Gradation and EvolutionAuthor(s): Ananda K. CoomaraswamySource: Isis, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Winter, 1944), pp. 15-16Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of The History of Science SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/330686 .Accessed: 22/01/2015 11:32

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Ancient American Papermaking Ancient American Papermaking

gives a general botanical account of the tree from which, as this book so amply demonstrates, the ancient and modern native-type papers of Aztecs and Mayas are derived.

Such, with inevitable condensation, is the con- tent of VON HAGEN'S admirable book. Its pages 102 to 115 are taken up with very rich bibliograph- ical citations, and with the extensive bibliography. The thirty-two plates are worthy of the text, seven of them being specimens of ancient-style paper provided for our inspection and experimentation. Truth to tell, they are wretched stuff to write on, at least with a metal pen, and probably a quill pen would operate upon them as badly. But these papers were never intended to be written upon; on the contrary, it was expected that they would be either painted upon or else printed upon with clay stamps such as those shown in Plate 30. Essentially, these clay stamps represent a process closely akin to printing with movable type, and the Mayas were using it many centuries before

gives a general botanical account of the tree from which, as this book so amply demonstrates, the ancient and modern native-type papers of Aztecs and Mayas are derived.

Such, with inevitable condensation, is the con- tent of VON HAGEN'S admirable book. Its pages 102 to 115 are taken up with very rich bibliograph- ical citations, and with the extensive bibliography. The thirty-two plates are worthy of the text, seven of them being specimens of ancient-style paper provided for our inspection and experimentation. Truth to tell, they are wretched stuff to write on, at least with a metal pen, and probably a quill pen would operate upon them as badly. But these papers were never intended to be written upon; on the contrary, it was expected that they would be either painted upon or else printed upon with clay stamps such as those shown in Plate 30. Essentially, these clay stamps represent a process closely akin to printing with movable type, and the Mayas were using it many centuries before

Europe came to the idea. By moistening their stamps with colored matter, they printed on cloth, pots, and paper. Incidentally, the ancient Peruvians also used printing of this sort, but not for paper books, of which they had none. But they did print designs on cotton cloth, not only by means of stamps like these but also by means of cylindrical rollers carrying patterns in relief which were operated by a rod running through a hole along the axis of the cylinder.2

Altogether, this is a remarkably instructive book that throws a strong and revealing light upon a heretofore much misunderstood problem of American native culture. But why, oh why, must so wise an auther as VON HAGEN, who has otherwise done so excellent a job, besmirch his pages with that horrible bastard word, 'Amerin- dian,' when the use of 'American Indian' would cost him so little trouble?

2As to this see: P. A. MEANS, Ancient Civilizations of the Andes, New York, 1931, p. 487.

Europe came to the idea. By moistening their stamps with colored matter, they printed on cloth, pots, and paper. Incidentally, the ancient Peruvians also used printing of this sort, but not for paper books, of which they had none. But they did print designs on cotton cloth, not only by means of stamps like these but also by means of cylindrical rollers carrying patterns in relief which were operated by a rod running through a hole along the axis of the cylinder.2

Altogether, this is a remarkably instructive book that throws a strong and revealing light upon a heretofore much misunderstood problem of American native culture. But why, oh why, must so wise an auther as VON HAGEN, who has otherwise done so excellent a job, besmirch his pages with that horrible bastard word, 'Amerin- dian,' when the use of 'American Indian' would cost him so little trouble?

2As to this see: P. A. MEANS, Ancient Civilizations of the Andes, New York, 1931, p. 487.

GRADATION AND EVOLUTION By ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY

GRADATION AND EVOLUTION By ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY

DR. ASHLEY MONTAGU, in Isis no. 96, p. 364, distinguishes two explanations of the past and present existence of living creatures of different species as (1) Gradation, assuming a special crea- tion of immutable species, and (2) Evolution, assuming the emergence of species in all their variety and mutability by the gradual operation of causes inherent in the species and their environ- ment. He does not say, and may not mean that these two explanations are incompatible; but the reader is likely to assume that the doctrine of a creation "in the beginning" and that of the gradual development of new species are really irrecon- cilable propositions.

The two propositions are, doubtless, incom- patible if the mythical account is to be interpreted historically. The serious mythologist, however, is well aware that to interpret myth as factual his- tory is to mistake the genre; and that a myth can only be called "true" when time and place are abstracted.' The object of the present note is to point out that if the doctrine of special creation is understood as it has generally been interpreted by Christian and other philosophers, then Grada- tion and Evolution are not irreconcilable alter- natives, but only different ways, respectively ideal and historical, formal and figurative, algebraic and

1 "Mythology can never be converted into history" (M. P. NILSSON, Mycenean Origin of Greek Mythology, 1932, p. 31). Cf. Lord RAGLAN, The Hero, 1936; E. SIECKE, Drachen- kaimpfe, 1907, pp. 60, 61.

DR. ASHLEY MONTAGU, in Isis no. 96, p. 364, distinguishes two explanations of the past and present existence of living creatures of different species as (1) Gradation, assuming a special crea- tion of immutable species, and (2) Evolution, assuming the emergence of species in all their variety and mutability by the gradual operation of causes inherent in the species and their environ- ment. He does not say, and may not mean that these two explanations are incompatible; but the reader is likely to assume that the doctrine of a creation "in the beginning" and that of the gradual development of new species are really irrecon- cilable propositions.

The two propositions are, doubtless, incom- patible if the mythical account is to be interpreted historically. The serious mythologist, however, is well aware that to interpret myth as factual his- tory is to mistake the genre; and that a myth can only be called "true" when time and place are abstracted.' The object of the present note is to point out that if the doctrine of special creation is understood as it has generally been interpreted by Christian and other philosophers, then Grada- tion and Evolution are not irreconcilable alter- natives, but only different ways, respectively ideal and historical, formal and figurative, algebraic and

1 "Mythology can never be converted into history" (M. P. NILSSON, Mycenean Origin of Greek Mythology, 1932, p. 31). Cf. Lord RAGLAN, The Hero, 1936; E. SIECKE, Drachen- kaimpfe, 1907, pp. 60, 61.

arithmetical, of describing one and the same thing. In these philosophies causality is taken for

granted; nothing happens by chance. The impos- sible never happens; what happens is always the realization of a possibility. But we have to take account of two orders of causes, (1) a First Cause, in which the possibilities inhere, and (2) Mediate Causes, by which the conditions are provided in which the possible becomes the necessary. The First Cause of the existence of things, or in other words their possibility, is often called "God," but also "Being," "Life" or "Nature" (natura natu- rans). This First Cause, whether philosophically "absolute" or mythically "personified," is the direct cause of the being of things, but only in- directly of the manner of their being. The manner of their being (according to which they are dis- tinguished as species) is determined by the Mediate Causes, known or unknown, of which the result is the production of the given species or individual at a given time or place. The category of Mediate Causes does not exclude any of those forces or tendencies or determining accidents on which the evolutionist relies as explanations of the observed series; if he differs from the phi- losopher in ignoring a First Cause, it is because he is not discussing the origin of life, but only its variety. Again: if by "in the beginning" we under- stand an operation completed at a given moment, i.e. at the beginning of time itself, then, of course, Gradation and Evolution will be incompatible

arithmetical, of describing one and the same thing. In these philosophies causality is taken for

granted; nothing happens by chance. The impos- sible never happens; what happens is always the realization of a possibility. But we have to take account of two orders of causes, (1) a First Cause, in which the possibilities inhere, and (2) Mediate Causes, by which the conditions are provided in which the possible becomes the necessary. The First Cause of the existence of things, or in other words their possibility, is often called "God," but also "Being," "Life" or "Nature" (natura natu- rans). This First Cause, whether philosophically "absolute" or mythically "personified," is the direct cause of the being of things, but only in- directly of the manner of their being. The manner of their being (according to which they are dis- tinguished as species) is determined by the Mediate Causes, known or unknown, of which the result is the production of the given species or individual at a given time or place. The category of Mediate Causes does not exclude any of those forces or tendencies or determining accidents on which the evolutionist relies as explanations of the observed series; if he differs from the phi- losopher in ignoring a First Cause, it is because he is not discussing the origin of life, but only its variety. Again: if by "in the beginning" we under- stand an operation completed at a given moment, i.e. at the beginning of time itself, then, of course, Gradation and Evolution will be incompatible

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Ananda K. Coomaraswamy Ananda K. Coomaraswamy

concepts. As to this "beginning," it must, of course, be realized that (as ST. AUGUSTINE says) the ques- tion, What was God doing before he created the world, is meaningless; or to say the same in other words, that a succession of events in the eternal now (of which empirical experience is impossible) is as inconceivable as the notion of a locomotion in the Infinite. What our philosophers actually un- derstand by "in the beginning" is a logical, and not a temporal priority. So Meister ECKHART, "as I have often said, God is creating the whole world now, this instant" (PFEIFFER, p. 206); and JACOB BEHMEN, "it is an everlasting beginning" (Myst. Pansophicum, IV. 9). Similarly in the Rgveda: for, as Professor KEITH very justly remarks, "This creation cannot be regarded as a single definite act: it is regarded as ever proceeding" (Harvard Oriental Series, 18. cxxvi). This does not mean that it is unfinished in principio and ex tempore, but that it is apprehended by ourselves as a tem- poral sequence and as if cause and effect could be separated from one another by sensible periods. "At that time, indeed, all things took place simul- taneously .... but a sequence was necessarily written into the narrative because of their sub- sequent generation from one another" (PHILo, De Opif. Mundi 67),-just as it is necessarily written into the evolutionist's narrative; what Gradation states sub specie aeternitatis, the Myth relates sub specie aeviternitatis, and History sub specie tem- poris. "What is rooted in the nature of the All is

concepts. As to this "beginning," it must, of course, be realized that (as ST. AUGUSTINE says) the ques- tion, What was God doing before he created the world, is meaningless; or to say the same in other words, that a succession of events in the eternal now (of which empirical experience is impossible) is as inconceivable as the notion of a locomotion in the Infinite. What our philosophers actually un- derstand by "in the beginning" is a logical, and not a temporal priority. So Meister ECKHART, "as I have often said, God is creating the whole world now, this instant" (PFEIFFER, p. 206); and JACOB BEHMEN, "it is an everlasting beginning" (Myst. Pansophicum, IV. 9). Similarly in the Rgveda: for, as Professor KEITH very justly remarks, "This creation cannot be regarded as a single definite act: it is regarded as ever proceeding" (Harvard Oriental Series, 18. cxxvi). This does not mean that it is unfinished in principio and ex tempore, but that it is apprehended by ourselves as a tem- poral sequence and as if cause and effect could be separated from one another by sensible periods. "At that time, indeed, all things took place simul- taneously .... but a sequence was necessarily written into the narrative because of their sub- sequent generation from one another" (PHILo, De Opif. Mundi 67),-just as it is necessarily written into the evolutionist's narrative; what Gradation states sub specie aeternitatis, the Myth relates sub specie aeviternitatis, and History sub specie tem- poris. "What is rooted in the nature of the All is

[in the Myth] figuratively treated as coming into being by generation and creation: stage and sequence are transferred, for clarity of exposition, to things whose being and definite form are eternal" (PLoTINUS, Enneads IV. 8.4). "The be- ginning, which is thought, comes to an end in action; know that in such wise was the construc- tion of the world in eternity" (RUMI, Mathnawi, II. 970). And, finally (for present purposes): "Ne prima ne poscia procedette lo discorrer di Dio sopra quest'acque" (DANTE, Paradiso XXIX. 20-1).

The concepts, then, on the one hand of an eternal and ideal pattern or "intelligible world," unextended in space and time, and on the other of a temporal and' "sensible world" extended in space and time as an echo, reflection or imitation of the other, are not alternative, but correlative. Each implies the other; the uniformity of the in- telligible world is in every way compatible with the multiformity of its manifestations. A real conflict of science with religion is unimaginable; the actual conflicts are always of scientists ignorant of religious philosophy with fundamen- talists who maintain that the truth of their myth is historical. Neither of these can be really dan- gerous to anyone who is capable of thought on more than one level of reference; nor have we any intention to suggest that Dr. ASHLEY MONTAGU fits into either of these categories! Museum of Fine Arts, Boston

[in the Myth] figuratively treated as coming into being by generation and creation: stage and sequence are transferred, for clarity of exposition, to things whose being and definite form are eternal" (PLoTINUS, Enneads IV. 8.4). "The be- ginning, which is thought, comes to an end in action; know that in such wise was the construc- tion of the world in eternity" (RUMI, Mathnawi, II. 970). And, finally (for present purposes): "Ne prima ne poscia procedette lo discorrer di Dio sopra quest'acque" (DANTE, Paradiso XXIX. 20-1).

The concepts, then, on the one hand of an eternal and ideal pattern or "intelligible world," unextended in space and time, and on the other of a temporal and' "sensible world" extended in space and time as an echo, reflection or imitation of the other, are not alternative, but correlative. Each implies the other; the uniformity of the in- telligible world is in every way compatible with the multiformity of its manifestations. A real conflict of science with religion is unimaginable; the actual conflicts are always of scientists ignorant of religious philosophy with fundamen- talists who maintain that the truth of their myth is historical. Neither of these can be really dan- gerous to anyone who is capable of thought on more than one level of reference; nor have we any intention to suggest that Dr. ASHLEY MONTAGU fits into either of these categories! Museum of Fine Arts, Boston

AN HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE CONCEPT OF NATURE FROM A MEDICAL VIEWPOINT

By MAX NEUBURGER

AN HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE CONCEPT OF NATURE FROM A MEDICAL VIEWPOINT

By MAX NEUBURGER

WHEREAS the medical literature of the old Orient deals only with healing by means of drugs and surgery, or through the intervention of super- natural powers, in the Hippocratic collection the occurrence of spontaneous healing is for the first time established as a fact.

Based on this fundamental idea, which forms a dividing line between theurgic-empiric and scien- tific medicine, the Corpus Hippocraticum is per- meated by the conception of natural healing processes, so far as it expresses the spirit of the school of Cos. For generations this school had studied the course of disease, favouring methods of treatment adverse to any polypragmasia, and had gradually developed the theory that diseases, like all natural events, are subject to certain laws of nature, and that the organism does not pas- sively sustain injuries received, but adjusts itself

WHEREAS the medical literature of the old Orient deals only with healing by means of drugs and surgery, or through the intervention of super- natural powers, in the Hippocratic collection the occurrence of spontaneous healing is for the first time established as a fact.

Based on this fundamental idea, which forms a dividing line between theurgic-empiric and scien- tific medicine, the Corpus Hippocraticum is per- meated by the conception of natural healing processes, so far as it expresses the spirit of the school of Cos. For generations this school had studied the course of disease, favouring methods of treatment adverse to any polypragmasia, and had gradually developed the theory that diseases, like all natural events, are subject to certain laws of nature, and that the organism does not pas- sively sustain injuries received, but adjusts itself

to counteract these injuries. Viewed from this angle, the disease appears not purely as 7radOo, as a malady, but also-and by no means least-as 7rovos, that is, as an exertion, an effort of the body to re-establish the disturbed equilibrium of the functions. Recovery is thus shown to be the work of nature, whose healing power alone, or supple- mented by medical aid, achieves the aim. Nov"owv

vmtOLEc rlTpOl 'Natures are the healers of disease' reads a Hippocratic sentence, which, rightly inter- preted, expresses an eternal truth.

HIPPOCRATES' writings give evidence of the most meticulous study of nature's working in disease, especially in acute, febrile affections. Fever com- pletes the "coctions" of the vitiated humours: these, the "materia peccans" are eliminated by means of secretions and excretion, by sweating, sputum, vomiting, urine, occasionally by haemor-

to counteract these injuries. Viewed from this angle, the disease appears not purely as 7radOo, as a malady, but also-and by no means least-as 7rovos, that is, as an exertion, an effort of the body to re-establish the disturbed equilibrium of the functions. Recovery is thus shown to be the work of nature, whose healing power alone, or supple- mented by medical aid, achieves the aim. Nov"owv

vmtOLEc rlTpOl 'Natures are the healers of disease' reads a Hippocratic sentence, which, rightly inter- preted, expresses an eternal truth.

HIPPOCRATES' writings give evidence of the most meticulous study of nature's working in disease, especially in acute, febrile affections. Fever com- pletes the "coctions" of the vitiated humours: these, the "materia peccans" are eliminated by means of secretions and excretion, by sweating, sputum, vomiting, urine, occasionally by haemor-

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Article Contentsp.15p.16

Issue Table of ContentsIsis, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Winter, 1944), pp. 3-94Front MatterPreface to Volume XXXV: Faraday Drinks a Glass of Water [p.3]Maimonides' Book for Al-Fadil [pp.3-5]John Landen, F.R.S. (1719-1790)--Mathematician [pp.6-10]The Need for Studies in the History of American Science [pp.10-13]Ancient American Papermaking [pp.13-15]Gradation and Evolution [pp.15-16]An Historical Survey of the Concept of Nature from a Medical Viewpoint [pp.16-28]Queries and Answers [pp.28-29]Notes and Correspondence [pp.29-33]Reviewsuntitled [pp.33-34]untitled [p.35]untitled [pp.35-36]untitled [pp.36-37]untitled [p.37]untitled [pp.37-39]untitled [pp.39-40]untitled [pp.40-41]untitled [pp.41-42]untitled [pp.42-43]untitled [pp.43-44]untitled [pp.44-45]untitled [pp.45-46]untitled [pp.46-47]untitled [pp.47-48]untitled [pp.48-51]

Administrative Documents [pp.51-52]Sixty-Fifth Critical Bibliography of the History and Philosophy of Science and of the History of Civilization (To December 1943) [pp.53-94]