Alan S. Blinder Princeton University Burt Malkiel Conference April 8, 2011 Rethinking Monetary...
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Transcript of Alan S. Blinder Princeton University Burt Malkiel Conference April 8, 2011 Rethinking Monetary...
Alan S. BlinderPrinceton University
Burt Malkiel ConferenceApril 8, 2011
Rethinking Monetary Policy in a Very Low Inflation Environment
References
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“Quantitative Easing: Entrance and Exit Strategies,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, November/December 2010, pp. 465-479 (the 2010 Homer Jones lecture).
“Revisiting Monetary Policy in a Low Inflation and Low Utilization Environment,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, forthcoming in a special issue.
Bagehot and recent history
“Lend freely, at a penalty rate, against good collateral.”
Most CBs did Well, not much. Well, it varied.
•For the ECB, Bagehot+ was just about enough (until Greece).
•But the Fed, BoE, and BoJ felt compelled to do more.•Why? The zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest
rates led to a perceived need for unconventional monetary policy.
ECB never hit the ZLB; neither did the BoE, but it came close.6
Friedman and recent history
“Don’t peg the nominal interest rate.”Why not? r = i - πFriedman was thinking mainly about upward
instability when π is rising and r is falling.But the argument is symmetric: When i is
stuck at zero, and π is falling, r is rising.Again, the ZLB leads to unconventional
monetary policy.And, BTW, can also lead to huge fiscal
multipliers.
7
Keynes and recent history
The liquidity trap idea: In a very depressed economy, the central bank might push the short rate all the way down to zero--and still not stimulate the economy.
Then monetary policy becomes useless.But fiscal policy becomes powerful.But what if fiscal policy is paralyzed by
large deficits and/or public debt?
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Four quick conclusions1. (obvious) In an environment of very low inflation, we
need to worry much more about the ZLB.2. (less obvious, but should be) If that environment
also has low utilization, we may need large doses of expansionary policy.
If fiscal policy is paralyzed, that must be monetary policy.
3. (deduction) Given our starting point today, unconventional monetary policy will be more important than in the past.
So the “crazy aunt” may not be stuffed back in the closet so easily.
4. Maybe we should think more about unconventional monetary policy options.
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Types of unconventional monetary policy
1.Commitment via words (“extended period”)2.A higher π* (because r = i – π)3.Lower the interest rate on reserves (no ZLB
here)4.Quantitative easing (← will focus on this one)a) Treasury bonds (work on term premia)b) Private-sector assets (work on risk premia)
5.Pegging one or more bond prices Exactly what our forefathers told us not to do!
6.Supervisory forbearance (if CB is a supervisor)
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The underlying idea
Idea: Demand curves for financial assets are not horizontal, so changing relative supplies can change term and/or risk premiums.
Rj = r + ρj
• Requires imperfect substitutes or “frictions”
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A taxonomy of QE
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Alter the composition of the central bank’s balance sheet.
Increase the size of the central bank’s balance sheet.
a)Longer-dated government securitiesb)Private-sector securities
Simplified Fed balance sheetASSETS LIABILITIES AND
NET WORTH
Treasury bills CurrencyLess liquid assets Bank Reserves
Loans Treasury deposits
Capital
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Specific strategies To shrink term premiums Buy long-term government bonds...
-- and sell T-bills
-- by creating new bank reserves Relies on imperfect arbitrage across yield curve
(“preferred habitat” theory) Related option: commit to keeping the overnight
rate low for a long time Note: This strategy relies on the expectations
theory.
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Specific strategies To shrink term premiums Buy long-term government bonds...
-- and sell T-bills
-- by creating new bank reserves Relies on imperfect arbitrage across yield curve
(“preferred habitat” theory) Related option: commit to keeping the overnight
rate low for a long time Note: This strategy relies on the expectations
theory.
This man taught me those theories. →
15
Specific strategies To shrink term premiums Buy long-term government bonds... -- and sell T-bills -- by creating new bank reserves Relies on imperfect arbitrage across yield curve
(“preferred habitat” theory) Related option: commit to keeping the overnight rate
low for a long time Note: This strategy relies on the expectations theory.
To shrink risk premiums Buy some risky asset… -- and sell the safe asset -- by creating new bank reserves Relies on imperfect substitutability (e.g., preferred
habitat)
16
Swapping assets (QE 0)ASSETS LIABILITIES AND
NET WORTHTreasury bills Currency
Less liquid assets Bank Reserves
Loans ↑ Treasury deposits
Capital17
…nor increase bank reserves much
0
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800
900
1,000
1,100
1,200
1,300
1,400Bi
llion
s of d
olla
rs
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Lehman changed everything
0
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900
1,000
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Billi
ons o
f dol
lars
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Blowing up the balance sheet (QE I)
ASSETS LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH
Treasury securities Currency
Less liquid assets↑ Bank Reserves ↑
Loans ↑ Treasury deposits
Capital22
Did QE I work?
CP vs. T-Bill risk spread Corporate bond vs. T-note risk spread
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
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1.8
Perc
enta
ge p
oint
s
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Perc
enta
ge po
ints
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Econometric evidence suggests: yes
Blowing up the balance sheet (QE II)
ASSETS LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH
Treasury securities• Bills• Bonds ↑
Currency
Less liquid assets Bank Reserves ↑
Loans Treasury deposits
Capital25
Did QE II work?
28
It was supposed to work on term premiums.
They have widened. (see next slide)But perhaps for other reasons: brighter outlook for the economy higher expected inflation worsening outlook for national debt
• Too early for econometric evidence. (But you can guess!)
Questions for research/thinking
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• Which of the six unconventional monetary policies works best, under what circumstances?
• If it’s going to be QE, which kind?
There is a strong a priori casefor using private assets:
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• Treasury market is the broadest, deepest in the world → hardest to move.
• Any other market is thinner → easier to move.
• The substitutability between T-bills and T-bonds must be higher than the substitutability between, say, T-bills and MBS.