1NC v. CM Lin-UmarOffTThe aff is not topical because ocean development is limited to development in the ocean A. Interpretation-- Ocean is the single continuous body of salt waterScience Dictionary 2 The American Heritage Science Dictionary Copyright 2002. Published by Houghton Mifflin. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/oceanocean ('shn) Pronunciation Key The continuous body of salt water that covers 72 percent of the Earth's surface. The average salinity of ocean water is approximately three percent. The deepest known area of the ocean, at 11,034 m (36,192 ft) is the Mariana Trench , located in the western Pacific Ocean. Any of the principal divisions of this body of water, including the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian, and Arctic Oceans. Our Living Language : The word ocean refers to one of the Earth's four distinct, large areas of salt water, the Pacific, Atlantic, Indian, and Arctic Oceans. The word can also mean the entire network of water that covers almost three quarters of our planet. It comes from the Greek Okeanos, a river believed to circle the globe. The word sea can also mean the vast ocean covering most of the world. But it more commonly refers to large landlocked or almost landlocked salty waters smaller than the great oceans, such as the Mediterranean Sea or the Bering Sea. Sailors have long referred to all the world's waters as the seven seas. Although the origin of this phrase is not known for certain, many people believe it referred to the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Black Sea, the Adriatic Sea, the Caspian Sea, and the Indian Ocean, which were the waters of primary interest to Europeans before Columbus. B. Violationthe plan offers incentives for all algae biofuel production, which will occur in ponds and closed systems not just the oceanBracemort 13- their author (Kelsi Bracmort, who completed her PhD at Purdue in 2004, worked for the USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service in Washington DC, and now works for the Congressional Research Service (CRS). As a policy analyst for agricultural conservation and natural resources policy, Kelsis portfolio includes biomass energy (including cellulosic biofuels and anaerobic digestion) and non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gases. Algaes Potential as a Transportation Biofuelfas.org1 April 2013-- http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42122.pdf, accessed 7-22-14 bh@ddi)Algae undergoes four major processes in its conversion to biofuel: cultivation, harvest, processing, and biofuel/bio product conversion (see Figure 3). Algae cultivation may be photoautotrophic (algae requiring light to grow) or heterotrophic (algae grown without light and requiring a carbon source such as sugar to grow). 13 Photoautotrophic cultivation can occur in an 12 For more information on the chemical composition of algae, see Table 6-1 in Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Renewable Biological Systems for Alternative Sustainable Energy Production , 1997, http://www.fao.org/docrep/w7241e/w7241e00.htm#Contents. 13 Algae cultivation methods described here are for microalgae and cyanobacteria. Macroalgae requires unique cultivation strategies such as offshore, near-shore, or op en pond facilities. This report does not address another cultivation methodmixotrophic cultivation which combines photoautotrophic and heterotrophic cultivation methods. Algaes Potential as a Transportation Biofuel Congressional Research Service 5 open pond or in a closed system (e.g., a photobioreactor; see Figure 4 ). Each has advantages and challenges. 14 Open pond cultivation is generally cheaper and simpler to build, but is subject to weather conditions, contamination, and more water consumption. Cultivation conditions may be better controlled in a closed system, but there are scalability concerns, and closed systems historically have been more expensive than open ponds. Heterotrophic cultivation occurs in a fermentation tank and can use inexpensive lignocellulosic sugars for algae growth, which could lead to competition for feedstocks with other biofuel technologies. C. Their interpretation is unreasonable for debate 1. Limits the plan unlimits by allowing any aff that could be done on the ocean AS WELL AS anywhere elsethis is unreasonable because everything affects the ocean Timmons 12 Bob Timmons, Artist - Author Speaker, the Artist for the Ocean October 21, 2012 Ocean Guardians http://oceanguardians.com.au/artist-for-the-ocean-bob-timmons/Everything is connected and everything affects the ocean in the end since its majority of the planets surface and subsurface.2. Extra Topicality this allows no risk inclusion of non-topical provisions, which is an unreasonable burden on the negative

D. T is a voter for clash and well-prepared debatin Security KApocalyptic representations of climate change are an ineffective rhetorical strategy that produces a self-fulfilling prophecy Hulme (Professor of Environmental Sciences at the University of East Anglia, and Director of the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research) 6(Mike, Chaotic world of climate truth, 4 November, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/6115644.stm)

The language of catastrophe is not the language of science. It will not be visible in next year's global assessment from the world authority of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). To state that climate change will be "catastrophic" hides a cascade of value-laden assumptions which do not emerge from empirical or theoretical science. Is any amount of climate change catastrophic? Catastrophic for whom, for where, and by when? What index is being used to measure the catastrophe? The language of fear and terror operates as an ever-weakening vehicle for effective communication or inducement for behavioural change. This has been seen in other areas of public health risk. Empirical work in relation to climate change communication and public perception shows that it operates here too. Framing climate change as an issue which evokes fear and personal stress becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. By "sexing it up" we exacerbate, through psychological amplifiers, the very risks we are trying to ward off. The careless (or conspiratorial?) translation of concern about Saddam Hussein's putative military threat into the case for WMD has had major geopolitical repercussions. We need to make sure the agents and agencies in our society which would seek to amplify climate change risks do not lead us down a similar counter-productive pathway. The IPCC scenarios of future climate change - warming somewhere between 1.4 and 5.8 Celsius by 2100 - are significant enough without invoking catastrophe and chaos as unguided weapons with which forlornly to threaten society into behavioural change. I believe climate change is real, must be faced and action taken. But the discourse of catastrophe is in danger of tipping society onto a negative, depressive and reactionary trajectory.

If they do succeed at mobilizing action, apocalyptic representations of climate change lead to regional interventions and arms racesBrzoska (Inst. for Peace Research and Security Policy @ Hamburg) 8 (Micahel, The Securitization of climate change and the power of conceptions of security ISA Convention Paper)

In the literature on securitization it is implied that when a problem is securitized it is difficult to limit this to an increase in attention and resources devoted to mitigating the problem (Brock 1997, Waever 1995). Securitization regularly leads to all-round exceptionalism in dealing with the issue as well as to a shift in institutional localization towards security experts (Bigot 2006), such as the military and police. Methods and instruments associated with these security organizations such as more use of arms, force and violence will gain in importance in the discourse on what to do. A good example of securitization was the period leading to the Cold War (Guzzini 2004 ). Originally a political conflict over the organization of societies, in the late 1940s, the East-West confrontation became an existential conflict that was overwhelmingly addressed with military means, including the potential annihilation of humankind. Efforts to alleviate the political conflict were, throughout most of the Cold War, secondary to improving military capabilities. Climate change could meet a similar fate. An essentially political problem concerning the distribution of the costs of prevention and adaptation and the losses and gains in income arising from change in the human environment might be perceived as intractable, thus necessitating the build-up of military and police forces to prevent it from becoming a major security problem. The portrayal of climate change as a security problem could, in particular, cause the richer countries in the global North, which are less affected by it, to strengthen measures aimed at protecting them from the spillover of violent conflict from the poorer countries in the global South that will be most affected by climate change. It could also be used by major powers as a justification for improving their military preparedness against the other major powers, thus leading to arms races. This kind of reaction to climate change would be counterproductive in various ways. Firstly, since more border protection, as well as more soldiers and arms, is expensive, the financial means compensate for the negative economic effects of reducing greenhouse gas emission and adapting to climate change will be reduced. Global military expenditure is again at the level of the height of the Cold War in real terms, reaching more than US $1,200 billion in 2006 or 3.5 percent of global income. While any estimate of the costs of mitigation (e.g. of restricting global warming to 2C by 2050) and adaptation are speculative at the moment,1 they are likely to be substantial. While there is no necessary link between higher military expenditures and a lower willingness to spend on preventing and preparing for climate change, both policy areas are in competition for scarce resources.

The alternative is to do nothing and reject their obsession with preserving organized life Klein 13 (Richard, prof emeritus in the Dept of Romance Studies @ Cornell University, Climate Change Through The Lens Of Nuclear Criticism, Diacritics, Vol 41.3, 2013, pgs 82-87)//mm

If after climate catastrophe organized society were somehow able, after many years, to reconstitute itself in another ecology, what will have been lost? With the destruction of the archive would be lost all the institutions that depend in part or entirely on its existencelike law or mathematics, history or philosophy. But the most vulnerable (not necessarily the most precious) institution of all is literature, which has no real referent and which depends as an institution exclusively on the archive for existence. Science might revive or perhaps archeology, to the extent that their referents are material things in the world. Poetry, song, and epic might once again be emitted. But that institution we call literature, which, for our purposes, began sometime at the end of the seventeenth century in Europe, with its conventions, its reading public, its critics and merchants, editors and printers, with all the effects of intersexuality, I mean intertexuality, that its history makes possibleall that could never be revived. The fiction of climate catastrophe invites what Frances Ferguson called the nuclear sublime. She demonstrates that to speak in the future perfect about the termination of organized existence fulfills the conditions with which Kant, in the third Critique, defines the sublime aesthetic experience. It is a mode of speech that is imagined, in a fiction, to be posthumousas if one could see ones past from some perspective beyond the grave, a past life to which one is present only as a spectatora ghost, as it were, viewing its past life. Its what Kant evokes describing the walker in the Alps who turns a corner and suddenly confronts an immense abyss. The first moment of his experience is one of awe and terror before the enormity of the void, a first negative moment of nonpleasure, in which death looms. But in a second time, when the walker sees that he is safe on the edge, he can enjoy the spectacle of seeming infinite nothingness that opens at his feet before his astonished eyes. That second moment brings a feeling of what Kant calls aes thetic wellbeing, an immense pleasure of confronting the greatest forces, the vastest distances in the universe, and surviving, quite deliciously, unharmed. Nothing protects better from death than having died. That is why the posthumous perspective of the sublime is so enticing. Ferguson reminds us that Schiller says that suicide is the highest form of the sublime, for it requires that you imagine yourself dead.5 Nothing more perfectly illustrates the illusion of the nuclear sublime than the posthumous perspective presup posed by the cheery slogan of the Gaia Liberation Fronts Church of Euthanasia: Save the planet, kill yourself.6 The ultimate catastrophe is therefore a fiction, but it nevertheless is one that has very material consequences in the present. That is what distinguished it from fables that are mere inventions. It is a necessary postulation in order to recognize the symptoms and dangers of climate change, and that recognition, however muted politically, is already at work in the phantasms and dreams of people today, all over the worldfrom the population of Beijing to Islanders in the Pacific, to the shores of New Jersey, the coasts of Australia, the plains of Africa, etc. In our unconscious the worst may have already happened. And yet whenever we try to imagine what lies beyond our own death, or beyond the human species, after the ultimate apocalyptic disaster, we assume the condition of ghosts, between life and death, able to view in retrospective the world from which we are absent. That explains why it may be always an error, and the sign of an error, to speak apocalyptically about climate changes in tones of sublime terror and delicious awe. Indeed, if engagement in the politics of climate change doesnt feel funny, even ridiculousstruggling to save the whole of organized lifeyou are taking yourself too seriously. Dwelling on the tragedy that awaits us, you have been seduced into the error of the nuclear sublime. And whenever you hear a climate change speaker adopt some lurid, mournful, or pious tone, you should ask yourself, since its standpoint is in a fiction of posthumous existence, where exactly is the speaker actually standing? And what profit is to be gained in standing there? The dolorous tones of the nuclear sublime, when they are heard in the language of climate change, are the sign that a buck is being made.

Cap K Algae biofuels sanction overconsumption and reproduce neoliberalism theyre science fiction used to deflect environmental criticism and reduced consumptionSmith 10 (Charles Hugh Smith, writes the Of Two Minds which includes topics on finance and sustainability; The Overlapping Crises of Neoliberal Global Capitalism; http://www.oftwominds.com/blogsept10/crises-capitalism09-10.html; September 7, 2010)4. Resource depletion. Though many are drawn to appealing fantasies of endless oil (abiotic or otherwise), breeder nuclear reactors burning plutonium, etc., the awkward reality is that the world does not contain enough oil, gas, lithium, uranium, etc. etc. for another 1.5 billion middle-class consumers, never mind an additional 3 billion. Capitalism is based on the idea that The Invisible Hand of self-interest will drive markets to benefit all participants. This means that when one resource becomes scarce and thus costly, then an alternative will be found, manufactured or exploited. This has played out satisfactorily in the procession from wood to whale oil to coal to oil and natural gas, but the concept that no real substitute is available runs counter to capitalist ideals. The notion that there will only be shortages and no substitutions seamlessly appearing via the magic of free markets is alien. Like the person falling from a tall cliff, the fact that they we haven't slammed into any hard limit yet provides a false faith in the magic of the markets to provide a technological alternative. Thus mini-nuclear reactors, algae-based fuels, and various other exciting schemes are routinely trotted out as the "source of unlimited energy in the near future," always with the implicit faith that the process can be scaled up from the laboratory to a global scale with only modest difficulties. The idea that these grand concepts cannot be scaled up cheaply or quickly due to physics or other severe limitations of Nature is anathema to a faith in the unconquerable power of human ingenuity and open markets. Maybe algae will scale up from a few thousand gallons a month to billions of gallons a day, or solar energy can be converted to hydrogen, which will then power the planet's 600 million vehicles via fuel cells; but the market has no way to price the possibility than essential resources will enter permanent depletion declines and that no cheap, scalable substitute exists. 5. The market is intrinsically incapable of pricing extinction and other social/shared costs of global production and consumption. As I often note, the last wild tuna will fetch a handsome price when it's auctioned off in the Tokyo Fish Market. Was the value of a wild species calculated by the market? No. the "market" has no mechanism for pricing in the "value" of a species, or of the social costs of poisoned air and water--the Commons we all depend on. It also is intrinsically incapable of pricing control of resources or assets; the free market presumes that an unfilled demand will be met by someone, somewhere. That ignores the potential for political control of assets and resources which are immune to market pricing. Risk, future value, control--all of these critical elements are reduced to a "futures bid" which has no inputs for the value of a wild species, the "value" of clean air, the costs of polluted air borne by the tax-paying citizenry, the difficult-to-assess cost of a floating "island" of plastic garbage in the Pacific 2,000 kilometers in diameter, etc.This single-focus commodity thinking ensures resource conflict, environmental collapse, and structural violenceHarvey 5 (David, FBA is the Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography @ the Graduate Center of the City Univ. of New York, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, pgs 165-171)//ddiTo presume that markets and market signals can best determine all allocative decisions is to presume that everything can in principle be treated as a commodity. Commodification presumes the existence of property rights over processes, things, and social relations, that a price can be put on them, and that they can be traded subject to legal contract. The market is presumed to work as an appropriate guidean ethicfor all human action. In practice, of course, every society sets some bounds on where commodification begins and ends. Where the boundaries lie is a matter of contention. Certain drugs are deemed illegal. The buying and selling of sexual favours is outlawed in most US states, though elsewhere it may be legalized, decriminalized, and even state-regulated as an industry. Pornography is broadly protected as a form of free speech under US law although here, too, there are certain forms (mainly concerning children) that are considered beyond the pale. In the US, conscience and honour are supposedly not for sale, and there exists a curious penchant to pursue corruption as if it is easily distinguishable from the normal practices of influence-peddling and making money in the marketplace. The commodification of sexuality, culture, history, heritage; of nature as spectacle or as rest cure; the extraction of monopoly rents from originality, authenticity, and uniqueness (of works or art, for example)these all amount to putting a price on things that were never actually produced as commodities.17 There is often disagreement as to the appropriate- ness of commodification (of religious events and symbols, for example) or of who should exercise the property rights and derive the rents (over access to Aztec ruins or marketing of Aboriginal art, for example). Neoliberalization has unquestionably rolled back the bounds of commodification and greatly extended the reach of legal contracts. It typically celebrates (as does much of postmodern theory) ephemerality and the short-term contractmarriage, for example, is understood as a short-term contractual arrangement rather than as a sacred and unbreakable bond. The divide between neoliberals and neoconservatives partially reflects a difference as to where the lines are drawn. The neoconservatives typically blame liberals, Hollywood, or even postmodernists for what they see as the dissolution and immorality of the social order, rather than the corporate capitalists (like Rupert Murdoch) who actually do most of the damage by foisting all manner of sexually charged if not salacious material upon the world and who continually flaunt their pervasive preference for short-term over long-term commitments in their endless pursuit of profit. But there are far more serious issues here than merely trying to protect some treasured object, some particular ritual or a preferred corner of social life from the monetary calculus and the short-term contract. For at the heart of liberal and neoliberal theory lies the necessity of constructing coherent markets for land, labour, and money, and these, as Karl Polanyi pointed out, are obviously not commodities . . . the commodity description of labour, land, and money is entirely fictitious. While capitalism cannot function without such fictions, it does untold damage if it fails to acknowledge the complex realities behind them. Polanyi, in one of his more famous passages, puts it this way: To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of purchasing power, would result in the demolition of society. For the alleged commodity labour power cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately, or even left unused, without affecting also the human individual who happens to be the bearer of this peculiar commodity. In disposing of mans labour power the system would, incidentally, dispose of the physical, psychological, and moral entity man attached to that tag. Robbed of the protective covering of cultural institutions, human beings would perish from the effects of social exposure; they would die as victims of acute social dislocation through vice, perversion, crime and starvation. Nature would be reduced to its elements, neighborhoods and landscapes defiled, rivers polluted, military safety jeopardized, the power to produce food and raw materials destroyed. Finally, the market administration of purchasing power would periodically liquidate business enterprise, for shortages and surfeits of money would prove as disastrous to business as floods and droughts in primitive society.18 The damage wrought through the floods and droughts of fictitious capitals within the global credit system, be it in Indonesia, Argentina, Mexico, or even within the US, testifies all too well to Polanyis final point. But his theses on labour and land deserve further elaboration. Individuals enter the labour market as persons of character, as individuals embedded in networks of social relations and socialized in various ways, as physical beings identifiable by certain characteristics (such as phenotype and gender), as individuals who have accumulated various skills (sometimes referred to as human cap- ital) and tastes (sometime referred to as cultural capital), and as living beings endowed with dreams, desires, ambitions, hopes, doubts, and fears. For capitalists, however, such individuals are a mere factor of production, though not an undifferentiated factor since employers require labour of certain qualities, such as physical strength, skills, flexibility, docility, and the like, appropriate to cer- tain tasks. Workers are hired on contract, and in the neoliberal scheme of things short-term contracts are preferred in order to maximize flexibility. Employers have historically used differentiations within the labour pool to divide and rule. Segmented labour markets then arise and distinctions of race, ethnicity, gen- der, and religion are frequently used, blatantly or covertly, in ways that redound to the employers advantage. Conversely, workers may use the social networks in which they are embedded to gain privileged access to certain lines of employment. They typically seek to monopolize skills and, through collective action and the creation of appropriate institutions, seek to regulate the labour market to protect their interests. In this they are merely construct- ing that protective covering of cultural institutions of which Polanyi speaks. Neoliberalization seeks to strip away the protective coverings that embedded liberalism allowed and occasionally nurtured. The general attack against labour has been two-pronged. The powers of trade unions and other working-class institutions are curbed or dismantled within a particular state (by violence if necessary). Flexible labour markets are established. State withdrawal from social welfare provision and technologically induced shifts in job structures that render large segments of the labour force redun- dant complete the domination of capital over labour in the market- place. The individualized and relatively powerless worker then confronts a labour market in which only short-term contracts are offered on a customized basis. Security of tenure becomes a thing of the past (Thatcher abolished it in universities, for example). A personal responsibility system (how apt Dengs language was!) is substituted for social protections (pensions, health care, protec- tions against injury) that were formerly an obligation of employers and the state. Individuals buy products in the markets that sell social protections instead. Individual security is therefore a matter of individual choice tied to the affordability of financial products embedded in risky financial markets. The second prong of attack entails transformations in the spa- tial and temporal co-ordinates of the labour market. While too much can be made of the race to the bottom to find the cheapest and most docile labour supplies, the geographical mobility of capital permits it to dominate a global labour force whose own geographical mobility is constrained. Captive labour forces abound because immigration is restricted. These barriers can be evaded only by illegal immigration (which creates an easily exploitable labour force) or through short-term contracts that permit, for example, Mexican labourers to work in Californian agribusiness only to be shamelessly shipped back to Mexico when they get sick and even die from the pesticides to which they are exposed. Under neoliberalization, the figure of the disposable worker emerges as prototypical upon the world stage.19 Accounts of the appalling conditions of labour and the despotic conditions under which labourers work in the sweatshops of the world abound. In China, the conditions under which migrant young women from rural areas work are nothing short of appalling: unbearably long hours, substandard food, cramped dorms, sadistic managers who beat and sexually abuse them, and pay that arrives months late, or sometimes not at all.20 In Indonesia, two young women recounted their experiences working for a Singapore-based Levi-Strauss subcontractor as follows: We are regularly insulted, as a matter of course. When the boss gets angry he calls the women dogs, pigs, sluts, all of which we have to endure patiently without reacting. We work officially from seven in the morning until three (salary less than $2 a day), but there is often compulsory overtime, sometimesespecially if there is an urgent order to be delivereduntil nine. However tired we are, we are not allowed to go home. We may get an extra 200 rupiah (10 US cents) . . . We go on foot to the factory from where we live. Inside it is very hot. The building has a metal roof, and there is not much space for all the workers. It is very cramped. There are over 200 people working there, mostly women, but there is only one toilet for the whole factory . . . when we come home from work, we have no energy left to do anything but eat and sleep . . .21 Similar tales come from the Mexican maquila factories, the Taiwanese- and Korean-operated manufacturing plants in Honduras, South Africa, Malaysia, and Thailand. The health haz- ards, the exposure to a wide range of toxic substances, and death on the job pass by unregulated and unremarked. In Shanghai, the Taiwanese businessman who ran a textile warehouse in which 61 workers, locked in the building, died in a fire received a lenient two-year suspended sentence because he had showed repentance and cooperated in the aftermath of the fire.22 Women, for the most part, and sometimes children, bear the brunt of this sort of degrading, debilitating, and dangerous toil.23 The social consequences of neoliberalization are in fact extreme. Accumulation by dispossession typically undermines whatever powers women may have had within household production/ marketing systems and within traditional social structures and relocates everything in male-dominated commodity and credit markets. The paths of womens liberation from traditional patri- archal controls in developing countries lie either through degrad- ing factory labour or through trading on sexuality, which varies from respectable work as hostesses and waitresses to the sex trade (one of the most lucrative of all contemporary industries in which a good deal of slavery is involved). The loss of social protec- tions in advanced capitalist countries has had particularly negative effects on lower-class women, and in many of the ex-communist countries of the Soviet bloc the loss of womens rights through neoliberalization has been nothing short of catastrophic. So how, then, do disposable workerswomen in particular survive both socially and affectively in a world of flexible labour markets and short-term contracts, chronic job insecurities, lost social protections, and often debilitating labour, amongst the wreckage of collective institutions that once gave them a modicum of dignity and support? For some the increased flexibility in labour markets is a boon, and even when it does not lead to material gains the simple right to change jobs relatively easily and free of the traditional social constraints of patriarchy and family has intangible benefits. For those who successfully negotiate the labour market there are seemingly abundant rewards in the world of a capitalist consumer culture. Unfortunately, that culture, however spectacular, glamorous, and beguiling, perpetually plays with desires without ever conferring satisfactions beyond the limited identity of the shopping mall and the anxieties of status by way of good looks (in the case of women) or of material possessions. I shop therefore I am and possessive individualism together con- struct a world of pseudo-satisfactions that is superficially exciting but hollow at its core. But for those who have lost their jobs or who have never managed to move out of the extensive informal economies that now provide a parlous refuge for most of the worlds disposable work- ers, the story is entirely different. With some 2 billion people condemned to live on less than $2 a day, the taunting world of capitalist consumer culture, the huge bonuses earned in financial services, and the self-congratulatory polemics as to the emancipa- tory potential of neoliberalization, privatization, and personal responsibility must seem like a cruel joke. From impoverished rural China to the affluent US, the loss of health-care protections and the increasing imposition of all manner of user fees adds considerably to the financial burdens of the poor.24Alternative text: the judge should vote negative to endorse an ethic of social fleshAn ethic of social flesh foregrounds embodied interdependence, substituting an ecological view of relationships for the affs commodity thinking only the alternative can produce ethical institutional decisionmakingBeasley & Bacchi 7(Chris, Prof. of Politics @ University of Adelaide, Carol, Prof. Emeritus @ University of Adelaide, Envisaging a new politics for an ethical future: Beyond trust, care and generosity -- towards an ethic of `social flesh', Feminist Theory, 2007 8: 279)

The political vocabulary of social flesh has significant implications for democratic visions. Because it conceptualizes citizens as socially embodied as interconnected mutually reliant flesh in a more thoroughgoing sense than the languages of trust, care, responsibility and generosity, it resists accounts of political change as making transactions between the less fortunate and more privileged, more trusting, more caring, more responsible or more generous. Social flesh is political metaphor in which fleshly sociality is profoundly levelling. As a result, it challenges meliorist reforms that aim to protect the vulnerable from the worst effects of social inequality, including the current distribution of wealth. A political ethic of embodied intersubjectivity requires us to consider fleshly interconnection as the basis of a democratic sociality, demanding a rather more far-reaching reassessment of national and international institutional arrangements than political vocabularies that rest upon extending altruism. Relatedly, it provides a new basis for thinking about the sorts of institutional arrangements necessary to acknowledge social fleshly existence, opening up the scope of what counts as relevant (Shildrick, 2001: 238). For example, it allows a challenge to current conceptualizations that construct attention to the private sphere as compensatory rather than as necessary (Beasley and Bacchi, 2000: 350). We intend to pursue the relationship between social flesh and democratic governance in future papers. Conclusion In this paper we focus on various vocabularies of social interconnection intended to offer a challenge to the ethos of atomistic individualism associated with neo-liberalism and develop a new ethical ideal called social flesh. Despite significant differences in the several vocabularies canvassed in this paper, we note that most of the trust and care writers conceive the social reform of atomistic individualism they claim to address in terms of a presumed moral or ethical deficiency within the disposition of individuals. Hence, they reinstate the conception of the independent active self in certain ways. Moreover, there is a disturbing commonality within all these accounts: an ongoing conception of asymmetrical power relations between strong and weak, carers and cared for, altruistic and needy. While widely used terms like trust and care clearly remain vocabularies around which social debate may be mobilized, and hence are not to be dismissed (see Pocock, 2006), we suggest that there are important reasons for questioning their limits and their claims to offer progressive alternative understandings of social life. In this setting, we offer the concept of social flesh as a way forward in rethinking the complex nature of the interaction between subjectivity, embodiment, intimacy, social institutions and social interconnection. Social flesh generalizes the insight that trusting/caring/ altruistic practices already take place on an ongoing basis to insist that the broad, complex sustenance of life that characterizes embodied subjectivity and intersubjective existence be acknowledged. As an ethico-political starting point, social flesh highlights human embodied interdependence. By drawing attention to shared embodied reliance, mutual reliance, of people across the globe on social space, infrastructure and resources, it offers a decided challenge to neo-liberal conceptions of the autonomous self and removes the social distance and always already given distinction between strong and weak. There is no sense here of givers and receivers; rather we are all recognized as receivers of socially generated goods and services. Social flesh also marks our diversity, challenging the privileging of normative over other bodies. Finally, because social flesh necessarily inhabits a specific geographical space, environmentalist efforts to preserve that space take on increased salience (Macken, 2004: 25). By these means, the grounds are created for defending a politics beyond assisting the less fortunate. Social flesh, therefore, refuses the residues of noblesse oblige that still appear to linger in emphasis upon vulnerability and altruism within the apparently reformist ethical ideals of trust/respect, care, responsibility and even generosity. In so doing it puts into question the social privilege that produces inequitable vulnerability and the associated need for altruism. Vital debates about appropriate distribution of social goods, environmental politics, professional and institutional power and democratic processes are reopened.

Mexico CP

Text: The United States federal government should substantially increase financing for advanced biofuels in Mexico.

Solves all the case internal links better: Sugar and cellulosic ethanol had huge potential to offset fossil fuels and shift corn back food only US FDI to Mexico solves McDonald 9 JD and MBA @ U Mississippi, LLM in International Legal Studies @ American

(Jeff, Corn, Sugar, and Ethanol: How Policy Change Can Foster Sustainable Agriculture and Biofuel Production in Mexico and the United States, ILSP Law Journal, p. 127-134)Additionally, Mexican agricultural resources are scant in comparison to its North American counterparts.113 In fact, only 12% of Mexicos land is considered arable, with less than 3% of that land being irrigated.114 Agriculturally, the country has been slow to modernize, failing to take advantage of the ethanol movement and other technological advancements such as genetically modified crops.115 Further, state operated granaries and distribution networks are withering, and agriculture cooperatives may be key to the survival of Mexican agriculture.116 Regardless, the future of Mexican agriculture depends on advances in irrigation, agricultural infrastructure, and mechanization, and these advances will likely only result from foreign direct investment. IV. A Possible Solution? A. Cooperative Advances in Agriculture and Infrastructure The devastation of Mexican agriculture post-NAFTA, while problematic, may have been an inevitable development.117 The resulting downfall of the Mexican ejido, while initially displacing Mexican farm workers and further weakening Mexican agricultural production, might be viewed as a market correction demanding efficient production and modernization while providing a better economic quality of life for rural Mexicans.118 However, because the Mexican economy may not be able to survive such a correction, the country might benefit from the help of its Northern neighbor. U.S. assistance should consist of both direct aid and investment in Mexico, and concurrent changes in domestic agricultural practices and subsidization. Under comparative trade theory, the U.S. should become Mexicos supplier of basic grains, and Mexico should supply most, if not all, of U.S. fruits and vegetables.119 However, special consideration should be given to the socio-economic conditions of the rural Mexican farmer, and Mexican producers of traditional varieties of maize must be protected from market intrusion.120 Part of any agreement must be an inherent interest in mutual socio-cultural preservation. In trade, nations must recognize the higher responsibility to protect vulnerable aspects of one anothers culture and heritage. As this analysis will demonstrate, the effects of protecting Mexican farmers of white corn will be marginal to U.S. yellow corn farmers as inflated demand for U.S. corn will be eliminated, and any income lost in the Mexican market will be recouped by environmental credits, and the harvesting of biomass for domestic biofuel production. Notwithstanding the need to protect this sector of Mexican agriculture, recent land reforms in Mexico has given rise to increased U.S. interest in contract farming and marketing arrangements. 121 Permitting U.S. firms to operate on Mexican agricultural lands, and invest in its development, will likely enhance Mexican agricultural efficiency, productivity, and profitability, while facilitating land ownership for the Mexican farmer. With Mexican sugar production becoming ever-important in the establishment of a North American biofuel industry, FDI from the United States should focus on the supply and development of agricultural technology, the engineering of biofuel production facilities, and the infrastructure necessary to transport ethanol throughout both countries, and to points of export.

Wastewater DA Wastewater algae cultivation causes massive bloomsprefer scientific studies over industry speculation Ma et al., 6/6/2014(Xiaochen Maa, b, Wenguang Zhoua, Zongqiang Fua, Yanling Chenga, Min Mina, Yuhuan Liua, Yunkai Zhanga, Paul Chena, Roger Ruana, , a Center for Biorefining, and Bioproducts and Biosystems Engineering Department, University of Minnesota, 1390 Eckles Avenue, St. Paul, MN 55108, USA b Institute of Microbiology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, A3 Datun Rd., Chaoyang District, Beijing 100101, China, Bioresource Technology, Effect of wastewater-borne bacteria on algal growth and nutrients removal in wastewater-based algae cultivation system, June 6th 2014, SciVerse ScienceDirect, accessed 7-24-14 bh@ddi) This result is partially different from other reports which claimed that high algal cell concentration would inhibit the bacterial growth completely probably due to different microbial community (Xavier Mayali, 2002), while synergistic relationship was observed in this study (Fig. 2). There are several reasons that wastewater-borne bacteria and algae may have a symbiotic relationship. First, bacteria could supply sufficient carbon dioxide which is required for algal bloom during fast growth stage. Under favorable conditions, bacteria could deliver large amount of CO2 in a supersaturated state (Kuentzel, 1969). From our previous study, the microalgae strain used in this study could grow well in organic-rich wastewater with mixotrophic mode to achieve high biomass concentration and high lipid content simultaneously (Zhou et al., 2012b). The CO2 generated by bacteria would favor the algal growth and bloom which could explain why algal growth did not have a visible lag phase at the initial stage during the cultivation. Second, bacteria participated in the nutrients and pollutants degradation process and transformed complex substrates to small organic acid molecules and ammonium which could be easily used by algae (Zhang et al., 2012). In addition, the generation of large amount of CO2 led to maximum concentration of CO2 presented at the surfaces of algal and bacterial cells. When these cells are in close proximity, this CO2 rich environment is a favorable condition for algal growth. Algae could utilize incomplete metabolic products released by the bacteria, and similarly the bacteria may benefit from vitamins and growth factors leached from algal cells (Humenik and Hanna, 1971).Algal blooms kill marine biodiversity and result in ocean deadzones Anderson and McCarthy, 2012 (Donald M. Anderson1 and Shannon McCarthy2 1Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Woods Hole MA 02543 2 Middle East Desalination Research Center, Muscat, Oman, Middle East Desalination Research Center, Red Tides and Harmful Algal Blooms: Impacts on Desalination Operations, February 8-9, 2012, http://www.medrc.org/download/Habs_and_desaliantion_workshop_report_final.pdf, accessed 7-24-14 bh @ddi) Desalination plants face many operational challenges. One that has emerged in recent years is the threat from harmful algal blooms (HABs). HABs, commonly called red tides, are blooms of algae (microscopic (phytoplankton) and macroscopic (seaweeds) that cause harm in many ways. Traditionally, these impacts have affected human and ecosystem health, fisheries, tourism, and coastal aesthetics. For example, HABs have caused mass mortalities of fish and marine mammals, and have sickened and killed humans through consumption of contaminated seafood or through recreational exposure. Non-toxic HABs also cause many problems, typically through biomass effects such as the decay of dense blooms, leading to oxygen depletion and mass mortalities of marine organisms. The threat from HABs to desalination plants is not new, but is growing in scale and significance, due to the expansion of both HABs and desalination plants globally. Recent events (e.g., Richlen et al. 2010) highlighted the vulnerability of traditional plant designs to blooms, and emphasized how little we know about important processes such as toxin removal during treatment or the best methods for removing algal biomass and extracellular products during pretreatment. Likewise, design features of plants, including the location and nature of intakes need to account for the types of bloom events and species that might occur in a given region. These dead zones collapse ocean biodiversityCarlisle 2K[Elizabeth Carlisle 2000 The Gulf of Mexico Dead Zone and Red Tides, The Louisiana Environment, http://www.tulane.edu/~bfleury/envirobio/enviroweb/DeadZone.htm]As the fresh, nutrient-enriched water from the Mississippi and Atchafalaya Rivers spread across the Gulf waters, favorable conditions are created for the production of massive phytoplankton blooms. A bloom is defined as an increased abundance of a species above background numbers in a specific geographic region. Incoming nutrients stimulate growth of phytoplankton at the surface, providing food for unicellular animals. Planktonic remains and fecal matter from these organisms fall to the ocean floor, where they are eaten by bacteria, which consume excessive amounts of oxygen, creating eutrophic conditions. Hypoxic waters appear normal on the surface, but on the bottom, they are covered with dead and distressed animal, and in extreme cases, layers of stinking, sulfur-oxidizing bacteria, which cause the sediment in these areas to turn black. These hypoxic conditions cause food chain alterations, loss of biodiversity, and high aquatic species mortality.

Loss of marine biodiversity causes extinction cross apply Crist and Queally from the 1ACRivers (writer for the Helium Network)September 19th, 2012(Christyl, Loss of Biodiversity Means Loss of Human Life, Sciences 360, http://www.sciences360.com/index.php/loss-of-biodiversity-means-loss-of-human-life-2409/)The loss of biodiversity means the loss of all life supported by inter-connected dynamics which supply air, water and nutrients. Biodiversity is in effect, everything evolved on earth that is not mere mineral or inanimate chemical. In school, many students have learned about the food chain, or even the great chain of being. The chain theory, however, is obsolete and has been replaced by the new comprehension that all life complements other life. Life exists in a web of interconnected bits. It is not just the survival of fittest, but the interaction of everything that lives and dies which creates the carbon cycle, the hydrology cycle, the replenishment of the soil and the restoration, daily and ongoing, of the water and air that support life upon earth. Without insects, pollinators, and seed depositors, there is no way to propagate or continue sustainable populations of plants and animals, no less human beings. For example, cattle when fed on grasslands do not rely upon the monoculture of artificially fertilized corn. Grazing cattle do not add concentrated methane, or deteriorate landscapes. In their naturally evolved context, cattle replenish and support biodiversity. In the factory farm, they are yet another aberration that adds to the loss of biodiversity. Another simple way to look at it, it to see that which evolved in nature arrived at the present system of life on earth that in circle of life fashion, continues to ensure life on earth. As humans developed agriculture, then cities and factories, biodiversity began to decline. Most mega-fauna (large animals) were hunted to extinction eons ago. Pollution, garbage, waste, deforestation, mining and much more human activity, notably burning of fossil fuels, threatens current remaining biodiversity, and, so too, the future of life. This bleak future is avoidable, as described by E.O. Wilson, in his book, the Future of Life. Also since modern times, those things brought about by humans that threaten biodiversity can all be reduced to the idea of waste. Annihilation of the American Bison for example, shows how one missing creature virtually extinguished native American ways of life. In nature, there is no waste. All debris and death gives rise to life. The idea of garbage, toxins, waste, plastic and contaminants threatens all biodiversity because artificial waste, in huge quantity, cannot be digested by nature. The great Pacific garbage patch, a plastic floating Texas size mess, kills marine animals and birds because they have no natural ability to digest, or disentangle from plastic trash. Glass would be a simple technology to protect such life, but few people care because they do not know loss of biodiversity threatens human life, too.CaseFood Advantage 1. Alt causes to global food insecurity lack of infrastructure and natural resources, political stability and lack of market integration FAO et al., 2013 (UN Food and Agriculture Organization, IFAD, and WFP, The State of Food Insecurity in the World: The multiple dimensions of food security, Rome 2013 Annual Report, http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3434e/i3434e.pdf, accessed 7-25-14 bh@ddi) Progress in reducing hunger reflects country and regional specificities in terms of economic conditions, infrastructure, the organization of food production, the presence of social provisions and political and institutional stability. In Western Asia, the worsening undernourishment trend appears to be mostly related to food price inflation and political instability. In Northern Africa, where progress has been slow, the same factors are relevant. Lack of natural resources, especially good-quality cropland and renewable water resources, also limit the regions food production potential. Meeting the food needs of these regions rapidly growing populations has been possible only through importing large quantities of cereals. Some of these cereal imports are financed by petroleum exports; simply put, these regions export hydrocarbons and import carbohydrates to ensure their food security. Both food and energy are made more affordable domestically through large, untargeted subsidies. The regions dependency on food imports and oil exports make them susceptible to price swings on world commodity markets. The most precarious food security situations arise in countries where proceeds from hydrocarbon exports have slowed or stalled, food subsidies are circumscribed by growing fiscal deficits or civil unrest has disrupted domestic food chains. While at the global level there has been an overall reduction in the number of undernourished between 199092 and 201113 (Figure 4), different rates of progress across regions have led to changes in the distribution of undernourished people in the world. Most of the worlds undernourished people are still to be found in Southern Asia, closely followed by sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Asia. The regional share has declined most in Eastern Asia and South-Eastern Asia, and to a lesser extent in Latin America and the Caribbean and in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Meanwhile, the share has increased in Southern Asia, in sub-Saharan Africa and in Western Asia and Northern Africa. Many countries have experienced higher economic growth over the last few years, a key reason for progress in hunger reduction. Still, growth does not reach its potential, owing to structural constraints. Arguably the most important is the often woefully inadequate infrastructure that plagues vast areas of rural Africa. Much improved communication and broader access to information technology may, to some extent, have helped overcome traditional infrastructure constraints, and promoted market integration. Also encouraging is the pick-up in agricultural productivity growth, buttressed by increased public investment, incentives generated by higher food prices and renewed interest of private investors in agriculture. In some countries, remittance inflows from migrants have helped spur domestic growth. Remittances have increased smallscale investment, which was particularly beneficial to growth where food production and distribution still rely on smallscale and local networks. This holds in particular for sub- Saharan African countries, where a combination of higher crop yields and increased livestock production have led to a reduction of undernourishment.2. Food insecurity is extremely complex and depends on a litany of market and non-market factors the aff doesnt resolvereject this contrived advantage Johnson, CFR Deputy Editor, 2013(Toni, Council on Foreign Relations, Food Price Volatility and Insecurity, January 16, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/food-security/food-price-volatility-insecurity/p16662, accessed 7-25-14 bh) Grain Stocks. Increased use of grains to meet the demand for meat and biofuels has largely contributed to a major increase in cereals demand (PDF), writes Brian D. Wright at the International Food and Agriculture Trade Policy Council. Grain reserves--carryover supplies that can provide a cushion for market fluctuations and seen as an indicator of market tightness--have declined significantly, falling from a roughly 110-day supply before 2000 to a 64-day supply in 2007-2008. Global stocks are expected to continue to fall in 2013, with corn stocks predicted to fall to a nine-year low. Wright notes that low stocks contribute to the kind of price shocks seen in 2008 and 2010-2011. Researchers from the FAO note that "ample and highly liquid commercial stocks held by major international suppliers appear a necessary and sufficient condition to instill confidence in world markets and to lessen the probability of future bouts of extreme global volatility" (PDF). However, other analysts have dismissed stocks as an important factor in higher prices (PDF). Population Trends. The growth of the middle class in developing countries has increased demand for food generally and for meat in particular, placing greater pressure on grain consumption. Meat, dairy, and oils (PDF) are expected to rise from about 20 percent of current calorie intake in developing countries to nearly 30 percent in the next forty years. Livestock feed currently represents about 55 percent of consumption (PDF) of coarse grains (corn, sorghum, and barley), according to the FAO. A number of experts say the growth in meat consumption harms overall food security, since the production of one serving of meat takes more land, water, and energy than the production of a serving of corn or rice. Growing urbanization, particularly in the developing world, contributes to lifestyles that include higher consumption of meat and commercial foods (PDF). As more people leave rural areas for cities, a lack of investment in modernized farm equipment and irrigation techniques increases the burden on developing-world farmers, precisely as they dwindle in number and need to increase production capacity. Commodities Markets. Similar to the debate over oil prices, non-sector participants--like pensions and hedge funds--in the agricultural markets are considered by some to be a driver of price volatility. Critics argue that such speculation should be curbed, because food access is ultimately a humanitarian issue. Others say market speculators are reacting to uncertainty rather than driving it. "Speculators make money out of understanding and providing insurance against volatility," writes Brookings' Homi Kharas. "The volatility inherent in the food marketplace causes speculation, not the other way around." Still, a June 2011 report from Oxfam says that is it possible excessive speculation can temporarily amplify volatility (PDF) and contribute to food price bubbles. Many experts have said one way to lower uncertainty caused by commodities' trading is to increase markets' transparency and get countries to accurately report food stocks. Since commodities are pegged to the dollar, the currency-exchange rate volatility seen in recent years also has had an impact on food prices. Weather and Climate Change. Disasters such as drought and flooding can cause catastrophic damage to crops. A string of recent bad weather in 2010, 2011, and 2012 and related disasters such as wildfires in some of the world's biggest food exporters have helped raise prices to record levels. Severe droughts in the summer of 2012 across the U.S. Midwest and Eastern Europe in parts of Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan have also pushed prices even higher. July saw a month-over-month increase of 25 percent in corn and wheat prices and 10 percent in overall food commodities, figures that could go higher in 2013. Climate change is forecast to spur more crop-damaging weather events (PDF) and impact water supplies and the availability of arable land, especially in the developing world. Countries in South Asia and parts of Africa, some of which have the world's fast growing populations, could lose more than 5 percent of their growing season, the FAO forecasts, placing an estimated 370 million people in jeopardy due to diminished food security. These regions already contain large populations considered chronically hungry. Experts say policies and technologies to adapt crops to climate change and increase water supplies will be needed. Trade policy. Most crops do not cross national boundaries; few have international trade rates higher than 20 percent of what is grown. However, prices and export controls can disproportionately impact import-dependent countries. "[F]ood price inflation is not simply the result of supply and demand," says a June 2011 Oxfam report (PDF). "[A] more globalized food system equals a more interdependent one too--which makes the system vulnerable to zero-sum games when governments or other key players succumb to panic or herd behaviors." According to the UN's World Food Program, over forty countries in 2008 imposed some form of export ban in an effort to increase domestic food security. Many economists say hoarding, particularly in some rice-producing countries, exacerbated the 2008 food-price crisis. Following a 2010 drought and wildfires, Russia limited exports of wheat and wheat prices more than doubled, according to the World Bank.3. 80% of the hungry work in agriculturereduced food prices dont help them, but high food prices can give them an opportunity to sell more food La Vina et al., World Resources Institute, 2006 (Antonio, Lindsey Fransen, Paul Faeth, Yuko Kurachi, World Resources Institute, REFORMING AGRICULTUREAL SUBSIDIES: No Regrets Policies for Livelihoods and the Environment, 2006, http://pdf.wri.org/reforming_ag_subsidies.pdf, accessed 7.28.14 bh@dd) Poverty, agriculture, environment, and trade are fundamentally linkedphysically, ecologically, socio-economically, and ultimately at the policy level. While these linkages exist in all countries, the connections are most obvious in developing countries and countries with economies in transition, where poverty frequently coincides with the predominance of agriculture in the economy (La Vina and Fransen 2006). Nearly three billion people live on less than US$2 a day, most of them in the developing world. Among them, over one billion people live in extreme poverty, surviving on less than US$1 a day (World Bank 2001). The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that there were 842 million undernourished people in the world in 1999-2001, with 798 million living in developing countries and 34 million in countries with economies in transition (FAO 2004). Worldwide, almost 80 percent of the hungry live in rural areas and depend on agriculture as their source of livelihood (Clay 2004). The Millennium Projects Task Force on Hunger breaks down this figure, stating that about half of the worlds undernourished are small farmers, 20 percent are landless rural dwellers, 10 percent are pastoralists and fishermen, and the remaining 20 percent are urban dwellers (Mayrand et al. 2005). Substantial reductions in poverty and hunger among the farming population would have implications for developing countries national economies. In fact, historically, [a]ll reported rapid reductions in widespread poverty started with livelihoods being enhanced through agricultural transformation (DFID 2002). Additionally, in many developing countries agriculture is a primary source of foreign exchange earnings (UNDP 2003). While increased agricultural production is an important component of poverty alleviation, it also has implications for the environment. Agriculture is probably the single most powerful influence on environmental quality in most developing countries (Scherr 1999), where it accounts for most land use and affects many environmental variables such as water quality and flow, soil quality and movement, natural vegetative cover, and biodiversity. In countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), agriculture is the single largest user of water and source of pollution (Clay 2004).4. Resource wars dont happen other variables at play Victor, professor of law at Stanford Law School and the director of the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, 2007(David, What Resource Wars?, November 12, Online: http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=16020)RISING ENERGY prices and mounting concerns about environmental depletion have animated fears that the world may be headed for a spate of "resource wars"-hot conflicts triggered by a struggle to grab valuable resources. Such fears come in many stripes, but the threat industry has sounded the alarm bells especially loudly in three areas. First is the rise of China, which is poorly endowed with many of the resources it needs-such as oil, gas, timber and most minerals-and has already "gone out" to the world with the goal of securing what it wants. Violent conflicts may follow as the country shunts others aside. A second potential path down the road to resource wars starts with all the money now flowing into poorly governed but resource-rich countries. Money can fund civil wars and other hostilities, even leaking into the hands of terrorists. And third is global climate change, which could multiply stresses on natural resources and trigger water wars, catalyze the spread of disease or bring about mass migrations. Most of this is bunk, and nearly all of it has focused on the wrong lessons for policy. Classic resource wars are good material for Hollywood screenwriters. They rarely occur in the real world. To be sure, resource money can magnify and prolong some conflicts, but the root causes of those hostilities usually lie elsewhere. Fixing them requires focusing on the underlying institutions that govern how resources are used and largely determine whether stress explodes into violence. When conflicts do arise, the weak link isn't a dearth in resources but a dearth in governance.Warming Advantage 1. India and China override any gains that Western countries make- other countries wont model b/c of profit motiveMcardle 12 ( Megan, editor at The Atlantic, Why We Should Act to Stop Global Warmingand Why We Won't, 2/28/12, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/02/why-we-should-act-to-stop-global-warming-and-why-we-wont/253752/, HG)This for a set of targets that, from the planet's perspective, did roughly nothing to delay the onset of global warming. If it's this hard to make weak targets work, how are we going to get a global consensus for strong ones? Addressing global warming is the mother of all collective action problems. The reductions needed to avoid catastrophe are very sizeable, and they must occur across the globe. Yet fossil fuel resources are fungible. Oil that is not burned in the United States does not stay tidily in the ground; it gets shipped somewhere else, like China. This is especially true these days, when there's basically no spare capacity; close to every available barrel is being pumped. In this environment, lowering our oil consumption lowers the price, but not supply. This is a nice charitable gift to emerging nations, but the climate does not care whether the carbon comes from fat, disgusting Americans thundering around in their mongo SUVs, or soulful Indian peasants getting their first tractor. It will warm up, or not, just the same. And I've seen no evidence that the Chinese, or the Indians, plan to do much of anything to reduce their emissions in the near-term. They talk a bunch about green initiatives, which makes westerners all excited, but from what I can tell, their green initiatives with teeth are aimed at reducing their deadly, ubiquitous air pollution, not their carbon emissions. Oh, they may reduce the carbon intensity of their Gross Domestic Product as their economy upskills. But the United States is actually relatively carbon-efficient per dollar of GDP compared to China or India. It's just that we have a lot more dollars worth of GDP. For China to grow while merely holding its emissions steady--and their carbon output already surpasses ours and Canada's combined--then the improvement in carbon intensity will have to match their rate of growth. So far, this hasn't happened, and given that China has vast coal deposits that it's using to bring electricity to its citizens, it doesn't seem likely to in the near future. Yes, they've made a big investment in solar panel production . . . for export to rich countries that subsidize them. I'm not criticizing China or India, mind you--I'd be less than enthusiastic about a bunch of rich countries telling me that I wasn't allowed to get rich, too, because that would be bad for the planet. But I don't find the alternative--a one-for-one offset by the rich world--very plausible either. Energy is a key input into GDP. And note how cranky we've gotten about a fairly small and temporary reduction in our national income.2. Warming is irreversible regardless of CO2 emissions- even complete cessation does not solve.Solomon 08 Susan Solomon, Chemical Sciences Division, Earth System Research Laboratory, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Irreversible climate change due to carbon dioxide emissions, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Dec 16, 2008, Available at: http://www.pnas.org/content/106/6/1704.long, Accessed on: 7/17/2014, IJ) Over the 20th century, the atmospheric concentrations of key greenhouse gases increased due to human activities. The stated objective (Article 2) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is to achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a low enough level to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Many studies have focused on projections ofpossible 21st century dangers (13). However, the principles (Article 3) of the UNFCCC specifically emphasize threats of serious or irreversible damage, underscoring the importance of the longer term. While some irreversible climate changes such as ice sheet collapse are possible but highly uncertain (1,4), others can now be identified with greater confidence, and examples among the latter are presented in this paper. It is not generally appreciated that the atmospheric temperature increases caused by rising carbon dioxide concentrations are not expected to decrease significantly even if carbon emissions were to completely cease (57) (seeFig. 1). Future carbon dioxide emissions in the 21st century will hence lead to adverse climate changes on both short and long time scales that would be essentially irreversible (where irreversible is defined here as a time scale exceeding the end of the millennium in year 3000; note that we do not consider geo-engineering measures that might be able to remove gases already in the atmosphere or to introduce active cooling to counteract warming). For the same reason, the physical climate changes that are due to anthropogenic carbon dioxide already in the atmosphere today are expected to be largely irreversible. Such climate changes will lead to a range of damaging impacts in different regions and sectors, some of which occur promptly in association with warming, while others build up under sustained warming because of the time lags of the processes involved. Here we illustrate 2 such aspects of the irreversibly altered world that should be expected. These aspects are among reasons for concern but are not comprehensive; other possible climate impacts include Arctic sea ice retreat, increases in heavy rainfall and flooding, permafrost melt, loss of glaciers and snowpack with attendant changes in water supply, increased intensity of hurricanes, etc. A complete climate impacts review is presented elsewhere (8) and is beyond the scope of this paper. We focus on illustrative adverse and irreversible climate impacts for which 3 criteria are met: (i) observed changes are already occurring and there is evidence for anthropogenic contributions to these changes, (ii) the phenomenon is based upon physical principles thought to be well understood, and (iii) projections are available and are broadly robust across models.3. Turn/ the aff is not carbon neutraltheir projections only assume emissions and production from the algae itself without considering the spike in emissions from the carbon capture they claim reduce GHGs De Decker, Freelance Eco-Journalist and Manager/Creator of Low-Tech Magazine, 2008 (Kris, Low-Tech Magazine, Leave the algae alone, April 4th, 2008, http://www.lowtechmagazine.com/2008/04/algae-fuel-biof.html, accessed 7/23/14 bh@ddi) Several companies plan to hook up their production facilities to a fossil fuel energy plant, in order to capture the CO2 and nitrogen emissions and "feed" them to the algae. This method is hailed as a way of reducing greenhouse gases emitted by coal and gas plants, which is a ridiculous claim. It's very curious that this capturing technology is criticized when used in the context of "clean" coal, but applauded when it is used to make algal fuel. In both cases, capturing CO2 from smokestacks raises the energy use of the power plant by at least 20 percent. That not only makes the technology very expensive, it also means that more coal or gas has to be mined, transported and burned. Algal fuel can even be considered a worse idea than "clean" coal. In the "clean" coal strategy, at least the CO2 is captured with the intention to store it underground. In the case of algae, the CO2 is captured only with the intention to release in the air some time later, by a car engine. Last but not least, capturing CO2 from power plants ties algal fuel production to fossil fuels. If we switch to solar energy, where will the algal fuel producers get their CO2 from? Outsourcing energy use Again, are algae producers considering the extra use of energy that arises by the capture of the CO2 when they claim that algae can deliver 100 times more energy than first generation biofuels? This seems very doubtful. All these claims have one thing in common: they focus only on a small part of the total energy conversion chain.4. Converting algae to fuel is energy intensive, it isnt economically viable and their studies are small scale and idealChanakya, Principal Research Scientist at the Centre for Sustainable Technologies, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, 2012 (Hoysall, Sci Dev Net, Algal biofuels are no energy panacea, 11-6-12, http://www.scidev.net/global/biotechnology/opinion/-algal-biofuels-are-no-energy-panacea-.html, accessed 7-21-14, bh@ddi) Of late, there is heady euphoria over 'green' algal biofuels that are dangled as a panacea for developing countries such as India. While it is true that algal biofuels can contribute to a fossil fuel-free future, the promises of runaway successes are unrealistic. Scientists and policy makers need to address several critical issues that raise doubts over the sustainability of an extensive algal biofuel system. Do we need to re-learn sustainability lessons all over again in the light of first 'green revolution' which raised crop yields but left a trail of environment impacts? Sustainability criteria need to be spelt out before anyone claims breakthroughs in this field. All claims need to be demonstrated on appropriate field-scale sizes; and an authenticated overall energy and resource balance established. Such a filter will make awareness, research, action and policy elements more realistic, achievable, accountable and transparent. The spectre of more land, water, chemicals and pollution Algal cultivation, like crops, will need land, water, farmers, fertilisers, pesticides and weedicides. As it is, water-deficit India can barely meets it agricultural needs cumulative losses due to transpiration are 50-100 per cent higher than the rainfall. Producing 10 grams of algae per square metre from a water body daily will lead to a water loss of 10 litres and a conservative oil content of 20 per cent from the algae. So, producing a kilogram of algal oil will need 5,000 litres of water. A typical rainfed crop would function at a tenth to a fifth of this water use. All cultivable land in India is already under crops, and wastelands suitable for algae are sparse. Large-scale, high-density algal cultivation can be done simultaneously with constantly flooded paddy crop covering 20 million hectares. The sodic wastelands of Kachch in western India offer three million hectares and the coastal shelf a similar area. With urban wastewaters amounting to 40,000 million litres per day, the equivalent of 10 million hectares of dedicated cultivable area could be reached To produce one kilogram of algal fuel, one kilogram of naptha is needed for adequate nitrogen, tilting the energy balance to zero or negative Learning from agricultural crops especially paddy where nitrogen uptake efficiency is about 30 per cent achieving high nitrogen efficiency is difficult in a short time-frame. Raised simultaneously with flooded paddy, nutrients taken up by algae could be fed back to paddy fields, after extracting oil and biomethanation of the residue. As the nitrogen is in organic form, its losses are low and the overall efficiency could be high. However, this requires intensive farm nutrient management. In short, the problems of algal biofuel are akin to those of high-yielding agriculture. Taking the algal biofuel path would require India to double its area under cultivation, more than double its water budget and double its fertiliser use. This is unaffordable for Indias economy and environment. Contested productivity claims Algal productivity is widely contested. Most productivity data are derived from small-scale studies, with projections ranging between 18360 tonnes per hectare each year. The higher values arise from feeding sugar and providing light for 1824 hours daily to the algal system. Algal cultivation is likely to be in open pond systems where yields are likely to be in the range of 510 grams per square metre daily. The perceived higher yields in sterile monocultures in laboratories are difficult to replicate in the field where a host of algae feeders and algal competitors thrive. In typical fast-growing algal ponds, nearly 3040 per cent of the algal biomass is consumed by grazers and feeders. Studies show that in short growth cycles of 510 days lipid accumulation is at best a paltry 1015 per cent; and reaches 80 per cent in cycles beyond 30 days. It is misleading to multiply the highest lipid content of 80 per cent with the upper limit of yields of 360 tonnes per hectare per year (obtained by feeding sugar and artificial light at one to three per cent energy efficiency) to project a potential yield of 288 tonnes from every hectare each year. In the field, a potential oil yield in the range of three tonnes per hectare each year would be more realistic. And the energy and solvent needs for oil extraction operations are still unclear. Unless very efficient processes are evolved, algal biofuel extraction would have poor energy balance. Making algae ecologically competitive is something few understand. If we do not resolve the issues, we will end up with a system similar the current model of poorly sustainable, high-input agriculture, something that we don't need and would like to avoidGreen Leadership Advantage 1. The offense from the other advantages proves that they wouldnt solve enough warming to get other countries on board 2. 7 other countries are way too far ahead on algaeeven if the US gets on board it will be perceived as tagging along not leadership Williams, Biofuels reporeter, 2012 (John, interviewing Dr. Jose Olivares, head of the National Alliance for Advanced Biofuels and Bioproducts (this is who is talking in the card), Biofuelsdigest.com, Who's in the lead? Algae around the world,1/12/12, http://www.biofuelsdigest.com/bdigest/2012/01/12/whos-in-the-lead-algae-around-the-world/, accessed 7/27/14 bh@ddi) India India has a long history of working with algae, but mostly as a nutritional source or for wastewater treatment. They are trying to develop those areas into a biofuels industry to some extent. In fact, India and the United States have cooperated in the establishment of a funding opportunity for the development of biofuels in general, whether it is algae or cellulosic or some other energy plant that has yet to be determined. That funding opportunity is in development process and promises to put nearly a million and a half to two million dollars per year for research and development of biofuels in each country. I think India is a force to contend with because of their long history with algae, but at this point they are trying to determine out how best to enter into the biofuels industry. We are very fortunate, from a NAABB perspective, to be partnering with Reliance Industries Limited, which is one of the largest petrochemical companies in the world and is located in India. They have two of the worlds largest refineries and they are in the top 20 petrochemical producers in the world. Reliance Industries is in the process of developing a strategy for biofuels and algae biofuels in particular. We are very privileged to be partnering with them in developing this strategy. Japan Japan has had an even longer history than most countries in developing algae for commercial purposes, mostly macroalgae, for nutritional sources and food sources. They have also had a top phycological society and are very active in prospecting for new species of algae. The Japanese probably have some of the top researchers in the world looking at species such as Botryococcus braunii. Much of this research is concentrated at the University of Tsukuba. There, they have actually identified a new species of algae that grows very, very fast and has fairly good oil productivity. Its very consistent and very fast growing in large numbers, so its overall productivity looks promising for the biofuels industry. NEDO (New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization), which manages government, industry, and academic based energy research in Japan, is helping fund a few algae projects. With the University of Tsukuba and several other companies, they have formed a small consortium of industry leaders to push forward with the research and development of algae for biofuels. It is a fairly sizable effort overall, but you can point it to a few institutions. China Within China, I went to visit the Qingdao Institute for Bioenergy and Biotechnology. The institute was founded to help the region around Qingdao develop a bioenergy infrastructure and they are well on their way to doing that. Within the last three years, they have put together an institute with about 200 researchers. It is kind of amazing to see the research power that theyve been able to muster in that very short time. The Chinese have a few projects in algae and we are, again, very fortunate within the NAABB to be partners. We are collaborating with Dr. Jian Xu in the sequencing and the annotation and analysis of Nannochloropsis salina strain 1776 which we are also sequencing here at Los Alamos. This collaboration also involves NMSU and Solix Biosystems which played a key role in developing our collaboration. Another entity in China working in the algae industry is ENN, they have been developing some interests in photobioreactor-based systems for carbon sequestration and the development of algae for biofuels and bioproducts. This project looks like it is starting to take off, and they are well on their way with some test pilot units already developed. Taiwan Taiwan is very similar to China. There is a very large steel plant in southern Taiwan, the Chinese Steel Corporation in Tungkang. One of the largest steel plants in the world with sizable CO2 emissions. This plant is collaborating with the National Cheng Kung University to develop a photobioreactor sequestration system for CO2. The Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) itself is actually working very closely with Taiwanese universities in transformation of algae, photobioreactor systems, belt screen based harvesting technologies and supercritical extraction systems. NAABB, through Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, has recently entered into a research collaboration with ITRI in new membrane technologies for harvesting systems. Overall, this is a significant effort for a very small country. Australia Australia has been in the news for quite some time and has been developing quite an industrial interest in algae. Muradel, a small company forming in Adelaide and in Karratha (from a joint venture between Murdoch U., Adelaide Research and Innovation Pty Ltd and SQC Pty Ltd) is developing a small 10 acre facility and currently has about two acres under development. Additionally, Aurora Algae has started developing some facilities in Karratha, and MBD Energy is active in Queensland. The University of Sydney is developing a number of technologies for the conversion of biomass into oils, in particular their hydrothermal liquefaction capabilities look very promising for algae. The Australian government recently announced a $23/ton carbon tax, which will be reinvested in renewable energy development. This will make about $23 B available for new developments. Much of the effort will be managed through the Clean Energy Finance Corporation and the Australian Biofuels Research Institute. Of course, we have all seen the interest from airlines such as Qantas and Virgin Air, and airplane manufacturer Boeing, in the Australian bioenergy initiatives. All of this is a very, very nice level of development from Australia. Europe There are four new algae projects being funded by the European Union. Three of them are located in Spain. Specifically, I visited the Repsol Innovation Center in Madrid and University of Alicante. Repsol is a large Spanish petrochemical interested in the development of biofuels. Repsol has a number of algae projects developing around Spain, including at the Univeristy of Alicante. Their research is looking at plastics for photobioreactors, greenhouse containment systems, strain selection, photobioreactor design, and fuel conversion. At the U. of Alicante I was particularly interested in their work with hydrothermal liquefaction technologies. Of course, there has also been great work by Rene Wijffels at Wageningen University in the Netherlands, in understanding different types of photobiorector systems and cultivation systems for the European-type environment. There are also some efforts in other countries like Greece and Italy, but overall, Spain seems to be the one leading the development of the algae industry in Europe. A nice, new technology just emerged out of a company called Evodos looking at a new centrifugal technology that is very low energy and fairly well developed. They are already being looked at very heavily by a lot of commercial entities and some research institutions. They have three different sized systems, from a research and development system to systems that can be taken out into the field for harvesting algae very, very quickly up to twenty thousand liters per hour flow rates for their largest systems. Israel and Korea Weve heard quite a bit from Israel who has had a long history in developing nutraceuticals and now are using their photobioreactor systems mostly for biofuels. This development has come primarily out of Ben-Gurion University. In fact, Ami Ben-Amotz and his company Seambiotic are just starting to develop a new facility in China for algal biofuels, from technology they developed in Israel. Korea recently started the Advanced Biomass R&D Center (ABC) a consortium of universities, institutes and industry funded the Korea Ministry of Education, Science and Technology with an investment of more than $200 M over nine years. This consortium will work to develop a number of new algae and cellulosic based biofuels technologies. NAABB partners, primarily led by Brooklyn College and Los Alamos National Laboratory, will be collaborating with ABC in algae strain selection and development.3. Obama is pushing for clean tech now affs not keyMeltzer 14--Fellow in Global Economy and Development, Brookings Institution, and adjunct professor at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies. This article follows in part upon the authors earlier article. Joshua Meltzer, [Joshua, A CARBON TAX AS A DRIVER OF GREEN TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE,ALLIANCE21, http://www.alliance21.org.au/about/people/joshua-meltzer, Apr. 12, 2014, accessed 7/18/14]RMTThe EPA finding that CO2 from mobile sources endangers public health and welfare triggered a requirement under the Clean Air Act (CAA) to regulate CO2 emissions from stationary sources. 91 EPA has proposed that as part of the permitting process for a proposal to construct or operate new and modified stationary sources emitting at least 75,000 tons per year of CO2 emissions, there must be a demonstration that the applicant is using the best available control technology (BACT) to limit its emissions.92 What constitutes BACT would be assessed on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the commercial viability and availability of the technologies for reducing GHG emissions.93 In the near term, BACT is unlikely to require adopting technologies such as carbon capture and sequestration that have yet to be technically and economically proven and instead will drive a transition toward energy efficient technologies. Most recently, in September 2013, the EPA proposed new source performance standards (NSPS) for CO2 emissions from fossil fuel-fired power plants with separate standards for natural gas and coal-fired units.94 Under these proposed standards, CO2 emissions from new (and modified) fossil fuel-fired plants will be limited to 1,100lb CO2 per megawatt-hour (CO2/MWh). 95 And as coal plants emit on average 1,800lb CO2/MWh, only coal plants with (at least partial) CCS will meet this standard.96 Moreover, regulating new sources of CO2 emissions requires the EPA to also regulate existing sources.97 President Obama has directed EPA to develop standards for existing sources of CO 2 by 2016. 98 As this discussion demonstrates, most U.S. climate change policies involve technology-push measures. The EIA table above illustrates the United States bias toward technology-push measures and includes U.S. spending on R&D, loan guarantees, and tax credits for suppliers of renewable energy projects. Additionally, the increased fuel efficiency standards that apply to vehicle manufacturers and proposed new CO standards for stationary sources also operate as technologypush incentives. 2 That said, not all U.S. climate change policy seeks to encourage the innovation and production of green technologies through supply-side policies. There are some demand-pull measures though these are piecemeal and mostly at the state level, such as Californias cap and trade system. 99 For the reasons outlined above, a more comprehensive demand-pull measure such as a federal carbon tax would, in addition to reflecting the environmental externalities of carbon, induce greater innovation and thereby complement the range of technology-push measures already in place. 4. Turn - Hegemony causes econ collapse, backlash, and foreign overstretch only retreat is sustainablePosen 13 [Barry R., Jan/Feb 2013, Foreign Affairs, Pull Back, Vol. 92, Issue 1, Academic Search Complete, accessed 7/2/13]To this end, the U.S. government has expanded its sprawling Cold War-era network of security commitments and military bases. It has reinforced its existing alliances, adding new members to NATO and enhancing its security agreement with Japan.