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Africa & the drugs tradeChris Allen

To cite this Article Allen, Chris(1999) 'Africa & the drugs trade', Review of African Political Economy, 26: 79, 5 11To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/03056249908704357URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03056249908704357

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Review o f African Political Econom y No.79:5-11 ROAP E Publications Ltd., 1999ISSN 0305-6244

Africa & the Drugs TradeChris Allen

Sourcing the Study of 'Africa & the D rags Tra de'This issue focuses on African involvement in the production, sale and consumption of(illegal) drugs. Production and use of such 'mass ' drugs as cannabis and khatt(or qaf)is ubiquitous in Africa, and the continent is becoming ever more drawn into theinternational trade in (largely) manufactured drugs, a trade estimated by the UN in its1998 World Drug Report to have been worth $400bn in 1995, some 8 per cent of worldexports; only the arms trade was larger, at $800bn. Despite this, as our threecontributors' references make clear, the literature on drugs is astonishingly sparse(and often concerned with medical or technical aspects). A mere handful of books andarticles appeared on the topic in the 1990s, very few, especially compared w ith that onmost of the phenomena or trends that are associated with the rise of the drug trade inAfrica, and which together make up the political economy of the drug industry andtrade on the continent (see below).Primary sources for the topic amount to police reports, which are often neitherreliable for accessible; press coverage, which is neither complete nor representative;and material from a variety of international agencies: Interpol, the US Bureau forInternational Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, the International NarcoticsControl Board, the UN Drug Control programme, and the non-official ObservatoireGeopolitique des Drogues (OGD). In addition, one can use interview material fromthose involved in the trade , bu t this is not only hard to obtain, but harder still to checkfor accuracy and reliability. Two of the three contributions in this issue draw on workdone for a major UNDCP study of the economic and social implications of drugconsumption and trade in eight African states, representing the most substantial,coherent and scholarly attempt to analyse the issue to date. They have had toovercome the problem of limited sources to produce a picture less of Africa's role ininternational trafficking than of a set of issues arising from the continued domesticgrowing of cannabis and khatt, and of the impact on this both of changes in Africa'spolitical economy in the last two decades, and of the advent of a significant presenceof imported drugs: cocaine, heroin, mandrax and others. Much of this latter trade isentrepot trade: the drugs are in transit, sometimes to elsewhere in Africa but morecommonly to Europe and the US.It is this last feature that makes Africa of interest to the international agenciesconcerned with drugs, and with 'enforcement' aspects - the control, detection andpunishment of those who produce, trade and consume drugs. Their perspective isthus one that tends to subsume all drug production and use under one narrow'trafficking' model; that has low standards of evidence; that is far more concernedwith the interests of final consumer countries that those of Africans or Africangovernments; and whose conception of enforcement is akin to that of the American'War on Drugs'. These perspectives interact with a picture of the nature of African

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6 Review of African Political Economysocieties, economies and political systems that is best crude or naive, reminiscent ofthe worst international reporting of African crises and disasters. The OGD is wellaware of the narrow vision of the official, international agencies, and tries itself to'grasp the components of the drug phenomenon and assess how they interact at alllevels' (OGD, 1997, quoting its 1992 report), yet while it does try to adopt a politicaleconomy approach, it is still the international flow of drugs to Western consumersthat is central to its analysis, and its repo rts on ind ividual African states contain suchsad anachronism s as references to 'juju m en ', and rely on a model of African politics inwhich all such states are necessarily incompetent and corrupt, this thoughtlessdenigration, when combined with the anonymity and gossipy nature of OGD's'sources' (1) makes it difficult to trust their reports, which are the fullest and mostindependent of those readily available.Changing Patterns of Production & TradeTwenty years ago the drugs most readily available in Africa, including South Africa,were those grown locally: cannabis, in most of Africa, and khatt, largely grown andconsumed in The Horn (see Green in this issue). 'H ard ' d rugs, and the abusive use ofPharmaceuticals, were almost entirely confined to expatriates and tourists. Onlymandrax (methaqualone), a drug produced in India and increasingly popular inSouthern Africa from the later 1970s, had begun to disturb this pattern by the early1980s. Since then there have been dramatic changes, involving the integration ofAfrica into international ne tworks of trafficking, consumption and control. The mostobvious feature has been the developm ent of transit routes throug h African ports andairports for bulk consignments of heroin and cocaine, intended mainly for high-income consumer countries, including some Arab states. While Lagos and Nairobihave probably been the key hubs in this trade, a large num ber of West, East and NorthAfrican states are now involved, including Benin, Ghana, Ivory C oast, Liberia, SierraLeone, Tanzania, the Congo, Zambia, Sudan, and Egypt. One result has been thearrival in (or the return to) Africa of expatriates involved in the trade - Indians andPakistanis, Dutch, Italians and other Europeans, and Malaysians are often mentionedin the various international reports. Less predictable has been the development ofAfrican traffickers. Initally African couriers, often women, were used to transportdrugs, but there now exist entire networks, often run by N igerians (2) or Ghanaians,which import, repackage and distribute heroin and cocaine from Asia, Brazil andother areas. Distribution is through European and A merican counterparts, or throughnetworks of African expatriates in consumer countries. Nigerian traffickers are nowcompeting with Colombian and Russian d istributors, and have beg un to shift fromreliance on other N igerians or West Africans (who tend to be targeted by Customs) tomore multinational teams.Another effect has been the rapid growth, or even entire development, of markets forhard dru gs w ithin Africa, and the associated local processing of varieties of crack, orproduction of adulterated forms of heroin. This market was initially confined to theresident or transient rich, including African businessmen, politicians and civilservants and their children, bu t also tourists, agency employees and other short-termexpatriate residents. In the last decade and especially the last five years, it has bothexpanded into lower-income urban groups, and triggered the development ofassociated markets, notably that for medical drugs open to abusive use, such asvalium or amphetamines. These are either directly imported or stolen frompharmacies, hospitals and government stores. While the extent of hard drug use is

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Editorial: Africa & the Drugs Trade 7difficult to estimate, and it remains modest by com parison with 'traditional' drugs, itis now a significant part of the market, and especially so in South Africa (Venter, 1998;OGD, 1999:51-57).Production patterns for the 'traditional' drugs have also changed. There is stillconsiderable growing on small plots, often intercropped with foodstuffs, andintended for local markets, supplied by petty traders. Customers here are individualconsumers, and usually poor, for whom the use of cannabis or khatt forms part ofdaily life: not recreational so much as utilitarian (but see Green). Production hasexpanded, however, in every sense: larger fields, a significant output in many moreareas, and supplying both increased domestic demand, and foreign markets. Thusthis older, domestic pattern of production and use is beginning to overlap with thenewer patterns of trafficking, in South Africa, Morocco, Madagascar, Nigeria, Ghanaand the Ivory Coast.

An Outline Political EconomyIn part, the incorporation of Africa (and Africans) into the trade in drugs arises fromaspects of globalisation, such as the changes in communications and theiraccessibility, or the ease and speed with which capital can be moved. M ore significant,however, have been three changes in Africa's political economy since the mid-1980s:changes in the natu re of the state and the political dynamic; changes in the economyand its management; and changes in the relationship between African states andinternational actors. These have combined to encourage drug production and trade,to make Africa open and vulnerable to trafficking (and less able to control it), and tocreate some of the mechanisms and activities that complement or support the trade.The combination of economic decline and its management through structuraladjustment programmes, mainly externally-designed and imposed on reluctantAfrican governm ents, has had three main relevant effects: the state state's capacity to enforce and regulate has been d iminished; informal, and often covert, forms of economic activity have expanded and, agricultural production in some areas, or based on some crops, has sufferedfrom declining prices and support.The weakening of the state, and pressure on it to reduce and reconfigure publicspending, can in turn weaken the army and police, together with associated agenciessuch as customs and border guards (though other factors may influence theirperformance much more). Detection and control of cross-border and entrepot tradesbecomes more difficult. Deregulation of banking, foreign exchange and investmentcontrols, all make it easier to transfer and launder income from trafficking, as well asto secure short-term investment opportunities, which both launder and enhanceprofits (Keh, 1996). thus the most recent OGD report (OGD, 1999:42-43) argues of theIndian Ocean area, that

Investments in the region combine naked political intervention, rigged or non-existenttenders, and unaccoun ted-for unds coming no t only from 'investor' countries in the region(Mauritius. South A frica and the Persian Gulf countries), but also from Europe (Russiaand particularly Italy). These investments are aimed at privatized companies, currencyexchan ges, casinos, tourist infrastructure, a nd certain heavy infrastructure.

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8 Review of African Political EconomyIt also claims that in Kenya the absence of money-laundering laws, the proliferation ofprivate banks, and the openings for investment in the tourist industry make it 'anideal place to invest for money-launderers' (156).The growth of the informal sector, including informal credit systems, makes the saleand transit of drugs easier, especially the internal and cross-border trade in cannabisand khatt. The marked expansion in the production of these drugs, however, seemsmore to be related to growth of markets, especially in towns, and to the decline inviablity of alternative crops. Thus declining incomes from cocoa in the Ivory Coastafter 1989, or from coffee and cocoa in Togo in the late 1980s, or from groundnuts inthe Gambia or Senegal, all appear to be related to the subsequent development of newcannabis crops, or the expansion of older ones. Other factors are of course importanttoo, including the impact of Ghanaian or Nigerian drug traders in initiatingproduction, but the key seems to lie in the relative returns with cannabis (or khatt)compared to other crops. Both are quite labour and w ater-intensive; but a small plotcan be combined with food cultivation, and will yield a far higher income than dorival crops. OGD reports suggest ratios of 50:1 in favour of cannabis productionagainst gro undnuts in Senegal (but only 10:1 for the Gambia), and 300:1 against cocoain the Ivory Coast. While these figures are but rough estimates (and should becompared with those for Ghana collected by Bernstein in this issue), they do suggeststrong reasons why peasants may be turning to cannabis and khatt, either of their ownaccord, or triggered by offers of guaranteed prices by buyers (who may also supplyseed). In a related fashion, involvement in d rug trading, and especially petty tradingor acting as a courier, can be seen as providing a replacement income in a period whenpublic and private sector employment and real incomes have declined severely.Political change in the same period has been dominated by two distinct processes,occurring in different groups of states; the struggle over democratic reform, and thedeepening of the crisis engendered by prolonged spoils politics, inducing processes ofstate collapse. The former process, which is still in its early stages, is often marked bysustained resistance by incum bent regimes, at the cost of increasing internal violence,political and electoral manipulation, and loss of control over political corruption. Theextent varies - compare Kenya with the Ivory Coast - b ut the associated w eakening instate capacity and of respect for law and authority, makes control over drugproduction and use more problematic and less effective. Corruption, and theinvolvement of senior politicians, army officers and civil servants in drug traffickingor in providing protection for traffickers and money-launderers, is still moresupportive of the trade, though it is all too easy to assume that for each example oftrade there must be a supporting cast of corrupt notables.Prolonged spoils, state collapse, war and warlordism have more substantial impact.At the heart of spoils politics is competition for and exploitation of political officeprimarily or solely for personal enrichment. Not only does this make protection oftraffickers far more likely than their prosecution, but direct involvement in the traderepresents and a safe and lucrative form of spoils, one often attributed to Nigerians.War, whether associated with terminal spoils or not, destroys controls, whilepromoting a linked collection of covert and/or criminal activities that eithercomplement drug trafficking, or create logistic support for it. The creation ofnetworks and mechanisms for supplying w eapons, or trading in diamonds, tropicalhardwoods or endangered species, can readily be combined with or adapted totrading in drugs. Illicit means of payment, associated with these forms of trade, orwith embargo-breaking, fit readily with money-laundering. It is thus no suprise when

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Editorial: Africa & the Drugs Trade 9a recent UN report on illegal arms flows in the Great Lakes region should concludethat they are in part financed by d rug trafficking by leading m embers of the formerarmy and militia (Interahamwe) of the pre-1994 government of Rwanda, based inMombasa and Dar es Salaam (IRIN, 1998). Similar claims have made concerningUNITA in Angola, though its main source of funding has been diamonds. Drug use,notably of a mixture of hard and m edical drugs , has also frequently been reported asa key element in the recruitment and use of soldiers (especially child soldiers) inLiberia, Sierra Leone, Mozambique and Angola.When the state itself promotes covert forms of violence - as in South Africa in the1980s and early 1990s - then similar consequences occur. Not only did the state recruitfrom, or work with criminal and vigilante organisations, but it encouraged variousforms of illicit activity and trade on their part. These organisations, now no longerpar t of the state bu t maintained by some of their former m embers, can be seen activelyinvolved in arms trading (and theft), car theft, and drug trafficking. A laboratoryunder the charge of Dr W outer Basson, responsible for the developm ent of chemicaland bacteriological weapons under apartheid, was devoted to the production ofmandrax and ecstasy both before and after 1990.Issues of ControlEconomic decline and the end of the Cold W ar have marginalised Africa within theinternational system, turning it from being an actor into being a 'problem'. It hassuffered a decline in role, importance and influence; and has lost much of whatremained of its autonomy, as can be seen in the phenomenon of aid conditionality. Atthe same time as this drain of influence and autonomy, African states have beenpressured to take on more responsibilities. Thus while in the early 1990s westernstates accepted some degree of responsibility for peacekeeping (or peace enforce-ment) and for humanitarian intervention, recent US argument see this as limited tofinancial and logistic support, while field responsibility (and the related risks) can beleft to African troops.Drug control measures raise related issues. African governments have becomeexposed to concerted pressures from the US Drug Enforcement Agency and theBureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, together withinternational agencies, to act effectively on the 'drug problem. To fail to do so is to riska reduction in aid (though other geopolitical considerations also apply here, as duringthe Cold War). Yet, as Klein argues in his contribution, the definition of the problem,and thus of appropriate measures of control, is derived from western - and mainlyAmerican - paradigms inapplicable in African settings. In such paradigms, the drugproblem is essentially that of the supply of hard drugs to high income consumercountries; the production, sale and use of drugs is always criminal, and is associatedwith violence; and all drugs should be treated as part of the same problem. From thisperspective, the drug trade is not the product of demand in the consumer countries,and their failure to control domestic organised crime; nor does it does it arise fromdecades of support for corrupt regimes, and movements deeply implicated in drugtrafficking. Instead it is a problem created by supplier countries and those areasinvolved in the transit trade, who must be induced to contain or stop the trade, andpenalized if they do n o t. By contrast, Klein argues that much of drug consum ption inNigeria (as in Ghana, see Bernstein) is not of hard or medical drugs, but of cannabis.Its use is not primarily recreational or criminal, bu t is intended to permit the user towork harder or longer, or to dull hunger, much as is the chewing of coca leaves in

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10 Review of African Political Econom yLatin America. Green, while skeptical of the utility of chewing khatt, also sees itsconsumption as distinct from that of hard drugs, and as creating a quite different,though serious, set of problems.To impress external drug control agencies it has been necessary for African states to(appear to) adop t a proactive and punitive control strategy: a local version of the 'wa ron d rug s'. The effect has been, however, much less to disrupt trafficking (which has ifanything increased) than to target cannabis users and the smaller growers. Both Kleinand Bernstein show that the vast bulk of arrests have been of petty cannabis users andgrowers, rather than of sellers, and still less of pushers, just as the great bulk ofseizures has been of cannabis (though this too has become part of the internationaldru g trade). Sentences for such trivial offences can very severe, while major traffickersbribe their way out of trouble. The consequence of this strategy, and of theaccompanying portrayal of cannabis as both a major problem and as 'gateway' toharder drugs, is to create (or risk creating) a linked set of economic, social andpolitical problems.Arrest and seizure strategies, particularly when combined with crop eradicationcampaigns (again targeting cannabis or khatt, as there is very little opium cultivation)take little account of the economic reasons for cannabis cultivation discussed above,and thus may exacerbate both rural and urban poverty. An example is given in therecent OGD report (1999:175), of such a campaign in the Gam bia, in March 1998.

Police destroyed all the plantations and seized the islanders' stocks of marijuana. D jinack ishome to 3,500 people, (and) all the amilies who live there, without exception are financiallydependent on cannabis cultivation, which accounts for at least 75% o f their income. Therecent police operation (which was not co mbined with measures to help armers grow othercrops) left many homes utterly destitute; ... the inhabitants are experiencing food andhealth problems, with children particularly hard hit.

They also discourage the authorities from examining the social, medical andeducational issues arising from cannabis and khatt consumption, in favour of'criminal' issues alone. Finally, they promote a strengthening of authoritarianinstitutions and repressive state capacity, raising civil liberties issues. The last issuegoes beyond questions of harassment, arrest and incarceration, to the use of ostensibledrug control measures as a political or military weapon. In Sudan, for example, theareas selected for eradication campaigns, carried out by the army, have been those inwhich regime opponents live, and which contain land that can be expropriated oncecleared of residents (and then allocated to regime supporters), such as the Beja regionnear Ethiopia, attacked in this fashion in 1997/98, or Darfur. A similar pattern can beseen in Casamance, where large scale eradication campaigns have occurred since1995, under the aegis of the Drug Squad, but intended to deprive the local autonomistmovem ent, the MFDC, of the taxes it levies on cannabis growers.Endnotes1. For these see the OGD website; http://w ww.ogd.o rg; see also OGD 1998.2. For an analogous approach to the 'Nigerian crime prob lem', see Winer 1996.

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Editorial: Africa & the Drugs Trade 11BibliographyIRIN (1998), 'Great Lakes; rebel activit iesfinanced b y d rug trade ' , press release, Nairobi,23 November .Keh, D I (1996), 'Drug money in a changingworld: economic reform and criminal finance',Vienna: UND CP.Observatoire G opolitique d es Drogues (1997),'The World geopolitics of dru gs 1995 /96', Paris;(1998), 'Les drogu es en Afrique subs aharie nne ',

Paris: Karthala; (1999), 'The world geopoliticsof drugs 1997/98' , Paris .Venter, CJ D (1998), 'D ru g trafficking in Sou thAfrica' in War and Peace in Southern Africa, R IRotb erg & G Mills (ed), 184-202.Winer, J (1996), 'Nigerian crim e' (testimony tothe Subcommittee on Africa of the House ofR e p r e s e n t a t i v e s I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n sCom mittee, Washington, 11 September).

Stephen RileyWe are saddened to announce the death of ourfriend and colleague who died suddenly on the28 th of December 1998. An O bituary and tributeswill appear in the next issue of ROAPE.

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