CHINA CO-OP 1NC

China Co-Op 1NC TRI 20111/17 Shree and Akil

Topicality

A) Interpretation: Affirmatives must increase the presence of the United States in Earth beyond the Earth’s mesosphere in either exploration or development activities.

Its is possessive and exclusive, which excludes cooperation as a mandate of the plan.English Grammar 5 (Glossary of English Grammar Terms, http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)

Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership. EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)

Grammatically, this refers solely to U.S.; any other interpretation makes interpretation impossible. Manderino 73 (Justice – Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, “Sigal, Appellant, v. Manufacturers Light and Heat Co”., No. 26, Jan. T., 1972, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 450 Pa. 228; 299 A.2d 646; 1973 Pa. LEXIS 600; 44 Oil & Gas Rep. 214, Lexis)On its face, the written instrument granting easement rights in this case is ambiguous. The same sentence which refers to the right to lay a 14 inch pipeline (singular) has a later reference to "said lines" (plural). The use of the plural "lines" makes no sense because

the only previous reference has been to a "line" (singular). The writing is additionally ambiguous because other key words

which are "also may change the size of its pipes" are dangling in that the possessive pronoun "its" before the word

"pipes" does not have any subject preceding, to which the possessive pronoun refers. The dangling phrase is the beginning of a sentence, the first word of which does not begin with a capital letter as is customary in normal English [***10] usage. Immediately preceding the "sentence" which does not begin with a capital letter, there appears a dangling [*236] semicolon which makes no sense at the beginning of a sentence and can hardly relate to the preceding sentence which is

already properly punctuated by a closing period. The above deviations from accepted grammatical usage make difficult, if not impossible, a clear understanding of the words used or the intention of the parties. This is particularly true concerning the meaning of a disputed phrase in the instrument which states that the grantee is to pay damages from ". . . the relaying, maintaining and operating said pipeline. . . ." The instrument is ambiguous as to what the words ". . . relaying . . . said pipeline . . ." were intended to mean.

B) Violation: The plan increases cooperation with China OVER space, but does not increase United States exploration or development OF space.

And, the ISS is not development or exploration; it is a space operation.The 2010 National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act (P.L. 111-267) 2010

(http://legislative.nasa.gov/PL%20111-267.pdf)There are authorized to be appropriated to NASA for fiscal year 2013, $19,960,000,000, as follows: (1)

For Exploration , $5,264,000,000, of which— (A) $1,400,000,000 shall be for a multi-purpose crew vehicle and associated program and other necessary support; (B) $2,640,000,000 shall be for Space Launch System and associated program and other necessary support ; (C) $449,000,000 shall be for Exploration Technology Development; (D) $175,000,000 shall be for Human Research ; (E) $500,000,000 shall be for commercial crew capabilities; and (F) $100,000,000 shall be for Robotic Precursor Instruments and Low-Cost Missions. (2) For Space Operations , $4,253,300,000, of which—

(A) $3,129,400,000 shall be for the ISS operations and crew/cargo support ; and

(B) $1,123,900,000 shall be for Space and Flight Serv- ices, of which $400,000,000 shall be directed toward the NASA launch support and infrastructure modernization program . (3) For Science , $5,509,600,000, of which— (A) $2,089,500,000 shall be for Earth Sciences; (B) $1,591,200,000 shall be for Planetary Science; (C) $1,149,100,000 shall be for Astrophysics; and (D) $679,800,000 shall be for Heliophysics. (4) For Aeronautics, $1,105,000,000, of which— (A) $590,000,000

shall be for Aeronautics Research; and (B) $515,000,000 shall be for Space Technology. (5) For Education , $145,700,000, of which— (A) $25,000,000 shall be for the Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research; and (B) $45,600,000 shall be

for the Space Grant program. (6) For Cross-Agency Support Programs , $3,276,800,000. (7) For Construction and Environmental Compliance and Restoration, $366,900,000. (8) For Inspector General, $38,700,000.

http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/noun.html

http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/pronoun.html

http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html


C) Vote neg:

1) Limits: Allowing affirmatives to cooperate multiplies the number of topical affs by 180, which is unpredictable and unresearchable.2) Ground: The aff can claim unpredictable link turns to all our off case positions including unpredictable add-ons, destroying 1NC offense.3) Effects: While the plan may result in topical action, it only mandates cooperation. Effects Topicality is an independent voter for fairness because it allows the aff to claim unpredictable advantages off the initial plan action while gutting all link ground to the resolution. 4) Vote neg on presumption: the affirmative can’t fiat the cooperation of another country, which means there is no guarantee of plan passage.

D) Evaluate topicality under a framework of competing interpretations.


Counterplan

Text: The United States federal government should publicly announce and end reconnaissance flights along the Chinese borders and arms sales to Taiwan.

It solves. Their own author believes it ratchets down our national security concerns with ChinaPan, PhD in Political Science and International Relations and member of the International Studies Association, in ‘4 [Chengxin Pan: ―The "China threat" in American self -imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics‖, Alternatives]Clearly, the practical implications of this kind of representation go far beyond that. After perceiving a power imbalance in the Taiwan Strait in favor of China, James Lilley (former U.S. ambassador to China) and Carl Ford proposed: "The name of the game for Taiwan, then, is deterrence," which means that the United States must help Taiwan's military maintain "a qualitative edge over the PRC." (81) The 2002 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Security Review Commission reached similar conclusions, recommending, among other things, "deterring China attacking Taiwan" and "supporting Taiwan's ability to defend itself without

outside assistance." In its formal conclusion, the review commission, made up of well-known U.S. China experts as well as influential policymakers, vows to continue monitoring China in every aspect relating to "our national security concerns." (82) In fact, U.S. monitoring activity, such as conducting reconnaissance flights along Chinese borders, had always been part of its China policy. So went the rationale: The Chinese say they have the right to use force to reclaim Taiwan because it belongs to them, and

they regularly practice for an invasion. This threat of force is why on April 1st [2001], the U.S. Navy's EP-3 surveillance plane was in the area to monitor China's military preparations. (83) Yet it turned out that the EP-3 spy plane collided with a Chinese navy fighter jet that was tailing it over the South China Sea, some fifty miles from the coast of China's Hainan Province. The Chinese jet crashed into the waters below, while the crippled spy plane landed on Hainan island. Washington demanded immediate return of its crew and plane, while Beijing insisted that the United States bear the responsibility for the midair collision and apologize for the incident. Rather than reflecting on how their new containment policy might have contributed to this incident in the first place, many U.S. realist analysts hastily interpreted it as further objective proof of the long-suspected "China threat." As Allen S. Whiting put it, the collision "focused attention anew on Beijing's willingness to risk the use of force in pursuit of political objectives." (84) It was as if the whole incident had little to do with U.S. spying, which was seen as "routine" and "normal." Instead, it was the Chinese who were said to be "playing a dangerous game," without regard to the old spy etiquette formulated during the Cold War. (85) For other observers, China's otherness was embodied also in its demand for a U.S. apology. For example, Merle Goldman, a history professor at Boston University, said that the Chinese emphasis on apologies was rooted in the Confucian value system: "This kind of internalized consensus was the way China was ruled for thousands of years." (86) From this perspective, China's request for an apology was preordained by a fixed Chinese tradition and national psyche and had nothing whatsoever to do with the specific context of this incident in which China was spied on, its sovereignty violated, and one of its pilots lost. Thus, even in the face of such a potentially explosive incident, the self-fulfilling effect of the "China threat" discourse has not

been acknowledged by mainstream U.S. China analysts. To the contrary, deterring and containing China has gained new urgency. For example, in the aftermath of this standoff, neoconservative columnists Robert Kagan and William Kristol (chairman of the Project for the New American Century) wrote that "not only is the sale of Aegis [to Taiwan] ... the only appropriate

response to Chinese behavior; We have been calling for the active containment of China for the past six years precisely because we think it is the only way to keep the peace." (87) Although the sale of the Aegis destroyers was

deferred, President George W. Bush approved an arms package for Taiwan that included so-called "defensive" weapons such as four Kidd class destroyers, eight diesel submarines, and twelve P-3C submarine-hunting aircraft, as well as minesweeping helicopters, torpedoes, and amphibious assault vehicles. On this arms sale, David Shambaugh, a Washington-based China specialist, had this to say: "Given the tangible threats that the Chinese military can present to Taiwan--particularly a naval blockade or quarantine and missile threats--this is a sensible and timely package." (88)


Politics

DREAM Act Will Pass – Despite Previous Failures, Momentum is Rolling Over for a Final Push Parti, 2k11. (Tarini Parti, Works at OpenSecrets.org, Center for Responsive Politics. ―Activists Push for DREAM Act (Again), Obama Woos Bundlers and More in Capital Eye Opener: June 29‖ June 29, 2011.Online http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/06/your-daily-dose-of-news-37.html [KC])

SENATE HOLDS FIRST HEARING ON DREAM ACT: Advocates of White House-endorsed immigration reform legislation called the ―DREAM Act ‖ may still be scrambling for support in Congress. But on Tuesday, backers of the measure scored a small victory. A renewed push for the passage of this decade-old proposal, which would provide a conditional path to citizenship for illegal immigrants who were brought to the United

States as minors, led to the first ever Senate hearing on the bill. Education Secretary Arne Duncan and Homeland

Security Secretary Janet Napolitano attended the hearing to show their support for the act. Immigration activists on both sides of the issue have lobbied Congress and several government agencies, and spent hundreds of thousands of dollars, in recent years. (It‘s impossible to know how much money was specifically spent lobbying on

the DREAM Act, since organizations are not by law required to attach a dollar figure to a specific lobbying campaign.) But during the first quarter of 2011 alone, 216 separate corporations, unions or special interest groups lobbied on immigration-related bills, including the DREAM Act -- notable, since 329 entities lobbied on immigration issues in all of 2010. Lobbying data for the second quarter, which is expected to be released in mid-July, will provide an even better picture of the recent efforts made by groups focused on immigration reform. Groups such as the National Council of La Raza and the National Immigration Forum both spent more than $400,000 on lobbying in

favor of the Dream Act and other pro-immigrant rights bills in 2010, according to the Center for Responsive Politics' research. Despite their efforts, the Dream Act narrowly failed to pass the Senate in late 2010. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid reintroduced the bill in May, and the White House is working with Democrats in Congress to garner support for the legislation this time around.

Massive Opposition Against China Cooperation – And This Link Independently Turns Case – Causes Rollback Whittington, 2k11. (Mark Whittington, Yahoo News, ―White House and Congress Clash Over NASA Funding, Space Cooperation with China‖ http://old.news.yahoo.com/s/ac/20110508/pl_ac/8438927_white_house_and_congress_clash_over_nasa_funding_space_cooperation_with_china, online. [AMD])

Another indication that President Barack Obama's 2012 NASA funding request was in trouble occurred when at a hearing of the House Appropriations commerce, justice, science subcommittee on May 3. White House science czar John Holdren came under some sharp questioning by Rep. Frank Wolf chairman of the subcommittee. The questioning revolved around the belief by Wolf that the administration is short changing the development of a heavy lift launcher and the Orion spacecraft that congress views as vital for the long term human exploration of space. The priorities of the administration include subsidies to commercial space firms, Earth science, and technology development. Wolf also questioned why NASA has not gotten a request for an increase of funding, even though some other science oriented agencies have gotten such requests. According to the

account of the hearings on Space News, Wolf did not find Holdren's answers to be satisfactory. That suggests that there will be a renewed clash between the congress and the White House on space policy. The clash is not limited to funding and of space policy priorities. Space News also reports that the following day, on May 4, Holdren told members of the subcommittee that cooperation with China is seen as critical for prospects for long term space exploration, such as to Mars. This, mildly speaking, was not welcome news to members of the subcommittee. The problem is that China is currently ruled by a tyrannical regime that violates the human rights of its own people and is engaged in an imperial drive toward super power status at the expense of the United States. Congress has, in fact, passed a law prohibiting most forms of space and science cooperation with the People's Republic of China. The distrust Congress holds toward the administration where it comes to space policy is palatable. Members of Congress have expressed the view

that NASA is slow walking the heavy lift launcher. Many are also pretty sure that the White House is trying to circumnavigate the law and is trying to find ways to cooperate with China despite the law. All of this points to the very real possibility that congress will use the power of the purse to restrict White House space policy options and to impose its own will on the future direction of NASA and space exploration. That this clash is happening at all is a direct result of a series of political


blunders made by the administration dating back to the cancellation of the Constellation space exploration program and a lack of leadership on the part of the president.

Political Capital is Key to the DREAM Act Famuyde, 11(Joesph Famuyde,Immigration Lawyer,"Good news, the Dream Act is back in Congress",http://lawyerfamuyide.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=78:good-news-the-dream-act-is-back-in-congress-&catid=37:immigration-articles&Itemid=59, June 6, 2011. [AC])

On the 11th day of May 2011, The Dream Act returned to Congress to mark the 10th year anniversary of the

introduction of the bill in 2001. Hopefully, our political leaders will have enough courage this time to pass the bill into law for the betterment and the future prosperity of the United States of America. The United States of America is known for justice, equality and compassion. In America, the innocents are not punished for the sins of the guilty. All the prospective beneficiaries of the Dream Act are innocent children brought to the United States illegally by their parents without their consent. Some of them are very frustrated because of their inability to realize their full potentials. Some won scholarships that they could not use. They are treated as second class citizens among their pairs. Something

needs to be done. With the recent political capital earned by President Barack Obama with the killing of the terror chief of the world, I believe the time is ripe for the current administration to push the Dream Act and spend part of the political capital on the immigrants to guarantee the reelection of the President for a second term. On May 11, 2011, The Dream Act was introduced by

Senators Dick Durbin, Harry Reid, Menendez, and 30 others to the delight of all immigrants. According to Senator Dick Durbin, the Assistant Senate Majority Leader ―Our immigration laws prevent thousands of young people from fully contributing to our nation‘s future. These young people have lived in this country for most of their lives. It is the only home they know. They are Americans in every sense except their technical legal status, they are honor roll students, star athletes, talented artists and valedictorians. These children are tomorrow‘s doctors, nurses, teachers, policemen, firefighters, soldiers, and senators,

and we should give them the opportunity to reach their full potential.‖ Senator Majority Leader Harry Reid also opined that ―The DREAM Act will give children brought to this nation by their parents through no fault of their own – children who in

many cases have known no other country – the opportunity to earn legal status. Only those who stay in school and out of trouble, and who go on to college or to defend our country in the armed forces would be eligible. Allowing these students to

become productive citizens is not only good for them – it makes economic sense, would reduce our deficit by $2.2 billion in a decade and would strengthen our military and national security,‖ While Senator Menendez said "We should not punish children for their parents‘ past decisions. The students who would be helped by the DREAM Act did not make the decision to enter this country in an undocumented fashion. They've followed the rules, worked hard in school and now they want to serve this country in the military or get a higher education. Equally important, they love the United States, the only home many of them have known, and should be permitted to continue here in pursuit of the American Dream,‖ The Dream Act is about children brought to the United States legally or illegally before the age of sixteen. A large chunk of the estimated 12 million undocumented aliens in the United States today are these children who after completing High School or College currently face the reality of their illegal status. The Country they grew up knowing as home now draws a line and set barriers to their ability to fulfill their dream of being useful to humanity. In summary, the Dream Act when passed will provide illegal aliens who entered the United States before the age of sixteen with conditional permanent resident status which will be valid for six years. To remove the conditional status, the alien will be given opportunity to meet certain requirements within six years which include amongst others that ―the alien has demonstrated good moral character during the entire period the alien has been a conditional permanent resident.‖ The alien must not abandon the alien's residence in the United States. The Secretary shall presume that the alien has abandoned such residence if the alien is absent from the United States for more than 365 days, in the aggregate, during the period of conditional residence, unless the alien demonstrates that alien has not abandoned the alien's residence. An alien who is absent from the United States due to active service in the uniformed services has not abandoned the alien's residence in the United States during the period of such service. The alien must have completed at least 1 of the following: (i) The alien has acquired a degree from an institution of higher education in the United States or has completed at least 2 years, in good standing, in a program for a bachelor's degree or higher degree in the United States. (ii) The alien has served in the uniformed services for at least 2 years and, if discharged, has received an honorable discharge. The alien has provided a list of all of the secondary educational institutions that

the alien attended in the United States. Expect the Dream Act to become law some day. Hopefully it is now.

DREAM Act is a Stepping Stone to Ending the Exclusion of Immigrants Annand, 2007. (Katie Annand, JD at Hastings College of Law, Still Waiting for the DREAM: The Injustice of Punishing Undocumented Immigrant Students, http://uchastings.edu/hlj/Archive/vol59/Annand_59-HLJ-683.pdf, online. [AMD])

The exclusion of undocumented immigrant students from institutions of higher education not only

damages the future psychological and economic well-being of these students, but it also negatively affects society as a whole. Undocumented students are valuable and functioning


members of society whose immigration status, not lack of work ethic or motivation, excludes them from achieving the same goals as their classmates and peers. They have strong ties to family members in the United States, both

citizens and non-citizens, and they have the potential to make significant societal and economic contributions. Education is the primary means of success in the United States, and blocking this channel for undocumented students not only unjustifiably punishes them, but it also stratifies society.168 Furthermore, undocumented students are members of our community, whether or not opponents of the DREAM Act accept this view. These students will continue to be a part of the United States; their presence is a

reality that restrictions in higher education will not alter. Why suffocate a vibrant, talented, motivated group in society who will be an integral part of the country‘s future? Supporting the educational and professional achievements of undocumented students can only benefit the country, fully

integrating a group of young people who consider themselves American and who hope to continue contributing positively to society.169 Current federal laws punish undocumented students for the decisions of their

parents. In addition, the merging of criminal law and immigration law further frames innocent undocumented youth as criminals. Nevertheless, there is no justification to punish undocumented students under popular theories of punishment. The DREAM Act is a remedy to the unjustified punishment of undocumented youth. The Act must be enacted to address the pressing needs of

thousands of undocumented students living in the United States who aspire to attend an institution of higher education but are still waiting to achieve that dream.

We Must End the Pre-Dominant Strategy of Deportation – Only Offering a Strategy for Immigrants to Enter Society Prevents the Letting Die of Populations Walters, 2k. (William Walters, Professor of Political Science @ Carelton Univ. Citizenship Studies. Volume 6. Number 3.) Another way we can trace this governmentalization of deportation is around the question of foreign or alien workers. As states became involved in the regulation of labour markets and the management of economies in the twentieth century, deportation found economic uses that paralleled its social purposes. Here deportation was to function as the corollary of immigration policy and the supplement to voluntary emigration. If immigration policy was often driven by the need to recruit ‗migrant‘ labour from abroad, deportation was used to regulate and enforce the return of these temporary hands during times of economic downturn. This use of deportation é rst became clearly evident during the interwar depression when France, a state that had traditionally relied upon immigration to meet labour shortages,

and to a lesser extent Belgium, used deportation as a means of ‗exporting their unemployment‘ (Arendt, 1964,

p. 286; Strikwerda, 1997, p. 63). But deportation is more than just a form of police that operates on a national population. Here I want to argue for a second and potentially more signié cant dimension to the police character of deportation. It is that we should see the deportation of aliens as a form of the internationa l police of population.12 Seen from a national, or purely internal perspective deportation appears as the exclusion and expulsion of aliens and ‗the uninvited‘; it stands as an expression of

the hierarchical relationship between citizens on the one hand with full rights, and aliens or denizens on the other, or the ways in which states discriminate against non-citizens and outsiders. But seen from an international perspective, deportation represents the compulsory allocation of subjects to their proper sovereigns, or, in many instances of statelessness, to other surrogate sovereigns (for example, the current practice of returning certain asylum-seekers to ‗safe third countries‘). In the face of patterns of international migration, deportation serves to sustain the image of a world divided into ‗national‘ populations and territories, domiciled in terms of state membership. It operates in relation to a wider regime of practices including resettlement, voluntary return, political asylum, temporary protection and so on, which together can be said to comprise a global police of population. Extradition belongs to this series as well, though extradition is in certain respects the inverse of deportation—a recognition of the sovereign‘s claim to have their subjects returned for the application of justice. Following Hindess, we can see citizenship in a different light. Less ‗the rights and responsibilitie s accruing to individuals by virtue of their membership of an appropriate polity‘ but rather ‗a marker of identié cation, advising state and nonstate agencies of the particular state

to which an individual belongs‘ (Hindess, 2000, p. 1487). [WALTERS CONTINUES…] I have discussed deportation as a form of international police that seeks to divide and distribute population on a global basis, and which presupposes the idea of citizenship as a marker of belonging within the state system. As it stands, however, this account of deportation as international police and, more generally, in terms of sovereign and governmental power, is seriously incomplete. For the most controversial and troubling forms of deportation are not usually the return of nationals to their ‗home‘ states. Rather, they have involved the stateless, the refugee, the German Jew or Russian denationalized and stripped of citizenship, the refugees who, in desperate circumstances, have destroyed their own citizenship papers, and today the rejected asylum-seeker. The fact is that when deportation has featured in these cases it goes hand in hand with the camp. Practices of deportation need to be seen in relation to a wider incarceral archipelago of detention centres, refugee camps and zones d’attente.… But in addition to defining a space of emergency in which particular exceptional modes of treatment become normal, the camp


represents a crisis of Western politics and citizenship. It signals a sort of surplus of ‗bare life‘ that can no

longer be contained within the political order of nation-states : ‗what we call camp is this disjunction ‘ (p. 175). In the absence of a working cosmopolitan model of citizenship, or other ways of organizing and distributing rights, belongings, and identities, and with the menacing growth of a politics of xenophobia and racism that encourages publics to see the presence of refugees and aliens as threats to their freedom, culture, and security, we have the camps—we have border zones, detention centres, holding areas, a panoply of partitions, segregations and striations. The é gure of the refugee reveals that the Rights of Man that become ours ‗naturally‘ through birth, are in actual fact partial, provisional and inadequate. The camps stand as a sign of the rupture of the state–people– territory complex, but also the permanently-temporary attempt to suture it. The dream of the perfect prison, of the school and other disciplinary spaces was the production of a docile useful body, and a self-regulating, interiorized citizen. However, the diagram of the camp does not presuppose a comparable, positive kind of subjectivity . Rather, its logic is one of expedience and exemption. It is not interested in projects of reform, so much as countering the dangerous ‗illegal‘ global è ows of impoverished humanity. If, following Giovanna Procacci (1991, p. 161), the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were transé xed by a fear of pauperism, with its dangerous ‗è uid, elusive sociality, impossible either to control or to utilize‘, and if the governmental response included the great strategies of ‗territorial sedentarization‘ in order to produce ‗é xed concentrations of population‘ (for example, anti-vagabondage laws, the poor law, and later, public housing), then camps and deportations represent components of a contemporary sedentarization campaign which operates in relation to a local–global space. The camp delivers surplus humanity into a zone of indistinction , invoking a near permanent state of emergency to place its subjects indeé nitely ‗on hold‘ on the edge of the juridical order—all so

that the sovereign system of states and its division of citizens to states can be re-established. Here surplus humanity is caught in the cross-currents between the police and immigration authorities and their moves to extra-judicial and arbitrary treatment, and the countermovements of the human-rights and immigrants-right s groups who protest such forms of treatment. The camp is extraterritorial, in the sense that it can stand outside the legal and juridical order, but also intensely territorial to the point where the territorial regime of citizenship becomes dependent upon these exceptions if it is to sustain the principle that all the world‘s population can be ascribed a ‗country‘. Yet if the camp is quite different from the disciplinary spaces which Foucault and others associate with modernity, it has at least one thing in common. Like the workhouse or the prison, the camp is to be highly symbolic; its harshness stands as a ‗semio-technique ‘ (Dean, 1991, pp. 184– 5; Foucault, 1977, pp. 93–103) of deterrence, a signal that ‗our‘ immigration systems are not a ‗soft touch‘.


Capitalism

The exploration and development of space is smoke screen for the expansion of capitalism, a short-term solution to economic and societal crisis on Earth. The militarization of space leading to space wars over resources and the development of markets in the cosmos is an inevitable consequence of the aff.Dickens, teaches at the Universities of Brighton and Cambridge, UK, in ‘10[Peter, “The Humanization of the Cosmos—To What End?”, Monthly Review, Vol. 62 No. 6, http://monthlyreview.org/2010/11/01/the-humanization-of-the-cosmos-to-what-end]Instead of indulging in over-optimistic and fantastic visions, we should take a longer, harder, and more critical look at what is happening and what is likely to happen. We can then begin taking a more measured view of space humanization, and start developing more progressive alternatives. At this point, we must return to the deeper, underlying processes which are at the heart of the capitalist economy and society, and which are generating this demand for expansion into outer space. Although the humanization of the cosmos is clearly a new and exotic development, the social relationships and mechanisms underlying space-humanization are very familiar. In the early twentieth century, Rosa Luxemburg argued that an “outside” to capitalism is important for two main reasons. First, it is needed as a means of creating massive numbers of new customers who would buy the goods made in the capitalist countries.7

As outlined earlier, space technology has extended and deepened this process, allowing an increasing number of people to become integral to the further expansion of global capitalism. Luxemburg’s second reason for imperial expansion is the search for cheap supplies of labor and raw materials. Clearly, space fiction fantasies about aliens aside, expansion into the cosmos offers no benefits to capital in the form of fresh sources of labor power.8 But expansion into the cosmos does offer prospects for exploiting new materials such as those in asteroids, the moon, and

perhaps other cosmic entities such as Mars. Neil Smith’s characterization of capital’s relations to nature is useful at this point.

The reproduction of material life is wholly dependent on the production and reproduction of surplus value. To this end, capital stalks the Earth in search of material resources; nature becomes a universal means of production in the sense that it not only provides the subjects, objects and instruments of production, but is also in its totality an appendage to the production process…no part of the Earth’s surface, the atmosphere, the oceans, the geological substratum or the biological superstratum are immune from transformation by capital.9 Capital is now also “stalking” outer space in the search for new resources and raw materials. Nature on a cosmic scale now seems likely to be incorporated into production processes, these being located mainly on earth. Since Luxemburg wrote, an increasing number of political economists have argued that the importance of a capitalist “outside” is not so much that of creating a new pool of customers or of finding new resources.10 Rather, an outside is needed as a zone into which surplus capital can be invested.

Economic and social crisis stems less from the problem of finding new consumers, and more from that of finding, making, and exploiting zones of profitability for surplus capital. Developing “outsides” in this way is also a product of recurring crises, particularly those of declining economic profitability. These crises are followed by attempted “fixes” in distinct geographic regions. The word “fix” is used here both literally and

figuratively. On the one hand, capital is being physically invested in new regions. On the other hand, the attempt is to fix capitalism’s crises. Regarding the latter, however, there are, of course, no absolute guarantees that such fixes will really correct an essentially unstable social and economic system. At best, they are short-term solutions.

The kind of theory mentioned above also has clear implications for the humanization of the cosmos. Projects for the colonization of outer space should be seen as the attempt to make new types of “spatial fix,” again in response to economic, social, and environmental crises on earth. Outer space will be

“globalized,” i.e., appended to Earth, with new parts of the cosmos being invested in by competing nations and companies. Military power will inevitably be made an integral part of this process, governments protecting the zones for which they are responsible. Some influential commentators argue that the current problem for capitalism is that there is now no “outside.”11 Capitalism is everywhere. Similarly, resistance to

capitalism is either everywhere or nowhere. But, as suggested above, the humanization of the cosmos seriously questions these assertions. New “spatial fixes” are due to be opened up in the cosmos, capitalism’s emergent outside. At first, these will include artificial fixes such as satellites, space stations, and space hotels. But during the next twenty years or so, existing outsides, such as the moon and Mars, will begin attracting investments. The stage would then be set for wars in outer space between nations and companies attempting to make their own cosmic “fixes.”

The aff cannot hide behind their good intentions – our argument is structural. The plan doesn’t take place in the vacuum of space itself, but in the political economy of the status quo, in which NASA represents massive corporate interests who over


determine the way that plan is executed. They bloat the budgets of the same space-industrial complex that will ensure that the aff becomes a marketing strategy or a new resource pool. Martin Parker, University of Leicester School of Management, 2009 [“Capitalists in Space,” The Sociological Review, Volume 57, Issue Supplement 1]When David Scott went to the moon on Apollo 15 he took with him some firstday postal covers in his Personal Preference Kit (PPK). Taking items into space as souvenirs had been common since the Mercury programme, the idea being that the

astronauts handed them out to friends and family. However, the practice had commercial aspects. Astronauts were not

particularly well paid, and space objects sold well. But matters were getting out of hand with the PPKs. Even before Apollo 14 launched, the Franklin Mint (a company manufacturing commemorative memorabilia) was advertising medallions containing silver from the flight. Some members of Congress asked questions, the deal was never done, and Deke Slayton (Director of Flight Crew Operations) halved the number of medallions allowed in PPKs. But Scott, Irwin and Worden were later persuaded, with Slayton’s knowledge, to take 400 first day covers with them, 100 each, and 100 for a dealer in Germany. After the flight, the deal was exposed, and the three astronauts were formally reprimanded. NASA also had to admit that many other astronauts had been profiting in similar ways for many years (Scott and Leonov, 2004: 328–331; Hansen, 2005: 524). This is not simply a story about corrupt astronauts, or poor auditing, but an everyday account of personal economics. Scott says he did the deal because he was promised that the money would go into a trust fund for his children. But do Scott’s actions make his account of standing on the moon, blotting out the entire earth with his gloved thumb, any the less chilling (Scott and Leonov, 2004: 378)? Probably not. So it might be that exploring the implications of Weber’s problem cannot stay at the level of the individual, as if (in some Kantian sense) the purity of your heart could determine the purity of your motive. Buzz Aldrin did a commercial for Volkswagen in 1972, and Armstrong one for Chrysler in 1979, but does that mean that the ‘one small step’ was demeaned?2 We must, at the start here, acknowledge that motives are complex, and that this is an enquiry into generalities, or ideal types. What happens when profit becomes the institutional motive? Nostalgia is a

problem in any framing of such a question. NASA, in its Golden Age, was not an institution that relied on saintly scientists, dedicated administrators and heroic astronauts who had been commanded on a mission by a young and

idealistic president. Even in general terms, the foundation of NASA represented something of an unholy alliance between military hawks, big research institutions, ‘defence’ contractors and politicians wanting the reflected sparkle of a little space dust or jobs for their state (DeGroot, 2007). There was a lot of money involved. According to Jones and Benson (2002: 22), in the 1960s, the US spent more than four per cent of Federal expenditures on space exploration. Wachhorst (2000: 130) translates this into $24 billion for Apollo. NASA’s budget peaked in 1965 at what was 5.3 percent of the total federal budget for that year. In 1966 NASA directly employed thirty-six thousand people, and close to half a million others via roughly 500 main contractors and around 20 thousand sub-contractors (Klerkx, 2004: 165–6; Pyle, 2005: 8). Most of the money went to the big aerospace companies. Stage one was built by Boeing; stage two by North American Rockwell; stage three by McDonnell Douglas, and the rocket motors by Rocketdyne. The prime contractor for the Apollo Command and Service modules was North American Rockwell, the Lunar Module was built by Grumman, and the Lunar Roving Vehicle by Boeing. It should be clear enough that NASA, for a while, was a very effective way for a whole host of organizations to get secure contracts from the state. The politics of this were clear enough to the participants, as a speech by Werner Von Braun to a banquet for what he called ‘the leaders and captains of the mainstream of American industry and life’ the day before Apollo 11 lifted off suggests. Without your success in building the economic foundations of this nation, the resources for mounting tomorrow’s expedition to the moon would have never been committed. (in Mailer, 1971: 73) Norman Mailer’s beautiful analysis of the contradictions of Apollo, ‘of the real and true tasty beef of capitalism (. . .) the grease and guts of it’ makes the clear point that Apollo would not have been possible without ‘a capitalist who risks all the moral future of his soul on the gamble that God believes in capitalism and wants each man to enrich himself as part of God’s design’ (op. cit. p. 158). For Mailer, the sublime strangeness and mystery of

Apollo – the fire on the moon – was only possible because of this combination of scientific rationalism and corporate greed. It was a sacred effort, held together by the most profane of motives. In addition, the high end research and development that Big Defence were being paid to do could also feed into the manufacture and sales of many other products. It was, effectively, an extra ‘civilian’ funding stream in addition to the general budget for military hardware. By the late 1960s, as the Vietnam war became more and more expensive, the state gradually shrunk NASA’s budget, though this did not damage the profitability of many of the aerospace and defence contractors because they were now selling more jets, bombers and missiles for the killing fields of South-East Asia. There was lots of money in space for many other manufacturers too. The vogue for newness, science and streamlined technology meant that fabrics, wallpaper and furniture were often designed with a space theme. Clothing used whites, blues and new synthetic materials, often with metallic finishes, and innumerable children’s toys were manufactured (DeGroot, 2007: 184). Food became space food. ‘Tang’, the powdered orange drink used by John Glenn on the third Mercury flight;3 ‘Space Food Sticks’ and so on. And, of course, people bought books, magazines, newspapers and watched TV to find out about Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo. Copies of the post-mission dinner invitation from the White House vied with pop singles and swimming pool inflatables for consumer spending. Even some products that had already been developed, such as Teflon, Velcro, the Fisher Space Pen and WD40,4 gained a huge boost from stories concerning their use on the space programme. Smith (1983) argues that ‘selling the moon’ was part of the project of ‘commodity scientism’, a conjunction of nation building and consumption. The shareholders of all of these organizations must have been grateful that the US economy allowed such generous state intervention, despite free market rhetoric. Space was, in an important sense, part of the general economy, even if NASA never ‘officially’ endorsed anything. 5 As NASA’s budgets declined, so was there an


increasing pressure to find something that the agency could sell. However, during the 1970s and 80s NASA was still almost entirely funded by the US state, and was hence usually the purchaser of goods and services. The first sign that a commercial organization might buy something from NASA was a deal to explore space based pharmaceutical manufacturing signed by McDonnell-Douglas, Ortho Pharmaceuticals and NASA in 1975. This never materialized, but mutated into a series of suggestions about an Industrial Space Facility in the early1980s, backed by Boeing and Westinghouse (Klerkx, 2004: 81). At roughly the same time, the space shuttle was beginning to deliver commercial satellites into orbit, sometimes together with the first non-NASA or services personnel on board. Partly as an inducement to use the already heavily subsidized service, NASA took payload specialists from various companies on the shuttle in order to operate the cargo, and also gave ‘free’ flights to foreign nationals in return for launching their satellites. But these were attempts at marketing, and not commercial transactions. 6 So Prince Sultan Salman Al-Saud (who flew with a Saudi communications satellite), was not a paying space tourist, but an advertisement for NASA. The same was true of the two Congressmen who flew into space, presumably as a reward and incentive for continued support for NASA budget requests. In any case, the Challenger disaster of 1986 ended flights for a while, as well as slowing their pace and increasing their cost. The massive historical irony is that it was the space programme that grew from state control that embraced the market first. After the collapse of the Soviet Union a ‘rockets for roubles’ policy was all that could keep the Russian programme going. Just keeping Mir, the Russian space station, in orbit required large amounts of cash. The first clearly commercial traveller seems to have been Toyohiro Akiyama, a Japanese broadcaster who spent a week on Mir in 1990 for $12 million, paid for by the Tokyo Broadcasting System. The following year Glavkosmos, the Russian space administration, charged around $10 million to take the first UK astronaut, Helen Sharman, to Mir. The money was to be raised by industrial sponsorship and underwritten by the UK subsidiary of the Narodny Bank (Sharman, 1993). Later Mir was being kept aloft by a deal with NASA for International Space Station training, and there was even a proposal by an organization called MirCorp to buy and run the ailing station as a commercial project. However, according to Klerkx (2004: 44), this deal was eventually killed by NASA and Big Aerospace, partly because neither wanted any competition for the new International Space Station. The commercialization of the state space agencies continued during the 1990s, but with Russia very much in the lead. NASA took a generally more conservative position, and often acted to protect its monopoly, rather than breaking the alliances it had with both the US state and Big Aerospace. So it was the Russians who took the money on offer. In 1999 Pizza Hut paid one million dollars in order that a Russian Proton rocket would launch with a forty foot high ‘Pizza Hut’ logo emblazoned on its side. Two years later, the Soyuz that took Dennis Tito (the first of five paying astrotourists so far) to the International Space Station also delivered a salami Pizza Hut pizza, copies of Popular Mechanics magazine, talking picture frames and Lego toys that 88became prizes in a competition (Klerkx, 2004: 233–4). Tito paid between $12 and $20 million for his trip, which worked out at around 7 per cent of the budget of the entire Russian space programme that year. In comparison, 7 per cent of NASA’s budget that year would have been about a billion dollars (Klerkx, 2004: 184). No wonder that a Pepsi commercial was filmed in Mir, whilst Radio Shack commercials have been filmed in the Russian part of the ISS. The Russians even signed an agreement with the creator of the TV show ‘Survivor’ for a reality TV show entitled ‘Destination Space’. Contestants would train at Star City, with the winner going for a trip to the ISS (Commercial Alert, 2003). From the mid 1990s onwards, NASA Administrator Daniel Goldin was arguing that financial and efficiency targets could be achieved by commercializing the programme. He mandated that 30% of the space on the new International Space Station should be used by private companies, and held talks with McDonald’s and Coca-Cola about providing food for the station. Few deals actually happened though, unless you count existing relationships being renamed. Lockheed and Boeing formed a joint company called the United Space Alliance, which sells shuttle services, mainly maintenance, to NASA. In 2000, this contract was worth $1.6 billion (Klerkx, 2004: 100). There were some small, and perhaps symbolic, ‘partnerships’ such as the contract with Lego to name the two Mars rovers, or with Dreamtime to produce high definition broadcasts from space. The shuttles were also beginning to carry (again heavily subsidized) commercial payloads. For example, the shuttle Columbia contained an experiment for International Flowers and Fragrances Inc. concerning the effects of low gravity on flower scent, as well as seven other experiments (Commercial Alert, 2003).7 The collapse of the stock market in 2001, combined with Columbia’s 2003 disintegration over Texas, again put paid to NASA’s ambitions for a while. According to Dickens and Ormrod, space-related capitalism had generated nearly $1 trillion in the decade up to 2004 (2007: 1). This is a lot of money, and there is every reason to imagine that NASA would like some of it. However, there is an even more compelling reason to expect NASA to behave more like a corporation in future – the beginnings of space tourism.

And CAPITALISM IS IMPERIALISM—it fuels a genocidal foreign policy that threatens global destruction. Foster, co-editor of Monthly Review, professor of sociology at the University of Oregon, 2k3 [John, “The new Age of

Imperialism,” Monthly Review 55.3] At the same time, it is clear that in the present period of global hegemonic imperialism the United States is geared above all to expanding its imperial power to whatever extent possible and subordinating the rest of the capitalist world to its interests. The Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea Basin represent not only the bulk of world petroleum reserves, but also a rapidly increasing proportion of total reserves, as high production rates diminish reserves elsewhere. This has provided much of the stimulus for the United States to gain greater control of these resources—at the expense of its present and potential rivals. But U.S. imperial ambitions do not end there, since they are driven by economic ambitions that know no bounds. As Harry Magdoff noted in the closing pages of The Age of Imperialism in 1969, "it is the professed goal" of U.S. multinational corporations "to control as large a share of the world market as they do of the United States market," and this hunger for foreign markets persists today. Florida-based Wackenhut Corrections Corporation has won prison privatization contracts in Australia, the United Kingdom, South Africa, Canada, New Zealand, and the Netherlands Antilles ("Prison Industry Goes Global," www.futurenet.org, fall 2000).Promotion of U.S. corporate interests abroad is one of the primary responsibilities of the U.S. state. Consider the cases of Monsanto and genetically

modified food, Microsoft and intellectual property, Bechtel and the war on Iraq. It would be impossible to exaggerate how dangerous this dual expansionism of U.S. corporations and the U.S. state is to the world at large. As Istvan


Meszaros observed in 2001 in Socialism or Barbarism, theU.S. attempt to seize global control, which is inherent in the workings of capitalism and imperialism, is now threatening humanity with the "extreme violent rule of the whole world by one hegemonic imperialist country on a permanent basis...an absurd and unsustainable way of running the world order."* This new age of U.S. imperialism will generate its own contradictions, amongst them attempts by other major powers to assert their influence, resorting to similar belligerent means , and all sorts of strategies by weaker states and non-state actors to engage in "asymmetric" forms of warfare. Given the unprecedented destructiveness of contemporary weapons, which are diffused ever more widely, the consequences for the population of the world could well be devastating beyond anything ever before witnessed. Rather than generatinga new "Pax Americana" the United States may be paving the way to new global holocausts. The greatest hope in these dire circumstances lies in a rising tide of revolt from below , both in the United States and globally. The growth of the antiglobalization movement, which dominated the world stage for nearly two years following the events in Seattle in November 1999, was succeeded in February 2003 by the largest global wave of antiwar protests in human history. Never before has the world's population risen up so quickly and in such massive numbers in the attempt to stop an imperialist war. The new age of imperialism is also a new age of revolt. The Vietnam Syndrome, which has so worried the strategic planners of the imperial order for decades, now seems not only to have left a deep legacy within the United States but also to have been coupled this time around

with an Empire Syndrome on a much more global scale--something that no one really expected. This more than anything else makes

it clear that the strategy of the American ruling class to expand the American Empire cannot possibly succeed in the long run, and will prove to be its own--we hope not the world's—undoing

Thus our alternative is an unconditional commitment to the Communist Hypothesis. Every ethical decision – up to the ballot itself – should be infused with all of the significance of humanity’s destiny. The question regarding the plan is “does it confirm or contradict the communist hypothesis.” If we win a link argument, you should reject the affirmative because they reduce life to a barbaric ratrace and stand opposed to universal emancipation. Alain Badiou, former Chair of Philosophy at École normale supérieure, 2008. [The Meaning of Sarkozy, pp. 97-103]

I would like to situate the Sarkozy episode, which is not an impressive page in French history, in a broader horizon. I Let us picture a kind of Hegelian fresco of recent world history - by which I do not, like our journalists, mean the triad Mitterrand-Chirac-Sarkozy, but rather the development of the politics of working-class and popular emancipation over nearly two centuries. Since the French Revolution and its gradually universal echo, since the most radically egalitarian developments of that revolution, the decrees of Robespierre's Committee of Public Safety on the 'maximum' and Babeuf's theorizations, we know (when I say 'we', I mean humanity in the abstract, and the knowledge in question is universally available on the paths of emancipation) that communism is the right hypothesis. Indeed, there is no other, or at least I am not aware of one. All those who abandon this hypothesis immediately resign themselves to the market economy, to parliamentary democracy - the form of state suited to capitalism - and to the inevitable and 'natural' character of the most monstrous inequalities. What do we mean by 'communism'? As Marx argued in the 1844 ManUJcriptJ, communism is an idea regarding the destiny of the human species. This use of the word must be completely distinguished from the meaning of the adjective 'communist' that is so worn-out today, in such expressions as 'communist parties', 'communist states' or 'communist world' - never mind that 'communist state' is an oxymoron, to which the obscure coinage 'socialist state' has wisely been preferred. Even if, as we shall see, these uses of the word belong to a time when the hypothesis was still coming-to-be. In its generic sense, 'communist' means first of all, in a negative sense - as we can read in its canonical text The Communist ManijeJto - that the logic of classes, of the fundamental subordination of people who actually work for a dominant class, can be overcome. This arrangement, which has been that of history ever since antiquity, is not inevitable. Consequently, the oligarchic power of those who possess wealth and organize its circulation, crystallized in the might of states, is not inescapable. The communist hypothesis is that a different collective organization is practicable, one that will eliminate the inequality of wealth and even the division of labour: every individual will be a 'multi-purpose worker', and in particular people will circulate between manual and intellectual

work, as well as between town and country. The private appropriation of monstrous fortunes and their transmission by inheritance will disappear. The existence of a coercive state separate from civil society, with its military and police, will no longer seem a self-evident necessity. There will be, Marx tells us - and he saw this point as his major contribution - after a brief sequence of 'proletarian dictatorship' charged with destroying the remains of the old world, a long sequence of reorganization on the basis of a 'free association' of producers and creators, which will make possible a 'withering away' of the state. 'Communism' as such only denotes this very general set of intellectual representations. This set is the horizon of any initiative, however local and limited in time it may be, that breaks with the order of established opinions - the necessity of inequalities and the state instrument for protecting these - and composes a fragment of a politics of emancipation. In

other words, communism is what Kant called an 'Idea', with a regulatory function, rather than a programme. It


is absurd to characterize communist principles in the sense I have defined them here as utopian, as is so often done.

They are intellectual patterns, always actualized in a different fashion, that serve to produce lines of demarcation between different forms of politics. By and large, a particular political sequence is either compatible with these principles or opposed to them, in which case it is reactionary. 'Communism', in this

sense, is a heuristic hypothesis that is very frequently used in political argument, even if the word itself does not appear. If it is still true, as Sartre said, that 'every anti-communist is a swine', it is because any political sequence that, in its principles or lack of them, stands in formal contradiction with the communist hypothesis in its generic sense, has to be judged as opposed to the emancipation of the whole of humanity, and thus to the properly human destiny of humanity. Whoever does not illuminate the coming-to-be of humanity with the communist hypothesis - whatever words they use, as such words matter little - reduces humanity, as far as its collective becoming is concerned, to animality. As we know, the contemporary -

that is, the capitalist name of this animality - is 'competition'. The war dictated by self-interest, and nothing more. As a pure Idea of equality, the communist hypothesis has no doubt existed in a practical state since the beginnings of the

existence of the state. As soon as mass action opposes state coercion in the name of egalitarian justice, we have the appearance of rudiments or fragments of the communist hypothesis. This is why, in a pamphlet titled

De l'UJeologie, which I wrote in collaboration with the late lamented Francois Balmes and was published in 1976, we proposed to identity 'communist invariants'f Popular revolts, such as that of the slaves led by Spartacus, or that of the German peasants led by Thomas Munzer, are examples of this practical existence of communist invariants. However, in the explicit form that it was given by certain thinkers and activists of the French Revolution, the communist hypothesis inaugurates political modernity.

It was this that laid low the mental structures of the ancien regime, yet without being tied to those 'democratic' political forms that the bourgeoisie would make the instrument for its own pursuit of power. This point is

essential: from the beginning, the communist hypothesis in no way coincided with the 'democratic' hypothesis that would lead to present-day parliamentarism. It subsumes a different history and different events. What seems important and creative when illuminated by the communist hypothesis is different in kind from what bourgeois-democratic historiography selects. That is indeed why Marx, giving materialist foundations to the first effective great sequence of the modern politics of emancipation, both took over the word 'communism' and distanced himself from any kind of democratic 'politicism' by maintaining, after the lesson of the Paris Commune, that the bourgeois state, no matter how democratic, must be destroyed. Well, I leave it to you to judge what is important or not, to judge the points whose consequences you choose to assume against the horizon of the communist hypothesis. Once again, it is the right hypothesis, and we can appeal to its principles, whatever the declensions or variations that these undergo in different contexts. Sartre said in an interview, which I paraphrase:

If the communist hypothesis is not right, if it is not practicable, well, that means that humanity is not a thing in itself, not very different from ants or termites. What did he mean by that? If competition, the 'free market', the sum of little pleasures, and the walls that protect you from the desire of the weak, are the alpha and omega of all collective and private existence, then the human animal is not worth a cent. And it is this worthlessness to which Bush with his aggressive conservatism and crusader spirit, Blair the Pious with his militarist rhetoric, and Sarkozy with his 'work, family, country' discipline, want to reduce the existence of the immense majority of living individuals. And the 'Left' is still worse, simply juxtaposing to this vacant violence a vague spirit of charity. To morbid competition, the pasteboard victories of daddy's boys and girls, the ridiculous supermen of unleashed finance, the coked-up heroes of the planetary stock exchange, this Left can only oppose the same actors with a bit of social politeness, a little walnut oil in the wheels, crumbs of holy wafer for the disinherited - in other words, borrowing from Nietzsche, the bloodless figure of the 'last man. To put an end once and for all to May '68 means agreeing that our only choice is between the hereditary nihilism of finance and social piety. It not only means accepting that communism collapsed in the Soviet Union, not only acknowledging that the Parti Communiste Francais has been wretchedly defeated, but also and above all it means abandoning the hypothesis that May '68 was a militant invention precisely aware ofthe failure of state'communism'. And thus that May '68, and still more so the five years that followed, inaugurated a new sequence for the genuine communist hypothesis, one that always keeps its distance from the state. Certainly, no one could say where all this might lead, but we knew in any case that what was at stake was the rebirth of this hypothesis. If the thing that Sarkozy is the name of succeeds in imposing the necessity of abandoning any idea of a rebirth of this kind, if human society is a collection of individuals pursuing their self-interest, if this is the eternal reality, then it is certain that the philosopher can and must abandon the human animal to its sad destiny. But we shall not let a triumphant Sarkozy dictate the meaning of our existence, or the tasks of philosophy. For what we are witnessing in no way imposes such a renunciation of the communist hypothesis, but simply a consideration of the moment at which we find ourselves in the history of this hypothesis.


Pan F/L

1. Chinese has no incentive to cooperate; US military dominance has backed them into a corner and they see space as our Achilles Heel.Tellis Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in ‘7[Ashley, Survival, Autumn, “China’s Military Space Strategy”, ingenta]To assert in the face of this evidence that the Chinese civilian leadership could have been wholly unaware of the army’s anti-satellite weapons programme would be tantamount to claiming that the Chinese armed forces have been conducting a major military research and development effort – with grave international implications – without the authorisation of, and perhaps even in opposition to, the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party. Such a contention would undercut much of what is known about party–military relations in China and would be difficult to uphold against a weaker alternative explanation, perhaps grounded in bureaucratic politics.17 And it would certainly be peculiar, given that the resource allocations associated with China’s diverse counterspace activities are considerable and that these initiatives have been part of the public record in the West, and hence knowable to the civilian leadership in Beijing, for at least a decade. Finally, and most importantly, the inference that the military might be pursuing a covert counterspace programme unauthorised by the civilian leadership is incredible precisely because the effort is consistent with the other sophisticated anti-access and battlespace-denial programmes that have been authorised and have been underway for several years.18 The brute reality of these anti-access and battlespace-denial programmes undermines the notion advanced by other commentators that the Chinese anti- satellite test was, in Michael Krepon’s words, ‘a predictable – and unfortunate – response to U.S. space policies’.19 This explanation asserts that Beijing’s decision to display its emerging counterspace capabilities owes less to blundering or malevolent internal bureaucratic politics and more to the long-standing American opposition toward negotiating a space arms-control regime. By declin-ing to negotiate an agreement governing the ‘peaceful’ uses of space, the United States may have compelled China’s leaders to conclude ‘that only a display of Beijing’s power to launch … an arms race would bring Washington to the table to hear their concerns’.20 In other words, the Chinese anti- satellite test was a cri de coeur designed to force a recalcitrant Washington to reverse the positions articulated in its National Space Policy and move with alacrity to arrest the creeping weaponisation of space.21 Concerns about an arms race in space ought to be taken seriously, as a threat to both American

and global security, but there is, unfortunately, no arms-control solution to this problem. China’s pursuit of counterspace capabilities is not driven fundamentally by a desire to protest American space policies, and those of the

George W. Bush administration in particular, but is part of a considered strategy designed to counter the overall military capability of the United States, grounded in Beijing’s military weakness at a time when China considers war with the United States to be possible. The weapons China seeks to blunt through its emerging space-denial capability are not based in space: they are US naval and air forces that operate in China’s immediate or extended vicinity. What are in space are the sensory organs, which find and fix targets for these forces, and the nervous system, which connects the combatant elements and permits them to operate cohesively. These assets permit American forces to detect and identify different kinds of targets; exchange vast and diverse militarily relevant informa- tion and data streams; and contribute to the success of combat operations by providing everything from meteorological assessment, through navigation and guidance, to different platforms, weapon systems, and early warning and situ- ational awareness. There is simply no way to ban or control the use of space for such military purposes. Beijing’s diplomats, who repeatedly call

for negotiations to assure the peaceful use of space, clearly understand this. And the Chinese military appreciates better than most that its best chance of countering the massive con-ventional superiority of the United States lies in an ability to attack the relatively vulnerable eyes, ears and voice of American power. The lure of

undermining America’s warfighting strengths in this way prompts Beijing to systematically pursue a variety of counterspace programmes even as it persists in histrionic calls for the demilitarisation of space.22 China’s Janus-faced policy suggests it is driven less by bureaucratic accident or policy confusion than by a compelling and well-founded strategic judgement about how to counter the military supe-riority of its opponents, especially the United States.

2. A threat prevention based stance leads to a substantial net decrease in conflict – institutional safeguards check error and abuseBuchanan 07Professor of Philosophy and Public Policy at Duke, Preemption: military action and moral justification, pg. 128However, the consequentialist label is misleading, because it lumps together two different objections based on the inherently speculative character of the preventive-war justification, only one of which is consequentialist in any interesting sense. The first

objection, which more properly warrants the title 'consequentialist', appeals to the supposedly bad consequences, not of the

particular preventive act, but of the general acceptance of a principle that allows preventive war. The idea here is that because the preventive-war justification is inherently speculative, the general acceptance of a principle allowing preventive war would lead to intolerable abuse and error. Too many wars would be undertaken on the basis of false


or unjustified predictions of future harm or because the prospect of future harm would be used as a pretext for aggressive war, or both, ("all this the 'bad practice' objection. The second objection that is lumped together with it under the label 'consequentialist', unlike the 'bad practice' objection, does not rely upon any prediction about the bad consequences of the general acceptance of a principle that allows preventive war. Rather, it holds that, given the inherently speculative character of the preventive-war justification, it is morally irresponsible for state leaders to invoke it to undertake anything so morally momentous as war. Call this the 'irresponsible act' objection. As it stands, the'bad practice' objection is not in fact an argument to show that it is wrong to engage in preventive war; at most it shows that general acceptance of a principle that allows preventive war would be wrong. To make it an argument that shows that it is wrong to engage in preventive war, one would need to add one or the other of two premises, each of which is highly disputable: (a) it is always wrong to act on a principle which, if generally accepted, would produce unacceptable results, or (b) every case in which a country engages in preventive war in fact significantly increases the probability that other states will come to accept the principle that preventive war is justified (and thereby will contribute to a bad practice). The difficulties with premise (a) are well-known from the critical literature on the role of generalization principles in ethical judgment. The most obvious problem is that there are innumerable acts that are permissible even though it would be disastrous if everyone did them—for example, devoting one's life to the solution of the Trolley Problem, or closing one's eyes for one minute at a particular time of day. Whether a particular case of preventive war will significantly increase the probability of unjustified preventive wars in the future may depend upon how the particular case is generally regarded. Especially if there is a well-entrenched norm against preventive war, a single instance may not increase the probability of future occurrences; if the country engaging in preventive war makes a convincing case

that the circumstances warranted an exception to an otherwise sound prohibition against prevention. A plausible justification, along with an acknowledgment that the general prohibition is sound, may avoid a significant increase in the chance of unjustified preventive war. It is worth making explicit why premise (b) is formulated using the notion of significantly increasing the probability of future (unjustified) preventive wars. The point is that we cannot assume that if a particular preventive war does increase the probability of future unjustified preventive wars, it is thereby impermissible. A small increase in the probability of future unjust preventive wars might be an acceptable price to pay to prevent a sufficiently awful harm. Any slate contemplating engaging in preventive war should, of course, take seriously the possibility that its action will be taken to have precedential value and should also be aware that others may either unwittingly or deliberately misrepresent the character of the act they take as a precedent. For example, under certain circumstances, a country might be justified in engaging in preventive war, but only because of exceptional circumstances; yet other countries might believe or claim to believe that a more general precedent was being set, that a broader permission to engage in preventive war was being established, one that did not limit permissible preventive war to the exceptional circumstances. As I suggested earlier, however, how great this risk of false precedent' is in any particular case will depend upon several factors, including how well-entrenched the prohibition against prevention is and how good a job the country engaging in prevention does in making the case that its action was justified only because of exceptional circumstances and that those circumstances arc very unlikely to be repeated. Although it may be true that the most powerful, influential countries run the greatest risk of setting a dangerous precedent by their actions, they are also the ones that are best able to shape the content of the precedent that is set. Once we see how problematic premises (a) and (b) are, it becomes clear that the first 'consequentialist' argument

against preventive war, the 'bad practice' argument, at best gives reason to be very cautious about engaging in preventive war, not conclusive reasons against its justifiability. It may be that those who have argued against preventive war by appealing to the fact that the preventive-war justification is prone to error and abuse, but who have done so without making explicit and defending either premise (a) or premise (b), have failed to distinguish clearly between two quite different tasks that might be pursued under the heading of just war theorizing. The first is to determine the moral status of various acts of war; the second is to formulate appropriate constitutive rules for a morally defensible practice of war-making. (Jeff McMahan has noted this crucial distinction and made it clear that his just war theorizing is concerned primarily with the former task). Unless supplemented with a convincing defense of either premise {a) or premise {b), the "bad practice' objection cannot show that any particular act of making preventive war is wrong. As it stands, the 'bad practice' argument is only plausible as an objection to the general acceptance of a principle allowing preventive war, whether as a formal principle of international law or as constitutive rule of an informal practice. It is important to understand that this first objection cannot provide a conclusive argument against general acceptance of a principle allowing preventive war. For as Robert O. Keohane and I have argued elsewhere, appropri ate institutions for making the decision to use preventive force may signifi cantly reduce the risk of abuse and error, both in the decision itself and with respect to its precedential effects . Whether a practice that allows preventive war under certain circumstances would be an unacceptable practice depends upon how the practice is institutionalized.' If institutional safeguards can adequately address the problem of abuse and error, then the practice may be morally acceptable.

3. Evolutionary biology predicts that humans will possess the traits of egotism, domination, and enemy construction because of evolved traitsThayer, Baylor University Political Science Professor, in ‘10 [Darwin and International Relations Theory: Improving Theoretical Assumptions of Political Behavior, Political Studies Association]I argue that evolutionary theory also offers a fundamental cause for offensive realist behavior. Evolutionary theory explains why individuals are motivated to act as offensive realism expects, whether an individual is a captain of industry or a conquistador. My argument anarchy is even more important than most

scholars recognize. The human environment of evolutionary adaptation was anarchic, our ancestors lived in a state of nature where resources were poor and dangers from other humans and the environment were


great—so great that it is truly remarkable that a mammal standing 3 feet high, without claws or strong teeth, not particularly strong or swift, survived and evolved to become what we consider human. Humans survived because natural selection gave them

the right behaviors to survive in those conditions. This environment produced the behaviors examined here: egoism, domination, and the in-group/out-group distinction. They are sufficient to explain why leaders will

behave, in the proper circumstances, as offensive realists expect them to behave. That is, even if they must hurt other humans or risk injury to themselves, they will strive to maximize their power, demand as either control

over others, for example through wealth or leadership, or control over an environmental circumstance, such as meeting their own and their family’s or tribe’s need for food, shelter, or other resources, even if this means hurting other humans or risking injury to oneself. Evolutionary theory explains why people seek control over environmental circumstances—we are all egotistic and concerned about food—why we will struggle to control our group, and why some of us, particularly males, will seek to dominate

others by maintaining a privileged in a dominance hierarchy. Clearly, as the leaders of states are human, they too will be influenced by evolutionary theory as they react to the actions of other states and as they make decisions for their own state. I have already discussed these two elements of my argument: that

evolutionary theory allows realist scholars to explain why state decisionmakers are, first, egoistic and, second, strive to dominate others when circumstances permit. These adaptations were critically important in

the course of human evolution and remain a significant ultimate cause of human behavior. Recalling that biology is good probability, not destiny, we should expect that leaders of states and major decisionmakers will possess these traits and are

not likely to suppress them, they are likely doing so only for tactical reason or as required by specific circumstances. In fact, a state’s elites—the captains of industry and media, and military and political leaders—are more likely than average to show these traits in abundance since most leaders rise to the top of their respective hierarchies through an intensively competitive process. This is almost always the case for political leaders.

Cooperation over space is empirically a mask for realism—other states adopt this perspective alreadyEverett C. Dolman, 2002, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL,Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age, 7To accomplish this task, several analyses will be presented. The first will describe the international setting from which the current regime emerged. It should become evident that the cooperative end result was merely the vehicle for consistent foreign policies in a decentralized, decidedly uncooperative international environment of Cold War antagonism. The United States, its dominance in space challenged by the Soviet Union, felt compelled to ensure that no other nation could carve out an empire in space . The highly touted international cooperation that produced the 1967 Outer Space Treaty was not in truth evidence of a newly emerging universalism; rather, it was a reaffirmation of Cold War realism and national rivalry, a slick diplomatic maneuver that both bought time for the United States and checked Soviet expansion .

Related descriptions will include: the competitive military environment which provided the motivation and technology for space exploration; evidence that the scientific roots of the world’s first satellite endeavors were grounded not in international fraternity but in epistemic conflict and Cold War manipulation; proof that, once the criteria for cooperation were accepted, the very terms of cooperation became points of contention; the air and sea law foundations for negotiation, suggesting the Outer Space Treaty is itself the jumbled consolidation of a body of conflicting precedents; and a chronology of the negotiations for the 1967 Outer Space Treaty that highlight its devolution into a perverse competition of who could outcooperate whom. Analyses in these chapters will further examine the notions of common heritage and collective ownership as they apply to space. This is done to support a

recommendation for a new outer-space regime. The political realism pervasive among the participant states, to include the peculiar effects of a geopolitical heritage on their decision-making processes, will be described. An exploration of the negotiation history and positions of the major players will provide a structure for analysis. Included will be a brief description of the major treaties and declarations of the international outer-space regime, including two unratified but significant agreements that may signify a future shift in basic political outlooks. Suggestions of the future role this regime will play in a political world that has fundamentally changed since the regime was emplaced, to include an assessment of its validity and prospects for stability and order, will be offered. Finally, the outline for a new regime, one that harnesses the self-interested nature of the continuing territorial state, will be offered.


Cooperation F/L

1. Colonization fails—

a. Reproduction in outer-space is impossible. Jive Turkey, 2-18-2011 , “NASA Experts Deem Reproduction in Space Unlikely, Refuse to Allow Boning in the Name of Scientific Research” , {http://www.moxiebird.com/2011/02/nasa-experts-deem-reproduction-in-space-unlikely-refuse-to-allow-boning-in-the-name-of-scientific-research.html} Bad news for those of you hoping to populate deep space with your own special brand of DNA: NASA scientists have recently determined that ever-present and invasive proton particles would render any female embryos conceived in space sterile, making prolific human colonization of other planets all but impossible. In research done on gestating animals, studies have shown that exposure to ionizing radiation will destroy egg cells in a female fetus — sometimes as far along as the second or third trimester. And that’s if you manage to conceive in

the first place; research has also shown that proton particles can be detrimental to sperm count.

b. Inadequate environment and materials Donald F. Robertson, 3-6-06, industry journalist, “Space Exploration: A Reality Check,” http://www.space.com/spacenews/archive06/RobertsonOpEd_030606.html) Two largely unquestioned assumptions long ago took root within the space community. As we prepare to voyage back to Earth's Moon and on to Mars, it is time to question them both. The first assumption is that exploring the Moon, Mars, or any part

of the solar system, can be accomplished in a generation or two and with limited loss of life. The second is that we can use robots to successfully understand another world. Both assumptions are almost certainly wrong, yet many important elements of our civil space program are based on one or both of them being correct. To paraphrase Douglas Adams, even within the space community most people don't have a clue how "mind-boggingly big space really is." Most of the major worlds in the solar system have surface areas at

least as large as terrestrial continents -- a few are much larger -- and every one of them is unremittingly hostile to human life. Learning to travel confidently through former President John F. Kennedy's "this new ocean" will be difficult, expensive, time-consuming and dangerous. Mr. Kennedy's rhetoric was more accurate than he probably knew. The only remotely comparable task humanity has faced was learning to travel across our world's oceans. We take trans-oceanic travel for granted, but getting from Neolithic boats to modern freighters cost humanity well over 10,000 years of hard work and uncounted lives. Even today, hundreds of people die in shipping accidents every year. We and our woefully inadequate chemical rockets are like Stone Age tribesfolk preparing to cast off in canoes, reaching for barely visible islands over a freezing, storm-tossed, North Atlantic.

2. No chance of extinction –

a. Humanity is resilient—extinction is highly unlikely.Tonn 5 (Bruce Tonn, Futures Studies Department, Corvinus University of Budapest, 2005, “Human Extinction Scenarios,” www.budapestfutures.org/downloads/abstracts/Bruce%20Tonn%20-%20Abstract.pdf)The human species faces numerous threats to its existence. These include global climate change, collisions with near-earth objects, nuclear war, and pandemics. While these threats are indeed serious, taken separately they fail to describe exactly how humans could become extinct. For example, nuclear war by itself would most likely fail to kill everyone on the planet, as strikes would probably be concentrated in the northern hemisphere and the

Middle East, leaving populations in South America, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand some hope of survival. It is highly unlikely that any uncontrollable nanotechnology could ever be produced but even it if were, it is likely that

humans could develop effective, if costly, countermeasures, such as producing the technologies in space or destroying

sites of runaway nanotechnologies with nuclear weapons. Viruses could indeed kill many people but effective quarantine of a healthy people could be accomplished to save large numbers of people. Humans appear to be resilient to extinction with respect to single events.

b. Human nature to innovate and make changes accordingly for survival. Simon, 93 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Julian J. Simon “Scarcity or Abundance? A Debate on the Environment” http://www.juliansimon.org/writings/Norton/NORTON09.txt)Population growth does not lower the standard of living all the evidence agrees. And the evidence supports the view that population growth raises it in the long run. Now we need some theory to explain how it can be that economic welfare grows along with population, rather than humanity being reduced to misery and poverty as population grows. The Malthusian theory of increasing scarcity, based on supposedly-fixed resources, which is the theory that the doomsayers rely upon, runs exactly contrary to the data over the long sweep of history. And therefore it makes sense to prefer


another theory. The theory that fits the facts very well is this: More people, and increased income, cause problems in the short run. Short-run scarcity raises prices. This presents opportunity, and prompts the search for solutions. In a free society, solutions are eventually found. And in the long run the new developments leave us better off than if the problems had not arisen. When we take a long-run view, the picture is different, and considerably more complex, than the simple short-run view of more people implying lower average income. In the very long run, more people almost surely imply more available resources and a higher income for everyone. 3. No cooperation - their cooperation evidence is really bad and only says it could potentially lead to a mars mission. This is too indeterminate to weigh. Their long-term impact will be solved by other means.

4. The vision of earth from space serves not to unite humanity in a common cause but rather to promote the elite ‘lucky’ enough to go to space to the position of demi-god, as the overview effect serves only as an advertisement for space tourism for the expansion of markets Dickens, lecturer at the university of cambridge and professor of sociology, university of essex and Ormrod lecturer in sociology at the university of brighton 07 (peter and james, “cosmic society: towards a sociology of the universe”, pg 134, au)In his book charting the experiences of astronauts, The Overview Effect, Frank White (1987) reports on astronauts’ experiences of being in space. His concern is with the effect that looking back on the Earth from space has on one’s perspective on the planet and on the self. The overview effect rests on a new appreciation of how small

and precious the planet is, and on observing a world without political boundaries. As above, the experience of travelling into space has supposedly profoundly positive effects on the self. There is a real tension in White’s writing, which most probably reflects contradictions within the experiences of astronauts. On the one hand, he presents these new insights as steps towards humility. This can be seen as part of a historical de-centring of the planet, humanity and the self. It is often recognized that Copernicus and Galileo, who were the early contributors to the scientific revolution pre-dating the Enlightenment, contributed to this progressive de-centring. They showed the Earth was not the centre of the universe. Darwin de-centred humanity by showing that Homo sapiens, along with all organic beings, is probably descended from one primordial form or creature. And Freud demonstrated that humans were not even masters of their own psyche (Freud 1973b; Craib 1998; Best and Kellner 2001: Tarnas 2006 provides a slightly different account). On the other hand, White seems more than well aware of the ways in which visiting outer space provides a sense of empowerment. Although

rejecting the idea that space travel is inherently a spiritual experience, he acknowledges the power of the myth of the heavens as the dwelling place of God, and refers to the ‘demi-god’ status of astronauts and cosmonauts based on their ability to travel to the heavens. Arguably they have been made the new intermediaries in the Great Chain

of Being. White talks about the trip being like a death and rebirth, marking a transition of the self. His desire to write the book came from his own feelings when flying over Washington DC and thinking how preposterous it was that the tiny beings down there were making decisions for him. It was ‘like ants making laws for humans!’ (White 1987: 3). Clearly he envisages the overview effect as aggrandizing the self, this clearly being more a part of Space Adventures’ advertising campaign than is humility8

CHINA CO-OP 1NC

Documents

Transcript of CHINA CO-OP 1NC