Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2016 Part 19-118-Caliphate-vs-Regular...

CdW Intelligence to Rent -2016- In Confidence [email protected]

Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2016 Part 19-118-Caliphate-vs-Regular Armies-26-4-Iraq-2

But IS’ phenomena; ghost will continue to exist in the region as a mentality “The loss of these two cities will likely lead to some IS members defecting back to al-Qaeda" as they realize that the latter was correct in predicting that IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi proclaimed the IS caliphate prematurely, before IS was strong enough to sustain the territory. “ We expected the Iraqi army to be bad, but not this bad. These guys are really bad," said Colonel Waya Aziz, who commands a unit of Kurdish peshmerga holding the front at Nasr

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, which tracks violence in the country, confirmed reports on websites by militant sympathizers that Abu Firas, "the Syrian", was killed in a suspected Syrian or Russian air raid on a village northwest of the city of Idlib in northwestern Syria.

The growing scandal over cooked ISIS intelligence just got much worse. Now, analysts are saying they’re being forced out for not toeing the Obama administration’s line on the war.Two senior intelligence analysts at U.S. Central Command say the military has forced them out of their jobs because of their skeptical reporting on U.S.-backed rebel groups in Syria, three sources with knowledge of their claim told The Daily Beast. It’s the first known instance of possible reprisals against CENTCOM personnel after analysts accused their bosses of manipulating intelligence reports about the U.S.-led campaign against ISIS in order to paint a rosier picture of progress in the war.One of the analysts alleging reprisals is the top analyst in charge of Syria issues at CENTCOM. He and a colleague doubted rebels’ capabilities and their commitment to U.S. objectives in the region. The analysts have been effectively sidelined from their positions and will no longer be working at CENTCOM, according to two individuals familiar with the dispute, and who spoke on condition of anonymity.The analysts’ skeptical views put them at odds with military brass, who last year had predicted that a so-called “moderate opposition” would make up a 15,000-man ground force to take on ISIS in its self-declared caliphate. A $500 billion program to train and arm those fighters failed spectacularly. And until the very end, Pentagon leaders claimed the operation was more or less on track. Lawmakers called the plan a “joke” when Gen. Lloyd Austin, the CENTCOM commander, finally testified last September that there were just “four or five” American-trained fighters in Syria… SWJ Blog Post | April 3, 2016 - 8:31pm

Tens of thousands of trapped Iraqi civilians have stalled the government's advance in the battle against the Islamic State group in the western Anbar province, the spokesman for Iraq's elite counterterrorism said Friday. The civilians are trapped between the Iraqi forces' lines and the IS extremists hunkered down in the center of the town of Hit, 85 miles (140 kilometers) west of Baghdad, the official told The Associated Press.

MAKHMOUR, IRAQ // More than a million Iraqis could be forced to flee their homes if the military campaign to retake Mosul from ISIL continues to falter, aid officials say.A limited offensive launched from Makhmour, billed as the first phase of the campaign, stalled almost as soon as it began on March 24, highlighting once more the poor

“Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster”― Sun Tzu, The Art of War

CdW Intelligence to Rent of 11 01/05/2023

mailto:[email protected]


fighting capabilities of the Iraqi army and causing local Arab villagers to seek safety in the Kurdish-held town in northern Iraq, about 75 kilometres

from Mosul.About 1,900 men, women and children have made their way to Makhmour to escape the fighting so far. They barely register among the 3.3 million Iraqis who have been forced from their homes since ISIL took over vast swathes of the country in 2014, but the trickle of people could soon swell into a human tidal wave.Lise Grande, the UN humanitarian coordinator for Iraq, said more than a million people could flee the battle for Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city which the government is determined to retake from ISIL this year. “In the worst case scenario, we are looking at the largest population displacement worldwide this year," said Mrs Grande.Aid officials say the speed of the advance is crucial – should the army struggle like it did during its campaign to retake Ramadi, the scale of displacement would be higher. When Ramadi was finally retaken by elite Iraqi army units last December after eight months of fighting, most residents had fled and the city was in ruins. By contrast, the ongoing offensive to retake the city of Hit is progressing more swiftly, which limits the displacement. Given the importance of speed to contain the humanitarian fallout, aid agencies will be alarmed by the slow progress made by the Iraqi army out of Makhmour.So far, the army has managed to take only three villages, two of which were not contested by ISIL, according to Najat Ali, the sector commander of Kurdish forces at Makhmour. The Iraqis quickly became bogged down elsewhere, and have not managed to take the village of Nasr in a week of fighting.Reinforcements are reportedly on the way to help the struggling 15th Army division that has been tasked to take Qayarrah, the town that is to be used as a staging post for the attack on Mosul itself. But the problem is not one of manpower or materiel, it is the lack of morale and seemingly total absence of military competence.“We expected the Iraqi army to be bad, but not this bad. These guys are really bad," said Colonel Waya Aziz, who commands a unit of Kurdish peshmerga holding the front at Nasr. The villagers who fled to Makhmour are equally unimpressed by their liberators.“From what we saw, I don’t think Mosul will be liberated," said Ibrahim, 23, a student from Kharbadan, the only village that was taken in combat.“When we first saw the Iraqi army we were happy to see them. But when we put out the white flag they started shooting aimlessly. They even destroyed my car after they had taken the village."Should a drawn-out battle for Mosul cause the UN’s worst-case scenario to come true, the consequences would be dire. Aid agencies are already struggling to deal with the current size of the displaced population, which keeps on growing as the Iraqi army and allied Shiite militias challenge ISIL’s hold over Anbar province.Fifty thousand people are estimated to have fled Hit from the beginning of the year until March 20, according to the Norwegian Refugee Council. As many more are expected leave as the fighting continues.

Gen. Magsosi says that his bomb-detection units called peroxide-based explosives the “Satan Recipe” because they are very hard to detect and they are usually so lethal “The University of Mosul is the best Daesh research center in the world,” the general said, using another name for Islamic State. “Trainees go to Raqqa, [Syria], then to Mosul university to use the existing facilities.”Its current status isn’t clear, however. The U.S.-led coalition has targeted the campus with airstrikes more than once, most recently on March 19.





“We do know that Daesh has used some of those buildings for military purposes and we bombed them,” said Col. Steve Warren, spokesman for the

U.S. military in Iraq.April 1, 2016 Islamic State has been using a well-stocked university chemistry lab in Mosul, Iraq, for the past year to concoct a new generation of explosive devices and train militants to make them, according to U.S. and Iraqi military officials and two people familiar with the university.Gen. Hatem Magsosi, Iraq’s top explosives officer, said the facilities at the University of Mosul have enhanced Islamic State’s ability to launch attacks in Iraq and to export bomb-making know-how when its fighters leave the so-called caliphate and return to their home countries. The weaponry churned out includes peroxide-based chemical bombs and suicide-bomb vests like the ones used in the Brussels attacks and by at least some of the Paris attackers, according to the general and others in the Iraqi military, as well as an official from the U.S.-led coalition fighting Islamic State.Other bombs made include nitrate-based explosives and chemical weapons, Gen. Magsosi said. Col. Warren said the Mosul bomb-making labs are among the biggest that Islamic State has established. He said the university has a sprawling campus and the coalition would continue to target such facilities if they are identified. At least since August, dozens of individuals—presumed to be foreigners because they didn’t speak Iraqi Arabic—were seen moving through the labs, the two people said. They said they were told specialized units had been set up there for chemical explosives and weapons research as well as suicide-bomb construction. A chemistry lab like the one at the University of Mosul is an ideal setting to get practice mixing volatile explosives in a controlled setting, explosives experts said. Beyond the right recipe for a stable bomb, a person also needs to know how to house the explosives and transport the assembled bomb to avoid an accidental explosion. TATP is known among experts in law enforcement and military as highly unstable.“TATP is so sensitive that any level of heat, friction and shock can lead to initiation,” meaning an explosion, said Phil Jowett, a retired British Royal Engineer who now works for a consultancy, Worldwide Counter Threat Solutions. Another evolutionary design style in Islamic State suicide belts is the “double bluff,” or two sets of detonating triggers that serve as a backstop against possible malfunction.—Alexis Flynn in London and Ghassan Adnan in Baghdad contributed to this article.

March 28, 2016 Iraq Situation Report, Part I: The military campaign against ISISEditors’ Note: Brookings senior fellow Kenneth M. Pollack traveled to Iraq from March 9 to March 19 with Michael Knights of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. The trip was sponsored in part by the Atlantic Council's Task Force on the Future of Iraq. They had extensive meetings in Baghdad, Sulaymaniyyah, and Irbil with Iraqi, Kurdish, American, and British officials. This is the first of a three-part survey on the situation in Iraq.The military campaign is gathering steamThe U.S.-led coalition’s military campaign to “defeat” Da’esh (the Arabic acronym for ISIS) appears to be going better than is widely realized. The media has begun to pick up on this, but so far, the accounts do not seem to do it justice. The coalition has trained (or retrained) six Iraqi brigades, typically called the “Mosul Counterattack Brigades” or just the “Counterattack Brigades.” It was these formations that did most of the work at Ramadi and several are being shifted north to begin the Mosul operation. They are performing considerably better than other Iraqi brigades, a fact that is increasingly understood





throughout the Iraqi government, boosting their prestige and the influence of the United States.

Coalition air power is hitting Da’esh much harder than in the past, not because any additional assets have been allocated, but because the American military leadership has been able to convince the Iraqis to forego copious on-call fire support and plastering the ground in front of Iraqi formations with air strikes before even the smallest Iraqi offensive. As a result, U.S. commanders have been able to direct far more strike sorties against deliberate targets such as Da’esh’s oil, money, bomb-making plants, transportation, and leadership targets. Moreover, the coalition has been able to employ Special Operations Forces (SOF) more aggressively and creatively than in the past, achieving some impressive synergies with the air and conventional ground campaigns. The United States has also put some additional assets into the fight in Iraq, such as the tube artillery deployed to Makhmur and advanced multiple-rocket launcher systems that have been employed elsewhere in Iraq. As the press is already reporting, there are probably about 5,000 American troops in Iraq—not the 3,800 the U.S. government typically claims—and they are far more involved in combat operations than most recognize. Moreover, expect the U.S. military to ask for both more assets and more permissive rules of engagement to enable them to provide greater direct support to Iraqi forces in the field as part of the operations against Mosul.

[T]here is growing evidence to suggest that Da’esh is taking a beating.

As a result, there is growing evidence to suggest that Da’esh is taking a beating. Da’esh has not mounted a successful offensive operation essentially since Ramadi and Palmyra in May 2015. Moreover, whenever they have tried during the past six months, the attack has been smashed quickly and efficiently, typically suffering 60 percent or higher casualties (a historically catastrophic rate). There are indications that the morale of Da’esh fighters in Fallujah and Mosul is growing somewhat fragile, with Da’esh commanders worrying that their troops will neither attack nor defend as strenuously as they once had. As further evidence of problems, Da’esh is increasingly shifting both new recruits and experienced cadre from Iraq-Syria to Libya. In contrast, the sense of momentum and coming victory by the coalition is also encouraging more and more Sunni tribesman to abandon Da’esh—or simply find the courage to defy them—and join Sunni Popular Mobilization Forces (Hashd ash-Shaabi, or Hashd in Arabic). American military and embassy personnel reported that since the fall of Ramadi, several thousand had shown up for training from Anbari tribes. They described it as a sudden and dramatic change from the prior 18 months.The Iraqi high command remains very problematic, but even there the coalition command team appears to have made some noteworthy progress. The coalition seems to have more say in which Iraqi commands are entrusted to lead key ground operations, and has been able to inject some greater alacrity into the typically ponderous Iraqi military leadership. Of course, this last problem has been greatly ameliorated during the campaign along the Euphrates valley because Da’esh’s defenses are crumbling west of Ramadi. Still, Iraq’s command and control problems may be the most important impediments to further progress, at least at present.

Baghdad’s announcement that the liberation of Mosul has begun is a bit premature.

Baghdad’s announcement that the liberation of Mosul has begun is a bit premature. As has “Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster”

― Sun Tzu, The Art of WarCdW Intelligence to Rent of 11 01/05/2023



been widely reported, Iraqi forces are pushing toward Qayyarah West airfield, west of the Tigris river south of Mosul. Qayyarah West can then serve as a

logistical hub and staging base for a more deliberate assault toward Mosul somewhat later. Assuming that the Iraqis and the coalition continue to prioritize the liberation of Mosul over finishing off the Da’esh strongholds along the Euphrates valley, and barring some unforeseen development that hamstrings the Iraqis or revives Da’esh’s fortunes, it is entirely possible that Mosul could fall in the next 6 to 12 months.Credit for this progress should go to Lt. General Sean MacFarland, the commander of Operation Inherent Resolve, and his team, who have taken a disorganized and fragmented effort and turned it into something starting to resemble a well-oiled machine. MacFarland and his team, many of them seasoned Iraq veterans, are demonstrating how much can be achieved even with relatively modest U.S. and Western forces, and even when you are forced to “punch with somebody else’s fists,” as they say.The persistent danger of catastrophic successWhile the military campaign against Da’esh is starting to move ahead smartly, the civilian side of the effort is not keeping pace. This is deeply problematic because, as I warned over a year ago, even decisive military success against Da’esh is likely to prove ephemeral if there is no plan (nor any effort to implement such a plan) to create a political context where tactical military victories can be translated into enduring, political achievements. Indeed, the situation could actually be worse under those circumstances because we will have removed the common threat of Da’esh, which is one of the few forces currently holding various Iraqi groups together.

[E]ven decisive military success against Da’esh is likely to prove ephemeral if there is no plan...to create a political context where tactical military victories can be translated into enduring, political achievements.

First off, there does not appear to be plan for the stabilization and reconstruction of Mosul after it falls. In U.S. military parlance, these tasks are part of Phase IV of any campaign plan. Infamously, the United States did not have an articulated, resourced Phase IV to the operations plan for the invasion of Iraq in 2003, hence the catastrophic failure of the post-invasion occupation for the next three years. In 2011, the United States effectively had no Phase IV plan for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq either. Arguably, such a plan existed on the military side, but it was never implemented by the civilian side once the military withdrew. Either way, Iraq’s slide back into civil war by mid-2014 was the inevitable result of this parallel failure. Today, we are facing another massive military operation (the fall of Mosul and the final “defeat” of Da’esh in Iraq) and once again we do not yet have a Phase IV plan. And while we still have some time, building such a plan, resourcing it, and preparing to implement it are such monumental tasks that they should have begun six months ago.This is especially problematic because the intelligence suggesting the fragility of Da’esh’s forces in Mosul—and the convergence of all manner of Iraqi, coalition and regional forces around Mosul—raise the possibility that Da’esh forces there might implode or flee before the coalition is ready to take the city deliberately. That would trigger a stampede of various groups claiming parts or all of Mosul that could lead to all kinds of internecine conflict. In these circumstances, the United States would have to try to get the Iraqis to quickly improvise a plan. Given the difficulty of getting the Iraqi military (and civilian) leadership either to improvise or to move quickly in small operations, the prospect that we would need them to do both for a massive undertaking like Mosul seems like a disaster





waiting to happen. Having those plans and everything necessary to implement them must be a top priority, lest the “liberation” of Mosul turn into yet

another American-Iraqi fiasco.

Stabilizing Iraq is a lesser task included in the current mission, meaning that it often gets short shrift for attention and resources.

Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that the military campaign remains solely aimed at Da’esh. Stabilizing Iraq is a lesser task included in the current mission, meaning that it often gets short shrift for attention and resources. As I have repeatedly argued elsewhere, the history of civil wars demonstrates that this is a huge mistake. It could easily produce the collapse of Da’esh and its replacement by “son of Da’esh” which will almost certainly be even worse than Da’esh (just as Da’esh is the “son of” al-Qaida and even worse than it) because we will not have addressed the circumstances that gave rise to Da’esh in Iraq and Syria in the first place.The militia questionAnother critical political-military problem is the question of the Hashd ash-Shaabi. Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi is clearly well aware of both the importance of the Hashd (they were critical to halting the Da’esh offensive against Baghdad in 2014) as well as their potential to undermine Iraq’s future stability and security if they endure as an Iranian-backed alternative military—an Iraqi Hezbollah. We noted that even key Hashd ash-Shaabi commanders duly intoned that they intend for Hashd personnel to eventually be incorporated into the armed forces, although it is impossible to gauge their sincerity. The government’s original plan was to start paying the Hashd, and so use the “power of the purse” to gain control over them. Once that was accomplished, Baghdad would eventually demobilize most and integrate the rest into the Iraqi armed forces. Unfortunately, Iraq’s financial crisis has made that impossible. Instead, the government is now considering conscription as a way to handle the problem. The idea is that if there is universal conscription, all of the members of the Hashd will eventually be conscripted and placed immediately under the armed forces. Universal conscription could be hugely beneficial to Iraq in many ways. At the most basic level, universal conscription would mitigate Iraq’s massive (and growing) problem with youth unemployment. It would allow Iraq to build an integrated, non-sectarian military force that could be accepted by the populace and help to bind it together. More than that, as the Israelis demonstrated beginning in 1948, because military service is such a powerful method of socialization, conscription would allow Baghdad to build a new Iraqi political culture to heal the rifts that have occurred since 2005 (and to a lesser extent since 1991). Indeed, some Iraqi military personnel are actively exploring the Israeli model to think about how Iraq might use conscription to help heal the rifts and build a new, unified Iraqi society. It is not clear, however, if conscription will solve the problem of the Hashd. First, Iran or its Iraqi allies may block it, although this too is far from certain. Nevertheless, the Iranians or key leaders of the Hashd may conclude that it is just too useful to them to have the Hashd as an independent military responsive to them as a check on Baghdad and the United States. Both Tehran and its Iraqi friends wield considerable influence in Iraq, although that influence has waned somewhat as a result of the greater and more successful U.S. effort (see below). Second, even if the Iranians or the Hashd leadership chooses not to block conscription, they might insist on exemptions for the Hashd personnel—or that the Hashd remain as a





standing force and get its share of new recruits. Finally, Iraq is probably still several years away from being able to implement conscription, and the Hashd

could do a lot of damage between then and now, including institutionalizing itself in ways that might make it much harder to eliminate when and if conscription ever materializes. Thus, conscription is a great idea and it could be a solution to the problem of the Hashd, but there is no certainty it will be. Ephemeral or durable?The purely military aspects of the campaign appear to be progressing well, finally beginning to hit on all cylinders. A superb American command team has found important news to greatly improve the impact of U.S. air power, SOF, and direct support. The Iraqi Army has been partly rebuilt, and those units retrained and re-equipped by the coalition are performing noticeably better than the others. While the coalition’s military power is slowly building, the increasing pressure on Da’esh is diminishing its capacity to resist.Unfortunately, as has been a trademark of American involvement with Iraq at least since 2003 (and arguably since 1991), military success is not being matched with the commensurate political-economic efforts that will ultimately determine whether battlefield successes are translated into lasting achievements. In particular, the absence of developed and resourced plans to deal with post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, and the lingering question regarding the future status of the militias raise huge questions about whether these victories will prove as ephemeral as America’s many past triumphs in Iraq.

Regards Cees***Apr 2, Congressman Dana Rohrabacher has expressed his gratitude for Russia’s positive role in world affairs – and the Syrian crisis in particular – at an inter-parliamentary meeting in Moscow, where he noted the ignorance of some of his colleagues’ opinions and statements.“Thank you for what you are doing in Syria. From me!” Rohrabacher said in front of Russian and US parliamentary delegations. “I’ve been talking to ordinary Americans and I say: It’s great they have Russia down there killing the terrorists that want to kill us. And they thank you too.” Parts of the American political leadership, Rohrabacher said, still views Russia in through the lens of the Cold War paradigm.“Literally a large percentage of decision makers” are ignorant about the modern-day Russia, Rohrabacher explained, adding “they do not give you credit for the good things you are doing. When there are disagreements, it’s been portrayed as: ‘Russia is evil because you disagree with us.’” Konstantin Kosachev, the head of the Upper House Committee for International Relations, in his stead thanked the Congressman for his effort in trying to revive the inter-parliamentary discussions between the countries, highlighting that over the last few years, these contacts have been “practically frozen.”

What it will cost to rebuild IraqBAGHDAD — “Ramadi has turned into ruins,” said Ouda, a soldier who has been fighting in the Iraqi army’s Seventh Division since mid-2015. Ouda took part in the liberation of Anbar province from the Islamic State (IS), which took hold of the city of Ramadi in May 2015. Al-Monitor met Ouda (a pseudonym), who is a resident of Baghdad, in one of the cafes of the capital during his day off.He recalled, “We fought with my comrades violent battles to expel radical IS militants in several axes of the city of Ramadi and the province of Hit. The battles wreaked havoc in Ramadi.”Ouda described the situation in Ramadi to Al-Monitor on condition his real name not be





used, because as a soldier he is not allowed to speak with the media.“Ramadi’s houses and streets are all filled with mines. The entire city will

crumble as a result of the vast quantity of mines left by IS,” he said.Ouda, who is in his mid-30s, said that IS has booby-trapped everything. “Mines exploded all over the place as we moved inside the city. This is IS’ style. It destroys everything.”The High Level United Nations mission to Ramada confirmed this situation, estimating that the city could be one of the worst mine-infested cities in the world. The mission's statement followed the visit to Ramadi on March 22 of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) resident representative and UN resident and humanitarian coordinator for Iraq, Lise Grande.After assessing the situation in the city, Grande said in a press statement, “It is a tragedy that people are dying and injured because of booby traps. The reality is that many if not most neighborhoods in Ramadi aren’t yet safe.”A UN analysis of satellite imagery in February showed that around 5,700 buildings in Ramadi and its outskirts had sustained different levels of damage since mid-2014, with almost 2,000 buildings completely destroyed.The staggering devastation of Ramadi and fear of mines pushed Khansa al-Dulaimi to leave Ramadi in April 2015 and seek refuge in Baghdad. Dulaimi rented a small apartment in the predominantly Sunni neighborhood of Adhamiya, while her husband fled via Turkey to Europe. She hopes her family will be reunited again if her husband is granted asylum in Germany.She told Al-Monitor that she did not own a home in Ramadi, but lived in a rented house. “Things are difficult there. I am afraid to return to Ramadi because of the land mines and lack of security in the city. I will stay here in Baghdad for now,” she said.Dulaimi lives off her savings; her husband had sold his car before he left and she sold all her gold jewelry. The family's savings allow her to provide for her three children who stay with her in Baghdad.She said, “I will not go back. I would rather bear the hardship of living here in Baghdad instead of watching death every day in Ramadi.”Member of parliament Liqa al-Wardi from Anbar told Al-Monitor that the city of Ramadi is like the Syrian town of Kobani because of the fighting, military operations and indiscriminate terrorist bombings.“Thousands of houses, hospitals and bridges have been destroyed, as well as [public] buildings and schools,” she said. “The city was [already] neglected by the Iraqi governments after 2003, and now it is witnessing difficult circumstances.”Wardi called on the Iraqi government to cooperate with the international community to reconstruct Ramadi and not to undervalue the previous and ongoing destruction and devastation. “The city requires large sums of money, but that doesn't mean it should be abandoned,” she said. According to her, the reconstruction of Ramadi is an essential and positive step for the return of its displaced residents.Bassem Jamil Antoine, vice president of the Economists and Industrialists Iraqi Association, told Al-Monitor, “Iraq needs about $60 billion to ensure the reconstruction of areas recaptured from IS in Iraq, including Ramadi. Iraq will not be able to afford the reconstruction of these cities without international efforts and aid.”Following his visit to Iraq on March 26, Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon promised international support for the country to reconstruct the liberated areas, acknowledging the significant challenges facing Iraq in the future.In a press statement, Ban pointed to the challenges that remain to be addressed in these areas, including massive destruction and widespread contamination of improvised





explosive devices.Saad al-Hadithi, a spokesman for Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, told

Al-Monitor, “Ban’s visit is a confirmation of the international community's support for Iraq in overcoming its financial crisis. A donors' conference will be held in April 2016; it will probably be held in the Jordanian capital, Amman, to raise funds for the reconstruction of liberated areas, including Ramadi.”Hadithi added, “The World Bank expressed its desire to reconstruct liberated areas by providing financial aid, determining the method of spending such aid and ensuring there is no suspicion of corruption. The World Bank and the Islamic Development Bank will encourage international organizations and donors to attend the donors conference to support Iraq in the reconstruction of liberated areas.”The reconstruction of Ramadi and other devastated Iraqi cities and the return of their displaced residents is now being discussed by international parties. It remains to be seen, however, whether the international community is up to the challenge.

Jihadists say airstrike killed veteran al Qaeda leader in SyriaBY THOMAS JOSCELYN | April 3, 2016 | [email protected] | @thomasjoscelyn

Jihadists on social media reported earlier today that Abu Firas al Suri, who served al Qaeda since the 1980s, was killed in an airstrike in Syria.Abu Firas relocated from Yemen to Syria in late 2012 or early 2013 as part of al Qaeda’s attempt to smooth over the then simmering tensions between Al Nusrah Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS). The mediation efforts failed and ISIS grew into the Islamic State, becoming al Qaeda’s chief jihadist rival around the globe.It is not clear which nation launched the airstrike that purportedly killed Abu Firas. His putative death has not been confirmed by any official sources. Several well-connected jihadists on Twitter announced his death, saying the US hunted him down in Kafr Jalis, which is in the northwestern province of Idlib. One of the tweets can be seen on the right.Abu Firas made his first public appearance in March 2014, when he was featured in an Al Nusrah Front video. The al Qaeda leader testified against Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s organization, blaming it for the jihadists’ infighting in Syria. Abu Firas also said he had warned another al Qaeda veteran, Abu Khalid al Suri, about ISIS’ intent to kill him. Abu Firas’ warning didn’t save Abu Khalid, as he was killed in a suicide attack the following day (Feb. 23, 2014).[For an analysis of Abu Firas’ first appearance in March 2014, see LWJ report: Al Qaeda veteran appears in Al Nusrah Front video, criticizes rival.]





After the news broke of Abu Firas’ death, jihadists posted the picture on the right showing him sitting with Abu Khalid (far left) and Hassan Abboud

(center). Abboud, the first emir of Ahrar al Sham, was killed in an explosion in September 2014. Abu Khalid acted as Abboud’s mentor and played a leading role in Ahrar al Sham.The Long War Journal helped reveal Abu Khalid’s senior role in Ahrar al Sham in December 2013. Up until that time, his leadership position had not been formally acknowledged by Ahrar al Sham. Nor was it reported by Ahrar al Sham’s allies in the West.If today’s report is in fact true, and Abu Firas perished in an airstrike, then all three of the men pictured above sitting together are now dead.Abu Firas was a “core” al Qaeda member, under any reasonable definition of the term.According to a biography provided by Al Nusrah, Abu Firas traveled in the early 1980s to Afghanistan, where he met with Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden. He trained both Afghans and Arabs, as well as jihadists from other countries around the world.Abu Firas served as Osama bin Laden’s “envoy” for “mobilizing Pakistanis for jihad.” And the Pakistani jihadist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) was set up for this purpose, the Al Nusrah Front said. With Abu Firas acting as an intermediary, the LeT and another Pakistani group “were established, trained, and funded by Osama bin Laden.”Further demonstrating Abu Firas’ seniority within al Qaeda, the Al Nusrah Front said that he worked with the group’s first two military commanders, Abu Ubaidah al Banshiri and Abu Hafs al Masri. Abu Firas also worked with Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the deceased commander of al Qaeda in Iraq.After the 9/11 attacks, Abu Firas “secured the mujahideen families in Pakistan,” meaning that he helped al Qaeda families and others find safe haven in the country.In 2003, he relocated to Yemen and stayed there until late 2012 or 2013, when the conflict between ISIS and Al Nusrah Front erupted. Al Qaeda’s senior leadership then dispatched Abu Firas to Syria in an attempt to help put an end to the dispute.

Al Risalah, a pro-al Qaeda and pro-Al Nusrah magazine, published an infographic with Abu Firas’ biography on it in October 2015. The biography emphasized his longstanding opposition to the Assad family, noting that he used the expertise he gained in the Syrian military to help the “Combatant Vanguard” (or “Fighting Vanguard”) fight the Syrian regime in 1976.In more recent years, Abu Firas served as Al Nusrah’s spokesman and as a member of the al Qaeda branch’s elite Shura council. He was known to stir controversy. For example, in more recent months, he became a critique of Ahrar al Sham’s strategy for waging jihad.Abu Firas was a proponent of the idea that some Muslim-majority countries should be turned into “erupting jihadi center[s].” He explained in a video released in June 2015 that the “concept of jihad in the Levant was absent from people’s minds” for decades.





“Nobody even heard of the word jihad,” Abu Firas continued. “In reality, the Levant is regarded [as] one of the most important centers in the Islamic world

due to its close proximity to Palestine, to the Hijaz [Saudi Arabia] and being in the center of the Islamic world.” He drew on Marxist thinking to explain that the jihadists needed to spark revolutions that could change the course of the Islamic world for generations to come.




Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2016 Part 19-118-Caliphate-vs-Regular...

Documents

Transcript of Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2016 Part 19-118-Caliphate-vs-Regular...