Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2016 Part 19-122-Russia-10-36-1

CdW Intelligence to Rent -2016- In Confidence [email protected]

Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2016 Part 19-122-Russia-10-36-1

ISIS threatens to attack Russia very soon vowing: 'Blood will spill like an ocean', Nov 30

Russia is so far winning big in Syria, and making Moscow’s projection of force in the Middle East a reality that the other great powers have to recognize. As Russia has emerged as a major combatant against Syrian al-Qaeda and against Daesh (ISIS, ISIL), it is being accepted back into a Europe traumatized by two major attacks on Paris. France is signalling that it hopes to end sanctions on Russia over Ukraine by this summer. While the Minsk peace process is going all right, the motivation here is to ally more closely with Moscow against Muslim radicals in the wake of Russia’s successes against them in Syria.Russia’s intervention in Syria last October was in many ways a desperate measure and a gamble. It is said that in mid-summer of 2015, Iranian special forces commander Qasem Soleimani flew to Moscow with a blunt message. The Syrian regime was going to fall if things went on the way they were going and Iran did not have the resources to stop it.

Vladimir Putin, still smarting from having lost Libya as a sphere of influence, was determined to stop the fall of Syria.The regime of Bashar al-Assad has to to control a y-shaped area and set of transportation routes if it is to survive. The ‘Y’ is anchored at the bottom by Damascus, the capital. In its metropolitan area, given shifting population, live around 5 million Syrians who are afraid of the two major forces battling the regime, al-Qaeda (the Nusra Front) and Daesh (ISIS, ISIL).

“Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster”― Sun Tzu, The Art of War

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The trunk of the ‘Y’ stretches up to Homs and then veers off to the left, to the key port city of Latakia. The right branch of the ‘Y’ goes up through Hama

to Aleppo, a city of 4 million before the war, which is divided in half, with the west in the hands of the regime.Controlling this huge ‘Y’ where 70% of Syrians live is a tall order. It is vulnerable at several key points, of which the rebels have attempted to take advantage.1. Deraa province to the south of Damascus is largely Sunni and rural and its clans could sweep up and take the capital, with Jordanian, US and Saudi support. If that happened, game over.2. The Army of Islam, backed by Saudi Arabia, has strong positions besieging the capital just to its north. If it could come down into Damascus, game over.3. If the rebels could take and hold Homs and Qusayr in the middle of the ‘Y’, they could cut Damascus off from resupply by truck from the port of Latakia.4. If the rebels, who took all of Idlib Province in the northwest last April, could move

west from Idlib and take Latakia, they could cut Damascus off from its major port and deny it ammunition, arms, even some foodstuffs.5. If the rebels can move from south of Aleppo to cut off the road from Hama and strangle West Aleppo, they could take all of the country’s largest city, making it difficult for the regime to survive.Along this Y set of trunk roads, the most effective fighting force has been al-Qaeda in Syria, which reports to 9/11 mastermind Ayman al-Zawahiri. This affiliate, called the Support Front or the Nusra Front, is formally allied with other Salafi jihadis in the Army of Conquest coalition and is tactically allied with many small groups in what’s left of the Free Syrian Army. The CIA has sent medium weaponry, including T. O. W. anti-tank weapons to 30 “vetted” groups in the FSA, via Saudi Arabia. Many of these weapons have made their way into the hands of al-Qaeda and been used against regime tanks and armored vehicles to devastating effect.





So when Soleimani when to Moscow, it seemed that the road from Hama to West Aleppo had been lost and Aleppo would fall. Al-Qaeda had also made

advances in the south, taking al-Sheikh Miskin just south of Damascus, and preparing for a push on the capital. Idlib had fallen and Latakia might well have been next.So when Putin sent in his air force, it concentrated on protecting the red ‘Y’ in the map above. It mainly hit al-Qaeda, the primary threat to regime control of the Y, but also struck at Free Syrian Army groups backed by the US, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, which were tactically allied with al-Qaeda. This move was necessary to defend the ‘Y’. It drew howls of protest from Washington, Ankara and Riyadh demanding to know why Russia wasn’t instead targeting Daesh/ ISIL.The answer was simple. Except at Aleppo and at a point below Hama, Daesh for the most part posed little threat to the ‘Y’. Al-Qaeda and its allies were the big menace, so Putin concentrated on them.Air support to a determined local ground force can be an effective strategy. It worked for Bill Clinton in Kosovo. It worked for George W. Bush in Afghanistan in 2001, when the US-backed Northern Alliance handily defeated the Taliban. It worked again in March-April 2003, when US air support to the Kurdish Peshmerga guerrillas, allowed them to defeat the Iraqi Baath army in Kirkuk, Mosul and elsewhere in the north.And so this strategy has been working for Putin. He appears to have rearmed and retrained the Syrian Arab Army, which has new esprit de corps and is making significant headway for the first time in years. It is of course aided by Hizbullah, over from Lebanon, and by a small contingent of some 2000 Iranian spec ops forces (many of them actually Afghan).So what has the Russian air force accomplished?1. It allowed the reopening of the road from Hama to West Aleppo, ending the siege of that regime-held part of the city and pushing back the rebels from it.2. It retook most of Latakia Province, safeguarding the port. Yesterday came the news that the major northern al-Qaeda-held town of Rabia had fallen to the government forces, meaning that Latakia is nearly 100% in government control. These advances into northern Latakia involved hitting Turkmen proxies of Turkey, which is why Turkey shot down a Russian plane last fall. Likely the next step will be to take back cities in Idlib like Jisr al-Shughour, which fell last spring to an al-Qaeda-led coalition, and which could be used as a launching pad for the taking of Latakia port.3. It strengthened regime control of Hama and Homs, ensuring the supply routes south to Damascus.4. It hit the Army of Islam as well as al-Qaeda and Daesh around Damascus, forcing the latter two to withdraw from part of the capital and killing Zahran Alloush, leader of the Army of Islam.5. It hit al-Qaeda and FSA forces in Deraa Province and yesterday the key town of al-Sheikh Miskin fell to the Syrian Arab Army. This is a Deraa crossroads and its loss affects the rebels ability to maneuver in this province.The Russian air force, in conjunction with Syrian troops and Hizbullah and a few Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps fighters has therefore profoundly braced regime control of the ‘Y’ where most Syrians live and along which the capital’s supplies flow. If in July through September it appeared that the regime could well fall, and quickly, now al-Assad’s minions are on the march, pushing back their opponents.It shouldn’t need to be said, but I want to underline that the above is analysis, not advocacy. Be that as it may, in the past 4 months, Putin has begun winning in Syria, which means so has al-Assad. And the spillover effects on Russian diplomacy are huge.





January 20, 2016 Special Dispatch No.6271A New National Security Strategy For The Russian FederationOn December 31, 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree to update the National Security Strategy for the Russian Federation.[1] According to Russian legislation, the documents relating to strategic planning have to be updated once every six years. The previous National Security Strategy was adopted in May 2009.The document assumes that Russia will maintain its status as one of the world’s leading nations. It confirms that Russia “has demonstrated its ability to maintain its sovereignty, statehood and territorial integrity, as well as to defend its citizens abroad.” The document mentions that there has also been an increase in Russia’s role in resolving the most pressing international problems, in settling military conflicts, and in promoting legal standards in international affairs. According to the document, the prevention of military conflicts will be achieved by means of a nuclear deterrent policy.[2]Following are excerpts from Chapters 2 and 3 of the document, describing the Russian authorities’ view on the country's place in the world and its national security priorities for the next six years.[3]Image: Iwm.at

"Chapter 2: Russia In The Modern World""7. State policy, which provides national security and socio-economic development of the Russian Federation, also facilitates the implementation of strategic national priorities as well as the defense of national interests. A stable sustainable foundation has already been created which strengthens the Russian Federation's economic, political, military and moral potential, and which increases Russia’s role in the polycentric world that is now taking shape."8. …The Russian Federation's role in resolving the most important international problems, in the settling of military conflicts, and in providing strategic stability and the rule of international law has increased."9. The Russian economy demonstrates the ability to maintain and to strengthen its potential in the face of international economic instability and restrictive economic measures against the Russian Federation, which have been introduced by some countries."10. There are positive trends in providing measures to improve the health of the Russian population. Natural population growth and the average life span have increased.[...]"12. Russia’s growing strength has been accompanied by new threats to its national security... The Russian Federation's independent domestic and foreign policies are discouraged by the U.S.A. and its allies, who want to maintain their dominant role in international affairs. Their containment policies toward Russia imply political, economic, military and public diplomacy pressure."13. As the new multipolar world model takes shape, it is accompanied by the growth of global and regional instability... Competition between different countries encompasses the values and models of social development, as well as human, scientific and technological potential. Special importance is given to leadership in the development of the world's oceans and Arctic resources. To reach international prominence, countries must utilize the full spectrum of political, financial, economic and informational instruments. Special security services are greatly increasing their involvement in this process."14. …The acceleration in development of offensive weaponry and its modernization and deployment weakens global security as well as international arms control agreements.





Uniform security principles are no longer compatible with conditions in the Euro-Atlantic, Euro-Asian and Asia-Pacific regions. Militarization and

armament build-ups are moving forward in the regions which neighbor Russia."15. Russian national security is threatened by the growing potential of the NATO force, its violation of the norms of international law on a global scale,… further expansion of the [NATO] alliance, and its approach towards Russian borders. Opportunities to maintain global and regional stability are dramatically decreasing while U.S. anti-missile defense systems are deployed in Europe, Asia Pacific and the Middle East. These moves will bring about the realization of the “Global Strike” concept, that is, the deployment of highly precise non-nuclear arms systems, including space systems.[...]"17. …U.S. and European support for the anti-constitutional coup in the Ukraine has led to a deep split in Ukrainian society and to armed conflict. In the long run, the growth of Ukrainian nationalistic, ultra-right wing ideology, the maintaining of Russia’s image as the enemy, and a deep social and economic crisis will make the Ukraine a pocket of instability in Europe, with borders that are closed to Russia.[...]"19. There is a risk of increasing the number of countries possessing nuclear armaments, and of the dissemination and utilizing of chemical weapons... A network of U.S. military biological labs is expanding in the countries neighboring Russia."20. The physical safeguarding of dangerous objects and materials is becoming more critical, especially in politically unstable countries. This fact, along with the uncontrolled dissemination of regular weapons, makes it easier for terrorists to acquire all these weapons."21. Increasing confrontation in the global information area is having a growing influence on the global environment. This is caused by the frenzy of certain countries to use information and communication technologies to realize their geopolitical goals [while] manipulating collective consciousness and falsifying history. "22. There is evidence of the increasing influence of political factors on economics. Certain countries tend to use economic methods, including financial, trading, investing and technological policies, to realize their geopolitical goals. All these factors weaken the stability of the international economic relations system. Structural imbalances in the world economy and financial system, growing sovereign debts, and volatility in energy markets are all linked to a high probability of crises in the global economy...[...]"25. ...Regional trading and economic agreements have become some of the most important instruments to prevent such crises. Interest in the use of regional currencies seems to be increasing."26. To prevent national security threats, the Russian Federation concentrates on strengthening the internal and national unity of its society, providing social stability, religious tolerance and economic modernization, and improving its defensive capability."27. To defend its national interests, Russia pursues an open, rational and pragmatic foreign policy, avoiding costly confrontations (including a new arms race)."28. The Russian Federation bases its foreign relations on the principles of international law, providing security to all countries reliably and equally, promoting mutual respect among all nations, and enabling them to maintain their cultures, traditions and interests. Russia is interested in the development of mutually beneficial and equitable trade and economic cooperation with other countries, and is a responsible party in the multilateral trading system...





"29. In regards to international security, Russia remains committed to first use all political and legal instruments, diplomacy and peace-making mechanisms.

Armed force becomes possible only when all nonviolent measures have proven ineffective.""Chapter 3: National Interests And Strategic National Priorities""30. Long-term national interests include:• Strengthening the country’s defense; firming up the constitutional system; sovereignty and independence; state and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.• Maintaining national consensus; political and social stability; development of democratic institutions; enhancement of the interaction between the state and civil society.• Improving living standards; promoting health; providing for the stable demographic growth of the country.• Preserving and developing cultural, moral, and traditional Russian spiritual values.• Improving of the competitiveness of the national economy.

• Keeping the status of the Russian Federation as one of the dominant powers, based on strategic stability and mutually beneficial partnership relations in a polycentric world framework."31. Realizing national interests depends upon the realization of the following national priorities:• Defense;• State and social security;• Improving living standards for

Russian citizens;• Economic growth;• Science, technology, education;• Healthcare;• Culture;• Preserving ecological systems and rational environmental management;• Strategic stability and equitable strategic partnerships."Endnotes: [1] Rbc.ru, December 31, 2015.[2] The strategy document begins with three introductory chapters: General Provisions (pp. 1-6), Russia in the Modern World (7-29), and National Interests and Strategic National Priorities (30-31). Its main section describes the current security status and Russia's goals in different areas such as the National Defense (33-41), State and Social Security (42-49), Economic Growth (55-66), and Science, Technology and Education (67-70). The document ends with basics and priorities for the Strategy’s Implementation (108-114) and indicators for the evaluation of its status (115-116).[3] For the full document in Russian, see Kremlin.ru, December 31, 2015.

Jan 19, 2016 Russia to Equip Radio-Technical Troops with 80% of Radars Before 2020 TEHRAN (FNA)- The Radio-Technical Troops (RTT) of the Russian Aerospace Forces are to undergo a general re-equipment with advanced radar-location systems by 2020, according to the Russian Defense Ministry. The Radio-Technical Troops (RTT) of the Russian Aerospace Forces will be re-equipped with 80 percent of modern radar systems before 2020, the Defense Ministry said Monday,





Sputnik reported. "By 2020, RTT are to undergo a general re-equipment with advanced radar-location systems. The RTT regiments will operate some

80 percent of modern radar systems…," the statement issued by the ministry reads. The detection range of the new systems is expected to reach about 1,120 miles lengthwise and over 745 miles in height.Russia is currently carrying out a large-scale rearmament program, announced in 2010, to achieve a 70-percent modernization of its military hardware by 2020.

Jan 20, The Russian military is to start testing a new remote-controlled weapon system, which, its producer says, has an exceptionally small and swift 30-mm autocannon turret and highly-advanced control system.The weapon platform was developed by the Crimea-based R&D firm Impuls-2. The turret designated ABM M30-M3 can be armed with a number of automatic cannons up to 30mm caliber and is remarkably small and swift, said the firm head Vyacheslav Krivorukov. “With our automated combat module we have reduced size and weight characteristics below those of similar weapon systems,” he said. The mini-turret is meant to be paired with Strazh-M, a computer system that remotely controls the turret and assists operator with tracking and targeting. The battle station may be located as far as 50km from the actual turret, depending on the connection quality. The company says its turrets can be installed on warships and military boats, armored vehicles or stationary installations. Impuls-2 is to deliver 24 of their weapon systems to the Russian Defense Ministry in 2016 for testing.

WE DON’T KNOW WHAT TO CALL RUSSIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND THAT MAY BE A PROBLEMMARK GALEOTTI, JANUARY 19, 2016

As I write this, Russian military intelligence doesn’t have a chief. Perhaps more perplexingly, no one seems entirely sure what it’s called, either. And yet this matters.On January 3, director of military intelligence Colonel General Igor Sergun died suddenly of congestive heart failure. He was a relatively young 58, but had been suffering from overwork, and some have suggested that there was talk of transferring him, or putting him — like his ill-starred predecessor, General Shlyakhturov — on medical furlough. Some richly implausible and poorly supported tales to the contrary, there is no reason to believe there was anything suspicious about his death.At present, despite some hints that an outsider might be parachuted into the position — perhaps someone from the Federal Security Service (FSB) or else the Presidential Security Service (SBP),





Vladimir Putin’s closest clients — it seems most likely the job will go to one of Sergun’s deputies. However, what is the job called?

Beginning in the 1920s, Russian military intelligence was known as the GRU, standing for the Glavnoe razvedyvatel’noe upravlenie, or Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff. When Leon Trotsky established the Red Army out of the Bolshevik revolutionary Red Guard and began to regularize and professionalize it, he created its first intel branch, known initially as Registrupravlenie (the Registration Directorate) then Razvedupr (short for the Intelligence Directorate). This was the Second Directorate of the General Staff, which then became the Fourth Directorate, and then the GRU.Civilian intelligence and security went through a bewildering array of organization and name changes through the Soviet era. Ready? The VChK became the GPU, then OGPU; next NKVD, briefly NKGB, back to NKVD; NKGB again, MGB, and finally KGB in 1954. Even after the Soviet collapse in 1991, the alphabetic merry-go-round continued to spin. The KGB was dissolved. Its foreign espionage activities went to a new Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), while domestic security went to a new the Ministry of Security (MB), which became the Federal Counter-Intelligence Service (FSK), in 1995 renamed the FSB, Federal’naya sluzhba bezopasnosti.But the GRU retained its name, position, and role pretty much unchanged through all these changes, through World War II, the fall of the Soviet Union, and Putin’s rise. In the 1990s, it suffered along with the other security agencies from massive under-funding and political infighting, but it made it through. In 2006, its slick new headquarters, still known as the Aquarium, was opened close to its former one, in Moscow’s Khodinka suburb.It was thus a big deal when, after the 2008 Georgian War, there began whispers that the GRU would lose its “G” and be demoted to a regular directorate of the General Staff. While its Spetsnaz special forces performed well in that conflict, the GRU as a whole were regarded as having done a poor job. Airfields which were actually out of service were bombed in the mistaken belief they still housed Georgian planes, for example.Downgrading to becoming a regular department would have been more than just an embarrassment to the GRU brass. It would mean that the director of the agency lost his right personally to brief Putin, and henceforth all intelligence materials would have flowed through the chief of the General Staff. Russia cannot simply be described as an autocracy, but nonetheless, today’s Kremlin is reminiscent of a royal court. As such, personal access to Putin is one of the most powerful bureaucratic resources there is. To lose that would have been a blow from which Russian military intelligence would not recover.As it was, though, the GRU was in luck. In 2011, its former chief Alexander Shlyakhturov was replaced by Igor Sergun, who proved an able, articulate, and effective champion of his agency’s interests. According to insiders, he was particularly good at managing relations with Putin and those to whom the president listens. He was, in short, an able courtier. It may prove to be (and this is my personal suspicion) that in the process he shaded his briefings to flatter and reassure, to tell the tsar what the tsar wanted to hear. This is poor intelligence practice but good court tradecraft. However it happened, he won Putin’s esteem.The times were also changing. The chaos in Ukraine was a boon for the GRU, which was one of the lead agencies both in the seizure of the Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent destabilization of the Donbas. If the future means more “hybrid war” operations, more interactions with warlords, gangsters, and insurgents, then this is much more the forte of the GRU than the SVR. Sergun died, ironically, with his service’s prestige and role at their peak.The strange thing is that the GRU may not even be the GRU anymore. Look at the Russian





defense ministry’s website and it is listed simply as the GU, the “Main Directorate.” This more than faintly strange, not least because there are other

main directorates, such as the Main Operations Directorate. This would be a little like renaming the Department of Defense as “the Department.” It may sound cool at first blush, and a little creepy, but also makes very little sense. After all, if the GU — technically, the GU GSh VS RF, or Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation — has been renamed for reasons of security, then why still have a webpage saying what it is?There are suggestions the name change may even date back to 2011. But if so, no one seems to have told the Russian media or even the Kremlin. Commenting on Sergun’s death, Putin’s telegram of sympathy referred to him as head of the GRU.So why does any of this matter? First of all, because it seems to have settled the question of whether military intelligence (or whatever it is called) retains the partial autonomy of being a main directorate. In the process, it means that the Kremlin can hear its briefings without the involvement of the chief of the General Staff. Given that from Crimea ’14 back to Afghanistan ’79, the Russian chief of the General Staff has tended to be a voice for caution in military adventures — thereby typically sidelined from the key political discussions — this raises the risk that the “voice of the military” heard in the Kremlin is actually the voice of the military spies.But even if that battle has been won, the GU formulation seems like a temporary aberration. “GRU” may simply disappear from view only to resurface again as the official name (after all, why change a brand when it is successful?) or it could be that the real battle for its role is yet to come. The name GU may simply be a placeholder, signifying that the agency’s long-term role and future is still in play.Regular military commanders who for a while thought they had managed to get the Spetsnaz transferred to their control still feel that the GRU should stick to spooky ops and leave the kinetic stuff to them. Or at least the agency should be divided into strategic and tactical intelligence arms. Meanwhile, in the regular “spook wars” fought behind the scenes in Russia, the SVR and the FSB still would like to see all or some of the GRU’s roles and assets transferred to them.Whoever is chosen to fill Sergun’s shoes may well find quite a fight ahead of him. Mark Galeotti is Professor of Global Affairs at New York University’s Center for Global Affairs and director of its Initiative for the Study of Emerging Threats. His most recent book is Spetsnaz: Russia’s Special Forces (Osprey, 2015).




Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2016 Part 19-122-Russia-10-36-1

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