These shared ideas include an em- phasis on Auerbach's "nonrepressive self-control" and such related virtues as honor and temperance; a fear of mob disorder, com- bined with a commitment to a hierarchical society ruled by a benevolent monarch in cooperation with the upper classes; and a tendency to link religious belief and political order. Although this tradition has in one way or another influenced many nonconser- vative political thinkers, a comparison of ideas shows that conser- vatives tap this tradition more deeply and directly than do liberal or socialist thinkers.26 Another intellectual bond between conser- vatives is provided by the writings of Edmund Burke. Burke in- fluenced and was cited favorably by practically every major nineteenth-century romantic conservative, thus partially justify- ing the importance commonly ascribed to him as the founder of modern conservatism (although it is also probable that romantic conservatism would have arisen without Burke). It is the com-

26 The importance of these classical and medieval sources is pointed out by Schuet- tinger, Conservative Tradition in European Thought, p. 30. See also Thomas Chaimowicz, "Die Widerentdeckung Burkes," in Gerd-Klaus Kaltenbrunner, ed., Rekonstruktion des Konser- vatismus (Freiburg, 1972), pp. 389-406.

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bination of shared ideas and shared problems which binds

together nineteenth-century conservatives and makes it possible to speak of romantic conservatism as a supraindividual phenomenon.

It is true, of course, that conservatives can be divided into

subgroups. The differences between the various groups can also

largely be explained by examining their social and political set-

tings, together with their intellectual heritages. These subgroup- ings can be made from both chronological and national or

regional perspectives. As regards national subgroupings, the relative moderation of English conservatism owes much to the close alliance between the middle classes and the aristocracy in that country, and to the relative adaptability of British institu- tions. In the Catholic monarchies of Spain, France, and

Italy-where the "old regime" had been overthrown and at least

partially restored-it was natural that a group of "ultras" adamantly opposed to the principles of the French Revolution and favoring the restoration of the powers of king and church should appear-hence De Maistre, Bonald and Donoso Cortes. Conservatives who were willing to reconcile themselves with the most important results of the French Revolution had enough in common with liberals to make it difficult to differentiate between them and moderate liberals -hence the existence of a number of borderline figures in France like Tocqueville, Guizot, and Thiers. In Germany, such considerations as the relative backwardness of the country and the split between "feudal" and "bureaucratic" con- servatives caused thinkers there to move in still other directions.

Interacting with these differing social, political, and economic environments is the differing intellectual heritages of these coun- tries. Thus, Burke and his successors in England were strongly in- fluenced by such sixteenth- and seventeenth-century figures as Hooker, Coke, and to a certain extent Locke.27 Bossuet was quite important for the development of French conservatism.28 Donoso Cortes seems to have drawn largely from French sources, but Suarez and other figures of the Spanish Counter-Reformation

27 For Burke's sources, see (in addition to the previously cited works by Auerbach and Chaimowicz): Francis P. Canavan, The Political Reason of Edmund Burke (Durham, N.C., 1960), p. 29 ff., p. 197 ff.; Burleigh Taylor Wilkins, The Problem of Burke's Political Philosophy (Oxford, 1967), pp. 15-49; F.J.C. Hearnshaw, Conservatism in England (London, 1933).

28 For the antecedents of Bonald and De Maistre see Bruce Mazlish, "Burke, Bonald and De Maistre: A Study in Conservatism" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1955), pp. 25-28.

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played a part in his intellectual formation.29 Various German conservatives were influenced by a mixture of thinkers ranging from borderline "traditionalists" like Justus Moser, to Pietist religious thinkers, to idealist philosophers like Schelling and Hegel. Although these intellectual and sociopolitical influences strongly color conservative thought in various countries, they do not, I think, completely separate them. We are dealing here with a "family" of thinkers, albeit a diverse one with many quarreling and eccentric relatives.

If one looks at conservative thought from a cross-national perspective over a long period of time, a number of developments can be discerned. The ideal type I have described as romantic conservatism existed in its purest form in the early nineteenth century. As the century moved on, a number of changes took

place, largely as a result of industrialization and the rise of mass participation in politics. Especially after 1848, there is a noticeable tendency for conservatives to discard many features of earlier conservative thought, such as its idealization of the Middle Ages and its opposition to industrialization. Cultural alienation also plays a less significant role in European conservative thought in the period between 1848 and 1890 than it did in earlier conser- vatism, and there is a greater willingness to use the power of the state to achieve political goals. This movement from romanticism to Realpolitik is, of course, most noticeable in Germany, where it is symbolized by the triumph of Bismarck. But this same drift towards a more pragmatic and flexible style of conservative politics can also be traced, for example, in England, where it can readily be seen in a comparison of the ideas of Burke or Coleridge with those of Disraeli or Salisbury.

Perhaps the most striking development in the history of modern conservatism is the emergence of radical conservatism around 1890, a phenomenon which poses fundamental questions for anyone interested in the history of conservative ideas. It is not immediately apparent whether the radical conservatives should be classified with the romantic conservatives as members of the same family of thinkers. Whereas the romantic conservatives were formed in part by their corimon reaction to the French Revolution and the events associated with it, the radical conser-

29 See John T. Graham, Donoso Cortes (Columbia, Missouri, 1974), esp. pp.82-88. Bossuet, Chateaubriand, and De Maistre seem to have played the most important part in Cortes' intellectual formation. Cortes cites Burke favorably and may have been influenced by Leibniz, Hegel, and Gorres.

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vatives were children of the so-called second industrial revolution, which saw the rise of mass participation in politics - a develop- ment to which various conservatives reacted in quite different

ways. Some of these neo-conservatives -particularly those who courted the support of the masses -raised such new issues as na- tionalism, imperialism, and anti-Semitism. The more intellectual of these radical conservatives were frequently influenced by in- novative new thinkers, particularly Nietzsche, but also by Dostoevski, Bergson, and others.30 But in spite of the differences between the radical conservatives and their romantic

predecessors-as well as those among the radical conservatives themselves -there are important similarities between the old and new conservatives. The radical conservatives revived a number of themes found in early romantic conservatism which appeared to be disappearing from conservative thought, including an-

ticapitalism and antiurbanism. Perhaps the most striking similari- ty of all is the revival- and the great heightening - of the theme of cultural alienation which characterizes such romantic conser- vatives as Muller. Although this is not the place for a detailed comparison of romantic and radical conservatism, it should be evident from the foregoing that such a comparison would show both significant similarities and great differences. The similarities are certainly great enough to make comparison worthwhile, and probably to justify regarding radical conservatism as a peculiar but recognizable offspring of romantic conservatism.

The consideration of the relationship between romantic con- servatism and radical conservatism leads into two final reflections concerning the nature of conservative thought - both of which will doubtless strike some readers as unacceptable. The first of these observations concerns the important role in conservative thought of that cultural alienation to which I have already alluded. By cultural alienation I mean a strong sense of disaffection from ex- isting society, a disaffection which is frequently coupled with an urge to reorder society to provide a more satisfying, harmonious

30 For the diverse sources of the Action francaise see: Charlotte Muret, French Royalist Doctrine since the Revolution (New York, 1933); Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism (New York, 1966), pp. 29-53; Francis Bayle, Les Idles politique deJoseph de Maistre (Lyon, 1944), pp. 135-42. For the intellectual origins of the German version of radical conservatism see: Armin Mohler, Die konservative Revolution in Deutschland (Stuttgart, 1950); Klemens von Klemperer, Germany's New Conservatism (Princeton, 1957); Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair (Berkeley, 1960); Robert Lougee, Paul de Lagarde (Cambridge, Mass., 1962).

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life. That such a sense of alienation should form a characteristic

component of conservative ideology sounds paradoxical, yet nonetheless alienated conservatives are not hard to find. Indeed, it may well be that the transition from traditionalism to conser- vatism could not have been made without some alienation, for the

capacity to conceive of society as an independent entity which can be shaped by human effort-a prerequisite of ideological thought-cannot be attained without the ability to distance oneself considerably from one's own society and see alternatives to it. And a strong case could be made-although this is not the place to make it -that it is psychologically impossible to achieve that necessary sense of distance or apartness from society and still remain completely at home within it. Be that as it may, it is not difficult to document the existence of cultural alienation among romantic and postromantic conservatives. Certainly, the aliena- tion of the radical conservatives of the twentieth century is ob- vious, and needs no further comment. The role of alienation

among the earlier romantic conservatives is less well known, but its presence has been noted by many observers. The alienation

pervading much of early nineteenth-century German conser- vatism has been expounded at length by Greiffenhagen, but it has been noted by political commentators dating all the way back to the beginning of the nineteenth century.31 Sir Isaiah Berlin has found something similar in the case of De Maistre, and Philip Rosenberg in the case of Carlyle.32 Even Burke, who subscribed to a much more fixed and hierarchical view of the world than

Carlyle or the German romantic conservatives, has been found by at least two writers to be characterized by a kind of half-

suppressed disaffection from the existing aristocratic order, which could fairly be described as symptomatic of cultural alienation.33

The existence of radical conservatism as well as the presence 31 See, for example, the anonymous reviewer of Muller's Elemente des Staatskunst in the

Gottinger Gelehrte Anzeigen (1810), 900. Among recent writers see Robert W. Lougee, "Ger- man Romanticism and Political Thought," Review of Politics, 21 (1959), 631-45; Reinhold Aris, History of Political Thought in Germany from 1789 to 1815 (New York, 1965), pp. 305-307.

32 Neither writer uses the term alienation extensively as a category of analysis, but see Berlin's comments on De Maistre in The Hedgehog and the Fox. An Essay on Tolstoy's View of History (New York, 1970), p. 48 ff.; and Rosenberg's comments on the "radical" character of Carlyle's thought throughout The Seventh Hero: Thomas Carlyle and the Theory of Radical Ac- tivism (Cambridge, Mass., 1974).

33 See Conor Cruise O'Brien's "Introduction" to Burke's Reflections (Penguin Books, 1969), pp. 34-41; Isaac Kramnick, The Rage of Edmund Burke: Portrait of an Ambivalent Con- servative (New York, 1971).

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of a sense of cultural alienation in many conservatives brings me to my final point-namely the inadequacy of such traditional

categories as liberal, reactionary, conservative and radical. The existence of a large body of alienated conservatives blurs the distinction between conservative and radical. The recognition of this psychological link between conservatism and radicalism makes the appearance of radical conservatism at the end of the nineteenth century much easier to understand and helps explain much of the controversy over thinkers like Carlyle. This link also makes it easier to understand why certain individuals (such as

Lamennais) could move so easily from extreme conservatism to radicalism, and why others shifted from radicalism to conser- vatism (such as Coleridge or Friedrich Schlegel). This substratum of shared ideas and emotions also helps explain why some writers have found striking similarities between conservatism and

nineteenth-century utopian socialism, and why one writer has even gone so far as to write an article subtitled "Marx's debt to German conservatism."4

If the lines between conservative and radical are strangely fluid, the same is even more obviously true of the distinction be- tween conservative and reactionary. Romantic conservatives subscribed to both status quo and reactionary or restorative posi- tions. Most historians of conservatism have included in their list of conservatives figures like De Maistre and Adam Miiller, even though such writers were clearly reactionary rather than conser- vative-that is, they aimed at restoring conditions which existed in a distant or imaginary past. And these historians have been correct in so doing, for the overall pattern of ideas found in these reactionaries corresponds closely to that developed by individuals who took much more moderate positions in practical politics, such as Burke, Chateaubriand, and Coleridge. It should also be noted that numerous radicals, including many of the leaders of the French Revolution, drew their inspiration from an idealized vi- sion of the past. These overlaps between conservatism and radical or reactionary positions indicate that modern conservatism must be defined much more in terms of a set of interlinked ideas and feelings than in terms of a particular attitude towards change. This is not to deny that conservatives were more often advocates of the status quo than reactionaries or radicals, but merely to assert

34 Michael Levin, "Marxism and Romanticism- Marx's Debt to German Conser- vatism," Political Studies, 22 (1974), 400-13.

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that the similarities between various ninteenth-century political ideologies should not be overlooked, and that attitude towards speed of change is not necessarily the most definitive characteristic of conservative thought.

What areas are likely to be the most productive in the future for scholars studying the history of conservatism?

My initial answer to the above question is a negative one: I doubt that much will be achieved by new works of synthesis at-

tempting broader and better definitions of or descriptions of con- servatism. I make this assertion because I have become increas-

ingly convinced that severe limits exist to what can be accom- plished through any approach to describing conservatism. Although I have argued that conservatism can be defined as an ideal type, I have also tried to show that one can only make limited progress with this approach. In attempting to define con- servatism, it soon becomes necessary to move from general defini- tions to describe conditions in particular countries and then to

depict individual groups and thinkers. Soon, one is writing descriptive or narrative history rather than using typological con- structs. But the narrative approach also has its limitations. If a

general history of conservatism is to avoid serious distortions, it must necessarily be so detailed as to overwhelm the reader. The pitfalls of attempting in a short space a comprehensive history of conservatism are well illustrated by John Weiss's recently pub- lished book-a work in which such an effort at synthesis is over- whelmed by the diversity of the subject matter-resulting in a mixture of dubious generalizations and historical platitudes, which is more misleading than helpful, even for the beginning student.35 The magnitude of the problems a historian writing on a larger scale will encounter is indicated by Claus Epstein's The Genesis of German Conservatism. 36 This work, which only studies the development of modern conservatism in Germany until 1806, when it was barely beginning to emerge, encompasses over 700

35 The weaknesses of Weiss's book are too numerous and too evident to warrant de- tailed discussion. Typical of the conceptual flaws in the work is his treatment of fascism as an extreme form of conservatism -a generalization which contains elements of truth, but which stretches the concepts of both conservatism and fascism to such an extent as to mislead the reader concerning the character of both movements. See Conservatism in Europe, 1770-1945 (London, 1977), pp. 7; 156.

36 Epstein even hoped that his book would "serve as one of many preliminary studies for the general history of modern European conservatism to be written in the future" (Genesis of German Conservatism, p. 7).

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pages. Even so, it can be faulted for paying insufficient attention to some of the literary, philosophical, and social origins of Ger- man conservatism. I doubt that a history of European conser- vatism written on such a scale would be widely read, or that it would really contribute much to our knowledge. It would, in ef- fect, be a collection of monographs.

It appears to me that more can be achieved by smaller-scale works which bring to play several approaches to conservative thought and focus them on relatively small areas. A typology, for example, can be incorporated into and expanded upon by a nar- rative history, which can show how and why a particular style of

thought was modified by historical circumstances, such as the necessities of practical politics or various social and economic forces. In my own work-which I do not claim as a great methodological departure -I have adopted such an agglutinative approach to the study of nineteenth-century German conser- vatism by using the time-tested technique of focusing on the ideas of three conservative thinkers who lived in successive overlapping "generations" extending over most of the nineteenth century (Adam Miiller, Friedrich Julius Stahl, and Otto von Bismarck).37 Although none of these individuals could accurately be described as "representative conservatives"- particularly not Bis- marck-each was sufficiently aware of the important trends in contemporaneous conservative thought and politics to make it possible to gather a reasonably accurate picture of the state of German conservatism as a whole in the nineteenth century through describing the problems they faced and the ways they at- tempted to solve them. By prefacing these biographical studies with a typological sketch of European conservatism and a descrip- tion of the forces and ideas which caused German conservatism to diverge from the general European pattern, by filling out an ac- count of the ideas of individual conservatives with descriptions of political and economic developments which affected their writings, and by providing brief sketches of the ideas of other leading conservative thinkers and politicians, I believe a reasonably comprehensive picture of the evolution of nineteenth- century German conservatism can be produced.

Another monograph which sheds new light on the history of German conservatism by combining several approaches and

37 "From Romanticism to Realpolitik: Studies in Nineteenth-Century German Con- servatism" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1971).

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focusing on a relatively narrow area is Hans-Jiirgen Puhle's Agrarische Interessenpolitik und preussischer Konservatismus in wilhelminischen Reich (1893-1914)-a work which concentrates on the influence of the Bund der Landwirte ("League of Agriculturists") on the development of the German Conservative party in the period between the fall of Bismarck and the First World War. Puhle's work is written primarily from the perspective of social history, but takes a more sophisticated approach than did Mann- heim. The narrow scope and careful scholarship of the author enable him to avoid the pitfalls into which Mannheim stumbles in his sweeping forays. Puhle's book may well prove to be a model for future studies in this area, especially given the increasing in- terest in social history on the part of many historians.

For writers whose interest is synthesis and theorizing about large-scale trends in the history of political thought, I would sug- gest that more could be achieved by focusing on the interrelation- ships between conservatism and other political ideologies than by attempting yet another description of conservatism as a distinct political philosophy. If, as I have maintained, the traditional distinctions of Left and Right are inadequate as a guide to understanding nineteenth-century political ideologies, more might be achieved by reexamining the common assumptions and interrelationships among these ideologies. Alternate ways of grouping thinkers might be considered, such as examining the division between individualistic and communitarian political philosophies. Perhaps now is the time to reevaluate what all of the nineteenth-century political ideologies have in common, to look for lines of cleavage in new places, and to try to distinguish them more clearly from what existed previously and from the predomi- nant trends in the political thought of today.

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